Соответствующая норма
Sri Lanka
Practice Relating to Rule 1. The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants
In 2011, in its Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis July 2006–May 2009, Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Defence stated:
184. The Humanitarian Operation that commenced in Mavil Aru, converted itself to a civilian rescue mission in the last phases of the war …
196. … [M]eticulous pre-planning was carried out prior to commencing each phase of the rescue operation. The chief objective being the minimising of casualties, the following strategies were adopted:
d. Snipers were constantly used since the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] were intermingling with civilians. This had a tremendous impact on the civilians as they observed that the targets taken were the LTTE combatants engaged in the act of firing, and Security Forces carefully avoided the civilians in the vicinity. 
Sri Lanka, Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis July 2006–May 2009, July 2011, §§ 184 and 196(d).
The Ministry of Defence further stated: “On 18 May 2009, Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE, bringing to an end three decades of conflict and suffering.” 
Sri Lanka, Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis July 2006–May 2009, July 2011, § 12.
In 2008, in its initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child under the 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, Sri Lanka stated:
36. The former Special Representative of the [UN] Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict Mr. Olara Otunnu was invited by the Government to visit Sri Lanka in May 1998, to add strength to the advocacy campaign against child recruitment … The LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] made the following commitments in relation to children in armed conflict to Mr. Otunnu during his meeting with the LTTE[:]
(e) The LTTE … agreed to review its strategies and tactics of targeting civilian population contrary to humanitarian laws.
37. These commitments were not implemented by the LTTE. 
Sri Lanka, Initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child under the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 15 February 2010, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/LKA/1, submitted 16 June 2008, §§ 36(e) and 37.
[footnote in original omitted]
In 2011, in its Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis July 2006–May 2009, Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Defence stated:
25. The LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] carried out attacks … throughout Sri Lanka using human bombs, vehicle bombs, time bombs, claymore mines, different Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and armed attacks. The attacks on innocent civilians using these methods killed over 9,800 and grievously injured more than 10,000 in Government controlled areas. The number of civilians killed and injured by the LTTE in areas under its dominance is unknown. Some of the deadliest bomb attacks include the central bus station attack in Colombo in 1987 that killed over 100 people, and the truck bomb attack at the Central Bank in 1996 that killed 86 whilst wounding over 1,300. Several armed attacks were also carried out, including the massacre of 120 devotees at the sacred Buddhist site of the Sri Maha Bodhiya in Anuradhapura in 1985, the massacre of 37 civilians including 33 novice Buddhist monks aboard a bus at Aranthalawa in 1987, and the massacre of 147 Muslim devotees at prayer at the Kathankudy Mosque in Batticaloa in 1995.
26. The LTTE also attacked civilians in vulnerable villages, using automatic weapons, small arms, swords, machetes, clubs and other handheld weapons. These attacks were mostly carried out under cover of night and indiscriminately targeted innocent men, women and children. In sum, LTTE attacks on vulnerable villages are estimated to have killed over 1,950 civilians and injured over 400. …
28. The LTTE also engaged in a brutal campaign of assassinations. The victims of this campaign include two national leaders. A female suicide bomber killed [the] former Indian Prime Minister … in 1991. Serving Sri Lankan President … was also killed in a suicide bombing in 1993. In 1999, [the] Sri Lankan President … narrowly escaped a similar fate. The LTTE also assassinated Sri Lanka’s Defence Minister … in 1991 and, during the last ceasefire period, killed [the] Foreign Minister.
30. … The LTTE’s indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including the butchering of children, and its targeting of places of religious worship, made it clear that no one and nothing was safe from its violence. …
D. Ethnic Cleansing carried out by the LTTE
34. Starting in the early 1980s, the LTTE drove out the Sinhala residents from the Jaffna peninsula. Attacks carried out on Sinhala civilians in the North and East during the 1980s accounted for close to 500 deaths, while over 150 more Sinhala civilians were killed in vulnerable villages near LTTE dominated areas during the same period. …
35. The LTTE was also determined to drive out the Muslims from the North. … The LTTE carried out several brutal attacks on Muslim villages in the North and East, massacring almost 600 civilians. 
Sri Lanka, Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis July 2006–May 2009, July 2011, §§ 25–26, 28, 30 and 34–35.
The Ministry of Defence also stated:
67. The Black Tiger Wing consisted of an elite group of cadres specialised in suicide operations …
68. … The Black Tigers regularly targeted civilians throughout Sri Lanka. 
Sri Lanka, Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis July 2006–May 2009, July 2011, §§ 67–68.
The Ministry of Defence further stated:
92. … On 01 October 1987, just four days after falsely claiming it had surrendered all its arms, the LTTE launched a pogrom against Sinhalese civilians in the East, killing 211 civilians within two weeks and wounding 39. …
100. The LTTE also targeted Muslims in its killing spree. In August 1990, the LTTE killed 147 Muslim devotees praying at a mosque in Kathankudy and 173 Muslim villagers in Eravur, Batticaloa. 
Sri Lanka, Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis July 2006–May 2009, July 2011, §§ 92 and 100.
The Ministry of Defence also stated: “On 18 May 2009, Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE, bringing to an end three decades of conflict and suffering.” 
Sri Lanka, Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis July 2006–May 2009, July 2011, § 12.
In 2012, Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Defence issued a press release entitled “Allow Sri Lanka’s efforts at reconciliation to proceed unimpeded – Minister Samarasinghe at UNHCR, ‘No justification or urgency for resolution to implement LLRC recommendations’”, which stated:
[T]he [Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation] Commission offers detailed observations and recommendations on International Humanitarian Law issues relating to the final phases of the conflict. The Report [of the Commission] endorses the position that the protection of civilian life was a key factor in the formulation of policy for carrying out military operations, and that the deliberate targeting of civilians formed no part of it. This was and remains the position of the Government. 
Sri Lanka, Ministry of Defence, “Allow Sri Lanka’s efforts at reconciliation to proceed unimpeded – Minister Samarasinghe at UNHCR, ‘No justification or urgency for resolution to implement LLRC recommendations’”, Press Release, 27 February 2012, p. 4.
In 2012, in its fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Sri Lanka stated:
Humanitarian operation and the end of the conflict
Post-conflict developments
29. Several significant measures were taken by the GoSL [Government of Sri Lanka] to protect the civil and political rights of those that were affected by the conflict with particular attention being paid to the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
LLRC [Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission] and reconciliation process
79. With regard to matters of accountability, the LLRC report clearly states, that protection of civilian life was a key factor in the formulation of policy for carrying out military operations and the deliberate targeting of civilians formed no part of this strategy. 
Sri Lanka, Fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 31 January 2013, UN Doc. CCPR/C/LKA/5, submitted 29 October 2012, §§ 29 and 79.
[footnote in original omitted]