Practice Relating to Rule 89. Violence to Life

Note: For practice concerning attacks against civilians, see Rule 1, Section C. For practice concerning attacks on persons hors de combat, see Rule 47. For practice concerning enforced disappearance and its relationship to the right to life, see Rule 98. Practice concerning extermination as a crime against humanity is included under the present rule; for practice specifically concerning deprivation of access to food and medicine as an element of the crime against humanity of extermination, see Rule 55. For practice concerning the killings, summary executions and the death penalty for spies, see Rule 107, Section B.
Hague Regulations (1899)
Article 46 of the 1899 Hague Regulations provides that, in occupied territory, “individual lives” must be respected. 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, Article 46.
Hague Regulations (1907)
Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provides that, in occupied territory, “the lives of persons” must be respected. 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 46.
IMT Charter (Nuremberg)
Article 6 of the 1945 IMT Charter (Nuremberg) provides:
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:
(b) “War crimes:” namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder … of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder … of prisoners of war or persons on the seas …
(c) “Crimes against humanity:” namely, murder, extermination … and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war. 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for Germany, concluded by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, acting in the interests of all the United Nations and by their representatives duly authorized thereto, annexed to the London Agreement, London, 8 August 1945, Article 6.
Geneva Conventions (1949)
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits at any time and in any place whatsoever “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds” and “the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples” with respect to “persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause”. 
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 3; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 3; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 3; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 3.
Geneva Convention I
Article 12, second paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention I provides, with respect to wounded and sick members of the armed forces in the field: “Any attempts upon their lives, or violence to their persons, shall be strictly prohibited; in particular, they shall not be murdered or exterminated, …”. 
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 12, second para.
Geneva Convention II
Article 12, second paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention II provides, with respect to wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea: “Any attempts upon their lives, or violence to their persons, shall be strictly prohibited; in particular, they shall not be murdered or exterminated, …”. 
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 12, second para.
Geneva Convention III
Article 13, first paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention III provides: “Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death … of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited”. 
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 13, first para.
Geneva Convention III
Article 42 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III provides:
The use of weapons against prisoners of war, especially against those who are escaping or attempting to escape, shall constitute an extreme measure, which shall always be preceded by warnings appropriate to the circumstances. 
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 42.
Geneva Convention III
Article 121 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III provides:
Every death or serious injury of a prisoner of war caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, another prisoner of war, or any other person, as well as any death the cause of which is unknown, shall be immediately followed by an official enquiry by the Detaining Power.
A communication on this subject shall be sent immediately to the Protecting Power. Statements shall be taken from witnesses, especially from those who are prisoners of war, and a report including such statements shall be forwarded to the Protecting Power.
If the enquiry indicates the guilt of one or more persons, the Detaining Power shall take all measures for the prosecution of the person or persons responsible. 
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 121.
Geneva Convention IV
Article 27, first paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV provides that protected persons shall be “protected especially against all acts of violence”. 
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 27, first para.
Geneva Convention IV
Article 32 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV provides:
The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the … extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder … but also to any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents. 
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 32.
Geneva Convention IV
Article 131 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV provides:
Every death or serious injury of an internee, caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, another internee or any other person, as well as any death the cause of which is unknown, shall be immediately followed by an official enquiry by the Detaining Power.
A communication on this subject shall be sent immediately to the Protecting Power. The evidence of any witnesses shall be taken, and a report including such evidence shall be prepared and forwarded to the said Protecting Power.
If the enquiry indicates the guilt of one or more persons, the Detaining Power shall take all necessary steps to ensure the prosecution of the person or persons responsible.  
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 131.
Geneva Conventions (1949)
According to Article 50 of the 1949 Geneva Convention I, Article 51 of the 1949 Geneva Convention II, Article 130 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III and Article 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, “wilful killing” is a grave breach of these instruments. 
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 50; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 51; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 130; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 147.
Genocide Convention
According to Article 2 of the 1948 Genocide Convention, “killing members of the group” constitutes genocide when “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res. 260 A (III), 9 December 1948, Article 2.
European Convention on Human Rights
Article 2 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights provides: “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.” It also states: “Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” Article 15(2) provides: “No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, shall be made under this provision.” 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950, as amended by Protocol No. 11, Strasbourg, 11 May 1994, Articles 2 and 15(2).
Panmunjom Armistice Agreement
Paragraph I(3) of the Annex to the 1953 Panmunjom Armistice Agreement (establishing a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission) provides: “No violence to their persons [of prisoners of war] … shall be permitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever.” 
Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a Military Armistice in Korea, Panmunjom, 8 June 1953, Annex, § I(3).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 6(1) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” This right is non-derogable under Article 4(2) of the Covenant. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res. 2200 A (XXI), 16 December 1966, Articles 6(1) and 4(2).
American Convention on Human Rights
Article 4 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights provides: “Every person has the right to have his life respected … No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” This right is non-derogable under Article 27(2) of the Convention. 
American Convention on Human Rights, adopted by the OAS Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San José, 22 November 1969, also known as Pact of San José, Articles 4 and 27(2).
Protocol to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam
Article 8(a) and (b) of the 1973 Protocol to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam provides that all captured military personnel and all captured civilian personnel “shall be protected against all violence to life and person, in particular against murder in any form”. 
Protocol on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam concerning the Return of Captured Military Personnel and Foreign Civilians and Captured and Detained Vietnamese Personnel, signed on behalf of the United States of America, the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam, Paris, 27 January 1973, Article 8(a) and (b).
Additional Protocol I
Article 75(2)(a) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides that “violence to the life … of persons”, in particular “murder”, is prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 75(2)(a). Article 75 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.43, 27 May 1977, p. 250.
Additional Protocol II
Article 4(2)(a) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II provides that “violence to the life … of persons”, in particular “murder”, is prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 4(2)(a). Article 4 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.50, 3 June 1977, p. 90.
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Article 4 of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides: “Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right.” The Charter does not provide for any derogation in a state of emergency. 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted by the Eighteenth Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Nairobi, 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, Article 4.
Agreement on Human Rights annexed to the Dayton Accords
Article 1(1) of the 1995 Agreement on Human Rights annexed to the Dayton Accords provides: “The Parties shall secure to all persons within their jurisdiction the right to life.” 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 6, Agreement on Human Rights, signed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, Dayton, 22 November 1995, Article 1(1).
ICC Statute
Pursuant to Article 6(a) of the 1998 ICC Statute, “[k]illing members of the group” constitutes genocide when “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 6(a).
ICC Statute
Pursuant to Article 7(1)(a) of the 1998 ICC Statute, “[m]urder” constitutes a crime against humanity “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”. 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 7(1)(a).
ICC Statute
Pursuant to Article 7(1)(b) of the 1998 ICC Statute, “[e]xtermination” constitutes a crime against humanity “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population”. 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 7(1)(b).
ICC Statute
Pursuant to Article 8(2)(a)(i) of the 1998 ICC Statute, “[w]ilful killing” constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts.  
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 8(2)(a)(i).
ICC Statute
Pursuant to Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the 1998 ICC Statute, “[v]iolence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,” constitutes a war crime in non-international armed conflicts. 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 8(2)(c)(i).
ICC Statute
Pursuant to article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the 1998 ICC Statute, “the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable,” constitutes a war crime in non-international armed conflicts. 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 8(2)(c)(iv).
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
Under Article 2(b) of the 2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, extermination “as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population” constitutes a crime against humanity. 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown, 16 January 2002, annexed to Letter dated 6 March 2002 from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2002/246, 8 March 2002, p. 17, Article 2(b).
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
Article 3 of the 2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone provides:
The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed or ordered the commission of serious violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall include:
a. Violence to life … in particular murder …
g. … [T]he carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, annexed to the 2002 Agreement on the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown, 16 January 2002, annexed to Letter dated 6 March 2002 from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/2002/246, 8 March 2002, p. 29, Article 3(a) and (g).
UN-Cambodia Agreement Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea
Article 9 of the 2003 UN-Cambodia Agreement Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea provides:
The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers shall be the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, crimes against humanity as defined in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and such other crimes as defined in Chapter II of the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers as promulgated on 10 August 2001. 
Agreement between the UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Phnom Penh, 6 June 2003, Article 9.
In accordance with Article 2 of the Agreement, Cambodia’s Law on the Establishment of the ECCC (2001), as amended, further implements these provisions. 
Agreement between the UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Phnom Penh, 6 June 2003, Article 2.
Kampala Convention
Article 9(1) of the 2009 Kampala Convention states:
State Parties shall protect the rights of internally displaced persons regardless of the cause of displacement by refraining from, and preventing, the following acts, amongst others:
c. Arbitrary killing, summary execution. 
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, adopted in Kampala, Uganda, 23 October 2009, Article 9(1)(c).
Lieber Code
Article 23 of the 1863 Lieber Code provides: “Private citizens are no longer murdered.” 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Order No. 100 by President Abraham Lincoln, Washington D.C., 24 April 1863, Article 23.
Lieber Code
Article 44 of the 1863 Lieber Code provides: “All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, … or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited.” 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Order No. 100 by President Abraham Lincoln, Washington D.C., 24 April 1863, Article 44.
Lieber Code
Article 56 of the 1863 Lieber Code provides: “A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of … death, or any other barbarity.” 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Order No. 100 by President Abraham Lincoln, Washington D.C., 24 April 1863, Article 56.
Lieber Code
Article 61 of the 1863 Lieber Code provides: “Troops that give no quarter have no right to kill enemies already disabled on the ground, or prisoners captured by other troops.” 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Order No. 100 by President Abraham Lincoln, Washington D.C., 24 April 1863, Article 61.
Lieber Code
Article 71 of the 1863 Lieber Code provides:
Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an enemy already wholly disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages soldiers to do so, shall suffer death, if duly convicted, whether he belongs to the Army of the United States, or is an enemy captured after having committed his misdeed. 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Order No. 100 by President Abraham Lincoln, Washington D.C., 24 April 1863, Article 71.
Lieber Code
Article 148 of the 1863 Lieber Code provides:
The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile government, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any captor, any more than the law of peace allows such intentional outlawry. 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Order No. 100 by President Abraham Lincoln, Washington D.C., 24 April 1863, Article 148.
Report of the Commission on Responsibility
Based on several documents supplying evidence of outrages committed during the First World War, the 1919 Report of the Commission on Responsibility lists violations of the laws and customs of war which should be subject to criminal prosecution, including murder, massacres and putting hostages to death. 
Report submitted to the Preliminary Conference of Versailles by the Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, Versailles, 29 March 1919.
Allied Control Council Law No. 10
Article II of the 1945 Allied Control Council Law No. 10 provides:
1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:
(b) War crimes. Atrocities or offenses against persons or property constituting violations of the laws or customs of war, including but not limited to, murder … of civilian population from occupied territory, murder … of prisoners of war or persons on the seas …
(c) Crimes against humanity. Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination … or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population. 
Allied Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against Humanity, enacted by the Allied Control Council of Germany, composed of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Berlin, 20 December 1945, Article II(1)(b) and (c).
IMT Charter (Tokyo)
Article 5(c) of the 1946 IMT Charter (Tokyo) established individual responsibility for crimes against humanity, including “murder, extermination … and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war”. 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, approved by an Executive Order, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, Tokyo, 19 January 1946, amended on 26 April 1946, Article 5(c).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.” 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res. 217 A (III), 10 December 1948, Article 2.
Nuremberg Principles
Principle VI of the 1950 Nuremberg Principles adopted by the International Law Commission provides:
The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law:
(b) War crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of war include, but are not limited to, murder … of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder … of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas …
(c) Crimes against humanity: Murder, extermination … and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population. 
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, adopted by the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/1316, New York, 5 June–29 July 1950, Principle VI.
UN Command Rules and Regulations
Rule 4 of the 1950 UN Command Rules and Regulations gave to Military Commissions of the UN Command in Korea jurisdiction over various offences, including “murder of civilians or prisoners of war”. 
Rules of Criminal Procedure for Military Commissions of the United Nations Command, Tokyo, 22 October 1950, Rule 4.
UN Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict
Paragraph 5 of the 1974 UN Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict provides: “All forms of repression … of women and children, including … shooting … committed by belligerents in the course of military operations or in occupied territories shall be considered criminal.” 
Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res. 3318 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, § 5.
Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions
Paragraph 1 of the 1989 Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions provides:
Governments shall prohibit by law all extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions and shall ensure that any such executions are recognized as offences under their criminal laws, and are punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the seriousness of such offences. Exceptional circumstances including a state of war or threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked as a justification of such executions. 
Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, recommended by the UN Economic and Social Council, Res. 1989/65, 24 May 1989, § 1.
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials
The 1990 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provides:
2. Governments and law enforcement agencies should develop a range of means as broad as possible and equip law enforcement officials with various types of weapons and ammunition that would allow for a differentiated use of force and firearms. These should include the development of non-lethal incapacitating weapons for use in appropriate situations, with a view to increasingly restraining the application of means capable of causing death or injury to persons. For the same purpose, it should also be possible for law enforcement officials to be equipped with self-defensive equipment such as shields, helmets, bullet-proof vests and bullet-proof means of transportation, in order to decrease the need to use weapons of any kind.
4. Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result.
5. Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall:
(a) Exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved;
(b) Minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life;
8. Exceptional circumstances such as internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked to justify any departure from these basic principles. 
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the Eight United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August–7 September 1990, UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, 1990, p. 112, Principles 2, 4, 5 and 8.
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam
Article 2(a) of the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam provides:
Life is a God-given gift and the right to life is guaranteed to every human being. It is the duty of individuals, societies and states to protect this right from any violation, and it is prohibited to take away life except for a Shari’ah prescribed reason. 
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, adopted at the 19th Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Res. 49/19-P, Cairo, 5 August 1990, annexed to Letter dated 19 September 1990 from the permanent representative of Egypt to the UN addressed to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/45/421-S/21797, 20 September 1990, Article 2(a).
ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1991)
According to Article 22(2)(a) of the 1991 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, “acts of inhumanity, cruelty or barbarity directed against life … in particular wilful killing” are considered as exceptionally serious war crimes and as serious violations of the principles and rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. 
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-third session, 29 April–19 July 1991, UN Doc. A/46/10, 1991, Article 22(2)(a).
Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Paragraph 4 of the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requires that all civilians be treated in accordance with Article 75 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of International Humanitarian Law between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Geneva, 27 November 1991, § 4.
Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Under paragraph 1 of the 1992 Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the parties committed themselves to respect and ensure respect for common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Paragraph 2.3 requires that all civilians be treated in accordance with Article 75 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
Agreement between Representatives of Mr. Alija Izetbegović (President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and President of the Party of Democratic Action), Representatives of Mr. Radovan Karadžić (President of the Serbian Democratic Party), and Representative of Mr. Miljenko Brkić (President of the Croatian Democratic Community), Geneva, 22 May 1992, §§ 1 and 2.3.
ICTY Statute
Under Article 2(a) of the 1993 ICTY Statute, the Tribunal is competent to prosecute wilful killing of persons protected under the provisions of the relevant 1949 Geneva Convention. Article 5(a) provides that murder, “when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population” constitutes a crime against humanity. Article 4(2)(a) provides that killing members of “a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, when committed with intent to destroy it, in whole or in part, as such” constitutes genocide. 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 827, 25 May 1993, as amended by Res. 1166, 13 May 1998 and by Res. 1329, 30 November 2000, Articles 2(a), 5(a) and 4(2)(a).
Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala
Under Section III(2) of the 1994 Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala, the Government of Guatemala undertook to modify the Penal Code so that “summary or extra-judicial executions may be characterized as crimes of particular gravity and punished as such”. 
Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights between the Government of the Republic of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, Mexico City, 29 March 1994, annexed to Letter dated 8 April 1994 from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UN General Assembly and to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/928-S/1994/448, 19 April 1994, Annex I, Section III(2).
ICTR Statute
Article 2(2)(a) of the 1994 ICTR Statute provides that killing members of “a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, when committed with intent to destroy it, in whole or in part, as such” constitutes genocide. Article 3(a) provides that murder, “when committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”, constitutes a crime against humanity. Under Article 4, the Tribunal is competent to prosecute violations of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including “violence to life … in particular murder” and “the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”. 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 955, 8 November 1994, as amended by Res. 1165, 30 April 1998, and by Res. 1329, 30 November 2000, Articles 2(2)(a), 3(a) and 4(a) and (g).
ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996)
Article 18(a)–(b) of the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind states that “[m]urder” and “[e]xtermination” are crimes against humanity. Article 20(a) provides that “[w]ilful killing”, committed in an international armed conflict and in violation of international humanitarian law, is a war crime. Under Article 20(f)(i), “[v]iolence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder”, committed in violation of IHL applicable in armed conflict not of an international character, is a war crime. Article 20(f)(vii) states that “the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable”, committed in violation of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict not of an international character, is a war crime. 
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, 6 May–26 July 1996, UN Doc. A/51/10, 1996, Articles 18(a)–(b), 20(a) and 20(f)(i) and (vii).
Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and IHL in the Philippines
Article 2(4) of Part III of the 1998 Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and IHL in the Philippines states:
This Agreement seeks to confront, remedy and prevent the most serious human rights violations in terms of civil and political rights, as well as to uphold, protect and promote the full scope of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including:
4. The right to life, especially against summary executions (salvagings), … massacres … and the right not to be subjected to campaigns of incitement to violence against one’s person. 
Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, The Hague, 16 March 1998, Part III, Article 2(4).
Article 3(1) of Part IV of the Agreement further provides that violence to life shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to persons hors de combat. Article 4(1) of Part IV adds: “Persons hors de combat … are entitled to respect for their lives.” 
Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, The Hague, 16 March 1998, Part IV, Articles 3(1) and 4(1).
UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin
According to Section 7.2 of the 1999 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin, “violence to life” or “murder” of persons not, or no longer, taking part in military operations and persons placed hors de combat is prohibited at any time and in any place. 
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, Secretary-General’s Bulletin, UN Secretariat, UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999, Section 7.2.
ICC Elements of Crimes
According to Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the 2000 ICC Elements of Crimes, “execution without due process” is defined by reference to the requirements of independence and impartiality and to “all other judicial guarantees generally recognized as indispensable under international law”. 
Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, adopted by the 23rd Meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, New York, 30 June 2000, Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2, Addendum, 6 July 2000, as adopted by the Assembly of States Parties, First Session, 3–10 September 2002, Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, UN Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, 25 September 2002, and ICC-ASP/1/3/Corr.1, 31 October 2002, Article 8(2)(a)(vi) and (c)(iv).
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
Article 1 of the 2000 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides: “Everyone has the right to life.” 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, signed and proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of the European Union, Nice, 7 December 2000, Article 1.
UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15
The UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15 establishes panels with exclusive jurisdiction over serious criminal offences, including war crimes. According to Section 6(1)(a)(i), “wilful killing” constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts. According to Section 6(1)(c)(i), “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,” constitutes a war crime in non-international armed conflicts. According to Section 6(1)(c)(iv), “the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable,” constitutes a war crime in non-international armed conflicts. 
Regulation on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, UN Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15, Dili, 6 June 2000, Section 6(1)(a)(i), (c)(i) and (c)(iv).
UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15
The UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15 establishes panels with exclusive jurisdiction over serious criminal offences, including crimes against humanity. According to Section 5(1)(b), “[e]xtermination” constitutes a crime against humanity “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population”. 
Regulation on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, UN Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15, Dili, 6 June 2000, Section 5(1)(b).
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement between the political forces of Côte d’Ivoire
The 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement between the political forces of Côte d’Ivoire provides:
1) At the invitation of the President of the French Republic, a Round Table of the Ivorian political forces met in Linas-Marcoussis from 15 to 23 January 2003. It brought together the following parties FPI, MFA, MJP, MPCI, MPIGO, PDCI-RDA, PIT, RDR, UDCY, UDPCI … The delegations have shown high-mindedness to allow the Round Table to bring the positions closer together and to arrive at the following consensus, all elements of which – principles and annexes – have equal value:
Annex
VI-Rights and liberties of the human person
3) Upon the report of the international commission of inquiry, the government of national reconciliation shall determine who must be brought before the courts in order to end impunity. Condemning in particular the actions of death squadrons and their commanders as well as the perpetrators of summary executions on the entirety of the territory, the Round Table considers that the perpetrators and accomplices of these activities will have to be brought before international criminal justice. 
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement between the political forces of Côte d’Ivoire, Round table of the Ivorian political forces, meeting at Linas-Marcoussis from 15 to 23 January 2003 and bringing together the following parties: FPI (Front Populaire Ivoirien), MFA (Mouvement des Forces d’Avenir), MJP (Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix), MPCI (Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire), MPIGO (Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest), PDCI-RDA (Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain), PIT (Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs), RDR (Rassemblement des Républicains), UDCY (Union Démocratique et Citoyenne), UDPCI (Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire), Linas-Marcoussis, 24 January 2003, Text of the agreement, paragraph 1 and Annex, paragraph VI.3.
Accra Agreement II between the political forces of Côte d’Ivoire signatory to the Agreement of Linas-Marcoussis
The 2003 Accra Agreement II between the political forces of Côte d’Ivoire signatory to the Linas-Marcoussis agreement provides:
At the invitation of His Excellency Mr John Agyekum Kufour, President of the Republic of Ghana, incumbent Chairman of ECOWAS, a Round Table of the Ivorian political forces signatory to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement met in Accra on 6 and 7 March 2003.
The following groups participated in that Round Table: FPI, MFA, MJP, MPCI, MPIGO, PDCI-RDA, PIT, RDR, UDCY, UDPCI.
The Round Table reaffirms its will to adhere to the Marcoussis Agreement, unanimously considered as a sustainable framework for the resolution of the Ivorian crisis.
The Round Table recalls the need for all the opposing parties to stop immediately the massacres and killings as well as all the violent acts committed in their zones of operation. 
Accra Agreement II between the political forces of Côte d’Ivoire signatory to the Agreement of Linas-Marcoussis, Round table of the Ivorian political forces signatory to the Agreement of Linas-Marcoussis, meeting at Accra on 6 and 7 March 2003, Accra, 7 March 2003.
Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1969) restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Argentina, Leyes de Guerra, RC-46-1, Público, II Edición 1969, Ejército Argentino, Edición original aprobado por el Comandante en Jefe del Ejército, 9 May 1967, § 8.001.
Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1989) provides that “wilful killing” is a war crime and a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It also states that “violence to life” is prohibited against persons who are in the power of a party to the conflict and who do not benefit from a more favourable treatment under the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Argentina, Leyes de Guerra, PC-08-01, Público, Edición 1989, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, aprobado por Resolución No. 489/89 del Ministerio de Defensa, 23 April 1990, §§ 4.15 and 8.03.
Australia
Australia’s Commanders’ Guide (1994) states that wilful killing is a war crime which warrants the institution of criminal proceedings. 
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 1305(a).
Australia
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) provides: “Attempts upon the lives [of the wounded and sick and shipwrecked], and violence against them is prohibited. They shall not be murdered.” It further states that “wilful killing” is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions which warrants institution of criminal proceedings. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, §§ 990 and 1315(a) and (n); see also § 945.
Australia
Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states:
The following acts are prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever:
• Violence to the life, health or physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular:
– murder; and
• threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 9.46.
The manual also states that, with regard to the general treatment of protected persons in both their own territory and occupied territory, “[v]iolence … [is] forbidden”. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 9.58.
In its chapter on “Prisoners of War and Detained Persons”, the manual states:
Killing prisoners of war is prohibited. PW [prisoners of war] cannot be put to death for any reason including:
• because the captors are unable to provide the necessary facilities or personnel to restrict their movements;
• because they will have to be fed, thus reducing the supplies available to the captors; or
• because they may gain their liberty as a result of an early success by the forces to which they belong. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 10.23.
In its chapter on “Occupation”, the manual states with regard to inhabitants of occupied territory:
12.37 Any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons … is prohibited. That prohibition [includes] … murder …
12.39 Measures for the control of the population which are prohibited include:
• violence. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, §§ 12.37 and 12.39.
In its chapter on “Compliance”, the manual states:
13.25 Grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions consist of any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Convention:
• wilful killing
13.29 Provisions of the Hague Regulations 1907 are now recognised as part of customary law. Those regulations provide that the following acts are “especially forbidden”:
• to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, §§ 13.25 and 13.29.
The LOAC Manual (2006) replaces both the Defence Force Manual (1994) and the Commander’s Manual (1994).
Belgium
Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) prohibits, in internal armed conflicts, “attacks on the life and physical integrity” of “persons who do not take a direct part in hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and persons placed hors de combat”. 
Belgium, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit de la Guerre, Ecole Royale Militaire, par J. Maes, Chargé de cours, Avocat-général près la Cour Militaire, D/1983/1187/029, 1983, pp. 16–17.
The manual further states that wilful killing is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Belgium, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit de la Guerre, Ecole Royale Militaire, par J. Maes, Chargé de cours, Avocat-général près la Cour Militaire, D/1983/1187/029, 1983, p. 55.
Benin
Benin’s Military Manual (1995) provides that all persons hors de combat and who do not take a direct part in hostilities shall be entitled to respect for their lives and physical integrity. 
Benin, Le Droit de la Guerre, III fascicules, Forces Armées du Bénin, Ministère de la Défense nationale, 1995, Fascicule II, p. 4 and Fascicule III, p. 4.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Instructions to the Muslim Fighter (1993) issued by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993 states:
Killing of women, children and priests who do not participate at all in the war and who do not directly or indirectly assist the enemy is forbidden … These are general rules which are binding for our soldiers. However, if the commanding officer assesses that the situation and the general interest demand a different course of action, then the soldiers are duty-bound to obey their commanding officer … It is also left to the military command’s discretion to decide whether it is more useful or in the general interest to free, exchange or liquidate enemy prisoners of war. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Instructions to the Muslim Fighter, booklet, ABiH 3rd Corps, 1993, cited in ICTY, Hadžihasanović and Others Case, Amended Indictment, 11 January 2002, § 24, § c.
Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso’s Disciplinary Regulations (1994) prohibits attacks on the lives and physical integrity of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners and civilians, including murder. 
Burkina Faso, Règlement de Discipline Générale dans les Forces Armées, Décret No. 94-159/IPRES/DEF, Ministère de la Défense, 1994, Article 35(2).
Burundi
Burundi’s Regulations on International Humanitarian Law (2007) states: “Persons hors de combat and those who do not directly participate in hostilities are entitled to respect for their life”. 
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, p. 31; see also Part I bis, p. 80 and Part I, p. 15.
The Regulations also states that “intentional homicide” constitutes a “grave breach” of IHL. 
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, p. 26; see also Part I bis pp. 45, 67 and 114 and Part I bis, p. 27 (crimes against humanity).
Cameroon
Cameroon’s Disciplinary Regulations (1975) prohibits attacks on the lives and physical integrity of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners and civilians, including murder. 
Cameroon, Règlement de discipline dans les Forces Armées, Décret No. 75/700, 6 November 1975, Article 32.
Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (1992) states: “An obligation is given to safeguard the life of [prisoners of war].” 
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, § 142.
Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (2006), under the heading “Responsibility for Acts or Omissions of which Subordinates are Accused”, states that a commander may be held responsible for any “homicide” committed by his subordinates. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 99, § 361; see also p. 141, § 421.
The manual also states that “intentional homicide” constitutes a grave breach of IHL. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 295, § 661.
Cameroon
Cameroon’s Disciplinary Regulations (2007) states:
Article 32: Prohibitions
It is prohibited to soldiers in combat:
- to fire at, injure or kill an enemy who surrenders or who is captured or with whom a suspension of combat has been concluded;
- to commit violence to life or person of the wounded, sick or shipwrecked, of prisoners, as well as of civilians, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment or torture. 
Cameroon, Règlement de discipline générale dans les forces de défense, Décret N° 2007/199, Président de la République, 7 July 2007, Article 32.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) states that “wilful killing” is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and provides that the following acts are prohibited: assassination; attempts upon the lives of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked; killing of prisoners of war; and murder of persons protected by the 1949 Geneva Convention IV and the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 6-3, § 25, p. 9-2, § 18, p. 10-3, § 26, p. 11-4, § 33, p. 11-7, § 63(a), p. 17-3, § 21 and p. 16-2, § 12; see also p. 16-4, § 21(j) (genocide as a violation of the Hague Conventions and customary law).
With regard to non-international armed conflicts, the manual restates common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 17-2, § 10(a).
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on land warfare: “Assassination is prohibited. Assassination means the killing or wounding of a selected non-combatant for a political or religious motive.” 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 612.1.
In its chapter on the treatment of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, the manual provides:
907. Treatment of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked
1. The wounded, sick and shipwrecked are to be protected, respected, treated humanely and cared for by the Detaining Power without any adverse discrimination.
2. Attempts upon their lives and violence against their persons are prohibited. They shall not be murdered …. The term “wounded, sick and shipwrecked”, includes civilians.
912. Acts or omissions endangering health are grave breaches
1. Any wilful act or omission which seriously endangers the physical or mental health or integrity of any person in the power of a party, other than the one on which that person depends and which violates the above prohibitions is a grave breach. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, §§ 907 and 912.
In its chapter on the treatment of prisoners of war (PWs), the manual states:
It is forbidden to kill PWs. The fact that captors are unable to provide the necessary facilities or personnel to restrict their movements or because they will have to be fed, thus reducing the supplies available to the captors, or because they may gain their liberty as a result of an early success by the forces to which they belong are no exceptions to the rule. In other words, self-preservation or military necessity can never provide an excuse for the murder of PWs. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1020.
In its chapter on the treatment of civilians in the hands of a party to the conflict or an occupying power and, more specifically, in a section entitled “Provisions common to the territories of the parties to the conflict and to occupied territories”, the manual states:
[The 1949 Geneva Convention IV] prohibits taking any measure, which will cause physical suffering to protected persons or will lead to their extermination. This prohibition applies […] to murder…. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1121.2.
In the same chapter, in a section entitled “Treatment of internees”, the manual further states:
Whenever the death or serious injury of an internee is caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, by another internee, or by any other person, or if the cause of death is unknown, the detaining power must immediately hold an official enquiry into the matter and a report of the result of such enquiry must be sent to the Protecting Power. Should the result of the enquiry point to any person or persons as being guilty, the detaining power must take all necessary steps to ensure the prosecution of those responsible. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1130.
In the same chapter, in a section entitled “Additional Protocol I”, the manual also states:
1. [The 1977 Additional Protocol I] provides that all persons in the power of a party to the conflict are entitled to at least a minimum of humane treatment without adverse discrimination on grounds of race, gender, language, religion, political discrimination or similar criteria. It states in part:
2. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military agents:
a. violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular:
(1) murder;
e. threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1135.1, 2.a.1 and e.
In its chapter on “War crimes, individual criminal liability and command responsibility”, the manual states that “wilful killing” is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1607.4.
In its chapter on non-international armed conflicts, the manual restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
By Common Article 3, the parties to a non-international armed conflict occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions are obliged to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
a. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, gender, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following are at any time and in any place prohibited with regard to such persons:
i violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds….
iv … the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1708.1.
In the same chapter, the manual also states:
Although [the 1977 Additional Protocol II] contains no provisions relating to enforcement or punishment of breaches, it does contain a statement of fundamental guarantees prohibiting at any time and anywhere:
a. violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder …;
g. threats to commit any of the foregoing. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1713.1.a and g.
Canada
Canada’s Prisoner of War Handling and Detainees Manual (2004) states:
Grave breaches of the [1949 Geneva Conventions] and [the 1977 Additional Protocol I] include any of the following actions:
a. The wilful killing, torture or inhumane treatment (including medical or scientific experimentation) of wounded and sick PW [prisoners of war], or other protected persons, or otherwise wilfully causing them great suffering or serious injury to body and health. 
Canada, Prisoner of War Handling, Detainees, Interrogation and Tactical Questioning in International Operations, B-GJ-005-110/FP-020, National Defence Headquarters, 1 August 2004, § 4A04.
Central African Republic
The Central African Republic’s Instructor’s Manual (1999) states in Volume 3 (Instruction for non-commissioned officers studying for the level 1 and 2 certificates and for future officers of the criminal police): “Causing harm to life, health or physical or mental well-being, for example through murder … is prohibited.” 
Central African Republic, Le Droit de la Guerre, Fascicule No. 3: Formation pour l’obtention du Brevet d’Armes No. 1, du Brevet d’Armes No. 2 et le stage d’Officier de Police Judiciaire (OPJ), Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Centrafricaines, 1999, Chapter I, Section I.
Central African Republic
The Central African Republic’s Disciplinary Regulations (2009) states: “During combat, it is also prohibited for servicemen to … commit violence to life and person … , in particular through murder of all kinds”. 
Central African Republic, Décret 09.411 portant règlement de discipline générale dans les Armées, Ministre de la Défense Nationale, des Anciens Combattants, des Victimes de Guerre, du Désarmement et de la Restructuration de l’Armée, 10 December 2009, Article 12(11).
Chad
Chad’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) prohibits “attacks on life”. 
Chad, Droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces armées et de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 92.
The manual also states that “murder” is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and thus a war crime. 
Chad, Droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces armées et de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 108.
Colombia
Colombia’s Circular on Fundamental Rules of IHL (1992) states: “Persons hors de combat and who no longer participate directly in hostilities have the right to respect for their lives and physical integrity.” 
Colombia, Transcripción Normas Fundamentales del Derecho Humanitario Aplicables en los Conflictos Armados, Circular No. 033/DIPL-SERPO-526, Policía Nacional, Dirección General, Santafé de Bogotá, 14 May 1992, § 1.
The Circular also states: “Captured persons and civilian persons who are in the power of the adverse Party have the right to respect for their life.” 
Colombia, Transcripción Normas Fundamentales del Derecho Humanitario Aplicables en los Conflictos Armados, Circular No. 033/DIPL-SERPO-526, Policía Nacional, Dirección General, Santafé de Bogotá, 14 May 1992, § 4.
Colombia
Colombia’s Basic Military Manual (1995) provides that, in both international and non-international armed conflicts, the lives of all persons hors de combat shall be respected. 
Colombia, Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual Básico para las Personerías y las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 1995, pp. 20, 22 and 29.
With regard to internal armed conflict, the manual contains the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Colombia, Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual Básico para las Personerías y las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 1995, p. 42.
Colombia
Colombia’s Soldiers’ Manual (1999) and Instructors’ Manual (1999) provide that the right to life is a human right which the armed forces must respect. 
Colombia, Derechos Humanos & Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Guía de Conducta para el Soldado e Infante de Marina, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Oficina de Derechos Humanos, Fuerzas Militares de Colombia, Santafé de Bogotá, 1999, p. 10; Derechos Humanos & Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual de Instrucción de la Guía de Conducta para el Soldado e Infante de Marina, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Oficina de Derechos Humanos, Fuerzas Militares de Colombia, Santafé de Bogotá, 1999, pp. 8 and 21.
Congo
The Congo’s Disciplinary Regulations (1986) prohibits attacks on the lives and physical integrity of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners and civilians, including murder. 
