UN Charter
Article 1(3) of the 1945 UN Charter provides that one of the purposes of the United Nations is “to achieve international co-operation … in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion”.
Geneva Conventions (1949)
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides:
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
European Convention on Human Rights
Article 14 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights stipulates that the rights and freedoms contained in the Convention shall be secured “without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”. Article 15(1) provides:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
Article 2 of the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination provides: “States Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races.” Article 5 provides that States Parties undertake “to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law”.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 2(1) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 4(1) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that during war, public danger and other emergencies, in which derogations from the obligations of the Convention are allowed, a State party is nonetheless not permitted to take measures “inconsistent with its other obligations under international law” and involving “discrimination on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin”.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 26 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Article 2(2) of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Article 3 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides: “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant.”
American Convention on Human Rights
Article 1 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights provides:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.
American Convention on Human Rights
Article 27 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights provides that during war, public danger and other emergencies, in which derogations from the obligations of the Convention are allowed, a State party is nonetheless not permitted to take measures “inconsistent with its other obligations under international law” and involving “discrimination on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin”.
Additional Protocol I
The preamble to the 1977 Additional Protocol I states:
The provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of this Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict.
Additional Protocol I
Article 9(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I states that the provisions of the Protocol shall apply “without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria”.
Additional Protocol I
Article 75(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides that persons who are in the power of a party shall be treated humanely and enjoy the protection provided “without any adverse distinction based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria”.
Additional Protocol II
Article 2(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II provides: “This Protocol shall be applied without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria.”
Additional Protocol II
Article 4(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II provides: “All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities … shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction.”
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
Article 2 of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women provides: “State Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms.”
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Article 2 of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides:
Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.
Convention on the Rights of the Child
Article 2(1) of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child provides:
States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.
ICC Statute
Under Article 7(1)(h) of the 1998 ICC Statute, the following is a crime against humanity subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.
European Convention on Human Rights
Article 1 of the 2000 Protocol 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights provides:
1. The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
2. No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.
UN-Cambodia Agreement on the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea
Article 9 of the 2003 UN-Cambodia Agreement on the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea provides:
The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers shall be the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, crimes against humanity as defined in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and such other crimes as defined in Chapter II of the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers as promulgated on 10 August 2001.
In accordance with Article 2 of the Agreement, Cambodia’s Law on the Establishment of the ECCC (2001), as amended, further implements these provisions.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 7 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam
Article 1 of the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam provides:
All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, social status or other considerations.
Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Paragraph 4 of the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requires that all civilians be treated in accordance with Article 75 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
In paragraph 1 of the 1992 Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the parties committed themselves to respect and ensure respect for common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Paragraph 2.3 requires that all civilians be treated in accordance with Article 75 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
ICTY Statute
Under Article 5(h) of the 1993 ICTY Statute, the following is a crime against humanity subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: “persecution on political, racial and religious grounds.”
ICTR Statute
Under Article 3(h) of the 1994 ICTR Statute, the following is a crime against humanity subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, when committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: “persecution on political, racial and religious grounds.”
ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996)
Article 18(e) of the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind provides that “persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds” constitutes a crime against humanity.
Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and IHL in the Philippines
Article 2(10) of Part III of the 1998 Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and IHL in the Philippines states that the Agreement seeks to protect and promote the “right to equal protection of the law and against any form of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, belief, age, physical condition or civil status and against any incitement to such discrimination”.
Article 4(1) of Part IV of the Agreement stipulates: “Persons
hors de combat and those who do not take a direct part in hostilities … shall be … treated … without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, faith, sex, birth, social standing or any other similar criteria.”
UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin
Section 7.1 of the 1999 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin provides:
Persons not, or no longer, taking part in military operations, including civilians, members of armed forces who have laid down their weapons and persons placed
hors de combat by reason of sickness, wounds or detention, shall, in all circumstances, be treated humanely and without any adverse distinction based on race, sex, religious convictions or any other ground.
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
Article 21 of the 2000 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights prohibits “any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation”.
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of IHL (2005)
Paragraph 25 of the 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of IHL provides:
The application and interpretation of these Basic Principles and Guidelines must be consistent with international human rights law and international humanitarian law and be without any discrimination of any kind or on any ground, without exception.
Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1969) restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1989) stipulates that the provisions of the chapter regarding non-international armed conflicts are applicable “without any adverse distinction for reasons of race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other analogous condition or criteria, to persons affected by an armed conflict”.
Australia
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) states, with regard to non-international armed conflicts: “The general rule is that persons are to be treated humanely without adverse discrimination on the ground of race, sex, language, religion, political discrimination or similar criteria.”
The manual stipulates that inhabitants of an occupied territory “must be treated with the same consideration, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion”.
Australia
Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states: “All persons are to be treated … without any adverse distinction based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status or on any other similar criteria.”
The LOAC Manual (2006) replaces both the Defence Force Manual (1994) and the Commander’s Manual (1994).
Belgium
Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) states, with reference to common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, that in internal armed conflicts “persons who do not take a direct part in hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and persons placed
hors de combat must be treated … without any adverse distinction”.
Benin
Benin’s Military Manual (1995) provides that persons placed
hors de combat “shall in any circumstances be protected … without any adverse distinction”.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Military Instructions (1992) provides that the wounded and sick
hors de combat must be treated without any discrimination.
Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso’s Disciplinary Regulations (1994) provides that it is a custom of war to treat all persons
hors de combat humanely and without distinction.
Burundi
Burundi’s Regulations on International Humanitarian Law (2007) lists “persecution for political reasons” as a “crime against humanity”.
Cameroon
Cameroon’s Disciplinary Regulations (1975) and Instructor’s Manual (1992) provide that each soldier must treat “all persons placed
hors de combat without distinction”.
Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states that members of the armed forces are obliged “to treat humanely and without distinction all regular combatants
hors de combat”.
Cameroon
Cameroon’s Disciplinary Regulations (2007) states:
Article 31: Humanitarian rules
…
Every soldier must:
- treat humanely, without distinction, all persons placed
hors de combat.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) establishes non-discrimination as an operational principle of the law of armed conflict, stating: “The LOAC is to be applied without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, gender, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.”
The manual restates common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and specifies:
[Additional Protocol II] applies without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, gender, language, religion, or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or any other similar criteria.
[Additional Protocol II] provides that all persons not participating in the conflict or who have ceased to do so are entitled to respect … and to be treated … without adverse distinction.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states:
The principle of non-discrimination must be considered in two aspects. First, the LOAC binds both sides in a conflict. Although one side may label the other an aggressor, it is not entitled to apply the law in a different way because of that assertion. Second, the LOAC is to be applied without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, gender, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. The fact that the enemy is of a different colour or a different religion does not allow the other party to apply the law in a different fashion.
In its chapter on non-international armed conflicts, the manual restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
By Common Article 3, the parties to a non-international armed conflict occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions are obliged to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
a. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, gender, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
In the same chapter, the manual further states:
1711. No Adverse Discrimination
1. [Additional Protocol II] applies without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, gender, language, religion or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria.
2. [Additional Protocol II] provides that all persons not participating in the conflict or who have ceased to do so are entitled, whether under restriction or not, to respect for their persons, honour and convictions, and religious practices, and are, in all circumstances, to be treated humanely and without adverse distinction.
Central African Republic
The Central African Republic’s Instructor’s Manual (1999) states in Volume 2 (Instruction for group and patrol leaders): “Persons who are
hors de combat or not directly taking part in the hostilities … must under all circumstances be protected and treated humanely, without adverse distinction.”
Central African Republic
The Central African Republic’s Disciplinary Regulations (2009) states: “In accordance with the international conventions signed or approved by the Central African Government, it is stipulated that during combat servicemen must: … treat all persons
hors de combat … without any distinction.”
Colombia
Colombia’s Circular on Fundamental Rules of IHL (1992) provides: “Persons placed
hors de combat or who do not participate directly in the hostilities … shall be protected … without any adverse distinction.”
Colombia
Colombia’s Soldiers’ Manual (1999) and Instructors’ Manual (1999) provide:
All persons are born free and equal before the law, receive the same protection and treatment from the authorities and possess the same rights, freedoms and opportunities without any discrimination based on sex, race, family or nationality, origin, language, religion or political or philosophical opinion.
Congo
The Congo’s Disciplinary Regulations (1986) stipulates that persons placed
hors de combat “shall be treated without distinction”.
Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book I (Basic instruction):
In times of war and armed conflicts, certain rules must be observed, in particular vis-à-vis the civilian population, the wounded, prisoners, and even the enemy. These rules can be found in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and in their Additional Protocols.
Together, these rules constitute international humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of armed conflicts (LOAC) or the law of war …
This law is based on the idea of respect for and dignity of the individual and goods. Persons who do not directly participate in hostilities and those rendered
hors de combat because they are sick, wounded, shipwrecked, captured or for other reasons, must be respected and protected against the consequences of the war. All victims must be assisted without discrimination.
In Book III, Volume 1 (Instruction of first-year trainee officers), the Teaching Manual provides:
II. The fundamental principles of IHL
Just as military operations are based on principles concerning attack, defence, withdrawal, etc., the law of armed conflicts contains a set of well-defined principles. These concrete principles reflect the realities of conflicts. They represent a balance between the principle of humanity and military necessity, and they are valid at all times, in all places, and in all circumstances. It is essential that these rules are known by all combatants. They must permanently be taken into consideration in every activity of assessment, planning, and military training or operation. The following principles can be found throughout the texts of the law of armed conflicts.
…
II.6. Humane treatment and non-discrimination
All persons must be treated humanely and must not be made the object of any discrimination based on sex, nationality, race, religion or political convictions.
In Book III, Volume 2 (Instruction of second-year trainee officers), the Teaching Manual provides:
Persons not or no longer participating in hostilities, including the members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and persons rendered
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause, must in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any distinction founded on race, religion, faith, sex, social class, or any other similar criteria.
Djibouti
Djibouti’s Disciplinary Regulations (1982) states: “Combatants must … treat all persons placed
hors de combat … without distinction”.
El Salvador
El Salvador’s Human Rights Charter of the Armed Forces provides: “According to the law, we are all equal, without distinction based on sex, race, ideology or religion.”
France
France’s Disciplinary Regulations (1975), as amended, exhorts combatants to “treat humanely and without distinction all persons
hors de combat”.
France
France’s LOAC Manual (2001) restates Article 75(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.

It further emphasizes that one of the three main principles common to IHL and human rights is the principle of non-discrimination, according to which “individuals are treated without any distinction based on race, sex, nationality, philosophical, religious or political opinion”.
Greece
The Hellenic Territorial Army’s Internal Service Code (1984), as amended, provides: “Members of the armed forces should: … Treat humanely and without distinction all persons
hors de combat.”
Guinea
Guinea’s Disciplinary Regulations (2012) states: “In accordance with the international agreements signed by the government of Guinea, military personnel in combat are required … to treat humanely, without distinction, all persons placed
hors de combat”.
Israel
With reference to Israel’s Law of War Booklet (1986), the Report on the Practice of Israel states:
As a general policy … all individuals falling in the power of a party to a conflict should, at a minimum, be treated in accordance with the principles of humanity, without any adverse distinction based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria.
Kenya
Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997) states:
Persons not involved in the fighting because they are not taking part in hostilities, or because they are wounded or have surrendered, or have been detained, must be treated … without adverse discrimination.
Madagascar
Madagascar’s Military Manual (1994) states that one of the seven fundamental rules of IHL is that “persons placed
hors de combat and those who do not take a direct part in hostilities … shall in all circumstances be protected and treated humanely, without any adverse distinction”.
Mali
Mali’s Army Regulations (1979) provides that the refusal to treat without distinction all persons
hors de combat is a serious breach of its rules.
Mexico
Mexico’s Army and Air Force Manual (2009), in a section entitled “Basic rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts”, states: “Persons placed
hors de combat and those who do not take a direct part in hostilities … must be protected and treated humanely in all circumstances, without any adverse distinction.”
The manual also states that Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions “stipulates that in the event of armed conflict, protected persons must be treated humanely in all circumstances, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth, wealth or any other such criteria.”
Morocco
Morocco’s Disciplinary Regulations (1974) provides that as a custom of war, soldiers are required to treat without distinction all regular combatants placed
hors de combat.
Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands provides that protected persons shall be treated humanely “without adverse distinction based on race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria”.
With respect to non-international armed conflict, the manual restates the principle of non-discrimination contained in common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 4 of the 1977 Additional Protocol II.
Netherlands
The Military Handbook (1995) of the Netherlands provides with respect to protected persons: “Any discrimination based on race, religion, sex … is prohibited.”
Netherlands
The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states:
Individuals should be treated without detrimental discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, nationality, language, status, health, political, philosophical or religious conviction or any other such criteria.
This principle does not prejudice the distinction which may be made in the treatment of individuals in order to remedy irregularities arising from their personal circumstances, needs or emergency situation.
The manual lists the “[p]rohibition of discrimination” as one of the standards derived from the principle of “[h]umane conduct”.
The manual further states:
Protected persons must be humanely treated in all circumstances, and should at least receive protection under the fundamental guarantees, without any negative discrimination against them on grounds of race, skin colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other convictions, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or any other similar criteria.
In its chapter on non-international armed conflict, the manual states:
1049. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Article 4 of AP II [1977 Additional Protocol II], contain a number of fundamental guarantees of humane treatment that relate to all who are not participating directly in the hostilities, or have ceased to do so. Primarily this means civilians, but also members of the armed forces, dissident militias and armed groups who, due to wounds, sickness or capture, are no longer taking part in the combat or have been placed hors de combat. They must be treated without any negative discrimination on any grounds whatsoever …
…
1055. The wounded, the sick and shipwreck survivors must be respected and protected, whether or not they have taken part in the armed conflict. They must in all circumstances be humanely treated, and provided with the requisite medical care without discrimination.
In its chapter on peace operations, under the heading “Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces”, the manual states:
Members of the armed forces must scrupulously obey the rules of national and international law. They must show respect to their fellow human beings, even when they belong to another ethnic group or have a different culture.
In addition, the manual provides: “Persons who are not, or have ceased to be, participants in fighting or hostilities should be protected and treated without any form of discrimination.”
New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states that the principle of non-discrimination is one of the key principles of the law of armed conflict. It states: “The law is to be applied without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.”
The manual further states: “All protected persons must be treated with the same consideration, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion.”
The manual also emphasizes the principle of non-discrimination with regard to non-international armed conflicts, and provides that the 1977 Additional Protocol II “is to apply without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, sex, language, religion or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status or any other similar criteria”. It adds:
All persons not participating in the conflict or who have ceased so to do are entitled, whether under restriction or not, to respect for their persons, honour and convictions, and religious practices and are, in all circumstances, to be treated humanely and without adverse distinction.
Nicaragua
Nicaragua’s Military Manual (1996) reproduces common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Peru
Peru’s Human Rights Charter of the Armed Forces (1994) states that non-discrimination, i.e. respect for all without any distinction on the grounds of nationality, race, religion, social condition or political opinion, is one of the three common principles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions which represent the minimum level of protection to which every human being is entitled.
Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states: “People must not be discriminated against on the grounds of race, sex, language, religion, beliefs, political or other opinions, nationality, social standing, wealth or any other such criteria.”
The manual contains a similar provision with respect to situations of non-international armed conflict:
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
Peru
Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states:
There are … principles common to the [1949] Geneva Conventions and human rights law which represent a minimum level of protection to which every human person is entitled … [including] [n]on-discrimination, [that is to say] respect for all individuals without any distinction based on nationality, race, religion, social status [or] political opinion.
…
Regarding these fundamental guarantees, there is no exception whatsoever and they are binding both in times of peace and in times of armed conflict.
With respect to situations of non-international armed conflict, the manual states:
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states:
Under any circumstances international humanitarian law ensures humane treatment during an armed conflict of persons not directly involved in combat operations, including those who have been rendered
hors de combat by sickness, injury, detention or any other cause without adverse distinction for reasons of race, colour, faith, birth, wealth or any other similar criteria.
With regard to internal armed conflict, the Regulations states that applicable rules “shall be applied to all persons affected by an internal armed conflict without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other beliefs, ethnic or social origin, wealth or any other status, or on any other similar criteria.”
Senegal
Senegal’s Disciplinary Regulations (1990) provides that all persons placed
hors de combat must be treated without distinction.
Senegal
Senegal’s IHL Manual (1999) restates common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
South Africa
South Africa’s LOAC Teaching Manual (2008) states:
1.2 Reasons for compliance with LOAC[law of armed conflict] and basic principles thereof.
…
Fundamental Norms and Values (rules)
The fundamental norms/val[u]es which underlie the LOAC are:
- Persons who are hors de combat (out of combat) and those who do not take a direct part in hostilities are entitled to respect for their lives and their moral and physical integrity. They must in all circumstances be protected and treated humanely without any adverse distinction.
…
Prohibited Acts against Persons not taking an Active Part in Armed Conflicts
…
- All protected persons must be treated equally, without any adverse distinction based on race, religion or political opinion.
…
1.3 Relationship between LOAC and Human Rights Law and Fundamental Protection Provided under LOAC
…
Specific Areas that are Subject to Fundamental Protection
…
Non-discrimination
An unfair discriminatory distinction based on race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion or similar criteria is absolutely prohibited.
- This does not mean that justifiable differentiation is prohibited. Under unequal circumstance, it might be justifiable to treat people unequal[ly], e.g. t[t]reatment of sick versus healthy POW [prisoners of war].
…
1.4 Different Types of armed Conflict and those bound by LOAC
…
Application: Civil Wars and Non-International Armed Conflicts
…
Current Op[]inio Juris on Common Article 3 [of the 1949] Geneva Conventions. This article determines that, in the case of armed conflicts not of an international character, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply certain minimum rules. Although originally written for situations of non-international armed conflicts, the current legal opinion is that its contents are so fundamental that it is applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts. The minimum rules contained in Common article 3 Geneva Conventions are the following:
- Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
Sweden
Sweden’s IHL Manual (1991) considers that the fundamental guarantees for persons in the power of one party to the conflict as contained in Article 75 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I are part of customary international law.
Togo
Togo’s Military Manual (1996) provides that persons placed
hors de combat “shall in any circumstances be protected … without any adverse distinction”.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) incorporates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In its chapter on the applicability of the law of armed conflict, the UK LOAC Manual (2004) states:
… every victim of armed conflict is entitled to the protection afforded by the law. The fact that he is a national, or member of the armed forces, of any particular state or that he has particular religious convictions or political opinions is irrelevant in this context.
In its chapter on the protection of civilians in the hands of a party to the conflict, the manual states:
All persons are to be treated humanely in all circumstances and “without any adverse distinction based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status or on any other similar criteria”.
In its chapter on internal armed conflict, the manual restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
Under the terms of Common Article 3, the parties to a non-international armed conflict occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions are obliged to apply “as a minimum”, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
Furthermore, the manual provides that, in internal armed conflicts in which the 1977 Additional Protocol II is applicable, it applies “without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria” to all persons affected by the conflict.
United States of America
The US Field Manual (1956) restates common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The manual provides that the wounded and sick in the hands of one party to the conflict shall be cared for “without any adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions, or any other similar criteria”.
The manual also states:
Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion.
United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) provides that the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions “insure humane treatment to civilians and others who are
hors de combat, without regard to race, colour, religion, sex, birth, or wealth”.
The Pamphlet also stipulates that under the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, “any distinction in treatment based upon race, religion or political opinion is specially forbidden”.
The Pamphlet quotes Article 1 of the 1945 UN Charter and adds that the set of documents elaborated by the UN and the Geneva Conventions safeguard such fundamental freedoms as “freedom from discrimination based on race, sex, language, or religion”.
United States of America
The US Instructor’s Guide (1985) restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Australia
Australia’s ICC (Consequential Amendments) Act (2002) incorporates in the Criminal Code the crimes against humanity defined in the 1998 ICC Statute, including persecution.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s International Crimes (Tribunal) Act (1973) states that the “violation of any humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts laid down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949” is a crime.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Criminal Code (2003) criminalizes the following as crimes against humanity:
(1) Whoever, as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of such an attack, perpetrates any of the following acts:
…
h) Persecutions against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or sexual gender or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law …
…
(2) For the purpose of paragraph 1 of this Article the following terms shall have the following meanings:
…
g)
Persecution means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights, contrary to international law, by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity.

