Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.

1651  The first paragraph of Article 14 requires a Detaining Power to ensure respect for the persons and honour of prisoners of war throughout their captivity. The obligation reinforces the requirement of humane treatment laid down in Article 13 and informs the rules for the treatment of prisoners of war set down in Parts III and IV of the Convention.

1652  The second paragraph requires that due regard be given to the specific needs of women and forbids any discriminatory treatment of them. The number of women joining armed forces and taking on active combat roles has been steadily rising since the adoption of the Third Convention. The special protection of women prisoners of war and the call for treatment at least as favourable as that of men during captivity is therefore of continued importance today.

1653  The third paragraph addresses the civil capacity of prisoners of war. Civil capacity signifies the recognition of a person as a full member of society who is able to take part in legal and business transactions and is a fundamental part of a person’s dignity. While being detained as a prisoner of war during an armed conflict obviously affects this ability, Article 14(3) provides that restricting the civil capacity of prisoners of war to act as natural legal persons and to exercise the rights such capacity confers must not go beyond those directly required by the captivity.

1654  The general obligations found in Article 14 that call for respectful treatment of prisoners of war, special considerations for women and the recognition of prisoners’ civil capacity were already set forth in Article 3, first paragraph, of the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. Article 14 of the present Convention reproduces the essence of that article, but adds further detail, particularly relating to the protection of women and to prisoners’ exercise of their civil rights during captivity.

1655  The addition in 1949 of the sentence that women ‘shall in all cases benefit by treatment as favourable as that granted to men’ was intended to acknowledge that ‘the position of women was not the same in all countries’ and that experiences during the Second World War had shown that ‘it was urgently necessary to safeguard the position of women in the hands of Detaining Powers where their status was lower than that of men’.[1] The discussion during the 1949 Diplomatic Conference indicates that the drafters wished to stress that any discriminatory treatment of women prisoners of war is forbidden irrespective of women’s legal standing in the country of the Detaining Power.[2]

1656  While it had long been acknowledged that prisoners of war were entitled to private property and that it would be ‘dishonourable’ to take their money and personal valuables away upon capture,[3] the notion that they retain their civil capacity developed during the early twentieth century.[4] Article 3 of the 1929 Convention merely stated that prisoners of war retained their civil capacity. During the Second World War, this broad wording led to misunderstandings among prisoners of war about their right to exercise civil capacity in the country where they were detained.[5] Therefore, the Drafting Committee at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference decided that ‘the things to preserve for the prisoner were his rights in the civil world at the time he was captured, and that those rights should be exercised by him so far as possible, without unnecessary interference by the Detaining Power’.[6] The language of Article 14(3) thus seeks to clarify the scope of civil capacity enjoyed by prisoners of war in captivity and to identify the extent to which the exercise of civil rights may be restricted by the Detaining Power.

1657  Article 14(1) imposes an obligation on the Detaining Power to ensure that prisoners of war in their custody are treated in a way that is respectful of their persons and their honour.[7]

1658  The Geneva Conventions do not define the concept of ‘respect for person and honour’. According to the common understanding, ‘respect for [someone’s] person’ signifies ‘esteem for or a sense of the worth or excellence of a person’[8] and ‘due regard for the feelings and rights of others’.[9] Respect for a person’s honour, while to some extent overlapping with respect for their person, more specifically entails due regard for the sense of value that every person has of themselves. Honour is a personal concept that may also be linked to a person’s reputation, age and standing in their community or peer group.[10]

1659  How respect for the person and honour of a prisoner of war is to be expressed is dependent on a wide range of factors, including their cultural, social or religious background, gender and age.[11] A minimum of respect is required towards any person, however, and the specific context can only expand, never diminish this respect.

1660  The obligation of respectful treatment is related to the more explicit prohibitions that can be found in the Third Convention, such as the prohibition of acts of violence against or insulting treatment of prisoners and the prohibition of outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.[12] Nevertheless, Article 14 must be understood as having a substantive content and a protective scope of its own. Its scope, while illustrated by provisions of the Third Convention, goes beyond the prohibitions of Article 13 or the technical regulations on detention conditions and is not limited by them. The Detaining Power is obliged to take into consideration the standards of treatment set by Article 14(1), in particular when implementing the provisions in Part III of the Convention governing different aspects of captivity, such as places of internment, food and hygiene, as well as the exercise of religious duties.[13]

1661  There are two distinct aspects of the notion of respect for the person: physical integrity and moral integrity.[14]

1662  A prisoner of war’s right to respect for their physical integrity entails the right to protection from any physical injury or from acts of violence inflicted by agents of the Detaining Power, members of its armed forces, the public or other prisoners. This covers, for example, protection from acts or omissions prohibited under Article 13, as well as the prohibitions of torture and coercion during questioning (Articles 17(4) and 99(2)) and the manner of execution of disciplinary or judicial punishments (Articles 87(3), 88, 89(3) and 108(3)). It also includes the prohibition on holding prisoners in areas where they may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone and the obligation to provide prisoners with shelters against air bombardment or other hazards of war, to the same extent as the local civilian population (Article 23).