Congo, Décret No. 86/057 du 14 janvier 1986 portant Règlement du Service dans l’Armée Populaire Nationale, 1986, Article 32(2).
Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book I (Basic instruction):
Lesson 3. Rules on behaviour in combat
- Every person
- has the right to life,
- must respect the life and dignity of others.
Lesson 4. Breaches and repression of violations of IHL
I. Grave violations
They are enumerated by the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, as well as by the Ivorian Penal Code.
They are:
- murder
 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre I: Instruction de base, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, pp. 21–22 and 29; see also Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre II: Instruction du gradé et du cadre, Manuel de l’instructeur, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 16; Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 1: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 1ère année, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 39; Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 65.
In Book II (Instruction of non-commissioned officers and officers), the Teaching Manual provides:
I.1.1. War crimes
They are grave violations of IHL mentioned in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, committed during armed conflict.
Examples: … murder. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre II: Instruction du gradé et du cadre, Manuel de l’instructeur, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 28.
In Book III, Volume 2 (Instruction of second-year trainee officers), the Teaching Manual further provides:
Lesson 2. Protection
A person hors de combat must be collected and protected in conformity with the provisions of Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick. In this respect, they must not be the object:
- of violence to life or person,
Lesson 4. Violations and repression
I.3. War crimes
This is by far the breach which can take the most varied forms. It relates to the grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, namely the following acts directed against the persons or objects protected by these acts:
- wilful killing;
 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 2: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 2ème année, Manuel de l’instructeur, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, pp. 21, 23–24 and 43–44.
In Book IV (Instruction of heads of division and company commanders), the Teaching Manual provides:
I.2.5. Murder
Murder means an execution outside any military operation.
Murder is prohibited. However, it is not prohibited to kill an enemy during combat. Murder is defined as a war crime since World War II, based on the principles of international law enshrined in the Nuremberg statute …
If prior information concerning a planned murder reaches the Party on behalf of which the act shall be committed, that Party should do everything possible to prevent the execution of that act. In case of murder, the Party concerned is under the obligation to repress that act.
It is prohibited to put a price on the head of an enemy individual or to offer a bounty for an enemy “dead or alive”. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, pp. 49–50.
Croatia
Croatia’s LOAC Compendium (1991) provides that wilful killing is a grave breach of IHL and a war crime. 
Croatia, CompendiumLaw of Armed Conflicts”, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1991, Annex 9, p. 56.
Croatia
Croatia’s Instructions on Basic Rules of IHL (1993) requires that the armed forces protect the lives and physical and mental integrity of persons hors de combat, the wounded and sick, who must not be killed or wounded. 
Croatia, InstructionsBasic Rules of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts”, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1993, §§ 1–3.
Djibouti
Djibouti’s Manual on International Humanitarian Law (2004) states: “Murder … [and] executions without prior judgment are prohibited.” 
Djibouti, Manuel sur le droit international humanitaire et les droits de l’homme applicables au travail du policier, Ministère de l’Intérieur, Direction Générale de la Police, 2004, p. 31; see also p. 37.
The manual also states under the heading “Inalienable Rights”: “These are rights which the State may not derogate from. They include: … the right to life.” 
Djibouti, Manuel sur le droit international humanitaire et les droits de l’homme applicables au travail du policier, Ministère de l’Intérieur, Direction Générale de la Police, 2004, p. 36.
The manual further states that the following “are currently considered as war crimes … if committed against any person not or no longer participating in hostilities: … intentional homicide”. 
Djibouti, Manuel sur le droit international humanitaire et les droits de l’homme applicables au travail du policier, Ministère de l’Intérieur, Direction Générale de la Police, 2004, p. 50; see also p. 51 (genocide).
Denmark
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (1973), as amended in 1978, provides:
Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 1973, as amended in 1978, § 25(1).
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (2005) provides:
Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 2005, § 36(2).
Djibouti
Djibouti’s Disciplinary Regulations (1982) states: “It is prohibited for combatants to … commit violence to the life and person of … prisoners and civilians, including all forms of murder”. 
Djibouti, Décret no. 82-028/PR/DEF du 5 mai 1982 portant règlement de la discipline générale dans les Forces armées, Article 30(3).
Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) provides that the “killing without just cause” of prisoners of war, civilian inhabitants of occupied territories, the wounded and sick, enemies hors de combat and the shipwrecked is a war crime. 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 6.2.5.
The manual further provides that “individuals captured as … illegal combatants … may not be summarily executed.” 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 11.8.
El Salvador
In El Salvador’s Human Rights Charter of the Armed Forces, one of the ten basic rules is to respect human life. In a chapter devoted to the “right to life”, the manual contains the following provisions: “human life is the most sacred thing of any person; nobody can deprive someone arbitrarily of his life”. 
El Salvador, Derechos Humanos. Decálogo de la Fuerza Armada de El Salvador, Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional, Departamento de Derecho Humanitario, pp. 3 and 6.
France
France’s Disciplinary Regulations (1975), as amended, prohibits attacks on the lives and physical integrity of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners and civilians, including murder. 
France, Règlement de Discipline Générale dans les Armées, Decree No. 75-675 of 28 July 1975, replacing Decree No. 66-749, completed by Decree of 11 October 1978, implemented by Instruction No. 52000/DEF/C/5 of 10 December 1979, and modified by Decree of 12 July 1982, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-Major de l’Armée de Terre, Bureau Emploi, Article 9 bis (2).
France
France’s LOAC Summary Note (1992) provides that all persons hors de combat have the right to respect for their lives. It further states that “wilful killing” is a war crime. 
France, Fiche de Synthèse sur les Règles Applicables dans les Conflits Armés, Note No. 432/DEF/EMA/OL.2/NP, Général de Corps d’Armée Voinot (pour l’Amiral Lanxade, Chef d’Etat-major des Armées), 1992, §§ 2.1 and 3.4.
France
France’s LOAC Teaching Note (2000) provides: “It is prohibited to … kill or injure an adversary … who is hors de combat.” It further states that “wilful killing” is a grave breach of the law of armed conflict and is a war crime. 
France, Fiche didactique relative au droit des conflits armés, Directive of the Ministry of Defence, 4 January 2000, annexed to the Directive No. 147 of the Ministry of Defence of 4 January 2000, pp. 2 and 7.
France
France’s LOAC Manual (2001) provides that “attacks upon the life and physical and mental well-being of persons, such as murder” constitute war crimes. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 45; see also p. 44 (killing as a part of a genocide campaign).
The manual also states that wilful killing and attempts on the physical integrity or health of the wounded and sick are war crimes. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 45.
It further states that one of the three main principles common to IHL and human rights is the principle of inviolability, which guarantees every human being the right to respect for his or her life. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, pp. 50–52.
The manual further states that the execution of hostages is expressly prohibited by the law of armed conflict and has been a war crime since 1949. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 101.
The manual also provides that “practices of massive and systematic summary executions” constitute war crimes. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 44.
The manual refers to common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and stipulates that the “carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples” is prohibited. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 101.
Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) provides that attempts on the lives of civilians and the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, or violence to their persons, are prohibited. It lists “wilful killing” among the grave breaches of IHL. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, §§ 502, 601, 608 and 1209.
Germany
Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (1991) provides: “Any attack on the lives or persons of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked is prohibited.” 
Germany, Taschenkarte, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, Bearbeitet nach ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, Zentrum Innere Führung, June 1991, p. 5.
Germany
Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (2006) states:
Civilians who do not take part in combat operations shall be respected and protected. They may neither be attacked nor killed, wounded or captured …
The wounded, sick and shipwrecked shall be respected and protected in all circumstances. Any violence to their lives or persons is prohibited. 
Germany, Druckschrift Einsatz Nr. 03, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten _ Grundsätze, Erarbeitet nach ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten _ Handbuch, DSK SF009320187, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, R II 3, August 2006, pp. 4–5.
Greece
The Hellenic Territorial Army’s Internal Service Code (1984), as amended, provides that “[i]t is forbidden for members of the armed forces” to “kill the enemy who has been captured as PoW [prisoner of war]” and to “violate the life and physical integrity of sick, wounded as well as citizens by means of murder”. 
Greece, Hellenic Territorial Army Regulation of Internal Service Code, Presidential Decree 130/1984, (Military Regulation 20-1), as amended, Articles 15(a) and 15(i).
Hungary
Hungary’s Military Manual (1992) states that “wilful killing” is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and a war crime. 
Hungary, A Hadijog, Jegyzet a Katonai, Föiskolák Hallgatói Részére, Magyar Honvédség Szolnoki Repülötiszti Föiskola, 1992, p. 90.
Ireland
Ireland’s Basic LOAC Guide (2005) states: “The following acts are specified as grave breaches under the convention for the treatment of PWs [prisoners of war] [1949 Geneva Convention III]: - wilful killing …”. 
Ireland, Basic Guide to the Law of Armed Conflict, TP/TRG/01-2005, Director of Defence Forces Training, Department of Defence, July 2005, p. 10.
The manual further states that “wilful killing” is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV relating to the treatment of civilians. 
Ireland, Basic Guide to the Law of Armed Conflict, TP/TRG/01-2005, Director of Defence Forces Training, Department of Defence, July 2005, p. 12.
The manual also provides a list of “Soldiers Rules”, one of which is: “Do not … kill … prisoners of war.” 
Ireland, Basic Guide to the Law of Armed Conflict, TP/TRG/01-2005, Director of Defence Forces Training, Department of Defence, July 2005, p. 13.
Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Laws of War (1998) states: “It is strictly forbidden to cause (by act or omission) the death of a prisoner of war after he has surrendered or to put him in a situation that endangers his health and physical integrity.” 
Israel, Laws of War in the Battlefield, Manual, Military Advocate General Headquarters, Military School, 1998, p. 51.
Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states:
[K]illing prisoners-of-war after they have surrendered will not necessarily weaken the enemy’s army, it will merely cause unnecessary suffering, and such actions are morally tainted on humanitarian grounds.
Many of the customs that are accepted today, such as raising the hands to indicate surrender, allowing prisoners-of-war to remain alive … and so on, originate in the Middle Ages.
Attacking a combatant who has surrendered is murder and the same also applies to attacking a combatant who has been wounded and has ceased to pose a threat to our forces.
It is strictly forbidden to cause the death (deliberately or by neglect) of a prisoner-of-war after he has surrendered and to put him in a situation in which his health or physical being are threatened. 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, pp. 8, 10, 29 and 33.
The Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) is a second edition of the Manual on the Laws of War (1998).
Italy
Italy’s IHL Manual (1991) provides that, in occupied territories, civilians shall not be subject to brutality and violence against their lives. 
Italy, Manuale di diritto umanitario, Introduzione e Volume I, Usi e convenzioni di Guerra, SMD-G-014, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, Vol. 1, § 41(e).
The manual also provides that wilful killing and attacks on the physical and mental integrity of any person in the power of a belligerent, genocide and wilful killing of prisoners of war, the wounded and sick are war crimes. 
Italy, Manuale di diritto umanitario, Introduzione e Volume I, Usi e convenzioni di Guerra, SMD-G-014, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, Vol. 1, § 84.
Kenya
Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997) restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Kenya, Law of Armed Conflict, Military Basic Course (ORS), 4 Précis, The School of Military Police, 1997, Précis No. 2, pp. 5 and 6.
Madagascar
Madagascar’s Military Manual (1994) states that one of the seven fundamental rules of IHL is that persons hors de combat and who do not take a direct part in hostilities are entitled to respect for their lives and their mental and physical integrity. 
Madagascar, Le Droit des Conflits Armés, Ministère des Forces Armées, August 1994, p. 22 and p. 91, Rule 1.
Mali
Mali’s Army Regulations (1979) prohibits attacks on the lives and physical integrity of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners and civilians, including murder. 
Mali, Règlement du Service dans l’Armée, 1ère Partie: Discipline Générale, Ministère de la Défense Nationale, 1979, Article 36.
Mexico
Mexico’s Army and Air Force Manual (2009) states: “The States party to the [1949] Geneva Conventions undertake to: … prohibit … summary executions [and] extermination.” 
Mexico, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para el Ejército y la Fuerza Área Mexicanos, Ministry of National Defence, June 2009, § 80(C); see also § 104.
In a section on the 1949 Geneva Convention I, the manual also states:
Members of the armed forces and other persons who are wounded or sick must be respected and protected in all circumstances … Any attempts upon their lives or violence to their persons are strictly prohibited; in particular, they must not be murdered. 
Mexico, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para el Ejército y la Fuerza Área Mexicanos, Ministry of National Defence, June 2009, § 88; see also §§ 85(B) and 107(B).
The manual also states that Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits “the carrying out of executions without previous judgment”. 
Mexico, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para el Ejército y la Fuerza Área Mexicanos, Ministry of National Defence, June 2009, § 85(B); see also § 107(B).
Mexico
Mexico’s IHL Guidelines (2009) states: “War crimes include the wilful killing of civilians … and enemy combatants who are rendered hors de combat or have surrendered … , [and] the … execution of hostages”. 
Mexico, Cartilla de Derecho Internacional Humanitario, Ministry of National Defence, 2009, § 5.
Morocco
Morocco’s Disciplinary Regulations (1974) prohibits attacks on the lives and physical integrity of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners and civilians, including murder. 
Morocco, Règlement de Discipline Général dans les Forces Armées Royales, Dahir No. 1-74-383 du 15 rejeb 1394, 5 August 1974, Article 25(2).
Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands provides: “Every attempt on the life of the wounded and sick is prohibited. In particular, they may not be killed or exterminated.” 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, pp. VI-1/VI-2.
The manual further restates the prohibition of violence directed against a protected person’s life, health, physical or psychological well-being, such as murder as found in Article 75 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, p. VIII-3.
With respect to non-international armed conflicts, the manual restates the prohibition of violence to life and person, in particular murder, as found in common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 4 of the 1977 Additional Protocol II. 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, pp. XI-1 and XI-4.
Netherlands
The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states:
Starting with the introduction of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, followed by many treaties and conventions at world and regional level, there has come into being an extensive corpus of rules and procedures by which States have undertaken to respect and guarantee human rights. A number of these rights are so important that they are binding even on States which are not party to the conventions and permit no deviation from them, even in emergency situations such as war. These core rights, including the right to life … are just as relevant in time of armed conflict as in time of peace. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0116; see also § 0603 (wounded and sick).
The manual further states:
In the event of escape, it is permitted to use weapons against prisoners of war. Firearms may not, however, be used other than as a last resort, and must be preceded by warnings. Instructions to guards in the use of force must therefore be drawn up based on these rules. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0730.
In its chapter on the protection of the civilian population, the manual states:
The following acts are, and remain, prohibited at all times:
- Violence against the life, health or physical or mental wellbeing of persons, especially: murder … 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0810.
[emphasis in original]
In its chapter on non-international armed conflict, the manual states: “The right to life is inalienable, even in the event of death as a result of lawful acts of war.” 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 1020.
In its chapter on peace operations, the manual states:
Section 2 - Applicability of human rights
1211. Human rights should be respected … However, “in time of war or in case of any other general state of emergency which threatens the existence of the country,” certain human rights may be curtailed as long as the situation strictly necessitates such measures. But the right to life, the prohibition of torture, slavery and forced labour, and the legal principle “no punishment without prior legal provision” cannot be waived …
1212. When carrying out its operational mission, the military may be confronted with the following and other human rights, which may affect what they do. The following is based on ECHR [1950 European Convention on Human Rights] and related protocols ratified by the Netherlands. In view of the detailed rules added by extensive legal precedents, this convention forms a basis for the fulfilment of the human rights established in other treaties, at least those with which the military may be involved in pursuit of their duties. Those human rights are as follows:
ECHR Article 2
- The right to life … ECHR makes the use of lethal force conditional on very strict requirements, but lawful acts of war do not breach this human right. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, p. 159, §§ 1211–1212.
New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) prohibits killing and provides: “Self-preservation or military necessity can never provide an excuse for the murder of prisoners of war.” 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 919(1).
The manual further states that “wilful killing” is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, §§ 1137(1), 1702(1) and 1704(2-c); see also § 1704(5) (genocide as an offence against the law of armed conflict and a war crime).
With respect to non-international armed conflicts, the manual restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 1807(1)(d).
Nicaragua
Nicaragua’s Military Manual (1996) states that, in both internal and international armed conflicts as well as in situations of internal troubles, the right to life is inviolable and inherent to the human being. 
Nicaragua, Manual de Comportamiento y Proceder de las Unidades Militares y de los Miembros del Ejército de Nicaragua en Tiempo de Paz, Conflictos Armados, Situaciones Irregulares o Desastres Naturales, Ejército de Nicaragua, Estado Mayor General, Asesoría Jurídica del Nicaragua, 1996, Articles 3; see also Articles 7.1, 8 and 14(31).
The Manual also states: “In no case may summary executions be carried out.” 
Nicaragua, Manual de Comportamiento y Proceder de las Unidades Militares y de los Miembros del Ejército de Nicaragua en Tiempo de Paz, Conflictos Armados, Situaciones Irregulares o Desastres Naturales, Ejército de Nicaragua, Estado Mayor General, Asesoría Jurídica del Nicaragua, 1996, Article 3.
Nigeria
Nigeria’s Operational Code of Conduct (1967) provides that soldiers who surrender, pregnant women and children must not be killed. 
Nigeria, Operational Code of Conduct for Nigerian Armed Forces, Federal Military Government of Nigeria, July 1967, § 4(a), (b) and (c).
Nigeria
Nigeria’s Military Manual (1994) refers to Article 12 of the 1949 Geneva Convention I, which “prohibits any attempt upon the lives [of the wounded and sick], or violence to their persons, and in particular to wound or to exterminate them”. 
Nigeria, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Directorate of Legal Services, Nigerian Army, 1994, p. 13, § 4.
Nigeria
Nigeria’s Manual on the Laws of War provides that attempts on the lives of the wounded and sick and unlawful acts or omissions endangering the lives of prisoners of war are prohibited. 
Nigeria, The Laws of War, by Lt. Col. L. Ode PSC, Nigerian Army, Lagos, undated, §§ 35 and 37.
The manual also specifies that wilful killing of all protected persons is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and is considered as a serious war crime. 
Nigeria, The Laws of War, by Lt. Col. L. Ode PSC, Nigerian Army, Lagos, undated, § 6(a); see also § 6(12) and (20) (killing of spies, saboteurs and partisans, and genocide).
Peru
Peru’s Human Rights Charter of the Security Forces (1991) states that one of the 10 basic rules is to respect human life. It adds that “human life is sacred for every person” and that the lives of the wounded or of persons who surrender must be respected. These rules must be respected by the armed and police forces. 
Peru, Derechos Humanos: Decálogo de las Fuerzas del Orden, Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, Ministerio de Defensa, Ejército Peruano, 1991, p. 3, § 2 and p. 7.
Peru
Peru’s Human Rights Charter of the Armed Forces (1994) states that respect for a person’s life and mental and physical integrity is one of the three principles common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which represent the minimum level of protection to which every human being is entitled. 
Peru, Derechos Humanos: Principios, Normas y Procedimientos, MFA 09-1, Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, Ministerio de Defensa, Ejército Peruano, Lima, Peru, May 1994, § 24.
Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states:
g. Violence to the life, health or physical or mental well-being of any person is prohibited.
h. Murder … is prohibited. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 32(g) and (h); see also § 84(a)(5).
The manual also states that war crimes include “wilful killing”.  
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 31(a)(1); see also § 83(f)(1).
The manual further states:
The following acts, among others, are prohibited and are considered war crimes:
a. any act leading to the death of a prisoner of war;
b. any act that endangers the life of a prisoner of war. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 35(a) and (b).
With regard to non-international armed conflicts, the manual restates the provisions of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 71.
Peru
Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states with respect to the civilian population:
g. Violence to life, health and physical or mental integrity is prohibited.
h. Murder … of all kinds is prohibited. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 33(g)–(h), p. 251.
The manual also states that war crimes include “wilful killing”. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 32(a)(1), p. 248.
The manual further states: “The life of prisoners of war must be respected … The treatment accorded to prisoners of war only applies to combatants who refrain from any hostile acts and do not try to escape.” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 100(a), p. 297.
In its Glossary of Terms, the manual states: “Extermination … [i]s prohibited by the law of armed conflict in order to protect the wounded, sick, prisoners of war and any other protected person.” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, p. 419.
In a section on occupied territories, the manual states that it is prohibited for “civilian or military officials to … exterminate protected persons through killing, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation or any other brutal means.” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 60(b), p. 264.
With regard to non-international armed conflicts, the manual restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 72, p. 269.
In a section on the relationship between IHL and human rights law, the manual states:
There are … principles common to the [1949] Geneva Conventions and human rights law which represent a minimum level of protection to which every human person is entitled … [including] [r]espect for life, physical and mental integrity … [and] each individual’s right to security of the person.
Regarding these fundamental guarantees there is no exception whatsoever and they are binding both in times of peace and in times of armed conflict. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 26, pp. 41–42.
In a section on the human rights obligations of the security forces, the manual further states: “The life of persons who are captured or who have surrendered must be respected.” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 105(b)(2)(a), p. 141.
Philippines
The Rules for Combatants (1989) of the Philippines provides: “Prisoners must be respected. It is prohibited to … kill them.” 
Philippines, Rules for Combatants, in Handbook on Discipline, Annex C(II), General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 1989, § 6(4).
Philippines
The Philippine National Police (PNP) Manual on Ethical Doctrine (1995) provides:
Respect for Human Rights – In the performance of duty, PNP members shall respect and protect human dignity and uphold the human rights of all persons. No member shall inflict, instigate or tolerate extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and shall not invoke superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as a state-of-war, a threat to national security, internal political instability or any public emergency as a justification for committing such human rights violations. 
Philippines, Manual on Ethical Doctrine, PNPM-0-0-8-95 (DHRDD), Directorate for Human Resource and Doctrine Development, National Headquarters, Philippine National Police, Revised, August 1995 Edition, Section 2.9.
Philippines
The Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (2006) provides:
During an engagement:
4. Don’t kill enemy combatants who are wounded, who could no longer fight or who have already surrendered. By International Humanitarian Law, it is authorized to neutralize enemy forces by reasonable means while in combat. An enemy who wields a firearm and considered a threat is still a military objective and thus considered an authorized target. As long as he is wielding his firearm, he can still be considered as target for neutralization. But as soon as he drops his firearm, raises his hand or a white cloth that is a gesture of symbol of surrender, he can no longer be shot. 
Philippines, Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, A Practical Guide for Internal Security Operations, 2006, p. 59, § 4.
Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea’s Military Regulation 187 (1991) provides that “killing non-combatants” is a war crime. 
Republic of Korea, Military Regulation 187, 1 January 1991, Article 4.2.
The regulation also states that “executing the death penalty for … persons who have taken part in hostilities through summary trial not full trial” is an “unjustifiable crime”. 
Republic of Korea, Military Regulation 187, 1 January 1991, Article 4.2; see also Military Operations Law of War Compliance Regulation, Regulation No. 525-8, 1 November 1993, Statute 525-8 of United Nations Command/Combined Force Command (UNC/CFC), Statute of Observing Laws of War of 15 December 1988, § D.
Romania
Romania’s Soldiers’ Manual (1991) provides that persons hors de combat and who do not take a direct part in hostilities and captured combatants have the right to respect for their lives. 
Romania, Manualul Soldatului, Ghid de comportare în luptă, Asociaţia Română de Drept Umanitar (ARDU), 1991, p. 33, § 1.
The manual also states: “The killing and injuring of an adversary who surrenders or who is hors de combat is prohibited.” 
Romania, Manualul Soldatului, Ghid de comportare în luptă, Asociaţia Română de Drept Umanitar (ARDU), 1991, p. 32, § 2.
Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Military Manual (1990) prohibits violence to the lives and physical integrity, in particular murder of all kinds, of war victims, namely the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners of war and the civilian population. 
Russian Federation, Instructions on the Application of the Rules of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the USSR, Appendix to Order of the USSR Defence Minister No. 75, 1990, §§ 7 and 8.
Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states:
Under any circumstances international humanitarian law ensures humane treatment during an armed conflict of persons not directly involved in combat operations … In particular, the following shall be prohibited with regard to such persons: violence to life and person, including murder of any kind … [and] threats to commit any of the above acts. 
Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 4.
With regard to internal armed conflict, the Regulations states:
The following acts against [all persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities] are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever:
- violence to … life …, in particular murder [and] threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 
Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 81.
Senegal
Senegal’s Disciplinary Regulations (1990) prohibits attacks on the lives and physical integrity of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners and civilians, including murder. 
Senegal, Règlement de Discipline dans les Forces Armées, Décret 90-1159, 12 October 1990, Article 34(2).
Senegal
Senegal’s IHL Manual (1999) restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and prohibits attacks on life. 
Senegal, Le DIH adapté au contexte des opérations de maintien de l’ordre, République du Sénégal, Ministère des Forces Armées, Haut Commandement de la Gendarmerie et Direction de la Justice Militaire, Cabinet, 1999, pp. 4 and 23.
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Instructor Manual (2007) states:
[T]here are certain human rights that can never be suspended no matter the situation. These are referred to as hard-core rights and they include … the right to life … Hard core rights are protected under the LoAC as well. 
Sierra Leone, The Law of Armed Conflict. Instructor Manual for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), Armed Forces Education Centre, September 2007, p. 18.
[emphasis in original]
South Africa
South Africa’s LOAC Manual (1996) provides that “wilful killing” is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
South Africa, Presentation on the South African Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Appendix A, Chapter 4: International Humanitarian Law (The Law of Armed Conflict), National Defence Force, 1996, § 40.
South Africa
According to South Africa’s Revised Civic Education Manual (2004), “wilful killing … of any persons” is a grave breach of the law of armed conflict and a war crime. 
South Africa, Revised Civic Education Manual, South African National Defence Force, 2004, Chapter 4, § 57.
Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) provides that a person who has participated in hostilities and who does not benefit from prisoner-of-war status and who does not benefit from a better treatment under the 1949 Geneva Convention IV is entitled to a minimum of guarantees, inter alia, “the prohibition at all times and in all places of the following acts, whether they are committed by civilians or soldiers: attacks on life, health and physical integrity, in particular homicide”. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 8.2.c.
According to the manual, “wilful killing” committed by medical personnel is a war crime. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 9.2.a.(2).
The manual also states that soldiers must respect the lives of surrendered or captured combatants. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, §§ 7.3.a.(7) and 10.8.f.(2).
Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states:
[N]o person who is captured or detained in relation to an armed conflict remains unprotected under the law of armed conflict and is entitled, at all times, to minimum guarantees. [These include] … prohibition of the following acts at any time and in any place, whether committed by civilian or military agents: … violence to the life, health or physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular … murder. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 8.2.c; see also § 1.4.
The manual further states with regard to captured combatants: “Under no circumstances must there be any violence to their life”. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 7.3.a.(7).
According to the manual, “wilful killing” committed by medical personnel is a war crime. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 9.2.a.(2).(b).
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Military Manual (1984) and Teaching Manual (1986) provide that enemy civilians shall not be murdered. 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre, Manuel 51.7/III dfi, Armée suisse, 1984, p. 34; Droit des gens en temps de guerre, Programme d’instruction fondé sur le Manuel 51.7/III “Lois et coutumes de la guerre”, Cours de base pour recrues de toutes les armes 97.2f, Armée suisse, 1986, p. 43.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) states that it is prohibited to make an attempt on the lives of the wounded and sick. 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Articles 69 and 147.
The manual further provides that wilful killing of protected persons (wounded and sick, medical personnel, prisoners of war, inhabitants of occupied territory and enemy civilians on national territory) is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Examples provided include “killing prisoners of war or letting them die of starvation”. 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 192.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Regulation on Legal Bases for Conduct during an Engagement (2005) states:
5 Restriction of fundamental freedoms
32 Due to the so-called guarantee of the intangible core, the following freedoms are inalienable and can never be restricted:
1 the right to life (prohibition of the death penalty also under the military criminal code …);
34 The right to life entails an absolute protection against intentional violence to life. According to Swiss legislation, the following situations however do not represent a violation of the essential principle:
1 legitimate acts of war resulting in the death of a person …
36 Due to the mission of the army, fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted during military service. The inviolable core of fundamental freedoms can never be affected by these restrictions; it must be protected and respected at all times.
17 Sanctions for violations of the international law of armed conflict
237 The following in particular are criminal offences: … intentional killing outside of war hostilities[.] 
Switzerland, Bases légales du comportement à l’engagement (BCE), Règlement 51.007/IVf, Swiss Army, issued based on Article 10 of the Ordinance on the Organization of the Federal Department for Defence, Civil Protection and Sports of 7 March 2003, entry into force on 1 July 2005, §§ 32, 34, 36 and 237.
[emphasis in original]
Togo
Togo’s Military Manual (1996) provides that all persons hors de combat and who do not take a direct part in hostilities shall be entitled to respect for their lives and physical integrity. 
Togo, Le Droit de la Guerre, III fascicules, Etat-major Général des Forces Armées Togolaises, Ministère de la Défense nationale, 1996, Fascicule II, p. 4 and Fascicule III, p. 4.
Uganda
Uganda’s Code of Conduct (1986) provides: “Never kill any member of the public or any captured prisoners, as the guns should only be reserved for armed enemies or opponents.” 
Uganda, Code of Conduct for the National Resistance Army (NRA), Legal Notice No. 1 of 1986 (Amendment), 23 August 1986, Rule 4.
Uganda
Uganda’s Operational Code of Conduct (1986) states: “The offence of disobeying lawful orders shall include … unauthorised killing of prisoners of war”. 
Uganda, Operational Code of Conduct for the National Resistance Army (NRA), Legal Notice No. 1 of 1986 (Amendment), 23 August 1986, Rule 17(i).
The manual also states: “The following crimes shall cause an immediate arrest of an officer by any soldier … murder”. 
Uganda, Operational Code of Conduct for the National Resistance Army (NRA), Legal Notice No. 1 of 1986 (Amendment), 23 August 1986, Rule 26(a).
Ukraine
Ukraine’s IHL Manual (2004) states: “Serious violations of international humanitarian law directed against people include: … wilful killing.” 
Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, § 1.8.5.
The manual further states that, in non-international armed conflicts, “violence to life”, “murder” and “the carrying out of executions without previous judgment [duly] delivered”, or threats of such actions, against the following persons are prohibited:
- persons taking no active part in the hostilities;
- members of armed forces who have laid down their arms;
- those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause. 
Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, § 1.4.10.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK Military Manual (1958) provides that “a commander may not put his prisoners of war to death”, that “it is unlawful for a commander to kill prisoners of war on grounds of self-preservation” and that “any attempts on [the lives of the wounded and sick] … are strictly prohibited”. 
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, §§ 137 and 339.
The manual also states that it is prohibited to “take any measure of such a character as to cause … extermination of protected persons”. 
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 549.
The manual further states that wilful killing of persons protected by the 1949 Geneva Conventions is a grave breach of these instruments. 
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 625(a).
The manual also provides that “the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilised peoples” is prohibited at any time. 
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 131(1)(d).
The manual also states: “In addition to the ‘grave breaches’ of the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions, … the following are examples of punishable violations of the laws of war, or war crimes: … killing without trial of … saboteurs, partisans and others who have committed hostile acts”. 
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 626(l).
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and provides: “Murder or violence to the person [is] strictly prohibited.” 
United Kingdom, The Law of Armed Conflict, D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (Revised 1981), Ministry of Defence, prepared under the Direction of The Chief of the General Staff, 1981, Section 6, p. 22, § 2.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states in its chapter on the protection of civilians in the hands of a party to the conflict:
The following acts are prohibited “at any time and in any place whatsoever”:
a. violence to the life, health or physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular:
(1) murder … 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 9.4.
In its chapter on prisoners of war, the manual states:
In relation to prisoners of war the following acts and omissions by the detaining power are prohibited:
a. Those unlawfully causing death … 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 8.29.
[emphasis in original]
With regard to internal armed conflict, the manual restates the provisions of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
Under the terms of Common Article 3, the parties to a non-international armed conflict occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions are obliged to apply “as a minimum”, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds…
(d) … the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 15.4.
In its discussion on starvation as a method of warfare, the manual further provides: “The right to life is a non-derogable human right. Violence to the life and person of civilians is prohibited, whatever method is adopted to achieve it.” 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 15.19.1.
In its chapter on enforcement of the law of armed conflict, the manual further notes:
Grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions consist of any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant convention:
a. wilful killing. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 16.24.
United States of America
The US Field Manual (1956) restates common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 11.
The manual also states that “wilful killing” is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 502.
The manual further provides: “In addition to the ‘grave breaches’ of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the following acts are representative of violations of the law of war (‘war crimes’): … killing without trial … persons who have committed hostile acts”. 
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 504(l).
United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) states that “wilful killing” is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 15-2(b).
The Pamphlet specifies that “wilfully killing without trial persons in custody who have committed hostile acts” in an act involving individual criminal responsibility. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 15-3(c)(10).
United States of America
The US Air Force Commander’s Handbook (1980) provides: “Even terrorists … and illegal partisans … cannot be summarily executed.” 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-34, Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict, Judge Advocate General, US Department of the Air Force, 25 July 1980, § 4-2(e).
United States of America
The US Soldier’s Manual (1984) states: “An order to commit a crime such as murder … is in violation of the laws of war.” 
United States, Your Conduct in Combat under the Law of War, Publication No. FM 27-2, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, November 1984, p. 26.
United States of America
The US Instructor’s Guide (1985) provides that violating life and person, in particular murder, is a capital offence prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever. It specifically prohibits murder of prisoners. 
United States, Instructor’s Guide – The Law of War, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, April 1985, pp. 8 and 9.
It also states that “killing, without proper legal trial, … captured persons who have committed hostile acts” is a war crime. 
United States, Instructor’s Guide – The Law of War, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, April 1985, p. 14.
United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (1995) provides that the “killing without just cause” of prisoners of war, civilian inhabitants of occupied territories, the wounded and sick, enemies hors de combat and the shipwrecked is a war crime. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 6.2.5.
The Handbook specifies that “individuals captured as … illegal combatants … may not be summarily executed.” 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 11.7.
United States of America
The US Manual for Military Commissions (2007), Part IV, Crimes and Elements, includes in the list of crimes triable by military commissions:
MURDER OF PROTECTED PERSONS.
a. Text. “Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more protected persons shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct.”
b. Elements.
(1) The accused without justification or excuse, intentionally and unlawfully kills a protected person;
(2) The accused knew or should have known of the factual circumstances that established that person’s protected status; and
(3) The killing took place in the context of and was associated with armed conflict.
c. Comment. The intent required for this offense precludes its applicability with regard to collateral damage or death, damage, or injury incident to a lawful attack.
d. Maximum punishment. Death. 
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part IV, § 6(1), p. IV-3.
The manual further lists:
MURDER IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF WAR.
a. Text. “Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more persons, including lawful combatants, in violation of the law of war shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct.”
b. Elements.
(1) One or more persons are dead;
(2) The death of the persons resulted from the act or omission of the accused;
(3) The killing was unlawful;
(4) The accused intended to kill the person or persons;
(5) The killing was in violation of the law of war; and
(6) The killing took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict.
c. Comment. See comment to “Intentionally Causing Serious Bodily Injury.”
d. Maximum punishment. Death. 
