Соответствующая норма
United States of America
Practice Relating to Rule 90. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
Section B. Definitions
The US Field Manual (1956) restates Article 32 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, which provides that States have agreed not to take any “measures of such character as to cause the physical suffering … of protected persons in their hands”. 
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 271.
According to the US Instructor’s Guide (1985), “beating a prisoner or applying electric shocks, dunking his head into a barrel of water, and putting a plastic bag over his head to make him talk” are acts of torture and inhumane treatment. 
United States, Instructor’s Guide – The Law of War, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, April 1985, p. 10.
The US Manual for Military Commissions (2007) states:
Confessions, admissions, and other statements
(b) Definitions. As used in these rules:
(3) Torture. For the purpose of determining whether a statement must be excluded under section (a) of this rule, “torture” is defined as an act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incident to lawful sanctions) upon another person within the actor’s custody or physical control. “Severe mental pain or suffering” is defined as the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from:
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. 
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part III, Rule 304(b), pp. III-8 and III-9.
The US Manual for Military Commissions (2010) states:
Confessions, admissions, and other statements
(b) Definitions. As used in these rules:
(3) Torture. For the purpose of determining whether a statement must be excluded under section (a) of this rule, “torture” is defined as an act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incident to lawful sanctions) upon another person within the actor’s custody or physical control. “Severe mental pain or suffering” is defined as the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from:
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
(4) Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The term “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as defined in the United States Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment done at New York, December 10, 1984, without geographical limitation. 
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 304(b)(3) and (4), pp. III-7, III-9 and III-10.
The US Torture Victim Protection Act (1991) defines torture as “any act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering … whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual”. 
United States, Torture Victim Protection Act, 1991, Section 3.
The US War Crimes Act (1996), as amended by the Military Commissions Act (2006), includes in its definition of war crimes any conduct constituting a grave breach of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
§ 2441. War crimes
(c) Definition.—As used in this section the term “war crime” means any conduct—
(3) which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 (as defined in subsection (d)) when committed in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not of an international character; or
(d) Common Article 3 Violations.—
(1) Prohibited conduct.—In subsection (c)(3), the term “grave breach of common Article 3” means any conduct (such conduct constituting a grave breach of common Article 3 of the international conventions done at Geneva August 12, 1949), as follows:
(A) Torture.—The act of a person who commits, or conspires or attempts to commit, an act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or any reason based on discrimination of any kind.
(B) Cruel or inhuman treatment.—The act of a person who commits, or conspires or attempts to commit, an act intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions), including serious physical abuse, upon another within his custody or control.
(F) Intentionally causing serious bodily injury.—The act of a person who intentionally causes, or conspires or attempts to cause, serious bodily injury to one or more persons, including lawful combatants, in violation of the law of war.
(2) Definitions.—In the case of an offense under subsection (a) by reason of subsection (c)(3)—
(A) the term “severe mental pain or suffering” shall be applied for purposes of paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B) in accordance with the meaning given that term in section 2340 (2) of this title;
(B) the term “serious bodily injury” shall be applied for purposes of paragraph (1)(F) in accordance with the meaning given that term in section 113 (b) (2) of this title;
(D) the term “serious physical pain or suffering” shall be applied for purposes of paragraph (1)(B) as meaning bodily injury that involves—
(i) a substantial risk of death;
(ii) extreme physical pain;
(iii) a burn or physical disfigurement of a serious nature (other than cuts, abrasions, or bruises); or
(iv) significant loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; and
(E) the term “serious mental pain or suffering” shall be applied for purposes of paragraph (1)(B) in accordance with the meaning given the term “severe mental pain or suffering” (as defined in section 2340 (2) of this title), except that—
(i) the term “serious” shall replace the term “severe” where it appears; and
(ii) as to conduct occurring after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the term “serious and non-transitory mental harm (which need not be prolonged)” shall replace the term “prolonged mental harm” where it appears.
(3) Inapplicability of certain provisions with respect to collateral damage or incident of lawful attack.—The intent specified for the conduct stated in subparagraph … (F) o[f] paragraph (1) precludes the applicability of those subparagraphs to an offense under subsection (a) by reasons of subsection (c)(3) with respect to—
(A) collateral damage; or
(B) death, damage, or injury incident to a lawful attack.
(5) Definition of grave breaches.—The definitions in this subsection are intended only to define the grave breaches of common Article 3 and not the full scope of United States obligations under that Article. 
United States, War Crimes Act, 1996, 18 United States Code Sec. 2441, as amended by Military Commissions Act, 2006, 17 October 2006, § 2441(c)(3) and (d).
The US Detainee Treatment Act (2005) states:
Sec. 1003. Prohibition on Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of Persons Under Custody or Control of the United States Government
(d) Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Defined – In this section, the term “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as defined in the United States Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment done at New York, December 10, 1984. 
United States, Detainee Treatment Act, 2005, Title X of Public Law 109-148 (the 2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act), 119 Stat 2680, 30 December 2005, § 1003(d).