1663  The requirement of respect for prisoners’ physical integrity also informs the rules governing the living conditions that prisoners must be afforded.[15] Pursuant to the principle of humane treatment, the Detaining Power is required to ensure ‘adequate detention conditions’ for prisoners of war during their captivity.[16]

1664  Persons deprived of their liberty are vulnerable to ill-treatment, including sexual violence, with women and sexual and gender minorities being at particularly high risk.[17] The duty to respect the physical integrity of prisoners of war affirms the prohibition of sexual violence that is found implicitly and explicitly in other provisions of international humanitarian law.[18] It imposes a due diligence obligation on the Detaining Power to protect all prisoners of war, taking into account the distinct risks each prisoner faces.

1665  Respect for the person also covers respect for all the essential attributes of the human person, including their religious, political, intellectual and social convictions, gender and sexual orientation.[19] While captivity may restrict a person’s ability to act in accordance with these convictions, Article 14 requires that any such restrictions not go beyond what is necessary for captivity itself.

1666  In line with this, respect for the person demands the dignified treatment of all prisoners of war that is mindful of their sense of self-value, for example in relation to clothing.[20] Article 14 precludes any treatment during detention that humiliates prisoners, for example scornful language or sexual or other harassment. What constitutes humiliating treatment in a given case is dependent on a wider range of factors, including the person’s cultural, social and religious background, gender and age.[21]

1667  Furthermore, respect for moral integrity requires that the Detaining Power consider gender aspects in the planning and running of prisoner-of-war camps in order to protect prisoners from deliberate or unintentional humiliation on the basis of gender.[22] Searches of prisoners of war are a case in point. While the Third Convention does not contain any explicit provision regulating searches of prisoners they should be conducted by a person of the same gender, whenever possible, to mitigate the risk of humiliating the prisoner being searched.[23]

1668  Respect for a person’s moral integrity is also relevant to the question as to the extent to which prisoners of war may be subjected to propaganda by the Detaining Power. The use of propaganda to weaken prisoners’ morale was discussed at the Conference of Government Experts in 1947, but the majority of the participants ‘thought that propaganda was too difficult to define for the matter to be explicitly mentioned in the Convention’.[24] While no all-encompassing definition of ‘propaganda’ exists under international law, and definitions of propaganda have altered in light of changing technologies, the term generally involves the dissemination of information by State organs or individuals with the aim of influencing or manipulating people or public opinion in a certain predefined way.[25]

1669  Detaining Powers have attempted to influence prisoners of war politically in a number of armed conflicts since the Second World War.[26] Indeed, the ICRC has witnessed such attempts on a number of occasions involving compulsory ‘educational sessions’ or lectures by political representatives of the Detaining Power, the putting up of posters and notices containing political statements in the camp, the broadcasting of radio programmes and the showing of propaganda films offensive to the national and/or religious sentiments of the prisoners.

1670  Although propaganda is generally not prohibited under international humanitarian law, special considerations apply in the context of captivity, where it may be difficult or impossible for prisoners to elude attempts by the Detaining Power to influence or manipulate their opinions and beliefs. Any propaganda that intimidates prisoners of war would be inconsistent with the present provision, as well as Article 13(2).[27] In view of the obligation to respect the moral integrity of prisoners of war, attempts to politically influence them are impermissible in all those cases where they are exerted under pressure by exploiting the fact that prisoners cannot elude them in captivity. While it would not be prohibited to make available newspapers or radio or TV programmes that contain one-sided or biased information, the use of loudspeakers to broadcast such information without prisoners being able to switch them off would be a violation of Article 14(1), as well as Article 38(1).[28] Similarly, distributing information through obligatory ‘information and education sessions’ would violate Article 14(1), as well as Article 38(1).[29]

