Règle correspondante
United States of America
Practice Relating to Rule 8. Definition of Military Objectives
Section D. Weapons and weapon systems
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) considers that an adversary’s “armament, such as military aircraft, tanks, antiaircraft emplacements … are military objectives beyond any dispute”. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 5-3(b)(2).
The US Naval Handbook (1995) specifies that “proper targets for naval attack include such military objectives as enemy warships and military aircraft, naval and military auxiliaries, … military vehicles, armor, artillery, ammunition stores”. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 8.1.1.
The US Naval Handbook (2007) states: “Proper objects of attack include, but are not limited to, such military objectives as enemy warships and military aircraft, naval and military auxiliaries … military vehicles, armor, artillery, [and] ammunition stores”. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 8.2.5; see also § 8.6.1.
In 1966, in the context of the Vietnam War, the US Department of Defense stated that military targets “also include those anti-aircraft and SAM sites which endanger the lives of American pilots … In the specific case of Nam Dinh and Phu Li, targets have been limited to … air defense sites.” 
United States, Department of Defense, Statement on targeting policy in Vietnam, 26 December 1966, reprinted in Marjorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, Department of State Publication 8367, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 427.
In 1991, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United States stated that military targets included “Iraqi biological and chemical warfare facilities, mobile and fixed surface-to-surface missile sites … and the air defense networks that protect these facilities” as well as “Iraqi artillery positions”. 
United States, Letter dated 22 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22130, 22 January 1991, p. 1.
In another such report, the United States stated that “surface-to-surface missile capabilities remain as high priority targets”. 
United States, Letter dated 30 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22173, 30 January 1991, p. 1.
In the same report, the United States stated that “the naval forces of the United States have also engaged Iraqi patrol and mine-laying craft in the Northern Arabian Gulf”. 
United States, Letter dated 30 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22173, 30 January 1991, p. 1.
In a subsequent report, the United States stated that allied attacks had targeted “air defence, combat aircraft in the air and on the ground, nuclear, biological and chemical storage facilities”, as well as “air defence radars and missiles in Kuwait” and “surface-to-surface missile capabilities”. 
United States, Letter dated 8 February 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22216, 13 February 1991, p. 1.
In the same report, the United States reiterated that “the naval forces of the United States and the allied coalition have continued to engage Iraqi patrol and mine-laying craft in the Northern Arabian Gulf”. 
United States, Letter dated 8 February 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22216, 13 February 1991, p. 2.
In 1991, during a news briefing concerning the Gulf War, the US Secretary of Defense stated that “air defence units and radars”, “SCUD missile launchers” and “the factories where Iraq has produced chemical and biological weapons, and until recently, continued working on nuclear weapons” were considered military targets and had been attacked. 
United States, News Briefing by the US Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 23 January 1991, annexed to Letter dated 25 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22168, 29 January 1991, p. 3.
In 1992, in its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the US Department of Defense stated that Iraq’s strategic integrated air defense system, its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons research, production and storage facilities and its Scud missiles, launchers, and production and storage facilities had been included among the 12 target sets for the coalition’s attacks. 
United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Chapter VI, The Air Campaign, pp. 96 and 98.