Norma relacionada
South Africa
Practice Relating to Rule 161. International Cooperation in Criminal Proceedings
Section B. Extradition
South Africa’s Extradition Act (1962), taking into account amendments up to 2004, states:
1 Definitions
In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates–
‘associated State’ means any foreign State in respect of which section six [on endorsement for execution of warrants of arrest on a reciprocal basis under extradition agreements with foreign States in Africa] applies;
‘designated State’ means any foreign State designated by the President [of the Republic of South Africa] under section 2(1)(b) [regarding designations for the purpose of section 3(3), below];
‘extraditable offence’ means any offence which in terms of the law of the Republic [of South Africa] and of the foreign State concerned is punishable with a sentence of imprisonment or other form of deprivation of liberty for a period of six months or more, but excluding any offence under military law which is not also an offence under the ordinary criminal law of the Republic and of such foreign State;
‘extradition agreement’ means an agreement in force or deemed to be in force under section 2 including a multilateral convention to which the Republic is a signatory or to which it has acceded and which has the same effect as such agreement;
‘foreign State’ includes any foreign territory;
‘magistrate’ includes an additional magistrate and an assistant magistrate;
‘Minister’ means the Minister of Justice;
2 Extradition agreements
(1) The President may, on such conditions as he or she may deem fit, but subject to the provisions of this Act–
(a) enter into an agreement with any foreign State, other than a designated State, providing for the surrender on a reciprocal basis of persons accused or convicted of the commission within the jurisdiction of the Republic or such State or any territory under the sovereignty or protection of such State, of an extraditable offence or offences specified in such agreement and may likewise agree to any amendment or revocation of such agreement; and
(b) designate any foreign State for purposes of section 3(3), and may at any time amend the conditions to which such designation was subjected to or revoke such designation.
(3) No such agreement or designation [of a foreign State] or any amendment thereof, or revocation of the designation, shall be of any force or effect–
(c) unless provision is made by the law of the foreign State or by the agreement, that no person surrendered to such State shall, until he has been returned or had an opportunity of returning to the Republic, be detained or tried in the foreign State for any offence committed prior to his surrender other than the offence in respect of which extradition was sought or an offence of which he may lawfully be convicted on a charge of the offence in respect of which extradition was sought or that no such person shall be so detained or tried without the consent of himself or the Minister.
(3)bis Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (c) of subsection (3) any such agreement may provide that any person surrendered to the foreign State in question may with the consent of the Minister and with a view to his surrender to another foreign State be detained in such first-mentioned State for an offence which was committed prior to his surrender to such State and to which the agreement relates.
3 Persons liable to be extradited
(1) Any person accused or convicted of an offence included in an extradition agreement and committed within the jurisdiction of a foreign State … party to such agreement, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be liable to be surrendered to such State in accordance with the terms of such agreement, whether or not the offence was committed before or after the commencement of this Act or before or after the date upon which the agreement comes into operation and whether or not a court in the Republic has jurisdiction to try such person for such offence.
(2) Any person accused or convicted of an extraditable offence committed within the jurisdiction of a foreign State which is not a party to an extradition agreement shall be liable to be surrendered to such foreign State, if the President has in writing consented to his or her being so surrendered.
(3) Any person accused or convicted of an extraditable offence committed within the jurisdiction of a designated State shall be liable to be surrendered to such designated State, whether or not the offence was committed before or after the designation of such State and whether or not a court in the Republic has jurisdiction to try such person for such offence.
11 Minister may order or refuse surrender to foreign State
The Minister may–
(b) order that a person shall not be surrendered–
(i) where criminal proceedings against such person are pending in the Republic, until such proceedings are concluded and where such proceedings result in a sentence of a term of imprisonment, until such sentence has been served;
(ii) where such person is serving, or is about to serve a sentence of a term of imprisonment, until such sentence has been completed;
(iii) at all, or before the expiration of a period fixed by the Minister, if he or she is satisfied that by reason of the trivial nature of the offence or by reason of the surrender not being required in good faith or in the interests of justice, or that for any other reason it would, having regard to the distance, the facilities for communication and to all the circumstances of the case, be unjust or unreasonable or too severe a punishment to surrender the person concerned; or
(iv) if he or she is satisfied that the person concerned will be prosecuted or punished or prejudiced at his or her trial in the foreign State by reason of his or her gender, race, religion, nationality or political opinion.
