Practice Relating to Rule 65. Perfidy

If it be discovered, and fairly proved, that a flag of truce has been abused for surreptitiously obtaining military knowledge, the bearer of the flag thus abusing his sacred character is deemed a spy.

So sacred is the character of a flag of truce, and so necessary is its sacredness, that while its abuse is an especially heinous offense, great caution is requisite, on the other hand, in convicting the bearer of a flag of truce as a spy. 

IHL prohibits recourse to perfidy with the aim to kill, injure or capture an enemy.

Regarded as perfidy is any act which appeals to the good faith of the enemy, with the intention to deceive him, and with the aim to make him believe that he is entitled to receive, or has the obligation to give, protection provided by the rules of IHL.

The following acts are examples of perfidy:

Using a protective sign in order to deceive the enemy and attain an operational goal constitutes an act of perfidy. In some cases, this may be a war crime. It is notably prohibited to feign an intention to negotiate under the cover of the flag of parlementaires. 

Misusing the flag of truce constitutes perfidy and hence a violation of international law … The flag of truce is being misused, for instance, if soldiers approach an enemy position under the protection of the flag of truce in order to attack. 

It is forbidden to make false use of the white flag (pretending to surrender or to be willing to negotiate while the true intention is to obtain a military advantage) so that soldiers from the other side will not fear allowing fighter[s] to live and grant them the status of prisoner-of-war. 

Parlementaires, i.e. those who request to meet with the Commanding Officer of the enemy unit to discuss a ceasefire or to surrender, are protected by the “White flag”.

IT IS PROHIBITED to deceive the enemy by raising a white flag and then opening fire.  [emphasis in original]

AP I [1977 Additional Protocol I] lists a number of examples of acts of perfidy:

When planning and conducting combat operations it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between perfidy and ruses of war. Perfidy means committing a hostile act under the cover of a right to protection by feigning: … an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce. 

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- [1977] Additional Protocol I article 85 provides further examples of grave breaches, in that it stipulates that the following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches when committed wilfully, and causing death or serious injury to body or health:

It is forbidden to make improper use of a flag of truce. Thus, a feigned intention to negotiate or surrender with the intention of using the white flag as cover for the collection of information might amount to the war crime of perfidy whatever the consequences. It would amount to a grave breach of Additional Protocol I if it resulted in death or serious injury. A parlementaire who abuses his position in this way can be taken as a prisoner of war and tried. 

The white flag has traditionally indicated a desire to communicate with the enemy … It raises expectations that the particular struggle is at an end or close to an end since the only proper use of the flag of truce or white flag in international law is to communicate to the enemy a desire to negotiate. Thus, the use of a flag of truce or white flag in order to deceive or mislead the enemy, or for any other purpose other than to negotiate … has long been recognized as an act of treachery … [This] expresses the customary and conventional law in this area. 

a. Text. “Any person subject to this chapter who uses a flag of truce to feign an intention to negotiate, surrender, or otherwise suspend hostilities when there is no such intention shall be punished as a military commission under this chapter may direct.”

b. Elements.

(1) The accused used a flag of truce;

(2) The accused made such use of the flag in order to feign an intention to negotiate, surrender, or otherwise suspend hostilities;

(3) The accused had no intention to negotiate, surrender, or otherwise suspend hostilities; and

(4) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with armed conflict.

c. Maximum punishment. Confinement for 20 years. 

a. Text. “Any person subject to this chapter who uses a flag of truce to feign an intention to negotiate, surrender, or otherwise suspend hostilities when there is no such intention shall be punished as a military commission under this chapter may direct.”

c. Maximum punishment. Confinement for 20 years. 

A person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:

Penalty: Imprisonment for life. 

Any person who, intentionally, in time of war, commits or gives the order to commit acts resulting in the death of or causing serious harm to the body or health of an adversary by making perfidious use of the emblem of the red cross or red crescent or a distinctive signal, commits a war crime and is punished by forced labour.

Perfidious use means improperly using the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or other protective signs recognized by international humanitarian law, or improperly using the badge of a parlementaire, the flag or military insignia and uniform of the enemy, or of the United Nations, and by doing so, causing the loss of human lives or serious injuries. 

Whoever commits a war crime is punished with life imprisonment.

War crimes are:

Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment]. 

Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment]. 

Whoever intentionally:

is punishable with simple imprisonment, or, in cases of exceptional gravity, with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding five years. 

Intentional breach of the provisions of … international humanitarian law during armed conflicts between states or within a state, in particular:

shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of ten to fifteen years. 

