Practice Relating to Rule 87. Humane Treatment

Detainees who are wounded or sick will be cared for by the Detaining Power at first instance. Sick or wounded detainees will not be transferred as long as their recovery may be endangered by the journey, unless their safety, or the safety of others, imperatively demands it. 

By Common Article 3, the parties to a non-international armed conflict occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions are obliged to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

All wounded and sick, regardless of the party to which they belong, shall be respected and protected. In all circumstances, they shall be treated humanely and shall receive, to the fullest possible extent and with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention required by their condition.  [emphasis in original]

The wounded, the sick and shipwreck survivors must be respected and protected, whether or not they have taken part in the armed conflict. They must in all circumstances be humanely treated, and provided with the requisite medical care without discrimination. 

All the wounded [and] sick … must be treated humanely in all circumstances.

All these categories of people are protected under international humanitarian law. Medical personnel assigned to provide assistance to them must, in all circumstances, treat them humanely, as best they can and in accordance with the dictates of their conscience. 

It is also important to note that, in certain cases, deliberate omission and serious negligence are also considered to be violations of international humanitarian law, for example, abandoning people without assisting them, when their condition makes such assistance vital, or deliberately exposing the wounded or sick to infection or contagion.

Lastly, medical personnel must refrain from subjecting protected persons to affronts and insults to their dignity, humiliating or degrading treatment and exposure to public curiosity.

They must also ensure that protected persons are not subjected to any form of intimidation. 

The wounded [and] sick … and all those placed hors de combat or taking no direct part in the conflict must be treated humanely in all circumstances.

All these categories of people are protected under international humanitarian law. Medical personnel assigned to provide assistance to them must, in all circumstances, treat them humanely, as best as they can and in accordance with the dictates of their conscience. 

It is also important to note that, in certain cases, deliberate omission and serious negligence are also considered to be violations of international humanitarian law, for example, abandoning people without assisting them, when their condition makes such assistance vital, or deliberately exposing the wounded or sick to infection or contagion.

Lastly, medical personnel … must also ensure that protected persons are not subjected to any form of intimidation. 

Under any circumstances international humanitarian law ensures humane treatment during an armed conflict of persons not directly involved in combat operations, including those who have been rendered hors de combat by sickness [or] injury. 

…

The LOAC grants fundamental protection to persons and objects other than combatants and military objectives. This protection applies to all persons in the power of belligerent parties and neutral states. The protection corresponds to basic humanitarian principles applicable to most nations.

The legal basis for this fundamental protection is found in international treaties.

Examples of the wording of these fundamental rules are:

…

…

The wounded, sick and shipwrecked POW [prisoners of war] shall always be treated humanely and be protected and cared for as the tactical situation allows.

…

…

- Wounded and sick who no longer take part or can no longer take part in hostilities must be respected and protected in all circumstances.

- They must be humanely treated and cared for by the force into whose hands they fall.

…

Wounded and sick members of the armed forces at sea must be respected and protected as on land. In addition, the shipwrecked must also be respected and protected. (Article 12 Geneva Convention II.) 

…

- The wounded, sick and shipwrecked must be treated humanely, protected and evacuated from the combat area. 

7.3. The wounded and sick are to be protected and respected. They may not be attacked. They must be treated humanely. …

…

7.3.2. Paragraph 7.3 applies to all wounded and sick, whether United Kingdom, allied or enemy, military or civilian. They are entitled to respect and protection [and] humane treatment. 

Under the terms of Common Article 3, the parties to a non-international armed conflict occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions are obliged to apply “as a minimum”, the following provisions:

a. As a subset of military operations, detainee operations must comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations …

…

c. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are fully applicable as a matter of international law to all military operations that qualify as international armed conflicts … The principles reflected in these treaties are considered customary international law, binding on all nations during international armed conflict. Although often referred to collectively as the “Geneva Conventions,” the specific treaties are:

Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment]. 

Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment]. 

Article 279.- Maltreatment of, or Dereliction of Duty towards, Wounded, Sick or Prisoners.

Whoever, in violation of the rules of public international law, maltreats a sick or wounded person … or uses violence against him, or prevents him from exercising or makes it impossible for him to exercise, the rights guaranteed to him by such rules, or issues orders to the same effect,

is punishable with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding five years. 

Anyone who contravenes or is accessory to the contravention of provisions relating to the protection of persons or property laid down in … the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 … [and in] the two additional protocols to these Conventions … is liable to imprisonment. 

A commander who causes serious harm … to the sick, wounded or shipwrecked, by not according them the treatment prescribed by law or by international agreements … shall be punished, unless the act constitutes a more serious offence, by military confinement for not less than three years. 

