Practice Relating to Rule 158. Prosecution of War Crimes
South Africa’s LOAC Manual (1996) states: “Signatory States [of the 1949 Geneva Conventions] are required to treat as criminals under domestic law anyone who commits or orders a grave breach [of the 1949 Geneva Conventions].”
The manual further states:
Grave breaches of the law of war are regarded as war crimes. They shall be repressed by penal sanctions …
Grave breaches are indictable offence[s] under Section 7 of the Geneva Conventions Act, RSA, 1957. South Africa is obliged to search out and prosecute or extradite those who have committed a grave breach. For all breaches (i.e. violations of the law of war), South Africa has an obligation to take steps to ensure that the offences do not happen again … If breaches went unpunished, it would signify the degradation of human values and the regression of the entire concept of humanity.
South Africa’s Revised Civic Education Manual (2004) states: “South Africa is obliged to search out and prosecute or extradite those who have committed a grave breach [of the law of armed conflict].”
South Africa’s LOAC Teaching Manual (2008) states:
1.2 Reasons for compliance with LOAC [law of armed conflict] and basic principles thereof.
- Legal liability: Individuals who do not adhere to the LOAC will be charged with war crimes and other offences. (National Courts, International Criminal Court or War Crimes Tribunals).
1.3 Relationship between LOAC and Human Rights Law and Fundamental Protection Provided under LOAC.
Any breach of the LOAC is inevitably that of individuals and they have to answer for their actions. However, it is the State who must punish the offender and rectify the wrongs that were done and, in the end, individuals in the State, such as superior officers and political heads[,] are also held responsible for grave breaches of the LOAC.
The manual also states:
5.1 War Crimes and Grave Breaches of the LOAC
State Responsibility regarding War Crimes and Grave Breaches
- States must enact legislation to provide for punishment for committing war crimes or grave breaches.
- States must search for those that have committed war crimes or grave breaches.
- States must take legal action against or extradite those that have committed war crimes o[r] grave breaches.
5.3 Criminal Liability under the LOAC
The implementation of the [R]ome [S]tatute of the [I]nternational [C]riminal [C]ourt [A]ct (act no 27 of 2002)
- The act gives jurisdiction to sa [South African] courts to try any person who commits a crime (as defined in the  [R]ome [S]tatute) within the rsa [Republic of South Africa].
- The rsa courts also have jurisdiction to hear the case as if such a crime has been committed inside the rsa by a person[:]
- Who is a citizen of the rsa;
- Who is not a citizen of the rsa but is ordinarily resident in the rsa;
- Who is, after commission of the crime, present in the rsa; or
- Who has committed the said crime against a rsa citizen or against a person who is ordinarily resident in the rsa.
- However, no such prosecution may be instituted against a person without the consent of the national director of prosecutions.
South Africa’s Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act (2012) states:
5. Breach of Conventions and penalties
(1) Any person who, whether within or outside the Republic, commits a grave breach of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions, is guilty of an offence.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), “a grave breach” means –
(a) a grave breach referred to in Article 50 of the First Convention;
(b) a grave breach referred to in Article 51 of the Second Convention;
(c) a grave breach referred to in Article 130 of the Third Convention;
(d) a grave breach referred to in Article 147 of the Fourth [Geneva] Convention; or
(e) a grave breach referred to in Article 11 or 85 of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I.
3) Any person who within the Republic contravenes or fails to comply with a provision of the Conventions not covered by subsection (2), is guilty of an offence.
(4) Any citizen of the Republic who outside the Republic contravenes or fails to comply with a provision of the Conventions not covered by subsection (2), is guilty of an offence.
5) A person convicted of an offence contemplated in subsection (1), (3) or (4) is liable to a fine or to imprisonment, including imprisonment for life, or to such imprisonment without the option of a fine or to both a fine and such imprisonment.
South Africa’s Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act (2013) states:
Offences and penalties
(4) No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, including but not limited to, a state of war, threat of war, internal political instability, national security or any state of emergency may be invoked as a justification for torture.