12 Enquiry where offence committed in associated State
(1) If upon consideration of the evidence adduced at the enquiry referred to in section 9 (4) (b) (ii) [on enquiries relating to a person alleged to have committed an offence in an associated State] the magistrate finds that the person brought before him or her is liable to be surrendered to the associated State concerned, the magistrate shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), issue an order for his or her surrender to any person authorized by such associated State to receive him or her at the same time informing him or her that he or she may within 15 days appeal against such order to the Supreme Court.
(2) The magistrate may order that the person brought before him or her shall not be surrendered–
(a) where criminal proceedings against such person are pending in the Republic, until such proceedings are concluded and where such proceedings result in a sentence of a term of imprisonment, until such sentence has been served;
(b) where such person is serving, or is about to serve a sentence to a term of imprisonment, until such sentence has been completed; or
(c) at all, or before the expiration of a period fixed by him or her, or make such order as to him or her seems just if he or she is of the opinion that–
(i) by reason of the trivial nature of the offence or by reason of the surrender not being required in good faith or in the interests of justice, or that for any other reason it would, having regard for the distance, the facilities for communication and to all the circumstances of the case, be unjust or unreasonable or too severe a punishment to surrender the person concerned; or
(ii) the person concerned will be prosecuted or punished or prejudiced at his or her trial in the associated State by reason of his or her gender, race, religion, nationality or political opinion.
19 Persons surrendered to [the] Republic not to be detained or tried for certain offences in certain circumstances
No person surrendered to the Republic by any foreign State in terms of an extradition agreement or by any designated State shall, until he or she has been returned or had an opportunity of returning to such foreign or designated State, be detained or tried in the Republic for any offence committed prior to his or her surrender other than the offence in respect of which extradition was sought or an offence of which he or she may lawfully be convicted on a charge of the offence in respect of which extradition was sought, unless such foreign or designated State or such person consents thereto[, p]rovided that any such person may at the request of another foreign or designated State and with a view to his or her surrender to such State, be detained in the Republic for an extraditable offence which was so committed, provided such detention is not contrary to the laws of the State which surrendered him or her to the Republic. 
South Africa, Extradition Act, 1962, as amended to 2004, Sections 1, 2(1), 2(3)(c)–(3)bis, 3, 11(b) –12(2), and 19.
South Africa’s Refugees Act (1998), as amended to 2011, states:
Notwithstanding any provision of this Act or any other law to the contrary, no person may be … extradited … to any other country or be subject to any similar measure, if as a result of such … extradition … or other measure, such person is compelled to return to or remain in a country where–
(a) he or she may be subjected to persecution on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group; or
(b) his or her life, physical safety or freedom would be threatened on account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or other events seriously disturbing public order in any part or the whole of that country. 
South Africa, Refugees Act, 1998, as amended to 2011, Section 2.
In 1987, in the Petane case, the Cape Provincial Division of South Africa’s Supreme Court dismissed the accused’s claim that the 1977 Additional Protocol I reflected customary international law. The Court stated:
The accused has been indicted before this Court on three counts of terrorism, that is to say, contraventions of s 54(1) of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. He has also been indicted on three counts of attempted murder.
The accused’s position is stated to be that this Court has no jurisdiction to try him.
