Соответствующая норма
Colombia
Practice Relating to Rule 1. The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants
Colombia’s Circular on Fundamental Rules of IHL (1992) states: “The Parties to the conflict must at all times make a distinction between civilians and combatants in order to protect the civilian population and civilian objects.” 
Colombia, Transcripción Normas Fundamentales del Derecho Humanitario Aplicables en los Conflictos Armados, Circular No. 033/DIPL-SERPO-526, Policía Nacional, Dirección General, Santafé de Bogotá, 14 May 1992, § 7.
Colombia’s Basic Military Manual (1995) provides for the obligation “to distinguish between combatants and the civilian population”. 
Colombia, Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual Básico para las Personerías y las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 1995, pp. 48–49.
Colombia’s Operational Law Manual (2009) states:
3. Fundamental guarantees and IHL principles
These guarantees have been embodied in principles that guide behaviour during situations of hostilities and must be observed throughout all military operations:
- Principle of distinction: Generally, the principle of distinction implies that “the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Civilians must not be targeted.” …
4. Rules for the conduct of hostilities
a. Prohibition of indiscriminate attacks and [notion of] protected persons
Article 48 of the [1977] Additional Protocol I to the [1949] Geneva Conventions expressly enshrines the principle of distinction by establishing that “in order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives, and accordingly direct their operations only against military objectives”.
From the application of this principle derives a set of rules that on the one hand prohibit attacks against protected persons and objects and on the other hand allow the use of force against persons and objects not protected by IHL, since this principle helps to determine, for example, when a person can be a military objective.
v. Persons who take a direct part in hostilities
In situations of non-international armed conflict, it is necessary to differentiate between those who take a direct part in hostilities and those who do not and between military objectives and civilian objects. 
Colombia, Manual de Derecho Operacional Manual FF.MM. 3-41 Público, Primera Edición 2009, Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares, aprobado por el Comandante General de las Fuerzas Armadas por Disposición Número 056, 7 December 2009, pp. 36–37, 40 and 47; see also p. 58.
[footnotes in original omitted]
The manual also states:
3. Minimum contents of operational orders
c. Execution
The description of the execution of the operation must include the Commander’s operational concept. Within these sections, the following contents, depending on the operation[,] … should be included:
(i) For operations in a hostilities scenario:
If the operation is carried out in a situation of hostilities, i.e. if the planning can be done within the IHL framework, the section on execution must also include:
- Distinction: Identify, based on intelligence information, the presence of protected objects or persons and verify that the objective is limited to members of an organized armed group or to persons directly participating in hostilities. 
Colombia, Manual de Derecho Operacional Manual FF.MM. 3-41 Público, Primera Edición 2009, Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares, aprobado por el Comandante General de las Fuerzas Armadas por Disposición Número 056, 7 December 2009, pp. 100–102.
The manual further states:
If the operation is carried out to counter a situation of hostilities, meaning that the planning can be done within the IHL framework, the OLA [Operational Legal Adviser] must advise the Commander in describing the:
- Principle of distinction: identify the presence of protected persons based on intelligence information and verify that the objective is an organized armed group or a person directly participating in hostilities. 
Colombia, Manual de Derecho Operacional Manual FF.MM. 3-41 Público, Primera Edición 2009, Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares, aprobado por el Comandante General de las Fuerzas Armadas por Disposición Número 056, 7 December 2009, pp. 145–146.
Colombia’s Directive No. 10 (2007), whose objective is to prevent the killing of protected persons, states:
In view of the new circumstances and modalities of the criminal acts of illegal armed groups which operate more and more frequently disguised as civilians, the armed forces must undertake all possible efforts to distinguish the civilian population and to protect the civilian population in all circumstances. 
Colombia, Directive No. 10, 2007, § IV.
In 2004, in the Constitutional Case No. C-037/04, the Criminal Chamber of Colombia’s Constitutional Court stated that according to “the principle of distinction … parties to a conflict must distinguish between combatants and non-combatants (the civilian population), as the latter cannot be the object of attack”. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-037/04, Judgment of 27 January 2004, pp. 35–36.
