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Commentary of 1960 

[p.541] This is one of the most important Articles in the Convention and is intended to remedy very unsatisfactory situations. As a result of the changed conditions of modern warfare, the belligerents have on two occasions, and without expressly violating the provisions of the existing Conventions, been able to keep millions of prisoners of war in captivity for no good reason. In our opinion, it was contrary to the spirit of the Conventions to prolong war captivity in this way.
Article 20 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 simply stated that, after the conclusion of peace, the repatriation of prisoners of war should be carried out as quickly as possible. In accordance with this general rule, Article 214 of the Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919, read as follows: "The repatriation of prisoners of war and interned civilians shall take place as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty and shall be carried out with the greatest rapidity." The Treaty entered into force only on January 15, 1920 -- more than fourteen months after the armistice. Article 75 of the 1929 Convention therefore tried to expedite repatriation by stipulating that it should, if possible, take place as soon as an armistice had been concluded. For many Powers, however, the Second World War ended without either armistice or peace treaty, and it was all the more shocking that captivity should be prolonged. In the case of German prisoners of war, for instance, the elimination of the German State prevented the normal operation of the
Convention. Furthermore, in those circumstances there was no danger of any resumption of hostilities.


1. ' Historical Background '

A. ' Obligation to repatriate '. -- At the Conference of Government Experts, some delegations pointed out that the Second World War had shown the 1929 text to be inadequate, since hostilities could cease without any peace treaty, or even armistice. It was therefore essential to lay down that repatriation should take place as soon as possible after the end of hostilities, and to make this requirement unilateral so that its implementation would not be hampered by the difficulty of obtaining the consent of both Parties (1).
[p.542] Further difficulties arose, however, because of the ideological nature of the conflicts, and the International Committee of the Red Cross had to draw the attention of the Conference to the cases of prisoners of war repatriated against their will (which led to many suicides after the Second World War) and of prisoners of war who asked to be sent to a country other than their country of origin. The Conference of Government Experts did not think it possible to make exceptions for special cases, owing particularly to the strict immigration laws of some countries, and decided to maintain the general principle of repatriation of all prisoners of war nationals of a given country (2).
Discussion was resumed at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, when the Austrian Delegation suggested that the Convention should specify the country to which prisoners of war should be repatriated, and proposed the insertion of a new Article between Articles 118 and 119 , reading as follows:

"Subject to the provisions of the following paragraph prisoners of war shall be repatriated to the country whose nationals they are at the time of their repatriation.
Prisoners of war, however, shall be entitled to apply for their transfer to any other country which is ready to accept them (3)."

In the view of that Delegation, two exceptions should be made to the general rule that prisoners should be sent back to their country of origin: (a) where the territories of the country of origin have come under the jurisdiction of a foreign government; (b) where the conditions of life have so changed that the prisoner no longer wishes to return to his home country if he is able to settle in the territory of another State.
Some delegations, however, were concerned lest prisoners of war might not be able to express themselves with complete freedom while in captivity, and the Austrian amendment was rejected by a large majority (4).
Although in connection with Article 109 , which concerns repatriation during the hostilities of seriously wounded and seriously sick prisoners of war, account was taken of the wishes of those men (5), this [p.543] question was not dealt with in connection with Article 118 as regards the repatriation of all prisoners of war at the end of hostilities. The discussion of the present Article bore on other aspects of the problem. It was emphasized that at the end of the Second World War a number of States had kept prisoners of war in captivity for a very long time for various reasons. Every effort was therefore made to ensure repatriation as soon as possible after the end of hostilities.

B. ' Application of the provision to the Korean conflict '. -- At the time of the Korean war, none of the Parties to the conflict had ratified the Convention and it was not therefore legally applicable. It was nevertheless partially applied, since at the beginning of the hostilities the Parties had stated their intention of respecting the "principles" of the Geneva Conventions.
At the end of the hostilities a large number of prisoners were unwilling to be repatriated. The following question therefore arose for the Parties to the conflict: does Article 118, paragraph 1, oblige a Power detaining prisoners of war to repatriate, if need be by force, all the prisoners in its hands?
Each side gave a different answer to this question. North Korea held that under Article 1 18, paragraph 1, as supplemented by Article 7 , which provides that prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the Convention, prisoners of war were unconditionally required to be repatriated, regardless of their desires or preferences.