[emphasis in original]
Burundi
Burundi’s Law on Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (2003) lists “persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender grounds” as a crime against humanity “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”.
Cambodia
Cambodia’s Law on the Establishment of the ECCC (2001), as amended in 2004, provides:
Article 4
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all Suspects who committed the crimes of genocide as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, and which were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.
The acts of genocide, which have no statute of limitations, mean any acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, …
…
Article 5
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all suspects who committed crimes against humanity during the period 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.
Crimes against humanity … are any acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds, such as:
…
• persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds.
Canada
Canada’s Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000) provides that the crimes against humanity defined in Article 7 of the 1998 ICC Statute are “crimes according to customary international law” and, as such, indictable offences under the Act.
Congo
Under the Congo’s Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Act (1998), “persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law”, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack, is a crime against humanity.
Croatia
Croatia’s Criminal Code (1997) provides for the punishment of “any person who, on the basis of race, sex, skin colour, nationality or ethnic origin, violates basic human rights and freedoms accepted by the international community”.
Croatia
Croatia’s Criminal Code (1997), as amended to 2006, provides for the punishment of anyone who:
… on the basis of a difference in race, religion, political or other belief, property, birth, education, social position or other characteristics, or on the basis of gender, color, national or ethnic origin, violates fundamental human rights and freedoms recognized by the international community.
The Criminal Code further states that “[ordering] the persecution of a person by depriving them of their fundamental rights because this person belongs to a particular group or community” is a crime against humanity.
Denmark
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (1973), as amended in 1978, provides:
Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment].
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (2005) provides:
Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment].
Ethiopia
Ethiopia’s Criminal Code (2004) states:
Article 4.- Equality Before the Law.
Criminal law applies to all alike without discrimination as regards persons, social conditions, race, nation, nationality, social origin, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status.
No difference in treatment of criminals may be made except as provided by this Code, which are derived from immunities sanctioned by public international and constitutional law, or relate to the gravity of the crime or the degree of guilt, the age, circumstances or special personal characteristics of the criminal, and the social danger which he represents.
…
Article 15.- Crimes Committed in a Foreign Country by a Member of the Defence Forces.
…
(2) In cases of crimes against international law and specifically military crimes as defined in Article 269–322, the member of the Defence Forces shall remain subject to national law and be tried under the provisions of this Code by Ethiopian military courts.
Finland
Finland’s Revised Penal Code (1995), under the heading “Offences against humanity”, provides for the punishment of
any persons who, in their private or public functions, discriminate on grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, sex, age, family ties, sexual preferences, state of health, religion, political orientation, political or industrial activity or other comparable circumstance.
Guatemala
Guatemala’s Law on the Protection of Childhood and Adolescence (2003) states:
Right to equality and non-discrimination. During the investigation and in the course of proceedings, as well as in the execution of [punitive] measures, the adolescents’ right to equality before the law and to non-discrimination on any ground shall be respected.
Ireland
Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, provides that any “minor breach” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including violations of common Article 3, and of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, including violations of Articles 9(1) and 75(1), as well as any “contravention” of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, including violations of Articles 2(1) and 4(1), are punishable offences.
Israel
Israel’s Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law (1950) includes “persecution on national, racial, religious or political grounds” in its definition of crimes against humanity.
Kenya
Kenya’s Constitution (1992) provides that every person in Kenya is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual whatever his or her race, tribe, place of origin or residence or other local connection, political opinions, colour, creed or sex.
Netherlands
Under the International Crimes Act (2003) of the Netherlands, the following is a crime against humanity:
persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this subsection or any other crime as referred to in this Act.
Persecution is defined as “the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity”.
New Zealand
Under New Zealand’s International Crimes and ICC Act (2000), crimes against humanity include the crime defined in Article 7(1)(h) of the 1998 ICC Statute.
Norway
Norway’s Military Penal Code (1902), as amended in 1981, provides:
Anyone who contravenes or is accessory to the contravention of provisions relating to the protection of persons or property laid down in … the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 … [and in] the two additional protocols to these Conventions … is liable to imprisonment.
Peru
Peru’s Law on Internal Displacement (2004) states:
Internally displaced persons enjoy the same rights and freedoms under international and domestic law as do other persons in the country. They are not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of their rights and freedoms merely because they are internally displaced.
Peru
Peru’s Regulations to the Law on Internal Displacement (2005) states:
Internally displaced persons have the same rights as other persons in the country, without prejudice to the special rights and duties recognized in the Law [on Internal Displacement (2004)] and the present Regulations. National and international laws are applicable to internally displaced persons without discrimination of any kind, particularly without discrimination based on them being displaced persons.
Peru
Peru’s Decree on the Use of Force by the Armed Forces (2010) states that “persons placed
hors de combat for … any … reason must in all circumstances be treated … without any unfavourable distinction based on race, colour, religion or belief, sex, birth, socio-economic status or any other similar criterion.”
Philippines
The Philippines’ Executive Order No. 134 (1999), declaring August 12, 1999 and every 12th Day of August thereafter as International Humanitarian Law Day, states that the Philippines “subscribes to the basic principle of disinterested humanitarian aid to all victims of war and armed conflict without discrimination”.
Women shall have the right to protection and security in situations of armed conflict and militarization … The State … shall not … relocate [women] in special centers for military purposes under any discriminatory condition.
Poland
Poland’s Penal Code (1997) provides for the repression of incitement and use of violence or unlawful threat against a group or a particular person because he or she belongs to a particular racial group.
Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea’s ICC Act (2007) provides for the punishment of crimes listed in the 1998 ICC Statute, including as a crime against humanity:
Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity by depriving such group or collectivity of fundamental human rights or by substantially restricting the same, on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are recognized as impermissible under international law.
Serbia
Serbia’s Criminal Code (2005) states:
Whoever on grounds of race, colour, nationality, ethnic origin or other personal characteristic violates fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed by universally accepted rules of international law and international treaties ratified by Serbia and Montenegro, shall be punished by imprisonment for between six months and five years.
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Constitution (1991) states:
27. Protection from discrimination.
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (4), (5), and (7), no law shall make provision which is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.
…
(3) In this section the expression “discriminatory” means affording different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, sex, place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed whereby persons of one such description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such description are not made subject, or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of another such description.
(4) Subsection (1) shall not apply to any law so far as that law makes provision –
…
f. for authorising the taking during a period of public emergency of measures that are reasonably justifiable for the purpose of dealing with the situation that exists during that period of public emergency; or
…
…
29. Public emergency.
(1) Whenever in the opinion of the President a state of public emergency is imminent or has commenced, the President may, at any time, by Proclamation which shall be published in the Gazette, declare that—
a. a state of public emergency exists either in any part, or in the whole of Sierra Leone; or
b. a situation exists which, if it is allowed to continue, may lead to a state of public emergency in any part of or the whole of Sierra Leone.
(2) The President may issue a Proclamation of a state of public emergency only when—
a. Sierra Leone is at war; [or]
b. Sierra Leone is in imminent danger of invasion or involvement in a state of war; or
c. there is actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the whole of Sierra Leone or any part thereof to such an extent as to require extraordinary measures to restore peace and security; or
d. there is a clear and present danger of an actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the whole of Sierra Leone or any part thereof requiring extraordinary measures to avert the same; or
e. there is an occurrence of imminent danger, or the occurrence of any disaster or natural calamity affecting the community or a section of the community in Sierra Leone; or
f. there is any other public danger which clearly constitutes a threat to the existence of Sierra Leone.
South Africa
South Africa’s ICC Act (2002) reproduces the crimes against humanity listed in the 1998 ICC Statute, including:
persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender … or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Military Criminal Code (1927), taking into account amendments entered into force up to 2011, states:
Art. 5
1 In times of war, in addition to the persons mentioned in art. 3 [Personal conditions] and 4 [Extension in case of active service], the following are subject to military criminal law:
1. Civilians who make themselves culpable of one of the following offences:
…
d. … crime against humanity (Part 2, chapter 6) … ;
…
5. foreign military persons who make themselves culpable of … a crime against humanity (Part 2, chapter 6) … ;
…
Chapter 6 – Genocide and crimes against humanity
…
Art. 109
1. The penalty shall be a custodial sentence of not less than five years for any person who, as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population:
…
i. in relation with one of the acts under chapters 6 [genocide and crimes against humanity] and 6bis [war crimes] or with the aim of systematically oppressing or dominating a racial group, seriously injures the fundamental rights of members of a group of persons by depriving them or stripping them of these rights for political, racial, ethnical, religious or social reasons or any other reason that is contrary to international law.

[footnotes in original omitted]
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Under the UK ICC Act (2001), it is a punishable offence to commit a crime against humanity as defined in Article 7(1)(h) of the 1998 ICC Statute.
United States of America
Under the US War Crimes Act (1996), violations of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are war crimes.
United States of America
The US Regulations Governing the Trials of Accused War Criminals in the Pacific Region I (1945) established military commissions which had jurisdiction over offences such as “persecution on political, racial, national or religious grounds”.
United States of America
The US Regulations Governing the Trials of Accused War Criminals in the Pacific Region II (1945) established military commissions which had jurisdiction over offences such as “persecution on political, racial, national or religious grounds”.
United States of America
In July 2006, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum to senior military and civilian personnel in the Department of Defense (DoD) on the subject of common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its application to the treatment of detainees:
The Supreme Court Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 29 June 2006] has determined that Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies as a matter of law to the conflict with Al Qaeda. The Court found that the military commissions as constituted by the Department of Defense are not consistent with Common Article 3.
It is my understanding that, aside from the military commission procedures, existing DoD orders, policies, directives, execute orders, and doctrine comply with the standards of Common Article 3 … In addition, you will recall the President’s prior directive [President George W. Bush, Memorandum, Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, 7 February 2002] that “the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely,” humane treatment being the overarching requirement of Common Article 3.
You will ensure that all DoD personnel adhere to these standards. In this regard, I request that you promptly review all relevant directives, regulations, policies, practices and procedures under your purview to ensure that they comply with the standards of Common Article 3.
Uruguay
Uruguay’s Law on Cooperation with the ICC (2006) states:
26.2. Persons and objects affected by the war crimes set out in the present provision are persons and objects which international law protects in international or internal armed conflict.
26.3. The following are war crimes:
…
29. Committing … practices based on discrimination for reasons of race, gender or belonging to a group with its own identity.
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Penal Code (1976), as amended in 2001, provides that racial and other discrimination is a war crime.
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe’s Constitution (1979), as amended to 2009, states:
CHAPTER III
THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
…
23 Protection from discrimination on the grounds of race, etc.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section–
(a) no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect; and
(b) no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of any public office or any public authority.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a law shall be regarded as making a provision that is discriminatory and a person shall be regarded as having been treated in a discriminatory manner if, as a result of that law or treatment, persons of a particular description by race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed, sex, gender, marital status or physical disability are prejudiced–
(a) by being subjected to a condition, restriction or disability to which other persons of another such description are not made subject; or
(b) by the according to persons of another such description of a privilege or advantage which is not accorded to persons of the first-mentioned description;
and the imposition of that condition, restriction or disability or the according of that privilege or advantage is wholly or mainly attributable to the description by race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed, sex, gender, marital status or physical disability of the persons concerned.
…
25 Savings in the event of public emergencies
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Chapter [III], an Act of Parliament may in accordance with Schedule 2 derogate from certain provisions of the Declaration of Rights in respect of a period of public emergency …
26 Interpretation and other savings
…
(7) No measures taken in relation to a person who is a member of a disciplined force of a country with which Zimbabwe is at war or with which a state of hostilities exists and no law, to the extent that it authorises the taking of such measures, shall be held to be in contravention of the Declaration of Rights.
The Constitution also states:
SCHEDULE 2
1 Savings in the event of public emergencies
(1) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be in contravention of section 13, 17, 20, 21, 22 or 23 to the extent that the law in question provides for the taking, during a period of public emergency, of action for the purpose of dealing with any situation arising during that period, and nothing done by any person under the authority of any such law shall be held to be in contravention of any of the said provisions unless it is shown that the action taken exceeded anything which, having due regard to the circumstances prevailing at the time, could reasonably have been thought to be required for the purpose of dealing with the situation.
The Constitution further states:
In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires–
…
“period of public emergency” means–
(a) any period when Zimbabwe is engaged in any war and the period immediately following thereon until such date as may be declared by the President, by proclamation in the Gazette, as the end of the period of public emergency caused by that war.
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe’s Constitution (2013) states:
Chapter 4 – Declaration of Rights
…
56. Equality and non-discrimination
(1) All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.
(2) Women and men have the right to equal treatment …
(3) Every person has the right not to be treated in an unfairly discriminatory manner on such grounds as their nationality, race, colour, tribe, place of birth, ethnic or social origin, language, class, religious belief, political affiliation, opinion, custom, culture, sex, gender, marital status, age, pregnancy, disability or economic or social status, or whether they were born in or out of wedlock.
(4) A person is treated in a discriminatory manner for the purpose of subsection (3) if –
(a) they are subjected directly or indirectly to a condition, restriction or disability to which other people are not subjected; or
(b) other people are accorded directly or indirectly a privilege or advantage which they are not accorded.
(5) Discrimination on any of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair, reasonable and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom.
…
86. Limitation of rights and freedoms
…
(2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including –
…
(b) the purpose of the limitation, in particular whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest;
…
(3) No law may limit the following rights enshrined in this Chapter, and no person may violate them –
…
87. Limitations during public emergency
(1) In addition to the limitations permitted by section 86, the fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be further limited by a written law providing for measures to deal with situations arising during a period of public emergency, but only to the extent permitted by this section and the Second Schedule.
(2) A written law referred to in subsection (1) and any legislative measures taken under that law, must be published in the Gazette.
(3) Any limitation which a written law referred to in subsection (1) imposes on a fundamental right or freedom set out in this Chapter must not be greater than is strictly required by the emergency.
(4) No law that provides for a declaration of a state of emergency, and no legislative or other measure taken in consequence of such a declaration may –
(a) indemnify, or permit or authorise an indemnity for, the State or any institution or agency of the government at any level, or any other person, in respect of any unlawful act; or
(b) limit any of the rights referred to in section 86(3), or authorise or permit any of those rights to be violated.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
In 2007, in the
Damjanović case, the Appellate Panel of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that “an act of persecution on national, ethnic or religious grounds … is impermissible not only under the criminal legislation of Bosnia and Herzegovina but also under international law”.
Canada
In 2005, in the Mugesera case, Canada’s Supreme Court confirmed a deportation order on grounds of incitement to murder, hatred and genocide, and a crime against humanity, in Rwanda in 1992. The Court stated:
2. The outcome of the appeal hinges on the characterization of a speech delivered by the respondent Léon Mugesera in Rwanda in the Kinyarwandan language. The speech triggered a series of events that have brought the Government of Canada and Mr. Mugesera to this Court.
…
4. In 1995, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration became aware of allegations against the respondent and commenced proceedings under s. 27 of the Immigration Act. A permanent resident of Canada may be deported if it is determined, inter alia, that before or after being granted permanent residency, the individual committed criminal acts or offences. In this case, the speech was alleged to constitute an incitement to murder, hatred and genocide, and a crime against humanity.
5. In July 1996, an adjudicator concluded that the allegations were valid and issued a deportation order against Mr. Mugesera and his family. The Immigration and Refugee Board (Appeal Division) (“IAD”) upheld the adjudicator’s decision and dismissed the respondents’ appeal… The findings of fact and law were subject to judicial review in the Federal Court – Trial Division (“FCTD”)…, and then in the Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”). Décary J.A., writing for the FCA, reversed several findings of fact made by the IAD and reversed the deportation order, concluding that the Minister had not met his burden… The Minister has now appealed to this Court, and he asks that the IAD’s deportation order be confirmed.
…
7. For the reasons that follow, we would allow the appeal. The decision of the FCA should be set aside and the decision of the IAD in favour of deportation should be restored.
…
C. Crimes Against Humanity
…
129. The proscribed acts listed in s. 7(3.76) of the Criminal Code provide a first and essential requirement for a crime against humanity: an “underlying offence” must be committed. In essence, the listed acts represent the different ways in which a crime against humanity can be committed. This means that various acts may become crimes against humanity as long as the other elements of the offence are met. In s. 7(3.76) those crimes are murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, persecution or any other inhumane act or omission.
…
131. The question we must now consider is whether, as alleged by the Minister, Mr. Mugesera’s speech satisfies the initial criminal act requirement for a crime against humanity. We have found that the speech counselled murders which were not committed and incited hatred and genocide. This raises two issues: whether counselling a murder that is not committed meets the initial criminal act requirement for murder as a crime against humanity and whether speech inciting hatred meets the initial criminal act requirement for persecution as a crime against humanity.
…
2. Speech that Incites Hatred and Persecution as a Crime Against Humanity
…
138. Both the ICTR and the ICTY have approached the question of speech inciting hatred as relating to the enumerated act of “persecution”. Persecution is expressly listed in s. 7(3.76) of the Criminal Code as one of the underlying acts which, in the appropriate circumstances, may constitute a crime against humanity.
139. Determining whether an act constitutes persecution can be difficult. Persecution, unlike the other acts enumerated in s. 7(3.76), is not a standalone crime in Canadian law or in the legal systems of other countries: M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (2nd rev. ed. 1999), at p. 327. In contrast with murder, for instance, it is not evident from our domestic law what types of acts will constitute persecution.
140. … In considering the criminal act of persecution in Prosecutor v. Tadic, 112 ILR 1 (Trial Chamber II 1997), the ICTY, having reviewed the relevant jurisprudence and academic commentary, found that persecution “is some form of discrimination [on traditionally recognized grounds such as race, religion, or politics] that is intended to be and results in an infringement of an individual’s fundamental rights” (para. 697).
141. A danger arises, however, that the criminal act of persecution, as so defined, might apply to acts that are far less serious than the other forms of crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity should not be trivialized by applying the concept to fact situations which do not warrant the full opprobrium of international criminal sanction. Thus, the ICTY found in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T (Trial Chamber II) 14 January 2000, that the alleged persecution, in order to satisfy the criminal act requirement, must reach the same level of gravity as the other enumerated underlying acts. Persecution as a crime against humanity must constitute a “gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, reaching the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited” (para. 621).
142. Turning to the requisite mental element for persecution, we find that the accused must have intended to commit the persecutory acts and must have committed them with discriminatory intent. The requirement for discriminatory intent is unique to persecution and need not be shown in respect of the other forms of crimes against humanity … This point was made persuasively in the appeal from the Trial Chamber’s decision in Tadic, in which the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY conducted a thorough review of the international law principles on discriminatory intent and crimes against humanity in reaching a conclusion that the discriminatory intent requirement is unique to crimes against humanity which take the form of persecution: 124 ILR 61 (1999), at paras. 287–92.
143. The ICTR too has concluded that discriminatory intent is relevant only to persecution: Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A (Appeals Chamber), 1 June 2001, at paras. 460– 69. This is particularly significant since crimes against humanity as defined in art. 3 of the ICTR statute must be committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against any civilian population “on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”. In this respect, the judgment of our Court in Finta appears to be inconsistent with the recent jurisprudence of the ICTR and the ICTY. …
144. We see no reason to depart from the well-reasoned and persuasive findings of the ICTY and the ICTR on the question of discriminatory intent. Insofar as Finta suggested that discriminatory intent was required for all crimes against humanity … it should no longer be followed on this point.
145. We conclude from the preceding discussion that the criminal act of persecution is the gross or blatant denial of a fundamental right on discriminatory grounds. The guilty mental state is discriminatory intent to deny the right. The fundamental question remains to be answered: Was Mr. Mugesera’s speech a gross or blatant denial of fundamental rights on discriminatory grounds such that it was equal in gravity to the other acts enumerated in s. 7(3.76)?
146. The ICTR and the ICTY have both considered whether hate speech can ever satisfy the criminal act requirement for persecution. In one prominent case, the ICTR found that it was “evident” that hate speech targeting a population on the basis of ethnicity, or other discriminatory grounds was equal in gravity to the other enumerated acts: Media Case, at para. 1072. The ICTY, on the other hand, found in Kordic that the hate speech alleged in the indictment did not constitute persecution because it did not rise to the same level of gravity as the other enumerated acts (para. 209). The Trial Chamber distinguished hate speech that could properly form the basis of a crime against humanity from the hate speech alleged in the indictment, which fell short of incitement to murder, extermination, and genocide (footnote 272). The guiding concern must therefore always be whether the alleged persecutory act reaches the level of a gross or blatant denial of fundamental rights equivalent in gravity to the other enumerated acts.
147. In Keegstra, this Court found that the harm in hate speech lies not only in the injury to the self-dignity of target group members but also in the credence that may be given to the speech, which may promote discrimination and even violence … This finding suggests that hate speech always denies fundamental rights. The equality and the life, liberty and security of the person of target-group members cannot but be affected: see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, 39 ILM 1338 (ICTR, Trial Chamber I 2000), at para. 22. This denial of fundamental rights may, in particular instances, reach the level of a gross or blatant denial equal in gravity to the other acts enumerated in s. 7(3.76). This is particularly likely if the speech openly advocates extreme violence (such as murder or extermination) against the target group, but it may not be limited to such instances. In contrast to the case of counselling an enumerated violent act, whether the persecution actually results in the commission of acts of violence is irrelevant: Media Case, at para. 1073.
148. What then can be said of Mr. Mugesera’s speech? Mr. Duquette found as a matter of fact that Mr. Mugesera’s speech had incited hatred of Tutsi and of his political opponents … This incitement included the encouragement of acts of extreme violence … Keeping in mind that acts of persecution must be evaluated in context, Mr. Duquette’s finding that Mr. Mugesera’s speech occurred in a volatile situation characterized by rampant ethnic tensions and political instability which had already led to the commission of massacres is also compelling … A speech such as Mr. Mugesera’s, which actively encouraged ethnic hatred, murder and extermination and which created in its audience a sense of imminent threat and the need to act violently against an ethnic minority and against political opponents, bears the hallmarks of a gross or blatant act of discrimination equivalent in severity to the other underlying acts listed in s. 7(3.76). The criminal act requirement for persecution is therefore met.
149. Having concluded that the criminal act requirement for persecution is made out, we must go on to consider whether the culpable mental element of persecution is made out. Mr. Duquette found that Mr. Mugesera had a discriminatory intent in delivering his speech … He found that Mr. Mugesera targeted Tutsi and political opponents on the sole basis of ethnicity and political affiliation with the intent to compel his audience into action against these groups. The IAD’s [Immigration and Refugee Board Appellate Division] findings of fact thus amply support a finding that Mr. Mugesera not only committed the criminal act of persecution, but did so with the requisite discriminatory intent.
150. In sum, the criminal act requirement for a crime against humanity under ss. 7(3.76) and 7(3.77) of the Criminal Code contains two primary elements: (1) the accused has committed an underlying enumerated act; and (2) that act contravened international law. With respect to the first element, both the physical and mental elements of the underlying act must be made out. In the case at bar, there were two possible underlying acts: counselling of murder, and persecution by hate speech. For counselling of murder to be considered a crime against humanity under international law, murders must actually have been committed. Mr. Duquette’s finding that no murders were proven to have resulted from the speech therefore precludes a finding that Mr. Mugesera counselled murder within the meaning of s. 7(3.76). The other possible underlying act, persecution is a gross or blatant denial of fundamental rights on discriminatory grounds equal in severity to the other acts enumerated in s. 7(3.76). Hate speech, particularly when it advocates egregious acts of violence, may constitute persecution. In this case, it does.
…
179. Based on Mr. Duquette’s findings of fact, each element of the offence in s. 7(3.76) of the
Criminal Code has been made out. We are therefore of the opinion that reasonable grounds exist to believe that Mr. Mugesera committed a crime against humanity.
Canada
In 2013, in the
Sapkota case, Canada’s Federal Court dismissed a request for review of a decision denying refugee protection to the applicant on grounds of complicity in crimes against humanity in Nepal between 1991 and 2009. While reviewing the submissions of the respondent, Canada’s Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the Court stated: “The Respondent notes that the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court … is endorsed in Canada as a source of customary law.”
Chile
In its judgment in the Contreras Sepúlveda case in 2004, Chile’s Supreme Court stated:
[W]ithout any doubt, the 1949 Geneva Conventions are in force … and oblige State parties in case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring within their territory, which is exactly the situation in Chile during the period of 12 September 1973 and 11 March 1975, to treat humanely … opponents who have laid down their arms, without any adverse distinction.
Colombia
In 2005, in the Constitutional Case No. C-203/05, the Plenary Chamber of Colombia’s Constitutional Court stated:
As members of the civilian population affected by internal armed conflicts, children and adolescents have the right to respect for the fundamental guarantees granted to all persons not actively participating in hostilities, as established by Article 3 common to the [1949] Geneva Conventions … In accordance with this Article, in cases of non-international armed conflicts in the territory of one of the Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply certain minimum guarantees without affecting their legal status as parties to the conflict, including: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities shall be treated humanely in all circumstances without adverse distinction based on discriminatory criteria.
Colombia
In 2007, in the Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, the Plenary Chamber of Colombia’s Constitutional Court stated:
Taking into account … the development of customary international humanitarian law applicable in internal armed conflicts, the Constitutional Court notes that the fundamental guarantees stemming from the principle of humanity, some of which have attained
ius cogens status, … [include] prohibition of discrimination in the application of international humanitarian law.