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part IV, § 6(15), p. IV-12.
United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (2007) states:
[T]he following acts are prohibited with respect to detainees in DOD [Department of Defense] custody and control:
a. Violence to life and person, in particular murder …
d. … [C]arrying out executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees that are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 11.2(a) and (d).
The Handbook also states that examples of war crimes that could be considered as grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions include:
1. Offenses against prisoners of war, including killing without just cause …
2. Offenses against civilian inhabitants of occupied territory, including killing without just cause …
3. Offenses against the sick and wounded, including killing …
4. Denial of quarter (i.e., killing or wounding an enemy unable to fight …) …
5. Offenses against the survivors of ships and aircraft lost at sea, including killing.  
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 6.2.6(1)–(5).
United States of America
The US Manual on Detainee Operations (2008) states:
As a subset of military operations, detainee operations must comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts …
… Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, as construed and applied by U.S. law, establishes minimum standards for the humane treatment of all persons detained by the United States, coalition, and allied forces. Common Article 3 prohibits at any time and in any place: “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, … [and] the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples … ”. 
United States, Manual on Detainee Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 May 2008, pp. I-2–I-3.
The manual further states:
DODD 2310.01E [Department of Defense Directive, The Department of Defense Detainee Program] requires that all DOD [Department of Defense] personnel and contractors will apply, without regard to a detainee’s legal status, at a minimum, the standards articulated in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
United States, Manual on Detainee Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 May 2008, pp. III-11–III-12.
The manual also states:
Planning and preparing for the use of force (UOF) is a necessary element in maintaining order. JFCs [joint force commanders] will ensure that detainee facility security personnel are prepared to employ the effective UOF necessary to protect themselves, other members of the force, or detainees … The use of deadly force against detainees should always be considered a measure of last resort. Its use should be authorized when no other means of suppressing the dangerous activity (attack, escape, etc.) is feasible. Furthermore, use of deadly force should be preceded by warnings appropriate to the circumstances. The continuum shown below recognizes five basic types of subjects:
NOTE: Nothing in this Joint Publication limits a Servicemember’s inherent right to self defense.
(5) Lethal: Attempts to kill or inflict serious injury (e.g., using knives, clubs, thrown objects, firearms).
b. The continuum also incorporates five levels of force (see Figure III-4 [which associates the lethal type of subject to the use of deadly force]). Ideally, the Service member starts at Level 1 and progressively moves up the continuum until the detainee complies. However, the UOF is dictated by the actions of the subject during the encounter. Subject actions may escalate or de-escalate rapidly, possibly skipping one or more levels. The levels of force do not have to be applied in order.
(5) Level 5: Deadly Force. Used as a last resort when all lesser means have failed or would be impractical. Used to prevent death or serious injury to self or others; to prevent the theft, damage, or destruction of resources vital to national security or dangerous to others; to terminate an active escape attempt (e.g., firearms, strikes with nonlethal weapons directed at vital points of the body). 
United States, Manual on Detainee Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 May 2008, p. III-12–III-14.
United States of America
The US Manual for Military Commissions (2010), Part IV, Crimes and Elements, includes in the list of crimes triable by military commissions:
MURDER OF PROTECTED PERSONS.
a. Text. “Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more protected persons shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct.”
b. Elements.
(1) The accused without justification or excuse, intentionally and unlawfully kills a protected person;
(2) The accused knew or should have known of the factual circumstances that established that person’s protected status; and
(3) The killing took place in the context of and was associated with hostilities.
c. Comment. The intent required for this offense precludes its applicability with regard to collateral damage or death, damage, or injury incident to a lawful attack.
d. Maximum punishment. Death. 
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, § 5(1), p. IV-3.
The manual further lists:
MURDER IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF WAR.
a. Text. “Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more persons, including privileged belligerents, in violation of the law of war shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct.”
b. Elements.
(1) One or more persons are dead;
(2) The death of the persons resulted from the act or omission of the accused;
(3) The killing was unlawful;
(4) The accused intended to kill the person or persons;
(5) The killing was in violation of the law of war; and
(6) The killing took place in the context of and was associated with an hostilities.
c. Comment. For purposes of offenses (13) [intentionally causing serious bodily injury], (15) [murder in violation of the law of war], (16) [destruction of property in violation of the law of war], and (27) [spying] in Part IV of this Manual (corresponding to offenses enumerated in paragraphs (13), (15), (16), and (27) of § 950t of title 10, United States Code), an accused may be convicted in a military commission for these offenses if the commission finds that the accused employed a means (e.g., poison gas) or method (e.g., perfidy) prohibited by the law of war; intentionally attacked a “protected person” or “protected property” under the law of war; or engaged in conduct traditionally triable by military commission (e.g., spying; murder committed while the accused did not meet the requirements of privileged belligerency) even if such conduct does not violate the international law of war
d. Maximum punishment. Death. 
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, § 5(15), p. IV-13.
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe’s Code of Conduct for Combatants (1993) states: “As a State party to the [1949] Geneva Conventions … your country is bound by these treaties … The States party to the Geneva Conventions pledge to … [p]rohibit … summary execution or extermination”. 
Zimbabwe, Code of Conduct for Combatants, Joint publication of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces and the International Committee of the Red Cross Regional Delegation in Harare, 1993, p. 16.
The Code of Conduct also states: “Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions, which regulates non-international armed conflicts, … prohibits arbitrary executions”. 
Zimbabwe, Code of Conduct for Combatants, Joint publication of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces and the International Committee of the Red Cross Regional Delegation in Harare, 1993, p. 15.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s Law against Terrorist Offences (2008) states:
Article 13. Offences against Internationally Protected Persons.
(1) A person who commits one of the following acts against an internationally protected person shall be punished as following:
1. If the person with international protection has been physically … attacked, … or killed, with consideration of circumstances the perpetrator shall be sentenced to long term imprisonment of [no]-less than ten years or [life] imprisonment or execution.
2. If the official residence place, personal residence or the vehicle of the person with international protection has been attacked or a danger threatens the safety or freedom of the internationally protected person, with consideration of circumstances the perpetrator shall be sentenced to long term imprisonment of not less than six and [no]-more than ten years. 
Afghanistan, Law against Terrorist Offences, 2008, Article 13(1).
Albania
Albania’s Military Penal Code (1995) criminalizes killing as a war crime. 
Albania, Military Penal Code, 1995, Articles 73–75.
Armenia
Under Armenia’s Penal Code (2003), “murder” committed during an armed conflict constitutes a crime against the peace and security of mankind. 
Armenia, Penal Code, 2003, Article 390.1(1); see also Article 392 (systematic execution without trial as a crime against humanity) and Article 393 (killing as part of a genocide campaign).
Australia
Australia’s War Crimes Act (1945) provides that “murder and massacres” and “putting hostages to death” are war crimes. 
Australia, War Crimes Act, 1945, Section 3.
Australia
Australia’s War Crimes Act (1945), as amended in 2001, identifies murder and manslaughter as “serious war crimes”. 
Australia, War Crimes Act, 1945, as amended in 2001, Sections 6(1) and 7(1).
Australia
Australia’s Geneva Conventions Act (1957), as amended in 2002, provides: “A person who, in Australia or elsewhere, commits a grave breach of any of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions … is guilty of an indictable offence.” 
Australia, Geneva Conventions Act, 1957, as amended in 2002, Section 7(1).
The grave breaches provisions in this Act were removed in 2002 and incorporated into the Criminal Code Act 1995.
Australia
Australia’s Criminal Code Act (1995), as amended to 2007, states with respect to war crimes that are grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the 1977 Additional Protocol I:
268.24 War crime – wilful killing
(1) A person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:
(a) the perpetrator causes the death of one or more persons; and
(b) the person or persons are protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions or under Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions; and
(c) the perpetrator knows of, or is reckless as to, the factual circumstances that establish that the person or persons are so protected; and
(d) the perpetrator’s conduct takes place in the context of, and is associated with, an international armed conflict.
Penalty: Imprisonment for life.
(2) Strict liability applies to paragraph (1)(b). 
Australia, Criminal Code Act, 1995, as amended to 2007, Chapter 8, § 268.24, p. 320.
The Criminal Code Act states with respect to other serious war crimes that are committed in the course of an international armed conflict:
268.40 War crime – killing or injuring a person who is hors de combat
(1) A person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:
(a) the perpetrator kills one or more persons; and
(b) the person or persons are hors de combat; and
(c) the perpetrator knows of, or is reckless as to, the factual circumstances that establish that the person or persons are hors de combat; and
(d) the perpetrator’s conduct takes place in the context of, and is associated with, an international armed conflict.
Penalty: Imprisonment for life.
(2) A person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:
(a) the perpetrator injures one or more persons; and
(b) the person or persons are hors de combat; and
(c) the perpetrator knows of, or is reckless as to, the factual circumstances that establish that the person or persons are hors de combat; and
(d) the perpetrator’s conduct takes place in the context of, and is associated with, an international armed conflict.
Penalty for a contravention of this subsection: Imprisonment for 25 years. 
Australia, Criminal Code Act, 1995, as amended on 1 November 2007, taking into account amendments up to Act No. 177 of 2007, Chapter 8, § 268.40, pp. 328–329.
The Criminal Code Act also states with respect to war crimes that are serious violations of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and are committed in the course of a non-international armed conflict:
268.70 War crime – murder
(1) A person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:
(a) the perpetrator causes the death of one or more persons; and
(b) the person or persons are not taking an active part in the hostilities; and
(c) the perpetrator knows of, or is reckless as to, the factual circumstances establishing that the person or persons are not taking an active part in the hostilities; and
(d) the perpetrator’s conduct takes place in the context of, and is associated with, an armed conflict that is not an international armed conflict.
Penalty: Imprisonment for life.
(2) To avoid doubt, a reference in subsection (1) to a person or persons who are not taking an active part in the hostilities includes a reference to:
(a) a person or persons who are hors de combat; or
(b) civilians, medical personnel or religious personnel who are not taking an active part in the hostilities. 
Australia, Criminal Code Act, 1995, as amended on 1 November 2007, taking into account amendments up to Act No. 177 of 2007, Chapter 8, § 268.70, p. 347.
268.76 War crime – sentencing or execution without due process
(2) A person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:
(a) the perpetrator executes one or more persons; and
(b) the person or persons are not taking an active part in the hostilities; and
(c) the perpetrator knows of, or is reckless as to, the factual circumstances establishing that the person or persons are not taking an active part in the hostilities; and
(d) either of the following applies:
(i) there was no previous judgment pronounced by a court;
(ii) the court that rendered judgment did not afford the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality or other judicial guarantees; and
(e) if the court did not afford other judicial guarantees – those guarantees are guarantees set out in articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Covenant; and
(f) the perpetrator knows of:
(i) if subparagraph (d)(i) applies – the absence of a previous judgment; or
(ii) if subparagraph (d)(ii) applies – the failure to afford the relevant guarantees and the fact that they are indispensable to a fair trial; and
(g) the perpetrator’s conduct takes place in the context of, and is associated with, an armed conflict that is not an international armed conflict.
Penalty: Imprisonment for life.
(3) Strict liability applies to paragraphs … (2)(e).
(4) To avoid doubt, a reference in subsection … (2) to a person or persons who are not taking an active part in the hostilities includes a reference to:
(a) a person or persons who are hors de combat; or
(b) civilians, medical personnel or religious personnel who are not taking an active part in the hostilities. 
Australia, Criminal Code Act, 1995, as amended on 1 November 2007, taking into account amendments up to Act No. 177 of 2007, Chapter 8, § 268.76, pp. 353–354.
Australia
Australia’s ICC (Consequential Amendments) Act (2002) incorporates in the Criminal Code the crimes defined in the 1998 ICC Statute: “genocide by killing”; crimes against humanity, including murder when committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population”; and war crimes, including “wilful killing” of a person protected under the 1949 Geneva Conventions or the 1977 Additional Protocol I in international armed conflicts, and in non-international armed conflicts, murder of persons who are hors de combat and “execution without due process”. 
Australia, ICC (Consequential Amendments) Act, 2002, Schedule 1, §§ 268.3, 268.8, 268.24, 268.70 and 268.76.
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan’s Law concerning the Protection of Civilian Persons and the Rights of Prisoners of War (1995) provides that in international and non-international armed conflicts, “violence to life” and “murder” are acts prohibited against civilian persons and prisoners of war. 
Azerbaijan, Law concerning the Protection of Civilian Persons and the Rights of Prisoners of War, 1995, Articles 17 and 21.
The law also prohibits with regard to such persons the “carrying out of executions without a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees provided by international law”. 
Azerbaijan, Law concerning the Protection of Civilian Persons and the Rights of Prisoners of War, 1995, Articles 17(9) and 21(4).
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan’s Criminal Code (1999) provides that “wilful killing” of protected persons is a violation of the laws and customs of war. 
Azerbaijan, Criminal Code, 1999, Article 115.4; see also Article 103 (genocide as a crime against peace and the security of humanity).
The Criminal Code also provides that “extermination of the population, in whole or in part”, constitutes a crime against humanity. 
Azerbaijan, Criminal Code, 1999, Article 105.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s International Crimes (Tribunal) Act (1973) states that murder of the civilian population, murder of prisoners of war and the killing of detainees is a war crime. 
Bangladesh, International Crimes (Tribunal) Act, 1973, Section 3(2)(d).
It adds that the “violation of any humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts laid down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949” is a crime. 
Bangladesh, International Crimes (Tribunal) Act, 1973, Section 3(2)(e).
Belarus
Belarus’s Criminal Code (1999) provides that “wilful killing” of persons who have laid down their arms or are defenceless, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, sanitary and religious personnel, prisoners of war, the civilian population in an occupied territory or in the conflict zone, or other persons enjoying international protection, is a violation of the laws and customs of war. 
Belarus, Criminal Code, 1999, Article 135(3).
Belgium
Belgium’s Penal Code (1867), as amended in 2003, provides:
The crime of genocide, as defined below, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, constitutes a crime under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title. In accordance with the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, and without prejudice to criminal provisions applicable to breaches committed out of negligence, the crime of genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:
1. killing members of the group. 
Belgium, Penal Code, 1867, as amended on 5 August 2003, Chapter III, Title I bis, Article 136 bis, § 1.
The Penal Code further states:
A crime against humanity, as defined below, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, constitutes a crime under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title. In accordance with the Statute of the International Criminal Court, crime against humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
1. … murder …
2. extermination. 
Belgium, Penal Code, 1867, as amended on 5 August 2003, Chapter III, Title I bis, Article 136 ter, §§ 1–2.
The Penal Code further provides:
War crimes envisaged in the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions … and in the [1977 Additional Protocols I and II] … , as well as in Article 8(2)(f) of the [1998 ICC Statute], and listed below, … constitute crimes under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title … :
1. wilful killing. 
Belgium, Penal Code, 1867, as amended on 5 August 2003, Chapter III, Title I bis, Article 136 quater, § 1(1).
The Penal Code also states:
In the case of an armed conflict as defined in … Article 3 common [to the 1949 Geneva Conventions], the grave breaches of [common] Article 3, … listed below, shall constitute crimes under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title, when such breaches endanger, by act or omission, persons protected by these Conventions, without prejudice to criminal provisions applicable to breaches committed out of negligence:
1. violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds. 
Belgium, Penal Code, 1867, as amended on 5 August 2003, Chapter III, Title I bis, Article 136 quater, § 2(1).
Belgium
Belgium’s Law concerning the Repression of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols (1993), as amended in 1999, provides that “wilful killing” constitutes a crime under international law. 
Belgium, Law concerning the Repression of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, 1993, as amended in 1999, Article 1(3)(1); see also Article 1(1)(1) (killing as a part of a genocide campaign) and Article 1(1)(2) (killing as a crime against humanity).
The Law also provides that, in accordance with the 1998 ICC Statute, extermination constitutes a crime against humanity and a crime under international law. 
Belgium, Law concerning the Repression of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, 1993, as amended in 1999, Article 1(2)(2).
Belgium
Belgium’s Law relating to the Repression of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law (1993), as amended in 2003, provides:
The crime of genocide, as defined below, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, constitutes a crime under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title. In accordance with the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, and without prejudice to criminal provisions applicable to breaches committed out of negligence, the crime of genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:
1. killing members of the group. 
Belgium, Law relating to the Repression of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 1993, as amended on 23 April 2003, Article 1, § 1.
The Law further states:
A crime against humanity, as defined below, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, constitutes a crime under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title. In accordance with the Statute of the International Criminal Court, crime against humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
1. … murder … [or]
2. extermination. 
Belgium, Law relating to the Repression of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 1993, as amended on 23 April 2003, Article 1 bis, § 1–2.
The Law further provides:
War crimes envisaged in the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions … and in the [1977 Additional Protocols I and II] … , as well as in Article 8(2)(f) of the [1998 ICC Statute], and listed below, … constitute crimes under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title … :
1. wilful killing. 
Belgium, Law relating to the Repression of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 1993, as amended on 23 April 2003, Article 1 ter, § 1(1).
The Law also states:
In the case of an armed conflict as defined in … Article 3 common [to the (1949) Geneva Conventions], the grave breaches of [common] Article 3, … listed below, shall constitute crimes under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title, when such breaches endanger, by act or omission, persons protected by these Conventions, without prejudice to criminal provisions applicable to breaches committed out of negligence:
1. violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds. 
Belgium, Law relating to the Repression of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 1993, as amended on 23 April 2003, Article 1 ter, § 2(1).
Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Criminal Code (1998) provides that killing of civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked is a war crime. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federation, Criminal Code, 1998, Articles 154(1), 155 and 156.
The Republika Srpska’s Criminal Code (2000) contains the same provision. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, Criminal Code, 2000, Articles 433(1), 434 and 435.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Criminal Code (2003) criminalizes the following as an act of genocide:
Whoever, with an aim to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, orders perpetration or perpetrates any of the following acts:
a) Killing members of the group. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Code, 2003, Article 171(a).
The Criminal Code criminalizes the following as a crime against humanity:
Whoever, as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of such an attack, perpetrates any of the following acts:
a) Depriving another person of his life (murder).
b) Extermination. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Code, 2003, Article 172(1)(a) and (b).
The Criminal Code also states that, in time of war, armed conflict or occupation, ordering or committing “killings” of civilians, in violation of international law, constitutes a war crime. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Code, 2003, Article 173(1)(c).
The Criminal Code also contains the following war crimes provision:
Whoever, in violation of the rules of international law in time of war or armed conflict, orders or perpetrates in regard to wounded, sick, shipwrecked persons, medical personnel or clergy, any of the following acts:
a) Depriving another person of their life (murder)
shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years or long-term imprisonment. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Code, 2003, Article 174(a); see also Article 175(a) for a similar provision with respect to prisoners of war.
Botswana
Botswana’s Geneva Conventions Act (1970) punishes “any person, whatever his nationality, who, whether in or outside Botswana, commits, or aids, abets or procures the commission by any other person of, any such grave breach of any of the [1949 Geneva] conventions”. 
Botswana, Geneva Conventions Act, 1970, Section 3(1).
Bulgaria
Bulgaria’s Penal Code (1968), as amended in 1999, provides that ordering and committing acts of murder of the wounded, sick, shipwrecked, medical personnel, prisoners of war and the civilian population is a war crime. 
Bulgaria, Penal Code, 1968, as amended in 1999, Articles 410(a), 411(a) and 412(a).
Burundi
Burundi’s Law on Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (2003) states:
[The following are] considered as war crimes:
A. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 8 August 1949, namely any of the following acts aimed at persons or objects protected by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions:
a) murder;
C. In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely any of the following acts committed against persons taking no direct part in hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and persons placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:
a) violence to life or person, in particular murder of all kinds. 
Burundi, Law on Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, 2003, Article 4(A)(a) and (C)(a); see also Article 2(a) (genocide).
The Law also lists “murder [or] extermination” as a crime against humanity “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” 
Burundi, Law on Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, 2003, Article 3(a)–(b).
Burundi
Burundi’s Penal Code (2009) states:
“War crimes” means crimes which are committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes, in particular:
1. Any of the following grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions … :
1°. Wilful killing;
3. In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions … , namely, any of the following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:
1°. Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds.
4°. … [T]he carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable. 
Burundi, Penal Code, 2009, Article 198(1)(1°) and (3)(1°) and (4°).
Cambodia
Cambodia’s Law on the Establishment of the ECCC (2001) provides that “the Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all suspects who committed crimes against humanity during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979”, including extermination “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds”. 
Cambodia, Law on the Establishment of the ECCC, 2001, Article 5.
The law also provides:
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all suspects who committed or ordered the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention[s] of 12 August 1949 … which were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979. 
Cambodia, Law on the Establishment of the ECCC, 2001, Article 6.
Cambodia
Cambodia’s Law on the Establishment of the ECCC (2001), as amended in 2004, provides:
Article 4
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all Suspects who committed the crimes of genocide as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, and which were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.
The acts of genocide … mean any acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, such as:
- killing members of the group
- deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Article 5
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all suspects who committed crimes against humanity during the period 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.
Crimes against humanity … are any acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds, such as:
- murder
- extermination.
Article 6
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all Suspects who committed or ordered the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, such as the following acts against persons or property protected under provisions of these Conventions, and which were committed during the period 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979:
- wilful killing. 
Cambodia, Law on the Establishment of the ECCC, 2001, as amended in 2004, Articles 4–6.
Canada
Canada’s Geneva Conventions Act (1985), as amended in 2007, provides: “Every person who, whether within or outside Canada, commits a grave breach [of the 1949 Geneva Conventions] … is guilty of an indictable offence.” 
Canada, Geneva Conventions Act, 1985, as amended in 2007, Section 3(1).
Canada
Canada’s Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000) provides that the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes defined in Articles 6, 7 and 8(2) of the 1998 ICC Statute are “crimes according to customary international law” and, as such, indictable offences under the Act. 
Canada, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000, Section 4(1) and (4).
China
China’s Law Governing the Trial of War Criminals (1946) provides that acts of planned slaughter and murder constitute war crimes. 
China, Law Governing the Trial of War Criminals, 1946, Article 3, §1.
Colombia
Colombia’s Penal Code (2000) imposes a criminal sanction on anyone who, during an armed conflict, carries out or orders the carrying out of the killing of a protected person. 
Colombia, Penal Code, 2000, Article 135.
Colombia
Colombia’s Directive No. 10 (2007), whose objective is to prevent the killing of protected persons, states:
The casualties caused outside combat or if the use of force is not in accordance with the criteria of absolute necessity and proportionality are considered violations of the right to life. In the field of international human rights law, violations of the right to life encompass extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. These acts also constitute crimes within the competence of the International Criminal Court by virtue of the Rome Statute. 
Colombia, Directive No. 10, 2007, § IV.
Congo
Under the Congo’s Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Act (1998), killing members of an ethnical, racial or religious group, as such, with intent to destroy the group, in whole or in part, constitutes a crime of genocide. 
Congo, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Act, 1998, Article 1.
Moreover, “murder”, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack, is a crime against humanity. 
Congo, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Act, 1998, Article 6.
The Act defines war crimes with reference to the categories of crimes defined in Article 8 of the 1998 ICC Statute. 
Congo, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Act, 1998, Article 4.
In accordance with Article 7 of the 1998 ICC Statute, defines “extermination” as a crime against humanity, “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”. 
Congo, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Act, 1998, Article 6(b).
Cook Islands
The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols Act (2002) of the Cook Islands punishes “any person who in the Cook Islands or elsewhere commits, or aids or abets or procures the commission by another person of, a grave breach of any of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions”. 
Cook Islands, Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols Act, 2002, Section 5(1).
Côte d’Ivoire
Under Côte d’Ivoire’s Penal Code (1981), as amended in 1998, organizing, ordering or carrying out, in time of war or occupation, murder and attacks on the physical integrity of the civilian population constitutes a “crime against the civilian population”. The same applies in relation to prisoners of war and internees. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Penal Code, 1981, as amended in 1998, Articles 138(1) and 139(1).
Croatia
Croatia’s Criminal Code (1997) provides that the killing of the civilian population, the wounded, sick, shipwrecked, medical or religious personnel or prisoners of war is a war crime. 
Croatia, Criminal Code, 1997, Articles 158, 159 and 160.
Croatia
Croatia’s Criminal Code (1997), as amended to 2006, states that it is a war crime to kill:
- civilians. 
Croatia, Criminal Code, 1997, as amended in June 2006, Article 158.
- the wounded, sick, shipwrecked persons or medical or religious personnel. 
Croatia, Criminal Code, 1997, as amended to 2006, Article 159.
- prisoners of war. 
Croatia, Criminal Code, 1997, as amended in June 2006, Article 159.
The Criminal Code also states that “violat[ing] the rules of international law within an extensive or systematic attack against the civilian population and, with knowledge of such an attack, order[ing] the killing of another person” is a crime against humanity. 
Croatia, Criminal Code, 1997, as amended in June 2006, Article 157a.
The Criminal Code moreover states that “the infliction of conditions of life so as to bring about the physical destruction in whole or in part of some civilian population which could lead to its complete extermination” is a crime against humanity. 
Croatia, Criminal Code, 1997, as amended in June 2006, Article 157a.
The Criminal Code further states that an “intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, [or ordering] the killing of members of such a group” is an act of genocide. 
Croatia, Criminal Code, 1997, as amended in June 2006, Article 156.
Cyprus
Cyprus’s Geneva Conventions Act (1966) punishes “any person who, whatever his nationality, commits in the Republic or outside the Republic, any grave breach or takes part, or assists or incites another person, in the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions”. 
Cyprus, Geneva Conventions Act, 1966, Section 4(1).
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Code of Military Justice (1972), as amended in 1978, provides that in times of war, violence to or serious injury of the civilian population is an offence. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Code of Military Justice as amended, 1972, Article 472.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Military Penal Code (2002) provides:
Article 164
Genocide is punished by death.
As genocide is to be understood one of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, political, ethnical, racial, ethnic or religious group, in particular:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Article 169
Any of the following acts, perpetrated as part of a widespread or systematic attack knowingly directed against the Republic or the civilian population, equally constitutes a crime against humanity and is punished by death, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war:
1. Murder;
2. Extermination;
Article 171
Killing by reprisals is equated with assassination. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Penal Code, 2002, Articles 164, 169 and 171.
Egypt
Egypt’s Penal Code (1937) and Military Criminal Code (1966) prohibit homicide of the wounded. 
Egypt, Penal Code, 1937, Article 251bis; Military Criminal Code, 1966, Article 137.
El Salvador
El Salvador’s Penal Code (1997) includes murder as part of a genocide campaign in its list of crimes against humanity. 
El Salvador, Penal Code, 1997, Article 361.
Estonia
Under Estonia’s Penal Code (2000), the killing of civilians, prisoners of war and interned civilians is a war crime. 
Estonia, Penal Code, 2000, §§ 97 and 99; see also § 89 (killing as a crime against humanity) and § 90 (killing and physical elimination as part of a genocide campaign).
Ethiopia
Ethiopia’s Penal Code (1957) provides that in time of war, armed conflict or occupation, the organization, ordering or killing of civilians, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked or prisoners and interned persons constitutes a war crime. 
Ethiopia, Penal Code, 1957, Articles 282(a), 283(a) and 284(a); see also Article 281 (killing as a part of a genocide campaign).
Ethiopia’s Criminal Code (2004) states:
Article 270.- War Crimes against the Civilian Population.
Whoever, in time of war, armed conflict or occupation organizes, orders or engages in, against the civilian population and in violation of the rules of public international law and of international humanitarian conventions:
(a) killings…
(p) … carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted Court which affords all the judicial guarantees
is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from five years to twenty-five years, or, in more serious cases, with life imprisonment or death.
Article 271.- War Crimes against Wounded, Sick or Shipwrecked Persons or Medical Services.
(1) Whoever, in the circumstances defined above, organizes, orders or engages in:
(a) killings [of] … wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons, or … members of the medical or first aid service …
is punishable in accordance with Article 270
Article 272.- War Crimes against Prisoners and Interned Persons.
Whoever, in the circumstances defined above:
(a) organizes, orders or engages in killings [of] … prisoners of war or interned persons…
is punishable in accordance with Article 270. 
Ethiopia, Criminal Code, 2004, Articles 270–272.
The Criminal Code of 2004 repealed Ethiopia’s Penal Code of 1957.
Finland
Finland’s Revised Penal Code (1995) provides for the punishment of acts of killing perpetrated as a part of the crime of genocide. 
Finland, Revised Penal Code, 1995, Chapter 11, Section 6.
Finland
Finland’s Criminal Code (1889), as amended in 2008, provides that any person who “kills another” shall be “sentenced for a war crime to imprisonment for at least one year or for life”. 
Finland, Criminal Code, 1889, as amended in 2008, Chapter 11, Section 5(1)(1).
(emphasis in original)
France
Under France’s Penal Code (1994), “killing members of the group” constitutes genocide when “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. 
France, Penal Code, 1994, Article 211-1; see also Article 212-1 (massive and summary executions as a crime against humanity).
France
France’s Penal Code (1994), as amended in 2010, states in its section on war crimes common to international and non-international armed conflicts:
Wilfully committing violence to the life or to the physical or mental integrity of a person protected by the international law of armed conflict pursuant to the laws and customs of war and to international humanitarian law … is an aggravated offence. 
France, Penal Code, 1994, as amended in 2010, Article 461-2.
Georgia
Under Georgia’s Criminal Code (1999), in international or internal armed conflicts, it is a crime to wilfully kill persons not taking part in hostilities, persons hors de combat, the wounded and sick, prisoners of war, civilians and the civilian population in an occupied territory or zone of combat, refugees and stateless persons, as well as other persons enjoying international protection. 
Georgia, Criminal Code, 1999, Article 411(2)(a); see also Article 407 (killing as a part of a genocide campaign) and Article 408 (killing as a crime against humanity).
The Code also states that, any war crime provided for by the 1998 ICC Statute, which is not explicitly mentioned in the Code, such as violence to life of those placed hors de combat by detention in non-international armed conflicts, is a war crime. 
Georgia, Criminal Code, 1999, Article 413(d).
Germany
Germany’s Law Introducing the International Crimes Code (2002) provides for the punishment of anyone who, in connection with an international or non-international armed conflict, “kills a person who is to be protected under international humanitarian law”. 
Germany, Law Introducing the International Crimes Code, 2002, Article 1, § 8(1)(1); see also § 6(1)(1) (killing as a part of a genocide campaign) and § 7(1)(1) (killing as a crime against humanity).
The law also provides a punishment for anyone who, in connection with an international or non-international armed conflict:
imposes on or enforces against a person protected under international humanitarian law … the death penalty … , without such person having been convicted by an impartial and regularly constituted court affording the judicial guarantees required under international law. 
Germany, Law Introducing the International Crimes Code, 2002, Article 1, § 8(1)(7).
Guatemala
Guatemala’s Law on the Protection of Childhood and Adolescence (2003) states: “The rights of adolescents during the execution [of sanctions]. During the execution of sanctions the adolescent shall, at a minimum, have the right to the following: a) right to life”. 
Guatemala, Law on the Protection of Childhood and Adolescence, 2003, Article 260(a).
Guinea
Guinea’s Children’s Code (2008) states: “During an armed conflict, any act violating the physical integrity … of a child will be punished with 2 to 5 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 Guinean francs or with one of these penalties.” 
Guinea, Children’s Code, 2008, Article 430.
Hungary
Under Hungary’s Criminal Code (1978), as amended in 1998, the killing of a member of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as a part of a genocide campaign, constitutes a “crime against the freedom of peoples”. 
Hungary, Criminal Code, 1978, as amended in 1998, Section 155(1)(a).
India
India’s Geneva Conventions Act (1960) provides: “If any person within or without India commits or attempts to commit, or abets or procures the commission by any other person of, a grave breach of any of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions he shall be punished.” 
India, Geneva Conventions Act, 1960, Section 3(1).
Iraq
Iraq’s Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal (2005) identifies the “[w]ilful killing” of protected persons as a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Iraq, Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, 2005, Article 13(1)(A).
The Law further characterizes “[u]se of violence against life and persons, in particular killing of all kinds” and “the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all recognized and indispensable judicial guarantees” as war crimes in any armed conflict when “committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, injury, detention or any other cause”. 
Iraq, Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, 2005, Articles 13(1)(A) and 13(3)(D).
Ireland
Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, provides that grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are punishable offences. 
Ireland, Geneva Conventions Act, 1962, as amended in 1998, Section 3(1).
In addition, any “minor breach” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including violations of common Article 3, of Article 12 of Geneva Convention I, of Article 12 of Geneva Convention II, of Article 13 of Geneva Convention III, of Articles 27 and 32 of Geneva Convention IV, and of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, including violations of Article 75(2)(a), as well as any “contravention” of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, including violations of Article 4(2)(a), are also punishable offences. 
Ireland, Geneva Conventions Act, 1962, as amended in 1998, Section 4(1) and (4).
Israel
Israel’s Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law (1950) includes in its definition of war crimes the following acts: “murder of [the] civilian population of or in occupied territories; murder of … prisoners of war and persons on the seas”. 
Israel, Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 1950, Section 1(b) (this section also considers killing as a crime of genocide, and murder and extermination as crimes against humanity).
The law also punishes persons who have committed a crime against humanity, including “extermination [of] … any civilian population”. 
Israel, Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 1950, Section 1.
Jordan
Under Jordan’s Military Penal Code (2002) the “wilful killing” of a protected person constitutes a war crime. 
Jordan, Military Penal Code, 2002, Article 41(a)(1).
Kenya
Kenya’s Geneva Conventions Act (1968) punishes “any person, whatever his nationality, who, whether within or outside Kenya, commits, or aids, abets or procures the commission by any other person of any grave breach of any of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions”. 
Kenya, Geneva Conventions Act, 1968, Section 3(1).
Kenya
Kenya’s Constitution (1992) provides that no person shall be deprived of life intentionally, except as the result of a lawful act of war. 
Kenya, Constitution, 1992, Article 71.
Latvia
Under Latvia’s Criminal Code (1998), committing an act of murder constitutes a war crime. 
Latvia, Criminal Code, 1998, Section 74; see also Section 71 (killing as a part of a genocide campaign).
Lithuania
Under Lithuania’s Criminal Code (1961), as amended in 1998, the killing of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners of war, civilians or of other persons in occupied or annexed territories and combat zones is a war crime. 
Lithuania, Criminal Code, 1961, as amended in 1998, Article 333.
Luxembourg
Under Luxembourg’s Law on the Punishment of Grave Breaches (1985), “wilful killing” is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Luxembourg, Law on the Punishment of Grave Breaches, 1985, Article 1(1).
Malawi
Malawi’s Geneva Conventions Act (1967) punishes “any person, whatever his nationality, who, whether within or without Malawi, commits or aids, abets or procures the commission by any other person of any such grave breach of any of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions”. 
Malawi, Geneva Conventions Act, 1967, Section 4(1).