… The point in its early formulation was this. By the terms of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I to the [1949] Geneva Conventions the accused was entitled to be treated as a prisoner-of-war. A prisoner-of-war is entitled to have notice of an impending prosecution for an alleged offence given to the so-called “protecting power” appointed to watch over prisoners-of-war. Since, if such a notice were necessary, the trial could not proceed without it, Mr Donen suggested that the necessity or otherwise for giving such a notice should be determined before evidence was led. …
On 12 August 1949 there were concluded at Geneva in Switzerland four treaties known as the Geneva Conventions. …
South Africa was among the nations which concluded the treaties. … Except for the common art 3, which binds parties to observe a limited number of fundamental humanitarian principles in armed conflicts not of an international character, they apply to wars between States.
After the Second World War many conflicts arose which could not be characterised as international. It was therefore considered desirable by some States to extend and augment the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, so as to afford protection to victims of and combatants in conflicts which fell outside the ambit of these Conventions. The result of these endeavours was Protocol I and Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, both of which came into force on 7 December 1978.
Protocol II relates to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. Since the State of affairs which exists in South Africa has by Protocol I been characterised as an international armed conflict, Protocol II does not concern me at all.
The extension of the scope of art 2 of the Geneva Conventions was, at the time of its adoption, controversial. …
The article has remained controversial. More debate has raged about its field of operation than about any other articles in Protocol I. …
South Africa is one of the countries which has not acceded to Protocol I. Nevertheless, I am asked to decide, as I indicated earlier, as a preliminary point, whether Protocol I has become part of customary international law. If so, it is argued that it would have been incorporated into South African law. If it has been so incorporated it would have to be proved by one or other of the parties that the turmoil which existed at the time when the accused is alleged to have committed his offences was such that it could properly be described as an “armed conflict” conducted by “peoples” against a “ra[c]ist regime” in the exercise of their “right of self-determination”. Once all this has been shown it would have to be demonstrated to the Court that the accused conducted himself in such a manner as to become entitled to the benefits conferred by Protocol I on combatants, for example that, broadly speaking, he had, while he was launching an attack, distinguished himself from civilians and had not attacked civilian targets. …
… I am prepared to accept that where a rule of customary international law is recognised as such by international law it will be so recognised by our law.
To my way of thinking, the trouble with the first Protocol giving rise to State practice is that its terms have not been capable of being observed by all that many States. At the end of 1977 when the treaty first lay open for ratification there were few States which were involved in colonial domination or the occupation of other States and there were only two, South Africa and Israel, which were considered to fall within the third category of ra[c]ist regimes. Accordingly, the situation sought to be regulated by the first Protocol was one faced by few countries; too few countries in my view, to permit any general usage in dealing with armed conflicts of the kind envisaged by the Protocol to develop.
Mr Donen contended that the provisions of multilateral treaties can become customary international law under certain circumstances. I accept that this is so. There seems in principle to be no reason why treaty rules cannot acquire wider application than among the parties to the treaty.
Brownlie Principles of International Law 3rd ed at 13 agrees that non-parties to a treaty may by their conduct accept the provisions of a multilateral convention as representing general international law. …
I incline to the view that non-ratification of a treaty is strong evidence of non-acceptance.
It is interesting to note that the first Protocol makes extensive provision for the protection of civilians in armed conflict. …
In this sense, Protocol I may be described as an enlightened humanitarian document. If the strife in South Africa should deteriorate into an armed conflict we may all one day find it a cause for regret that the ideologically provocative tone of s 1(4) has made it impossible for the Government to accept its terms.
To my mind it can hardly be said that Protocol I has been greeted with acclaim by the States of the world. Their lack of enthusiasm must be due to the bizarre mixture of political and humanitarian objects sought to be realised by the Protocol. …
According to the International Review of the Red Cross (January/February 1987) No 256, as at December 1986, 66 States were parties to Protocol I and 60 to Protocol II, which, it will be remembered, deals with internal non-international armed conflicts. With the exception of France, which acceded only to Protocol II, not one of the world’s major powers has acceded to or ratified either of the Protocols. This position should be compared to the 165 States which are parties to the Geneva Conventions.