[footnote in original omitted]
South Africa
In 1987, in the Petane case, the Cape Provincial Division of South Africa’s Supreme Court dismissed the accused’s claim that the 1977 Additional Protocol I reflected customary international law. The Court stated:
The accused has been indicted before this Court on three counts of terrorism, that is to say, contraventions of s 54(1) of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. He has also been indicted on three counts of attempted murder.
…
The accused’s position is stated to be that this Court has no jurisdiction to try him.
…
… The point in its early formulation was this. By the terms of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I to the [1949] Geneva Conventions the accused was entitled to be treated as a prisoner-of-war. A prisoner-of-war is entitled to have notice of an impending prosecution for an alleged offence given to the so-called “protecting power” appointed to watch over prisoners-of-war. Since, if such a notice were necessary, the trial could not proceed without it, Mr Donen suggested that the necessity or otherwise for giving such a notice should be determined before evidence was led. …
…
On 12 August 1949 there were concluded at Geneva in Switzerland four treaties known as the Geneva Conventions. …
South Africa was among the nations which concluded the treaties. … Except for the common art 3, which binds parties to observe a limited number of fundamental humanitarian principles in armed conflicts not of an international character, they apply to wars between States.
After the Second World War many conflicts arose which could not be characterised as international. It was therefore considered desirable by some States to extend and augment the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, so as to afford protection to victims of and combatants in conflicts which fell outside the ambit of these Conventions. The result of these endeavours was Protocol I and Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, both of which came into force on 7 December 1978.
Protocol II relates to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. Since the State of affairs which exists in South Africa has by Protocol I been characterised as an international armed conflict, Protocol II does not concern me at all.
…
The extension of the scope of art 2 of the Geneva Conventions was, at the time of its adoption, controversial. …
The article has remained controversial. More debate has raged about its field of operation than about any other articles in Protocol I. …
South Africa is one of the countries which has not acceded to Protocol I. Nevertheless, I am asked to decide, as I indicated earlier, as a preliminary point, whether Protocol I has become part of customary international law. If so, it is argued that it would have been incorporated into South African law. If it has been so incorporated it would have to be proved by one or other of the parties that the turmoil which existed at the time when the accused is alleged to have committed his offences was such that it could properly be described as an “armed conflict” conducted by “peoples” against a “ra[c]ist regime” in the exercise of their “right of self-determination”. Once all this has been shown it would have to be demonstrated to the Court that the accused conducted himself in such a manner as to become entitled to the benefits conferred by Protocol I on combatants, for example that, broadly speaking, he had, while he was launching an attack, distinguished himself from civilians and had not attacked civilian targets. …
…
… I am prepared to accept that where a rule of customary international law is recognised as such by international law it will be so recognised by our law.
…
To my way of thinking, the trouble with the first Protocol giving rise to State practice is that its terms have not been capable of being observed by all that many States. At the end of 1977 when the treaty first lay open for ratification there were few States which were involved in colonial domination or the occupation of other States and there were only two, South Africa and Israel, which were considered to fall within the third category of ra[c]ist regimes. Accordingly, the situation sought to be regulated by the first Protocol was one faced by few countries; too few countries in my view, to permit any general usage in dealing with armed conflicts of the kind envisaged by the Protocol to develop.
…
Mr Donen contended that the provisions of multilateral treaties can become customary international law under certain circumstances. I accept that this is so. There seems in principle to be no reason why treaty rules cannot acquire wider application than among the parties to the treaty.
Brownlie Principles of International Law 3rd ed at 13 agrees that non-parties to a treaty may by their conduct accept the provisions of a multilateral convention as representing general international law. …
…
I incline to the view that non-ratification of a treaty is strong evidence of non-acceptance.
…
It is interesting to note that the first Protocol makes extensive provision for the protection of civilians in armed conflict. …
…
In this sense, Protocol I may be described as an enlightened humanitarian document. If the strife in South Africa should deteriorate into an armed conflict we may all one day find it a cause for regret that the ideologically provocative tone of s 1(4) has made it impossible for the Government to accept its terms.
…
To my mind it can hardly be said that Protocol I has been greeted with acclaim by the States of the world. Their lack of enthusiasm must be due to the bizarre mixture of political and humanitarian objects sought to be realised by the Protocol. …
…
According to the International Review of the Red Cross (January/February 1987) No 256, as at December 1986, 66 States were parties to Protocol I and 60 to Protocol II, which, it will be remembered, deals with internal non-international armed conflicts. With the exception of France, which acceded only to Protocol II, not one of the world’s major powers has acceded to or ratified either of the Protocols. This position should be compared to the 165 States which are parties to the Geneva Conventions.
This approach of the world community to Protocol I is, on principle, far too half-hearted to justify an inference that its principles have been so widely accepted as to qualify them as rules of customary international law. The reasons for this are, I imagine, not far to seek. For those States which are contending with “peoples[’]” struggles for self-determination, adoption of the Protocol may prove awkward. For liberation movements who rely on strategies of urban terror for achieving their aims the terms of the Protocol, with its emphasis on the protection of civilians, may prove disastrously restrictive. I therefore do not find it altogether surprising that Mr Donen was unable to refer me to any statement in the published literature that Protocol I has attained the status o[f] customary international [law].
…
I have not been persuaded by the arguments which I have heard on behalf of the accused that the assessment of Professor Dugard, writing in the Annual Survey of South African Law (1983) at 66, that “it is argued with growing conviction that under contemporary international law members of SWAPO [South-West Africa People’s Organisation] and the ANC [African National Congress] are members of liberation movements entitled to prisoner-of-war status, in terms of a new customary rule spawned by the 1977 Protocols”, is correct. On what I have heard in argument I disagree with his assessment that there is growing support for the view that the Protocols reflect a new rule of customary international law. No writer has been cited who supports this proposition. Here and there someone says that it may one day come about. I am not sure that the provisions relating to the field of application of Protocol I are capable of ever becoming a rule of customary international law, but I need not decide that point today.
For the reasons which I have given I have concluded that the provisions of Protocol I have not been accepted in customary international law. They accordingly form no part of South African law.
This conclusion has made it unnecessary for me to give a decision on the question of whether rules of customary international law which conflict with the statutory or common law of this country will be enforced by its courts.
In the result, the preliminary point is dismissed. The trial must proceed.
South Africa
In 2010, in the Boeremag case, South Africa’s North Gauteng High Court stated:
In Petane, … Conradie J found that the provisions of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I are not part of customary international law, and therefore are also not part of South African law.
…
Referring to the fact that in December 1986 only 66 of the 165 States party to the Geneva Conventions had ratified Protocol I, the Court [in Petane stated:
This approach of the world community to Protocol I is, on principle, far too half-hearted to justify an inference that its principles have been so widely accepted as to qualify them as rules of customary international law. The reasons for this are, I imagine, not far to seek. For those States which are contending with “peoples[’]” struggles for self-determination, adoption of the Protocol may prove awkward. For liberation movements who rely on strategies of urban terror for achieving their aims the terms of the Protocol, with its emphasis on the protection of civilians, may prove disastrously restrictive. I therefore do not find it altogether surprising that Mr Donen was unable to refer me to any statement in the published literature that Protocol I has attained the status of customary international law.
Important changes with respect to certain aspects applicable at the time of Petane have taken place. The ANC [African National Congress] has become South Africa’s ruling party and in 1995 ratified Protocol I. The total number of States that have ratified it, is now … 162.
This last aspect forms the basis on which the First Respondent [the State] and the applicants agree that Protocol I forms part of customary international law as well as of South African law. As requested, this position is accepted for the purposes of the decision, without deciding on the matter.
Despite these changes, it remains debatable whether the provisions of Protocol I have become a part of South African law in this way.
The consensus of both parties to the conflict is required. See Petane … and Article 96 of Protocol I. …
Parliament’s failure to incorporate Protocol I into legislation in accordance with Article 231(4) of the Constitution in fact points to the contrary, and is indicative that the requirements of
usus and/or
opinio juris have not been met. See
Petane.

[footnotes in original omitted]
The Court also held:
If the [1977 Additional Protocol I] applies in South Africa as customary international law, the two requirements that form the basis of customary law must be met. It is arguable that the requirement of
usus has been met by the vast number of States that have acceded or ratified it. By ratifying Protocol I the Republic of South Africa has indicated its intention to apply the Protocol, thereby fulfilling the requirement of
opinio juris.
United States of America
In 2004, in the Demjanjuk case, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a ruling by the district court which revoked the US citizenship of the appellant, due to his participation in Nazi-sponsored acts of persecution while serving during World War II as an armed guard at Trawniki Concentration Camp and other places of persecution. The Court stated:
[T]he district court found that the Government has proven by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that [the] Defendant assisted in the persecution of civilian populations during World War II, based on evidence that the Trawniki service pass was an authentic German wartime document issued to [the] Defendant sufficiently identifying him and establishing his presence at the Nazi training camp between 1942 and 1944. Demjanjuk 7.a United States v. Demjanjuk, No. 1:99CV1193, 2002 WL 544622 (N. D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2002)]. … Given the credibility determination made with respect to the identification elements of the Government’s case, this Court agrees with the Government that the district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous.
…
The district court correctly ruled that voluntariness is not an element of an assistance-in-persecution charge under the DPA [Displaced Persons Act of 1948]. The Supreme Court has previously ruled that “an individual’s service as a concentration camp armed guard – whether voluntary or not – made him ineligible for a visa.” Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512. [Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505, 101 S.Ct. 737, 66 L.Ed.2d 686 (1981)] Additionally, a defendant need not engage in “personal acts” of persecution in order to be held ineligible for a visa, because an individual’s service in a unit dedicated to exploiting and exterminating civilians on the basis of race or religion constitutes assistance in persecution within the meaning of the DPA. United States v. Dailide, 227 F.3d 385, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2000).
…
Furthermore, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that [the] Defendant misrepresented and concealed his wartime residence and activities, which included his service at Trawniki, Sobibor, Majdenek, with the Guard Forces of the SS and Police Leader in Lublin District, and with the SS Death’s Head Battalion at Flossenburg Concentration Camp. This information was material because its disclosure would have precluded Defendant from being placed in the “of concern,” category under the DPA, thus affecting the disposition of his visa application as a “displaced person.” See
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 514–15. If [the] Defendant had disclosed the information regarding his service in the Austrian and German armies during his application process, the immigration officials would have naturally been influenced in their decision, because service in such armies leaves applicants ineligible under the DPA. Therefore, upon signing his Application for Immigration Visa, Defendant knowingly misrepresented material facts, leaving his entry to the United States unlawful and naturalization illegally procured.
United States of America
In 2006, in the Kumpf case, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a ruling by the lower court which revoked the US citizenship of the appellant, due to his participation in Nazi-sponsored acts of persecution while serving during World War II as an armed SS guard at Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp and other places of persecution. The Court stated,
The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 provides that a person who “personally advocated or assisted” in persecution is ineligible for a visa. Pub.L. No. 83-203 § 14(a), 67 Stat. 400 (1953). The Refugee Relief Act added the word “personally.” The prior governing act, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which was amended in 1950, considered any person who “advocated or assisted” in persecution to be ineligible for a visa, regardless of whether he “personally” did so. Pub.L. No. 81-555 § 13, 64 Stat. 219 (1950). The amendment thus narrowed the class of potential immigrants who could be excluded based on their assistance in persecution. …
Under the narrower language of the Refugee Relief Act, Kumpf argues that his service in the Waffen SS does not constitute personal assistance in persecution, and therefore does not disqualify him from obtaining a visa. The Supreme Court described conduct that would satisfy the broader “assisting in persecution” under the Displaced Persons Act by stating:
an individual who did no more than cut the hair of female inmates before they were executed cannot be found to have assisted in the persecution of civilians. On the other hand, there can be no question that a guard who was issued a uniform and armed with a rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and was regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp to visit a nearby village, and who admitted to shooting at escaping inmates on orders from the commandant of the camp, fits within the statutory language about persons who assisted in the persecution of civilians. Other cases may present more difficult line-drawing problems but we need decide only this case.
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n. 34 … [Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505, 101 S.Ct. 737, 66 L.Ed.2d 686 (1981)] Thus, an armed guard who took direct action against prisoners unquestionably assisted in persecution. It is undisputed that persecution occurred at the locations where Kumpf served. The issue in this case, however, is whether Kumpf’s particular actions as a guard constituted “personal” assistance in the persecution under the Refugee Relief Act.
…
Kumpf emphasizes in his brief that he “never personally harmed any individual” and never “aimed or discharged his weapon at anyone.” He argues that his limited conduct cannot constitute personal assistance in persecution. This lack of affirmative acts, however, does not undermine the fact that he fulfilled his role as a guard. The Refugee Relief Act’s parameters are not limited to personally harming or personally shooting individuals; the language instead addresses personal assistance. Kumpf’s personal presence functioned to discourage escape attempts and maintain order over the prisoners. His participation was not through monetary contributions, mere membership, or other indirect actions. Rather, he presided over and witnessed the torture and murder of helpless people. Because no one tried to escape during his watch, he claims he did not have to shoot anyone. Nevertheless, his personal presence as an armed guard clearly assisted in the persecution of the prisoners. As the Eighth Circuit explained, “[t]he pertinent question is [ ] whether Friedrich ‘personally assisted’ on persecution, not whether he engaged in direct persecution.” Friedrich, 402 F.3d at 845. [United States v. Friedrich, 402 F.3d 842, (8th Cir.2005)] The Eighth Circuit concluded that “[b]y guarding the perimeter of the [ ] concentration camps to ensure that prisoners did not escape from these unspeakable conditions, Friedrich personally assisted in the persecution that occurred in those camps.” Id. at 846. We agree with this reasoning. While the precise parameters of personal assistance under the Refugee Relief Act have not been delineated by the courts, Kumpf’s own actions clearly constitute personal assistance in persecution. His claim of no affirmative or direct acts of harm does not alter this conclusion.
Kumpf next argues that his service in the Waffen SS was involuntary. He submits that the involuntariness of his service should be considered in determining his eligibility for a visa under the Refugee Relief Act. Even assuming that Kumpf served involuntarily, the Refugee Relief Act does not require a person to assist voluntarily in persecution. In the context of the Displaced Persons Act, courts have held that the voluntariness of the service is irrelevant. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 513, 101 S.Ct. 737 (“an individual’s service as a concentration camp armed guard –whether voluntary or involuntary – made him ineligible for a visa.”); Wittje, 422 F.3d at 489 [United States v. Wittje, 422 F.3d 479, (7th Cir.2005)] (“there is no voluntariness requirement in the plain language” of the Displaced Persons Act). Similarly, the plain language of the Refugee Relief Act lacks a voluntariness requirement.
…
Kumpf’s actions as an armed guard at Nazi concentration camps constitute personal assistance in persecution under the Refugee Relief Act. Because of this service, Kumpf was ineligible for a visa, making his entry into this country improper and his citizenship illegally procured. Denaturalization is therefore warranted. … Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
United States of America
In 2008, in the Geiser case, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a ruling by the lower court which revoked the US citizenship of the appellant, due to his participation in Nazi-sponsored acts of persecution while serving during World War II as an armed SS guard at Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp and other places of persecution. The Court stated,
On April 9, 2004, the United States filed a complaint to revoke Geiser’s citizenship … The complaint alleged that Geiser’s service as an SS concentration camp guard rendered him ineligible for a visa under the RRA [Refugee Relief Act of 1953], which provides: “No visa shall be issued under this Act to any person who personally advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person or group of persons because of race, religion, or national origin.” RRA § 14(a). …
…
[T]he precise question at issue … [is] whether serving as a concentration camp guard constitutes “personally advocat[ing] or assist[ing] in … persecution.”
…
Geiser argues that RRA § 14(a) is silent as to the meaning of the term “persecution,” and that the definition of “persecution” is therefore ambiguous. …
…
In a case involving the denaturalization of a former Nazi, we defined “persecution” … United States v. Koreh, 59 F.3d 431, 440 (3d Cir. 1995). We said that persecution is “the infliction of sufferings, harm, or death on those who differ … in a way regarded as offensive or meriting extirpation[;] a campaign having for its object the subjugation or extirpation of the adherents of a religion.” Id. …
Under … [this] definition, the experiences of prisoners at Nazi concentration camps fit squarely within the plain meaning of “persecution.” Thus, the meaning of “persecution” is not ambiguous, even though the statute does not define the term. Indeed, Geiser concedes that Sachscnhauscn and Buchenwald [concentration camps] were “places of persecution.” This admission forecloses his argument that “persecution” is an ambiguous term in the context of this case, because even if it is, he agrees that the concentration camps where he was a guard were places of persecution.
…
[T]he Supreme Court and this Court have both acknowledged that the term “persecution” has gray boundaries where ambiguity may legitimately be found. Id.; Chen [Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004)], at 232. However, these cases also recognize that certain conduct (guarding a concentration camp or forcing a woman to undergo an abortion) falls squarely within the definition of “persecution.” Geiser’s case presents an example of such conduct. It cannot be rationally argued that prisoners at Sachscnhauscn and Buchenwald were not persecuted within the plain meaning of that term. Therefore, the text of the RRA is not ambiguous due to the use of the term “persecution.”
…
Geiser’s conduct as an SS guard fits the plain meaning of “personally advocated or assisted in ... persecution.” Geiser stood watch at the perimeter of the concentration camps with instructions to fire his rifle if a prisoner tried to escape. Thus, his personal actions assisted in keeping the prisoners confined in the camps where they were persecuted. In addition, he marched prisoners to and from their work sites, and these personal actions assisted in coercing the prisoners into performing forced labor.
…
We conclude, as have other Courts of Appeals, that according to the plain meaning of the RRA, concentration camp guards “personally advocated or assisted in ... persecution.” RRA § 14(a).
…
We [therefore] conclude that … [a]s an armed concentration camp guard in World War II, Geiser “personally advocated or assisted in the persecution of [a] ... group of persons because of race, religion, or national origin.” RRA § 14(a). Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting the Government’s motion for summary judgment and revoking Geiser’s citizenship.
Afghanistan
In 2009, in its initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Afghanistan stated:
Concerted efforts have been undertaken by the MoE [Ministry of Education] to eliminate all forms of discrimination and to ensure accessibility to education by both “girls” and “boys” regardless of their ethnicity, race, religion, and social status … To achieve the determined objectives the following steps have been implemented:
…
- The MoE, in cooperation with relevant civil society organizations, has implemented a two phase accelerated education programme targeting children, especially girls, who were deprived of education during conflict and Taliban era and reintegrate them into mainstream education. From February 2003 to end of 2005, education was provided in 17 provinces in more than 6,800 classes to 170,000 primary students by 6,800 teachers. The second stage, which is currently continuing, supports students aged 10 to 15 years to complete two education years in one year upon which they are enrolled into basic mainstream education schools.

