Соответствующая норма
Australia
Practice Relating to Rule 153. Command Responsibility for Failure to Prevent, Punish or Report War Crimes
Australia’s Commanders’ Guide (1994) states:
ADF [Australian Defence Force] members are obliged to report LOAC breaches to their superior commanders and, where available, ADF legal advisers. Commanders must ensure that processes for reporting LOAC breaches are detailed in standing operating procedures. ADF members who receive reports about alleged breaches are responsible for ensuring that the suspected breach is properly recorded, documented, investigated and any relevant evidence preserved. 
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 1301.
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) refers to the “Yamashita principles” and states:
The principles of this doctrine are that the commander will be held responsible if the commander:
a. knows subordinates are going to commit war crimes and does not prevent them,
b. knows subordinates have committed war crimes and does not punish them,
c. should know subordinates are going to commit war crimes and does not prevent them, or
d. should know subordinates have committed war crimes and does not punish them. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 1303; see also Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 1203.
The manual also states:
Specifically, a commander will be held accountable if [he] knows that a breach is occurring and fails to intervene. A commander is also liable for prosecution if the commander fails to act to prevent a breach of LOAC of which the commander should have known. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 1304; see also Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 1204.
The manual further states:
Each ADF [Australian Defence Force] member is also responsible for ensuring that breaches are properly reported and documented. Reporting of LOAC breaches, whether committed by the enemy or ADF members, should be made to superiors. Commanders must ensure that processes for reporting LOAC breaches are detailed in standard operating procedures. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 1307; see also Commanders’ Guide (1994), § 1208.
Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) refers to a doctrine known as the “Yamashita principles”:
The principles of this doctrine are that the commander will be held responsible if the commander:
• knows subordinates are going to commit war crimes and does not prevent them,
• knows subordinates have committed war crimes and does not punish them,
• should know subordinates are going to commit war crimes and does not prevent them, or
• should know subordinates have committed war crimes and does not punish them. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 13.5.
The manual further states that “a commander will be held accountable … for failing to intervene if the commander knows that a breach is occurring. A commander is also accountable if the commander fails to prevent a breach of the LOAC of which the commander should have known.” 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 13.6.
The LOAC Manual (2006) replaces both the Defence Force Manual (1994) and the Commanders’ Guide (1994).
Australia’s Criminal Code Act (1995), as amended to 2007, states:
Responsibility of commanders and other superiors
(2) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander is criminally responsible for offences under this Division committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control, as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over those forces, where:
(a) the military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, was reckless as to whether the forces were committing or about to commit such offences; and
(b) the military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
(3) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in subsection (2), a superior is criminally responsible for offences against this Division committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over those subordinates, where:
(a) the superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information that clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such offences; and
(b) the offences concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the superior; and
(c) the superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 
Australia, Criminal Code Act, 1995, as amended to 2007, Chapter 8, § 268.115, p. 379.
In 2009, in the Snedden case – an action for defamation related to an article in a national newspaper alleging that the plaintiff had committed or condoned atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 – Australia’s New South Wales Supreme Court held:
124 … [T]here is overwhelming evidence of the commission of torture and the war crime of torture by members of the Serbian paramilitary units under the plaintiff’s command. Much of this evidence was not seriously challenged. As I have already noted, the real challenge was directed to the evidence of the plaintiff’s presence during these events and the extent to which the plaintiff can be held accountable for the actions of his men. Once the witness’ evidence of the plaintiff’s presence during the various assaults is accepted, it follows that the plaintiff condoned the commission of torture by failing to act to prevent it.
125 Given the tenor of the plaintiff’s evidence, it is also beyond doubt that he must be held accountable for the assaults perpetrated by his men. According to that evidence, he was in command at the Knin fortress and enjoyed a legendary status among his men. He exercised absolute authority and was kept very well informed, to the extent that “nothing could have happened there without me knowing it”. The plaintiff went so far as to say that it would be “impossible … absolutely” for anyone to have been beaten at the fortress without the plaintiff knowing. If beatings occurred then: “definitely if it happened, yes I would know of it.” In so far as the assaults committed at the hospital prison are concerned, there is no reason to doubt that the plaintiff’s authority over the guards, who wore the same uniform and the same insignia as the plaintiff, was any less than the authority he exercised at the fortress. One of the most striking features of the plaintiff’s evidence was the obvious pride he took in recounting the complete respect and adulation he enjoyed from his men and from Serbs generally. 
Australia, New South Wales Supreme Court, Snedden case, Judgment, 18 December 2009, §§ 124–125.
In 1984, in an assessment of the military implications of the 1977 Additional Protocols, Australia’s Joint Military Operations and Plans Division, stated that Article 87(1) of the Additional Protocol I
imposes upon commanders the additional responsibility to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report all breaches of the Geneva Conventions and [their Additional] Protocols. This requires that the constraints imposed by the Protocols and the law of armed conflict generally are understood and reflected in the conduct of operations by every level of military authority. 
Australia, Joint Military Operations and Plans Division, Assessment of the Military Implications of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Series No. AA-A1838/376, File No. AA-1710/10/3/1 Pt 2, September 1984, § 10.