That interpretation was based on the three following considerations:

(a) the wording of Article 118, paragraph 1, is categorical;

(b) the 1949 Diplomatic Conference expressly rejected the Austrian
amendment which would have given prisoners of war the option of going
to a country other than their country of origin if the former was
prepared to welcome them (6);

(c) Article 7 forbids prisoners of war to waive the rights secured to
them by the Convention; moreover, Article 109, paragraph 3 , may be
interpreted a contrario as permitting the repatriation of prisoners
of war against their will, provided such repatriation takes place
after and not during the hostilities.

[p.544] Those who supported this view also considered that the duties which the Convention laid upon the Detaining Power were duties for which that Power was responsible towards the Power of origin of prisoners of war, but not towards the prisoners themselves. The latter should therefore be repatriated "without consideration of their wishes" (7).
The United Command of the Western Powers, basing themselves on the general spirit of the Convention, held the contrary view.
At its Seventh Session, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Resolution on December 3, 1952, which gives an interpretation diametrically opposed to that of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (8).

That Resolution stated:

"The General Assembly...

1. Affirms that the release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall be effected in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, dated 12 August 1949, the well-established principles and practice of international law and the relevant provisions of the draft armistice agreement;

2. Affirms that force shall not be used against prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their homelands, and that they shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention and with the general spirit of the Convention...
(Force shall not be used against the prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their homelands, and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner or for any purpose whatsoever. This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Repatriation Commission and each of its members. Prisoners of war shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention and with the general spirit of that Convention...
After classification, prisoners of war shall be free to return to their homelands forthwith, and their speedy return shall be facilitated by all parties concerned.)"

[p.545] In 1950, Article 118 had been interpreted in the same spirit by the United Nations General Assembly when the latter proposed, subject to the respect of recognized international standards in the matter, that it should be so interpreted that "all prisoners should ... be given an unrestricted opportunity of repatriation" (9). Although the rôle of the General Assembly of the United Nations as interpreter of the Convention is nowhere defined, one author has pointed out, this construction is so much in line with the spirit of the Convention, that its quasi-authoritative character cannot be doubted (10).
[p.546] Without passing judgment on the decisions taken by the United Nations or by the Armistice Commission, it should be pointed out that the Korean war must not in any way be considered as a precedent for the application of Article 118. The Convention, which was not binding upon the Parties to that conflict, was only partially applied, in particular as regards scrutiny. The International Committee of the Red Cross had access to the camps set up by the United Nations, but was never in a position to make similar verifications in North Korea. The Protecting Powers never took up their duties, on either side. Moreover, the prisoners of war were never able to correspond with their families or to receive parcels from them.
Thus, the essential provisions of the Convention were not applied and the application of Article 118 was considerably affected thereby. The Convention constitutes a whole and if some of its essential provisions are neglected, the whole of it is jeopardized.
The decisions taken with regard to repatriation after the Korean conflict must therefore be considered as makeshift solutions adapted to the special circumstances of a conflict between two Parties of a single country. One cannot draw any valid conclusions for the future from them. In the case of the Suez conflict, repatriation was carried out normally and speedily.

C. ' Interpretation of the provision '. -- It is understood that the following rules presuppose that the Convention as a whole has been applied to the letter and in spirit by the belligerents, particularly as regards the co-operation of the Protecting Powers and scrutiny by them, in accordance with Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. On this basis, Article 118, paragraph 1, may be interpreted as follows:

1. ' Prisoners of war have an inalienable right to be repatriated once
active hostilities have ceased. In parallel, and subject to the
remarks below (sub-paragraph 3), it is the duty of the Detaining
Power to carry out repatriation and to provide the necessary means
for it to take place. '