[footnotes in original omitted]
Belgium
In 2001, in its thirteenth periodic report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Belgium stated:
Following reports of acts, particularly acts of a racist nature, which were allegedly committed by soldiers from a Belgian battalion of the international peacekeeping force in Somalia and for which sentences were handed down, the Minister of Defence took strong action, by agreement with the army chief of staff, to rid the army of racism and, in particular, make multiculturalism a positive feature of the army’s corporate culture. The general watchword adopted in 1999 thus relates to the topic of racism and xenophobia. A code of conduct was also drawn up and includes the question of racism and xenophobia.
Belgium
In 2001, in its initial report to the Committee against Torture, Belgium stated:
Paragraph 7 of the Code of Conduct of the Department of Defence (May 1999) also refers to human rights and international humanitarian law:
“7. … I undertake to treat every individual with respect on a basis of equality. I will not tolerate any form of discrimination. I will assist any individual in danger.”
Bosnia and Herzegovina
In 2004, in its initial report to the Committee against Torture, Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that its Law on the Movement and Stay of Aliens and Asylum (2004) prescribes:
No discrimination whatsoever based on any grounds, including sex, race, colour of skin, language, religion, political and other opinions, national and social origin, ethnic minority, property status, age, psychological or physical disability, status gained by birth or some other status may be expressed towards aliens.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
In 2005, in its initial report to the Human Rights Committee, Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that its Law on Freedom of Religion and on the Legal Status of Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004) prohibits “any kind of discrimination that is based on religion or belief”.
Croatia
In 2007, in its second periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Croatia stated:
68. Article 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia states:
During a state of war … individual freedoms and rights guaranteed by the Constitution may be restricted. …
69. The extent of such restrictions shall be adequate to the nature of the danger, and may not result in the inequality of persons in respect of race, colour, gender, language, religion, national or social origin.
Finland
In 2003, in its fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Finland stated:
The Emergency Powers Act (1080/1991) requires that the basic necessities of the population, the maintenance of law and order and the protection of the territorial integrity and independence of Finland be ensured in emergency situations. Section 9 (198/2000) specifically provides that the rights protected by the Constitution or other recognised rights may only be restricted under the Emergency Powers Act to the extent it is necessary in order to control the situation. The prohibited grounds of discrimination are listed in the Act in the same way as in the Constitution … A corresponding provision is included in section 7 (199/2000) of the Defence Act (1083/1991).
Georgia
In 2014, in its fourth periodic report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Georgia stated:
II. Violation of the rights of the child in the occupied regions of Georgia and the programs of the Government of Georgia addressing the needs of the children in the occupied regions
Introduction
6. Information below covers violations of the rights of the child in the occupied regions of Georgia in the two-year period of 2012–2013. However, many trends identified in the document date back to more than a decade, but have become particularly manifest after the Russian occupation of the Abkhazia and Tsk[h]invali regions in 2008. The Russian troops drawing barbed wire fences, digging trenches and erecting other physical barriers along the Administrative Boundary Lines (hereinafter ABL) near Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region became commonplace and intense throughout 2012. As a result, lives of residents in the occupied regions and those living in the vicinity, including children, have been adversely affected. Even worse, children of Georgian descent, mostly those living in the Gali district in Abkhazia, have been targeted on ethnic grounds. Violations of the rights of the child in the Occupied Regions have taken place in the fields of freedom of movement, freedom of expression, preservation of identity, protection of privacy, health and education, and constitute a grave breach of the [1989] Convention on the Rights of the Child. The matter of fact that the effective control over these Georgian territories is now exercised by the Russian military and the political officialdom, puts the responsibility over these violations on the shoulders of the Russian Federation as the subject of international law.
…
IV. General principles
Non-discrimination
…
47. Due to Russia’s occupation of Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia and Abkhazia[,] Georgia has been prevented from the opportunity to ensure protection of human rights, including children’s rights in th[ose] parts of the country. Serious facts of discriminations and human rights violations have been reported by numerous … reputable international organizations, committed predominantly against population of Georgian origin. People of Georgian ethnicity, including children, have been deprived of fundamental rights, such as right to property, right to receive education in their “mother tongue”, right to fair trial, etc. As a result of ethnic cleansing[,] hundreds of thousands of IDPs [internally displaced persons], predominantly of Georgian origin, are unable to return to their homes due to their ethnic belonging. Families who live in conflict zones are under constant pressure. They are forced to obtain Russian citizenship. If they refuse to comply they are threatened with punitive measures or expulsion. People living in adjacent areas are arbitrar[il]y arrested and detained by illegal armed groups and Russian military forces.

[footnotes in original omitted]
Equal protection of rights in the Covenant
17. Indonesia has ensured non-discrimination in the protection of the rights provided for in the Covenant through national legislations, particularly the 1945 Constitution (Article 28 and Chapter XA on Human Rights). Article 28I Paragraph (2) of the Constitution states that every person shall have the right to be free from discriminatory treatment on any grounds whatsoever and shall have the right to protection from such discriminatory treatment.
…
Islamic Republic of Iran
In 2003, in its second periodic report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Islamic Republic of Iran stated:
The Constitutional Law of Iran, according to its articles 19 and 20, while considering all persons equal, has forbidden any kind of discrimination based on race, gender, colour, etc. It has guaranteed equality before the law, and protection of the people. … [T]here is no bar to admissions based on religion.
Iraq
On the basis of the reply by Iraq’s Ministry of Defence to a questionnaire, the Report on the Practice of Iraq states that, during the Iran–Iraq War, members of the opposing forces who were
hors de combat were treated without distinction based on military rank or category.
Jordan
The Report on the Practice of Jordan states that Article 75 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I embodies customary law.
Rwanda
In 2010, in its initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child under the 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, Rwanda stated:
42. With regard to the conformity of the implementation of the [2000] Optional Protocol [on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict] to the general principles of the [1989] Convention on the Rights of the Child, the following should be noted.
1. Non-discrimination
43. Concerning … non-discrimination, Article 11 of the Constitution [of the Republic of Rwanda (2003)] specifies that:
All Rwandans are born and remain free and equal in rights and duties.
Discrimination of whatever kind based on, inter alia, ethnic origin, tribe, clan, colour, sex, region, social origin, religion or faith, opinion, economic status, culture, language, social status, physical or mental disability or any other form of discrimination is prohibited and punishable by law.
44. All national legal instruments conform to this constitutional principle. … Law [Relating to] the Rights and Protection of the [C]hild [A]gainst [V]iolence [(2001)] … is one of those laws. … [It] does not make any discrimination among [the] rights and obligations that it stipulates with regard to children, and this applies [also] to penal acts.
45. In practice, no discrimination is made among beneficiaries of rehabilitation and social reintegration measures. … [Although] there are very few girls who return according to official procedures, the facilities were however provided for them at the demobilisation camp ([such as] dormitories and toilet amenities separate from those of boys, [and the presence of] a female social worker).
Serbia and Montenegro
In its initial report to the Human Rights Committee in 2003, Serbia and Montenegro stated:
According to Article 99, paragraph 11, of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, enactments adopted during a state of war may throughout the duration of the state of war restrict various rights and freedoms of man and the citizen, except specific rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution (equality of citizens.
Somalia
In 2011, in its report to the Human Rights Council, Somalia stated:
Somalia has not ratified AP II [1977 Additional Protocol II] and it is therefore not directly applicable to Somalia as a matter of treaty law. The Government is aware that many provisions of AP II represent customary IHL rules and therefore apply to the situation in Somalia. Such provisions include Article 4 providing guarantees to persons taking no active part in hostilities … due to the fact that these norms are reflected in Common Article 3 of the [1949] Geneva Conventions.
Humanitarian law is based on a number of fundamental principles. They are apparent in current treaties and customary law and express the core of humanitarian law. They concern the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution, the prohibition on causing superfluous damage and unnecessary suffering and the principle of non-discrimination as well as the so called Martens Clause.
Switzerland
In 2012, Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs issued a press release entitled “Appeal by the Swiss authorities for compliance with international humanitarian law in Syria”, which stated: “Persons who are not or no longer taking part in the hostilities must be treated humanely without any discrimination. This is especially important in the case of detainees.”
Ukraine
In 1999, in its sixth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Ukraine stated:
72. In article 64, paragraph 2, the Constitution lists those rights and freedoms which may not be restricted under martial law or a state of emergency.
73. These rights and freedoms include, among others, the following:
- There may be no privileges or restrictions on the grounds of race, colour, sex, political, religious or other conviction, ethnic or social origin, property, place of residence, or linguistic or other attributes.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2010, in its closing submissions to the public inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Baha Mousa and the treatment of those detained with him by UK armed forces in Iraq in 2003, the UK Ministry of Defence stated regarding common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: “On its face this protection is restricted to armed conflicts not of an international character. However, it is understood to apply in all forms of armed conflict as part of customary international law to set out the irreducible minimum standard.”
United States of America
In 1987, the Deputy Legal Adviser of the US Department of State affirmed:
We support in particular the fundamental guarantees contained in article 75 [of the 1977 Additional Protocol I], such as the principle that all persons who are in the power of a party to a conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions be treated humanely in all circumstances and enjoy, at a minimum, the protections specified in the Conventions without any adverse distinction based upon race, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, or any similar criteria.
United States of America
According to the Report on US Practice, “Articles 4, 5 and 6 [of the 1977 Additional Protocol II] reflect general US policy on treatment of persons in the power of an adverse party in armed conflicts governed by common Article 3 [of the 1949 Geneva Conventions]”.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, the UN General Assembly acknowledged that “no derogation from the prohibition of racial discrimination, genocide, the crime of apartheid or slavery is permitted, as defined in the obligations under the relevant human rights instruments”.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, the UN General Assembly acknowledged that “no derogation from the prohibition of racial discrimination, genocide, the crime of apartheid or slavery is permitted, as defined in the obligations under the relevant human rights instruments”.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the UN General Assembly:
Stresses that States and international organizations have a responsibility to ensure that measures taken in the struggle against terrorism do not discriminate in purpose or effect on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, and urges all States to rescind or refrain from all forms of racial profiling.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief, the UN General Assembly:
Resolved to adopt all necessary and appropriate measures for the speedy elimination of … intolerance based on religion or belief in all its forms and manifestations and to prevent and combat discrimination based on religion or belief,
Noting that a formal or legal distinction at the national level between different kinds of religions or faith-based communities may, in some cases, constitute discrimination and may impinge on the enjoyment of the freedom of religion or belief,
…
2. Condemns all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief;
…
6. Expresses concern over the persistence of institutionalized social intolerance and discrimination practised against many in the name of religion or belief;
7. Condemns any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, whether it involves the use of print, audiovisual and electronic media or any other means;
…
10.
Urges States to step up their efforts to eliminate intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on the Human Rights Council, the UN General Assembly:
Emphasizing the responsibilities of all States, in conformity with the Charter, to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language or religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the UN General Assembly:
Stresses that States and international organizations have a responsibility to ensure that measures taken in the struggle against terrorism do not discriminate in purpose or effect on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, and urges all States to rescind or refrain from all forms of racial profiling.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief, the UN General Assembly:
Resolved to adopt all necessary and appropriate measures for the speedy elimination of … intolerance based on religion or belief in all its forms and manifestations and prevent and combat discrimination based on religion or belief,
Noting that a formal or legal distinction at the national level between different kinds of religions or faith-based communities may, in some cases, constitute discrimination and may impinge on the enjoyment of the freedom of religion or belief,
…
2. Condemns all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief;
…
6. Expresses concern over the persistence of institutionalized social intolerance and discrimination practised against many in the name of religion or belief;
7. Condemns any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, whether it involves the use of print, audio-visual and electronic media or any other means;
…
10.
Urges States to step up their efforts to eliminate intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the UN General Assembly:
2. Expresses grave concern at:
(a) The ongoing systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of Myanmar … including discrimination and violations suffered by persons belonging to ethnic nationalities of Myanmar …
…
3. Strongly calls upon the Government of Myanmar:
…
(b) To take urgent measures to put an end to the military operations targeting civilians in the ethnic areas, and the associated violations of human rights and humanitarian law against persons belonging to ethnic nationalities …
…
4. Calls upon the Government of Myanmar:
…
(
b) To pursue through dialogue and peaceful means the immediate suspension and permanent end of conflict with all ethnic nationalities in Myanmar.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the situation in Afghanistan, the UN General Assembly:
19. Calls for the full respect of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all, without discrimination of any kind, including on the basis of gender, ethnicity or religion, in accordance with obligations under the Afghan Constitution and international law;
…
26.
Recognizes the significant progress achieved on gender equality in Afghanistan in recent years, and strongly condemns incidents of discrimination and violence against women and girls, including women activists, in Afghanistan, wherever they occur.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling its previous resolutions on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief, the most recent being resolution 61/161 of 19 December 2006, as well as Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 of 18 June 2007,
1. Condemns all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief, as well as violations of freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief;
2. Stresses that the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion applies equally to all people, regardless of their religions or beliefs, and without any discrimination as to their equal protection by the law;
…
6. Expresses concern over the persistence of institutionalized social intolerance and discrimination practised against many in the name of religion or belief;
7. Condemns any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, whether it involves the use of print, audio-visual and electronic media or any other means;
…
10.
Urges States to step up their efforts to eliminate intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, the UN General Assembly reaffirmed that “counter-terrorism measures should be implemented in full consideration of the human rights of persons belonging to minorities and must not be discriminatory on grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin”.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the UN General Assembly:
1. Acknowledges that no derogation from the prohibition of racial discrimination, genocide, the crime of apartheid or slavery is permitted, as defined in the obligations under the relevant human rights instruments;
…
4.
Stresses that States and international organizations have a responsibility to ensure that measures taken in the struggle against terrorism do not discriminate in purpose or effect on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, and urges all States to rescind or refrain from all forms of racial profiling.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the UN General Assembly:
2. Expresses grave concern at:
…
(d) The discrimination and violations suffered by persons belonging to ethnic nationalities of Myanmar, particularly in border and conflict areas, and attacks by military forces and non-State armed groups on villages in Karen State and other ethnic States in Myanmar, leading to extensive forced displacements and serious violations and other abuses of the human rights of the affected populations;
…
4. Strongly calls upon the Government of Myanmar:
…
(
h) To take urgent measures to put an end to the military operations targeting civilians in the ethnic areas, and to the associated violations of human rights and humanitarian law directed against persons belonging to ethnic nationalities, to end the systematic forced displacement of large numbers of persons and other causes of refugee flows to neighbouring countries and to respect existing ceasefire agreements.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on combating defamation of religions, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Reaffirming that discrimination against human beings on the grounds of religion or belief constitutes an affront to human dignity and a disavowal of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
…
Alarmed at the serious instances of intolerance, discrimination and acts of violence based on religion or belief, intimidation and coercion motivated by extremism, religious or otherwise, occurring in many parts of the world and threatening the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
…
2. Expresses deep concern at negative stereotyping of religions and manifestations of intolerance and discrimination in matters of religion or belief still in evidence in some regions of the world;
…
7. Urges all States, within their national legal framework, in conformity with international human rights instruments, to take all appropriate measures to combat hatred, discrimination, intolerance and acts of violence, intimidation and coercion motivated by religious intolerance, including attacks on religious places, and to encourage understanding, tolerance and respect in matters relating to freedom of religion or belief;
8.
Also urges all States to ensure that all public officials, including members of law enforcement bodies, the military, civil servants and educators, in the course of their official duties respect different religions and beliefs and do not discriminate on the grounds of religion or belief, and that necessary and appropriate education or training is provided.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressed its grave concern at “discrimination and persecution on the basis of religious or ethnic background”.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Stresses that States and international organizations have a responsibility to ensure that measures taken in the struggle against terrorism do not discriminate in purpose or effect on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, and urges all States to rescind or refrain from all forms of racial profiling.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on combating defamation of religions, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Recalling that all States have pledged themselves, under the Charter of the United Nations, to promote and encourage universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,
…
Reaffirming that discrimination against human beings on the grounds of religion or belief constitutes an affront to human dignity and a disavowal of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
…
Alarmed at the serious instances of intolerance, discrimination and acts of violence based on religion or belief, intimidation and coercion motivated by extremism, religious or otherwise, occurring in many parts of the world and threatening the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
…
2. Expresses deep concern at negative stereotyping of religions and manifestations of intolerance and discrimination in matters of religion or belief still in evidence in some regions of the world;
…
9. Urges all States, within their national legal framework, in conformity with international human rights instruments, to take all appropriate measures to combat hatred, discrimination, intolerance and acts of violence, intimidation and coercion motivated by religious intolerance, including attacks on religious places, and to encourage understanding, tolerance and respect in matters relating to freedom of religion or belief;
10.
Also urges all States to ensure that all public officials, including members of law enforcement bodies, the military, civil servants and educators, in the course of their official duties respect different religions and beliefs and do not discriminate on the grounds of religion or belief, and that necessary and appropriate education or training is provided.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressed its grave concern at “discrimination and persecution on the basis of religious or ethnic background”.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on assistance to Somalia in the field of human rights, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressed deep concern “at discrimination against children belonging to minority clans, who are vulnerable to violence, including murder, poverty and lack of access to education”.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Stresses that States and international organizations have a responsibility to ensure that measures taken in the struggle against terrorism do not discriminate in purpose or effect on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, and urges all States to rescind or refrain from all forms of racial profiling.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on combating defamation of religions, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Recalling that all States have pledged themselves, under the Charter of the United Nations, to promote and encourage universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,
…
Reaffirming that discrimination against human beings on the grounds of religion or belief constitutes an affront to human dignity and a disavowal of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
…
Alarmed … at the serious instances of intolerance, discrimination and acts of violence based on religion or belief, intimidation and coercion motivated by extremism, religious or otherwise, occurring in many parts of the world and threatening the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
…
1. Expresses deep concern at negative stereotyping of religions and manifestations of intolerance and discrimination in matters of religion or belief still in evidence in some regions of the world;
…
7. Recognizes that in the context of the fight against terrorism and the reaction to counterterrorism measures, defamation of religions becomes an aggravating factor that contributes to the denial of fundamental rights and freedoms of target groups, as well as their economic and social exclusion;
8. Stresses the need to effectively combat defamation of all religions, Islam and Muslims in particular especially in human rights forums;
9. Urges States to take resolute action to prohibit the dissemination through political institutions and organizations of racist and xenophobic ideas and material aimed at any religion or its followers that constitute incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence;
10. Also urges States to provide, within their respective legal and constitutional systems, adequate protection against acts of hatred, discrimination, intimidation and coercion resulting from defamation of religions, to take all possible measures to promote tolerance and respect for all religions and their value systems, and to complement legal systems with intellectual and moral strategies to combat religious hatred and intolerance;
11.
Urges all States to ensure that all public officials, including members of law enforcement bodies, the military, civil servants and educators, in the course of their official duties, respect different religions and beliefs and do not discriminate on the grounds of religion or belief, and that necessary and appropriate education or training is provided.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressed its grave concern at:
(a) The ongoing systematic violation of human rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, of the people of Myanmar, in particular discrimination and violations suffered by persons belonging to ethnic minorities, women and children, especially in nonceasefire areas;
…
(
f) … discrimination and persecution on the basis of religious or ethnic background.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged States:
To ensure that all public officials and civil servants, including members of law enforcement bodies, the military and educators, in the course of their official duties, respect different religions and beliefs and do not discriminate on the grounds of religion or belief, and that all necessary and appropriate education or training is provided.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Stresses that States and international organizations have a responsibility to ensure that measures taken in the struggle against terrorism do not discriminate in purpose or effect on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, and urges all States to rescind or refrain from all forms of racial profiling.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on assistance to Somalia in the field of human rights, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressed deep concern “at discrimination against children belonging to minority clans, who are vulnerable to violence, including murder, poverty and lack of access to education”.
UN Human Rights Council
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on combating defamation of religions, the UN Human Rights Council:
Urges all States to ensure that all public officials, including members of law enforcement bodies, the military, civil servants and educators, in the course of their official duties, respect different religions and beliefs and do not discriminate against persons on the grounds of their religion or belief, and that any necessary and appropriate education or training is provided.
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on the former Yugoslavia, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights demanded that “those who have engaged in incitement to ethnic or religious hatred be brought to justice and held individually accountable for their acts”.
UN Secretary-General
In 2000, in his report on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, the UN Secretary-General stated that common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 4 of the 1977 Additional Protocol II “have long been considered customary international law”.
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
In an opinion adopted in 1995 in the context of Turkey’s military intervention in northern Iraq, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly observed that “ICRC efforts have been directed towards a pragmatic approach, whose operational objectives are … to assess on the spot the medical and sanitary needs of the wounded and sick, civilian or combatant, regardless of their origin”.
International Conference of the Red Cross (1973)
The 22nd International Conference of the Red Cross in 1973 adopted a resolution on the elimination of racial discrimination in which it condemned “all forms of racism and racial discrimination at all levels”.
World Conference on Human Rights
In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 expressed dismay and condemnation that “gross and systematic violations and situations that constitute serious obstacles to the full enjoyment of all human rights continue to occur in all parts of the world, [including] … all forms of racism, racial discrimination and … discrimination against women”.
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
In the Kaing case before the ECCC, the accused was charged, both individually and as a superior, with, inter alia, various crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In its judgment in 2010, the Trial Chamber considered the crime of persecution, stating
374. Persecution has long been proscribed as a crime under customary international law. The crime of persecution has in the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals come to describe large-scale and discriminatory offending in situations involving massive criminality but which may not entail the necessary physical destruction or exterminatory intent required for genocide.
375. Whilst an offence charged before the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the elements of this offence received limited elaboration prior to the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals. It has instead fallen to the international jurisprudence post-1992 to outline the contours of this offence. As the Kordic Trial Judgement notes:
Neither international treaty law nor case law provides a comprehensive list of illegal acts encompassed by the charge of persecution, and persecution as such is not known in the world’s major criminal justice systems. The Trial Chamber agrees […] that the crime of persecution needs careful and sensitive development in light of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. [ICTY, Kordić and Čerkez case, Judgement, § 192]
376. The Chamber finds that as early as 1975, persecution nonetheless clearly included an “act or omission which […] discriminates in fact and which denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in international customary or treaty law.” [ICTR, Bagosora case, Judgement, § 2208]
377. This act or omission must actually discriminate: a discriminatory intention is not sufficient, the act or omission must have discriminatory consequences. An act is discriminatory when a victim is targeted because of the victim’s membership in a group defined by the perpetrator on specific grounds, namely on a political, racial or religious basis. In this case, the Accused has been indicted only for persecution on political grounds.
378. Persecutory acts include (but are not limited to) the other underlying offences for crimes against humanity, for example murder, extermination, enslavement, imprisonment and torture. While no comprehensive enumeration of other acts constituting persecution is possible, relevant examples include harassment, humiliation and psychological abuse, confinement in inhumane conditions, cruel and inhumane treatment, deportation, forcible transfer and forcible displacement, and forced labour assignments. Such acts must be of “equal gravity or severity” to the specified underlying offences to constitute persecution and must be evaluated not in isolation but in context, by looking at their cumulative effect. Not every denial of a human right may constitute a crime against humanity, and to reach the level of gravity required the act or omission generally needs to be a gross or blatant denial of a fundamental human right.
379. The perpetrator must have carried out the act or omission “deliberately with the intention to discriminate on one of the listed grounds.” [ICTR, Bagosora case, Judgement, § 2208] This requires “evidence of a specific intent to discriminate on political, racial or religious grounds.” [ICTY, Kvočka case, Judgement on Appeal, § 460] There is no requirement in law that the perpetrator possess a “persecutory intent” over and above a discriminatory intent. The existence of a “specific intent to cause injury to a human being because he belongs to a particular community or group” is sufficient to establish the intent required for the crime of persecution. This specific intent is not a legal element of the other underlying crimes against humanity.
380. The requisite discriminatory intent may not be inferred directly from the general discriminatory nature of an attack, but may be inferred from this context if “in view of the facts of the case, circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged acts substantiate the existence of such intent.” [ICTY,
Krnojelac case, Judgement on Appeal, § 184].