In 2006, in the Constitutional Case No. T-165/06, the First Appeals Chamber of Colombia’s Constitutional Court stated:
[W]ith regard to the conduct of hostilities, it is important to note that IHL is ruled by fundamental principles, such as the principles of distinction, limitation and proportionality. Indeed, … the principle of distinction imposes on weapon bearers the obligation to distinguish in their military actions between combatants and non-combatants. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. T-165/06, Judgment of 7 March 2006, pp. 7–8
In 2007, in the Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, the Plenary Chamber of Colombia’s Constitutional Court stated:
[T]he essential principles of international humanitarian law have acquired ius cogens status, based on the fact that the international community as a whole has recognized their peremptory and imperative nature … Among the essential principles of international humanitarian law with ius cogens status applicable in internal armed conflicts … [is] … the principle of distinction. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, Judgment of 25 April 2007, p. 70.
The Court further held: “The principle of distinction, one of the cornerstones of international humanitarian law, flows directly from the obligation to protect the civilian population from the effects of war, as in times of armed conflict it is only acceptable to weaken the enemy’s military potential.” 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, Judgment of 25 April 2007, p. 70.
(footnote in original omitted)
The Court also held:
The general duty to distinguish between civilians and combatants is an essential duty binding the parties to any non-international armed conflict to differentiate at all times between civilians and combatants in order to protect civilians and their property. Indeed, parties to a conflict are bound to make every effort to distinguish between military objectives and civilians … This rule is found in international treaties applicable in internal armed conflicts and is binding on Colombia. It forms part of customary international humanitarian law and has attained ius cogens status. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, Judgment of 25 April 2007, p. 78.
[footnote in original omitted]
The Court further found that “the principle [of distinction] … is … customary international law applicable in both internal and international armed conflicts”. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, Judgment of 25 April 2007, pp. 78–79.
In 2010, in the Ramirez Vivas and others case, which concerned the murder of a civilian by Colombian soldiers, Colombia’s Second Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit of Popayán stated:
The accused had orders to stop the vehicle with the aim of verifying who was inside and whether it carried weapons, but with no orders to fire. However, they consciously and voluntarily chose to use force. They clearly violated the principle of distinction, which obliges one to distinguish and differentiate between civilians and combatants at all times. It is a fundamental duty of the parties to any non-international armed conflict and is aimed at preserving civilians and civilian objects. It is a rule contained in international treaties applicable in internal armed conflicts and binding on Colombia. It is also part of customary international humanitarian law and has the status of ius cogens. 
Colombia, Second Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit of Popayán, Ramirez Vivas and others case, 10 September 2010, p. 24.
In 2010, in the El Iguano case, the Justice and Peace Chamber of Colombia’s High District Court of Bogotá convicted a member of the paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) of several crimes committed against the civilian population. The Court stated:
234. … The principle of distinction imposes on the parties to a conflict the obligation to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. In this regard, the Constitutional Court held:
235. “The principle of distinction, one of the cornerstones of international humanitarian law, flows directly from the obligation to protect the civilian population from the effects of war, as in times of armed conflict it is only acceptable to weaken the enemy’s military potential [footnote: Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, Judgment, 25 April 2007, p. 70] … ”. 
Colombia, High District Court of Bogotá, El Iguano case, Judgment, 2 December 2010, §§ 234–235.
Colombia’s Circular on Fundamental Rules of IHL (1992) states: “Neither the civilian population, as such, nor individual civilians may be made the object of attack. Attacks may only be directed against military objectives.” 
Colombia, Transcripción Normas Fundamentales del Derecho Humanitario Aplicables en los Conflictos Armados, Circular No. 033/DIPL-SERPO-526, Policía Nacional, Dirección General, Santafé de Bogotá, 14 May 1992, § 7.
Colombia’s Instructors’ Manual (1999) states that it is a rule of combat to “fight only combatants”. 
Colombia, Derechos Humanos & Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual de Instrucción de la Guía de Conducta para el Soldado e Infante de Marina, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Oficina de Derechos Humanos, Fuerzas Militares de Colombia, Santafé de Bogotá, 1999, p. 15.
Colombia’s Operational Law Manual (2009) states:
3. Fundamental guarantees and IHL principles
These guarantees have been embodied in principles that guide behaviour during situations of hostilities and must be observed throughout all military operations:
- Principle of distinction: Generally, the principle of distinction implies that “the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Civilians must not be targeted.” …
4. Rules for the conduct of hostilities
a. Prohibition of indiscriminate attacks and [notion of] protected persons
Article 48 of the [1977] Additional Protocol I to the [1949] Geneva Conventions expressly enshrines the principle of distinction by establishing that “in order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives, and accordingly direct their operations only against military objectives”.