Malaysia
Malaysia’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962) punishes “any person, whatever his citizenship or nationality, who, whether in or outside the Federation, commits, or aids, abets or procures the commission by any other person of any such grave breach of any of the … [1949 Geneva] conventions”. 
Malaysia, Geneva Conventions Act, 1962, Section 3(1).
Mali
Under Mali’s Penal Code (2001), wilful killing is a war crime. 
Mali, Penal Code, 2001, Article 31(a); see also Article 29(a) (killing and extermination as crimes against humanity) and Article 30(a) (killing as a part of a genocide campaign).
The law also states that extermination is a crime against humanity, “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”. 
Mali, Penal Code, 2001, Article 29(b).
Mauritius
The Geneva Conventions Act (1970) of Mauritius punishes “any person who in Mauritius or elsewhere commits, or is an accomplice in the commission by another person of, a grave breach of any of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions”. 
Mauritius, Geneva Conventions Act, 1970, Section 3(1).
Mexico
Mexico’s Penal Code (1931), as amended to 2000, provides for the punishment of the killing, as a part of a genocide campaign, of a member of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. 
Mexico, Penal Code, 1931, as amended to 2000, Article 149 bis.
Mozambique
Under Mozambique’s Military Criminal Law (1987), killing any member of the civilian population is a criminal offence. 
Mozambique, Military Criminal Law, 1987, Article 85(a).
Myanmar
Myanmar’s Defence Services Act (1959) provides:
Any person subject to this law who commits an offence of murder against any person not subject to military law, or culpable of homicide not amounting to murder against such a person … shall not be deemed to be guilty of an offence against this act and shall not be tried by a court-martial unless he commits any of the said offences … while in active service. 
Myanmar, Defence Services Act, 1959, Section 72.
Netherlands
The Definition of War Crimes Decree (1946) of the Netherlands includes “murder and massacres” and “putting hostages to death” in its list of war crimes. 
Netherlands, Definition of War Crimes Decree, 1946, Article 1.
Netherlands
Under the International Crimes Act (2003) of the Netherlands, it is a crime to commit “in the case of an international armed conflict, one of the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions”, including “intentional killing”. 
Netherlands, International Crimes Act, 2003, Article 5(1)(a); see also Article 3(1)(a) (killing members of a group as part of a genocide campaign) and Article 4(1)(a) and (b) (intentional killing and extermination as crimes against humanity).
Furthermore, under the Act, it is also a crime to commit, “in the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, a violation of Article 3 common to all of the Geneva Conventions”, including “violence to life and person, in particular killing of all kinds” of persons taking no active part in the hostilities and “the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable”. 
Netherlands, International Crimes Act, 2003, Article 6(1)(a) and (d).
New Zealand
New Zealand’s Geneva Conventions Act (1958), as amended in 1987, provides: “Any person who in New Zealand or elsewhere commits, or aids or abets or procures the commission by another person of, a grave breach of any of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions … is guilty of an indictable offence.” 
New Zealand, Geneva Conventions Act, 1958, as amended in 1987, Section 3(1).
New Zealand
Under New Zealand’s International Crimes and ICC Act (2000), genocide includes the crimes defined in Article 6(a) of the 1998 ICC Statute, crimes against humanity include the crimes defined in Article 7(1)(a) of the Statute, and war crimes include the crimes defined in Article 8(2)(a)(i) and 8(2)(c)(i) and (iv) of the Statute. 
New Zealand, International Crimes and ICC Act, 2000, Sections 9(2), 10(2) and 11(2).
Nicaragua
Nicaragua’s Military Penal Code (1996) provides for the punishment of the wilful killing of prisoners of war, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and civilians. 
Nicaragua, Military Penal Code, 1996, Article 54.
Niger
According to Niger’s Penal Code (1961), as amended in 2003, wilful killing of persons protected under the 1949 Geneva Conventions or their Additional Protocols of 1977 is a war crime. 
Niger, Penal Code, 1961, as amended in 2003, Article 208.3(1); see also Article 208.1 (killing as part of a genocide campaign) and Article 208.2 (summary and systematic executions as crimes against humanity).
Nigeria
Nigeria’s Geneva Conventions Act (1960) punishes any person who “whether in or outside the Federation … whatever his nationality, commits, or aids, abets or procures any other person to commit, any such grave breach of any of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions”. 
Nigeria, Geneva Conventions Act, 1960, Section 3(1).
Norway
Norway’s Military Penal Code (1902), as amended in 1981, provides:
Anyone who contravenes or is accessory to the contravention of provisions relating to the protection of persons or property laid down in … the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 … [and in] the two additional protocols to these Conventions … is liable to imprisonment. 
Norway, Military Penal Code, 1902, as amended in 1981, § 108.
Norway
Norway’s Penal Code (1902), as amended in 2008, states: “Any person is liable to punishment for a war crime who in connection with an armed conflict … kills a protected person.” 
Norway, Penal Code, 1902, as amended in 2008, § 103(a).
The Penal Code further states: “A protected person is a person who does not take, or who no longer takes, active part in hostilities, or who is otherwise protected under international law.” 
Norway, Penal Code, 1902, as amended in 2008, § 103.
Papua New Guinea
Papua New Guinea’s Geneva Conventions Act (1976) punishes any “person who, in Papua New Guinea or elsewhere, commits a grave breach of any of the Geneva Conventions”. 
Papua New Guinea, Geneva Conventions Act, 1976, Section 7(2).
Paraguay
Paraguay’s Penal Code (1997) provides for the punishment of “anyone who, in violation of international law in times of war, armed conflict or military occupation, commits against the civilian population, the wounded and sick, or prisoners of war an act of … homicide”. 
Paraguay, Penal Code, 1997, Article 320(1); see also Article 319 (killing as a part of a genocide campaign).
Peru
Peru’s Regulations to the Law on Internal Displacement (2005) states:
Internally displaced persons who return to their place of habitual residence or who have resettled in another part of the country have a right to:
e) be protected against genocide, homicide, summary or arbitrary executions … ; as well as any threats and incitement to commit any of the foregoing acts. 
Peru, Regulations to the Law on Internal Displacement, 2005, Article 6(e).
Peru
Peru’s Code of Military and Police Justice (2006) states:
Any member of the military or police who, in the context of an international or non-international armed conflict:
1. Kills a person protected by international humanitarian law shall be imprisoned for a period of no less than 20 and no more than 30 years. 
Peru, Code of Military and Police Justice, 2006, Article 90(1).
The Code also states:
A member of the military or police shall be imprisoned for a period of no less than eight and no more than 15 years if he or she in the context of an international or non-international armed conflict:
7. Treacherously kills or wounds a member of the enemy armed forces or a member of the hostile party directly participating in hostilities. 
Peru, Code of Military and Police Justice, 2006, Article 95(7).
These articles are no longer in force. Along with certain other articles in this legislation, they were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court (en banc decision for case file No. 0012-2006-PI-TC, 8 January 2007) because they do not stipulate crimes committed in the line of duty that would fall under the jurisdiction of a military court pursuant to Article 173 of Peru’s Constitution.
Peru
Peru’s Decree on the Use of Force by the Armed Forces (2010) states:
With respect to the persons mentioned above [i.e. persons not directly participating in hostilities or who have laid down their arms as well as persons placed hors de combat by illness, wounds, detention or any other reason], the following actions are prohibited anytime and anywhere:
a. Violence to life and physical integrity, in particular murder of all kinds … and [summary] executions.
e. … [T]he carrying out of executions without previous judgment by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees.
f. Threats to carry out any of the aforementioned acts.  
Peru, Decree on the Use of Force by the Armed Forces, 2010, Article 8.1.a and 8.1.e–f.
Philippines
Under the War Crimes Trial Executive Order (1947) of the Philippines applicable to acts committed during the Second World War, “murder of civilian population of or in occupied territory; murder … of prisoners of war or internees or persons on the seas or elsewhere” are violations of the laws and customs of war. 
Philippines, War Crimes Trial Executive Order, 1947, Part II(b)(2).
The Executive Order adds that “murder, extermination [of] … civilian populations before or during [the Second World War]” constitute war crimes whether or not in violation of the local laws. 
Philippines, War Crimes Trial Executive Order, 1947, Part II(b)(3).
Philippines
The Philippines’ Executive Order No. 8 (1986), creating the Presidential Committee on Human Rights, states that the Committee shall have the following functions:
Investigate complaints it may receive, cases known to it or to its members and such cases as the President may, from time to time assign to it, of unexplained or forced disappearances, extra-judicial killings (salvaging), massacres, torture … and other violations of human rights, past or present, committed by officers or agents of the national government or persons acting in their place or stead or under their orders, express or implied. 
Philippines, Executive Order No. 8, 1986, Section 4a.
Philippines
The Philippines’ Republic Act No. 8438 (1997) provides: “The regional government [of the Cordillera Autonomous Region] shall take measures to prevent torture; other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment; and illegal detention and extra-judicial executions.” 
Philippines, Republic Act No. 8438, 1997, Section 27.
Poland
Poland’s Penal Code (1997) provides for the punishment of any person who, in violation of international law, kills persons hors de combat, protected persons and persons enjoying international protection. 
Poland, Penal Code, 1997, Article 123(1); see also Article 118(1) (killing as a part of a genocide campaign).
Portugal
Portugal’s Penal Code (1996) provides for the punishment of anyone who, in violation of international law, in times of war, armed conflict or occupation, commits wilful killing of the civilian population, the wounded and sick or prisoners of war. 
Portugal, Penal Code, 1996, Article 241(1)(a).
Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea’s ICC Act (2007) provides for the punishment of crimes listed in the 1998 ICC Statute, including genocide by killing a member of a group, killing a person as a crime against humanity, and the war crime of killing a person who is to be protected under international humanitarian law, in both international and non-international armed conflicts. 
Republic of Korea, ICC Act, 2007, Articles 8(1), 9(1) and 10(1).
Republic of Moldova
The Republic of Moldova’s Penal Code (2002) provides for the punishment of anyone ordering and carrying out the killing of protected persons or executing them without due process. 
Republic of Moldova, Penal Code, 2002, Article 137; see also Article 135(a) (killing as a part of a genocide campaign).
Romania
Romania’s Penal Code (1968) provides for the punishment of anyone who kills the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, members of civil medical services, the Red Cross or similar organizations, prisoners of war, or any person in the hands of the adverse party. 
Romania, Penal Code, 1968, Article 358.
Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Criminal Code (1996) provides for the punishment of the killing or extermination of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group when conducted as a part of a genocide campaign. 
Russian Federation, Criminal Code, 1996, Article 357.
Rwanda
Rwanda’s Constitution (2003) provides:
Article: 137
A state of emergency and a state of siege shall be governed by the law and declared by the President of the Republic, following a decision of the Cabinet.
A declaration of a state of siege or of a state of emergency shall not under any circumstances violate the right to life and physical integrity of the person, the rights accorded to people by law in relation to their status, capacity and nationality; the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law, the right to legal defence and freedom of conscience and religion. 
Rwanda, Constitution, 2003, Article 137.
Rwanda
Rwanda’s Law Repressing the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (2003) provides:
Article: 8
A war crime is one of the following acts, committed during armed conflicts against persons or property protected under the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and its Additional Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977:
1° wilful killing;
15° … the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a competent court, and without respecting the rights of the accused;
Article: 9
Shall be punished by one of the following penalties any person having committed one of the war crimes provided for in Article 8 of this law:
1° the death penalty or life imprisonment where he has committed a crime provided for in point 1°, 2°, 3°, 9°, 11° or 16° of Article 8 of this law;
3° imprisonment for five (5) to ten (10) years where he has committed a crime provided for in point 4°, 5°, 13°, 14° or 15° of Article 8 of this law. 
Rwanda, Law Repressing the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, 2003, Articles 8–9.
Acts constituting the crime of genocide perpetrated against Tutsi and other crimes against humanity which are in the jurisdiction of the Primary Court
The following offences shall be tried at the first instance by the Primary Court:
Senegal
Senegal’s Penal Code (1965), as amended in 2007, states:
[a)] Any of the following acts constitutes a war crime if it concerns members of the armed forces, the wounded, sick or shipwrecked, prisoners of war or civilians or objects protected by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949:
1. willful killing;
c) in case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against persons taking no direct part in hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and persons placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause [also constitute war crimes]:
1. wilful killing. 
Senegal, Penal Code, 1965, as amended in 2007, Article 431-3(a)(1) and (c)(1); see also Article 431-1(1) (genocide) and Article 431-2(2)–(3) and (6) (crimes against humanity).
Serbia
Serbia’s Criminal Code (2005) states that ordering or committing the killing “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” constitutes an act of genocide. 
Serbia, Criminal Code, 2005, Article 370.
The Criminal Code also states that ordering or committing murder “as part of a wider and systematic attack against the civilian population” in violation of international law constitutes a crime against humanity. 
Serbia, Criminal Code, 2005, Article 371.
The Criminal Code further states that, in time of war, armed conflict or occupation, ordering or committing “murder of [members of] the civilian population” in violation of international law constitutes a war crime. 
Serbia, Criminal Code, 2005, Article 372(3); see also Article 373(2).
The Criminal Code further states that ordering or committing “murder of prisoners of war” constitutes a war crime. 
Serbia, Criminal Code, 2005, Article 374(2).
The Criminal Code also states:
(1) Whoever in violation of international law in time of war or armed conflict kills … an enemy who has laid down his weapons or has surrendered unconditionally or has no means of defence, shall be punished by imprisonment of between one to fifteen years.
(2) If the murder specified in paragraph 1 of this Article is committed in a perfidious manner or from base motives, the offender shall be punished by imprisonment of a minimum of ten years.
(3) If the murder specified in paragraph 1 of this Article … [results in] several persons [being] killed, the offender shall be punished by imprisonment of between ten years … to forty years. 
Serbia, Criminal Code, 2005, Article 378(1)–(3).
Seychelles
The Geneva Conventions Act (1985) of the Seychelles punishes “any person, whatever his nationality, who, whether in or outside the Seychelles, commits, or aids, abets or procures the commission by any other person of, any such grave breach of any of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions”. 
Seychelles, Geneva Conventions Act, 1985, Section 3(1).
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Constitution (1991) states:
16. Protection of right to life.
(1) No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally except in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence under the laws of Sierra Leone, of which he has been convicted.
(2) Without prejudice to any liability for a contravention of any other law with respect to the use of force in such cases as are hereinafter mentioned, a person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in contravention of this section if he dies as a result of the use of force to such extent as is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the case, that is to say –
a. for the defence of any person from unlawful violence or for the defence of property; or
b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; or
c. for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny; or
d. in order to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal offence; or
e. if he dies as a result of a lawful act of war. 
Sierra Leone, Constitution, 1991, Section 16.
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Geneva Conventions Act (2012) states:
2. Grave breaches of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions and the [1977] First [Additional] Protocol.
(1) A person of whatever nationality commits an offence if that person, whether within or outside Sierra Leone[,] commits, aids, abets or procures any other person to commit a grave breach specified in –
(a) article 50 of the First Geneva Convention [on, inter alia, the grave breach of wilful killing];
(b) article 51 of the Second Geneva Convention [on, inter alia, the grave breach of wilful killing];
(c) article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention [on, inter alia, the grave breach of wilful killing];
(d) article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention [on, inter alia, the grave breach of wilful killing]. 
Sierra Leone, Geneva Conventions Act, 2012, Section 2(1)(a)–(d).
Singapore
Singapore’s Geneva Conventions Act (1973) punishes “any person, whatever his citizenship or nationality, who, whether in or outside Singapore, commits, aids, abets or procures the commission by any other person of any such grave breach of any [1949 Geneva] Convention”. 
Singapore, Geneva Conventions Act, 1973, Section 3(1).
Slovenia
Under Slovenia’s Penal Code (1994), the killing of civilians, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners of war and medical and religious personnel is a war crime. 
Slovenia, Penal Code, 1994, Articles 374(1), 375 and 376.
Somalia
Somalia’s Military Criminal Code (1963) states:
367. Prohibition of the immediate execution of those guilty of … offences against the laws and customs of war. – A commander who, except in the case of imminent danger to the security of the armed forces or to the military defence of the State, orders that a person caught … committing an offence against the laws and customs of war should immediately be brought before a firing squad without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, shall be liable to military confinement for up to one year.
369. Violence by Somali soldiers against enemy private individuals or by the inhabitants of occupied territories against Somali soldiers. – 1. A soldier who, needlessly or otherwise without justification, for reasons not extraneous to the war, uses violence against enemy private individuals who are not taking part in military operations shall be punished by military confinement for up to two years.
2. If the violence consists of homicide, including attempted murder or manslaughter, or of a severe or serious personal injury, the penalties prescribed in the criminal code shall be applied. The penalty of short-term imprisonment may, however, be increased. 
Somalia, Military Criminal Code, 1963, Articles 367 and 369.
South Africa
South Africa’s ICC Act (2002) reproduces the crimes listed in the 1998 ICC Statute, including genocide by “killing members of the group”, murder as a crime against humanity, as well as the war crimes of “wilful killing” of a person protected under the 1949 Geneva Conventions in international armed conflicts. The Act also reproduces war crimes listed in the 1998 ICC Statute regarding non-international armed conflicts, including “violence to life and person, in particular murder” of “persons taking no active part in the hostilities” and “the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognised as indispensable”. 
South Africa, ICC Act, 2002, Schedule 1, Part 1, § (a), Part 2, § 1(a), and Part 3, §§ (a)(i), (c)(i) and (c)(iv).
Spain
Spain’s Military Criminal Code (1985) punishes military personnel for “wilful killing” of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners of war or the civilian population. 
Spain, Military Criminal Code, 1985, Article 76.
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka’s Emergency Regulations (2005), as amended to 2008, states:
25. (1) Any person who –
(b) causes or attempts to cause death or injury to any other person with fire or any combustible matter or any explosive or corrosive sub[s]tance or … [with] any missile, weapon or instrument of any description; …
Shall be guilty of an offence and, not withstanding anything in the Penal Code or in these regulations shall, on conviction thereof before the High Court, be liable to suffer death.
53. Where in the course of his duty a police officer or any member of the armed forces causes the death of any person, … notw[ith]standing the provisions of any other law, such police officer or member of the armed forces shall be handed over to the appropriate authority to be detained in police custody or military custody as the case may be.
54. Where a police officer or member of the armed forces has reason to believe that the death of any person may have been caused as a result of any action taken in the course of duty either by him or by any subordinate officer as the case may be, or where any person dies in police custody or military custody, the Superintendent of Police in charge of the division to which such police officer is attached or in the case of a member of the armed forces the Commanding Officer of the Unit to which he belongs, shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary to Chapter XXX [relating to inquests of deaths], and Section 9, of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 15 of 1979 [giving power to the Magistrates’ court to inquire into sudden deaths] or the provisions of any other written law for the time being in force, report the facts relating to such death to the Inspector-General of Police or the nearest Deputy Inspector-General of Police.
55. Upon receipt of the information under regulation 54, the Inspector-General of Police or the Deputy Inspector-General of Police as the case may be, shall –
(a) direct … [an] officer not below the rank of an Assistant Superintendent of Police, to proceed to the scene of the incident and –
(i) record his observations;
(ii) take charge of any probable productions; and
(iii) record the statements of any persons, who in his opinion, appear to be acquainted with the circumstances relating to such death; and
(b) in any case where the body is found forthwith report such fact to the Magistrate.
56. (1) The Magistrate shall, upon receipt of the report of the facts by the Inspector-General of Police, or the Deputy Inspector-General of Police as the case may be under regulation 55;
(a) direct a Government Medical Officer to forthwith hold a post-mortem examination of such body and may direct that the dead body if it has already been buried, be disinterred;
57. (1) The High Court … in Colombo shall notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any written law have exclusive jurisdiction to inquire into the death of any person in any part of the island or within its territorial water, caused or purported to have [been] caused in the circumstances specified in regulation 54.
(2) The Judge of the High Court … in Colombo shall upon application being made to such Court by the Inspector-General of Police hold an inquiry into the cause of death of the person named as deceased in such application.
(9) At the conclusion of the inquiry the Judge of the High Court shall transmit the record of evidence and a report of the circumstances under which the death was caused together with any other documents to the Attorney-General.
58. Upon receipt of the record of evidence and other documents transmitted to him under paragraph (9) of regulation 57, it shall be lawful for the Attorney-General –
(a) to call for any further material or information as he may require;
(b) if he is satisfied that the commission of any … [offence] has been disclosed –
(i) direct the institution of proceedings under Chapter XIV [commencement of proceedings before the Magistrates’ Court] or XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act [offences to be tried by the High Court], No. 15 of 1979; or
(ii) proceed under the provision of sub-section (7) of section 393 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 15 of 1979 [empowering the Attorney-General to forward an indictment directly to, or transfer it from the Magistrates’ Court to, the High Court]. 
Sri Lanka, Emergency Regulations, 2005, as amended to 5 August 2008, Sections 25(1)(b), 53–55, 56(1)(a), 57(1)–(2) and (9) and 58.
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka’s Geneva Conventions Act (2006) includes the grave breach of “wilful killing” as an indictable offence. 
Sri Lanka, Geneva Conventions Act, 2006, Section 2, Schedule I: Article 50, Schedule II: Article 51, Schedule III: Article 130, and Schedule IV: Article 147.
Sudan
Sudan’s Armed Forces Act (2007) provides:
Subject to the provisions of the Criminal Act of 1991, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years, or with any lighter penalty, whoever treats inhumanly any of the persons hereinafter mentioned, during wartime, by killing him/her …:
(a) civilians, as long as they enjoy such capacity;
(b) journalists who perform professional missions;
(c) personnel of the medical and religious service of the enemy, unless they turn into combatants;
(d) personnel of enemy civil defense, unless they turn into combatants;
(e) a prisoner of war, as long as he/she enjoys such capacity;
(f) international monitors;
(g) officials belonging to international agencies and organizations, protected by international treaties and agreements ratified by the Sudan. 
Sudan, Armed Forces Act, 2007, Article 152.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Military Criminal Code (1927), taking into account amendments entered into force up to 2011, states in a chapter entitled “War crimes”:
Art. 111
1 The penalty shall be a custodial sentence of not less than five years for any person who commits, in the context of an international armed conflict, a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely one of the following acts against persons or objects protected under one of these Conventions:
a. murder;
2 Acts covered by paragraph 1 committed in the context of a non-international armed conflict are equivalent to grave breaches of international humanitarian law if they are directed against a person or object protected by that law. 
Switzerland, Military Criminal Code, 1927, taking into account amendments entered into force up to 2011, Article 111(1)(a) and (2).
[footnote in original omitted]
The Code also states:
Art. 5
1 In times of war, in addition to the persons mentioned in art. 3 [Personal conditions] and 4 [Extension in case of active service], the following are subject to military criminal law:
1. Civilians who make themselves culpable of one of the following offences:
d. genocide [Art. 108] or crime against humanity [Art. 109] (Part 2, chapter 6) … ;
5. foreign military persons who make themselves culpable of genocide [Art. 108] or a crime against humanity [Art. 109] (Part 2, chapter 6)[.]
Chapter 6 – Genocide and crimes against humanity
Art. 108
The penalty shall be a custodial sentence of life or a custodial sentence of not less than ten years for any person who with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, racial, religious, ethnical, social or political group, as such:
a. kills members of the group or causes serious bodily or mental harm to them;
Art. 109
1 The penalty shall be a custodial sentence of not less than five years for any person who, as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population:
a. intentionally kills a person;
b. kills a number of persons with premeditation or inflicts on the population conditions of life suited to bring about its destruction, with the intent to destroy it in whole or in part. 
Switzerland, Military Criminal Code, 1927, taking into account amendments entered into force up to 2011, Articles 5(1)(1)(d) and (5), 108(1)(a) and 109(1)(a)–(b).
[footnotes in original omitted]
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Penal Code (1937), as amended in 2009, states
[The following] are to punished with life imprisonment, 10 years’ imprisonment or less: anyone who, with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, racial, religious or ethnic group:
a. has killed members of the group. 
Switzerland, Penal Code, 1937, as amended in 2009, Article 264(a).
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Penal Code (1937), taking into account amendments entered into force up to 2011, states under the title “War crimes”:
Art. 264c
1 The penalty shall be a custodial sentence of not less than five years for any person who commits, in the context of an international armed conflict, a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely one of the following acts against persons or objects protected under one of these Conventions:
a. murder;
2 Acts covered by paragraph 1 committed in the context of a non-international armed conflict are equivalent to grave breaches of international humanitarian law if they are directed against a person or object protected by that law. 
Switzerland, Penal Code, 1937, taking into account amendments entered into force up to 2011, Article 264c (1)(a) and (2).
[footnote in original omitted]
Tajikistan
Tajikistan’s Criminal Code (1998) provides that, in international or internal armed conflicts, “wilful killing” of protected persons is a crime. 
Tajikistan, Criminal Code, 1998, Article 403(2)(a); see also Article 398 (killing and extermination as a part of a genocide campaign).
Turkey
Under Turkey’s Criminal Code (2004), deliberate killing constitutes genocide when committed “under a plan against members of national, racial or religious groups with the intention of destroying the complete or part of the group” and a crime against humanity when committed “systematically under a plan against a sector of a community for political, philosophical, racial or religious reasons”. 
Turkey, Criminal Code, 2004, Articles 76(a) and 77(a).
Uganda
Uganda’s Geneva Conventions Act (1964) punishes “any person, whatever his nationality, who, whether within or without Uganda, commits or aids, abets or procures the commission by any other person of any grave breach of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions”. 
Uganda, Geneva Conventions Act, 1964, Section 1(1).
Ukraine
Ukraine’s Criminal Code (2001) provides for the punishment of the “wilful killing” of civilians or prisoners of war. 
Ukraine, Criminal Code, 2001, Article 408; see also Article 442 (killing and extermination as a part of a genocide campaign).
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK Geneva Conventions Act (1957), as amended in 1995, punishes “any person, whatever his nationality, who, whether in or outside the United Kingdom, commits, or aids, abets or procures the commission by any other person of, a grave breach of any of the [1949 Geneva] conventions”. 
United Kingdom, Geneva Conventions Act, 1957, as amended in 1995, Section 1(1).
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Under the UK War Crimes Act (1991), proceedings for murder, manslaughter or culpable homicide may be brought against a person in the United Kingdom irrespective of his or her nationality if that offence, inter alia, constituted a violation of the laws and customs of war. 
United Kingdom, War Crimes Act, 1991, Article 1.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Under the UK ICC Act (2001), it is a punishable offence to commit genocide as defined in Article 6(a) of the 1998 ICC Statute, a crime against humanity as defined in Article 7(1)(a) of the Statute and a war crime as defined in Article 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(c)(i) and 8(2)(c)(iv) of the Statute. 
United Kingdom, ICC Act, 2001, Sections 50(1) and 51(1) (England and Wales) and Section 58(1) (Northern Ireland).
United States of America
The US Regulations Governing the Trials of Accused War Criminals in the Pacific Region I (1945) established military commissions which had jurisdiction over offences such as extermination, murder of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, hostages or civilians of or in an occupied territory. 
United States, Regulations Governing the Trials of Accused War Criminals in the Pacific Region I, 1945, Regulation 5.
United States of America
The US Regulations Governing the Trials of Accused War Criminals in the Pacific Region II (1945) established military commissions which had jurisdiction over offences such as the murder of the civilian population of or in occupied territory, prisoners of war or internees or persons on the seas or elsewhere and “extermination … committed against any civilian population”. 
United States, Regulations Governing the Trials of Accused War Criminals in the Pacific Region II, 1945, Regulation 2(b).
United States of America
Under the US War Crimes Act (1996), violations of common Article 3 and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are war crimes. 
United States, War Crimes Act, 1996, Section 2441(c).
The US War Crimes Act (1996), as amended by the Military Commissions Act (2006), includes in its definition of war crimes any conduct constituting a grave breach of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
§ 2441. War crimes
(c) Definition. – As used in this section the term “war crime” means any conduct –
(3) which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 (as defined in subsection (d)) when committed in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not of an international character; or
(d) Common Article 3 Violations. –
(1) Prohibited conduct. – In subsection (c)(3), the term “grave breach of common Article 3” means any conduct (such conduct constituting a grave breach of common Article 3 of the international conventions done at Geneva August 12, 1949), as follows:
(D) Murder. – The act of a person who intentionally kills, or conspires or attempts to kill, or kills whether intentionally or unintentionally in the course of committing any other offense under this subsection, one or more persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including those placed out of combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.
(3) Inapplicability of certain provisions with respect to collateral damage or incident of lawful attack. – The intent specified for the conduct stated in subparagraph … (D) o[f] paragraph (1) precludes the applicability of those subparagraphs to an offense under subsection (a) by reasons of subsection (c)(3) with respect to –
(A) collateral damage; or
(B) death, damage, or injury incident to a lawful attack.
(5) Definition of grave breaches. – The definitions in this subsection are intended only to define the grave breaches of common Article 3 and not the full scope of United States obligations under that Article. 
United States, War Crimes Act, 1996, 18 United States Code Sec. 2441, as amended by Military Commissions Act ( 2006), 17 October 2006, § 2441(c)(3) and (d).
United States of America
The US Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004) states in Title V–Border Protection, Immigration and Visa Matters; Subtitle E–Treatment of Aliens Who Commit Acts of Torture, Extrajudicial Killings or Other Atrocities Abroad:
§. 5501. Inadmissibility and Deportability of Aliens Who have Committed Acts of Torture or Extrajudicial Killings Abroad
(a) INADMISSIBILITY.—Section 212(a)(3)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(E)) is amended—
(1) in clause (ii), by striking “has engaged in conduct that is defined as genocide for purposes of the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide is inadmissible” and inserting “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in conduct outside the United States that would, if committed in the United States or by a United States national, be genocide, as defined in section 1091(a) of title 18, United States Code, is inadmissible”;
(2) by adding at the end the following: “(iii) COMMISSION OF ACTS OF TORTURE OR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS.—Any alien who, outside the United States, has committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the commission of—
“(I) any act of torture, as defined in section 2340 of title 18, United States Code; or
“(II) under color of law of any foreign nation, any extrajudicial killing, as defined in section 3(a) of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (28 U.S.C. 1350 note),
is inadmissible.”; and
(3) in the subparagraph heading, by striking “PARTICIPANTS IN NAZI PERSECUTION OR GENOCIDE” and inserting “PARTICIPANTS IN NAZI PERSECUTION, GENOCIDE, OR THE COMMISSION OF ANY ACT OF TORTURE OR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING”
(b) DEPORTABILITY.—Section 237(a)(4)(D) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)(D)) is amended—
(1) by striking “clause (i) or (ii)” and inserting “clause (i), (ii), or (iii)”; and
(2) in the subparagraph heading, by striking “ASSISTED IN NAZI PERSECUTION OR ENGAGED IN GENOCIDE” and inserting “PARTICIPATED IN NAZI PERSECUTION, GENOCIDE, OR THE COMMISSION OF ANY ACT OF TORTURE OR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING”. 
United States, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004, Public Law 108-458, 17 December 2004, Title V, Subtitle E, § 5501(a) and (b).
United States of America
In July 2006, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum to senior military and civilian personnel in the Department of Defense (DoD) on the subject of common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its application to the treatment of detainees:
The Supreme Court Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 29 June 2006] has determined that Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies as a matter of law to the conflict with Al Qaeda. The Court found that the military commissions as constituted by the Department of Defense are not consistent with Common Article 3.
It is my understanding that, aside from the military commission procedures, existing DoD orders, policies, directives, execute orders, and doctrine comply with the standards of Common Article 3 … In addition, you will recall the President’s prior directive [President George W. Bush, Memorandum, Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, 7 February 2002] that “the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely,” humane treatment being the overarching requirement of Common Article 3.
You will ensure that all DoD personnel adhere to these standards. In this regard, I request that you promptly review all relevant directives, regulations, policies, practices and procedures under your purview to ensure that they comply with the standards of Common Article 3. 
United States, Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, Application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense, 7 July 2006.
United States of America
The US Military Commissions Act (2006), passed by Congress following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in 2006, amends Title 10 of the United States Code as follows:
§ 950v. Crimes triable by military commissions
“ …
“(b) OFFENSES.—The following offenses shall be triable by military commission under this chapter at any time without limitation:
“(1) MURDER OF PROTECTED PERSONS.—Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more protected persons shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct.
“ …
“(15) MURDER IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF WAR.—Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more persons, including lawful combatants, in violation of the law of war shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct. 
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, pp. 120 Stat. 2626 and 2628, § 950v(b)(1) and (15).
The Military Commissions Act also provides:
Sec. 6. Implementation of Treaty Obligations
“…
“(b) REVISION TO WAR CRIMES OFFENSE UNDER FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—
“…
“(B) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
“(d) COMMON ARTICLE 3 VIOLATIONS—
“(1) PROHIBITED CONDUCT—In subsection (c)(3), the term “grave breach of common Article 3” means any conduct (such conduct constituting a grave breach of common Article 3 of the international conventions done at Geneva August 12, 1949), as follows:
“…
“(D) MURDER—The act of a person who intentionally kills, or conspires or attempts to kill, or kills whether intentionally or unintentionally in the course of committing any other offense under this subsection, one or more per sons taking no active part in the hostilities, including those placed out of combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause. 
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, pp. 120 Stat. 2633 and 2634, Sec. 6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(D).
United States of America
In July 2007, and in accordance with section 6(a)(3) of the Military Commissions Act (2006), the US President issued an Executive Order which stated that a “Program of Detention and Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency” complied with US obligations under common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Executive Order stated, in part:
Sec. 3. Compliance of a Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program with Common Article 3.
(a) Pursuant to the authority of the President under the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including the Military Commissions Act of 2006, this order interprets the meaning and application of the text of Common Article 3 with respect to certain detentions and interrogations, and shall be treated as authoritative for all purposes as a matter of United States law, including satisfaction of the international obligations of the United States. I hereby determine that Common Article 3 shall apply to a program of detention and interrogation operated by the Central Intelligence Agency as set forth in this section. The requirements set forth in this section shall be applied with respect to detainees in such program without adverse distinction as to their race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth, or wealth.
(b) I hereby determine that a program of detention and interrogation approved by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency fully complies with the obligations of the United States under Common Article 3, provided that:
(i) the conditions of confinement and interrogation practices of the program do not include:
(B) any of the acts prohibited by section 2441(d) of title 18, United States Code, including murder, torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, mutilation or maiming, intentionally causing serious bodily injury, rape, sexual assault or abuse, taking of hostages, or performing of biological experiments;
(C) other acts of violence serious enough to be considered comparable to murder, torture, mutilation, and cruel or inhuman treatment, as defined in section 2441(d) of title 18, United States Code. 
United States, Executive Order 13440, Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program of Detention and Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency, 20 July 2007, Sec. 3(a)–(b)(i)(B) and (C).