[footnotes in original omitted]
International Court of Justice (ICJ)
In its judgment in the
Nicaragua case (Merits) in 1986, the ICJ held that the rules contained in common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions reflected what the Court in 1949 in the
Corfu Channel case (Merits) had called “elementary considerations of humanity”.
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
In the Bikindi case, the accused, a composer and singer, director of a performance group, official in the Rwandan Ministry of Youth and Sports, and member of the political party Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement (MRND), was charged with, inter alia, various counts of genocide under Article 2 of the 1994 ICTR Statute, and with murder as a crime against humanity under Article 3(a) of the 1994 ICTR Statute. In its judgment in the case in 2008, the ICTR Trial Chamber considered whether hate speech could form the underlying act of the offence of persecution as a crime against humanity under Article 3 of the 1994 ICTR Statute. The Trial Chamber stated:
390. … [H]ate speech that does not directly call for genocide may, in certain contexts, constitute persecution as a crime against humanity.
391. The crime of persecution consists of an act or omission that discriminates in fact and that denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in international customary or treaty law, and was carried out deliberately with the intention to discriminate on one of the listed grounds, specifically race, religion or politics.
392. Underlying acts of persecution need not be considered crimes in international law. For example, harassment, humiliation, psychological abuse, as well as denial of the rights of employment, freedom of movement, proper judicial process, and proper medical care have been recognised as underlying acts of persecution. It follows that it is not necessary to find that certain hate speech was in and of itself a crime under international law in order to regard such a speech as an underlying act of persecution. The Chamber is satisfied that hate speech may in certain circumstances constitute a violation of fundamental rights, namely a violation of the right to respect for dignity when that speech incites to hate and discrimination, or a violation of the right to security when it incites to violence.
393. The Appeals Chamber recently recalled that the underlying acts of persecution, whether considered in isolation or in conjunction with other acts, must be of equal gravity to the crimes listed under Article 3 of the [1994 ICTR] Statute. It also held that hate speeches may be considered of equal gravity to the crimes listed under Article 3 of the Statute if they occur as part of a larger campaign of persecution. In its determination, the Appeals Chamber considered the cumulative effect of all the underlying acts of the crime of persecution, namely the cumulative effect of the hate speeches and the direct calls to commit genocide broadcast in the context of a campaign of anti-Tutsi violence.
394. The question remains as to whether hate speech occurring in isolation could be considered to be of equal gravity to the other crimes listed under Article 3. In such a scenario, the hate speech would occur without any other underlying acts of persecution, and as such, would be the only act discriminating against the group. However, given that a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds would have to be established in order to support a conviction for persecution under the Tribunal’s Statute, the Chamber considers that the same facts that would lead it to find the existence of such an attack could also support a finding of many other underlying acts of persecution, as both must be committed on discriminatory grounds.
395. Finally, depending on the message conveyed and the context, the Chamber does not exclude the possibility that songs may constitute persecution as a crime against humanity.
3. CONCLUSION
396. The Chamber appreciates the precarious nature of restricting speech and discouraging political opinion through the criminalisation of certain kinds of expression. Although the Statute does not criminalise acts of expression per se, the inclusion of expressive acts within the underlying elements of the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal comes close to having such an effect. However, the Chamber is of the opinion that there is a discernible hierarchy of expression, one which requires the Chamber to treat different forms of expression differently. In fact, because of the serious nature of the crimes involved – persecution as a crime against humanity and direct and public incitement to commit genocide – it would be injudicious for the Chamber to treat the seeds of such grievous acts in the same fashion as any other act of expression, especially when accompanying a recognisable campaign of ongoing persecution or genocide.
397. While there is murky ground between some forms of expression, at some point, in the words of Judge Shahabuddeen, “[n]o margin of delicate appreciation is involved.” [
Nahimana case, Judgment, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, § 73] There are cases that are made up of simple criminality, in which the perpetrators know what they are doing and why they are doing it. These are the cases that will be punished under the Statute, no less.

[footnotes in original omitted]
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
In the Milutinović case, the accused were charged with violations of the laws or customs of war and crimes against humanity as members of a joint criminal enterprise to, amongst other things, modify the ethnic balance in Kosovo to ensure Serbian control of the province through a campaign of terror and violence directed at the Kosovo Albanian population. In its judgment in 2009, the ICTY Trial Chamber considered the definition of the crime against humanity of persecution. On the actus reus of the crime, the Trial Chamber stated:
175. A number of underlying offences are charged as persecution. The underlying conduct for persecution is generally described in Tribunal jurisprudence as an act or omission that (a) discriminates in fact and (b) denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in customary international law or treaty law.
176. The Trial and Appeals Chambers of the Tribunal have consistently emphasised that the crime against humanity of persecution requires intent to discriminate on political, racial, or religious grounds. Moreover, in practice, discrimination on the basis of ethnicity has been accepted as a ground upon which the requirement is satisfied.

[footnotes in original omitted]
The Trial Chamber then considered the mens rea of the crime of persecution, specifically the nature of the discriminatory intent required, stating:
With regard to the question of who must have the requisite discriminatory intent, namely the physical perpetrator or the accused who planned, ordered, or instigated the conduct of the physical perpetrator, the Trial Chamber considers that, so long as it is proved that one of these individuals possessed discriminatory intent, this element is satisfied. The Chamber reiterates here that this analysis should not be confused with the question of whether the accused bears criminal responsibility for persecution. Instead, the above is simply a determination as to whether such persecution was committed at all.
(b) Mens Rea
Human Rights Committee
In its General Comment on non-discrimination under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1989, the Human Rights Committee held:
The Committee believes that the term “discrimination” as used in the Covenant should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.
Human Rights Committee
In its General Comment on Article 4 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 2001, the Human Rights Committee held:
According to article 4, paragraph 1, one of the conditions for the justifiability of any derogation from the Covenant is that the measures taken do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. Even though article 26 or the other Covenant provisions related to non-discrimination (article 2, 3, 14, paragraph 1, 23, paragraph 4, 24, paragraph 1, and 25) have not been listed among the non-derogable provisions in article 4, paragraph 2, there are elements or dimensions of the right to non-discrimination that cannot be derogated from in any circumstances. In particular, this provision of article 4, paragraph 1, must be complied with if any distinctions between persons are made when resorting to measures that derogate from the Covenant.
ICRC
To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces that:
Any discriminatory distinction of treatment is prohibited if based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or any other similar criteria.
Council of Delegates (1973)
At its Teheran Session in 1973, the Council of Delegates adopted a resolution on action in the struggle against racism and racial discrimination in which it noted that “racism and racial discrimination constitute a serious violation of basic human rights” and of the Red Cross principle of impartiality. The resolution recalled the “provisions of the Geneva Conventions forbidding any discrimination of a racial character” and stressed the necessity “to engage still more actively in the struggle for the elimination of racism and racial discrimination”.
ICRC
In an appeal issued in 1979 with respect to the conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, the ICRC specifically requested that the Transitional Government in Salisbury “allow the ICRC to provide medical care without discrimination to all wounded and sick war victims”.
ICRC
In a communication to the press issued in 1993, the ICRC stated that its delegates in Bosnia and Herzegovina were once more witnessing “blatant violations of the basic principles of international humanitarian law” and cited the “adverse discrimination … practiced in the medical care given to sick and wounded civilians and combatants” as an example.
National Society (Mexico)
In a declaration issued in 1994 in the context of the conflict between the Mexican Government and the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), the Mexican Red Cross reminded the parties of their obligation to treat without any distinction non-combatants and persons
hors de combat. It recalled the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
American Law Institute
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1986, provides: “A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones … (f) systematic racial discrimination”.
Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards
The Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, adopted by an expert meeting convened by the Institute for Human Rights of Åbo Akademi University in Turku/Åbo, Finland in 1990, states: “All persons, even if their liberty has been restricted … shall in all circumstances be treated … without any adverse distinction.”
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)
The SPLM Constitution provides that a member of the SPLM has the duty and obligation to “combat racism, tribalism, political sectarianism, religious intolerance and all other forms of discrimination in the New Sudan”.
Note: For practice concerning non-discrimination towards returning displaced persons, see Rule 132, Section E.
Geneva Convention IV
Article 13 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV provides that the general protection of populations against certain consequences of war is applicable “without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion”.
Geneva Convention IV
Article 27, third paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV provides:
Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion.
Geneva Convention IV
Article 54, first paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV provides that, should judges and public officials in the occupied territories abstain from fulfilling their functions for reasons of conscience, “the occupying power may not … take any measures of coercion or discrimination against them”.
Additional Protocol I
Article 69(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides that the occupying power shall provide food, medical and other supplies necessary for the survival of the civilian population in the occupied territory “without any adverse distinction”.
Additional Protocol I
Article 70(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides that the relief actions of the occupying power and of relief societies are to be “conducted without any adverse distinction”.
Additional Protocol II
Article 18(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II states that the relief actions of the occupying power and of relief societies are to be “conducted without any adverse distinction”.
Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Paragraph 4 of the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia provides that “all civilians shall be treated in accordance with Article 75 [of the 1977 Additional Protocol I]”.
Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Paragraph 2.3 of the 1992 Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina provides: “In the treatment of the civilian population, there shall be no distinction founded on race, religion or faith, or any other similar criteria.”
Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1989) restates the provisions of Article 75(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Burundi
Burundi’s Regulations on International Humanitarian Law (2007) states that civilians “must in all circumstances be protected and treated humanely without any adverse distinction”.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) states that in occupied territories, “protected persons must receive equal treatment without any adverse distinction based on race, religion, or political opinion”.

It also states that Article 75 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I “provides that all persons in the power of a party to the conflict are entitled to at least a humane treatment without adverse discrimination on grounds of race, gender, language, religion, political discrimination or similar criteria”.
With regard to non-international armed conflicts, the manual states that “[Additional Protocol II] applies without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, gender, language, religion or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or any other similar criteria”.
Canada
Canada’s Code of Conduct (2001) provides that all civilians must be treated humanely and that “subject to favourable considerations based on sex, health or age, [civilians] must be treated with the same consideration and without any adverse distinction based in particular on race, religion or political opinion”.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001), in its chapter on the treatment of civilians in the hands of a party to the conflict or an occupying power, and, more specifically, in a section entitled “Provisions common to the territories of the parties to the conflict and to occupied territories”, states: “Subject to special provisions relating to health, age or gender, protected persons must receive equal treatment without any adverse distinction based on race, religion or political opinion.”
In the same chapter, in a section entitled “Additional Protocol I”, the manual states:
[Additional Protocol I] provides that all persons in the power of a party to the conflict are entitled to at least a minimum of humane treatment without adverse discrimination on grounds of race, gender, language, religion, political discrimination or similar criteria.
In its chapter on rights and duties of occupying powers, the manual further states in a paragraph dealing with the rights of inhabitants of occupied territory: “All protected persons must be treated with the same consideration, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion.”
In its chapter on non-international armed conflicts, the manual restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
By Common Article 3, the parties to a non-international armed conflict occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions are obliged to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
a. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, gender, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
In the same chapter, the manual further states:
1711. No Adverse Discrimination
1. [Additional Protocol II] applies without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, gender, language, religion or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria.
2. [Additional Protocol II] provides that all persons not participating in the conflict or who have ceased to do so are entitled, whether under restriction or not, to respect for their persons, honour and convictions, and religious practices, and are, in all circumstances, to be treated humanely and without adverse distinction.
Canada
Canada’s Code of Conduct (2005) instructs Canadian Forces (CF) personnel:
Military operations in foreign lands expose CF personnel to civilian populations that differ markedly from our own. However different or unusual a foreign land may appear, these civilians are in all circumstances entitled to respect for their persons and property, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. In your daily interaction with the civilian population, they must at all times be humanely treated and shall not be subjected to acts of violence, threats, or insults. Women and children in particular must not be subjected to rape, enforced prostitution, and any form of indecent assault. All civilians, subject to favourable considerations based on sex, health or age, must be treated with the same consideration and without any adverse distinction based in particular on race, religion or political opinion.
Djibouti
Djibouti’s Manual on International Humanitarian Law (2004) states that the following “are currently considered as war crimes … if committed against any person not or no longer participating in hostilities: … subjecting the civilian population to … other inhuman or degrading practices based on racial discrimination”.
Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) provides that, in case of occupation, “any discrimination for reasons of race, nationality, language, religious convictions and practices, political opinion, social origin or position or similar considerations is unlawful”.
Italy
Italy’s IHL Manual (1991) provides that, in occupied territories, civilians shall be treated without any distinction based on sex, race, religion or political opinion.
Mexico
Mexico’s Army and Air Force Manual (2009) states: “According to the provisions of … [the 1949 Geneva] Conventions, non-combatants, members of merchant marine and civil aircraft crews … must not be discriminated against on the grounds of religion, nationality or political opinions.”
Netherlands
The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states: “Although it is permitted temporarily to evacuate civilians, it is prohibited to move them for reasons relating to race, skin colour, religion or belief, gender, birth or social status or any other such criterion.”
New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) provides: “Protected persons must receive equal treatment without any adverse distinction based on race, religion or political opinion.”
Nicaragua
Nicaragua’s Military Manual (1996) provides that civilian persons “benefit from the fundamental guarantees without any discrimination”.
Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states:
Under any circumstances international humanitarian law ensures humane treatment during an armed conflict of persons not directly involved in combat operations … without adverse distinction for reasons of race, colour, faith, birth, wealth or any other similar criteria.
South Africa
South Africa’s LOAC Teaching Manual (2008) states:
2.4 Specifically Protected Persons and Objects:
a. Civilians
…
[1949] Geneva Convention IV article 27 provides for general protective provisions. … Geneva Convention IV article 27 also provides for specific protective provisions, to wit:
…
- All protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to a conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion, or political opinion. However, this provision does not prejudice any provisions relating to the state of health, age and sex of protected persons.
…
Protection of protected persons entails the following:
…
- All protected persons shall be treated equally without adverse distinction based on race, religion, or political opinion.
Sweden
Sweden’s IHL Manual (1991) states with regard to civilians within an occupied area: “There may be no discrimination on racial, religious or political grounds or the like.”
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) provides:
All civilian persons shall benefit from an equal treatment. No one can be disadvantaged because of race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinions, social origin, faith, sex, wealth or any other circumstance.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Regulation on Legal Bases for Conduct during an Engagement (2005) states:
Foreign civilians or civilians of an adverse party to a conflict are specifically protected under the law of armed conflict. If they are in the hands of a military unit, they must at all times be treated humanely. Any act of torture, physical or mental ill-treatment, degrading treatment or discrimination as well as measures of reprisal are prohibited.