From the application of this principle derives a set of rules that on the one hand prohibit attacks against protected persons and objects and on the other hand allow the use of force against persons and objects not protected by IHL, since this principle helps to determine, for example, when a person can be a military objective.
vii. Conclusion: Against whom can direct attacks be directed? What to do in case of doubt?
According to the ICRC Interpretive Guidance [on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law], direct attacks can only be directed against persons who: 1) are members of state armed forces or organized armed groups (“continuous combat function”); or 2) take a direct part in hostilities. 
Colombia, Manual de Derecho Operacional Manual FF.MM. 3-41 Público, Primera Edición 2009, Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares, aprobado por el Comandante General de las Fuerzas Armadas por Disposición Número 056, 7 December 2009, pp. 36–37, 40 and 51–52.
[footnotes in original omitted]
The manual also states:
3. Minimum contents of operational orders
c. Execution
The description of the execution of the operation must include the Commander’s operational concept. Within these sections, the following contents, depending on the operation[,] … should be included:
(i) For operations in a hostilities scenario:
If the operation is carried out in a situation of hostilities, i.e. if the planning can be done within the IHL framework, the section on execution must also include:
- Distinction: Identify, based on intelligence information, the presence of protected objects or persons and verify that the objective is limited to members of an organized armed group or to persons directly participating in hostilities.
4. Rules of engagement
c. Definitions
(i) Definitions for rules of engagement for land combat …
- Lawful target: Members of organized armed groups and persons participating directly in hostilities.
- Targeted use of weapons … : The use of force must be against the military objective or the lawful target. …
- Protected persons: Protected persons are: (i) civilians; (ii) those not taking a direct part in hostilities[.] 
Colombia, Manual de Derecho Operacional Manual FF.MM. 3-41 Público, Primera Edición 2009, Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares, aprobado por el Comandante General de las Fuerzas Armadas por Disposición Número 056, 7 December 2009, pp. 100–103 and 107–109.
In reaction to an article in the press, the Office of the Human Rights Adviser in the Office of the President of Colombia stated:
In a non-international armed conflict, civilians can take up arms and form armed rebel groups, putting themselves outside the laws of the country. They thus become combatants which the State can attack and fight against with perfect legitimacy. As a result, such rebels are criminals and combatants at the same time. 
Colombia, Presidencia de la República de Colombia, Consejería para los Derechos Humanos, Comentarios sobre el artículo publicado en La Prensa por Pablo E. Victoria sobre el Protocolo II, undated, § 5, reprinted in Congressional record concerning the enactment of Law 171 of 16 December 1994.
Colombia’s Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman’s Office), with respect to “convivir”, considered that:
These organizations, nurtured by the national government itself, contribute nothing to the immunity of the civilian population, since they involve citizens in the armed conflict, divesting them of their protected status and making them into legitimate targets of attack … In the view of the Ombudsman’s Office, the operation of the Convivir cooperatives means that civilians participate directly in the armed conflict, thereby becoming combatants. 
Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Cuarto informe anual del defensor del pueblo al congreso de Colombia, Santafé de Bogotá, September 1997, pp. 48–49.
The Report on the Practice of Colombia states:
In Colombia, communal guard and private security services have been created under the name “convivir”. These services take the form of rural security cooperatives composed of individuals whom the State has authorized to bear arms, and who collaborate with the authorities by providing information to the public security forces concerning the activities of the guerrilla organizations. There is a public debate over the question of whether the members of these services should be considered civilians or combatants. 
Report on the Practice of Colombia, 1998, Chapter 1.2.
Colombia’s Circular on Fundamental Rules of IHL (1992) states: “Neither the civilian population as such nor individual civilians may be made the object of attack.” 
Colombia, Transcripción Normas Fundamentales del Derecho Humanitario Aplicables en los Conflictos Armados, Circular No. 033/DIPL-SERPO-526, Policía Nacional, Dirección General, Santafé de Bogotá, 14 May 1992, § 7.
Colombia’s Basic Military Manual (1995) provides: “The civilian population is not a military objective.” 