United States of America
In 2009, the US President issued Executive Order 13491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, which stated:
By the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, in order to improve the effectiveness of human intelligence-gathering, to promote the safe, lawful, and humane treatment of individuals in United States custody and of United States personnel who are detained in armed conflicts, to ensure compliance with the treaty obligations of the United States, including the [1949] Geneva Conventions, and to take care that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed, I hereby order as follows:
Section 1. Revocation. Executive Order 13440 of July 20, 2007, is revoked. All executive directives, orders, and regulations inconsistent with this order, including but not limited to those issued to or by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from September 11, 2001, to January 20, 2009, concerning detention or the interrogation of detained individuals, are revoked to the extent of their inconsistency with this order. Heads of departments and agencies shall take all necessary steps to ensure that all directives, orders, and regulations of their respective departments or agencies are consistent with this order.
Sec. 2 . Definitions. As used in this order:
(f) … “violence to life and person” [and] “murder of all kinds” … refer to, and have the same meaning as, those same terms in Common Article 3 [to the 1949 Geneva Conventions].
Sec. 3. Standards and Practices for Interrogation of Individuals in the Custody or Control of the United States in Armed Conflicts.
(a) Common Article 3 Standards as a Minimum Baseline. Consistent with the requirements of the Federal torture statute, 18 U.S.C. 2340–2340A, section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 2000dd, the Convention Against Torture, Common Article 3, and other laws regulating the treatment and interrogation of individuals detained in any armed conflict, such persons shall in all circumstances be treated humanely and shall not be subjected to violence to life and person (including murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture), nor to outrages upon personal dignity (including humiliating and degrading treatment), whenever such individuals are in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States. 
United States, Executive Order 13491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 2009, Sections 1, 2(f) and 3(a).
United States of America
The US Military Commissions Act (2009) amends Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code as follows:
§ 950t. Crimes triable by military commission
“The following offenses shall be triable by military commission under this chapter at any time without limitation:
“(1) MURDER OF PROTECTED PERSONS.—Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more protected persons shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct.
“…
“(15) MURDER IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF WAR.—Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more persons, including privileged belligerents, in violation of the law of war shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct. 
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 950t(1) and (15).
Uruguay
Uruguay’s Law on Cooperation with the ICC (2006) states:
A person who commits any of the following acts with the intention to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, religious, political, or trade union group or a group with their own identity based on gender, sexual orientation, cultural or social reasons, age, disability or health, is punished with fifteen to thirty years’ imprisonment:
A) Intentional killing of one or more persons of the group. 
Uruguay, Law on Cooperation with the ICC, 2006, Article 16(A).
The Law also lists the following crime under the heading “Crimes against Humanity – Isolated Acts”:
(Political Killing).- A person who is a State agent or who is not a State agent but acts with the authorization, support or acquiescence of one or more State agents and who kills a person due to his or her actual or presumed political, trade union, religious, cultural, or gender-related activities or opinions; or because of his or her actual or presumed belonging to a political, trade union, or religious collectivity or a group with its own identity based on reasons of sex or social sector is punished with fifteen to thirty years’ imprisonment. 
Uruguay, Law on Cooperation with the ICC, 2006, Article 20.
The Law further states:
26.2. Persons and objects affected by the war crimes set out in the present provision are persons and objects which international law protects in international or internal armed conflict.
26.3. The following are war crimes:
1. Wilful killing.
6. Wilfully … subjecting … [a prisoner of war or other protected person] to … executions without previous judgment by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable.
19. Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army or enemy combatants. 
Uruguay, Law on Cooperation with the ICC, 2006, Article 26.2, 26.3.1, 26.3.6 and 26.3.19.
Uzbekistan
Under Uzbekistan’s Criminal Code (1994), ordering or carrying out the physical extermination of prisoners of war or the civilian population constitutes a violation of the laws and customs of war. 
Uzbekistan, Criminal Code, 1994, Article 152; see also Article 153 (extermination as a part of a genocide campaign).
Vanuatu
Vanuatu’s Geneva Conventions Act (1982) provides:
Any grave breach of the Geneva Conventions that would, if committed in Vanuatu, be an offence under any provision of the Penal Code Act Cap. 135 or any other law shall be an offence under such provision of the Penal Code or any other law if committed outside Vanuatu. 
Vanuatu, Geneva Conventions Act, 1982, Section 4(1).
Venezuela
Venezuela’s Law on the State of Emergency (2001), which includes situations of internal and international armed conflict, states:
In accordance with Articles 339 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Article 4(2) of the [1966] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 27(2) of the [1969] American Convention on Human Rights, the guarantee to the [following] rights must not be restricted:
1. The [right to] life. 
Venezuela, Law on the State of Emergency, 2001, Article 7(1).
Venezuela
Venezuela’s Constitution (2009) states:
The President of the Republic, at a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers, shall have the power to decree states of exception. … In such cases, the guarantees contained in this Constitution may be temporarily restricted, with the exception of those relating to the right to life. 
Venezuela, Constitution, 2009, Article 337.
The Constitution further states: “A state of internal or external commotion may be declared in the event of an internal or external [armed] conflict seriously endangering the security of the Nation, its citizens or its institutions.” 
Venezuela, Constitution, 2009, Article 338.
Viet Nam
Viet Nam’s Penal Code (1990) provides for the punishment of anyone who, in time of war, orders or directly commits the killing of civilians, the wounded or prisoners of war. 
Viet Nam, Penal Code, 1990, Article 279.
The Code also punishes “anyone who, in time of peace or in time of war, commits acts resulting in mass extermination of the population of an area”. 
Viet Nam, Penal Code, 1990, Article 278.
Viet Nam
Viet Nam’s Penal Code (1999) provides for the punishment of those “who, in time of war, give the order for or directly undertake the murder of civilians, wounded persons [or] prisoners of war”. 
Viet Nam, Penal Code, 1999, § 343; see also § 342 (killing as part of a genocide campaign).
The Code also provides for the punishment of those “who, in time of peace or time of war, commit acts of annihilating en-masse the population of an area”. 
Viet Nam, Penal Code, 1999, § 342.
Yemen
Under Yemen’s Military Criminal Code (1998), the killing of prisoners or civilians is a war crime. 
Yemen, Military Criminal Code, 1998, Article 21(1).
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Criminal Offences against the Nation and State Act (1945) considers that, during war or enemy occupation, “any person who ordered, assisted or otherwise was the direct executor of murders” committed war crimes. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Criminal Offences against the Nation and State Act, 1945, Article 3(3).
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Penal Code (1976), as amended in 2001, provides that the killing of civilians, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners of war and medical and religious personnel is a war crime. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Penal Code, 1976, as amended in 2001, Articles 142(1), 143 and 144; see also Article 141 (killing as a part of a genocide campaign).
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe’s Constitution (1979), as amended to 2009, states:
12 Protection of right to life
(1) No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been convicted.
(2) A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in contravention of subsection (1) … –
(d) … if he dies as the result of a lawful act of war. 
Zimbabwe, Constitution, 1979, as amended to 2009, Sections 12(1) and (2)(d).
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe’s Geneva Conventions Act (1981), as amended in 1996, punishes “any person, whatever his nationality, who, whether in or outside Zimbabwe, commits any such grave breach of [any of the 1949 Geneva] Conventions”. 
Zimbabwe, Geneva Conventions Act, 1981, as amended in 1996, Section 3(1).
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe’s Constitution (2013) states:
Chapter 4 – Declaration of Rights
48. Right to life
(1) Every person has the right to life.
(2) A law may permit the death penalty to be imposed only on a person convicted of murder committed in aggravating circumstances …
86. Limitation of rights and freedoms
(3) No law may limit the following rights enshrined in this Chapter, and no person may violate them –
(a) the right to life, except to the extent specified in section 48;
87. Limitations during public emergency
(1) In addition to the limitations permitted by section 86, the fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be further limited by a written law providing for measures to deal with situations arising during a period of public emergency, but only to the extent permitted by this section and the Second Schedule.
(4) No law that provides for a declaration of a state of emergency, and no legislative or other measure taken in consequence of such a declaration may –
(a) indemnify, or permit or authorise an indemnity for, the State or any institution or agency of the government at any level, or any other person, in respect of any unlawful act; or
(b) limit any of the rights referred to in section 86(3), or authorise or permit any of those rights to be violated. 
Zimbabwe, Constitution, 2013, Sections 48(1)–(2), 86(3)(a) and 87(1) and (4).
Australia
In its judgment in the Baba Masao case in 1947, Australia’s Military Court at Rabaul sentenced the Commanding General of the Japanese 27th Army in Borneo to death. He was held responsible for the deaths and ill-treatment of a large number of Allied prisoners of war under his control. The accused, aware of the precarious health conditions of the prisoners of war, ordered their evacuation, which proved to be fatal for many of them. Moreover, the accused was also found responsible for the murder of the remaining prisoners of war who were executed on the orders of an officer under the command of the accused. 
Australia, Military Court at Rabaul, Baba Masao case, Judgment, 2 June 1947.
All these crimes were perpetrated against [the] civilian population during the war of liberation … There is no doubt that the murders … were perpetrated in a planned and concerted manner … {F]our [minors] died on the spot … Therefore, there is no gainsaying the fact that all the ingredients of [the] offences of crimes against [h]umanity are present in this case. 
Bangladesh, Supreme Court, Molla case, Judgment, 17 September 2013, pp. 236–237. Held by majority of 3:2.
Belgium
In its judgment in the Sergeant W. case in 1966, Belgium’s Court-Martial of Brussels sentenced to imprisonment a sub-officer who wilfully killed a civilian while serving in the Congolese army within the framework of military technical cooperation between the Congo and Belgium. The Court held that the act committed was murder under the Belgian and Congolese Penal Codes and also a clear violation of the laws and customs of war and of the laws of humanity. 
Belgium, Court-Martial of Brussels, Sergeant W. case, Judgment, 18 May 1966.
Canada
In 2005, in the Mugesera case, Canada’s Supreme Court confirmed a deportation order on grounds of incitement to murder, hatred and genocide, and a crime against humanity, in Rwanda in 1992. The Court stated:
2. The outcome of the appeal hinges on the characterization of a speech delivered by the respondent Léon Mugesera in Rwanda in the Kinyarwandan language. The speech triggered a series of events that have brought the Government of Canada and Mr. Mugesera to this Court.
4. In 1995, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration became aware of allegations against the respondent and commenced proceedings under s. 27 of the Immigration Act. A permanent resident of Canada may be deported if it is determined, inter alia, that before or after being granted permanent residency, the individual committed criminal acts or offences. In this case, the speech was alleged to constitute an incitement to murder, hatred and genocide, and a crime against humanity.
5. In July 1996, an adjudicator concluded that the allegations were valid and issued a deportation order against Mr. Mugesera and his family. The Immigration and Refugee Board (Appeal Division) (“IAD”) upheld the adjudicator’s decision and dismissed the respondents’ appeal… The findings of fact and law were subject to judicial review in the Federal Court – Trial Division (“FCTD”)…, and then in the Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”). Décary J.A., writing for the FCA, reversed several findings of fact made by the IAD and reversed the deportation order, concluding that the Minister had not met his burden… The Minister has now appealed to this Court, and he asks that the IAD’s deportation order be confirmed.
7. For the reasons that follow, we would allow the appeal. The decision of the FCA should be set aside and the decision of the IAD in favour of deportation should be restored.
B. Incitement to Murder, Genocide and Hatred
(1) Incitement to Murder
60. As will be recalled, Mr. Duquette concluded that while there was evidence that murders had occurred following the speech by the respondent, the evidence directly linking the murders to the speech was insufficient (para. 310). This finding of fact precludes the application of s. 22 of the Criminal Code on counselling an offence that is committed.
61. Under s. 464(a) of the Criminal Code, however, it is an offence to counsel another person to commit an offence even if the offence is not committed. The Rwandan Penal Code also provides that it is a crime to incite murder, whether or not the incitement is followed by the actual commission of an offence.
77. The IAD’s findings of fact support the conclusion that Mr. Mugesera’s speech should be viewed as an incitement to kill Tutsi and opposition party members. The elements of the actus reus are met: viewed objectively, Mr. Mugesera’s message was likely to incite, and was made with a view to inciting, murder. Mr. Mugesera conveyed to his listeners, in extremely violent language, the message that they faced a choice of either exterminating the Tutsi, the accomplices of the Tutsi, and their own political opponents, or being exterminated by them.
79. This finding of fact is sufficient to meet the mens rea for counselling an offence that is not committed. It shows that, on the facts, Mr. Mugesera not only intentionally gave the speech, but also intended that it result in the commission of murders.
80. We find that the IAD correctly concluded that the allegation of incitement to murder that is not committed was well founded, and that the FCA erred in overturning that finding. We must now consider the Minister’s allegations in respect of the crime of incitement to genocide.
(2) Incitement to Genocide
83. Section 318(1) of the Criminal Code proscribes the offence of advocating genocide: “Every one who advocates or promotes genocide is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.” Genocide is defined as the act of killing members of an identifiable group or of deliberately inflicting conditions of life on an identifiable group calculated to bring about the physical destruction of that group, in whole or in part: subs. (2). Subsection (4), at the relevant time, defined an identifiable group as “any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin” …
(i) Is Proof of Genocide Required?
84. In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 9 IHRR 608 (1998), the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) drew a distinction between the constituent elements of the crimes of complicity in genocide and incitement to genocide. In the case of a charge of complicity, the prosecution must prove that genocide has actually occurred. A charge of incitement to genocide, however, does not require proof that genocide has in fact happened:
In the opinion of the Chamber, the fact that such acts are in themselves particularly dangerous because of the high risk they carry for society, even if they fail to produce results, warrants that they be punished as an exceptional measure. The Chamber holds that genocide clearly falls within the category of crimes so serious that direct and public incitement to commit such a crime must be punished as such, even where such incitement failed to produce the result expected by the perpetrator. [para. 562]
85. In the case of the allegation of incitement to genocide, the Minister does not need to establish a direct causal link between the speech and any acts of murder or violence. Because of its inchoate nature, incitement is punishable by virtue of the criminal act alone irrespective of the result. It remains a crime regardless of whether it has the effect it is intended to have: see also Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T (Trial Chamber I) (“Media Case”), 3 December 2003, at para. 1029. The Minister is not required, therefore, to prove that individuals who heard Mr. Mugesera’s speech killed or attempted to kill any members of an identifiable group.
(ii) The Criminal Act: Direct and Public Incitement
86. The criminal act requirement for incitement to genocide has two elements: the act of incitement must be direct and it must be public: Akayesu, Trial Chamber, at para. 559. See also art. III(c) of the [1948] Genocide Convention. The speech was public. We need only consider the meaning of the requirement that it be direct.
87. In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber of the ICTR held that the direct element “implies that the incitement assume a direct form and specifically provoke another to engage in a criminal act, and that more than mere vague or indirect suggestion goes to constitute direct incitement” (para. 557). The direct element of incitement “should be viewed in the light of its cultural and linguistic content” (para. 557). Depending on the audience, a particular speech may be perceived as direct in one country, and not so in another. The determination of whether acts of incitement can be viewed as direct necessarily focusses mainly on the issue of whether the persons for whom the message was intended immediately grasped the implication thereof (para. 558). The words used must be clear enough to be immediately understood by the intended audience. Innuendo and obscure language do not suffice.
98. The allegation of incitement to the crime of genocide is well founded. The IAD came to the correct legal conclusion on this question.
C. Crimes Against Humanity
129. The proscribed acts listed in s. 7(3.76) of the Criminal Code provide a first and essential requirement for a crime against humanity: an “underlying offence” must be committed. In essence, the listed acts represent the different ways in which a crime against humanity can be committed. This means that various acts may become crimes against humanity as long as the other elements of the offence are met. In s. 7(3.76) those crimes are murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, persecution or any other inhumane act or omission.
131. The question we must now consider is whether, as alleged by the Minister, Mr. Mugesera’s speech satisfies the initial criminal act requirement for a crime against humanity. We have found that the speech counselled murders which were not committed and incited hatred and genocide. This raises two issues: whether counselling a murder that is not committed meets the initial criminal act requirement for murder as a crime against humanity and whether speech inciting hatred meets the initial criminal act requirement for persecution as a crime against humanity.
1. Counselling an Enumerated Act That Is Not Committed and Murder as a Crime Against Humanity
132. The first question raised on the facts of this appeal is whether the fact that Mr. Mugesera counselled the commission of murders that were not committed meets the initial criminal act requirement for a crime against humanity. Section 7(3.77) of the Criminal Code provides that “counselling” an act listed in s. 7(3.76) will be sufficient to meet the requirement. Murder is one of the acts listed in s. 7(3.76). Mr. Duquette found, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Mugesera’s speech counselled the commission of murders. His findings of fact are sufficient to conclude, as discussed above, that Mr. Mugesera satisfied both the physical and mental elements of the “underlying offence” of counselling a murder that is not committed.
133. This does not end our analysis, however. As we noted above, s. 7(3.76) expressly incorporates principles of customary international law into the domestic formulation of crimes against humanity. We must therefore go further and consider whether the prevailing principles of international law accord with our initial analysis. A review of the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR suggests that it does not.
134. The statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR … do not use the word “counselling”. This does not mean, however, that the decisions of these courts cannot be informative as to the requirements for counselling as a crime against humanity. Both statutes provide that persons who “instigate” the commission of a proscribed act may be liable under international law. This Court found in Sharpe, at para. 56, that counselling refers to active inducement or encouragement from an objective point of view. The ICTR has found that instigation “involves prompting another to commit an offence”: Akayesu, Trial Chamber, at para. 482. The two terms are clearly related. As a result, we may look to the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR on instigation in determining whether counselling an offence that is not committed will be sufficient to satisfy the initial criminal act requirement for a crime against humanity under s. 7(3.76) of the Criminal Code.
135. In Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR- 96-3-T (Trial Chamber I), 6 December 1999, the ICTR conducted a review of the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR on individual criminal responsibility. The ICTR found that instigation (other than of genocide) involves (1) direct and public incitement to commit a proscribed act; but (2) only where it has led to the actual commission of the instigated offence: para. 38; see also Akayesu, Trial Chamber, at para. 482. It should be noted that the second requirement does not mean that the offence would not have been committed “but for” the instigation. However, a sufficient causal link must be made out: Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95- 14/2-T (ICTY, Trial Chamber III), 26 February 2001, at para. 387.
136. Mr. Duquette of the IAD was unable to find that the commission of murders had actually occurred as a result of Mr. Mugesera’s counselling. An interpretation of ss. 7(3.76) and 7(3.77) of the Criminal Code in light of customary international law shows that Mr. Mugesera’s counselling of murder was not sufficient to satisfy the initial criminal act requirement for a crime against humanity.
2. Speech that Incites Hatred and Persecution as a Crime Against Humanity
150. … In the case at bar, there were two possible underlying acts: counselling of murder, and persecution by hate speech. For counselling of murder to be considered a crime against humanity under international law, murders must actually have been committed. Mr. Duquette’s finding that no murders were proven to have resulted from the speech therefore precludes a finding that Mr. Mugesera counselled murder within the meaning of s. 7(3.76). The other possible underlying act, persecution is a gross or blatant denial of fundamental rights on discriminatory grounds equal in severity to the other acts enumerated in s. 7(3.76). Hate speech, particularly when it advocates egregious acts of violence, may constitute persecution. In this case, it does. 
Canada, Supreme Court, Mugesera case, Judgment and Reasons for Judgment, 28 June 2005, §§ 2, 4–5, 7, 60–61, 77, 79–80, 83–87, 98, 129, 131–136 and 150.
[emphasis in original]
Canada
In 2008, in the Carrasco Varela case, Canada’s Federal Court reviewed a decision by the Immigration and Refugee Board that had found the applicant inadmissible to Canada on grounds of war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Court stated:
[1] The Immigration and Refugee Board found there were reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. CARRASCO Varela, a Nicaraguan citizen and a member of the Sandinista Front of National Liberation, was an active and willing participant in combat against the Contras, armed guerrillas opposed to the government. His activities included the committing of atrocities against individuals under his guard, the killing of peasants in the mountains and the execution of four prisoners responsible for the kidnapping of a Soviet military attaché, all part of a widespread and systematic attack against any civilian population operating contrary to Sandinista rule. Mr. Carrasco was determined to be a person described in section 35(1) (a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, (IRPA), and as such inadmissible to Canada. He was ordered deported.
[2] This is a judicial review of that decision, which held he violated human or international rights for having committed an act outside Canada that constituted an offence referred to in sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24. …
[6] It must be borne in mind that crimes against humanity are considered in two different Canadian contexts. Persons are not normally charged in Canada with respect to alleged crimes committed in other jurisdictions. However, war crimes and crimes against humanity are considered so heinous that those alleged to have committed them may be charged in Canada with an indictable offence and, if found guilty, are liable to life imprisonment. Mr. Carrasco has not been charged with a crime against humanity, or any crime, here or elsewhere.
[7] The second context arises in refugee and immigration matters. It may be determined that the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is not applicable because section 1F thereof specifically excludes its application to persons who have committed crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity, or that a putative refugee or immigrant is not admissible for having committed an act outside Canada that constitutes either a war crime or a crime against humanity. The burden of proof is neither on the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt nor on the civil standard of the balance of probabilities. Section 33 of IRPA only requires that there be “…reasonable grounds to believe…”
i) El Chipote prison
[14] A case very much on point, and a case frequently cited, is the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 F.C. 306. In speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice MacGuigan held that simple membership in an organization which, from time to time, commits international offences is not normally sufficient to tar a mere guard with same, unless the organization is principally directed to a limited brutal purpose such as secret police activity. The Sandinistas formed the government and so cannot be considered as being limited to brutal purposes (Moreno v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 298 (C.A) and Murillo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 3 F.C. 287 per Lemieux, J. at para. 42).
[15] Mere presence at the scene of an offence is not enough to qualify as personal and knowing participation, and as Mr. Justice MacGuigan added, one must be careful not to automatically condemn everyone engaged in conflict under conditions of war as the law does not demand immediate benevolent intervention at a person’s own risk. “Usually, law does not function at the level of heroism.” However, he went on to say: “With respect to the appellant’s serving as a guard, I find it impossible to say that no properly instructed tribunal could fail to draw a conclusion as to personal participation”.
[16] He added that Mr. Ramirez:
[37] […] was an active part of the military forces committing such atrocities, he was fully aware of what was happening, and he could not succeed in disengaging himself merely by ensuring that he was never the one to inflict the pain or pull the trigger.
[17] Mr. Ramirez only had 20 months of service. Mr. Carrasco had six years; six years which afforded him ample opportunity to withdraw his services and to leave Nicaragua. He did not. The finding that he participated in these atrocities should not be disturbed.
ii) The killing of peasants
[19] According to Mr. Carrasco, because he regularly raised the plight of prisoners at El Chipote Prison at party meetings, he was banished to the countryside. He served as a guard in the village of San Jose de los Ramates for a time in 1986. He was concerned that the hunting down of Contras in the countryside was indiscriminate. He did not wish to be a member of search parties. With the help of an understanding superior officer, he was protected from active service as he was issued a medical certificate which stated he had a heart condition. The Board member did not consider this evidence credible, and his finding stands up to examination. He pointed out that it would be highly unlikely that a commander would jeopardize his own situation as once Mr. Carrasco returned to El Chipote Prison, which he did, it would likely be discovered that he had no heart condition. Mr. Carrasco claims that after six months at that village, he deserted and was captured but only spent two weeks in jail before he returned to his duties at El Chipote Prison and later formed part of a death squad.
[20] However, it does not follow that the situating of Mr. Carrasco in the mountains, hunting down Contras, gives rise to a crime against humanity. I see no clear and compelling information which would give reasonable grounds to believe he deliberately killed innocent peasants.
[21] As stated in Mugesera, above, the facts are one thing, but the determination that a crime against humanity has been committed is quite another, a matter of law.
[22] In Gonzalez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1994] 3 F.C. 646, (1994), 115 D.L.R. (4th) 403, the Court of Appeal dealt with a refugee applicant who had been a member of a Nicaraguan battalion which encountered Contras hiding in a peasant’s house. In the ensuing gun battle, three women and six children were killed along with about ten Contras. Apparently, Mr. Gonzalez had objected to firing on the women and children. The Court of Appeal held that this was an incident of war, not a war crime. In the circumstances, Mr. Gonzalez had committed neither a war crime nor a crime against humanity and so the Immigration and Refugee Board erred in applying exclusion clause 1F of the Convention. In concurring reasons, Mr. Justice Létourneau added:
However, I do not wish to be understood as saying that the killing of civilians by a private soldier while engaged in an action against an armed enemy can never amount to a crime against humanity or a war crime so as to never give rise to the application of the exclusion found in Article lF(a) of the Convention. Each individual case will depend on its own particular facts and circumstances. It may be that in a given situation, while the death of innocent civilians occurred at the time of, or during, an action against an armed enemy, such deaths were not the unfortunate and inevitable casualties of war as contended, but rather resulted from intentional, deliberate and unjustifiable acts of killing and slaughtering.
iii) The murder of the kidnappers
[23] Notwithstanding the many run-ins Mr. Carrasco said he had with the authorities, and notwithstanding his prior desertion, he was assigned to be part of a death squad to deal with four just captured kidnappers of a Soviet military attaché. They were led out into a field handcuffed and blindfolded. There, they were murdered in cold blood. Mr. Carrasco said that he did not fire and protested. …
[24] Mr. Carrasco did not fire, and again was punished. He remained on the job and only left Nicaragua, however, more than a year later.
[25] The remarks of Mr. Justice MacGuigan in Ramirez are even more telling when it comes to cold blooded murder.
Crimes against humanity and Mr. Carrasco
[26] I have no doubt that the Board was correct in holding that Mr. Carrasco had committed crimes against humanity not only with respect to the murder of the kidnappers, but also with respect to his participation in the abuse of other prisoners at El Chipote Prison. As mentioned above, and relying on Gonzalez, there is insufficient evidence to give reasonable grounds to believe he participated in the murder of peasants in the mountains.
[28] Mr. Carrasco argues that the kidnappers were garden variety criminals out for personal gain. Although they were civilians, there is no evidence that the murder was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack, or against a civilian population, as opposed to four specific individuals. While these events might give rise to serious criminality, another ground for inadmissibility under section 36 of IRPA, that was not the basis of the report against Mr. Carrasco which led to the admissibility hearing.
[29] … As Mr. Justice MacGuigan said in Ramirez, it does not really matter whether the crime is a war crime or a crime against humanity. It was a crime committed during the course of what was either a civil war or civil insurrection. He simply employed the term “international crime”. In Sivakumar, above, Mr. Justice Linden referred to article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal. Historically, a crime against humanity was committed against one’s own nationals, which helped distinguish it from a war crime. In Gonzalez, above, Mr. Justice Mahoney made mention of the United Nations Handbook on Procedure and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 1979, which in turn referred to the London Agreement of 1945. A war crime included murder, and ill-treatment of prisoners of war. Crimes against humanity included murder, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population. Article 8 provided that superior orders would not free a person from responsibility, but could be considered in mitigation of punishment.
[30] Regardless how the matter is considered, Mr. Carrasco was rightly ordered deported. The order states: “The Immigration Division determines that you are a person described in 35(1) (a) of the Act.” Both crimes against humanity and war crimes are covered.
Defences and mitigation
[34] The defences of superior orders and duress do not apply. Section 14 of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act repeats the long standing rule in international law that the defence of superior orders has no application if the order was manifestly unlawful. Cold blooded murder is always manifestly unlawful. 
Canada, Federal Court, Carrasco Varela case, Judgment, 8 April 2008, §§ 1–2, 6–7, 14–17, 19–26, 28–30 and 34
Canada
In 2009, in the Munyaneza case, Canada’s Superior Court of Québec found a Rwandan national who had been residing in Canada guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes commited in Rwanda in 1994. The Court held:
3.2 Genocide
(A) Indictment
[68] The first two counts allege that the accused committed an act of genocide in two ways:
- by the intentional killing of;
- by causing serious bodily or mental harm to;
members of an identifiable group of people, the Tutsi.
[71] The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 (the “1948 Convention”) is the foundation of conventional international law as it pertains to genocide.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
[72] This convention was ratified by Canada on September 3, 1952 and by Rwanda on April 26, 1975. It applied to Rwanda in 1994.
[75] Even without that conventional definition, the crime of genocide in 1994 was in contravention of all the peremptory rules of customary international law.
(B) Intentional killing
[81] The notion of “intentional killing” does not exist in the Canadian Criminal Code. Murder is defined in section 229 as follows:
Culpable homicide is murder
(a) where the person who causes the death of a human being
(i) means to cause his death, or
(ii) means to cause him bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause his death, and is reckless whether death ensues or not.
[82] By using in [Canada’s 2000 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes] Act a term that differs from the one used in the Criminal Code, the Canadian legislator wished to refer to the definition of “intentional killing” found in international law and its jurisprudence.
[83] But the difference is rather slim. In international law, it must be demonstrated that:
(a) the person is dead;
(b) the accused caused the death by means of an act or omission, or contributed substantially to the death;
(c) the accused intended to cause the death of the victim or inflict grievous bodily harm that he knew was likely to result in death.
3.3 Crime against humanity
(A) Indictment
[108] Counts 3 and 4 allege that the accused committed crimes against humanity:
- by intentional killing;
- by the act of sexual violence.
[112] [Canada’s 2000 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes] Act confirms a consensus of the League of Nations, prior to 1945, that crimes against humanity were part of customary international law. Killing, sexual violence and the other crimes listed in subsection 6(3) of the Act constituted crimes before 1945 and, therefore, in Rwanda in 1994.
(C) Intentional killing
[118] The elements essential to proving intentional killing, which are described in the chapter on genocide, are the same in the context of a crime against humanity or a war crime.
3.4 War crime
(A) Indictment
[129] Counts 5, 6 and 7 allege that the accused committed a war crime by means of:
(a) intentional killing;
(b) an act of sexual violence;
(c) pillage.
(B) War crime
[135] As for customary international law, Article 4 of the ICTR Statute, regarding non-international armed conflicts, provides that it applied on Rwandan territory in 1994 and that the list of war crimes included killing, outrages upon personal dignity, rape and pillage.
(C) Intentional killing
[140] The elements essential to intentional killing are the same in a context of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
[2087] While an armed national conflict raged in Rwanda between the RAF [Rwanda Armed Forces] and the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front], Désiré Munyaneza intentionally killed dozens of people in Butare and the surrounding communes who were not participating directly in the conflict, sexually assaulted dozens of people and looted the homes and businesses of individuals who had nothing to do with the armed conflict.
[2088] In doing so, he committed a war crime according to the Act.
[2089] Désiré Munyaneza is guilty of the seven counts filed against him by the Crown. 
Canada, Superior Court, Criminal Division, Province of Québec, Munyaneza case, Judgment, 22 May 2009, §§ 68, 71–72, 75, 81–83, 108, 112, 118, 129, 135, 140 and 2087–2089.
[footnotes in original omitted]
Canada
In 2013, in the Peters case, Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Board rejected an immigration request on grounds of complicity in crimes against humanity in Libya. The Board stated:
[W]hen the conflict began in February 2011 in Libya you were called upon [by Al-Saadi Gaddafi] to provide security services for him in Libya. …
Now, with respect to specific examples of crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Gaddafi regime, there is quite extensive documentary evidence that has been put forward by the Minister, so I’m going to mainly focus on the atrocities committed between February and August 2011 …
We also have reports of the regime … conducting public[] lynchings and executing the injured in their attacks against the civilians.
We have a report from August 23rd, 2011, at page 352 of exhibit three which documents mass killing of approximately 100 people at the Yaramuk(ph) Detention Centre and there is a report in exhibit four at page 23 of a family against [which] forces opened fire … in a car on August the 22nd, 2011, where three [people] were killed and three were injured.
I am … satisfied, based on the totality of the information before me, and the findings relating to both allegations, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that you are described pursuant to both paragraphs 35(1)(a) and 37(1)(b) of the Immigration Refugee Protection Act and I am therefore issuing deportation orders against you.
As per my explanation at the outset of the hearing on January 14th, 2013, and at the beginning of this decision today, the only avenue of recourse available to you is to seek judicial review from the Federal Court of Canada and that application must be filed with the courts within 15 days of today’s date. 
Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board, Peters case, Record of an Admissibility Hearing under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 29 January 2013, pp. 4, 13–14 and 15–16.
Canada
In 2013, in the MJS case, Canada’s Federal Court dismissed an appeal against the applicant’s exclusion from refugee protection on grounds of complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Court stated:
[2] The Refugee Protection Division [the Panel] found that Mr. MJS was excluded from refugee protection under section 98 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act … and Article 1F(a) of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees …
IV. Analysis
(a) Did the Panel apply the wrong test to determine the complicity of Mr. MJS?
[22] The Panel also reiterated that Mr. MJS acknowledged in his testimony that he knew of the human rights violations committed by [the Group]. Earlier in its decision, the Panel found that “the documentary evidence clearly demonstrates that [the Group] committed crimes against humanity as well as war crimes in the period 1998 to 2005”, by, for example, … perpetrating unlawful killings … and massacring [ethnic minority] civilians. …
[23] Simply because the Panel stated that some of these crimes had also been committed by [another group] does not detract from the Panel’s conclusion regarding [the Group’s] involvement in these crimes. 
Canada, Federal Court, MJS case, Reasons for Judgment and Judgment, 20 March 2013, §§ 2 and 22–23.
Canada
In 2013, in the Mungwarere case, Canada’s Ontario Superior Court of Justice acquitted the accused of the charges of genocide and crimes against humanity committed in Rwanda in 1994. The Court stated:
35. The CAHWCA [Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act] defines genocide in paragraph 6(3) as follows:
“genocide” means an act or omission committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, an identifiable group of persons, as such, that at the time and in the place of its commission, constitutes genocide according to customary international law or conventional international law or by virtue of its being criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations, whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the law in force at the time and in the place of its commission.
36. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [1948 Genocide Convention] adopted by the United Nations includes the murder [“meurtre”] of members of the group which is intended to be destroyed in whole or in part as an act of genocide. The case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has taught us that the term “murder” means the act of causing death with the specific intent of causing death. Consequently, the term intentional murder [“meurtre intentionnel”] is used in international law in order to prevent any ambiguity on its juridical interpretation given the use of the word “killing” in the English version of the [1948 Genocide] Convention. (Prosecutor v. Kayishe[m]a and [Ruzindana] case No. ICTR-95-1-A at pages 56-57).
38. The first count of indictment is in fact constituted of two crimes. The underlying crime of intentional murder[,] which requires evidence of the act of causing death with the specific criminal intent of doing it. The underlying crime becomes the crime of genocide when it is demonstrated that the intentional murder is accompanied by the genocidal intention, which is to target an ethnic group in particular with the intention to destroy in whole or in part such group.
40. The CAHWCA defines crimes against humanity in paragraph 6(3):
“crime against humanity” means murder … that is committed against any civilian population or any identifiable group and that, at the time and in the place of its commission, constitutes a crime against humanity according to customary international law or conventional international law or by virtue of its being criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations …
41. On one hand, murder is one of the prohibited acts listed in paragraph 6(3). The term “murder” must be understood in the same way as it is laid out in the [Canadian] Criminal Code[,] as it is prescribed by paragraph 2(2) of the CAHWCA.