In calling for the general repatriation of all prisoners of war once active hostilities have ceased, the 1949 Diplomatic Conference took account of the experience of the Second World War. It recognized that captivity is a painful situation which must be ended as soon as possible, and was anxious that repatriation should take place rapidly and that prisoners of war should not be retained in captivity on various pretexts. In time of war, the internment of captives is justified by a [p.547] legitimate concern -- to prevent military personnel from taking up arms once more against the captor State. That reason no longer exists once the fighting is over.
The right to repatriation is based on the general assumption that for the prisoner of war, repatriation constitutes a return to a normal situation and that, in almost every case, it is his own wish to be repatriated. Furthermore, by specifying in Article 7 that prisoners of war may not renounce the rights secured to them, the Diplomatic Conference obviously wished to protect them from themselves, that is to say from the temptation to accept offers by the Detaining Power which might at the time seem advantageous. Moreover, a member of the armed forces who becomes a prisoner of war in enemy hands remains a member of the armed forces of his country. Account must therefore be taken of the duty of allegiance which binds a prisoner of war to those armed forces.
In parallel to the inalienable right of prisoners of war to be repatriated there is an inescapable obligation for the Detaining Power. There is no need to attempt to determine whether repatriation is a separate operation from release, under the terms of Article 118; at most, one may consider that release without repatriation may occur when prisoners of war are detained on the territory of their own country which is occupied. In general, however, the two operations are closely linked and must take place simultaneously. Moreover, release and repatriation are in most cases the re-establishment of prisoners of war in the situation which they enjoyed when they were captured; in other words, having been released and repatriated, prisoners of war come once again under the orders of the military authority on which they depended at the time of capture.

2. ' No exception may be made to this rule unless there are serious
reasons for fearing that a prisoner of war who is himself opposed to
being repatriated may, after his repatriation, be the subject of
unjust measures affecting his life or liberty, especially on grounds
of race, social class, religion or political views, and that
consequently repatriation would be contrary to the general principles
of international law for the protection of the human being. Each case
must be examined individually. '

Apart from Articles 188 and 7 , the Convention, especially in Articles 13 and 14 , expresses very general principles prescribing humane treatment and respect for the person in all circumstances. For this reason, where the repatriation of a prisoner of war would be [p.548] manifestly contrary to the general principles of international law for the protection of the human being, the Detaining Power may, so to speak, grant him asylum.
Cases of this kind should be exceptional in normal circumstances; they might be more numerous if, during the period of captivity, an important political change took place in a prisoner's country of origin and, as a consequence of that change, certain groups of people were persecuted. Such a system corresponds to the general tendency which has become apparent since the Second World War against allowing anyone to be sent or returned to a country when he has good reason to fear that measures affecting his life and liberty would be taken against him there. This tendency is reflected, for instance, in Article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which forbids the transfer of a protected person to a country where he or she may have reason to fear persecution for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs. It is also reflected in the Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly calling for release and repatriation to be effected in accordance with the Geneva Convention and with the well-established principles and
practice of international law.
While recognizing the possibility of recourse to general humanitarian rules, one should nevertheless make a rather strict appraisal of each case, since the Third Geneva Convention has certainly not established a system under which repatriation depends solely on the wishes of the prisoner of war concerned. Each case must therefore be dealt with individually, on its own merits. A decision against repatriation must be reserved for exceptional cases where the dangers involved for the person concerned seems manifestly unjust and grave.

3. ' No propaganda or pressure may be directed at prisoners of war with
a view to persuading them to object to repatriation. '

4. ' The supervisory bodies must be able to satisfy themselves without
any hindrance that the requests have been made absolutely freely land
in all sincerity, and to give prisoners of war any information which
may set at rest groundless fears. '

In the case mentioned above, the prisoner of war concerned must spontaneously and of his own accord have expressed his unwillingness to be repatriated. It would therefore be an abuse if beforehand the Detaining Power were to offer him the opportunity of not being repatriated or, by insidious propaganda, induce him to refuse repatriation. For a member of the armed forces, patriotic allegiance is an essential part of his mental make-up, and the treatment which he [p.549] receives from the enemy should not tend systematically to destroy this feeling for which the Convention endeavours to ensure respect.
It is therefore essential that the supervisory bodies -- and in particular the representatives of the Protecting Power -- should be able to visit prisoners of war regularly, receive their complaints and give them all information which may clarify the situation. Moreover, the Protecting Power will thus be able to vouch for the sincerity of a prisoner of war who refuses repatriation vis-à-vis the Power whose interests it safeguards.