Colombia, Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual Básico para las Personerías y las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 1995, p. 49; see also Derechos Humanos & Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual de Instrucción de la Guía de Conducta para el Soldado e Infante de Marina, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Oficina de Derechos Humanos, Fuerzas Militares de Colombia, Santafé de Bogotá, 1999, pp. 15–16.
Colombia’s Operational Law Manual (2009) states:
One of the main expressions of customary international humanitarian law are the fundamental guarantees. In this respect, the Constitutional Court has listed the following as fundamental guarantees:
(1) the prohibition of directing attacks against the civilian population;
These guarantees have been embodied in principles that guide behaviour during situations of hostilities and must be observed throughout all military operations:
- Principle of distinction: Generally, the principle of distinction implies that “the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Civilians must not be targeted.” 
Colombia, Manual de Derecho Operacional Manual FF.MM. 3-41 Público, Primera Edición 2009, Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares, aprobado por el Comandante General de las Fuerzas Armadas por Disposición Número 056, 7 December 2009, pp. 36–37.
[footnotes in original omitted]
The manual also states:
IHL protects the civilian population and civilians. This is provided for in Article 13 of the [1977] Additional Protocol II to the [1949] Geneva Conventions, according to which: “[1.] The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules shall be observed in all circumstances. [2. ]The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. … [3.] Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” 
Colombia, Manual de Derecho Operacional Manual FF.MM. 3-41 Público, Primera Edición 2009, Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares, aprobado por el Comandante General de las Fuerzas Armadas por Disposición Número 056, 7 December 2009, p. 47.
The manual also states:
4. Rules of engagement
The rules of engagement are a set of simple rules that determine the levels, intensities and types of use of force. It is a set of rules that integrate human rights and IHL obligations into operational language and establishes the circumstances in which combat may be engaged and thus limit the use of force.
a. Rules of engagement for land combat
These rules govern the conduct of operations in scenarios of hostilities against precise military objectives related to organized armed groups.
Rules of engagement for land combat
3. Weapons shall be used in a targeted way and not indiscriminately, minimizing harm to protected objects and persons.
c. Definitions
The set of definitions applicable to the rules of engagement system is presented below.
(i) Definitions for rules of engagement for land combat … :
- Protected persons: Protected persons are: (i) civilians; (ii) those not taking a direct part in hostilities[.] 
Colombia, Manual de Derecho Operacional Manual FF.MM. 3-41 Público, Primera Edición 2009, Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares, aprobado por el Comandante General de las Fuerzas Armadas por Disposición Número 056, 7 December 2009, pp. 103, 105–107 and 109.
Colombia’s Penal Code (2000) imposes a criminal sanction on “anyone who, during an armed conflict, carries out or orders the carrying out of … attacks against the civilian population”. 
Colombia, Penal Code, 2000, Article 144.
Colombia’s Directive No. 10 (2007), whose objective is to prevent the killing of protected persons, states: “Attacks against civilians do not provide any military advantage.” 
Colombia, Directive No. 10, 2007, § IV.
In 2004, in the Constitutional Case No. T-025/04, the Third Appeals Chamber of Colombia’s Constitutional Court declared that the State had violated the Constitution owing to its failure to guarantee the rights of displaced persons. The Court stated:
The case law of this Court has highlighted the following fundamental constitutional rights among those that are threatened or violated by situations of forced displacement:
15. The right to peace, which is essentially composed of the personal guarantee not to suffer, to the extent possible, the effects of war, especially when the conflict breaches the limits established by international humanitarian law, in particular the prohibition of direct attacks against the civilian population. For the interpretation of this right, Principles 6, 7, 11, 13 and 21 of the [1998 Guiding] Principles [on Internal Displacement], which prohibit disregard for international humanitarian law rules protecting non-combatants, are relevant. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. T-025/04, Judgment, 22 January 2004, pp. 35 and 40.
[footnote in original omitted]
In 2007, in Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, the Plenary Chamber of Colombia’s Constitutional Court stated that the prohibition of attacks against civilians in the 1977 Additional Protocol II “has attained customary status, mainly due to its impact on State practice and on conflicts in the last decades”. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, Judgment of 25 April 2007, p. 69.