[emphasis in original]
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK Military Manual (1958) prohibits discrimination in the treatment of protected civilians and stipulates that non-discrimination also applies in occupied territories.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) prohibits discrimination in the treatment of protected civilians.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states n its chapter on the protection of civilians in the hands of a party to the conflict:
All persons are to be treated humanely in all circumstances and “without any adverse distinction based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status or on any other similar criteria”.
In its chapter on internal armed conflict, the manual restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
Under the terms of Common Article 3, the parties to a non-international armed conflict occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions are obliged to apply “as a minimum”, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
United States of America
The US Field Manual (1956) restates Article 13 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV.
United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) refers to Article 27 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV and states: “Any distinction in treatment based upon race, religion or political opinion is specifically forbidden.”
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan’s Law concerning the Protection of Civilian Persons and the Rights of Prisoners of War (1995) provides that in international and non-international armed conflicts, “civilian persons belonging to the adverse party, who are in the hands of the Azerbaijan Republic, are respected and treated humanely without any adverse distinction founded on race, sex, language, religion, national and social origin or any other similar criteria”.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s International Crimes (Tribunal) Act (1973) states that the “violation of any humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts laid down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949” is a crime.
Denmark
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (1973), as amended in 1978, provides:
Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment].
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (2005) provides:
Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment].
Ireland
Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, provides that any “minor breach” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including violations of Articles 13, 27 and 54 of the Geneva Convention IV, and of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, including violations of Articles 69(1) and 70(1), as well as any “contravention” of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, including violations of Article 18(2), are punishable offences.
Norway
Norway’s Military Penal Code (1902), as amended in 1981, provides:
Anyone who contravenes or is accessory to the contravention of provisions relating to the protection of persons or property laid down in … the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 … [and in] the two additional protocols to these Conventions … is liable to imprisonment.
Spain
Spain’s Royal Ordinances for the Armed Forces (2009) states that members of the armed forces “[m]ust treat and care for … members of the civilian population … that are in their power without any adverse distinction.”
No data.
China
According to the Report on the Practice of China, China protects foreigners in China, provided that they obey local laws, and makes no distinction between persons on the basis of whether they are from a country that is neutral or belligerent in relation to China.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1982 on Lebanon, the UN Security Council called for “respect for the rights of the civilian populations without any discrimination”.
No data.
No data.
European Court of Human Rights
In its judgment in the
Cyprus case in 2001, the European Court of Human Rights found, in relation to living conditions of Greek Cypriots in the Karpas region of northern Cyprus, that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights in that the Greek Cypriots had been subjected to discrimination amounting to degrading treatment.
No data.
DRC Pledge of Commitment
In 2008, the armed groups party to the DRC Pledge of Commitment, “deeply deploring the insecurity that has prevailed for a long time in the province of North Kivu, causing massive displacements of populations and enormous suffering of civilians as well as massive violations of human rights”, undertook to “strictly observe rules of international humanitarian law and human rights law, notably: [to] halt acts of … discrimination and exclusion, in any form, against the civilian population.”
Note: For practice concerning distinction among the wounded and sick on medical grounds only, see Rule 110, Section B.
Geneva Convention I
Article 12, second paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention I provides that the protection due to wounded and sick members of the armed forces in the field shall be granted “without any adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions, or any other similar criteria”.
Geneva Convention II
Article 12, second paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention II provides that the protection due to wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea shall be granted “without any adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions, or any other similar criteria”.
Geneva Convention II
Article 30, first paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention II provides that military hospital ships and the hospital ships of National Red Cross Societies of the parties to the conflict and of neutral States and small craft employed for coastal rescue operations “shall afford relief and assistance to the wounded and sick and the shipwrecked without distinction of nationality”.
Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia provide that “all wounded and sick” and “all wounded and sick at sea” shall be treated in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention I.
UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin
Section 9.1 of the 1999 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin provides: “Members of the armed forces and other persons in the power of the United Nations force who are wounded or sick … shall … receive the medical care and attention required by their condition, without adverse distinction.”
Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1969) states that the wounded and sick “shall be treated and cared for … without any adverse distinction based on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions or on any other similar criteria”.
Australia
Australia’s Commanders’ Guide (1994) provides with regard to the wounded and sick: “No regard is to be paid to the nationality of the patient.”
Australia
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) provides: “While there is no absolute obligation to accept civilian wounded and sick, once civilian patients have been accepted, discrimination against them, on any grounds other than medical, is not permissible.”
Concerning wounded, sick and shipwrecked combatants, the manual states that they “are to be protected and respected, treated humanely … and cared for by any detaining power without any adverse discrimination”.
Australia
Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states: “While there is no absolute obligation to accept civilian wounded and sick, once civilian patients have been accepted, discrimination against them, on any grounds other than medical, is not permissible.
The LOAC Manual (2006) replaces both the Defence Force Manual (1994) and the Commander’s Manual (1994).
Belgium
Belgium’s Field Regulations (1964) provides that wounded and sick soldiers who have laid down their arms shall be treated without distinction based on nationality.
Belgium
Belgium’s Teaching Manual for Soldiers provides that during search and rescue operations, “no difference shall be made between fellow or enemy wounded and sick”.
Benin
Benin’s Military Manual (1995) instructs soldiers to “collect and care for the wounded and sick, whether they are friends or enemies”.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Military Instructions (1992) provides that the wounded and sick must be treated without any discrimination.
Burundi
Burundi’s Regulations on International Humanitarian Law (2007) states with regard to “persons
hors de combat”: “These persons must in all circumstances be protected and treated humanely without any adverse distinction.”
The Regulations further states: “The primary mission of the medical personnel is to care without any distinction …”.
The Regulations also states: “Captured enemy medical personnel may not be considered as prisoners of war. They may nonetheless be retained for the sole purpose of caring for the wounded and sick without any distinction.”
The Regulations further provides:
The combatant who comes across a wounded person must not only spare him. He has also an obligation of active assistance. He is obliged, if operations permit, to search for and collect the wounded, to care for them and to evacuate them from areas of combat. In this respect, no difference may be made between friendly wounded and enemy wounded.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) provides: “Regardless of the party to which they belong, or whether they are combatants or non-combatants, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked are to be respected and protected without any adverse discrimination.”
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on the treatment of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked:
907. Treatment of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked
1. The wounded, sick and shipwrecked are to be protected, respected, treated humanely and cared for by the Detaining Power without any adverse discrimination.
2. … The term “wounded, sick and shipwrecked”, includes civilians.
908. Priority of treatment
1. Only urgent medical requirements will justify any priority in treatment among those who are sick and wounded.
2. Regardless of the party to which they belong, or whether they are combatants or non-combatants, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked are to be respected and protected without any adverse discrimination.
In its chapter on non-international armed conflicts, the manual restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
By Common Article 3, the parties to a non-international armed conflict occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions are obliged to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
a. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, gender, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
In the same chapter, the manual further states:
1711. No Adverse Discrimination
1. [Additional Protocol II] applies without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, gender, language, religion or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria.
2. [Additional Protocol II] provides that all persons not participating in the conflict or who have ceased to do so are entitled, whether under restriction or not, to respect for their persons, honour and convictions, and religious practices, and are, in all circumstances, to be treated humanely and without adverse distinction.
The manual also states: “The wounded and sick among [persons whose liberty has been restricted] are to be treated humanely and receive such medical care as their condition requires, without discrimination.”
Canada
Rule 7 of Canada’s Code of Conduct (2005) instructs: “Collect all the wounded and sick and provide them with the treatment required by their condition, whether friend or foe.”
The Code of Conduct states:
All the wounded and sick, whether friend or foe, shall be respected and protected. In all circumstances they shall be treated humanely and shall receive, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention required by their condition. There shall be no distinction among them based on any grounds other than medical ones.
Chad
Chad’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states that “there must be no discrimination in the treatment of the wounded”.
Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book III, Volume 2 (Instruction of second-year trainee officers):
Persons not or no longer participating in hostilities, including … persons rendered
hors de combat by sickness, wounds … must in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any distinction founded on race, religion, faith, sex, social class, or any other similar criteria.
Croatia
Croatia’s military manuals provide that wounded and sick persons shall be cared for and protected without distinction.
Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic’s Military Manual (1980) provides that enemy sick and wounded and wounded and sick enemy captives shall receive the same medical care as for one’s own troops.
Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) provides that wounded and sick members of the armed forces shall be cared for without any distinction with regard to nationality.
France
France’s LOAC Summary Note (1992) states: “Captured combatants whether they are wounded, sick or shipwrecked shall be cared for … and benefit from the same treatment as friendly military personnel.”
Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) states that in conflicts at sea, “hospital ships shall afford assistance to all wounded, sick and shipwrecked without distinction of nationality”.
Germany
Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (2006) states:
The wounded, sick and shipwrecked shall be respected and protected in all circumstances … They shall be treated humanely and cared for …
There shall be no distinction among them other than on medical grounds.
Guinea
Guinea’s Soldier’s Manual (2010), under the heading “Rules of conduct in combat”, states: “Collect, protect and care for the wounded and sick, whether they are friends, enemies or civilians.”
Ireland
Ireland’s Basic LOAC Guide (2005) states that “those who suffer must be aided and cared for without distinction”.
The manual further states: “There must be no distinction among them [the wounded and the sick] founded on any grounds other than medical ones. This means treatment must be by medical priority only and not by nationality. You cannot give automatic priority to your own wounded.”
Israel
With reference to Israel’s Law of War Booklet (1986), the Report on the Practice of Israel states:
The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has a strict policy [according to which] all wounded and sick shall be treated, respected and protected, irrespective of whichever party they belong to, and without any distinction based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion, belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other similar criteria.
Italy
Italy’s IHL Manual (1991) provides: “The wounded and sick enemy will receive the same care as members of national forces.”
Italy
Italy’s Combatant’s Manual (1998) states: “Captured wounded and sick belonging to the enemy army must be provided with the same assistance as wounded nationals.”
Mexico
Mexico’s Army and Air Force Manual (2009) states: “According to the provisions of these Conventions, … the sick and the wounded must be respected and protected by the party in whose power they are and must not be discriminated against on the grounds of religion, nationality or political opinions.”
Morocco
Morocco’s Disciplinary Regulations (1974) states that wounded and sick persons shall be protected without distinction.
Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands provides that the wounded and sick “must be treated without any distinction based on race, skin colour, sex, language, religion, political beliefs, nationality, birth or any other criteria”.
Netherlands
The IFOR Instructions (1995) of the Netherlands instructs troops to take care of the wounded whether they are friends or enemies.
Netherlands
The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states:
There must be no distinction among them [the wounded and sick] founded on race, skin colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political conviction, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status or any other such criterion.
In its chapter on non-international armed conflict, the manual states:
The wounded, the sick and shipwreck survivors must be respected and protected, whether or not they have taken part in the armed conflict. They must in all circumstances be humanely treated, and provided with the requisite medical care without discrimination.
Nicaragua
Nicaragua’s Military Manual (1996) provides:
People who do not participate directly in hostilities, including persons placed
hors de combat because … of sickness or wounds … shall be treated in all circumstances with humanity without any adverse distinction based on race, colour, language, religion or belief, sex, birth, economic status or any other similar criteria or situation.
Nigeria
Nigeria’s Operational Code of Conduct (1967) states that wounded and sick persons shall be protected without distinction.
Nigeria
Nigeria’s Manual on the Laws of War provides that no discrimination with regard to the wounded or sick “based on sex, race, nationality, religion, political belief, or any other similar criteria” is permitted.
Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states:
a. Medical personnel providing medical services in armed conflicts have a duty to respect the principles of medical ethics as in peacetime. They must behave in the following way:
…
(4) refrain, in the performance of their duties, from any form of discrimination on the grounds of religion, nationality, race, political opinions or social standing;
…
Medical ethics in armed conflict are the same as in peacetime, taking into account that:
…
(3) in emergency situations, medical assistance must be provided without discrimination, the only relevant criterion for determining priority of treatment being the degree of medical urgency.
…
c. …
In accordance with the principle of non-discrimination, there must be no distinction in determining priority of treatment founded on race, political opinion, religion or faith, sex, birth, language, nationality, social standing or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
Peru
Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states:
a. Medical personnel providing medical services in armed conflicts have a duty to respect the principles of medical ethics as in peacetime. They must behave in the following way:
…
(4) refrain, in the performance of their duties, from any form of discrimination on the grounds of religion, nationality, race, political opinion or social standing;
…
Medical ethics in armed conflict are the same as in peacetime, taking into account that:
…
(3) in emergency situations, medical assistance must be provided without discrimination
…
c. … In accordance with the principle of non-discrimination, there must be no distinction in determining priority of treatment founded on race, political opinion, religion or faith, sex, birth, language, nationality, social standing, wealth, or any other similar criterion.
Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states:
Under any circumstances international humanitarian law ensures humane treatment during an armed conflict of persons not directly involved in combat operations, including those who have been rendered
hors de combat by sickness [or] injury … without adverse distinction for reasons of race, colour, faith, birth, wealth or any other similar criteria.
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Instructor Manual (2007) provides: “All obligations to the wounded and sick must be carried out without adverse distinction based on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions or similar criteria.”
Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) states that wounded and sick prisoners and one’s own troops shall be evacuated under the same conditions.
Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states: “Prisoners of war who are sick or wounded must be evacuated under the same conditions as the detaining power’s own troops.”
Switzerland
Switzerland’s military manuals provide that medical personnel shall collect and care for enemy wounded, as well as those of friendly forces.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Aide-Memoire on the Ten Basic Rules of the Law of Armed Conflict (2005) states: “I recover and identify wounded, sick, shipwrecked and dead persons without discrimination as soon as the combat situation allows or the superior orders such.”
Togo
Togo’s Military Manual (1996) instructs soldiers to “collect and care for the wounded and sick, whether they are friends or enemies”. It recalls the duties of States which have ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
inter alia, “to care for friends or enemies without distinction”.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK Military Manual (1958) states that the wounded and sick “must be cared for … without adverse distinction based on sex, race, nationality, religion, political belief or any other similar test”.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) provides that, in the event of a civil war, “persons out of the fighting … because they are wounded must be treated … without any adverse discrimination”.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states:
7.3. The wounded and sick are to be protected and respected. …
7.3.1. The duty of respect means that the wounded and sick are not to be made the target of attack. The duty of protection imposes positive duties to assist them. The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I do not seek the unattainable by what would be a vain attempt at removing all hardships arising from armed conflict affecting the groups of persons defined above; they merely seek to ameliorate their conditions. They expressly do so “without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria”.
7.3.2. Paragraph 7.3 applies to all wounded and sick, whether United Kingdom, allied or enemy, military or civilian. They are entitled to respect and protection [and] humane treatment.
With regard to priority of treatment, the manual states:
There must be no discrimination on grounds of sex, race, nationality, religion, political belief or any other similar test. Spies, saboteurs, partisans and illegal combatants who are wounded or sick are entitled to the same treatment.
In its chapter on internal armed conflict, the manual restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
Under the terms of Common Article 3, the parties to a non-international armed conflict occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions are obliged to apply “as a minimum”, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
In its chapter on enforcement of the law of armed conflict, the manual states:
States are under a general obligation to issue orders and instructions requiring compliance with the law of armed conflict and to take steps to see that those orders and instructions are observed. There is a specific provision in relation to the handling of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, extending to a requirement to provide for unforeseen situations “in conformity with the general principles” of the Geneva Conventions 1949. These are that the wounded, sick and shipwrecked should be cared for and treated without any adverse distinction.
United States of America
The US Field Manual (1956) provides that sick and wounded captives shall be provided with the same medical care as friendly sick and wounded. It also restates Article 12 of the 1949 Geneva Convention II.
United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) states:
One of the important principles relating to wounded and sick requires medical care and humane treatment to friend and foe without distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions or similar criteria.
United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (1995) provides: “Wounded and sick personnel falling into enemy hands must be … cared for without adverse distinction.”
United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (2007) states: “Wounded and sick personnel falling into enemy hands must be … cared for without adverse distinction along with the enemy’s own casualties.”
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Military Manual (1988) states that there is an obligation to treat the wounded and sick humanely, without any discrimination.
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe’s Code of Conduct for Combatants (1993) states that “those who suffer must be aided and cared for without discrimination.”
The Code of Conduct also states: “As a State party to the [1949] Geneva Conventions … your country is bound by these treaties … The States party to the Geneva Conventions pledge to … [c]are for the wounded on an equal basis, regardless of whether they are friends or enemies.”
Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s Public Health Law (2009) states:
Article 18. Provision of Emergency Medical Aid.
Health services shall be provided by the nearest health facility to … those whose health condition requires emergency aid, without any discrimination.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s International Crimes (Tribunal) Act (1973) states that the “violation of any humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts laid down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949” is a crime.
Denmark
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (1973), as amended in 1978, provides:
Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment].
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (2005) provides:
Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment].
France
France’s Code of Defence (2004), as amended in 2008, states: “Combatants must collect, protect and care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked without any discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, religion, nationality, ideology or ethnic group.”
Guinea
Guinea’s Code of Medical Ethics (1996) states:
A Physician shall listen to, examine, advise or treat with the same conscientiousness all persons irrespective of their origin, their customs, their marital status, their affiliation to an ethnic group, nation or religion or lack thereof, their disability or state of health, their reputation or the feelings he might have for them. He shall provide them with his assistance in all circumstances.
Ireland
Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, provides that any “minor breach” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including violations of Article 12 of Geneva Convention I and Articles 12 and 30 of Geneva Convention II, is a punishable offence.
Norway
Norway’s Military Penal Code (1902), as amended in 1981, provides:
Anyone who contravenes or is accessory to the contravention of provisions relating to the protection of persons or property laid down in … the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 … is liable to imprisonment.
Peru
Peru’s Decree on the Use of Force by the Armed Forces (2010) states that “persons placed
hors de combat by illness [or] wounds … must in all circumstances be treated … without any unfavourable distinction based on race, colour, religion or belief, sex, birth, socio-economic status or any other similar criterion.”
Senegal
Senegal’s Law Authorizing Ratification of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (2010) states:
In order to achieve [the] objectives [of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions], each State Party has an obligation to adequately provide assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation, psychological support and social and economic inclusion to cluster munition victims in areas under its direction and control.
These precautions are determined by humanitarian and military considerations and can consist of … assessing the needs of cluster munition victims, developing a national plan and budget, and not discriminating against cluster munition victims.
Somalia
Somalia’s Military Criminal Code (1963) states:
A commander who causes serious harm … to the sick, wounded or shipwrecked, by not according them the treatment prescribed by law or by international agreements … shall be punished, unless the act constitutes a more serious offence, by military confinement for not less than three years.
Spain
Spain’s Royal Ordinance for the Armed Forces (1978) specifies that assistance will be lent to both one’s own and enemy wounded whenever the circumstances of security and of the mission permit.
Spain
Spain’s Royal Ordinances for the Armed Forces (2009) states that members of the armed forces “[m]ust treat and care for … the wounded, sick [and] shipwrecked … that are in their power without any adverse distinction.”
No data.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
In 1992, the Presidency of the Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina made an urgent appeal to ensure the protection of all wounded and sick persons “regardless of the side they belong to”.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1995, in a report on the situation of human rights in Burundi, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned the alleged practice of both parties of withholding medical care on the basis of ethnic origin.
No data.
No data.
No data.
ICRC
In a Memorandum on the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law sent in 1990 to all States party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions in the context of the Gulf War, the ICRC stated: “The wounded, the sick and the shipwrecked must be collected and cared for regardless of the party to which they belong.”
ICRC
In a press release issued in 1992, the ICRC urged all parties involved in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh “to ensure that the wounded and sick are cared for in all circumstances, regardless of the side to which they belong”.
ICRC
In a press release issued in 1992, the ICRC urged the parties to the conflict in Tajikistan to ensure that “the wounded and sick are cared for in all circumstances, regardless of the side to which they belong”.
ICRC
In 1994, in a Memorandum on Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Angola, the ICRC stated: “All the wounded and sick, both civilian and military, must be collected and cared for, without distinction.”
ICRC
In 1994, in a Memorandum on Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by the Forces Participating in Opération Turquoise in the Great Lakes region, the ICRC stated: “All the wounded and sick must be collected and cared for, without distinction.”
ICRC
In a press release issued in 1994, the ICRC called on the parties to the conflict in Chechnya to ensure that “the wounded and sick are cared for, regardless of the side to which they belong”.
ICRC
In a communication to the press issued in 2000 in connection with the hostilities in the Near East, the ICRC recalled that “the wounded and sick must be collected and cared for regardless of the party to which they belong”.
No data.
Geneva Convention III
Article 14, second paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention III provides: “Women shall be treated with all regard due to their sex and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as favourable as that granted to men.”
Geneva Convention III
Article 16 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III provides:
All prisoners of war shall be treated alike by the Detaining Power, without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria.
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
Rule 6(1) of the 1955 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners provides:
The following rules shall be applied impartially. There shall be no discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
European Prison Rules
Rule 2 of the 1987 European Prison Rules provides: “The rules shall be applied impartially. There shall be no discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, birth, economic or other status”.
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment
Principle 5 of the 1988 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment provides:
These principles shall be applied to all persons within the territory of any given State, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion or religious belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners
Paragraph 2 of the 1990 Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners provides: “There shall be no discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”
Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Paragraph 3 of the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia provides: “Captured combatants shall enjoy the treatment provided for by [the 1949 Geneva Convention III].”
Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1969) provides: “All prisoners shall be treated in the same way by the detaining power, without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religion, political opinions or any other similar criteria.”
Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1989) provides: “Prisoners of war, at all times, shall be treated … equally without distinction based on rank, sex, race, nationality, age, religion, political opinion, professional skills, etc.”
Australia
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) states that one of the fundamental rules for the treatment of prisoners of war is that “any discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions is unlawful”.
Australia
Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states:
10.2 The fundamental rules for the treatment of PW [prisoners of war] are:
…
- any discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions is unlawful.
…
10.21 All PW shall be treated without distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions or any other distinction subject to privileged treatment which may be given to them by reason of their rank and sex, state of health, age or professional qualifications.
The LOAC Manual (2006) replaces both the Defence Force Manual (1994) and the Commander’s Manual (1994).
Benin
Benin’s Military Manual (1995) provides: “Prisoners of war … shall be treated alike.”
Burundi
Burundi’s Regulations on International Humanitarian Law (2007) states: “Prisoners of war must be treated without any distinction based on role, sex or religion.”
Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states that members of the armed forces are obliged “to treat humanely and without distinction all regular combatants
hors de combat”.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) provides: “All POWs [prisoners of war] are to be treated alike without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief, or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria.”
With regard to non-international armed conflict, the manual states: “The wounded and sick among [persons whose liberty has been restricted] are to be treated humanely.”
Canada
Canada’s Code of Conduct (2001) states: “The standard of treatment which applies to all detained persons, without adverse distinction based on race, nationality, sex, religious belief or political opinion, is a long standing rule.”
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on the treatment of prisoners of war (PWs):
Subject to specified advantageous differences in treatment based on rank, gender or health, all PWs are to be treated alike without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria.
In its chapter on non-international armed conflicts, the manual restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
By Common Article 3, the parties to a non-international armed conflict occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions are obliged to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
a. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, gender, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
In the same chapter, the manual further states:
1711. No Adverse Discrimination
1. [Additional Protocol II] applies without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, gender, language, religion or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria.
2. [Additional Protocol II] provides that all persons not participating in the conflict or who have ceased to do so are entitled, whether under restriction or not, to respect for their persons, honour and convictions, and religious practices, and are, in all circumstances, to be treated humanely and without adverse distinction.
Canada
Canada’s Prisoner of War Handling and Detainees Manual (2004) states that, with regards to constraints placed on the interrogation and tactical questioning of prisoners of war, “adverse treatment on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, or ethnic, religious or cultural background” is specifically prohibited.
Canada
Canada’s Code of Conduct (2005) instructs Canadian Forces (CF) personnel:
Rule 4
…
3. On occasion it may be necessary to detain civilians who as a result of their actions are considered to be opposing forces. For example, looters or other common criminals may have to be detained in order to protect the military compound. In certain circumstances, civilians who interfere with and prevent the CF from accomplishing the mission may also be detained when authorized by the ROE [rules of engagement]. These civilians become “detainees” and as such, shall be treated at least as well as any other detained persons (see Rule # 6).
…
Rule 6
…
3. The primary reasons for which members of the CF may be called upon to detain individuals in the course of an operation are to prevent their further participation in a conflict or, when authorized, to prevent them from interfering with the military mission. The reason for captivity is never related to revenge or punishment. The concept of humane treatment toward those under your control and the standard of treatment which applies to all detained persons, without adverse distinction based on race, nationality, sex, religious belief or political opinion, is a long standing rule.
Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book III, Volume 2 (Instruction of second-year trainee officers):
Persons not or no longer participating in hostilities, including … persons rendered
hors de combat by … detention … must in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any distinction founded on race, religion, faith, sex, social class, or any other similar criteria.
In Book IV (Instruction of heads of division and company commanders), the Teaching Manual provides:
II.1.2. Adverse discrimination prohibited
Subject to certain advantageous differences in treatment based on rank, sex or health, all POWs [prisoners of war] shall be treated alike, without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria.
Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) provides: “When prisoners of war are given medical treatment, no distinction among them will be based on any grounds other than medical ones.”
Germany
Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (1991) recalls the prohibition of any distinction based on race, nationality, religion or political opinions in the treatment of captured combatants.
Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) provides that, with regard to the treatment of prisoners of war, one of the fundamental rules is the unlawfulness of any discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions or similar criteria.
Germany
Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (2006) states under the heading “Protection of prisoners of war”: “Distinctions based on race, nationality, religion or political reasons are impermissible.”
Ireland
Ireland’s Basic LOAC Guide (2005) states that prisoners of war “must be treated alike by the Detaining Power, without regard to race, nationality, religious beliefs, political opinions, etc.”
Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands states:
Prisoners shall be treated with equality, without any distinction based on race, nationality, religion, political beliefs or any other criteria. The only exception is the preferential treatment based on the health situation, age …
Netherlands
The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states: “Captivity in war is not a punishment, but only a means of preventing the opponent from playing any further part in the conflict.”
The manual further states:
In principle, prisoners of war must be treated alike, without adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief, political opinions or any other similar criteria. An exception to this principle exists when preferential treatment is desirable due to gender (see point 0719), state of health, age or special skill. Different treatment on the grounds of military rank is permitted, and even mandatory to a certain degree.
In its chapter on peace operations, the manual states: “Detainees must also be treated equally.”
New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992), under the heading “Adverse discrimination prohibited”, recalls:
By Article 16 of [the 1949 Geneva Convention III], subject to differences in treatment based on rank, sex, or health, all prisoners are to be treated alike without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria.
Nigeria
Nigeria’s Manual on the Laws of War provides that no discrimination with regard to prisoners of war is permitted.
Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states:
Under any circumstances international humanitarian law ensures humane treatment during an armed conflict of persons not directly involved in combat operations, including those who have been rendered
hors de combat by … detention … without adverse distinction for reasons of race, colour, faith, birth, wealth or any other similar criteria.
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Instructor Manual (2007) provides: “All POWs [prisoners of war] must be treated humanely and without discrimination based on sex, nationality, race, religion, or political belief.”
South Africa
South Africa’s LOAC Teaching Manual (2008) states:
1.5 Application of LOAC [law of armed conflict] during armed conflict []to the position of participants and non-participants
…
- Minimum Protection of Persons Who Participated in Hostilities. Article 45.3 read with article 75.1 Additional Protocol I determines that any person who has taken part in hostilities and any other person who is in the power of a Party to a conflict, who is not entitled [to] POW [prisoner-of-war] status and who does not benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions and the Protocol shall be treated humanely and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the protection of fundamental judicial guarantees without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
…
Conclusion
…
Any person in the power of a Party to a conflict, who is not entitled [to] POW status and who does not benefit from more favourable treatment under the LOAC shall be treated humanely and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the protection of fundamental judicial guarantees without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) lists among the rules for the basic treatment of prisoners of war the prohibition of any “discrimination based on sex, race, nationality or political opinion”.
Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) lists among the rules for the general treatment of prisoners of war: “They must … not be discriminated against on the grounds of sex, race, nationality or political opinion.”
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) recalls: “No adverse distinction can be based on race, nationality, religion, political opinions, language, colour, social condition, birth or other similar criteria.”
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Regulation on Legal Bases for Conduct during an Engagement (2005) states:
Prisoners must be humanely treated at any time and in any place. Any act of torture, physical or mental ill-treatment, degrading treatment or discrimination as well as measures of reprisal are prohibited. The State is responsible for the treatment of prisoners; each individual may be held liable for violations.
[emphasis in original]
Togo
Togo’s Military Manual (1996) provides: “Prisoners of war … shall be treated alike.”
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK Military Manual (1958) prohibits discrimination in the treatment of prisoners of war and restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Military Manual also quotes Article 14 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) prohibits discrimination in the treatment of prisoners of war and restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states:
Prisoners of war must be humanely treated and their persons and honour respected at all times. “Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as favourable as that granted to men.”
The manual further states:
There must be no adverse discrimination towards prisoners of war based on race, nationality, religious belief, political opinions or similar criteria. However, the detaining power is permitted to allow privileged treatment to prisoners of war by virtue of their rank, state of health, age or professional qualifications as well as the special rules already mentioned relating to women.
In its chapter on internal armed conflict, the manual restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
Under the terms of Common Article 3, the parties to a non-international armed conflict occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions are obliged to apply ‘as a minimum’, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
United States of America
The US Field Manual (1956) provides: “All POWs [prisoners of war] shall be treated alike without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria.”
United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) prohibits any adverse distinction with regard to prisoners of war.
United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (1995) provides: “When prisoners of war are given medical treatment, no distinction among them will be based on any grounds other than medical ones.”
United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (2007) states: “Humane treatment is … [to] be afforded to all detained persons without adverse distinction based on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria”.
The Handbook also states: “When prisoners of war are given medical treatment, no distinction among them will be based on any grounds other than medical ones.”
United States of America
The US Manual on Detainee Operations (2008) states:
DODD 2310.01E [Department of Defense Directive, The Department of Defense Detainee Program requires that all DOD [Department of Defense] personnel and contractors will apply, without regard to a detainee’s legal status, at a minimum, the standards articulated in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 …
Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities … shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
The manual also states:
The detaining power is … prohibited from imposing any adverse distinctions within the detainee population based on religion. In this regard, it should be noted that in some situations, segregating the detainee population based on religious affiliation may be beneficial and therefore not prohibited, particularly when conflict has been based in part on religious affiliation.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s Law on Juvenile Rehabilitation and Training Centres (2009) states regarding the detention of juveniles:
Article 4. Observance of Human Rights
1. Employees of Juvenile Justice Department Centres (JJDC) & Juvenile Rehabilitation Centres (JRCs), prosecutors, judges and other individuals who are dealing with the juveniles … must communicate with convicted juveniles impartially and … without any discrimination.
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan’s Law concerning the Protection of Civilian Persons and the Rights of Prisoners of War (1995) provides that in international and non-international armed conflicts:
Persons detained by an individual, a group of persons, some organization or military unit from the Republic of Azerbaijan as a party to the conflict, are entitled to respect for their dignity and honour irrespective of their status, nationality, religion, language, political opinions, their belonging to a defined social group or other similar criteria.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s International Crimes (Tribunal) Act (1973) states that the “violation of any humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts laid down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949” is a crime.
Denmark
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (1973), as amended in 1978, provides:
Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment].
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (2005) provides:
Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment].
Ireland
Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, provides that any “minor breach” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including violations of Articles 14 and 16 of the Geneva Convention III, is a punishable offence.
Japan
Japan’s Law concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations (2004) states:
The protection to be given to prisoners of war and other detainees pursuant to the provisions of this Act (including orders based on this Act) shall not be unjustly discriminative based on race, nationality, religious or political opinions or any other similar criteria.
Norway
Norway’s Military Penal Code (1902), as amended in 1981, provides:
Anyone who contravenes or is accessory to the contravention of provisions relating to the protection of persons or property laid down in … the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 … is liable to imprisonment.
Peru
Peru’s Code of Military and Police Justice (2006) states: “In a Military and Police Confinement Centre, any form of discrimination based on nationality, age, gender, race, religion, economic or social status, legal status, military or police rank, or other ground shall be prohibited.”
Peru
Peru’s Decree on the Use of Force by the Armed Forces (2010) states:
Persons who have laid down their arms as well as persons placed
hors de combat by … detention … must in all circumstances be treated … without any unfavourable distinction based on race, colour, religion or belief, sex, birth, socio-economic status or any other similar criterion.
Serbia
Serbia’s Law on Enforcement of Penal Sanctions (2005) states: “A prisoner shall not be discriminated [against] on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other convictions, ethnic or social origin, financial status, education, social or other personal status.”
Somalia
Somalia’s Military Criminal Code (1963) states:
A commander who causes serious harm to lawful enemy belligerents who have fallen into his power … by not according them the treatment prescribed by law or by international agreements … shall be punished, unless the act constitutes a more serious offence, by military confinement for not less than three years.
South Africa
South Africa’s Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act (2012) states: “A protected prisoner of war who is in the custody of the South African National Defence Force must be granted the protection of the [1949] Third [Geneva] Convention or the [1949] Fourth [Geneva] Convention, as the case may be.”
The Act defines a “protected prisoner of war” as a “person protected by the Third Convention or a person who is protected as a prisoner of war under [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I”.
Spain
Spain’s Royal Ordinances for the Armed Forces (2009) states that members of the armed forces “[m]ust treat and care for … prisoners [and] detainees … that are in their power without any adverse distinction.”
No data.
Denmark
In 2006, in a report on the detention and transfer of persons in Afghanistan in 2002, when discussing the protection afforded to prisoners of war under the 1949 Geneva Convention III, the Danish Ministry of Defence stated:
In addition, prisoners of war must at all times be treated humanely and treated equally, meaning that there is a prohibition against discrimination, although subject to preferential treatment based on rank, sex, health status, age or professional qualifications.
Switzerland
In 2010, in its Report on IHL and Current Armed Conflicts, Switzerland’s Federal Council stated:
3.4 [Increasing use] of anti-guerrilla tactics
…
Apart from the direct fight against insurgents, international humanitarian law also addresses other anti-guerrilla tactics. … If members of militias or opposition groups fall into the hands of the government they benefit from the protection of art. 75 of [the 1977] Additional Protocol I as well as that of art. 3 common to the [1949] Geneva Conventions.