Though we are unable to express a position regarding the specific events mentioned in the petition … we see fit to emphasize that our combat forces are required to abide by the rules of humanitarian law regarding the care of the wounded, the ill and bodies of the deceased. 

The accused has been indicted before this Court on three counts of terrorism, that is to say, contraventions of s 54(1) of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. He has also been indicted on three counts of attempted murder.

…

The accused’s position is stated to be that this Court has no jurisdiction to try him.

…

… The point in its early formulation was this. By the terms of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I to the [1949] Geneva Conventions the accused was entitled to be treated as a prisoner-of-war. A prisoner-of-war is entitled to have notice of an impending prosecution for an alleged offence given to the so-called “protecting power” appointed to watch over prisoners-of-war. Since, if such a notice were necessary, the trial could not proceed without it, Mr Donen suggested that the necessity or otherwise for giving such a notice should be determined before evidence was led. …

…

On 12 August 1949 there were concluded at Geneva in Switzerland four treaties known as the Geneva Conventions. …

South Africa was among the nations which concluded the treaties. … Except for the common art 3, which binds parties to observe a limited number of fundamental humanitarian principles in armed conflicts not of an international character, they apply to wars between States.

After the Second World War many conflicts arose which could not be characterised as international. It was therefore considered desirable by some States to extend and augment the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, so as to afford protection to victims of and combatants in conflicts which fell outside the ambit of these Conventions. The result of these endeavours was Protocol I and Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, both of which came into force on 7 December 1978.

Protocol II relates to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. Since the State of affairs which exists in South Africa has by Protocol I been characterised as an international armed conflict, Protocol II does not concern me at all.

…

The extension of the scope of art 2 of the Geneva Conventions was, at the time of its adoption, controversial. …

The article has remained controversial. More debate has raged about its field of operation than about any other articles in Protocol I. …

South Africa is one of the countries which has not acceded to Protocol I. Nevertheless, I am asked to decide, as I indicated earlier, as a preliminary point, whether Protocol I has become part of customary international law. If so, it is argued that it would have been incorporated into South African law. If it has been so incorporated it would have to be proved by one or other of the parties that the turmoil which existed at the time when the accused is alleged to have committed his offences was such that it could properly be described as an “armed conflict” conducted by “peoples” against a “ra[c]ist regime” in the exercise of their “right of self-determination”. Once all this has been shown it would have to be demonstrated to the Court that the accused conducted himself in such a manner as to become entitled to the benefits conferred by Protocol I on combatants, for example that, broadly speaking, he had, while he was launching an attack, distinguished himself from civilians and had not attacked civilian targets. …

…

… I am prepared to accept that where a rule of customary international law is recognised as such by international law it will be so recognised by our law.

…

To my way of thinking, the trouble with the first Protocol giving rise to State practice is that its terms have not been capable of being observed by all that many States. At the end of 1977 when the treaty first lay open for ratification there were few States which were involved in colonial domination or the occupation of other States and there were only two, South Africa and Israel, which were considered to fall within the third category of ra[c]ist regimes. Accordingly, the situation sought to be regulated by the first Protocol was one faced by few countries; too few countries in my view, to permit any general usage in dealing with armed conflicts of the kind envisaged by the Protocol to develop.

…

Mr Donen contended that the provisions of multilateral treaties can become customary international law under certain circumstances. I accept that this is so. There seems in principle to be no reason why treaty rules cannot acquire wider application than among the parties to the treaty.

Brownlie Principles of International Law 3rd ed at 13 agrees that non-parties to a treaty may by their conduct accept the provisions of a multilateral convention as representing general international law. …

…

I incline to the view that non-ratification of a treaty is strong evidence of non-acceptance.

…

It is interesting to note that the first Protocol makes extensive provision for the protection of civilians in armed conflict. …

…

In this sense, Protocol I may be described as an enlightened humanitarian document. If the strife in South Africa should deteriorate into an armed conflict we may all one day find it a cause for regret that the ideologically provocative tone of s 1(4) has made it impossible for the Government to accept its terms.

…

To my mind it can hardly be said that Protocol I has been greeted with acclaim by the States of the world. Their lack of enthusiasm must be due to the bizarre mixture of political and humanitarian objects sought to be realised by the Protocol. …

…

According to the International Review of the Red Cross (January/February 1987) No 256, as at December 1986, 66 States were parties to Protocol I and 60 to Protocol II, which, it will be remembered, deals with internal non-international armed conflicts. With the exception of France, which acceded only to Protocol II, not one of the world’s major powers has acceded to or ratified either of the Protocols. This position should be compared to the 165 States which are parties to the Geneva Conventions.