The Court further held:
The principle of distinction is complex and encompasses a number of treaty and customary norms applicable in internal armed conflicts, in addition to, in many cases, enjoying ius cogens status. These rules [include] … the prohibition of direct attacks against the civilian population. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, Judgment of 25 April 2007, pp. 84–86.
The Court also held:
Prohibited attacks are those where the primary objective is the civilian population. In order to determine whether an attack has been directed against the civilian population, international case law has taken into account factors such as: the means and methods employed for the attack, the number and status of the victims, the nature of the crimes committed during the attack, the resistence encountered, and the extent to which the attacking force complied or attempted to comply with the precautionary principle under international humanitarian law. It is not required that the attack be directed toward the civilian population as a whole in the geographic location where the events occur. But it must be proven that the attack was not directed against a limited number of individuals. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, Judgment of 25 April 2007, p. 90.
[footnotes in original omitted]
The Court further stated that “attacks directed against the civilian population can constitute war crimes under treaty and customary international humanitarian law applicable in internal armed conflicts.” 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, Judgment of 25 April 2007, p. 91.
The Court also held:
The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks … is directly related to the prohibition of direct attacks against the civilian population, so much so that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has classified the commission of attacks using indiscriminate means as attacks directed against civilians. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, Judgment of 25 April 2007, p. 96.
[footnote in original omitted]
In 2010, in the Fuentes Montaño case, the Criminal Appeals Chamber of Colombia’s Supreme Court of Justice revised the first and second instance judgments to qualify as murder of protected persons the crime of which the defendant had been convicted. The Court held:
In the present case, there is no doubt that the victims of the multiple murders were members of the indigenous reservation of Kankuamo who lived in the town of Atánquez, situated close to Valledupar. It is also known that, according to the facts proved in Court, those citizens did not belong to any illegal armed group. They lived in an area of the country where guerrilla and paramilitary groups fight for territorial control, and they did not offer any resistance to the incursion that took place on 8 December 2002.
In view of the above, it is clear that the victims are protected persons under IHL. …
… [This] results in a breach of the principle of distinction, which governs the regulation of armed conflicts under IHL[.] 
Colombia, Supreme Court of Justice, Fuentes Montaño case, Judgment, 27 January 2010, pp. 27 and 37.
[footnote in original omitted]
The Court also stated: “According to this [principle of distinction], those participating in the hostilities have the obligation to distinguish between the enemy and the civilian population, keeping the latter out of their operations.” 
Colombia, Supreme Court of Justice, Fuentes Montaño case, Judgment, 27 January 2010, p. 37, footnote 17.
In 2010, in the El Iguano case, the Justice and Peace Chamber of Colombia’s High District Court of Bogotá convicted a member of the paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) of several crimes committed against the civilian population. The Court stated:
210. … The grave offences committed here were part of Fronteras Front’s strategy of military and social consolidation in Cúcuta and its metropolitan area. It constituted a military advantage for this front of the self-defence organization because the tactic adopted was, rather than engage in confrontations or combat, to remove the social base of the subversive forces, deprive them of informers and limit as much as possible their support from the population. In essence, this was known as the policy of “taking the water from the fish” …
211. … [T]he victims: in all cases, the [persons] affected by the violent acts of the Fronteras Front did not take an active part in the hostilities, that is, were part of the civilian population and, therefore, deserved the protection of humanitarian rules. Thus, the combatants of this armed structure decided to ignore the principle of distinction and violated the prohibition of attacking persons protected under IHL pursuant to article 3 common to the four [1949] Geneva Conventions, which … form part of the [Colombian] constitutional block.
212. … The relation between the armed conflict and these acts is integral … Therefore, the Chamber concludes that the deaths here addressed must … be classified as war crimes. 
Colombia, High District Court of Bogotá, El Iguano case, Judgment, 2 December 2010, §§ 210–212.
On the basis of an opinion of the First Deputy Attorney-General in a case before the Council of State in 1994, the Report on the Practice of Colombia defines direct attacks against civilians as any operation that corresponds to one of the following three situations: a) it does not follow plans and strategies that respect the law of nations; b) the necessary staff and resources to save the lives of the victims are lacking; c) the attacks do not cease once the adverse party has been neutralized. 
Report on the Practice of Colombia, 1998, Chapter 1.4, referring to Council of State, Case No. 9276, Opinion of the First Deputy Attorney-General, 19 August 1994.