Anyone who contravenes or is accessory to the contravention of provisions relating to the protection of persons or property laid down in … the two additional protocols to [the 1949 Geneva] Conventions … is liable to imprisonment. 

A member of the military or the police shall be punished with deprivation of liberty of not less than ten and not more than twenty years if, in a state of emergency and when the Armed Forces assume control of the internal order, he or she improperly uses … the white flag … with the result set out in Article 33, paragraphs 16 and 17 [of the present code, namely causing serious injury or death]. 

(1) A person of whatever nationality commits an offence if that person, whether within or outside Sierra Leone[,] commits, aids, abets or procures any other person to commit a grave breach specified in –

(1) Any person who, whether within or outside the Republic, commits a grave breach of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions, is guilty of an offence.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), “a grave breach” means –

Ҥ 950v. Crimes triable by military commissions

“ …

“(b) OFFENSES.—The following offenses shall be triable by military commission under this chapter at any time without limitation:

Ҥ 950t. Crimes triable by military commission

“The following offenses shall be triable by military commission under this chapter at any time without limitation:

The accused has been indicted before this Court on three counts of terrorism, that is to say, contraventions of s 54(1) of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. He has also been indicted on three counts of attempted murder.

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The accused’s position is stated to be that this Court has no jurisdiction to try him.

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… The point in its early formulation was this. By the terms of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I to the [1949] Geneva Conventions the accused was entitled to be treated as a prisoner-of-war. A prisoner-of-war is entitled to have notice of an impending prosecution for an alleged offence given to the so-called “protecting power” appointed to watch over prisoners-of-war. Since, if such a notice were necessary, the trial could not proceed without it, Mr Donen suggested that the necessity or otherwise for giving such a notice should be determined before evidence was led. …

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On 12 August 1949 there were concluded at Geneva in Switzerland four treaties known as the Geneva Conventions. …

South Africa was among the nations which concluded the treaties. … Except for the common art 3, which binds parties to observe a limited number of fundamental humanitarian principles in armed conflicts not of an international character, they apply to wars between States.

After the Second World War many conflicts arose which could not be characterised as international. It was therefore considered desirable by some States to extend and augment the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, so as to afford protection to victims of and combatants in conflicts which fell outside the ambit of these Conventions. The result of these endeavours was Protocol I and Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, both of which came into force on 7 December 1978.

Protocol II relates to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. Since the State of affairs which exists in South Africa has by Protocol I been characterised as an international armed conflict, Protocol II does not concern me at all.

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The extension of the scope of art 2 of the Geneva Conventions was, at the time of its adoption, controversial. …

The article has remained controversial. More debate has raged about its field of operation than about any other articles in Protocol I. …

South Africa is one of the countries which has not acceded to Protocol I. Nevertheless, I am asked to decide, as I indicated earlier, as a preliminary point, whether Protocol I has become part of customary international law. If so, it is argued that it would have been incorporated into South African law. If it has been so incorporated it would have to be proved by one or other of the parties that the turmoil which existed at the time when the accused is alleged to have committed his offences was such that it could properly be described as an “armed conflict” conducted by “peoples” against a “ra[c]ist regime” in the exercise of their “right of self-determination”. Once all this has been shown it would have to be demonstrated to the Court that the accused conducted himself in such a manner as to become entitled to the benefits conferred by Protocol I on combatants, for example that, broadly speaking, he had, while he was launching an attack, distinguished himself from civilians and had not attacked civilian targets. …

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… I am prepared to accept that where a rule of customary international law is recognised as such by international law it will be so recognised by our law.

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To my way of thinking, the trouble with the first Protocol giving rise to State practice is that its terms have not been capable of being observed by all that many States. At the end of 1977 when the treaty first lay open for ratification there were few States which were involved in colonial domination or the occupation of other States and there were only two, South Africa and Israel, which were considered to fall within the third category of ra[c]ist regimes. Accordingly, the situation sought to be regulated by the first Protocol was one faced by few countries; too few countries in my view, to permit any general usage in dealing with armed conflicts of the kind envisaged by the Protocol to develop.

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Mr Donen contended that the provisions of multilateral treaties can become customary international law under certain circumstances. I accept that this is so. There seems in principle to be no reason why treaty rules cannot acquire wider application than among the parties to the treaty.

Brownlie Principles of International Law 3rd ed at 13 agrees that non-parties to a treaty may by their conduct accept the provisions of a multilateral convention as representing general international law. …

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I incline to the view that non-ratification of a treaty is strong evidence of non-acceptance.