This approach of the world community to Protocol I is, on principle, far too half-hearted to justify an inference that its principles have been so widely accepted as to qualify them as rules of customary international law. The reasons for this are, I imagine, not far to seek. For those States which are contending with “peoples[’]” struggles for self-determination, adoption of the Protocol may prove awkward. For liberation movements who rely on strategies of urban terror for achieving their aims the terms of the Protocol, with its emphasis on the protection of civilians, may prove disastrously restrictive. I therefore do not find it altogether surprising that Mr Donen was unable to refer me to any statement in the published literature that Protocol I has attained the status o[f] customary international [law].
I have not been persuaded by the arguments which I have heard on behalf of the accused that the assessment of Professor Dugard, writing in the Annual Survey of South African Law (1983) at 66, that “it is argued with growing conviction that under contemporary international law members of SWAPO [South-West Africa People’s Organisation] and the ANC [African National Congress] are members of liberation movements entitled to prisoner-of-war status, in terms of a new customary rule spawned by the 1977 Protocols”, is correct. On what I have heard in argument I disagree with his assessment that there is growing support for the view that the Protocols reflect a new rule of customary international law. No writer has been cited who supports this proposition. Here and there someone says that it may one day come about. I am not sure that the provisions relating to the field of application of Protocol I are capable of ever becoming a rule of customary international law, but I need not decide that point today.
For the reasons which I have given I have concluded that the provisions of Protocol I have not been accepted in customary international law. They accordingly form no part of South African law.
This conclusion has made it unnecessary for me to give a decision on the question of whether rules of customary international law which conflict with the statutory or common law of this country will be enforced by its courts.
In the result, the preliminary point is dismissed. The trial must proceed. 
South Africa, Supreme Court, Petane case, Judgment, 3 November 1987, pp. 2–8.
In 2010, in the Boeremag case, South Africa’s North Gauteng High Court stated:
In Petane, … Conradie J found that the provisions of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I are not part of customary international law, and therefore are also not part of South African law.
Referring to the fact that in December 1986 only 66 of the 165 States party to the Geneva Conventions had ratified Protocol I, the Court [in Petane] stated:
This approach of the world community to Protocol I is, on principle, far too half-hearted to justify an inference that its principles have been so widely accepted as to qualify them as rules of customary international law. The reasons for this are, I imagine, not far to seek. For those States which are contending with “peoples[’]” struggles for self-determination, adoption of the Protocol may prove awkward. For liberation movements who rely on strategies of urban terror for achieving their aims the terms of the Protocol, with its emphasis on the protection of civilians, may prove disastrously restrictive. I therefore do not find it altogether surprising that Mr Donen was unable to refer me to any statement in the published literature that Protocol I has attained the status of customary international law.
Important changes with respect to certain aspects applicable at the time of Petane have taken place. The ANC [African National Congress] has become South Africa’s ruling party and in 1995 ratified Protocol I. The total number of States that have ratified it, is now … 162.
This last aspect forms the basis on which the First Respondent [the State] and the applicants agree that Protocol I forms part of customary international law as well as of South African law. As requested, this position is accepted for the purposes of the decision, without deciding on the matter.
Despite these changes, it remains debatable whether the provisions of Protocol I have become a part of South African law in this way.
The consensus of both parties to the conflict is required. See Petane … and Article 96 of Protocol I. …
Parliament’s failure to incorporate Protocol I into legislation in accordance with Article 231(4) of the Constitution in fact points to the contrary, and is indicative that the requirements of usus and/or opinio juris have not been met. See Petane. 
South Africa, North Gauteng High Court, Boeremag case, Judgment, 26 August 2010, pp. 21–22.
[footnotes in original omitted]
The Court also held:
If the [1977 Additional Protocol I] applies in South Africa as customary international law, the two requirements that form the basis of customary law must be met. It is arguable that the requirement of usus has been met by the vast number of States that have acceded or ratified it. By ratifying Protocol I the Republic of South Africa has indicated its intention to apply the Protocol, thereby fulfilling the requirement of opinio juris. 
South Africa, North Gauteng High Court, Boeremag case, Judgment, 26 August 2010, p. 66.