(2) Unless otherwise provided, words and expressions used in this Act have the same meaning as in the Criminal Code.
42. A murder (the underlying crime) becomes a crime against humanity according to the principles of international law when it is committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against an identifiable group of people and if the author of the murder was aware of the attack and knew that his act was part of such attack, or was likely to be.
1188. … [E]very participant to the deadly attacks [against the Tutsi which took place between April and July 1994 at the Mugonero Hospital complex, at Gitwe, Murambi and Bisesero] who put in place one or more acts which contributed in a significant way to the death of one or more Tutsi and who shared, along with other participants, the plan of causing the death of the Tutsi in order to destroy in whole or in part their ethnicity, is guilty of genocide.
1190. … [E]very participant in one or more of the deadly attacks at stake is guilty of a crime against humanity … if he has committed one or more acts which have contributed in a significant way to the death of one or more Tutsi with the intention to cause the death of [such] Tutsi and while knowing that the deadly attack or attacks he was participating to were part of a widespread or systematic attack against the Tutsi. 
Canada, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Mungwarere case, Reasons for Judgment, 5 July 2013, §§ 35–36, 38, 40–42, 1188 and 1190.
Canada
In 2013, in the Sapkota case, Canada’s Federal Court dismissed a request for review of a decision denying refugee protection to the applicant on grounds of complicity in crimes against humanity in Nepal between 1991 and 2009. While reviewing the submissions of the respondent, Canada’s Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the Court stated: “The Respondent notes that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court … is endorsed in Canada as a source of customary law.” 
Canada, Federal Court, Sapkota case, Reasons for Judgment and Judgment, 15 July 2013, § 28.
Chile
In its judgment in the Videla case in 1994, Chile’s Appeal Court of Santiago held that the 1949 Geneva Conventions “protect the human rights of the contestants in the event of external war or a conflict between organized armed forces within the State, which latter situation effectively prevailed in the country in 1974”. The Court stated that common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions obliged parties to non-international armed conflicts “to extend humanitarian treatment to persons taking no active part in the hostilities or who have placed themselves hors de combat for various reasons, and prohibits at any time and in any place violence to life and person”. The Court found that the acts charged constituted grave breaches under Article 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV and that the prison order issued against the defendant should therefore be upheld. 
Chile, Appeal Court of Santiago, Videla case, Judgment, 26 September 1994, §§ 6–20.
Chile
In its judgment in the Contreras Sepúlveda case in 2004, Chile’s Supreme Court stated:
[W]ithout any doubt, the 1949 Geneva Conventions are in force … and oblige State parties in case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring within their territory, which is exactly the situation in Chile during the period between 12 September 1973 and 11 March 1975, to treat humanely … opponents who have laid down their arms, … prohibiting in particular at any time and any place … violence to life and person. 
Chile, Supreme Court, Second Chamber, Contreras Sepúlveda case, Case No. 2182-98, 17 November 2004, § 34.
China
In its judgment in the Takashi Sakai case in 1946, the Chinese War Crimes Military Tribunal of the Ministry of National Defence sentenced to death the Military Commander of the Japanese 29th Infantry Brigade in China. The Court considered the accused responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity for having incited or permitted his subordinates to murder prisoners of war, wounded soldiers, nurses and doctors of the Red Cross and other non-combatants. The Court considered the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1929 Geneva Convention violated. 
China, War Crimes Military Tribunal of the Ministry of National Defence at Nanking, Takashi Sakai case, Judgment, 29 August 1946.
Colombia
In 1995, Colombia’s Constitutional Court held that the prohibitions contained in Article 4(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II were consistent with the Constitution, since they were not only in harmony with the principles and values of the Constitution, but also practically reproduced specific constitutional provisions. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-225/95, Judgment, 18 May 1995.
Colombia
In 2005, in the Constitutional Case No. C-203/05, the Plenary Chamber of Colombia’s Constitutional Court stated:
As members of the civilian population affected by internal armed conflicts, children and adolescents have the right to respect for the fundamental guarantees granted to all persons not actively participating in hostilities, as established by Article 3 common to the [1949] Geneva Conventions, which provide at minimum a right … to not suffer violence against their life … In accordance with this article, in cases of non-international armed conflicts in the territory of one of the Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply certain minimum guarantees without affecting their legal status as parties to the conflict, including: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities shall be treated humanely in all circumstances without adverse distinction based on discriminatory criteria; (2) To this end, the following acts are prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons (including children): (a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-203/05, Judgment of 8 March 2005, § 5.4.2.2.
Colombia
In 2007, in the Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, the Plenary Chamber of Colombia’s Constitutional Court stated:
Taking into account … the development of customary international humanitarian law applicable in internal armed conflicts, the Constitutional Court notes that the fundamental guarantees stemming from the principle of humanity, some of which have attained ius cogens status, … [include] the prohibition of homicide. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, Judgment of 25 April 2007, p. 112.
[footnote in original omitted]
The Court also held:
The fundamental guarantee prohibiting homicide within the context of non-international armed conflicts … strives to protect non-combatants, that is, civilians and persons hors de combat, as long as they do not take a direct part in hostilities. The norm may be found in a number of international treaties – Article 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 4 of the [1977] Additional Protocol II, in particular – and is considered part of customary international humanitarian law applicable in internal armed conflicts. In fact, the prohibition against homicide of civilians and persons hors de combat is one of the first guarantees under international humanitarian law.
The prohibition against homicide of civilians and persons hors de combat is a ius cogens norm in itself. It must be borne in mind that this prohibition under international humanitarian law corresponds to one of the non-derogable guarantees under international human rights law – the right to life– which proves its peremptory nature. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, Judgment of 25 April 2007, p. 112.
[footnotes in original omitted]
[C]ontrary to the appeal arguments, the court of the first instance repeatedly outlined in a detailed and analytical manner all the reasons it relied on when it concluded that the accused M.N.K., already on 9 September 1993, had information about unlawful actions committed by the units subordinated to him. Based on the presented evidence, including the testimony of the appellant himself, the court of the first instance concluded that it is logical that by making a field trip to the area where seven civilians were killed on 9 September 1993, he learnt about at least one of these murders, which, in the view of the court of the first instance, is sufficient to establish his criminal responsibility given that as a commander, after having obtained this information, he had a duty to take measures to prevent these unlawful actions from being committed again … Given that the accused M.N.K. failed to exercise his legal duties both in relation to civilians … and in relation to prisoners of war (POWs), the court of the first instance found him guilty of the criminal offense of War Crimes against Civilians under Article 120(1), as read with Article 28 of the BCCRC [Basic Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia], committed by omission … and of the criminal offense of War Crimes against Prisoners of War. 
Croatia, Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, M.N.K. and R.A. case, Judgment, 18 November 2009, p. 6.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
In March 2006, in the Bongi Massaba case, a case against a captain of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Military Garrison Court of Ituri at Bunia held:
Considering the proceedings taken against the defendant described above, prosecuted for:
2. Having committed a war crime;
Namely, having committed, in the village Russinga Mudogo (Kengolo), community of the Walendu Bindi, territory of Irumu, district of Ituri, in the Eastern province, in the DRC, in October 2005, without a certain precise date but within the legal period of limitation, intentional homicide by killing 5 (five) persons arrested by him, namely M., D., O., A. and K., after the confrontations against the FRPI [Forces de resistance patriotiques en Ituri], persons led to and killed on the mount Awi called Golgotha. Acts provided and punished by articles 8.2).a).i. and 77 of the Rome Statute.
Judgement
IV. Merits
Whereas the prosecution, for its part, brings war crimes charges for pillage, article 8.[2).b)].xvi of the Rome Statue, and for willful killing, article 8.2).a).i.
Whereas … the second offence charged by the prosecution is the war crime of wilful killing, whose point b) in the constitutive elements [of crimes], noted by the prosecution, is … that “The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict”, whilst omitting proof of the international character of that conflict;
Whereas these acts can be better prosecuted on the basis of:
2) Article 8.2)c)I [of the Rome Statute], providing for the war crimes of violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
… point c) of article 8.2) literally alludes to armed conflicts not of an international character;
Regarding the analysis of murder according to article 8.2)c)i of the Rome Statute; for its completion, that crime requires the fulfilment of the following elements:
1) The perpetrator killed one or more persons; in the present case, captain Blaise Bongi Massaba killed five persons …
2) Such person or persons were either hors de combat, or were civilians, medical personnel, or religious personnel taking no active part in the hostilities; in this instance, they were civilian secondary school pupils;
3) The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established this status; in this instance, captain Blaise Bongi Massaba, who in the “centre de brassage” again had learned the law of armed conflict, who, according to his identification, is, on top of that, a trained pedagogue, saw certain victims in school uniform, those surprised on the school road carrying school notebooks; he further had all the time to identify them, for they were arrested by his own initiative;
4) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character; in this instance, captain Blaise Bongi Massaba commanded soldiers right in an attack operation against the pockets of resistance of the armed militias of Ituri, in the territory of Irumu, community of the Walendu-Bindi.
5) The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict; in the present case, being himself a company commander, he knew that he was in the middle of an armed conflict against the armed militias FRPI and others, against whom he organized combat patrols;
Therefore
The Military Garrison Tribunal of Ituri
Having deliberated on the case in public session on Friday, 24 March 2006;
Holding
On the question whether the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba is guilty of the crimes with which he is charged, the Tribunal, by the majority of the votes of its members, responds: Yes.
The Tribunal
Holds as established in fact and in law the offences the defendant captain Blaise Bongi Massaba is charged with and convicts him, consequently, without admitting mitigating circumstances:
- to penal servitude for life for war crimes of pillage of property (Article 8.2)e)v of the Rome Statute),
- to penal servitude for life for the war crime of murder (Article 8.2)c)i of the Rome Statute);
And, by applying article 7 of the Military Penal Code, convicts him:
- to penal servitude for life, as single, highest penalty. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Garrison Court of Ituri, Bongi Massaba case, Judgment, 24 March 2006.
In November 2006, on the defendant’s appeal, the Military Court of the Eastern Province held:
Whereas the Military Court of the Eastern Province is seized with the appeal of the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba, convicted by the Military Garrison Tribunal of Ituri on the basis of two offences under the competence of the International Criminal Court, namely war crimes …;
War crime of violence to life and person
Whereas that offence is provided for and punished by article 8.2)c)i [of the Rome Statute];
Whereas that offence consists of the following constitutive elements:
1. The perpetrator must have killed one or more persons;
Whereas, in the present case, the defendant Blaise Nogi Massaba has admitted having given the order to the group composed of warrant officer Batanga, Sergeant-Major Mwanga, Sergeant Ramazani, Captain Mpinda and Corporal Takakule, to promptly execute the pupils who had carried the pillaged objects, …
Whereas the defendant Blaise Bongi claims that he himself executed an order received from Major Faustin Kakule, who has contested this during the preliminary investigation and preparation of the trial;
Whereas article 28 of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo stipulates:
“No one is required to execute a manifestly illegal order”;
Whereas the unlawfulness of the order allegedly given by Major Faustin Kakule could not have been doubted and the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba would have had to refuse executing it if such an order really had been given …
Whereas Professor Verhaegen reports, in this sense, the decision of the Belgian Military Court in 1966, which the Military Court embraces:
“the act does not only constitute murder according to the provisions of the Congolese [Penal] Code, but also a flagrant violation of the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity;
the unlawfulness of the order being manifest, the defendant had to abstain from executing it”;
Whereas, therefore, the criminal responsibility of the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba can in no case be lifted;
[2.] The second condition required by the treaty: “such person or persons must be protected by the Geneva Conventions”;
Whereas they are persons enumerated in Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely:
1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities;
2) Members of armed forces who have laid down their arms;
3) Persons placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause;
Whereas, in the present case, the five pupils fall under the first category, like every civilian taking no active part in hostilities;
They were pupils who avoided the war between the FARDC [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo] soldiers and the militiamen;
Whereas, even if they were militiamen of the commander Darc, as claimed by the defendant without, however, providing evidence for it (presence of weapons, even non-firearms: machetes, knives or arrows), they would need to benefit from the Geneva Conventions as being rendered hors de combat by their capture;
Whereas, in fact, that protection is recognized for captured and disarmed combatants, i.e. those fallen into the hands of the adversary;
[3.] Whereas the defendant Blaise Bongi could not have been mistaken about the quality of the five persons presented to him;
Whereas they were dressed in school uniforms and four of them carried their typical [school] things;
Whereas corporal Valaka had insisted on that quality as pupils, used as porters, but in vain;
Whereas the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba knew that under the factual circumstances the five persons were taking no active part in the hostilities;
Whereas, by virtue of his training and his function, the defendant is considered as knowing international humanitarian law, which protects civilian and combatants rendered hors de combat in a conflict;
[4.] Whereas the incriminated behaviour took place in the context of and was associated with a conflict not of an international character;
[5.] Whereas the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba knew that his unit was engaged in the offensive launched in order to dismantle the pockets of resistance of militiamen in the sector of Walendu Bindi;
Whereas these men had confronted the FRPI militiamen at Olangba;
Whereas, in fact, the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba could not ignore the existence of hostilities in the sector where his unit was deployed;
Whereas the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba and his counsel plead guilty to that charge, they nevertheless have invoked mitigating circumstances
Whereas the Court … allows the defendant the benefit of mitigating circumstances resulting:
- from the fact that he is a first-time delinquent;
- from the fact that he is father to a large family;
- from the fact of his inexperience as a commander.
Whereas the charges of the war crimes of pillage and violence to life and person are sufficiently established as required by the law;
Therefore
Finding on the public action
To the question whether the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba is guilty of the war crimes of pillage and violence to life and persons he is charged with, the Military Court of the Eastern Province has replied, with the majority of the votes of members is: yes;
To the question whether there are grounds for holding mitigating circumstances to the benefit of the defendant, the Military Court of the Eastern Province has replied, with the majority of the votes of its members: yes, for each of the charges of which the defendant has been found guilty;
In consequence, convicts him:
- to 20 years of penal servitude for crimes of war of pillage;
- to 20 years of penal servitude for crimes of war of violence to life …,
applying article 7 of the Military Penal Code, convicts him therefore to 20 years of penal servitude as single, highest penalty. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Court of the Eastern Province, Bongi Massaba case, Judgment on Appeals, 4 November 2006.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
In 2010, in the Barnaba Yonga Tshopena case, the Military Garrison Court of Ituri-Bunia convicted a leader of the Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (FRPI) of several war crimes, including murder. The Court stated:
67 … [T]he war crime of murder is provided for and punished by article 8(2)(c)(i) [of the 1998 ICC Statute] …
68 … [T]his crime requires, in addition to the evidence of the existence of an armed conflict not of an international character, as well as of the awareness by the perpetrator of factual circumstances establishing the existence of this conflict, that there is also evidence of the following three elements: “i) the perpetrator must have killed one or more persons; ii) the person or persons killed should be protected by one or several of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; and finally, iii) the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established their status of protected persons.”
69 … [I]n the present case, the defendant … is accused of having caused, through FRPI Ngiti combatants, the death of over 1200 persons, all civilians who inhabited entire Nyankunde and part of Groupement Musedzo or who were present … during the attacks carried out against these two places, respectively on 5 and 12 September 2002, by FRPI Ngiti combatants; as well as over 100 other persons who had fled Nyankunde to take refuge in Musedzo, at the primary school with the same name, where they were burned alive by FRPI Ngiti combatants under the lead of a commander called Avege, not otherwise identified. These acts constitute war crimes.
71 … [S]uch attacks took place during the period when large military operations were planned by FRPI leaders in reprisal against the populations of …[Nyankunde and Musedzo] following the attack carried out on 31 August 2002 by the UPC [Union of Congolese Patriots] troops and their allies from the Ugandan army against the locality of Songolo. The latter had military positions at the centre of Nyankunde … , in the Ituri district. This constitutes an armed conflict not of an international character.
72 … [F]urthermore, these two attacks caused the death of a very large number of persons among the inhabitants of these two places …
73 … [S]uch persons were all peaceful civilians, who did not take direct part in the armed hostilities which were in place at the District of Ituri. Thus, they were protected by article 3 common to the four [1949] Geneva Conventions and by the 1977 [Additional] Protocol II;
74 … [I]n such situation, humanitarian law addresses the armed forces, whether they are regular or not, which take part in a conflict, and protects any individual or category of individuals not taking part, or no longer actively taking part, in hostilities, such as:
- Wounded or sick combatants;
- Persons deprived of their liberty due to the conflict;
- The civilian population;
- Medical or religious personnel.
The … [1998 ICC] Statute makes the same distinction between an internal and an international conflict. The character of the conflict is determinant for the charges which can be brought before the perpetrators of crimes.
75 … [M]oreover, throughout the period when these attacks were launched, there was an armed conflict not of an international character in Ituri, and all those civilian and military leaders from the FRPI who planned and ordered the attacks, as well as all Ngiti combatants of this political-military movement who materially committed [the attacks], were aware of the existence of an armed conflict of this type in Ituri. This proves the existence of the intentional or mental element which constitutes the special dolus according to article 30 of the [1998 ICC] … Statute.
77 … [T]herefore, this Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that murders constitutive of the war crime provided for in article 8(2)(c)(i) of the … [1998 ICC] … Statute were committed against over 1000 civilians who inhabited entire Nyankunde and part of Groupement Musedzo or who were present … during the attacks carried out against these two places respectively on 5 and 12 September 2002 by FRPI Ngiti combatants, with the support, authorization and/or blessing of the leaders of this political-military movement, including the defendant. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Garrison Court of Ituri-Bunia, Barnaba Yonga Tshopena case, Judgment, 9 July 2010, §§ 67–69, 71–75 and 77.
Regarding the applicable law, the Court stated:
[T]he constitutional provisions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, namely articles 153(4) and 215 of 18 February 2006 [Constitution (2006)], authorize both civil and military courts and tribunals to apply duly ratified international agreements and treaties, and give them higher authority than domestic legislation. This constitutional authorization combined with the self-executing nature of the … [1998 ICC] Statute justify the direct application of this treaty by Congolese courts and tribunals. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Garrison Court of Ituri-Bunia, Barnaba Yonga Tshopena case, Judgment, 9 July 2010, § 63.
Germany
In 2008, in the Kurdish Refugee case, Germany’s Higher Administrative Court for the Federal Land of Bavaria found that a Kurdish refugee claimant from Turkey was to be excluded from refugee protection inter alia because there were serious reasons for considering that he had committed war crimes and crimes against humanity during his involvement with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. The court held:
47
The wilful killing of persons who are to be protected under one of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 … [is] a war crime under Art. 8 para. 2 sub-para. a nos. i [and] ii … of the [1998] Rome Statute. According to Art. 3 of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War … , the range of persons protected include, also in non-international armed conflict, persons who are not directly participating in hostilities. Also according to §8 para. 1 no. 1 of [Germany’s] International Crimes Code it is a war crime to kill a person who is to be protected under international humanitarian law.
49
Moreover, the various murders which the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] committed against civilians between 1987 and mid-1991 constitute crimes against humanity in the sense of §3 para. 2 sentence 1 no. 1 AsylVgG [Asylum Procedure Code] and Art. 1 F para. a GFK [1951 Refugee Convention]. Art. 7 para. 1 sub-para. a of the [1998] Rome Statute and §7 para. 1 of the International Crimes Code state that any wilful killing is such a crime if it is committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population. In addition, Art. 7 [of the 1998] Rome Statute requires that acts in the sense of Art. 7 para. 1 must be committed multiple times and with knowledge of the attack and pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy whose objective was such an attack. If the PKK in multiple cases conducted its attacks … in a way that most of the victims were relatives of those protecting a village … , then this conduct reveals a certain method and must therefore be considered to be “systematic” in the sense of Art. 8 para. 1 of the Rome Statute and §7 para. 1 of the International Crimes Code. Since these attacks evidently had the objective to prevent Kurds from taking up the role of a village protector and to punish already active village protectors for their cooperation with the Turkish State, they enforced a PKK policy in the sense of Art. 8 para. 2 sub-para. a of the Rome Statute. If one accepts, in accordance with Number 13 of the UNHCR Guidelines of 4 September 2003, that an individual crime of killing is part of a coherent system or a series of systematic and repeated actions, the PKK’s conduct at the time against the relatives of village protectors also fulfils this requirement. 
Germany, Higher Administrative Court for the Federal Land of Bavaria, Kurdish Refugee case, Judgment, 21 October 2008, §§ 47 and 49.
Germany
In 2010, in the Chechen Refugee case, Germany’s Federal Administrative Court was called upon to decide whether a Russian refugee claimant from Chechnya had to be excluded from refugee protection because there were serious reasons for considering that he had committed a war crime in Chechnya in 2002 by killing two Russian soldiers and taking a Russian officer hostage. The court held:
[Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions] criminalizes violence to life and person and the taking of hostages who are not directly participating in hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their weapons and persons who have been placed hors de combat by illness, injury, capture or any other reason. This provision thus also considers acts as war crimes which are directed against soldiers. 
Germany, Federal Administrative Court, Chechen Refugee case, Judgment, 16 February 2010, § 27.
Germany
In 2010, in the Boere case, Germany’s Regional Court of Aachen found Heinrich Boere, a German national, guilty of murder because he shot three Dutch nationals in 1941 during the German occupation of the Netherlands. The court summarized the facts of the case as follows:
[A]t the beginning of the war between Germany and the Netherlands, the accused joined the Waffen-SS [Armed SS]. He was a member of the Feldmeijer commando of the Germanic SS in the Netherlands when the crime was committed. … Together with other members of the Feldmeijer commando, the accused was tasked with the killing of [the three Dutch nationals] Fritz Hubert Ernst Bi., Teunis de G. und Frans Willem Ku. In the views of the accused, the killing of the pharmacist Bi. was an act of revenge and the individuals G. and Ku. were members of the resistance movement against whom countermeasures had to be taken because of a previous attack [against the German occupying forces]. 
Germany, Regional Court of Aachen, Boere case, Judgment, 23 March 2010, § 233.
The court held:
234
The three murders cannot be considered as lawful acts of war because they were not committed by members of the armed military forces but by members of the Feldmeijer commando with support from the SD [German security service] and because when the victims were shot, they were not resistance fighters engaged in combat or in escape or, at least, manifesting a readiness to engage in combat.
235
Neither can the murders be considered as lawful war reprisals because the conditions for permitted war reprisals under the international law in force at the time are not met.
236
… It has to be taken into account that the killing of innocent civilians in occupied territory for the purpose of forcing illegal combatants to give up their unlawful acts of war can be considered lawful under certain conditions under the law applicable at the time. However, lawful reprisals had to be taken by a subject of international law which had to be made public or at least had to be identifiable as the author of the reprisal in order to fulfil its repelling purpose (so-called requirement of notification). The victims Bi., de G. and Ku. were not killed by members of the occupying power but by members of the commando Feldmeijer and the superordinate Germanic SS in the Netherlands, albeit in cooperation with the German SD. The commando Feldmeijer and the superordinate Germanic SS in the Netherlands were neither part of the German occupying forces nor were they a unit bound by orders of the German occupying forces. Moreover, based on the facts established by this Chamber, it must be considered that after the commission of the acts, the German occupying power did not inform the Dutch public about the authors of the killings apart from some general guesses or speculations. On the other hand, the accused and his co-perpetrators, who inter alia wore civilian clothes and used false identity documents, carried out the murders according to their directives in such a clandestine way that the German occupying power was not recognizable as the author of the three murders by the Dutch public and, according to the perpetrators’ plans, was not supposed to be recognizable either. This is demonstrated by the strict orders to remain silent [received by the accused and his co-perpetrators regarding the planning and execution of the killings]. Therefore, the requirement of notification cannot be considered to have been fulfilled. 
Germany, Regional Court of Aachen, Boere case, Judgment, 23 March 2010, §§ 234–236.
Germany
In 2010, in the Fuel Tankers case, the Federal Prosecutor General at Germany’s Federal Court of Justice investigated whether war crimes or other crimes under domestic law had been committed in the course of an airstrike which was ordered by a colonel (Oberst) of the German armed forces against two tankers transporting fuel for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan stolen by the Taliban near Kunduz and which resulted in the deaths of a number of civilians. The Federal Prosecutor General stated:
Pursuant to § 170 para. 2 StPO [Penal Procedure Code], the investigation proceedings which were initiated by the order of 12 March 2010 against Colonel (Oberst) Klein and Company Sergeant Major (Hauptfeldwebel) Wilhelm due to suspected offences under the VStGB [International Crimes Code] and other offences are to be terminated as a result of the investigations conducted and based on the sources of information set out hereafter and on the reasons given in detail hereafter. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Federal Prosecutor General, Fuel Tankers case, Decision, 16 April 2010, p. 1.
The Federal Prosecutor General also stated:
4. Other crimes under the VStGB
Colonel (Oberst) Klein is not criminally responsible … for other crimes listed in the International Crimes Code. …
a) § 8 (1) nr. 1 German Code of Crimes against International Law punishes the killing of a person to be protected under international humanitarian law. According to the definition in § 8 para. 6 no. 2 such persons include in non-international armed conflict the wounded, sick, shipwrecked and persons not directly participating in hostilities and having fallen into the power of the adverse party. In referring to “persons in the power of the adverse party” the legislator wished to include in particular those persons who in the parallel case of international armed conflict would be considered as prisoners of war … The victims of the bombing were, however, not in captivity but in liberty. The conditions of § 8 para. 1 no. 1 are therefore not fulfilled in the present case. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Federal Prosecutor General, Fuel Tankers case, Decision, 16 April 2010, pp. 50–51.
Germany
In 2010, in the Italian Partisans case, Germany’s Federal Court of Justice was called upon to decide a case concerning the killing of nine Italian civilians in Tuscany in June 1944 by German troops. The court summarized the facts of the case as follows:
2
… Two [German] soldiers, whom the accused had tasked with obtaining transport vehicles [as part of a mission to repair a bridge], were killed by partisans in an ambush. A third [German] soldier was injured. Since the partisans had absconded after the attack, the accused, motivated by rage and revenge, decided to take retaliatory measures against the male civilian population of the area. First, he reported the incident to the battalion commander and suggested to take action against the Italian civilians which he had already planned. Agreeing with the accused’s proposal, the battalion commander ordered the [retaliatory] measure and additionally provided logistic supported by making available an antiaircraft gun and explosives. The next day, the accused ordered the arrest of all male civilians in the area. In the end, the detainees comprised a group of nine men, the oldest of whom was 67 years old and which included two adolescents who were 15 and 16 years of age. None of them had participated in the attack or was suspected of supporting the partisans. They were locked into a house.
3
Although some detainees were afraid of being shot, others assumed that they would stay alive but would be deported to a concentration camp in Germany in order to work there. Soon, however, the house was destroyed by explosion. Subsequently, and also pursuant to the accused’s order, machine guns were fired at the debris in order to kill any surviving victims. In the end, only the fifteen-year-old survived with severe injuries. …
4
On this basis, the accused was convicted on ten counts of murder and attempted murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Italian Partisans case, Decision, 25 October 2010, §§ 2–4.
The court held: “The criminal chamber [of the lower court] rightly considered the killings of the Italian civilians which had been ordered by the accused to constitute murder.” 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Italian Partisans case, Decision, 25 October 2010, § 22.
The court further held:
Such killings, which were motivated by revenge, thoroughly prepared, directed at innocent individuals whose conduct ought not have prompted any kind of retaliation, which was carried out by destroying the building by explosion and subsequently firing machine guns, cannot even be justified by the background of a situation of emergency caused by the war as a humanly understandable act of the accused. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Italian Partisans case, Decision, 25 October 2010, § 26.
The court further held: “It is not possible to justify the killings as a war reprisal permissible under the customary laws of war applicable at the time because the subjective and objective requirements for such a justification are not fulfilled.” 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Italian Partisans case, Decision, 25 October 2010, § 31.
Regarding the subjective requirements, the Court held: “In this case the accused, when committing the crime, did not think that he was acting within the legal framework of a war reprisal.” 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Italian Partisans case, Decision, 25 October 2010, § 33.
Regarding the objective requirements, the Court held:
38
b) Justifying the killing of hostages who were taken in revenge as a lawful war reprisal under the customary law of war applicable at the time is not an option here anyway … All the objective conditions necessary under the law at the time were not fulfilled. This is the case for the circumstances, selection of the victims, the way they were killed and the subsequent events.
39
(1) A regular condition for such an act [a lawful war reprisal] was that it ultimately had the purpose of maintaining public order and safety in an occupied territory (… [see inter alia Art. 43 HLKO [(1907) Hague Convention IV]). Even this condition was not fulfilled. The territory in question was not (or no longer) occupied by the Germans, the Allies were only a few kilometers away, and the accused was only temporarily in the area with his unit in order to repair a bridge which was essential for the withdrawal [of the German forces]. At the relevant point in time, there was no longer any authorization or obligation whatsoever to ensure public order and the safety of the local population. The Federal Court of Justice considered “preventive killings” in order to fend off potential future dangers as “criminal” (BGH [Federal Court of Justice], Judgment of 30 September 1960 - 4 StR 242/60, BGHSt 15, 214, 217). …
40
(2) War reprisals were limited by the so-called barrier of humanity (Humanitätsschranke). Even though a humane way of killing is barely conceivable, in particular not today, the law at the time at least recognized the prohibition of reprisals against women and children …
41
The accused argues that the victims who were 15 and 16 years of age were not children. The Court does not share this view. The term child is not uniformly defined in law. … The equation of women with children at the time means in the view of this Court that war reprisals ought not to be taken against those who cannot at all become regular soldiers (women) or who cannot yet become regular soldiers (children). According to the law in force in Italy at the time regulating compulsory military service, the obligation to provide military service only began at the age of 17 … . Thus, the two adolescents affected by the retaliatory measure would not have been subject to compulsory military service. For this reason, the Court considers that they must be considered children for the present purposes.
42
(3) The way in which the killing was carried out is often considered a central aspect in determining the “humanity” of a killing in the context of a reprisal … The destruction of a building by explosion in which the victims, unaware of their fate, were detained, is considered a humiliating and degrading and therefore inhumane way of killing which is not justified under the laws of war. The same is true for the subsequent and additional killing by firing machine guns …
43
(4) The least controversial condition for the lawfulness of a war reprisal in this context was the so-called notification, i.e. the public declaration of the event … The purpose of the notification was, on the one hand, to repel future repetitions of attacks against the occupying power … and, on the other hand, to demonstrate “that the measures taken were in the interest of enforcing the law … and thus did not have to be concealed” … There was no such notification. …
44
c) … [T]he finding of the criminal chamber [of the lower court] that the objective requirements for a permissible war reprisal were not fulfilled is fully confirmed. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Italian Partisans case, Decision, 25 October 2010, §§ 38–44.
Greece
In its judgment in Prefecture of Voiotia case in 1997, Greece’s Court of First Instance of Leivadia stated:
[T]he occupant is obliged to respect, during the administration of the occupied land, the legislation of the latter (article 43 of the fourth Hague Convention 1907) as well as international law, including the provisions of the Regulation of Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the fourth Hague Convention (19th October 1907) … especially the provision of article 46, according to which “… the lives of persons … must be respected”. This rule is generally accepted as constituting peremptory international customary law (jus cogens). 
Greece, Court of First Instance of Leivadia, Prefecture of Voiotia case, Judgment of 30 October 1997.
Israel
In its judgment in the Eichmann case in 1962, Israel’s District Court of Jerusalem found the accused guilty of “crimes against the Jewish people … in the territories of the Axis States, in the area occupied by Germany and by the Axis States”. The Court found the accused “caused the killings of millions of Jews for the purpose of executing the plan known as the ‘Final Solution’ with the intent to exterminate the Jewish people”. The Court also found the accused responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes for murder and extermination of the civilian population carried out to persecute Jews. 
Israel, District Court of Jerusalem, Eichmann case, Judgment, 12 December 1961.
Israel
In its judgment in the Eichmann case in 1962, Israel’s Supreme Court confirmed the sentence of the District Court of Jerusalem, which found the appellant, Adolf Eichmann, guilty of “offences of the most gravity against the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law”, in particular the killing of millions of Jews for the purpose of carrying out the “Final Solution” with the intent to exterminate the Jewish people through murder and extermination of the civilian Jewish population. 
Israel, Supreme Court, Eichmann case, Judgment, 29 May 1962.
Israel
In its judgment in the Murar case in 2006, Israel’s High Court of Justice stated:
It is well-known that the right to life and physical integrity is the most basic right that lies at the heart of the humanitarian laws that are intended to protect the local population in the territories held under the laws of belligerent occupation (see HCJ 3799/02 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. IDF Central Commander [7], at para. 23 of the opinion of President Barak). This right is also enshrined in Israeli constitutional law in ss. 2 and 4 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and there is no doubt at all that this is a right that is on the highest normative echelon (see HCJ 1730/96 Sabiah v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], at p. 368; HCJ 2753/03 Kirsch v. IDF Chief of Staff [9], at pp. 377–378). All the residents of the territories – both Palestinians and Israelis – are therefore entitled to enjoy the right to life and physical integrity, and a fundamental and primary criterion that the military commander should consider when deciding to close areas is the criterion of the protection of the life and physical integrity of all the residents in the territories. 
Israel, High Court of Justice, Murar case, Judgment, 26 June 2006, § 14.
Netherlands
In its judgment in the Motosuke case in 1948, the Temporary Court Martial at Amboina in the Netherlands charged the accused, an officer in the Japanese army, with the unlawful execution of four Indonesian civilians. The first victim was summarily executed by a firing squad on the orders of the accused for allegedly firing at a Japanese soldier. The other three victims were similarly executed by a firing squad on the orders of the accused, based on a sentence passed by a Japanese Military Court. The Temporary Court Martial at Amboina found that the victims had not received a proper trial and that the accused was therefore guilty of murder. 
Netherlands, Temporary Court-Martial at Amboina, Motosuke case, Judgment, 28 January 1948.
Netherlands
In its judgment in the Silbertanne Murder case in 1946, the Special Court of Cassation of the Netherlands found the accused guilty of the murders of anti-German Dutch civilians, committed in reprisal for attacks on enemy supporters by members of the resistance. The Court considered the murders to be in violation of Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which obliges the Occupant to respect the lives of individuals. 
Netherlands, Special Court of Cassation, Silbertanne Murders case, Judgment, 24 June 1946.
Netherlands
In its judgment in the Enkelstroth case in 1948, the Special Court (War Criminals) at Arnhem in the Netherlands found the accused, a German officer, guilty of shooting, without trial, four people arrested by the German Security Service. The Court considered the murders to be in violation of Articles 30 and 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. 
Netherlands, Special Court (War Criminals) at Arnhem, Enkelstroth case, Judgment, 20 February 1948.
Netherlands
In its judgment in the Burghof case in 1949, the Special Court of Cassation found the accused, a member of the German Military Security Service in Rotterdam, guilty of shooting a number of people without trial and partly as a form of reprisal. The Court found that the killing of innocent civilians in occupied territory amounted to a war crime. 
Netherlands, Special Court of Cassation, Burghof case, Judgment, 17 October 1949.
