Соответствующая норма
United States of America
Practice Relating to Rule 147. Reprisals against Protected Objects
Section F. Works and installations containing dangerous forces
In 1987, in submitting the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the US Senate for advice and consent to ratification, the US President announced his decision not to ratify the 1977 Additional Protocol I, stating, inter alia, that the Additional Protocol I “fails to improve substantially the compliance and verification mechanisms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and eliminates an important sanction against violations of those Conventions”. 
United States, Message from the US President transmitting the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the US Senate for advice and consent to ratification, Treaty Doc. 100-2, 29 January 1987.
In 1987, the Deputy Legal Adviser of the US Department of State stated that the United States did not support “the prohibition on reprisals in article 51 [of the 1977 Additional Protocol I] and subsequent articles” and did not consider it part of customary law. He added that it did not support Article 56 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and that the United States did not consider it to be customary law. 
United States, Remarks of Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, US Department of State, The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, American Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 2, 1987, pp. 426 and 427.
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, the United States stated:
Various provisions of Additional Protocol I contain prohibitions on reprisals against specific types of persons or objects, including … works and installations containing dangerous forces (Article 56(4)). These are among the new rules established by the Protocol that … do not apply to nuclear weapons. 
United States, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 20 June 1995, p. 31.