5. ' The rules under 1, 2, 3 and 4 above do not apply to prisoners of
war who have been illegally enrolled in the armed forces of the enemy
State (for instance, the inhabitants of occupied territories who have
been forced to enlist in the army of the occupying Power) or to
deserters who go over to the enemy side. '

Enemy military personnel who have been illegally enrolled in the armed forces cannot be treated on the same basis as other prisoners of war, nor can those who go over to the other side. Although many countries, for instance Great Britain, treated the latter as prisoners of war, this does not mean that they are entitled to that status. The Detaining Power is under no obligation to repatriate persons who have deserted to the other side. Similarly, their names are not usually notified to their country of origin. It should, however, be noted that the status of a deserter who has gone over to the other side must be determined by the way in which he surrendered or by his statements during initial questioning. A prisoner of war does not become a deserter merely because he makes a statement in the course of captivity.

6. ' The rules given under 1, 2, 3 and 4 above do not prevent the
conclusion of agreements between the belligerents pursuant to Article
6 of the Convention in order to meet the requests of prisoners of war
who object to being repatriated. '

Apart from cases in which the Detaining Power grants requests for non-repatriation for imperative humanitarian reasons, prisoners of war may ask to be sent to a country other than their country of origin because of economic or family considerations or even simply reasons of personal convenience. In such cases the belligerents may reach agreement, under Article 6 , in order to seek a solution consistent with the wishes expressed by the prisoners of war concerned.

[p.550] 2. ' Time-limit for repatriation '

The text as finally adopted states that the repatriation must take place "without delay after the cessation of active hostilities".
This requirement does not, of course, affect the practical arrangements which must be made so that repatriation may take place in conditions consistent with humanitarian rules and the requirements of the Convention, as defined in Article 1 19, paragraph 1 , below, which refers to Articles 46 to 48 (relating to transfer).


Article 75, paragraph 1 , of the 1929 Convention stated: "When belligerents conclude an armistice convention, they shall normally cause to be included therein provisions concerning the repatriation of prisoners of war. It it has not been possible to insert in that Convention such stipulations, the belligerents shall, nevertheless, enter into communication with each other on the question as soon as possible. In any case, the repatriation of prisoners shall be effected as soon as possible after the conclusion of peace."
The Conference of Government Experts, held in 1947, recommended a similar clause and the definitive text of this provision was drawn up by the XVIIth International Conference of the Red Cross, which met at Stockholm in 1948; it provides for repatriation on a unilateral basis, without requiring the consent of the Power on which prisoners of war depend. It is true that this solution is only a subsidiary aspect, preference being given to the traditional solution already recognized by Article 76, paragraph 1 , of the 1929 Convention, if it can be carried out within the time allowed. Otherwise, the necessary steps will be taken in the territory of the Power on which prisoners of war depend by the authorities provisionally replacing the government authorities there, that is to say, if need be by the Detaining Power itself or its allies.
Some order of priority for repatriation will be included in the plan, if possible. Seriously wounded and seriously sick prisoners of war whom it has not been possible to release earlier under Article 109 will have priority on two counts: not only will they be repatriated first, but they will be evacuated by the shortest route and the quickest means with a minimun of stops on the way. For this category of prisoners of war more than any other, arrangements must be made not only for their travel but also for arrival in their own country, so that they are sure of receiving the care which they need. If these [p.551] conditions cannot be met, the repatriation of this category of prisoners of war should be postponed for a short time. The same will apply to wounded and sick prisoners of war who should have been accommodated in a neutral country in accordance with Article 109, paragraph 2 , and Article 110, paragraph 2 .
Thirdly, the Detaining Power should endeavour to repatriate able-bodied prisoners of war who have been in captivity for the longest period (pursuant to the last sentence of Article 109, paragraph 2 ).
Other categories may be classified on the basis of Article 16 , with particular regard to sex and age, priority being given to women and the oldest prisoners of war.
In no case may a Detaining Power make any discrimination based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions of prisoners of war or "on similar criteria". This rule was not always respected during the Second World War (11).
If repatriation is organized quickly and on a large scale, it is not essential to respect priorities and repatriation should not be held up unduly in order to respect those provisions. This will not be the case if repatriation is staged over a considerable period of time.