1671  Pressure is exerted not only in cases where prisoners of war who refuse to participate are punished, but also where privileges are granted to those who follow ‘voluntary’ courses. Such measures also violate the Convention, as they are inconsistent with the obligation of equal treatment.[30] In this regard, Article 14(1) is of specific relevance for the implementation of Article 38(1), which obliges States Parties to encourage prisoners of war to engage in intellectual, educational and recreational pursuits. Respect for the persons of prisoners of war implies that these pursuits must be on a voluntary basis and may not be forced upon them.[31]

1672  The obligation to respect the moral integrity of prisoners of war is in tension with their exploitation for propaganda purposes by the Detaining Power. In international armed conflicts since the end of the Second World War, the ICRC has witnessed the use of prisoners of war for political rallies, where they were forced to chant political slogans against the Power on which they depended. Any such exploitation of prisoners of war for propaganda purposes, be it through political rallies or exposing them on television or social media, constitutes a violation of Article 14(1). The forced participation of prisoners of war in political demonstrations would also be forbidden under Article 13(2), which prohibits exposing prisoners of war to public curiosity.

1673  Article 14(1) calls for respect for the honour of prisoners of war.[32] This obligation is echoed in a number of provisions of the Third Convention that aim to protect the honour of prisoners of war specifically with regard to military structures, distinctions and codes of honour.[33] Article 18(3) provides that badges of rank and decorations may not be taken away from prisoners of war, and Article 40 states that the wearing of these must be permitted during captivity. Furthermore, Articles 44 and 45 require that prisoners of war be treated in accordance with their rank and age and that services in officers’ camps be ensured. According to Article 87(3), prisoners of war may not be deprived of their rank or prevented from wearing their badges. The honour of prisoners of war is also protected by Article 52(2), which prohibits humiliating labour, and in Articles 120–124, which deal with prisoners’ wills, burials and death certificates.

1674  Some military manuals elaborate on the different facets of respect for prisoners’ honour, listing, for example, the prohibition on disclosing strictly personal particulars;[34] the prohibition on reporting that may affect their dignity or honour or that may lead to acts of violence, intimidation or insults against them and reporting about them in a way that allows them to be identified individually;[35] and the prohibition on marking their clothing in a humiliating or degrading way.[36] More generally, the obligation to respect prisoners’ honour also prohibits any conduct which cannot be reasonably justified by the requirements of proper and safe handling of the captives, including physical interference such as pushing and hustling or verbal assault.

1675  Since the drafting of the Third Convention, new technologies have developed, most notably in the area of surveillance, which potentially impact the right of prisoners to respect for their persons and honour.[37] Even though these technologies did not exist at the time the Third Convention was drafted, Article 14 is applicable when deciding on their use in prisoner-of-war camps, and they need to be employed in a way that is consistent with the protection required for prisoners of war under the Convention.[38]

1676  In recent decades, use of closed-circuit television monitoring systems in places of detention, including where prisoners of war are held, has increased exponentially. Limited, well-regulated and well-managed video surveillance in prisoner-of-war camps should not in principle be considered as prohibited under Article 14(1) and may be an appropriate measure of surveillance in certain places and at certain times to prevent or deter escape attempts. It may also have humanitarian advantages, by discouraging abuses by guards, who may fear the discovery of any violation they may have committed or that the footage could be used as evidence against them. It may also help to prevent suicide or violence among prisoners of war.[39]

1677  Whether the use of a specific surveillance measure would violate Article 14 thus depends on a variety of considerations: the number and type of cameras in place (fixed or rotating cameras, zoom lenses, etc.); whether the camera records or merely transmits images and how the data are managed; and the overall security risks facing prisoners of war or guards in the place of detention. The filming of family visits and of the prisoners’ emotional relations with family members, for example, or the placement of cameras in toilets or bathrooms generating a full view of the prisoners’ entire bodies would be excessive, if other ways to prevent security breaches, for example detailed searches of visitors or cameras positioned to preclude full-body images, would be equally effective. In addition, constant video surveillance in all places and at all times (e.g. in sleeping quarters or bathrooms) of all prisoners would seem to be inappropriate and disproportionate. The liberty of prisoners of war is restricted to prevent them from returning to combat, not because they have committed a crime.