This approach of the world community to Protocol I is, on principle, far too half-hearted to justify an inference that its principles have been so widely accepted as to qualify them as rules of customary international law. The reasons for this are, I imagine, not far to seek. For those States which are contending with “peoples[’]” struggles for self-determination, adoption of the Protocol may prove awkward. For liberation movements who rely on strategies of urban terror for achieving their aims the terms of the Protocol, with its emphasis on the protection of civilians, may prove disastrously restrictive. I therefore do not find it altogether surprising that Mr Donen was unable to refer me to any statement in the published literature that Protocol I has attained the status o[f] customary international [law].

…

I have not been persuaded by the arguments which I have heard on behalf of the accused that the assessment of Professor Dugard, writing in the Annual Survey of South African Law (1983) at 66, that “it is argued with growing conviction that under contemporary international law members of SWAPO [South-West Africa People’s Organisation] and the ANC [African National Congress] are members of liberation movements entitled to prisoner-of-war status, in terms of a new customary rule spawned by the 1977 Protocols”, is correct. On what I have heard in argument I disagree with his assessment that there is growing support for the view that the Protocols reflect a new rule of customary international law. No writer has been cited who supports this proposition. Here and there someone says that it may one day come about. I am not sure that the provisions relating to the field of application of Protocol I are capable of ever becoming a rule of customary international law, but I need not decide that point today.

For the reasons which I have given I have concluded that the provisions of Protocol I have not been accepted in customary international law. They accordingly form no part of South African law.

This conclusion has made it unnecessary for me to give a decision on the question of whether rules of customary international law which conflict with the statutory or common law of this country will be enforced by its courts.

In the result, the preliminary point is dismissed. The trial must proceed. 

In Petane, … Conradie J found that the provisions of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I are not part of customary international law, and therefore are also not part of South African law.

…

Referring to the fact that in December 1986 only 66 of the 165 States party to the Geneva Conventions had ratified Protocol I, the Court [in Petane] stated:

Important changes with respect to certain aspects applicable at the time of Petane have taken place. The ANC [African National Congress] has become South Africa’s ruling party and in 1995 ratified Protocol I. The total number of States that have ratified it, is now … 162.

This last aspect forms the basis on which the First Respondent [the State] and the applicants agree that Protocol I forms part of customary international law as well as of South African law. As requested, this position is accepted for the purposes of the decision, without deciding on the matter.

Despite these changes, it remains debatable whether the provisions of Protocol I have become a part of South African law in this way.

The consensus of both parties to the conflict is required. See Petane … and Article 96 of Protocol I. …

Parliament’s failure to incorporate Protocol I into legislation in accordance with Article 231(4) of the Constitution in fact points to the contrary, and is indicative that the requirements of usus and/or opinio juris have not been met. See Petane.  [footnotes in original omitted]

If the [1977 Additional Protocol I] applies in South Africa as customary international law, the two requirements that form the basis of customary law must be met. It is arguable that the requirement of usus has been met by the vast number of States that have acceded or ratified it. By ratifying Protocol I the Republic of South Africa has indicated its intention to apply the Protocol, thereby fulfilling the requirement of opinio juris. 

Today, August 12, 2009, the 60th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law is celebrated. The Conventions, which are the main legal instrument in this area, lay down universal rules on the treatment of the wounded … Brazil ratified the four Conventions in 1957. 

On the occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the Conventions, the Brazilian Government reaffirms its commitment to upholding International Humanitarian Law and calls on the international community to fully comply with the principles of the Conventions, in favor of the protection of … human dignity in the midst of armed conflicts.  

Article 85 entitled “Principle of Humanity”, contained in Title IV on Operations [of the Royal Ordinances for the Armed Forces (2009)] clearly embodies the spirit of the [1949] Geneva Convention and its [1977] Additional Protocols, as it provides that “[the] … conduct [of members of the armed forces] in any conflict or military operation must conform to the applicable rules of the international treaties on international humanitarian law to which Spain is a party”.

That is further developed in Chapter VI on Ethics in Operations, which goes into specific duties under international humanitarian law … the protection of the wounded, sick, [and] shipwrecked. 

International humanitarian law is aimed not only at states. It also contains numerous provisions for individuals and even civilians to observe. Perhaps the most well known example is Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions, according to which persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed “hors de combat” by sickness, wounds … or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated human[e]ly, without violence to life and person, in particular mutilation, torture and cruel treatment.  [footnote in original omitted; emphasis in original]

Wounded and sick are defined as members of the armed forces or Civilians, who are in need of medical attention and who renounce all acts of hostility. … International humanitarian law calls on all parties to a conflict to treat the wounded and sick in a humane way, i.e. to shelter, rescue and protect them and to provide medical care. No distinction is to be made, except of a medical nature, and Women are given special consideration. The same rules apply to shipwrecked persons, i.e. to all members of the armed forces and civilians in danger at sea or in any other body of water.