Prisoners of war must be informed of the measures adopted by the Detaining Power or of the conclusion of an agreement with a view to their repatriation; this requirement is new and was introduced at the request of the International Committee of the Red Cross (12). It also applies to any modifications to the agreement or to the initial plan. Notification will usually be made by means of notices posted in the camps in accordance with Article 41, paragraphs 1 and 2 . Pursuant to the same provision, the prisoners' representatives will receive a copy so that they may inform the prisoners whom they represent.


With the exception of Article 73 (13), which was included in the section relating to direct repatriation and accommodation in a neutral [p.552] country of wounded and sick prisoners of war -- and which refers mainly, if not exclusively, to this category of prisoners of war -- the 1929 Convention did not contain any clause relating to the apportionment of the costs of repatriating prisoners of war at the end of hostilities. This matter was the subject of lengthy discussion at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference.

A. ' General principle of equitable apportionment '. -- The first sentence sets forth a general principle which dominates the provision as a whole and is moreover reiterated in sub-paragraph (b) of the present paragraph. It states categorically and with no exception the principle that the costs must be "equitably" apportioned. In other words, if as a result of the strict application of the principles set forth under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) below the apportionment of costs were not equitable, it would have to be revised in order to make it consistent with that principle; for it is for this very purpose that the principle was set forth, as is clear from the phrase "à cet effet" at the beginning of the second sentence in the French text.

B. ' The case of two contiguous Powers (sub-paragraph (a)) '. -- The solution provided here -- that the costs are to be borne by the Powers concerned on their respective territories -- is expressly considered to be equitable in the case of two contiguous Powers; the victorious Power is therefore not authorized to bring pressure to bear on the conquered Power during negotiations, in order to impose any other solution which would be to the detriment of the latter Power.

C. ' The case of two Powers which are not contiguous (sub-paragraph (b)) '. -- This clause was the subject of considerable discussion at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference (14).
No difficulty arises from the first sentence, which provides that if the two Powers are not contiguous, the costs of transport shall be borne by the Detaining Power as far as its frontier or its port of embarkation nearest to the territory of the power on which prisoners of war depend. In the case of air transport, it is reasonable to assume that the same rule will apply as far as the aerodrome in the territory of the Detaining Power which is nearest to the territory of the Power on which prisoners of war depend. It should be noted that, in accordance with the general character of the present provision, the rule [p.553] does not merely refer to a frontier, port or aerodrome in metropolitan territory, but also to those situated outside metropolitan territory provided they are under the authority of the Detaining Power; the requirement is that prisoners of war must be taken to the nearest possible point to the territory of the Power on which the prisoners depend.
The second sentence repeats the terms of the first part of the paragraph and calls for an equitable appointment of the remaining costs, by agreement between the Powers concerned. This wording does not therefore mean that the Detaining Power will not participate in the costs relating to the remaining part of the journey. The apportionment must however be "equitable", which implies that, where appropriate, account must be taken of the costs already borne by the Detaining Power.
The third sentence, which is extremely important, was inserted on a proposal by the Swiss Delegation to the 1949 Diplomatic Conference (15). It protects the interests of prisoners of war, whose repatriation must not be delayed if the negotiations initiated under the second sentence above are not rapidly concluded. The settlement of accounts is a matter for the Governments concerned and does not affect the position of prisoners of war, provided their repatriation is not delayed.

* (1) [(1) p.541] See ' Report on the Work of the Conference of
Government Experts, ' pp. 243-245;

(2) [(1) p.542] See ' Report on the Work of the Conference of
Government Experts, ' p. 245; see also ' XVIIth
International Red Cross Conference, Draft Revised or New
Conventions, ' p. 125;

(3) [(2) p.542] See ' Final Record of the Diplomatic
Conference of Geneva of 1949, ' Vol. II-A, pp. 324 and

(4) [(3) p.542] Ibid., p. 462;

(5) [(4) p.542] See above, pp. 512-513;

(6) [(1) p.543] See above, p. 542;

(7) [(1) p.544] See speeches by Mr. Vyshinsky before the First
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, 521st
and 529th meetings (November 10 and November 24, 1952).
(U.S./A.C.1/2540 and U.S./A.C.1/2543);