1678  The obligations laid down in Article 14(1) apply ‘in all circumstances’, a phrase used also in other provisions.[40] A variety of legal meanings can be accorded to this formula.[41] It is often argued that the formula underlines the non-reciprocal nature of the Geneva Conventions,[42] meaning that even if the enemy fails to respect its humanitarian law obligations, one’s own obligations vis-à-vis the prisoner of war remain intact. Second, the formula has been read as a confirmation that military necessity may not be invoked to override rules of humanitarian law unless specifically provided for.[43] Moreover, the formula could be interpreted as having a geographical and temporal connotation requiring respect for and protection of prisoners of war in all places where the Third Convention applies, i.e. in the actual zone of combat as well as in places far from the zone of combat (the rear), and at all times for the duration of an international armed conflict and until termination of captivity. In light of the ordinary meaning of the wording ‘in all circumstances’ and in view of the purpose of Article 14, the phrase should be interpreted broadly to encompass all these meanings.

1679  The principle that women are to be accorded special respect in armed conflicts when they find themselves in the power of a Party to the conflict first found expression in Article 3 of the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.[44] That provision was largely informed by the fact that a significant number of women were involved in the First World War. Since then, the participation of women in armed conflicts has grown, in terms both of the number of women serving in armed forces and in the variety of roles they assume on and off the battlefield. Women are increasingly involved in close combat functions on the front line,[45] where there is an increased risk of capture.[46]

1680  While Article 14(2) uses the term ‘women’, it should be read as covering girls who were captured while recruited by or associated with armed forces.

1681  Article 14(2) requires Parties to the conflict to treat women ‘with all the regard due to their sex’. The paragraph builds on the general obligation in Article 14(1), with a particular focus on women who are members of the armed forces and who have fallen into enemy hands.

1682  Since 1949, there have been a number of social and international legal developments in relation to equality of the sexes, which need to be reflected in the application of Article 14(2) and related provisions.[47] Today, there is a deeper understanding that women, men, girls and boys may have specific needs, capacities and perspectives linked to the different ways armed conflict and detention may affect them.[48] In light of these developments, the specific mention of the protection of women in Article 14(2) is not to be understood as implying that women have less resilience, agency or capacity within the armed forces, but rather as an acknowledgement that women have a distinct set of needs and may face particular physical and psychological risks.[49]

1683  Article 14(2) requires Parties to the conflict to take into account the distinct needs and risks facing women prisoners of war during their internment, for example in relation to privacy, safety and medical care.[50] This is necessary in order to comply with both the specific obligation in Article 14(2) and the general purpose of Article 14.

1684  Experience in recent armed conflicts has shown that the risk of sexual violence for women prisoners of war is real.[51] While both men and women may suffer sexual assault and other ill-treatment during captivity, sexual violence has distinct effects on women’s physical and mental health and psychosocial well-being.[52] In particular, they face the additional risk of pregnancy, which may have adverse physical and psychological consequences, ranging from medical complications during pregnancy or labour to stigmatization and ostracism while pregnant or raising a child from rape.[53] The protection and care owed to women prisoners of war under Article 14(2) requires that the Detaining Power take proactive measures to prevent such incidents from occurring and to ensure that women who are victims of sexual violence have access to appropriate, gender-specific health care.[54]

1685  Article 14(2) more generally affects the implementation of the provisions in Part III of the Third Convention relating to the medical care of prisoners of war.[55] The duty to treat women with all regard due to their sex requires the Detaining Power to provide medical services in prisoner-of-war camps that comprise expertise and skills in dealing with both male and female patients.[56] If women are pregnant or have just given birth when they fall into enemy hands or become pregnant during captivity, specific medical attention will be required.[57] Parties are obliged to ensure that the medical services available to female prisoners of war are adequately equipped to address women’s gynaecological and reproductive health issues.

1686  The obligation contained in Article 14(2) is elaborated on in other provisions of the Third Convention. Women are to be accommodated in separate dormitories from men and provided with separate sanitary facilities.[58] If undergoing penal or disciplinary punishment, they are to be held in quarters separate from men and under the immediate supervision of women.[59]

1687  In addition to the specific arrangements required to ensure the physical safety and relevant medical care of female prisoners, the duty to treat women ‘with all regard due to their sex’ affects all aspects of the organization of a camp and the overall conditions of internment. The duty must therefore be taken into account with regard to the clothing that is supplied to women,[60] to the recreational activities provided, to ensure that they are appropriate for and open to women,[61] and to the work that is assigned to them.[62] The Detaining Power may be required to adjust the quality and quantity of food rations for women, to avoid the risk of anaemia and mineral deficiencies.[63] Furthermore, the Detaining Power is obliged to provide women prisoners of war with safe and regular access to clean toilets and shower facilities for the exclusive use of women,[64] with sufficient and suitable sanitary products, including sanitary towels and means to dispose of them,[65] and with clothing to deal with personal hygiene in dignity and privacy. In this regard, the Detaining Power needs to be mindful of the different effects that the non-provision of sanitary products or the lack of functional sanitary facilities might have on women and men.[66]