[footnotes in original omitted]
Switzerland
In 2012, Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs issued a press release entitled “Appeal by the Swiss authorities for compliance with international humanitarian law in Syria”, which stated: “Persons who are not or no longer taking part in the hostilities must be treated humanely without any discrimination. This is especially important in the case of detainees.”
No data.
No data.
No data.
No data.
ICRC
To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces that:
All prisoners of war must be treated alike, subject … to the provisions of [the 1949 Geneva Convention III and the 1977 Additional Protocol I] relating to rank, sex and age … [and] to any privileged treatment accorded to them by reason of their state of health, age or professional qualification.
No data.
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
In Article I of the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, the State Parties declared: “Apartheid is a crime against humanity.” They also stated that: “Inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid and similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination, as defined in article II of the Convention, are crimes violating the principles of international law.”
Additional Protocol I
Article 85(4)(c) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides that “practices of apartheid and other inhuman or degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination” shall be regarded as grave breaches of the Protocol.
ICC Statute
Article 7(1)(j) of the 1998 ICC Statute provides that “the crime of apartheid” constitutes a crime against humanity.
ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1991)
Article 20 of the 1991 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind provides:
1. An individual who as a leader or organizer commits or orders the commission of the crime of apartheid shall, on conviction thereof, be sentenced.
2. Apartheid consists of any of the following acts based on policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination committed for the purpose of establishing or maintaining domination by one racial group over any other racial group and systematically oppressing it:
(a) denial to a member of a racial group of the right to life and liberty of person;
(b) deliberate imposition on a racial group of living conditions calculated to cause its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(c) any legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent a racial group from participating in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country and the deliberate creation of conditions preventing the full development of such a group;
(d) any measures, including legislative measures, designed to divide the population along racial lines, in particular by the creation of separate reserves and ghettos for the members of a racial group, the prohibition of marriages among members of various racial groups or the expropriation of landed property belonging to a racial group or to members thereof;
(e) exploitation of the labour of the members of a racial group, in particular by submitting them to forced labour;
(f) persecution of organizations and persons, by depriving them of fundamental rights and freedoms, because they oppose apartheid.
ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996)
Under Article 18(f) of the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, “institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious grounds involving the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the population” is considered a crime against humanity.
UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15
The UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15 establishes panels with exclusive jurisdiction over serious criminal offences, including crimes against humanity. According to Section 6(1)(j) “the crime of apartheid” constitutes a crime against humanity.
Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1989) states that the practice of apartheid and similar practices are grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) provides that “practices of apartheid and other inhumane and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity based on racial discrimination” are a grave breach of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on “War crimes, individual criminal liability and command responsibility”, that “practices of apartheid and other inhumane and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity based on racial discrimination” constitute a grave breach of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Chad
Chad’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states that “the practice of apartheid and other inhuman, racist practices” is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and thus a war crime.
Djibouti
Djibouti’s Manual on International Humanitarian Law (2004) states that the following “are currently considered as war crimes … if committed against any person not or no longer participating in hostilities: … subjecting the civilian population to apartheid”.
France
France’s LOAC Manual (2001) quotes Article 7(1)(j) of the 1998 ICC Statute, which defines the crime of apartheid as a crime against humanity.
Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) provides that “practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices based on racial discrimination” are a grave breach of IHL.
Italy
Italy’s IHL Manual (1991) states: “The practice of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading treatments based on racial discrimination which offends the dignity of the human person is a grave breach of the … [1949 Geneva] conventions and their additional protocols.”
Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands provides: “Practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination, are a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols”.
New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) provides that “practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination”, when committed wilfully, are grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states:
The term [apartheid] comprises inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them.
a. International criminal responsibility applies, irrespective of the motive involved, to individuals, members of organizations and institutions and representatives of the State who, whatever their country of residence, promote apartheid.
b. Apartheid committed during an international armed conflict is a war crime.
Peru
Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states in its Glossary of Terms:
The term [apartheid] comprises … inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them.
a. International criminal responsibility applies, irrespective of the motive involved, to individuals, members of organizations and institutions and representatives of the State who, whatever their country of residence, promote apartheid.
b. Apartheid committed during an international armed conflict is a war crime.
Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Military Manual (1990) provides that the “practice of apartheid” is prohibited.
South Africa
South Africa’s LOAC Manual (1996) provides that “segregation and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity based on racial discrimination” is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols.
Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) states that “carrying out practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices” is a grave breach and is qualified as a war crime.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) provides that “practices of apartheid or other inhumane and humiliating treatment based on racial discrimination, implying a serious violation of human dignity”, is a grave breach of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Ukraine
Ukraine’s IHL Manual (2004) states:
1.2.11. “Apartheid” means policy and practice of racial discrimination of certain peoples or ethnic groups.
…
1.8.5. Serious violations of international humanitarian law directed against people include:
…
- inhuman treatment accompanied by degrading human dignity, including the practice of apartheid.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states:
Additional Protocol I extends the definition of grave breaches to include the following:
…
c. the following, when committed wilfully and in violation of the Conventions or the protocol:
…
(3) practices of
apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination.
Armenia
Under Armenia’s Penal Code (2003), “outrage upon personal self-esteem, based on apartheid or racial discrimination, application of inhuman and other humiliating practices”, during an armed conflict, constitute crimes against the peace and security of mankind.
Australia
Australia’s Geneva Conventions Act (1957), as amended in 2002, provides: “A person who, in Australia or elsewhere, commits a grave breach … of [the 1977 Additional Protocol I] is guilty of an indictable offence.”
The grave breaches provisions in this Act were removed in 2002 and incorporated into the Criminal Code Act 1995.
Australia
Australia’s Criminal Code Act (1995), as amended to 2007, states with respect to war crimes that are grave breaches of the 1977 Additional Protocol I:
War crime – apartheid
A person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:
(a) the perpetrator commits against one or more persons an act that is a proscribed inhumane act or is of a nature and gravity similar to any proscribed inhumane act; and
(b) the perpetrator knows of, or is reckless as to, the factual circumstances that establish the character of the act; and
(c) the perpetrator’s conduct is committed in the context of an institutionalised regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups; and
(d) the perpetrator intends to maintain the regime by the conduct; and
(e) the conduct takes place in the context of, and is associated with, an international armed conflict.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 17 years.
Australia
Australia’s ICC (Consequential Amendments) Act (2002) incorporates into the Criminal Code the crimes against humanity defined in the 1998 ICC Statute, including apartheid.
In addition, the Act incorporates into the Criminal Code the war crimes that are grave breaches of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, including apartheid.
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan’s Criminal Code (1999) provides a punishment for the crime of apartheid and inhuman and degrading practices based on racial discrimination.
Belgium
Belgium’s Law concerning the Repression of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols (1993), as amended in 1999, provides for the punishment of anyone “indulging in practices of apartheid or other inhuman or degrading practices based on racial discrimination and resulting in outrages upon personal dignity”.
Belgium
Belgium’s Penal Code (1867), as amended in 2003, provides:
A crime against humanity, as defined below, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, constitutes a crime under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title. In accordance with the Statute of the International Criminal Court, crime against humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
…
10. the crime of apartheid.
The Penal Code further states:
War crimes envisaged in the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions … and in the [1977 Additional Protocols I and II] … , as well as in Article 8(2)(f) of the [1998 ICC Statute], and listed below, … constitute crimes under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title … :
…
33. carrying out practices of apartheid and other inhuman or degrading practices based on racial discrimination and involving outrages upon personal dignity.
Belgium
Belgium’s Law relating to the Repression of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law (1993), as amended in 2003, provides:
A crime against humanity, as defined below, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, constitutes a crime under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title. In accordance with the Statute of the International Criminal Court, crime against humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
…
10. the crime of apartheid.
The Law further states:
War crimes envisaged in the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions … and in the [1977 Additional Protocols I and II] … , as well as in Article 8(2)(f) of the [1998 ICC Statute], and listed below, … constitute crimes under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title … :
…
19. carrying out practices of apartheid and other inhuman or degrading practices based on racial discrimination and involving outrages upon personal dignity.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Criminal Code (2003) criminalizes the following acts as crimes against humanity:
(1) Whoever, as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of such an attack, perpetrates any of the following acts:
…
j) The crime of apartheid.
…
(2) For the purpose of paragraph 1 of this Article the following terms shall have the following meanings:
…
i)
The crime of apartheid means inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, perpetrated in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and perpetrated with an aim of maintaining that regime.