The US Military Commissions Act (2006), passed by Congress following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in 2006, amends Title 10 of the United States Code as follows:
§ 950v. Crimes triable by military commissions
“ …
“(b) OFFENSES.—The following offenses shall be triable by military commission under this chapter at any time without limitation:
“…
“(11) TORTURE.—
“(A) OFFENSE.—Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or any reason based on discrimination of any kind, shall be punished, if death results to one or more of the victims, by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct, and, if death does not result to any of the victims, by such punishment, other than death, as a military commission under this chapter may direct.
“(B) SEVERE MENTAL PAIN OR SUFFERING DEFINED.—In this section, the term “severe mental pain or suffering” has the meaning given that term in section 2340(2) of title 18.
“(12) CRUEL OR INHUMAN TREATMENT.—
“(A) OFFENSE.—Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions), including serious physical abuse, upon another within his custody or control shall be punished, if death results to the victim, by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct, and, if death does not result to the victim, by such punishment, other than death, as a military commission under this chapter may direct.
“(B) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph:
(i) The term “serious physical pain or suffering” means bodily injury that involves—
(I) a substantial risk of death;
(II) extreme physical pain;
(III) a burn or physical disfigurement of a serious nature (other than cuts, abrasions, or bruises); or
(IV) significant loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.
(ii) The term “severe mental pain or suffering” has the meaning given that term in section 2340(2) of title 18.
(iii) The term “serious mental pain or suffering” has the meaning given the term “severe mental pain or suffering” in section 2340(2) of title 18, except that—
(I) the term “serious” shall replace the term “severe” where it appears; and
(II) as to conduct occurring after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the term “serious and non-transitory mental harm (which need not be prolonged)” shall replace the term “prolonged mental harm” where it appears.
“(13) INTENTIONALLY CAUSING SERIOUS BODILY INJURY.—
“(A) OFFENSE.—Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally causes serious bodily injury to one or more persons, including lawful combatants, in violation of the law of war shall be punished, if death results to one or more of the victims, by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct, and, if death does not result to any of the victims, by such punishment, other than death, as a military commission under this chapter may direct.
“(B) SERIOUS BODILY INJURY DEFINED.—In this paragraph, the term “serious bodily injury” means bodily injury which involves—
(i) a substantial risk of death;
(ii) extreme physical pain;
(iii) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or
(iv) protracted loss or impairment of the function
of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. 
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, pp. 120 Stat. 2626-2627, § 950v(b)(11)–(13).
The Military Commissions Act also states:
Sec. 6. Implementation of Treaty Obligations
“ …
“(b) REVISION TO WAR CRIMES OFFENSE UNDER FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—
“ …
“(B) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
“(d) COMMON ARTICLE 3 VIOLATIONS.—
“(1) PROHIBITED CONDUCT.—In subsection (c)(3), the term “grave breach of common Article 3” means any conduct (such conduct constituting a grave breach of common Article 3 of the international conventions done at Geneva August 12, 1949), as follows:
“(A) TORTURE.—The act of a person who commits, or conspires or attempts to commit, an act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or any reason based on discrimination of any kind.
“(B) CRUEL OR INHUMAN TREATMENT.—The act of a person who commits, or conspires or attempts to commit, an act intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions), including serious physical abuse, upon another within his custody or control.
“ …
“(F) INTENTIONALLY CAUSING SERIOUS BODILY INJURY.—The act of a person who intentionally causes, or conspires or attempts to cause, serious bodily injury to one or more persons, including lawful combatants, in violation of the law of war. 
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, pp. 120 Stat. 2633 and 2634, Sec. 6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(A), (B) and (F).
In 2002, in the Mehinovic case, a civil lawsuit filed on behalf of four Bosnian Muslims who were tortured by a Bosnian-Serb soldier in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, the US District Court Northern District of Georgia found the defendant liable for: torture; cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; arbitrary detention; war crimes; crimes against humanity; and genocide. The Court awarded the plaintiffs US$ 140 million in damages. In its judgment, the Court stated:
Generally, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment includes acts which inflict mental or physical suffering, anguish, humiliation, fear and debasement, which do not rise to the level of “torture” or do not have the same purposes as “torture.”
[U]nder international law, “inhuman treatment” includes “not only acts such as torture and intentionally causing great suffering or inflicting serious injury to body, mind or health but also extends to other acts contravening the fundamental principle of humane treatment, in particular those which constitute an attack on human dignity.” ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment (Trial Chamber I, March 3, 2000) § 155 (citing Delalic, Judgment (Trial Chamber) § 544. Similarly, “willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health” includes injury to “mental health” and “includes those acts which do not fulfill the conditions set for the characterization of torture, even though acts of torture may also fit the definition given.” ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment (Trial Chamber I, March 3, 2000) § 155 (citing Delalic, Judgment (Trial Chamber) § 511. 
United States, District Court Northern District of Georgia, Mehinovic case, Judgment, 29 April 2002.