1688  International humanitarian law aims to prevent and alleviate suffering in war without adverse distinction. With the obligation that women prisoners of war benefit in all cases by treatment as favourable as that granted to men, Article 14(2) emphasizes the fundamental prohibition of adverse distinction based on sex under international humanitarian treaty and customary law.[67]

1689  As stated earlier, records of the discussions during the 1949 Diplomatic Conference show that consideration was given to experiences during the Second World War, which had revealed that ‘it was urgently necessary to safeguard the position of women in the hands of Powers where their status was lower than that of men’.[68] By mentioning the prohibition of discrimination with regard to women separately from the general obligation to ensure equality of treatment for all prisoners of war contained in Article 16, the drafters acknowledged the specific risk of discrimination facing women.[69] Article 14(2) does not engage in a prescriptive or gendered view on whether or not women should take part in armed conflict as members of the armed forces, but rather, read together with Article 14(1), sets a requirement of equal treatment of women who are members of the armed forces during captivity.

1690  The records of the Diplomatic Conference show that the drafters wished to stress that any discriminatory treatment of women prisoners of war is forbidden irrespective of the legal standing that women otherwise have in the country of the Detaining Power.[70] This includes a prohibition on the Detaining Power discriminating against women prisoners of war based on the notion that captured women have violated cultural norms that run against women taking on combat roles in its own military forces.[71] The prohibition is further spelled out in Article 88(2) and (3), which prohibit imposing a more severe penal or disciplinary punishment or treatment on women prisoners of war than on men or women members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power.[72]

1691  Article 14(2) allows for differentiated treatment of women prisoners of war in certain circumstances.[73] It requires that the Detaining Power ensure that, although women prisoners of war might constitute a smaller proportion of the prisoner-of-war population, they have equal access to all the camp facilities established in accordance with the provisions of the Third Convention.[74]

1692  Article 14(3) expresses the principle that prisoners of war retain full civil capacity during their captivity. It means that captivity does not extinguish, in whole or in part, a person’s legal capacity, either in the prisoner’s domestic legal system or in that of the Detaining Power.[75]

1693  The first sentence of Article 14(3) lays down the general principle of retention of civil capacity. While Article 14(3) itself does not contain a definition of civil capacity, the term is understood to involve both the existence of and the ability to exercise one’s civil rights.[76]

1694  The retention of civil capacity has also found expression in several other articles of the Third Convention, which address some of the specific issues connected to the prisoners’ civil capacity during captivity. Article 54 safeguards the right of prisoners to obtain medical certificates for injuries sustained at work; Article 68 regulates compensation claims with respect to such injuries; Article 77 contains an obligation on the Detaining Power not just to allow but to provide facilities for the preparation, execution and transmission of legal documents; and Article 120 contains regulations on the drawing up and transmission of prisoners’ wills.

1695  The exact extent of a person’s civil capacity is determined by law, whether by the legislation of the country of nationality, origin or domicile. The wording, ‘which they enjoyed at the time of their capture’, in the first sentence of Article 14(3) was added to the 1929 provision to clarify which legislation defines a prisoner’s civil capacity during captivity.[77] Contrary to a literal reading of this sentence, the preparatory work on the Convention shows that this addition was not meant to freeze the status of a prisoner’s civil capacity at the point of their capture, but to connect the prisoner’s civil capacity to the legislation of their country of origin or domicile.[78] A prisoner of war who had not yet attained majority before being captured, but who reaches majority during captivity, thus enjoys the full civil capacity provided for under the legislation of their country of origin or domicile.

1696  The second sentence of Article 14(3) prohibits the Detaining Power from restricting the exercise of the rights that prisoners’ civil capacity confers on them both in and outside its own territory, beyond those restrictions that are necessitated by captivity.

1697  Since prisoners retain their full civil capacity, they must be able to exercise their civil rights both in their country of origin or domicile and in the country of detention, including in relations with fellow prisoners of war. This ability becomes increasingly important the longer the captivity lasts.

1698  In practice, it is primarily in the country of the prisoner’s nationality, origin or domicile – i.e. the country where they have their family and their interests or professional relationships – that a prisoner of war may need or wish to exercise certain civil rights.

