Соответствующая норма
Spain
Practice Relating to Rule 1. The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants
Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states that “a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants”. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 3.1.a.
Spain’s Royal Ordinances for the Armed Forces (2009) states: “In the conduct of any operation, [members of the armed forces] must take into account the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants … in order to protect the civilian population.” 
Spain, Royal Ordinances for the Armed Forces, 2009, Article 111.
In 2010, in the Couso case, which concerned the killing of a Spanish journalist in Baghdad on 8 April 2003 by troops of the United States of America, the Criminal Chamber of Spain’s Supreme Court referred to norms of IHL relevant to the case under review, including Article 48 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
Spain, Supreme Court, Couso case, Judgment, 13 July 2010, Section II(II), Sexto, § 2, p. 13.
In 2010, in its report to the UN General Assembly on the status of the 1977 Additional Protocols, Spain stated:
Article 85 entitled “Principle of Humanity”, contained in Title IV on Operations [of the Royal Ordinances for the Armed Forces (2009)] clearly embodies the spirit of the [1949] Geneva Convention and its [1977] Additional Protocols, as it provides that “[the] … conduct [of members of the armed forces] in any conflict or military operation must conform to the applicable rules of the international treaties on international humanitarian law to which Spain is a party”.
That is further developed in Chapter VI on Ethics in Operations, which goes into specific duties under international humanitarian law … the principle of the distinction between civilians and combatants. 
Spain, Report on the Status of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of armed conflict, 5 May 2010, Section 2.
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) states that the armed forces of the enemy are considered a legitimate target of attack. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, División de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 4.2.b.
Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states: “Attacks must be strictly limited to military objectives.” 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 4.2.b.
The manual further states: “Combatants may only fight other combatants.” 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 7.3.a.(1); see also § 10.3.e.(1).
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) prohibits military operations directed against civilians. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, División de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 4.5.b.(1); see also § 5.2.a.(2).
The manual further states that “intentionally attacking the civilian population or individual civilians” constitutes a grave breach. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, División de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 11.8.b.(1).
Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states: “The civilian population may not be the direct, intentional object of attack, as long as they do not take a direct part in hostilities.” 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 1.3.a.(2); see also §§ 4.5.b.(1).(b), 5.2.a.(2) and 7.3.a.(1).
Spain’s Royal Ordinance for the Armed Forces (1978) emphasizes the obligation to pay due attention to the protection of the civilian population. 
Spain, Royal Ordinance for the Armed Forces, 1978, Article 137.
Spain’s Penal Code (1995) punishes “anyone who, during an armed conflict, … makes the civilian population the object of attack”. 
Spain, Penal Code, 1995, Article 611(1).
In 2010, in the Couso case, the Criminal Chamber of Spain’s Supreme Court was called upon to decide an appeal in the case concerning the killing of a Spanish journalist in Baghdad on 8 April 2003 by troops of the United States of America. In deciding upon one of the issues raised in the appeal on breach of the law due to the failure to apply Article 611 of the Penal Code (1995), the Court noted:
2. Article 611 of the PC [Penal Code] effectively punishes
“anyone who in the event of an armed conflict commits [any of the following acts], without prejudice to the penalty for the results of such acts, shall be punished with ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment:
1. … [M]akes the civilian population the object of attacks”. 
Spain, Supreme Court, Couso case, Judgment, 13 July 2010, Section II(II), Sexto, § 2, p. 11.
[emphasis in original]
The Court further referred to norms of IHL relevant to the case under review, including Article 51(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
Spain, Supreme Court, Couso case, Judgment, 13 July 2010, Section II(II), Sexto, § 2, p. 14.
The Court also restated Articles 57(5) and 85(3)(a) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
Spain, Supreme Court, Couso case, Judgment, 13 July 2010, Section II(II), Sexto, § 2, pp. 15–16.
In deciding on the issue concerning breach of the law, the Court held:
The appealed decision declared the termination of the proceedings … as it considered that the “facts [of] the case did not constitute an offence” … [H]owever, the proceedings carried out do not permit sharing the conclusions of the first instance tribunal; rather, the facts [denounced] merit being subsumed under the cited penal provisions and the aforementioned norms of International Humanitarian Law. 
Spain, Supreme Court, Couso case, Judgment, 13 July 2010, Section II(II), Sexto, § 2, p. 16.
[emphasis in original]
The Court further held:
1. It is understood that jurisprudence only requires that there be a belief that an offence has been likely committed in order to institute proceedings, without it being necessary to certify that the accused persons are the authors of the offence, as determining the certainty of the existence [of an offence] is the responsibility of the sentencing tribunal. …
2. Due to their similarity with this matter, we must refer to what has been said in relation to the fifth and sixth issues raised by the previous appellants concerning the existence of rational indications of the commission of an offence which violate the ius in bello , namely the norms of International Humanitarian Law that must be observed by belligerents.
… [I]t is important to note that the principle of self-defence cannot be applied even in the case of military operations that are supposedly defensive or in response to real prior aggressions … when a belligerent commits any of the actions classified as contrary to the Law of War, such as attacking in any of the described manners those considered to be “protected persons” according to Article 608 of the PC, regardless of the penalty for the results of such acts as provided in Article 611(1) of the same code …
In addition, as criminal responsibility is purely personal, the military doctrine known as “shock and awe” consisting of acts such as the bombardment of protected persons … in the event of armed conflict … results in the criminal responsibility of the person exercising control over the specific direction of the military operations. 
Spain, Supreme Court, Couso case, Judgment, 13 July 2010, Section II(III), Octavo, §§ 1–2, pp. 17–18.
[emphasis in original]
The Court upheld the appeal against the order of 23 October 2009 by the Third Section of the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish National Court, which declared the termination of the proceedings, and held that “the proceedings must continue, and the outstanding preparatory enquiries must be undertaken, as well as any others arising from the clarification of the events under investigation.” 
Spain, Supreme Court, Couso case, Judgment, 13 July 2010, Section III, pp. 20–21.
In 1988, Spain protested against direct attacks on the civilian population during the Iran–Iraq War. 
Spain, Comunicado del Gobierno expresando su preocupación por el conflicto bélico entre Irán e Irak, 15 March 1988, Actividades, Textos y Documentos de la Política Exterior Española, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Oficina de Información Diplomática, Madrid, 1988, p. 669.
The Report on the Practice of Spain considers that, in general,
the Spanish Government has tended to condemn all attacks directed against the civilian population … whether the armed conflict was internal or international. This was its position in the civil war in Liberia, the Gulf War, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the civil war in Sudan, the war in Chechnya, and the Turkish attacks against the Kurds in northern Iraq. 
Report on the Practice of Spain, 1998, Chapter 1.4.