(8) [(2) p.544] See ' United Nations, General Assembly,
Official Records of the Seventh Session, Supplement No.
20 ' (A/2361);

(9) [(1) p.545] ' United Nations Year Book 1950, '
pp. 568-569. Resolution 427 (V), December 14, 1950;

(10) [(2) p.545] See J. MAYDA: "The Korean repatriation problem
and international law", ' The American Journal of
International Law, ' July 1953, Vol. 47, No. 3. p. 436.
The various views expressed may be found also in the
records of the Seventh Session of the United Nations
General Assembly, and in particular the Indian proposal of
November 17, 1952, the statement by Mr. Acheson, United
States representative, on November 24, 1952, before the
First Committee (Political and Security Questions), the
reply by Mr. Vychinsky, representative of the USSR, on
October 29, 1952, before the same Committee, and the
drafts submitted by Mexico and Peru. One should also note
the four points raised by Mr. Eden, representing the
United Kingdom, before the General Assembly (393rd plenary
meeting):" 1. Every prisoner of war has the right, on the
conclusion of an armistice, to be released; 2. every
prisoner of war has the right to be speedily repatriated;
3. there is a duty on the detaining side to provide
facilities for repatriation; 4. the detaining side has no
right to use force in connection with the disposal of
prisoners of war."
The following documentation is also relevant:
' United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records of
the Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20 (A /2361) ' and
' First Committee ' (A/C.1/SR.512); ' Documentation
française, Notes et études documentaires, ' Nos. 1677,
1791 and 2494 (November 1952, June and October 1953), "Les
négociations d'armistice et les camps de prisonniers de
guerre en Corée. -- Le livre blanc britannique de juin
1952 -- Texte de l'accord sur les prisonniers de guerre en
Corée -- Documents relatifs à l'armistice de Corée";
' Department of State Bulletin, ' April and June 1953:
"Talks on repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners. Text
of agreement on prisoners of war"; see also the following
authors: R. R. BAXTER: "Asylum to prisoners of war",
' British Year Book of International Law, 1953, ' pp.
489-498; D. BINDSCHEDLER-ROBERT: "Les Commissions neutres
instituées par l'armistice de Corée", ' Schweizerisches
Jahrbuch für internationales Recht, 1953, ' pp. 89-130:
CHAMATZ and WIT: "Repatriation of prisoners of war and the
1949 Geneva Conventions", ' The Yale Law Journal, ' 62,
1953, p. 39 ff.; P. H. DOUGLAS: "The Korean prisoner of
war issue", ' Vital Speeches of the Day, ' July 19, 1953,
pp. 568-570; GUTTERIDGE: "The Repatriation of Prisoners of
War", ' International and Comparative Law Quarterly, ' 2,
1953, p. 207 ff.; H. KRUSE: "Das Prinzip der freiwilligen
Repatrierung-Völkerrecht und Politik in Korea",
' Aussenpolitik, ' January 1954, pp. 36-42; W. H. JUDD:
"Korean unification and prisoner of war issue" ' Vital
Speeches of the Day, ' July 1953, pp. 578-585; LUNDIN:
"Repatriation of Prisoners of War: The Legal and Political
Aspects" ' American Bar Association Journal, 1953, ' p.
559 ff.; SCHAPIRO: "Repatriation of Deserters", ' British
Year Book of International Law, 1952, ' p. 310 ff.
See also ' Korea ' No. 1 (1953), British Government,
Cmd. 8793; Department of State Publication 4771 (1952),
' The Problem of Peace in Hostilities; ' U.N. Library, New
York 1952;

(11) [(1) p.551] See ' Report on the Work of the Conference of
Government Experts, ' pp. 244-245;

(12) [(2) p.551] Ibid., p. 244;

(13) [(3) p.551] See below, p. 743;

(14) [(1) p.552] See ' Final Record of the Diplomatic
Conference of Geneva of 1949, ' Vol. III, p. 88; Vol.
II-A, pp. 295, 450-452, 453-454, 526-527; Vol. II-B, pp.

(15) [(1) p.553] See ' Final Record of the Diplomatic
Conference of Geneva of 1949 ', Vol. II-A, p. 451;