Norway
In its judgment in the Hans case in 1947, the Court of Appeal found the accused, an officer in the German Security Police, guilty of the execution of Norwegian subjects during the occupation of Norway by Germany. The Court found that the occupying power had no right to execute subjects of occupied territory without a trial by an appropriate tribunal. 
Norway, Court of Appeal, Hans case, Judgment, 17 January 1947.
Peru
In 2006, in the Lucanmarca case, the Second Provisional Criminal Chamber of Peru’s Supreme Court of Justice stated:
International human rights law, international humanitarian law and Peru’s Political Constitution recognise the right to life …
In international humanitarian law, Article 3 common to the [1949] Geneva Conventions prohibits in non-international armed conflicts attempts on the life and physical integrity of civilians, in particular murder in all its forms. 
Peru, Supreme Court of Justice, Second Provisional Criminal Chamber, Lucanmarca case, Case No. 560-03, Judgment of 13 October 2006, p. 209.
Peru
In 2009, in the Fujimori case, the Special Criminal Chamber of Peru’s Supreme Court of Justice was called upon to decide whether the former Peruvian president … was criminally responsible for acts committed in 1991 and 1992 in the context of anti-terror operations. [He] was charged with various offences under domestic criminal law, including murder in relation to events that took place in Barrios Altos and at the so-called La Cantuta university in Lima. The court summarized the facts as follows:
[The murders] that occurred in the Barrios Altos neighbourhood and on Ramiro Prialé Avenue, that the crime [of murder] … were prepared in advance. This presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan, at least in terms of an outline for implementation. A special intelligence detachment was created for this purpose with the specific mission, inter alia, of killing those deemed to have links to the political or military apparatus of the “Shining Path” terrorist organization.
The direct perpetrators acted with absolute cold-bloodedness and determination in what they understood to be a military operation to eliminate members of Shining Path. To this end, they deliberately and stealthily entered the Jiron Huanta-Barrios Altos neighbourhood and the National University of Education “Enrique Guzman y Valle”, [also known as] La Cantuta, where they pretended to be conducting a search operation for terrorists in student and faculty buildings. They surprised the victims, who were not expecting such an operation, and proceeded to subdue and kill them using their weapons of war.
In the first case [in Barrios Altos], they entered the building at 840 Jiron Huanta, taking advantage of the fact that the victims were busy with a fundraising event. They singled out some of those present and shot them without any consideration whatsoever, even murdering a little boy. In the second case, under the guise of an operation to identify potential subversives, they entered the La Cantuta university – which was under military control at the time – and selected individuals whom they deemed to be members of Shining Path based on a previous identification process. They took these individuals to an open area on Ramiro Prialé Avenue, and executed them without further authority using the weapons of war they carried. They subsequently buried and burned the bodies to cover up the crime they had committed. 
Peru, Supreme Court of Justice, Fujimori case, 7 April 2009, § 700.
The court held:
[These] murders were carried out pursuant to a previously conceived plan, and, at least outwardly, the manner in which the crime was committed exhibited patterns inherent to military operations, albeit in deviation from and in breach of military regulations. The plan was clearly based on disregard for human life and on overt defiance of the basic rules of civilized society, of the very essence of military honour, and of the guidelines governing engagements and the treatment of a defeated or unarmed enemy. 
Peru, Supreme Court of Justice, Fujimori case, 7 April 2009, § 701.
Next, the Court considered whether the incidents in Barrios Altos and at La Cantuta university were crimes against humanity. The court held:
[T]he acts that occurred in Barrios Altos and at La Cantuta [university] can evidently be subsumed under … [crimes against humanity]. Nonetheless, this finding must be limited [in the present case]. Therefore, (i) … [although the] provisions [on crimes against humanity], whose core is represented by the [1945] Nuremberg Statute, are part of customary international law; (ii) the constitutional requirements of the principle of legality in criminal proceedings must be taken into account … and it must therefore be recognized that from the perspective of substantive law, at the time when the crimes were committed – in 1991 and 1992 – there was no law that would have incorporated into domestic criminal law a crime that included, on the one hand, all elements of the definition of the … [crime against humanity of murder] under customary international law (not even the present legislator has complied with the requirements flowing from the ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court by the State of Peru), and, on the other hand, the corresponding sanction. [Nevertheless,] … (iii) the serious violation of individual human rights manifested in the conduct prohibited by crimes against humanity … cannot have been unknown and unforeseeable for the perpetrator. 
Peru, Supreme Court of Justice, Fujimori case, 7 April 2009, § 711.
The court considered the definition of murder as a crime against humanity and held:
[M]urder has been characterized as a crime against humanity if it results from or is an expression of a systematic attack by a State or by its executive organs supported or fuelled by official or quasi-official policies or directives, and which affects the civilian population in conjunction with a belligerent or social conflict. 
Peru, Supreme Court of Justice, Fujimori case, 7 April 2009, § 714(2).
[footnotes in original omitted]
The court further held:
The murders and serious injuries that occurred in Barrios Altos and at La Cantuta [university] are also crimes that manifest a State policy of selectively eliminating alleged members of subversive groups. …
It has been demonstrated that it was a State decision, ordered and approved by the Chief of State and carried out by military intelligence bodies – the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment and DINTE [Army Directorate of Intelligence] – ultimately directed by the SIN [National Intelligence Service], with every conceivable form of official support, whose ultimate objective was the forced disappearance and/or arbitrary or extrajudicial murder of alleged subversives. In this context, Barrios Altos and La Cantuta were two, though not the only, significant events. 
Peru, Supreme Court of Justice, Fujimori case, 7 April 2009, § 717.
[footnote in original omitted]
Peru
In 2009, in the Armed Forces case, 31 members of Peru’s Congress requested that Peru’s Constitutional Court declare unconstitutional Article 7(1)–(2) of Law No. 29166 of 20 December 2007 which establishes rules on the use of force by members of the armed forces on Peruvian territory. On 9 September 2009, the Court held:
57. … [T]he second paragraph of Article 7 of Law No. 29166 states the following:
58. If military personnel participates in the control of internal order in accordance with its constitutional function during situations in which a state of emergency has been declared; or in support of the control of internal order in situations in which a state of emergency has not been declared, it may use force under the following conditions:
a. [The use of force must be] [i]n accordance with the assigned mission.
b. Legitimate defence: This is the right of a member of the military to use force against acts which put his or her life or physical integrity at risk, as well as the life or physical integrity of personnel under his or her protection.
c. Hostile act: This is an attack or the unlawful use of weapons which threatens the life or physical integrity of individuals, or which results in injuries or destruction of public property, private property or military installations.
d. Hostile intent: This is the threat or attempt to unlawfully use weapons demonstrated by the carrying out of acts in preparation of a hostile act.
In the aforementioned situations, with the exception of paragraph d), and if necessary, military personnel may use lethal force.
60. The main problem is that this provision conflates concepts of International Humanitarian Law regarding the conduct of hostilities in armed conflict with the use of force in situations of internal disturbances and tensions, in which International Human Rights Law is the applicable legal framework.
63. Since the Armed Forces must have a clear legal framework for their actions and use of force, Congress must adopt a brief law which regulates the use of force in the following situations: (i) the conduct of hostilities under International Humanitarian Law applicable in armed conflict; and (ii) the use of force in situations in which a state of emergency can be declared or in situations of internal tensions in which International Human Rights Law is applicable.
64. In the development of this law, Congress must take the United Nations Principles on the Use of Lethal Force as a basis:
a) The use of lethal force by military personnel is regulated by the Constitution and by treaties of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, depending on the circumstances.
b) The use of force and the use of lethal force may only be used in exceptional circumstances and as a last resort with the aim of reducing the risk of unnecessary damage.
c) ... [L]ethal force must only be used if it is strictly inevitable and reasonable in order to protect the right to life or another fundamental legal good.
d) Military personnel must give a warning, if possible, before using force and lethal force.
e) The use of force does not include the use of fire arms and ammunition which may cause unintended injuries or which may constitute an unjustified risk to third parties.
f) The competent authority may open an official investigation if there are reasonable indications that the means of force employed did not comply with the previously established norms.
66. Nevertheless, Congress must adopt within six months of the publication of the present decision a law which regulates the use of force by the Armed Forces. This law shall be divided into two parts:
a) a first part concerning the use of force in situations of armed conflict regulated by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols;
b) a second part which regulates the use of force in states of emergency, internal tensions or riots in accordance with International … [Human Rights] Law. At the same time, these rules must comply with the common principles recognized by the United Nations set out in this decision. 
Peru, Constitutional Court, Armed forces case, 9 September 2009, §§ 57–58, 60, 63–64 and 66.
[emphasis in original]
On 9 September, the Court also held:
1. Declares the request for unconstitutionality partially FOUNDED. Consequently:
a. The second part of the second paragraph of Article 7 of Law No. 29166, which provides that “in the aforementioned situations, (...) and if necessary, military personnel may use lethal force”, is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Until a new law on this matter is adopted, the rules set out in paragraph 64 above apply. 
Peru, Constitutional Court, Armed forces case, 9 September 2009, § 1(a).
On 17 September 2009, the Court clarified:
With respect to the [above quoted] rule contained in paragraph 64(a) and (b) … which distinguishes between “the use of force” and “the use of lethal force”, the decision [of 9 September 2009] is clear in that it is considers it necessary for Parliament to establish the framework for the use of force and lethal force in accordance with the Constitution and the relevant human rights and international humanitarian law treaties. “Use of force”, without the adjacent adjective “lethal”, refers to any use of force that is not intended to cause death. 
Peru, Constitutional Court, Armed Forces case, 17 September 2009, § 2.
In the presence of the defendant, the Public Prosecutor and the plaintiff, and in public:
The acts that [Dusingize] has been accused of:
The Court
Considering the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses stating that they saw everything that Alexis Dusingize did; including: [witness VNK], who was one of the witnesses who saw [Dusingize] during the attack that Alexis Dusingize was in command of and who saw that, during this attack, … the witness’ younger brother … was discovered while in hiding and killed.
Considering that Alexis Dusingize accepts that he left Nyamata on motorbike and headed towards Kibenga accompanied by his followers;
Considering that Alexis Dusingize accepts that he requested to see identity cards at the roadblocks; …
Considering that those who are seeking compensation have declared that their property was pillaged or that their property was destroyed during the hostilities and that members of their families were victims of the hostilities, and, therefore, they must be compensated for all of this by Alexis Dusingize along with the Rwandan State as he was an authority responsible for assisting the mayor of the Commune of Kanzenze;
Concluding that Alexis Dusingize knew the objective of the murders as he brought his family by motorbike to a place of refuge via the public highway while claiming that he was a wanted man;
Finds that, upon returning to his home in Kibenga, he went to the roadblock; a fact which he himself accepts.
Considering that Alexis Dusingize committed the act of identifying Tutsis in order to separate them from the others and that he himself admits to having committed these acts;
Considering the attacks that he has been accused of, and which he was the leader of, led to the extermination of a number of people, which he himself accepts;
Considering that the evidence from the Prosecutor is well founded;
On returning from his place of refuge, Alexis Dusingize did not undertake the work which he was responsible for in the Commune of Kanzenze, but instead left for Kigali where he had found work in the Ministry of Public Works where he was arrested;
For all these well-founded reasons, in the presence of the defendant and the Public Prosecutor … ;
Pursuant to Decree No. 08/75 of 12/02/1975 [approving and ratifying various international conventions on human rights, disarmament, and the prevention and repression of acts that may endanger peace between people and nations], Article 2 of the [2000] ICTR [International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda] [Statute] established with a view to prosecuting the criminals responsible for the genocide in Rwanda, and Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30/08/1996 on the organization of prosecutions for offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity committed since 1 October 1990;
Pursuant to Articles 91 and 312 of Books I and II of the Rwandan Penal Code;
Having regard to Articles 281, 282 and 283 as amended of Book II of the Rwandan Penal Code (RPC);
Having regard to Articles 91 and 168 as amended of Books I and II of the RPC;
Having regard to Articles 27 [stating that the Public Prosecution Department represents, as of right or upon request, the civil interests of minors and others who do not have legal representation] and 30 [on liability for damages for criminal acts committed and on awarding damages to victims not yet identified] as amended of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30/08/1996 referred to above, with Article 2 of the Organic Law placing him in Category 1 [subparagraph] “b” [of the offenders listed therein];
Confirms that the offences that Alexis Dusingize is accused of having committed are well-founded;
Confirms that the four offences that Alexis Dusingize has been accused of are well-founded, as detailed in the accusations that were made, and were committed in ideal concurrence of offences, which is why he must receive the death penalty as punishment;
Dismisses Alexis Dusingize, sentences him to death and orders that all [of his] property be seized from wherever it may be located. 
Rwanda, Court of First Instance of Nyamata, Dusingize case, Judgment, 12 March 1997, pp. 1–2.
Charges [brought against Gatanazi]:
Charges:
- Between 07/04/1994 and 17/07/1994, in the Gisenyi sector in the Commune of Rubavu, Gisenyi Prefecture in the Republic of Rwanda, was either the perpetrator, co-perpetrator or an accomplice, as provided for in Articles 89, 90, and 91 of Book I of the Rwandan Penal Code, in the commission of the crime of genocide as provided for in Articles 1, 2, 3, and 4 [on the crime of genocide] of the Convention [on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide] of 09/12/1948, Articles 146 and 147 [on grave breaches and the obligation to prosecute them] of the [Geneva] Convention [IV] of 12/08/1949 and Articles 1 and 2 [on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity and on the applicability of the Convention to representatives of the State authorities and private individuals who participate in or incite others to the commission of any of these crimes] of the Convention [on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity] of 26/11/1968. All three of [these Conventions] have been ratified by Rwanda through Decree No. 08/75, and through Articles 1 [on the general purpose of the law], 2 [classifying persons accused of offences into categories], 3 [on the definition of an accomplice and criminal responsibility of superiors for acts referred to in this organic law committed by a subordinate if the superior knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish or prevent such acts], 4, 5, 6 and 7 [on the rules and procedures governing the Confession and Guilty Plea Procedure and the accused's right and interest to participate in this] of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30/08/1996 [on the organization of prosecutions for offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity committed since 1 October 1990];
Charges brought against Jules Baritima:
- Under the same circumstances of time and place, was either the perpetrator, co-perpetrator or an accomplice, as provided for in Articles 89, 90 and 91 of Book I of the Rwandan Penal Code, in the murder of [victim K and victim R];
- Under the same circumstances of time and place, were the perpetrators of the murder of [victim DK] and his mother …, with this offence being punishable under Article 312 of Book II of the Penal Code;
- Under the same circumstances of time and place, acting as perpetrators, co-perpetrators or as accomplices, as provided for in Articles 89, 90 and 91 of Book I of the Penal Code, committed the offence of devastation, pillage and massacre, with this offence being punishable under Article168 of Book II of the Penal Code;
Charges:
In relation to Faustin Ntaganda and Faustin Bimenyimana, at Rond Point in Kinigi, in the Gihora sector, in the Commune of Kiningi, Ruhengeri Prefecture, … on an undetermined date in January 1991, acting as perpetrators, co-perpetrators or as each other’s accomplices, … [a]s provided for in Article 3 of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30/08/1996 [on the organization of prosecutions for offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity committed since 1 October 1990] and Article 90 of Book 1 of the Rwandan Penal Code, they committed the premeditated murder of … [11 victims] with the aim of exterminating the Tutsi ethnic group. [This amounts to] the crime of genocide as laid down in the International Conventions of 09/12/1948 [on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide] and of 26/11/1968 [on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity] as ratified by our country in Decree No. 08/75 of 12/02/1975 and punishable under Articles 2 [classifying persons accused of offences into categories] and 14 [specifying the penalties imposed for offences committed under the Organic Law] of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30/08/1996;
Under the same circumstances of time and place, acting as perpetrators, co-perpetrators or as each other’s accomplices, as provided for in Article 90 of [Book I of the Penal Code] and Article 3 [on the definition of an accomplice and on criminal responsibility of superiors for acts referred to in this organic law committed by a subordinate if the superior knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish or prevent such acts] of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30/08/1996, [Faustin Ntaganda and Faustin Bimenyimana] committed the premeditated murder of … [11 victims], with such a criminal offence provided for and punishable under Article 3/2 of [Book II of the Penal Code];
Under the same circumstances of time and place, as perpetrators, co-perpetrators or as each other’s accomplices, as provided for in Article 90 of [Book I of the Penal Code] and Article 3 of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30/08/1996, they attempted to kill … [eight victims]. Malicious intent is unequivocally proven by these acts upon commencement of the commission of the offence, that is to say through striking [the victims] with machetes, throwing stones at them, shooting at them and leaving them for dead. The crime was not completed for reasons beyond the control of the perpetrators. This criminal offence is contained in and punishable under Articles 21 and 22 of [Book I of the Penal Code] and 3/2 of [Book II of the Penal Code];
In relation to Faustin Ntaganda, Faustin Bimenyimana and Innocent Nzakira:
At Gikeri, Musange sector, in the Commune of Kinigi, Ruhengeri Prefecture, … on 25/05/1994, as perpetrators, co-perpetrators or as each other’s accomplices, as provided for in Article 90 of [Book I of the Penal Code] and Article 3 of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30/08/1996, they committed the premeditated murder of [victim K] with the aim of exterminating those who opposed the regime of the day, with such a crime being contained in the International Conventions of 26/11/1968, as ratified by Rwanda in Decree No. 08/75 of 12/02/1975, and punishable under Articles 2 [classifying persons accused of offences into categories] and 14 [specifying the penalties imposed for offences committed under the Organic Law] of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30/08/1996;
Under the same circumstances of time and place, as perpetrators, co-perpetrators or as each other’s accomplices, as provided for in Article 90 of [Book I of the Penal Code] and Article 3 of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30/08/1996, they committed the premeditated murder of [victim K], with such a crime contained in and punishable under Article 312 of [Book II of the Penal Code].
The Court of Appeal of Ruhengeri:
Considering that … the judgment [of the Specialized Chamber of the Court of First Instance of Ruhengeri, Case No. RP 001/R1/97] was delivered on 20/03/1997 in following terms:
Considering that … the [Prosecution] … asks that the judgment of the lower court be confirmed with the exception of the damages claimed from Bimenyimana in relation to the death of … [victim K].
After the proceedings, the Court [of Appeal of Ruhengeri]… issued the following judgment:
[The Court f]inds that while the lower court [the Court of First Instance of Ruhengeri] held that Ntaganda collaborated with Nzakira in order to kill [victim K], the eyewitnesses, in particular [witness S] at whose home the victim was killed, stated that Bimenyimana and Ntaganda had remained passive while Nzakira shot [victim K], meaning it is clear that they were unable to do anything in such a crowd of soldiers when they were civilians;
Finds that Ntaganda and Bimenyimana do not have to pay damages for [victim K] as they were not the ones who killed him and that it is rather Nzakira who is liable for this;
Finds that the other decisions made by the Court [of First Instance] that relate to the grounds of appeal put forward, comply with the relevant legal provisions in force;
Based on all of the above established reasons:
Having regard to Articles 93 [on court hearings being public, with the exception of those held in closed session when public disclosure poses a threat to public order or decency] and 94 [on all judgments being reasoned and pronounced in open court] of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 10/06/1991;
Having regard to the protocol to the Arusha Peace Agreement on power-sharing of 30/10/1992, particularly Articl[e] 26 [on the recognition of specific ordinary and military jurisdictions of the judiciary while specifying the law may establish any other specialized courts]… ;
Having regard to Articles 109 [stating that the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear appeals against judgment handed down by the Court of First Instance], 135 [on the definition and objective of a civil action] and 136 [on when a civil action may be pursued at the same times as or separately from any criminal proceedings] of Decree No. 09/80 of 7 July 1980 determining the Organization and Jurisdiction of Courts;
Having regard to Articles 90 [on the format that any judgment must take and the information it should contain] and 99 [on the right to lodge an appeal and who has the right to do so] of the Law of 23/02/1963 determining the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended and supplemented by Decree No. 07/82 of 07/01/1982;
Having regard to Articles 21 and 22 of Book I of the Rwandan Penal Code, and Article 312 of Book II of the Rwandan Penal Code;
Having regard to Articles 2(b) [which states that persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, prefectoral, communal, sector or cell level, or in a political party, the army, religious organizations or in a militia and who perpetrated or fostered such crimes fall within Category One of offenders for the purpose of the Organic Law], 3 [on the definition of an accomplice and criminal responsibility of superiors for acts referred to in this organic law committed by a subordinate if the superior knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish or prevent such acts], and 14(a) [which states that persons whose acts place them in Category One are liable to the death penalty] and 24 [on when decisions of the Specialized Chambers may be subject to opposition and appeal] of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30/08/1996 on the organization of prosecutions for offences constituting the crime of genocide [or crimes against humanity committed since 1 October 1990];
Having regard to International Conventions of 09/12/1948 on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and of 26/11/1968 on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity;
Having regard to Decree No. 08/75 of 12/02/1975 on Rwanda ratifying these Conventions;
Ruling on the documents submitted by the parties:
Declares that the appeal lodged by Bimenyimana is well-founded as the survivors of the massacre state that he was not at Rond Point at the point at which they had gathered them together, which is corroborated by his statement that he was at Musanze in Kigombe;
Declares that Bimenyimana and Ntaganda were not involved in the killing of [victim K] as the eyewitnesses, particularly [witness S] at whose home the victim was killed, have confirmed this, and that it was rather Nzakira who had spent the day searching for him and who shot him;
Declares that it was in fact soldiers who killed the 11 innocent victims and also attempted to kill eight others, but did not manage to do so, as confirmed by the survivors;
Declares that the soldiers who committed [these murders] had Ntaganda as their accomplice who showed them where Tutsis were living. Thus, he must be punished on the basis of Article 312 of Book II of the Penal Code;
Declares that the doctor’s report and the one provided by Bimenyimana are of no use to Ntaganda and Nzakira as they do not exonerate them of the criminal offence of murder that everybody accuses them of;
Declares that Bimenyimana is acquitted[.] 
Rwanda, Court of Appeal of Ruhengeri, Ntaganda and others case, Judgment, 24 June 1998, pp. 2–10 and 13–18.
Charges:
Charges [brought against the accused]:
… [T]he Court … delivered its judgment in public in the following terms:
Finds that the Public Prosecutor has lodged an appeal on the grounds that, of the four charges brought, namely: the crime of genocide, murder of [victim M], criminal association, and non-assistance to persons in danger, the Court [of First Instance] considered that only the charge brought against the accused of non-assistance to persons in danger had been established because he did not help [victim U] and that this shows a lack of understanding of the statements made by the 12 witnesses for the prosecution; and that [the Court of First Instance] sentenced him to a minimum sentence (two years imprisonment) whereas the Public Prosecutor was seeking a life sentence[.] … [The Court of Appeal notes that] Muhoza and his lawyer … cite the incompetence of the lower court as their ground of appeal because, from the moment Muhoza was acquitted of the crimes of genocide and murder, as well as the offence of involvement in a criminal association, the Court [of First Instance] did not have the jurisdiction to hear the action with respect to the offence of non-assistance to persons in danger as provided for and punishable under Article 256 of Book II of the Penal Code, and, in any case, he did not commit this offence;
Finds that the lower court based its finding on the testimony of the witnesses called by the Public Prosecutor and found that the charges brought against Muhoza of the crimes of the murder of [victim M] and of involvement in a criminal association with a view to committing genocide had not been established due to contradictions that were apparent in the testimony of the witnesses, especially in relation to the date and location of [victim M’s] death[.] … [Witness MU] states that [victim M] died … on 08/04/1994, [witness KA] claims that [victim M] was killed 05/05/1994 after being forced out of hiding … , [witness NT] says that he saw [victim M] with his own eyes at the moment when he was found at the Beau Séjour bar, while [witnesses ND and UW] claim that their testimony is based on what [another] had reported to them as they were already at the Milles Collines hotel at the time of [victim M’s] death. The acquittal is consistent with the statements of the witnesses who signed document No. 425/09/95 of 20/09/1995 issued by … [a] member of the Nyabitare cell, and … , following on from the hearing of the 15 witnesses who were survivors from the area where Muhoza was residing at the time of the genocide, even the authorities of the Commune of Nyarugenge who issued Muhoza with a certificate of good conduct, character and moral standards dated 26/09/1995, which shows that his behaviour during 1994 is irreproachable.
Finds that the Specialized Chamber of the Court of First Instance of Kigali, having acquitted [Muhoza] of the crime of genocide, was not competent to pursue the offence of non-assistance to persons in danger, a point which the Public Prosecutor, the accused, Muhoza, and his lawyer unanimously agree on, and that the lower court had been called upon to decide on crimes of genocide, but it ruled on a common law offence. This has been confirmed by Daniel de Beer, in collaboration with Cyiza, Gasasira, Kanubana, Mugenzi and Rwagasore, on page 41 of his book [providing a commentary on the Organic Law on the organization of prosecutions for offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity] published by Alter Ego Editions in 1997, where he states: “It should be noted that non-assistance to persons in danger (Article 256 of the RPC B.II [Book II of the Rwandan Penal Code]) falls within those offences which cannot be pursued under the Organic Law, as this offence cannot be regarded as relating to the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity. The criminal offence must be one of murder, killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, or other inhumane acts”;
Finds that the crimes of genocide, which Muhoza has been prosecuted for, have not been established as the Public Prosecutor has not provided tangible evidence in support of these charges given that contradictions are apparent amongst the testimonies gathered, as explained in the “second finding” above;
For these reasons:
Having regard to the fundamental law of the Republic of Rwanda, particularly Articles 93 [on court hearings being public, with the exception of those held in closed session when public disclosure poses a threat to public order or decency] and 94 [on all judgments being reasoned and pronounced in open court] of the Constitutions of 10/06/1991;
Having regard to Article 109 [stating that the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear appeals against judgments handed down by the Court of First Instance] of … Decree [No. 09/80 of 7 July 1980] determining the Organization and Jurisdiction of Courts;
Having regard to Article 99, 4° of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
Having regard to Articles 1 [on the general purpose of the law], 2 [classifying persons accused of offences into categories], 14 [specifying the penalties imposed for offences committed under the Organic Law], 19 [on the establishment and jurisdiction of Specialized Chambers within the Tribunals of First Instance and the military courts] and Article 24 [on when decisions of the Specialized Chambers may be subject to opposition and appeal] of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30/08/1996 on the organization of prosecutions for offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity [committed since 1 October 1990];
Ruling on the admissibility of the appeal lodged by the Public Prosecutor as it complies with the relevant legal requirements, having duly examined it, [the appeal] is declared unfounded;
Ruling on the admissibility of Muhoza and his lawyer’s … appeal as it complies with the relevant legal requirements, [the appeal] is declared founded;
Decides in favour of the acquittal of Ernest Muhoza and, accordingly, finds him innocent;
Orders the immediate release of Muhoza[.] 
Rwanda, Court of Appeal of Kigali, Muhoza case, Judgment, 17 June 1999, pp. 162 and 175–176.
South Africa
In its judgment in the Basson II case in 2005, South Africa’s Constitutional Court stated:
There can be no doubt that the use of instruments of state to murder captives long after resistance had ceased would in the 1980s, as before and after, have grossly transgressed even the most minimal standards of international humanitarian law. 
South Africa, Constitutional Court, Basson II case¸ Judgment, 9 September 2005, § 179.
Spain
In 2010, in the Couso case, the Criminal Chamber of Spain’s Supreme Court was called upon to decide an appeal in the case concerning the killing of a Spanish journalist in Baghdad on 8 April 2003 by troops of the United States of America. In deciding upon one of the issues raised in the appeal on breach of the law, the Court held:
[T]he application … of Article 614 PC [Penal Code (1995)] on its own or in combination with the offence of homicide in Article 138 or of manslaughter in Article 142 PC, in so far as they concern civilians “protected” by the [1949] IV Geneva Convention and its [1977] Additional Protocol, is claimed [by the appellants]. 
Spain, Supreme Court, Couso case, Judgment, 13 July 2010, Section II(II), Sexto, § 1, p. 11.
[emphasis in original]
The court also referred to norms of IHL relevant to the case under review, including Article 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV. 
Spain, Supreme Court, Couso case, Judgment, 13 July 2010, Section II(II), Sexto, § 2, p. 13.
The court upheld the appeal concerning breach of the law and held:
The appealed decision declared the termination of the proceedings … as it considered that the “facts [of] the case did not constitute an offence” … [H]owever, the proceedings carried out do not permit sharing the conclusions of the first instance tribunal; rather, the facts [denounced] merit being subsumed under the cited penal provisions and the aforementioned norms of International Humanitarian Law. 
Spain, Supreme Court, Couso case, Judgment, 13 July 2010, Section II(II), Sexto, § 2, p. 16.
[emphasis in original]
The court further held:
1. It is held that the last indictment order qualified the acts as the offence of homicide according to Article 138 PC in combination with an offence against the international community according to Article 611(1) PC.
It is also understood that the participation in the death of Mr. Carlos Jesús by the accused Sergeant Bruno, Captain Horacio and Lieutenant Coronel Rubén has even been admitted by several extra procedural documents that have been handed over … by the US authorities. The classification of the victims as protected civilians, in accordance with the IV Geneva Convention and its Protocol are also not called into question. All of the above sets forth the legal basis for the indictment order …
2. Due to its similarity with the previous issue [raised in the appeal], the current [issue] must be assessed through the reasoning adopted in the former. 
Spain, Supreme Court, Couso case, Judgment, 13 July 2010, Section II(II), Séptimo, §§ 1–2, p. 16; see also Sexto, § 2, p. 16.
[emphasis in original]
The court also held:
1. It is understood that jurisprudence only requires that there be a belief that an offence has been likely committed in order to institute proceedings, without it being necessary to certify that the accused persons are the authors of the offence, as determining the certainty of the existence [of an offence] is the responsibility of the sentencing tribunal. …
2. Due to their similarity with this matter, we must refer to what has been said in relation to the fifth and sixth issues raised by the previous appellants concerning the existence of rational indications of the commission of an offence which violate the ius in bello, namely the norms of International Humanitarian Law that must be observed by belligerents.
… [I]t is important to note that the principle of self-defence cannot be applied even in the case of military operations that are supposedly defensive or in response to real prior aggressions … when a belligerent commits any of the actions classified as contrary to the Law of War, such as attacking in any of the described manners those considered to be “protected persons” according to Article 608 of the PC, regardless of the penalty for the results of such acts as provided in Article 611(1) of the same code … [T]here is no doubt that in the case of the [current] proceedings [the acts] can be classified as the offence of homicide according to Article 138 PC. 
Spain, Supreme Court, Couso case, Judgment, 13 July 2010, Section II(III), Octavo, §§ 1–2, pp. 17–18.
[emphasis in original]
The court upheld the appeal against the order of 23 October 2009 by the Third Section of the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish National Court, which declared the termination of the proceedings, and held that “the proceedings must continue, and the outstanding preparatory enquiries must be undertaken, as well as any others arising from the clarification of the events under investigation.” 
Spain, Supreme Court, Couso case, Judgment, 13 July 2010, Section III, pp. 20–21.
Uganda
In the Kotido Field Court Martial case in 2008, which related to a Field Court Martial held in 2002 that had, within the space of three hours, resulted in the indictment, conviction and then execution of two soldiers for the crime of murder, Uganda’s Constitutional Court unanimously ruled that accused persons in Field Court Martials were entitled, as of right, to appeal through the Military Courts system up to the Supreme Court. In the lead judgment, Twinomujuni J stated
Article 22(1) of the Constitution provides:
Protection of Right to Life
(1) No person shall be deprived of life intentionally except in execution of a sentence passed in a fair trial by a court of competent jurisdiction in respect of a criminal offence under the laws of Uganda and the conviction and sentence have been confirmed by the highest appellate court. 
Uganda, Constitutional Court, Kotido Field Court Martial case, Judgment, 5 February 2008, p. 28.
Twinomujuni J also stated:
On the afternoon of the 25th March 2002, at exactly 12.50 pm they [the two accused soldiers] were indicted before a Field Court Martial presided over by Col. Sula Semakula and eight other soldiers. They were tried, convicted and three hours after their indictment, they were sentenced to death and executed by a firing squad.  
Uganda, Constitutional Court, Kotido Field Court Martial case, Judgment, 5 February 2008, pp. 22–23.
[emphasis in original]
Twinomujuni J further stated:
I stated earlier in this judgment that article 45 supra of our Constitution clearly states that Chapter IV of the Constitution is not exhaustive of fundamental human rights and freedoms available to the people of Uganda. An automatic right of appeal where one’s fundamental rights and freedoms have been violated is one good example. In the instant case the accused persons in the Kotido trial were entitled to a right to life guaranteed under article 22(1) of the Constitution. The right of appeal was therefore automatic. A denial of that right was clearly unconstitutional. 
Uganda, Constitutional Court, Kotido Field Court Martial case, Judgment, 5 February 2008, p. 36.
Twinomujuni J further stated:
The full meaning of this judgment is that the execution of [the two soldiers] on 25th March 2002 at the orders of a Field Court Martial was illegal, unlawful and unconstitutional. Unfortunately it is irreversible. 
Uganda, Constitutional Court, Kotido Field Court Martial case, Judgment, 5 February 2008, p. 43.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In its judgment in the Sandrock case (Almelo Trial) in 1945, the UK Military Court at Almelo found the accused, four German non-commissioned officers, guilty of the execution of a civilian believed to be evading military service. 
United Kingdom, Military Court at Almelo, Sandrock case (Almelo Trial), Judgment, 26 November 1945.
The court also found that “killing captured members of the opposing forces or civilian inhabitants of occupied territories suspected of … treason unless their guilt had been established by a court of law” amounts to a war crime. 
United Kingdom, Military Court at Almelo, Sandrock case (Almelo Trial), Judgment, 24–26 November 1945.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In its judgment in the Rohde case in 1947, the UK Military Court at Wuppertal found that “executions in the absence of a fair trial” amounted to war crimes. 
United Kingdom, Military Court at Wuppertal, Rohde case, Judgment, 1 June 1946.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2007, in the Al-Skeini case, the House of Lords was called upon to decide whether the 1998 UK Human Rights Act and the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights had extraterritorial application. The facts of the case, as summarized by Lord Bingham, were as follows:
Case 1
Mr Hazim Jum’aa Gatteh Al−Skeini was shot dead on 4 August 2003 by a member of a British military patrol in Basra. The claimant is his brother. Very different accounts of the incident have been given by the claimant and his witnesses on one side and British military witnesses on the other.
Case 2
Mr Muhammad Abdul Ridha Salim was fatally wounded on 6 November 2003 when British troops raided a house in Basra where he was. He received medical attention but died on 7 November 2003. The claimant is his widow. There is again a radical divergence between the respective parties’ accounts of this incident.
Case 3
Mrs Hannan Mahaibas Sadde Shmailawi was shot and fatally wounded on 10 November 2003 in the Institute of Education in Basra. On the British military account she was shot unintentionally during an exchange of fire between a British patrol and a number of gunmen. The claimant is the widower of the deceased, who accepts that the shooting of his wife was not intentional. It appears that she may have been a very unfortunate bystander, and the Secretary of State does not accept that the fatal shot was fired by a British soldier rather than a gunman.