[emphasis in original]
Bulgaria
Bulgaria’s Penal Code (1968), as amended in 1999, punishes the crime of apartheid and practices based on racial discrimination.
Burundi
Burundi’s Law on Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (2003) lists “the crime of apartheid” as a crime against humanity “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”
Canada
Canada’s Geneva Conventions Act (1985), as amended in 2007, provides: “Every person who, whether within or outside Canada, commits a grave breach [of the 1977 Additional Protocol I] … is guilty of an indictable offence.”
Canada
Canada’s Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000) provides that the crimes against humanity defined in Article 7 of the 1998 ICC Statute are “crimes according to customary international law” and, as such, indictable offences under the Act.
Colombia
Colombia’s Penal Code (2000) imposes a criminal sanction on “anyone who, during an armed conflict, orders or carries out against protected persons practices of racial segregation or other inhuman or degrading practices based on racial discrimination and which result in outrages upon personal dignity”.
Congo
Under the Congo’s Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Act (1998), “crimes of discrimination: tribal, ethnic or religious”, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack, are crimes against humanity.
Cook Islands
The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols Act (2002) of the Cook Islands punishes “any person who in the Cook Islands or elsewhere commits, or aids or abets or procures the commission by another person of, a grave breach … of [the 1977 Additional Protocol I]”.
Croatia
Croatia’s Criminal Code (1997), as amended to 2006, provides for the punishment of anyone, who:
… publicly states or disseminates ideas on the superiority or subordination of one race, ethnic or religious community, gender, ethnicity, or ideas on superiority or subordination on the basis of colour for the purpose of spreading racial, religious, sexual, national and ethnic hatred or hatred based on colour or for the purpose of disparagement shall be punished.
The Criminal Code further states that it is a crime against humanity:
[To order] within an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination of one racial group over another racial group or groups that an inhumane act described in this Article be committed or an act similar to any of these offences so as to maintain such a regime (the crime of apartheid).
Cyprus
Cyprus’s Additional Protocol I Act (1979) punishes “any person who, whatever his nationality, commits in the Republic or outside the Republic any grave breach of the provisions of the Protocol, or takes part or assists or incites another person in the commission of such a breach”.
Czech Republic
The Czech Republic’s Criminal Code (1961), as amended in 1999, provides for the punishment of anyone who carries out practices of apartheid.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Military Penal Code (2002) provides:
Article 165
Crimes against humanity are grave violations of international humanitarian law committed against any civilian population before or during war.
Crimes against humanity are not necessarily linked to the state of war and can be committed not only between persons of different nationality, but even between subjects of the same State.
Article 166
The grave breaches listed hereafter, affecting, by action or omission, the persons and objects protected by the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977, constitute crimes against humanity, repressed according to the provisions of the present Code, without prejudice to more severe penal provisions provided by the ordinary Penal Code:
…
17. Applying practices of apartheid or other inhuman or degrading practices involving outrages upon human dignity, based on racial discrimination;
…
Article 167
The offences contained in the preceding article are punished with penal servitude for life.
If those contained in points 1, 2, 5, 6, 10 to 14 of the same article lead to the death or cause grave injury to the physical integrity or health of one or several persons, the perpetrators are liable to the death penalty.
Denmark
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (1973), as amended in 1978, provides:
Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment].
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (2005) provides:
Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment].
Georgia
Georgia’s Criminal Code (1999) punishes the carrying out of practices of apartheid or other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity.
Hungary
Hungary’s Criminal Code (1978), as amended in 1998, punishes anyone who commits the crime of apartheid.
Ireland
Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, provides that grave breaches of the 1977 Additional Protocol I are punishable offences.
Jordan
Jordan’s Military Penal Code (2002) states that the following shall be deemed a war crime when committed in the event of armed conflict: “The crime of apartheid and other practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination”.
Mali
Mali’s Penal Code (2001) states that apartheid is a crime against humanity.
Netherlands
Under the International Crimes Act (2003) of the Netherlands, it is a crime to commit, in an international armed conflict, “the following acts if committed intentionally and in violation of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol (I): … practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination”.
New Zealand
New Zealand’s Geneva Conventions Act (1958), as amended in 1987, provides: “Any person who in New Zealand or elsewhere commits, or aids or abets or procures the commission by another person of, a grave breach … of [the 1977 Additional Protocol I] is guilty of an indictable offence.”
New Zealand
Under New Zealand’s International Crimes and ICC Act (2000), crimes against humanity include the crime defined in Article 7(1)(j) of the 1998 ICC Statute.
Niger
According to Niger’s Penal Code (1961), as amended in 2003, it is a war crime to carry out against persons protected under the 1949 Geneva Conventions or their Additional Protocols of 1977 “practices of apartheid or other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity”.
Norway
Norway’s Military Penal Code (1902), as amended in 1981, provides:
Anyone who contravenes or is accessory to the contravention of provisions relating to the protection of persons or property laid down in … the two additional protocols to [the 1949 Geneva] Conventions … is liable to imprisonment.
Peru
Peru’s Penal Code (1991), as amended in 1998, punishes the carrying out of practices of apartheid.
Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea’s ICC Act (2007) provides for the punishment of anyone who “commits any of the crimes under Paragraph (1) or (2) [crimes against humanity] with the intent of maintaining an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups”.
Republic of Moldova
The Republic of Moldova’s Penal Code (2002) punishes “grave breaches of international humanitarian law committed during international and non-international armed conflicts”.
Rwanda
Rwanda’s Law Repressing the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (2003) provides:
Article: 8
A war crime is one of the following acts, committed during armed conflicts against persons or property protected under the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and its Additional Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977:
…
12° practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination;
…
Article: 9
Shall be punished by one of the following penalties any person having committed one of the war crimes provided for in Article 8 of this law:
…
2° imprisonment for ten (10) to twenty (20) years where he has committed a crime provided for in point 6°, 7°, 8°, 10° or 12° of Article 8 of this law.
Senegal
Senegal’s Penal Code (1965), as amended in 2007, lists “the crime of apartheid” as a crime against humanity “when committed on the occasion of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population”.
Serbia
Serbia’s Criminal Code (2005) states that ordering or committing the “oppression of a racial group or establishing domination of one group over another” in violation of international law constitutes a crime against humanity.
The Criminal Code also states: “Whoever propagates ideas of superiority of one race over another or propagates racial intolerance or instigates racial discrimination shall be punished by imprisonment for between three months and three years.”
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Geneva Conventions Act (2012) states:
2. Grave breaches of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions and the [1977] First [Additional] Protocol.
(1) A person of whatever nationality commits an offence if that person, whether within or outside Sierra Leone[,] commits, aids, abets or procures any other person to commit a grave breach specified in –
…
(e) … paragraph … 4 of Article 85 of the First Protocol [on,
inter alia, the grave breach of practices of “apartheid” and other inhuman or degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination].
Slovakia
Slovakia’s Criminal Code (1961), as amended, provides for the punishment of anyone who carries out practices of apartheid.
South Africa
South Africa’s ICC Act (2002) reproduces the crimes against humanity listed in the 1998 ICC Statute, including the crime of apartheid.
South Africa
South Africa’s Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act (2012) states:
5. Breach of Conventions and penalties
(1) Any person who, whether within or outside the Republic, commits a grave breach of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions, is guilty of an offence.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), “a grave breach” means –
…
(e) a grave breach referred to in Article … 85 of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I.
Spain
Spain’s Penal Code (1995) provides for the punishment of anyone who orders or carries out practices of racial segregation or other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity.
Tajikistan
Tajikistan’s Criminal Code (1998) provides for the punishment of anyone who orders or carries out practices of apartheid or other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity based on racial discrimination.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK Geneva Conventions Act (1957), as amended in 1995, punishes “any person, whatever his nationality, who, whether in or outside the United Kingdom, commits, or aids, abets or procures the commission by any other person of, a grave breach of … [the 1977 Additional Protocol I]”.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Under the UK ICC Act (2001), it is a punishable offence to commit a crime against humanity as defined in Articles 7(1)(j) of the 1998 ICC Statute.
Uruguay
Uruguay’s Law on Cooperation with the ICC (2006) states:
26.2. Persons and objects affected by the war crimes set out in the present provision are persons and objects which international law protects in international or internal armed conflict.
26.3. The following are war crimes:
…
29. Committing … apartheid.
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe’s Geneva Conventions Act (1981), as amended in 1996, punishes “any person, whatever his nationality, who, whether in or outside Zimbabwe, commits any such grave breach of … [the 1977 Additional Protocol I]”.
Canada
In 2013, in the
Sapkota case, Canada’s Federal Court dismissed a request for review of a decision denying refugee protection to the applicant on grounds of complicity in crimes against humanity in Nepal between 1991 and 2009. While reviewing the submissions of the respondent, Canada’s Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the Court stated: “The Respondent notes that the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court … is endorsed in Canada as a source of customary law.”
Colombia
In 2007, in the Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, the Plenary Chamber of Colombia’s Constitutional Court stated:
[T]he essential principles of international humanitarian law have acquired
ius cogens status, based on the fact that the international community as a whole has recognised their peremptory and imperative nature in the same way it has recognised this for other cardinal provisions such as … the prohibition of apartheid.
South Africa
In 1987, in the Petane case, the Cape Provincial Division of South Africa’s Supreme Court dismissed the accused’s claim that the 1977 Additional Protocol I reflected customary international law. The Court stated:
The accused has been indicted before this Court on three counts of terrorism, that is to say, contraventions of s 54(1) of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. He has also been indicted on three counts of attempted murder.
…
The accused’s position is stated to be that this Court has no jurisdiction to try him.
…
… The point in its early formulation was this. By the terms of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I to the [1949] Geneva Conventions the accused was entitled to be treated as a prisoner-of-war. A prisoner-of-war is entitled to have notice of an impending prosecution for an alleged offence given to the so-called “protecting power” appointed to watch over prisoners-of-war. Since, if such a notice were necessary, the trial could not proceed without it, Mr Donen suggested that the necessity or otherwise for giving such a notice should be determined before evidence was led. …
…
On 12 August 1949 there were concluded at Geneva in Switzerland four treaties known as the Geneva Conventions. …
South Africa was among the nations which concluded the treaties. … Except for the common art 3, which binds parties to observe a limited number of fundamental humanitarian principles in armed conflicts not of an international character, they apply to wars between States.
After the Second World War many conflicts arose which could not be characterised as international. It was therefore considered desirable by some States to extend and augment the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, so as to afford protection to victims of and combatants in conflicts which fell outside the ambit of these Conventions. The result of these endeavours was Protocol I and Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, both of which came into force on 7 December 1978.
Protocol II relates to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. Since the State of affairs which exists in South Africa has by Protocol I been characterised as an international armed conflict, Protocol II does not concern me at all.
…
The extension of the scope of art 2 of the Geneva Conventions was, at the time of its adoption, controversial. …
The article has remained controversial. More debate has raged about its field of operation than about any other articles in Protocol I. …
South Africa is one of the countries which has not acceded to Protocol I. Nevertheless, I am asked to decide, as I indicated earlier, as a preliminary point, whether Protocol I has become part of customary international law. If so, it is argued that it would have been incorporated into South African law. If it has been so incorporated it would have to be proved by one or other of the parties that the turmoil which existed at the time when the accused is alleged to have committed his offences was such that it could properly be described as an “armed conflict” conducted by “peoples” against a “ra[c]ist regime” in the exercise of their “right of self-determination”. Once all this has been shown it would have to be demonstrated to the Court that the accused conducted himself in such a manner as to become entitled to the benefits conferred by Protocol I on combatants, for example that, broadly speaking, he had, while he was launching an attack, distinguished himself from civilians and had not attacked civilian targets. …
…
… I am prepared to accept that where a rule of customary international law is recognised as such by international law it will be so recognised by our law.
…
To my way of thinking, the trouble with the first Protocol giving rise to State practice is that its terms have not been capable of being observed by all that many States. At the end of 1977 when the treaty first lay open for ratification there were few States which were involved in colonial domination or the occupation of other States and there were only two, South Africa and Israel, which were considered to fall within the third category of ra[c]ist regimes. Accordingly, the situation sought to be regulated by the first Protocol was one faced by few countries; too few countries in my view, to permit any general usage in dealing with armed conflicts of the kind envisaged by the Protocol to develop.
…
Mr Donen contended that the provisions of multilateral treaties can become customary international law under certain circumstances. I accept that this is so. There seems in principle to be no reason why treaty rules cannot acquire wider application than among the parties to the treaty.
Brownlie Principles of International Law 3rd ed at 13 agrees that non-parties to a treaty may by their conduct accept the provisions of a multilateral convention as representing general international law. …
…
I incline to the view that non-ratification of a treaty is strong evidence of non-acceptance.
…
It is interesting to note that the first Protocol makes extensive provision for the protection of civilians in armed conflict. …
…
In this sense, Protocol I may be described as an enlightened humanitarian document. If the strife in South Africa should deteriorate into an armed conflict we may all one day find it a cause for regret that the ideologically provocative tone of s 1(4) has made it impossible for the Government to accept its terms.
…
To my mind it can hardly be said that Protocol I has been greeted with acclaim by the States of the world. Their lack of enthusiasm must be due to the bizarre mixture of political and humanitarian objects sought to be realised by the Protocol. …
…
According to the International Review of the Red Cross (January/February 1987) No 256, as at December 1986, 66 States were parties to Protocol I and 60 to Protocol II, which, it will be remembered, deals with internal non-international armed conflicts. With the exception of France, which acceded only to Protocol II, not one of the world’s major powers has acceded to or ratified either of the Protocols. This position should be compared to the 165 States which are parties to the Geneva Conventions.
This approach of the world community to Protocol I is, on principle, far too half-hearted to justify an inference that its principles have been so widely accepted as to qualify them as rules of customary international law. The reasons for this are, I imagine, not far to seek. For those States which are contending with “peoples[’]” struggles for self-determination, adoption of the Protocol may prove awkward. For liberation movements who rely on strategies of urban terror for achieving their aims the terms of the Protocol, with its emphasis on the protection of civilians, may prove disastrously restrictive. I therefore do not find it altogether surprising that Mr Donen was unable to refer me to any statement in the published literature that Protocol I has attained the status o[f] customary international [law].
…
I have not been persuaded by the arguments which I have heard on behalf of the accused that the assessment of Professor Dugard, writing in the Annual Survey of South African Law (1983) at 66, that “it is argued with growing conviction that under contemporary international law members of SWAPO [South-West Africa People’s Organisation] and the ANC [African National Congress] are members of liberation movements entitled to prisoner-of-war status, in terms of a new customary rule spawned by the 1977 Protocols”, is correct. On what I have heard in argument I disagree with his assessment that there is growing support for the view that the Protocols reflect a new rule of customary international law. No writer has been cited who supports this proposition. Here and there someone says that it may one day come about. I am not sure that the provisions relating to the field of application of Protocol I are capable of ever becoming a rule of customary international law, but I need not decide that point today.
For the reasons which I have given I have concluded that the provisions of Protocol I have not been accepted in customary international law. They accordingly form no part of South African law.
This conclusion has made it unnecessary for me to give a decision on the question of whether rules of customary international law which conflict with the statutory or common law of this country will be enforced by its courts.
In the result, the preliminary point is dismissed. The trial must proceed.
South Africa
In 2010, in the Boeremag case, South Africa’s North Gauteng High Court stated:
In Petane, … Conradie J found that the provisions of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I are not part of customary international law, and therefore are also not part of South African law.
…
Referring to the fact that in December 1986 only 66 of the 165 States party to the Geneva Conventions had ratified Protocol I, the Court [in Petane] stated:
This approach of the world community to Protocol I is, on principle, far too half-hearted to justify an inference that its principles have been so widely accepted as to qualify them as rules of customary international law. The reasons for this are, I imagine, not far to seek. For those States which are contending with “peoples[’]” struggles for self-determination, adoption of the Protocol may prove awkward. For liberation movements who rely on strategies of urban terror for achieving their aims the terms of the Protocol, with its emphasis on the protection of civilians, may prove disastrously restrictive. I therefore do not find it altogether surprising that Mr Donen was unable to refer me to any statement in the published literature that Protocol I has attained the status of customary international law.
Important changes with respect to certain aspects applicable at the time of Petane have taken place. The ANC [African National Congress] has become South Africa’s ruling party and in 1995 ratified Protocol I. The total number of States that have ratified it, is now … 162.
This last aspect forms the basis on which the First Respondent [the State] and the applicants agree that Protocol I forms part of customary international law as well as of South African law. As requested, this position is accepted for the purposes of the decision, without deciding on the matter.
Despite these changes, it remains debatable whether the provisions of Protocol I have become a part of South African law in this way.
The consensus of both parties to the conflict is required. See Petane … and Article 96 of Protocol I. …
Parliament’s failure to incorporate Protocol I into legislation in accordance with Article 231(4) of the Constitution in fact points to the contrary, and is indicative that the requirements of
usus and/or
opinio juris have not been met. See
Petane.

[footnotes in original omitted]
The Court also held:
If the [1977 Additional Protocol I] applies in South Africa as customary international law, the two requirements that form the basis of customary law must be met. It is arguable that the requirement of
usus has been met by the vast number of States that have acceded or ratified it. By ratifying Protocol I the Republic of South Africa has indicated its intention to apply the Protocol, thereby fulfilling the requirement of
opinio juris.
United States of America
In 2007, in the Khulumani case before the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in which various plaintiff representatives of apartheid victims appealed the decision of a lower court that had dismissed claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) and Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) made against various defendant corporations concerning alleged violations of international law, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the TVPA claims, but vacated portions of the lower court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ ATCA claims.
In a separate opinion, Judge Korman stated:
[T]he tenuous interest of the United States in the issues raised by these cases is also reflected in the fact that, under customary international law, we could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action against the primary tortfeasor – the officials of the Union of South Africa –or the foreign corporate defendants. This is so, because apartheid, however abhorrent it may have been, has not been regarded as an offense subject to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. This concept, as its name implies, “recognize[s] that international law permits any state to apply its laws to punish certain offenses although the state has no links of territory with the offense, or of nationality with the offender (or even the victim).” Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law ß 404 cmt. a (1987); see also Matter of Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 555–58 (N.D. Ohio 1985). Universal jurisdiction is dependent not only on “substantive agreement as to certain universally condemned behavior,” which transforms the behavior into a violation of customary international law, but also “procedural agreement that universal jurisdiction exists to prosecute a subset of that behavior.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
There is no agreement with respect to the latter issue. Although the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law cites racial discrimination, “when practiced systematically as a matter of state policy, e.g., apartheid,” as a violation of customary international law,
id. ß 702 cmt. i (emphasis deleted), it omits apartheid from the list of offenses subject to universal jurisdiction. Instead, the Restatement states that universal jurisdiction exists only for “certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism.”
Id. ß 404. Indeed, while the Reporters of the Restatement observed that the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,
adopted Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (the “Apartheid Convention”), provided for universal jurisdiction, they stated that it did so only “[a]mong [the] parties to the Convention.”
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law ß 702 reporters’ note 7.
See also Antonio Cassese,
Crimes Against Humanity,
in 1
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 353, 376 (Antonio Cassese et al., eds., 2002) (observing that the Rome Statute, enacted in 1998, is broader than customary international law and “expands general international law” insofar as it,
inter alia, “broadens the classes of conduct amounting to crimes against humanity” to include “the crime of apartheid”). Likewise, the European Commission, the executive body of the European Union, has stated explicitly that, while “apartheid is widely condemned by states … at least at present, it does not give rise to universal jurisdiction because, among other reasons, the [Apartheid Convention] … has not been widely ratified.” Br. for the European Commission as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 159 L. Ed. 2d 718 (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 177036, at 16 n.35. Another reason is that jurisdiction is limited to certain universally condemned crimes which “by their nature occur either outside of a State or where there is no State capable of punishing, or competent to punish, the crime (as in a time of war).”
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 105 (2d Cir. 2003).
Bulgaria
In 1979, during a debate in the UN General Assembly, Bulgaria stated that under international law, the practice of apartheid was a crime against humanity.
Kenya
In 1981, during a debate in the UN General Assembly, Kenya recalled that the practice of apartheid was considered a crime against humanity by international law and the international community.
Lebanon
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in 2004, Lebanon stated:
The construction of the wall and the resulting situation correspond to a number of the constituent acts of the crime of apartheid, as enumerated in Article 2 of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adopted by the General Assembly on 30 November 1973: that is to say, the denial of the liberty and dignity of a group, the deliberate imposition on a group of living conditions calculated to cause its physical destruction in whole or in part, measures calculated to deprive a group of the right to work, the right to education and the right to freedom of movement and residence, the creation of ghettos, the expropriation of property, etc.
Romania
In 1973, during a debate in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly on a draft convention on apartheid, Romania stated:
In light of the references to
apartheid in the United Nations instruments and resolutions mentioned in the preamble to the draft Convention, it could be said that
apartheid was already regarded in international law as constituting a crime against humanity.
Syrian Arab Republic
The Report on the Practice of the Syrian Arab Republic asserts that the Syrian Arab Republic considers Article 85 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to be part of customary international law.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
In 1973, during a debate in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly on a draft convention on apartheid, the USSR stated that apartheid was recognized as a crime against humanity in international law and was thus binding on South Africa.
United Arab Emirates
In 1980, during a debate in the UN General Assembly, the United Arab Emirates stated that apartheid was “a crime against the human conscience and a serious violation of the human principles and values on which civilization is based”.
Viet Nam
In 1981, during a debate in the UN General Assembly, Viet Nam declared that the practice of apartheid was considered a crime against humanity by international law.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1976, the UN Security Council reaffirmed that “the policy of
apartheid is a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind and seriously disturbs international peace and security”.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1980, the UN Security Council:
Reaffirms that the policy of
apartheid is a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind and is incompatible with the rights and dignity of man, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and seriously disturbs international peace and security.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1966, the UN General Assembly declared that “the practice of apartheid, as also all forms of racial discrimination, constitutes a crime against humanity”.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1967, the UN General Assembly condemned “the policies of oppression, racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia, which constitute a crime against humanity”.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1967, the UN General Assembly reiterated its declaration that “the practice of apartheid and all forms of racial discrimination constitute a crime against humanity”.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1979, the UN General Assembly reaffirmed that “
apartheid is a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind”.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1979, the UN General Assembly reaffirmed that “
apartheid is a crime against humanity”.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, the UN General Assembly acknowledged that “no derogation from the prohibition of racial discrimination, genocide, the crime of apartheid or slavery is permitted, as defined in the obligations under the relevant human rights instruments”.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, the UN General Assembly acknowledged that “no derogation from the prohibition of racial discrimination, genocide, the crime of apartheid or slavery is permitted, as defined in the obligations under the relevant human rights instruments”.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the UN General Assembly acknowledged that “no derogation from the prohibition of racial discrimination, genocide, the crime of apartheid or slavery is permitted, as defined in the obligations under the relevant human rights instruments”.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the UN General Assembly acknowledged that “no derogation from the prohibition of racial discrimination, genocide, the crime of apartheid or slavery is permitted, as defined in the obligations under the relevant human rights instruments”.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the UN General Assembly acknowledged that “no derogation from the prohibition of racial discrimination, genocide, the crime of apartheid or slavery is permitted, as defined in the obligations under the relevant human rights instruments”.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1992 on the situation of human rights in South Africa, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Reaffirms its support for the legitimate struggle of the South African people for the total eradication of apartheid through peaceful means and their right to establish a non-racial, democratic system which is consistent with the International Bill of Human Rights.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1993 on the implementation of the Programme of Action for the Second Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and launching of a third decade to combat racism and racial discrimination, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Declares that all forms of racism and racial discrimination, particularly in their institutionalized form, such as apartheid, or resulting from official doctrines of racial superiority or exclusivity, are among the most serious violations of human rights in the contemporary world and must be combated by all available means.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the UN Commission on Human Rights acknowledged that “no derogation from the prohibition of racial discrimination, genocide, the crime of apartheid or slavery is permitted, as defined in the obligations under the relevant human rights instruments”.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the UN Commission on Human Rights acknowledged that “no derogation from the prohibition of racial discrimination, genocide, the crime of apartheid or slavery is permitted, as defined in the obligations under the relevant human rights instruments”.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the UN Commission on Human Rights acknowledged that “no derogation from the prohibition of racial discrimination, genocide, the crime of apartheid or slavery is permitted, as defined in the obligations under the relevant human rights instruments”.
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights
In 1974, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights established a Working Group on contemporary forms of slavery to review developments in various fields, including practices of apartheid.
No data.
World Conference on Human Rights
In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 expressed dismay and condemnation that “gross and systematic violations and situations that constitute serious obstacles to the full enjoyment of all human rights continue to occur in all parts of the world, [including] … apartheid”.
No data.
ICRC
The ICRC’s commentary on Article 85 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I notes: “The practices concerned were already grave breaches of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions, whatever their motive; this is simply a special mention of reprehensible conduct for which the motive is particularly shocking.”
ICRC
In 1997, in a working paper on war crimes submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, the ICRC proposed that the following war crime, when committed wilfully and in violation of international humanitarian law, be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court: “practices of
apartheid, and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination”.
No data.