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It is interesting to note that the first Protocol makes extensive provision for the protection of civilians in armed conflict. …

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In this sense, Protocol I may be described as an enlightened humanitarian document. If the strife in South Africa should deteriorate into an armed conflict we may all one day find it a cause for regret that the ideologically provocative tone of s 1(4) has made it impossible for the Government to accept its terms.

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To my mind it can hardly be said that Protocol I has been greeted with acclaim by the States of the world. Their lack of enthusiasm must be due to the bizarre mixture of political and humanitarian objects sought to be realised by the Protocol. …

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According to the International Review of the Red Cross (January/February 1987) No 256, as at December 1986, 66 States were parties to Protocol I and 60 to Protocol II, which, it will be remembered, deals with internal non-international armed conflicts. With the exception of France, which acceded only to Protocol II, not one of the world’s major powers has acceded to or ratified either of the Protocols. This position should be compared to the 165 States which are parties to the Geneva Conventions.

This approach of the world community to Protocol I is, on principle, far too half-hearted to justify an inference that its principles have been so widely accepted as to qualify them as rules of customary international law. The reasons for this are, I imagine, not far to seek. For those States which are contending with “peoples[’]” struggles for self-determination, adoption of the Protocol may prove awkward. For liberation movements who rely on strategies of urban terror for achieving their aims the terms of the Protocol, with its emphasis on the protection of civilians, may prove disastrously restrictive. I therefore do not find it altogether surprising that Mr Donen was unable to refer me to any statement in the published literature that Protocol I has attained the status o[f] customary international [law].

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I have not been persuaded by the arguments which I have heard on behalf of the accused that the assessment of Professor Dugard, writing in the Annual Survey of South African Law (1983) at 66, that “it is argued with growing conviction that under contemporary international law members of SWAPO [South-West Africa People’s Organisation] and the ANC [African National Congress] are members of liberation movements entitled to prisoner-of-war status, in terms of a new customary rule spawned by the 1977 Protocols”, is correct. On what I have heard in argument I disagree with his assessment that there is growing support for the view that the Protocols reflect a new rule of customary international law. No writer has been cited who supports this proposition. Here and there someone says that it may one day come about. I am not sure that the provisions relating to the field of application of Protocol I are capable of ever becoming a rule of customary international law, but I need not decide that point today.

For the reasons which I have given I have concluded that the provisions of Protocol I have not been accepted in customary international law. They accordingly form no part of South African law.

This conclusion has made it unnecessary for me to give a decision on the question of whether rules of customary international law which conflict with the statutory or common law of this country will be enforced by its courts.

In the result, the preliminary point is dismissed. The trial must proceed. 

In Petane, … Conradie J found that the provisions of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I are not part of customary international law, and therefore are also not part of South African law.

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Referring to the fact that in December 1986 only 66 of the 165 States party to the Geneva Conventions had ratified Protocol I, the Court [in Petane] stated:

Important changes with respect to certain aspects applicable at the time of Petane have taken place. The ANC [African National Congress] has become South Africa’s ruling party and in 1995 ratified Protocol I. The total number of States that have ratified it, is now … 162.

This last aspect forms the basis on which the First Respondent [the State] and the applicants agree that Protocol I forms part of customary international law as well as of South African law. As requested, this position is accepted for the purposes of the decision, without deciding on the matter.

Despite these changes, it remains debatable whether the provisions of Protocol I have become a part of South African law in this way.

The consensus of both parties to the conflict is required. See Petane … and Article 96 of Protocol I. …

Parliament’s failure to incorporate Protocol I into legislation in accordance with Article 231(4) of the Constitution in fact points to the contrary, and is indicative that the requirements of usus and/or opinio juris have not been met. See Petane.  [footnotes in original omitted]

If the [1977 Additional Protocol I] applies in South Africa as customary international law, the two requirements that form the basis of customary law must be met. It is arguable that the requirement of usus has been met by the vast number of States that have acceded or ratified it. By ratifying Protocol I the Republic of South Africa has indicated its intention to apply the Protocol, thereby fulfilling the requirement of opinio juris. 

International humanitarian law prohibits killing, injuring or capturing an adversary by resorting to perfidy. Acts of perfidy include any form of deception designed to win the confidence of an adversary and lead him to believe that he is entitled or obliged to accord protection under the rules of international humanitarian law, with the intention of betraying that confidence. An example of perfidy is to falsely lay claim to protected status through the misuse of signs or emblems[.] 

The perfidious use … of emblems, signs, signals or uniforms referred to in Article 37 … of the Protocol [among which the flag of truce], for the purpose of killing, injuring or capturing an adversary, constitutes a grave breach under [Article 85(3)(f) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I].