6. (1) A court of the Republic has jurisdiction in respect of an act committed outside the Republic, which would have constituted an offence under section 4(1) or (2) had it been committed in the Republic, regardless of whether or not the act constitutes an offence at the place of its commission, if the accused person –
(a) is a citizen of the Republic;
(b) is ordinary resident in the Republic;
(c) is, after the commission of the offence, present in the territory of the Republic, or in its territorial waters or on board a ship, vessel, off-shore installation, a fixed platform or aircraft registered or required to be registered in the Republic and that person is not extradited pursuant to Article 8 of the  Convention [against Torture]; or
(d) has committed the offence against a South African citizen or against a person who is ordinarily resident in the Republic.
In 1987, in the Petane case, the Cape Provincial Division of South Africa’s Supreme Court dismissed the accused’s claim that the 1977 Additional Protocol I reflected customary international law. The Court stated:
The accused has been indicted before this Court on three counts of terrorism, that is to say, contraventions of s 54(1) of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. He has also been indicted on three counts of attempted murder.
The accused’s position is stated to be that this Court has no jurisdiction to try him.
… The point in its early formulation was this. By the terms of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I to the  Geneva Conventions the accused was entitled to be treated as a prisoner-of-war. A prisoner-of-war is entitled to have notice of an impending prosecution for an alleged offence given to the so-called “protecting power” appointed to watch over prisoners-of-war. Since, if such a notice were necessary, the trial could not proceed without it, Mr Donen suggested that the necessity or otherwise for giving such a notice should be determined before evidence was led. …
On 12 August 1949 there were concluded at Geneva in Switzerland four treaties known as the Geneva Conventions. …
South Africa was among the nations which concluded the treaties. … Except for the common art 3, which binds parties to observe a limited number of fundamental humanitarian principles in armed conflicts not of an international character, they apply to wars between States.
After the Second World War many conflicts arose which could not be characterised as international. It was therefore considered desirable by some States to extend and augment the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, so as to afford protection to victims of and combatants in conflicts which fell outside the ambit of these Conventions. The result of these endeavours was Protocol I and Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, both of which came into force on 7 December 1978.
Protocol II relates to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. Since the State of affairs which exists in South Africa has by Protocol I been characterised as an international armed conflict, Protocol II does not concern me at all.
The extension of the scope of art 2 of the Geneva Conventions was, at the time of its adoption, controversial. …
The article has remained controversial. More debate has raged about its field of operation than about any other articles in Protocol I. …
South Africa is one of the countries which has not acceded to Protocol I. Nevertheless, I am asked to decide, as I indicated earlier, as a preliminary point, whether Protocol I has become part of customary international law. If so, it is argued that it would have been incorporated into South African law. If it has been so incorporated it would have to be proved by one or other of the parties that the turmoil which existed at the time when the accused is alleged to have committed his offences was such that it could properly be described as an “armed conflict” conducted by “peoples” against a “ra[c]ist regime” in the exercise of their “right of self-determination”. Once all this has been shown it would have to be demonstrated to the Court that the accused conducted himself in such a manner as to become entitled to the benefits conferred by Protocol I on combatants, for example that, broadly speaking, he had, while he was launching an attack, distinguished himself from civilians and had not attacked civilian targets. …
… I am prepared to accept that where a rule of customary international law is recognised as such by international law it will be so recognised by our law.
To my way of thinking, the trouble with the first Protocol giving rise to State practice is that its terms have not been capable of being observed by all that many States. At the end of 1977 when the treaty first lay open for ratification there were few States which were involved in colonial domination or the occupation of other States and there were only two, South Africa and Israel, which were considered to fall within the third category of ra[c]ist regimes. Accordingly, the situation sought to be regulated by the first Protocol was one faced by few countries; too few countries in my view, to permit any general usage in dealing with armed conflicts of the kind envisaged by the Protocol to develop.
Mr Donen contended that the provisions of multilateral treaties can become customary international law under certain circumstances. I accept that this is so. There seems in principle to be no reason why treaty rules cannot acquire wider application than among the parties to the treaty.