The Agent Orange case in 2005 involved a class action suit filed on behalf of various Vietnamese nationals and an organization, The Vietnamese Association for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin, against Dow Chemical and other US chemical manufacturers, for harms allegedly done to them and their land through the United States’ use of Agent Orange and other herbicides during the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1971 and by the South Vietnamese government’s subsequent use of such herbicides until 1975. In dismissing the claims, the Court found that, while recognizing the evolution of international law since 1975, the use of herbicides did not violate, at the time they were used, either customary or conventional international law binding on the United States. With regard to the question of whether the use of herbicides constituted torture, the Court stated:
The use of herbicides in Vietnam does not fit within the definition of either torture or extrajudicial killing. Plaintiffs were not within the defendants’ custody or physical control, nor that of the United States, when herbicides were used. Nor were herbicides used to intentionally inflict pain and suffering. They were used to kill plants. 
United States, Eastern States District Court (EDNY), Agent Orange case, Judgment, 28 March 2005, pp. 176–177.
In August 2002, in response to a request from the Counsel to the President, the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, provided its views regarding the standards of conduct under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment as implemented by Sections 2340–2340A of Title 18 of the US Code. These included:
We conclude below that Section 23440A proscribes acts inflicting, and that are specifically intended to inflict, severe pain or suffering, whether mental or physical. Those acts must be of an extreme nature to rise to the level of torture within the meaning of Section 2340A and the Convention. We further conclude that certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading, but still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within Section 2340A’s proscription against torture …
… We conclude that for an act to constitute torture as defined in Section 2340, it must inflict pain that is difficult to endure. Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily functions, or even death. For purely mental pain or suffering to amount to torture under Section 2340, it must result in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g. lasting for months or even years. We conclude that the mental harm also must result from one of the predicate acts listed in the statute, namely: threats of imminent death; threats of infliction of the kind of pain that would amount to physical torture; infliction of such physical pain as a means of psychological torture; use of drugs or other procedures designed to deeply disrupt the senses, or fundamentally alter an individual’s personality; or threatening to do any of these things to a third party. The legislative history simply reveals that Congress intended for the statute’s definition to track the Convention’s definition of torture and the reservations, understandings, and declarations that the United States submitted with its ratification. We conclude that the statute, taken as a whole, makes plain that it prohibits only extreme acts.
… We conclude that the treaty’s text prohibits only the most extreme acts by reserving criminal penalties solely for torture and declining to require such penalties for “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” This confirms our view that the criminal statute penalizes only the most egregious conduct. Executive branch interpretations and representations to the Senate at the time of ratification further confirm the treaty was intended to reach only the most extreme conduct.
In Part III, we analyze the jurisprudence of the Torture Victims Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000), which provides civil remedies for torture victims, to predict the standards that courts might follow in determining what actions reach the threshold of torture in the criminal context. We conclude from these cases that courts are likely to take a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, and will look to an entire course of conduct, to determine whether certain acts will violate Section 2340A. Moreover, these cases demonstrate that most often torture involves cruel and extreme physical pain. In Part IV, we examine international decisions regarding the use of sensory deprivation techniques. These cases make clear that while many of these techniques may amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, they do not produce pain or suffering of the necessary intensity to meet the definition of torture. From these decisions, we conclude that there is a wide range of such techniques that will not rise to the level of torture.
In Part V, we discuss whether Section 2340A may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations undertaken of enemy combatants pursuant to the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers. We find that in the circumstances of the current war against al Qaeda and its allies, prosecution under Section 2340A may be barred because enforcement of the statute would represent an unconstitutional infringement of the President’s authority to conduct war. In Part VI, we discuss defenses to an allegation that an interrogation method might violate the statute. We conclude that, under the current circumstances, necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that might violate Section 2340A.  
United States, Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum by Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, 1 August 2002, pp. 1–2.
In May 2006, the US Department of State held an on-the-record press briefing during which its legal adviser responded to questions concerning the recently-released Concluding Observations of the Committee Against Torture to the United States’ second periodic report. In responding to a question on what was the legal definition of torture and humane treatment, and the nature of any differences between the United States and the Committee on that matter, he stated:
We don’t think that there is a difference. Torture is a term that is defined in the Convention. Much has been made by some who want to suggest that there is a difference between the definition of torture in the Convention and the definition in our U.S. criminal laws. There are some differences in wording that have to do with the intent that’s required, but that really only has to do with the fact that when a country, and particularly the United States, enacts a criminal statute, in order for the criminal statute to hold up in court, it’s important that there be a very specific intent requirement, that someone is not actually held guilty and accountable for violating a criminal statute unless they intended to do something.
So there were some fine word changes that were made in our U.S. criminal statute that some people have suggested we had nefarious intent, but these were changes that were made by our Senate 10 years ago and not anything – we don’t think there’s a substantial difference between the Convention and the definition in our criminal laws here. 
United States, Department of State Legal Adviser, John B. Bellinger, On-the-Record Briefing on the Committee Against Torture Report, Washington. D.C., 19 May 2006.