1699  During an extended and, notably, unknown duration of captivity, prisoners of war may wish to exercise rights with respect to family matters, such as marrying or divorcing, adopting or arranging guardianship of a child or preparing a will.[79] Furthermore, even though war captivity results in prisoners being unable to conduct commercial activities in general,[80] their business interests in their country of nationality, origin or domicile may be safeguarded by the prisoners themselves, acting through a proxy, by correspondence or through the appointment of guardians.

1700  The principle of retention of a prisoner’s civil capacity during captivity can only be fully implemented if both the Power on which the prisoner depends and the Detaining Power facilitate this. As a practical matter, prisoners would be able to enjoy the protection granted under Article 14(3) if the laws of the Power on which the prisoner depends were to allow for certain legal and judicial actions to be carried out by proxy. To that end, the country of origin may adopt procedures that are adapted to captivity in a hostile country and that allow prisoners to protect their interests during captivity.[81]

1701  More directly, Article 14(3) states that the Detaining Power may not restrict prisoners in exercising their civil capacity beyond what is required by captivity. With regard to legal documents, Article 77 goes further and requires the Detaining Power to authorize and to facilitate the transmission of the necessary correspondence, the preparation and transmission of powers of attorney, and the transmission of instruments, papers or documents; to take the measures necessary for the authentication of prisoners’ signatures; and to allow them to consult a lawyer. Similarly, Article 120 provides that wills must be drawn up in a manner that satisfies the conditions of validity required by the legislation of the prisoners’ country of origin.[82] This implies that the Detaining Power must take measures to enable such an instrument to be prepared.

1702  The ICRC has observed in a number of conflicts since the Second World War that prisoners of war have prepared powers of attorney to enable family members to take care of family and business matters at home. In many instances, these legal documents were prepared in the presence of an ICRC delegate serving as a witness and then handed over to the ICRC for delivery.

1703  A question arising from the retention of civil capacity by prisoners of war is the exercise of their civil rights in the country of detention.

1704  During the Second World War, the broad statement in Article 3 of the 1929 Convention that prisoners of war retained their full civil capacity led prisoners to believe that they enjoyed full civil rights in the territory of the Detaining Power and that they would be placed on a par with ‘any ordinary resident’.[83] This was not the case, however, as most Detaining Powers placed limitations on the right of prisoners of war to enter into marriages with nationals of the Detaining Power or with foreigners resident in the territory of that Power.[84] The revision of this article for the 1949 Convention aimed at avoiding such misunderstandings in the future.[85]

1705  The language that was finally agreed upon, however, leaves some ambiguity, as the wording ‘may not restrict the exercise, either within or without its own territory’ could be understood as obliging the Detaining Power to allow prisoners of war to exercise civil rights in its territory. The discussions during the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, however, clearly show that there was agreement among the delegates that, in the territory of the Detaining Power, prisoners of war may exercise only those civil rights that the Detaining Power chooses to afford them.[86] Given that prisoners of war are usually kept separate from the civilian population of the Detaining Power, opportunities for them to participate in the civilian or economic life of the country of detention are usually extremely limited.

1706  Nevertheless, experience has shown that contacts with the civilian population do occur. The Detaining Power might choose to grant prisoners a degree of independence by permitting them to purchase goods at local markets and shops for the canteen or for their personal use or by arranging for them to work for private employers.[87]

1707  With regard to prisoners performing labour, two articles of the Third Convention deal with liability for injuries resulting from occupational accidents. Articles 54(2) and 68 provide for compensation by the Power on which prisoners depend and require the Detaining Power to provide prisoners of war concerned with a medical certificate enabling them, if need be, to submit a claim for compensation to the Power on which they depend following repatriation.

1708  While the retention of civil capacity aims to enable prisoners of war to safeguard their family and business interests in their country of nationality, origin or domicile, Article 14(3) acknowledges that war captivity is not always compatible with the full exercise of a person’s civil rights, such as the right to vote in elections or to act as a juror. Article 14(3) expressly allows for restrictions that are inevitable during captivity or that are required to maintain captivity itself. The wording indicates that restrictions must be kept to a minimum and may not go beyond what is required by captivity.

1709  The exact scope of these requirements needs to be determined in each context. Captivity in a prisoner-of-war camp justifies restrictions on prisoners’ ability to mingle with the civilian population of the Detaining Power or to enter into legal relationships in the country of detention. Furthermore, the general infrastructure and the conditions of captivity, such as the location, accessibility, connectivity and size of the camp, will affect the ability of prisoners to exercise their rights and may justify restrictions on the number and frequency of legal actions that prisoners are allowed to undertake.