Brownlie Principles of International Law 3rd ed at 13 agrees that non-parties to a treaty may by their conduct accept the provisions of a multilateral convention as representing general international law. …
I incline to the view that non-ratification of a treaty is strong evidence of non-acceptance.
It is interesting to note that the first Protocol makes extensive provision for the protection of civilians in armed conflict. …
In this sense, Protocol I may be described as an enlightened humanitarian document. If the strife in South Africa should deteriorate into an armed conflict we may all one day find it a cause for regret that the ideologically provocative tone of s 1(4) has made it impossible for the Government to accept its terms.
To my mind it can hardly be said that Protocol I has been greeted with acclaim by the States of the world. Their lack of enthusiasm must be due to the bizarre mixture of political and humanitarian objects sought to be realised by the Protocol. …
According to the International Review of the Red Cross (January/February 1987) No 256, as at December 1986, 66 States were parties to Protocol I and 60 to Protocol II, which, it will be remembered, deals with internal non-international armed conflicts. With the exception of France, which acceded only to Protocol II, not one of the world’s major powers has acceded to or ratified either of the Protocols. This position should be compared to the 165 States which are parties to the Geneva Conventions.
This approach of the world community to Protocol I is, on principle, far too half-hearted to justify an inference that its principles have been so widely accepted as to qualify them as rules of customary international law. The reasons for this are, I imagine, not far to seek. For those States which are contending with “peoples[’]” struggles for self-determination, adoption of the Protocol may prove awkward. For liberation movements who rely on strategies of urban terror for achieving their aims the terms of the Protocol, with its emphasis on the protection of civilians, may prove disastrously restrictive. I therefore do not find it altogether surprising that Mr Donen was unable to refer me to any statement in the published literature that Protocol I has attained the status o[f] customary international [law].
I have not been persuaded by the arguments which I have heard on behalf of the accused that the assessment of Professor Dugard, writing in the Annual Survey of South African Law (1983) at 66, that “it is argued with growing conviction that under contemporary international law members of SWAPO [South-West Africa People’s Organisation] and the ANC [African National Congress] are members of liberation movements entitled to prisoner-of-war status, in terms of a new customary rule spawned by the 1977 Protocols”, is correct. On what I have heard in argument I disagree with his assessment that there is growing support for the view that the Protocols reflect a new rule of customary international law. No writer has been cited who supports this proposition. Here and there someone says that it may one day come about. I am not sure that the provisions relating to the field of application of Protocol I are capable of ever becoming a rule of customary international law, but I need not decide that point today.
For the reasons which I have given I have concluded that the provisions of Protocol I have not been accepted in customary international law. They accordingly form no part of South African law.
This conclusion has made it unnecessary for me to give a decision on the question of whether rules of customary international law which conflict with the statutory or common law of this country will be enforced by its courts.
In the result, the preliminary point is dismissed. The trial must proceed.
In its judgment in the Basson case
in 2004, the Constitutional Court of South Africa stated that “international law obliges the state to punish crimes against humanity and war crimes”.
In the same case, Justice Sachs wrote in his concurring opinion:
The duty of states to provide effective penal sanctions today for persons involved in grave breaches of humanitarian law, whenever committed, is captured and expressed in Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (articles 146–147 appear with different numbering in all four conventions).
In 2010, in the Boeremag case, South Africa’s North Gauteng High Court stated:
In Petane, … Conradie J found that the provisions of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I are not part of customary international law, and therefore are also not part of South African law.
Referring to the fact that in December 1986 only 66 of the 165 States party to the Geneva Conventions had ratified Protocol I, the Court [in Petane] stated:
This approach of the world community to Protocol I is, on principle, far too half-hearted to justify an inference that its principles have been so widely accepted as to qualify them as rules of customary international law. The reasons for this are, I imagine, not far to seek. For those States which are contending with “peoples[’]” struggles for self-determination, adoption of the Protocol may prove awkward. For liberation movements who rely on strategies of urban terror for achieving their aims the terms of the Protocol, with its emphasis on the protection of civilians, may prove disastrously restrictive. I therefore do not find it altogether surprising that Mr Donen was unable to refer me to any statement in the published literature that Protocol I has attained the status of customary international law.
Important changes with respect to certain aspects applicable at the time of Petane have taken place. The ANC [African National Congress] has become South Africa’s ruling party and in 1995 ratified Protocol I. The total number of States that have ratified it, is now … 162.
This last aspect forms the basis on which the First Respondent [the State] and the applicants agree that Protocol I forms part of customary international law as well as of South African law. As requested, this position is accepted for the purposes of the decision, without deciding on the matter.
Despite these changes, it remains debatable whether the provisions of Protocol I have become a part of South African law in this way.
The consensus of both parties to the conflict is required. See Petane … and Article 96 of Protocol I. …
Parliament’s failure to incorporate Protocol I into legislation in accordance with Article 231(4) of the Constitution in fact points to the contrary, and is indicative that the requirements of usus
and/or opinio juris
have not been met. See Petane
[footnotes in original omitted]
The Court also held:
If the [1977 Additional Protocol I] applies in South Africa as customary international law, the two requirements that form the basis of customary law must be met. It is arguable that the requirement of usus
has been met by the vast number of States that have acceded or ratified it. By ratifying Protocol I the Republic of South Africa has indicated its intention to apply the Protocol, thereby fulfilling the requirement of opinio juris
In 1998, in its report on “gross violations of human rights” committed between 1960 and 1993, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission stated:
Those combatants who were killed or seriously injured while they were unarmed or out of combat, executed after they had been captured, or wounded when they clearly could have been arrested were held to be victims of gross violations of human rights, and those responsible were held accountable.
In 2010, in a statement at the Tenth Annual Regional Seminar on the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in Pretoria, South Africa’s Deputy Minister of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation stated:
I am convinced that this seminar will contribute to Africa’s ongoing efforts to develop a culture of respect for non-combatants and for prisoners of, and persons affected by war. Discussions and debate need to be followed by proper implementation of IHL and its instruments. Following from the implementation of IHL, we should also continue to publicly deplore any violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, and also bring to justice the perpetrators thereof.
In 2011, in a statement before the UN Security Council during an open debate on children and armed conflict, made partly on behalf of the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict, including South Africa, the deputy permanent representative of Canada stated:
Although the Friends Group applauds the action taken by the Security Council so far in strengthening accountability for persistent perpetrators of grave violations against children, we call for further decisive action in three ways against such perpetrators … Third, we remain concerned with the accountability gap and call … upon national authorities and all parties concerned to take appropriate legal actions against persistent perpetrators.
In 2011, in an opening statement at the Eleventh Annual Regional Seminar on the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in Pretoria, South Africa’s Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation stated:
Member States on the African continent have shown a steady support for ratifying international instruments pertaining to IHL. However, we all acknowledge that more can and should be done. In this regard, I remain convinced that the effective implementation of IHL enhances a rules-based international system, which directly ensures the protection of civilians against breaches of IHL and impunity, and ultimately contributes to the creation of a better world for all. We therefore need to ensure that all relevant role-players are properly sensitised to and advised about the importance of IHL, not only during times of conflict, but also during times of peace. Lastly, we should also continue to publicly express our dissatisfaction about serious violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and remain unwavering in our resolve to bring to justice the perpetrators thereof.
In 2013, in a statement before the UN Security Council during a debate on children and armed conflict, made on behalf of the Friends of Children and Armed Conflict, including South Africa, the permanent representative of Canada stated:
Holding perpetrators to account [for] grave violations against children continues to be rare as indicated by the Secretary-General in his annual report, and yet is a crucial element towards protecting children’s rights. The Friends encourage Member States to strengthen national accountability mechanisms and judicial capacities, including by developing child protection legislations that criminalize all grave violations against children. In those cases where national authorities are unwilling or unable to hold perpetrators to account, due to lack of capacity or resources for instance, international justice mechanisms, including through the work of the International Criminal Court, and ad hoc and mixed tribunals, can and should play a complementary role.