Case 4
Mr Waleed Sayay Muzban was shot and fatally injured on the night of 24 August 2003 in Basra. He was driving a people-carrier when he was shot, and he died the next day. The shooting occurred when a British military patrol was, on its account, carrying out a perimeter check and the vehicle, having initially stopped, was driven away and appeared to present a threat. The claimant is the brother of the deceased.
Case 5
Mr Raid Hadi Sabir Al Musawi was shot and fatally wounded by a member of a British military patrol in Basra on 26 August 2003. He died nine weeks later, on 6 November 2003. The claimant is his mother. The parties’ respective accounts of what happened, as in the first case (which, on the facts, it resembles), are radically divergent.
Case 6
Mr Baha Mousa was employed as a receptionist at a hotel in Basra and was working there on the morning of 14 September 2003 when British troops entered the hotel. He was seized and detained and taken to a British military base in Basra. At the base he was brutally beaten by British troops. He died of the injuries so inflicted during the night of 15 September 2003. The claimant is the father of the deceased, and is a colonel in the Basra police. This deceased, unlike the others, was killed by British troops when held as a prisoner in a British military detention unit. This is the limited basis upon which the Divisional Court held that this case falls within the scope of the Convention, and this is the basis upon which the Secretary of State accepts that finding. 
United Kingdom, House of Lords, Al-Skeini case, Judgment, 13 June 2007, § 6.
In a 2004 judgment (R. (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2004] EWHC 2911 (Admin), Judgment of 14 December 2004), the England and Wales High Court of Justice, Divisional Court, had decided that the first five cases fell outside the scope of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and the UK 1998 Human Rights Act, but that the European Convention and the Human Rights Act applied to the sixth case and that in that case the United Kingdom had violated its procedural duties under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
On the claimants’ appeal against the decision regarding the first five cases and the Secretary of State’s cross-appeal against the decision regarding the sixth case, the England and Wales Court of Appeal, in a 2005 judgment (R. (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2005] EWCA Civ 1609, Judgment of 21 December 2005), on the basis of a slightly different argumentation, also concluded that the European Convention and the Human Rights Act did not apply to the first five cases, but that the European Convention and the Human Rights Act applied to the sixth case.
Before the House of Lords, the claimants appealed the Court of Appeal’s ruling that neither the European Convention nor the Human Rights Act applied to the first five cases; the Secretary of State cross-appealed the ruling that the Human Rights Act applied to the sixth case, now accepting the European Convention’s applicability to that case.
The majority of the House of Lords, Lord Bingham dissenting, dismissed the Secretary of State’s cross-appeal relating to the sixth case, ruling that the UK Human Rights Act had extraterritorial application to situations where the United Kingdom had jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The House unanimously dismissed the appeals relating to the first five cases, ruling that neither the UK Human Rights Act nor the European Convention on Human Rights applied to these cases.
With regard to the extraterritorial applicability of the UK Human Rights Act, Lord Rodger gave the leading opinion:
34. The claimants in these six cases are all relatives of Iraqi citizens who were killed in southern Iraq between 4 August and 10 November 2003. Except in the case of the third appellant, the Secretary of State for Defence accepts that the relatives were killed by members of the British forces. In February 2004 the representative of the appellants wrote to the Secretary of State asking him to hold a public inquiry into their relatives’ deaths. By letter dated 26 March 2004 the Secretary of State indicated that he would not hold such an inquiry. The claimants seek judicial review of that decision on the ground that it was unlawful in terms of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the 1998 Act”) since it was incompatible with the claimants’ article 2 “Convention right” as set out in the Schedule to the Act. For his part, the Secretary of State says that his decision was lawful since the 1998 Act does not apply in the circumstances of these cases. In particular, he argues, first, that the 1998 Act does not apply outside the territory of the United Kingdom and, secondly, that, in any event, with the exception of the relative of the sixth appellant, the deceased were not within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom in terms of article 1 of the European Convention when they were killed.
36. As was explained in In re McKerr [2004] 1 WLR 807, the Convention right of a relative under article 2 to insist on an inquiry being held where a death has been caused by agents of the state is procedural or adjectival. In domestic law it arises only where the killing itself could be unlawful under section 6 of the 1998 Act by reason of being incompatible with article 2 as set out in the Schedule. For that reason, the key question in these appeals is whether the killing of these individuals by British forces in Iraq could be unlawful under section 6 of the Act.
37. Section 6(1) provides: “It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.” The words are quite general and, on its face, the provision contains no geographical limitation hence the issue between the parties about its proper scope. The Secretary of State points out that Parliament has not chosen to use the kind of specific wording that would show that it was intended to apply outside the United Kingdom. That comment is, of course, correct, but it does not really go anywhere since the Secretary of State is merely drawing attention to a defining feature of any case where the issue is whether a statute is to be construed as applying, by implication, to conduct outside the United Kingdom.
44. So far as the application of statutes is concerned, there is a general rule that legislation does not apply to persons and matters outside the territory to which it extends: Bennion, Statutory Interpretation , p 306. But the cases show that the concept of the territoriality of legislation is quite subtle − “slippery” is how Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead described it in R (Quark Fishing Ltd) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2006] 1 AC 529, 545, para 32.
45. Behind the various rules of construction, a number of different policies can be seen at work. For example, every statute is interpreted, “so far as its language permits, so as not to be inconsistent with the comity of nations or the established rules of international law”: Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (12th edition, 1969), p 183. It would usually be both objectionable in terms of international comity and futile in practice for Parliament to assert its authority over the subjects of another sovereign who are not within the United Kingdom. So, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, a court will interpret legislation as not being intended to affect such people. They do not fall within “the legislative grasp, or intendment,” of Parliament’s legislation, to use Lord Wilberforce’s expression in Clark v Oceanic Contractors Inc [1983] 2 AC 130, 152C−D. In Ex p Blain (1879) 12 Ch D 522 the question was whether the court had jurisdiction, by virtue of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, to make an adjudication of bankruptcy against a foreigner, domiciled and resident abroad, who had never been in England. James LJ said, at p 526: “But, if a foreigner remains abroad, if he has never come into this country at all, it seems to me impossible to imagine that the English legislature could have ever intended to make such a man subject to particular English legislation.” On this general approach, for instance, there can be no doubt that, despite the lack of any qualifying words, section 6(1) of the 1998 applies only to United Kingdom public authorities and not to the public authorities of any other state.
46. Subjects of the Crown, British citizens, are in a different boat. International law does not prevent a state from exercising jurisdiction over its nationals travelling or residing abroad, since they remain under its personal authority: Oppenheim’s International Law (ninth edition, 1992), vol 1, para 138. So there can be no objection in principle to Parliament legislating for British citizens outside the United Kingdom, provided that the particular legislation does not offend against the sovereignty of other states. In Ex p Blain (1879) 12 Ch D 522, 531−532, Cotton LJ explained the position in this way:
“All we have to do is to interpret an Act of Parliament which uses a general word, and we have to say how that word is to be limited, when of necessity there must be some limitation. I take it the limitation is this, that all laws of the English Parliament must be territorial – territorial in this sense, that they apply to and bind all subjects of the Crown who come within the fair interpretation of them, and also all aliens who come to this country, and who, during the time they are here, do any act which, on a fair interpretation of the statute as regards them, comes within its provision. … As regards an Englishman, a subject of the British Crown, it is not necessary that he should be here, if he has done that which the Act of Parliament says shall give jurisdiction, because he is bound by the Act by reason of his being a British subject, though, of course, in the case of a British subject not resident here, it may be a question on the construction of the Act of Parliament whether that which, if he had been resident here, would have brought him within the Act, has that effect when he is not resident here.”
Restating the position in the language of the 1980s, in Clark v Oceanic Contractors Inc [1983] 2 AC 130, 145D−E, Lord Scarman said that the general principle is simply that:
“unless the contrary is expressly enacted or so plainly implied that the courts must give effect to it, United Kingdom legislation is applicable only to British subjects or to foreigners who by coming to the United Kingdom, whether for a short or a long time, have made themselves subject to British jurisdiction.”
47. The cases indicate, therefore, that British individuals or firms or companies or other organisations readily fall within the legislative grasp of statutes passed by Parliament. So far as they are concerned, the question is whether, on a fair interpretation, the statute in question is intended to apply to them only in the United Kingdom or also, to some extent at least, beyond the territorial limits of the United Kingdom. Here, there is no doubt that section 6 applies to public authorities such as the armed forces within the United Kingdom: the only question is whether, on a fair interpretation, it is confined to the United Kingdom.
48. Even in the case of British citizens, a court may readily infer that legislation is not intended to apply to them outside the United Kingdom. See Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes , p 171: “In the absence of an intention clearly expressed or to be inferred either from its language, or from the object or subject-matter or history of the enactment, the presumption is that Parliament does not design its statutes to operate on its subjects beyond the territorial limits of the United Kingdom.” In Tomalin v S Pearson & Son Ltd [1909] 2 KB 61, 64, Cozens-Hardy MR approved an earlier version of this statement. The court held that the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1906 did not apply where a workman, employed by a British company, had been killed in the course of his employment in Malta. Leaving aside the rule of construction, various provisions of the Act indicated that it was only intended to apply in certain specific circumstances outside the United Kingdom.
49. Again, this rule of construction has to be seen against the background of international law. One state is bound to respect the territorial sovereignty of another state. So, usually, Parliament will not mean to interfere by legislating to regulate the conduct of its citizens in another state. Such legislation would usually be unnecessary and would often be, in any event, ineffective. But sometimes Parliament has a legitimate interest in regulating their conduct and so does indeed intend its legislation to affect the position of British citizens in other states. For example, section 72 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 makes certain nasty sexual conduct in other countries an offence under English law. So, if the words of a statute are open to more than one interpretation, whether or not it binds British citizens abroad “seems to depend … entirely on the nature of the statute”: Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes , p 169.
50. The books therefore contain examples of cases where, because of its nature, legislation has been held to apply to British subjects outside the United Kingdom …
52. … In the same way, when considering the application of the 1998 Act, it is necessary to have regard to its overall nature and purpose.
53. In the first place, the burden of the legislation falls on public authorities, rather than on private individuals or companies. Most of the functions of United Kingdom public authorities relate to this country and will therefore be carried out here. Moreover, exercising their functions abroad would often mean that the public authorities were encroaching on the sovereignty of another state. Nevertheless, where a public authority has power to operate outside of the United Kingdom and does so legitimately − for example, with the consent of the other state in the absence of any indication to the contrary, when construing any relevant legislation, it would only be sensible to treat the public authority, so far as possible, in the same way as when it operates at home.
54. The purpose of the 1998 Act is to provide remedies in our domestic law to those whose human rights are violated by a United Kingdom public authority. Making such remedies available for acts of a United Kingdom authority on the territory of another state would not be offensive to the sovereignty of the other state. There is therefore nothing in the wider context of international law which points to the need to confine sections 6 and 7 of the 1998 Act to the territory of the United Kingdom.
55. One possible reason for confining their application in that way would, however, be if their scope would otherwise be unlimited and they would, potentially at least, confer rights on people all over the world with little or no real connexion with the United Kingdom. There is, however, no such danger in this case since the 1998 Act has a built-in limitation. By section 7(1) and (7), only those who would be victims for the purposes of article 34 of the Convention in proceedings in the Strasbourg Court can take proceedings under the 1998 Act. Before they could sue, claimants would therefore have to be “within the jurisdiction” of the United Kingdom in terms of article 1 of the Convention. Whatever the precise boundaries of that limitation, it blunts the objection that a narrow construction of the territorial application of the Act is the only way to prevent it having extravagant effects which could never have been intended. The requirement for a claimant to be within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom is a further assurance that, if the Act were interpreted and applied in that way, the courts in this country would not be interfering with the sovereignty or integrity of another state.
56. By this somewhat circuitous route, I arrive at what is surely the crucial argument in favour of the wider interpretation of section 6. The Secretary of State accepts that “the central purpose” of Parliament in enacting sections 6 and 7 was “to provide a remedial structure in domestic law for the rights guaranteed by the Convention”: Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2004] 1 AC 546, 564, para 44, per Lord Hope of Craighead. In other words, claimants were to be able to obtain remedies in United Kingdom courts, rather than having to go to Strasbourg. The Secretary of State also accepts that, while the jurisdiction of states for the purposes of article 1 of the Convention is essentially territorial, in exceptional cases, “acts of the contracting states performed, or producing effects, outside their territories can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction by them within the meaning of article 1 of the convention": Bankovic v Belgium (2001) 11 BHRC 435, 450, para 67. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State says that sections 6 and 7 are to be interpreted in such a way that, in these exceptional cases, a victim is left remediless in the British courts. Contrary to the central policy of the Act, the victim must resort to Strasbourg.
57. My Lords, I am unable to accept that submission. It involves reading into sections 6 and 7 a qualification which the words do not contain and which runs counter to the central purpose of the Act. That would be to offend against the most elementary canons of statutory construction which indicate that, in case of doubt, the Act should be read so as to promote, not so as to defeat or impair, its central purpose. If anything, this approach is even more desirable in interpreting human rights legislation. As Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood points out, this interpretation also ensures that, in these exceptional cases, the United Kingdom is not in breach of its article 13 obligation to afford an effective remedy before its courts to anyone whose human rights have been violated within its jurisdiction.
58. The speech of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in R (Quark Fishing Ltd) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2006] 1 AC 529, 546, para 34, provides powerful support for that approach:
“To this end the obligations of public authorities under sections 6 and 7 mirror in domestic law the treaty obligations of the United Kingdom in respect of corresponding articles of the Convention and its protocols. That was the object of these sections. As my noble and learned friend, Lord Hope of Craighead, has said, the ‘purpose of these sections is to provide a remedial structure in domestic law for the rights guaranteed by the Convention’: Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2004] 1 AC 546, 564, para 44. Thus, and this is the important point for present purposes, the territorial scope of the obligations and rights created by sections 6 and 7 of the Act was intended to be co-extensive with the territorial scope of the obligations of the United Kingdom and the rights of victims under the Convention. The Act was intended to provide a domestic remedy where a remedy would have been available in Strasbourg. Conversely, the Act was not intended to provide a domestic remedy where a remedy would not have been available in Strasbourg. Accordingly, in order to identify the territorial scope of a ‘Convention right’ in sections 6 and 7 it is necessary to turn to Strasbourg and consider what, under the Convention, is the territorial scope of the relevant Convention right.”
Lord Nicholls confirms that, in interpreting the rights in the Schedule, courts must take account of the territorial scope of the relevant right under the Convention. In the present case, that means having regard to those exceptional situations where article 2 would apply outside the territory of the United Kingdom. In other words, on a fair interpretation, article 2 in the Schedule to the Act must be read as applying wherever the United Kingdom has jurisdiction in terms of article 1 of the Convention. The corollary is that section 6 must also be interpreted as applying in the same circumstances.
59. For these reasons, section 6 should be interpreted as applying not only when a public authority acts within the United Kingdom but also when it acts within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for purposes of article 1 of the Convention, but outside the territory of the United Kingdom.
60. The Secretary of State’s cross appeal must therefore be dismissed. 
United Kingdom, House of Lords, Al-Skeini case, Judgment, 13 June 2007, §§ 34, 36–37, 44–50 and 52–60.
With regard to the extraterritorial applicability of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Lord Brown gave the leading opinion:
100. These appeals arise out of the deaths of six Iraqi civilians caused by the actions of British soldiers in southern Iraq in the latter part of 2003 (between the cessation of major combat operations and the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqi interim government). Five of the deceased were shot in the course of security operations (one in crossfire); the sixth died following gross ill-treatment whilst in custody in a UK military detention facility. The appellants are their relatives who in each case seek principally Convention-compliant investigations into the respective killings and, in the long run, damages.
101. It need hardly be said that all these deaths (and the thirty or so more leading to further claims now stayed pending the outcome of these proceedings) are greatly to be regretted, and the sixth utterly deplored. The issues now arising, however, have to be decided by reference to legal principle, not out of sympathy.
102. Your Lordships are here called on to decide two very important questions which arise by way of preliminary issue. One concerns the reach of the European Convention on Human Rights: Who, within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention, is to be regarded as “within [a contracting party’s] jurisdiction” so as to require that state to “secure to [them] the rights and freedoms” defined in the Convention? The other concerns the reach of the Human Rights Act 1998 (the Act), the only basis on which the domestic courts have jurisdiction to hear human rights claims: Does the Act apply extra-territorially and, if so, in what way?
103. These might be thought to be discrete questions, wholly unrelated to each other. But I question this. Suppose that article 1 of the Convention applies only to the extent contended for here by the respondent Secretary of State, with just a limited extra-territorial reach in certain closely defined circumstances. To conclude that Parliament intended the Act to apply to these few additional cases as well as to the great majority of cases where the Convention is breached within the UK’s own borders would be one thing. To reach that conclusion, however, were the Convention found to extend as widely as the appellants (supported by the interveners) contend, encompassing not merely all the present claims but, it may be, others still more contentious, might be regarded as another thing entirely. I propose, therefore, to consider first the reach of the Convention.
Article 1 − the reach of the Convention
105. The ultimate decision upon this question, of course, must necessarily be for the European Court of Human Rights. As Lord Bingham of Cornhill observed in R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] 2 AC 323, 350 (para 20), “the Convention is an international instrument, the correct interpretation of which can be authoritatively expounded only by the Strasbourg court.” In the same paragraph Lord Bingham made two further points: first, that a national court “should not without strong reason dilute or weaken the effect of the Strasbourg case law”; secondly that, whilst member States can of course legislate so as to provide for rights more generous than those guaranteed by the Convention, national courts should not interpret the Convention to achieve this: the Convention must bear the same meaning for all states party to it. Para 20 ends:
“The duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less.”
106. I would respectfully suggest that last sentence could as well have ended: “no less, but certainly no more.” There seems to me, indeed, a greater danger in the national court construing the Convention too generously in favour of an applicant than in construing it too narrowly. In the former event the mistake will necessarily stand: the member state cannot itself go to Strasbourg to have it corrected; in the latter event, however, where Convention rights have been denied by too narrow a construction, the aggrieved individual can have the decision corrected in Strasbourg. Ullah, of course, was concerned with the particular scope of individual Convention rights, there article 9, in the context of removing non-nationals from a member state. Lord Bingham’s cautionary words must surely apply with greater force still to a case like the present. As the Grand Chamber observed in Bankovic v Belgium (2001) 11 BHRC 435, 449 (para 65):
“the scope of article 1 … is determinative of the very scope of the contracting parties’ positive obligations and, as such, of the scope and reach of the entire Convention system of human rights' protection.”
107. Your Lordships accordingly ought not to construe article 1 as reaching any further than the existing Strasbourg jurisprudence clearly shows it to reach. How far is that and, more particularly, (a) does article 1 encompass the first five appellants and (b) on what basis does it encompass the sixth appellant (as, following the Divisional Court's judgment, the respondent concedes it does); is this on the narrow basis (found by the Divisional Court) that detention in a British military facility, operated with the consent of the Iraqi sovereign authorities, falls within the same exceptional category as embassies and consulates, or on the wider basis (found by the Court of Appeal) that Mr Mousa, from the moment of his arrest, “came within the control and authority of the UK”, or on a wider basis still (as the appellants contend and as would be necessary were it to avail the other appellants too)?
108. In considering how far Strasbourg has gone in extending article 1 jurisprudence extra-territorially, I propose to take as my starting point the decision of the Grand Chamber in Bankovic. This I have no doubt the Divisional Court was right to describe (at para 268) as “a watershed authority in the light of which the Strasbourg jurisprudence as a whole has to be re-evaluated”. The case was referred to the Grand Chamber specifically for a definitive judgment on this fundamental issue. It was fully argued, and the judgment, which was unanimous, was fully reasoned. The travaux préparatoires, the entire previous case law of the Commission and the Court, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), the practice of the contracting states with regard to derogating for extra-territorial military operations (none had ever done so), comparative case law and the international law background were for the first time all considered in a single judgment.
109. Lengthy extracts from Bankovic have already been set out in the judgments of the courts below and I shall not repeat them. Rather I shall at once set out certain central propositions for which in my judgment Bankovic stands:
(1) Article 1 reflects an “essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction” (a phrase repeated several times in the Court's judgment), “other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case” (para 61). The Convention operates, subject to article 56, “in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space (espace juridique) of the contracting states” (para 80) (ie within the area of the Council of Europe countries).
(2) The Court recognises article 1 jurisdiction to avoid a “vacuum in human rights’ protection” when the territory “would normally be covered by the Convention” (para 80) (ie in a Council of Europe country) where otherwise (as in Northern Cyprus) the inhabitants “would have found themselves excluded from the benefits of the Convention safeguards and system which they had previously enjoyed” (para 80).
(3) The rights and freedoms defined in the Convention cannot be “divided and tailored” (para 75).
(4) The circumstances in which the Court has exceptionally recognised the extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction by a state include:
(i) Where the state “through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by [the government of that territory]” (para 71) (ie when otherwise there would be a vacuum within a Council of Europe country, the government of that country itself being unable “to fulfil the obligations it had undertaken under the Convention” (para 80) (as in Northern Cyprus).
(ii) “Cases involving the activities of its diplomatic or consular agents abroad and on board craft and vessels registered in, or flying the flag of, that state [where] customary international law and treaty provisions have recognised the extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction” (para 73).
(iii) Certain other cases where a state’s responsibility “could, in principle, be engaged because of acts × which produced effects or were performed outside their own territory” (para 69). Drozd v France (1992) 14 EHRR 745 (at para 91) is the only authority specifically referred to in Bankovic as exemplifying this class of exception to the general rule. Drozd, however, contemplated no more than that, if a French judge exercised jurisdiction extra-territorially in Andorra in his capacity as a French judge, then anyone complaining of a violation of his Convention rights by that judge would be regarded as being within France's jurisdiction.
(iv) The Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 line of cases, the Court pointed out, involves action by the state whilst the person concerned is “on its territory, clearly within its jurisdiction” (para 68) and not, therefore, the exercise of the state’s jurisdiction abroad. There is, on the face of it, nothing in Bankovic which gives the least support to the appellants’ arguments.
110. Before turning to examine whether subsequent Strasbourg jurisprudence has weakened these principles, it is, I think, instructive first to consider the implications of article 56 of the Convention, an article mentioned in Bankovic merely as a provision which “enables a contracting state to declare that the Convention shall extend to all or any of the territories for whose international relations that state is responsible” (para 80).
Article 56
111. When under article 56 a state chooses to extend the Convention to a dependent territory (ex hypothesi not within the Council of Europe area - see, for example, Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1, at para 38), the Convention is applied “with due regard … to local requirements” (article 56(3)). Py v France (2005) 42 EHRR 548, where voting restrictions in New Caledonia were found justified, provides an up to date illustration of this.
112. Save under article 56, the Convention cannot apply to dependent territories. In particular, as the Court recently explained in Quark v United Kingdom (2006) 44 EHRR SE 70, the “effective control principle” does not apply to them.
113. How then could that principle logically apply to any other territory outside the area of the Council of Europe? As the respondent submits, it would be a remarkable thing if, by the exercise of effective control, for however short a time, over non-Council of Europe territory, a state could be fixed with the article 1 obligation to secure within that territory, without regard to local requirements, all Convention rights and freedoms whereas, despite its exercise of effective control over a dependent territory, perhaps for centuries past, the state will not be obliged to secure any Convention rights there unless it has made an article 56 declaration and even then it would be able to rely on local requirements.
114. It may be noted that thirty years ago Turkey unsuccessfully sought to rely (directly or by analogy) on article 56 (then article 63) to contest its liability to secure Convention rights for the inhabitants of Northern Cyprus unless it chose to do so – Cyprus v Turkey (1978) 21 Yearbook of the ECHR 100. The argument failed: Northern Cyprus being part of a Council of Europe country, whichever member state has effective control must secure all Convention rights. True it is that thirty years ago the reasoning of the Commission (by reference to the acts of state agents abroad) was different from that of the Strasbourg Court today: it was not until Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) 20 EHRR 99, another Northern Cyprus case, that the Court for the first time articulated the effective control of an area principle. The logic, however, remains clear: subject only to a few narrow exceptions the Convention applies solely within the Council of Europe area and must then apply in full measure. The same point was more recently made in Ilascu v Moldova (Admissibility) (Application No 48787/99) (unreported) 4 July 2001 where the Court, rejecting Moldova's assertion that the Convention did not extend to Transdniestria, expressly distinguished a state's right not to extend the Convention to non-Council of Europe territories under article 56.
The post-Bankovic cases
115. The Grand Chamber has considered the reach of article 1 of the Convention four times since Bankovic, on each occasion expressly following the Bankovic analysis. Assanidze v Georgia (2004) 39 EHRR 653 concerned the Ajarian Autonomous Republic in Georgia over which both parties accepted that Georgia exercised jurisdiction. The Grand Chamber emphasised the exceptional nature of extra-territorial jurisdiction and confirmed the indivisible nature of article 1 jurisdiction:
“The general duty imposed on the state by article 1 of the Convention entails and requires the implementation of a national system capable of securing compliance with the Convention throughout the territory of the state for everyone” (para 147).
116. Ilascu v Moldova and Russia (2004) 40 EHRR 1030, concerned human rights in Transdniestria, an area of Moldova subject to a separatist regime supported by Russia. The Grand Chamber held by a majority of 16 to 1 that Russia exercised jurisdiction and by 11 votes to 6 that Moldova did too. Because, however, Moldova lacked effective control within its own territory it could not be held responsible for violations save to the extent that they arose out of failures by Moldova to comply with its positive obligations “to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and are in accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Convention” (para 331). Judge Bratza, speaking for five of the six judges dissenting on whether Moldova exercised jurisdiction, expressed
“difficulty in accepting the proposition that those within a part of the territory of a state over which, as a result of its unlawful occupation by a separatist administration, the state is prevented from exercising any authority or control, may nevertheless be said to be within the ‘jurisdiction’ of the state according to the autonomous meaning of that term in article 1 of the Convention, which term presupposes that the state has the power ‘to secure to everyone … the rights and freedoms’ defined therein.”
Whatever view one takes of the majority’s approach, however, it cannot avail the appellants here: there was simply no question of Moldova exercising any form of extra-territorial jurisdiction.
117. Article 1 was only briefly touched on by the Grand Chamber in Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland (2005) 42 EHRR 1. Bankovic, Assanidze and Ilascu were all cited in footnotes to para 136.
118. Öcalan v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 985 concerned (in part) the applicant’s arrest by members of the Turkish Security Forces inside a Turkish registered aircraft in the international zone of Nairobi Airport. The Grand Chamber stated (at para 91) the basis upon which it accepted that Turkey had at that early stage exercised jurisdiction over the applicant:
“It is common ground that, directly after being handed over to the Turkish officials by the Kenyan officials, the applicant was under effective Turkish authority and therefore within the ‘jurisdiction’ of that state for the purposes of article 1 of the Convention, even though in this instance Turkey exercised its authority outside its territory. It is true that the applicant was physically forced to return to Turkey by Turkish officials and was under their authority and control following his arrest and return to Turkey (see, in this respect, the aforementioned decisions in the cases of Sánchez Ramirez v France and Freda v Italy; and, by converse implication, Bankovic v Belgium ).”
119. Both Sánchez Ramirez v France (1996) 86−A DR 155 and Freda v Italy (1980) 21 DR 250 (the authorities there referred to) also concerned irregular extradition, one a revolutionary known as Carlos (the Jackal), the other an Italian. Each was taken into custody abroad, respectively by French police in Khartoum and by Italian police in Costa Rica, and flown respectively in a French military airplane to France and in an Italian Air-force plane to Italy. In each case, as in Öcalan, the forcible removal was effected with the full cooperation of the foreign authorities and with a view to the applicant's criminal trial in the respondent state. Unsurprisingly in these circumstances the Grand Chamber in Öcalan had felt able to distinguish Bankovic “by converse implication”.
120. This line of cases clearly constitutes one category of “exceptional” cases expressly contemplated by Bankovic as having “special justification” for extraterritorial jurisdiction under article 1.
121. Another category, similarly recognised in Bankovic, was Drozd (see para 109(4)(iii) above ) into which category can also be put cases like X and Y v Switzerland (1977) 9 DR 57 and Gentilhomme v France (Application No 48205/99) (unreported) 14 May 2002. In X and Y v Switzerland , Switzerland was held to be exercising jurisdiction where, pursuant to treaty provisions with Liechtenstein, it legislated for immigration matters in both states, prohibiting X from entering either. In Gentilhomme, France operated French state schools in Algeria, again pursuant to a treaty arrangement.
122. The cases involving the activities of embassies and consulates (see para 109(4)(ii) above) themselves subdivide into essentially two sub-categories, those concerning nationals of the respondent state and those concerning foreign nationals. The former includes cases like X v Federal Republic of Germany (1965) 8 Yearbook of the ECHR 158 and X v UK (1977) 12 DR 73; the latter cases like M v Denmark (1992) 73 DR 193 and R (B) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2005] QB 643. It is unnecessary for present purposes to consider the facts of any of them.
123. None of the cases in any of these categories appear to me in any way helpful to the first five appellants.
124. I turn, therefore, to the one post-Bankovic Strasbourg judgment upon which the appellants seek to place particular reliance: Issa v Turkey (Merits) (2004) 41 EHRR 567. Issa was not, be it noted, a judgment of the Grand Chamber (although three of its seven judges had been members of the Grand Chamber in Bankovic); nor in the event did the application succeed. It had, moreover, been found admissible in a decision (Application No 31821/96) (unreported) 30 May 2000 which pre-dated Bankovic when (as noted in the Bankovic judgment at para 81) no issue of jurisdiction had been raised.
125. The complaint in Issa concerned the activities of Turkish forces during a military campaign in northern Iraq. It was dismissed because the applicants had failed to establish that Turkish troops had “conducted operations in the area in question.” The Court, however, “[did] not exclude the possibility that, as a consequence of this military action, the respondent state could be considered to have exercised, temporarily, effective overall control of a particular portion of the territory of northern Iraq. Accordingly, if there is a sufficient factual basis for holding that, at the relevant time, the victims were within that specific area, it would follow logically that they were within the jurisdiction of Turkey …” (para 74). Earlier in its judgment, moreover, the Court had referred to the principle of effective control of the territory established in Loizidou and reiterated in Bankovic, Assanidze and Ilascu and added (at para 71):
“Moreover, a state may also be held accountable for violation of the Convention rights and freedoms of persons who are in the territory of another state but who are found to be under the former state's authority and control through its agents operating whether - lawfully or unlawfully – in the latter state (see × M v Denmark, × . Sánchez Ramirez v France × Coard et al v United States × and the views adopted by the Human Rights Committee × in the cases of López Burgos v Uruguay and Celibert de Casariego v Uruguay ×). Accountability in such situations stems from the fact that article 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a state party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another state, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory (ibid).”
126. This, plainly, represents the high watermark of the appellants’ case. For my part, however, I find it unconvincing. Much, of course, depends upon how precisely para 71 of Issa is to be understood. Insofar as it supports the view that article 1 jurisdiction extends to encompass cases like M v Denmark (an embassy case – see para 122 above) and Sánchez Ramirez v France (an irregular extradition case – see para 119 above) (two of the authorities cited in paragraph 71), it is plainly unexceptionable. The two cited cases involving Uruguay (López 68 ILR 29 and Celiberti de Casariego 68 ILR 41) were also concerned with irregular extraditions – of citizens of Uruguay kidnapped in respectively Argentina and Brazil by Uruguayan security forces working with their Argentine and Brazilian counterparts – and it was in these two cases that the Human Rights Commission said that “it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the [1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)] as to permit a state party to perpetrate violations of the covenant on the territory of another state, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory,” a comment applied without more by the Court to the ECHR itself. Coard et al v US (1999) 9 BHRC 150, the final case cited in support of para 71, had been specifically considered in Bankovic (at paras 23, 48 and 78), the Grand Chamber there noting that article 2 of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 1948 contained no explicit limitation of jurisdiction whatever. Overall, the Grand Chamber in Bankovic (para 78) derived no assistance from “the allegedly similar jurisdiction provisions in the international instruments” (including article 2 of the ICCPR).
127. If and insofar as Issa is said to support the altogether wider notions of article 1 jurisdiction contended for by the appellants on this appeal, I cannot accept it. In the first place, the statements relied upon must be regarded as obiter dicta. Secondly, as just explained, such wider assertions of jurisdiction are not supported by the authorities cited (at any rate, those authorities accepted as relevant by the Grand Chamber in Bankovic). Thirdly, such wider view of jurisdiction would clearly be inconsistent both with the reasoning in Bankovic and, indeed, with its result. Either it would extend the effective control principle beyond the Council of Europe area (where alone it had previously been applied, as has been seen, to Northern Cyprus, to the Ajarian Autonomous Republic in Georgia and to Transdniestria) to Iraq, an area (like the FRY considered in Bankovic) outside the Council of Europe and, indeed, would do so contrary to the inescapable logic of the Court's case law on article 56. Alternatively it would stretch to breaking point the concept of jurisdiction extending extra-territorially to those subject to a state’s “authority and control". It is one thing to recognise as exceptional the specific narrow categories of cases I have sought to summarise above; it would be quite another to accept that whenever a contracting state acts (militarily or otherwise) through its agents abroad, those affected by such activities fall within its article 1 jurisdiction. Such a contention would prove altogether too much. It would make a nonsense of much that was said in Bankovic, not least as to the Convention being “a constitutional instrument of European public order”, operating “in an essentially regional context”, “not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of contracting states” (para 80). It would, indeed, make redundant the principle of effective control of an area: what need for that if jurisdiction arises in any event under a general principle of “authority and control” irrespective of whether the area is (a) effectively controlled or (b) within the Council of Europe?
128. There is one other central objection to the creation of the wide basis of jurisdiction here contended for by the appellants under the rubric “control and authority”, going beyond that arising in any of the narrowly recognised categories already discussed and yet short of that arising from the effective control of territory within the Council of Europe area. Bankovic (and later Assanidze) stands, as stated, for the indivisible nature of article 1 jurisdiction: it cannot be “divided and tailored". As Bankovic had earlier pointed out (at para 40) “the applicant's interpretation of jurisdiction would invert and divide the positive obligation on contracting states to secure the substantive rights in a manner never contemplated by article 1 of the Convention.” When, moreover, the Convention applies, it operates as “a living instrument.” Öcalan provides an example of this, a recognition that the interpretation of article 2 has been modified consequent on “the territories encompassed by the member states of the Council of Europe [having] become a zone free of capital punishment” (para 163). (Paragraphs 64 and 65 of Bankovic , I may note, contrast on the one hand “the Convention's substantive provisions” and “the competence of the Convention organs”, to both of which the “living instrument” approach applies and, on the other hand, the scope of article 1” the scope and reach of the entire Convention” to which it does not.) Bear in mind too the rigour with which the Court applies the Convention, well exemplified by the series of cases from the conflict zone of south eastern Turkey in which, the state's difficulties notwithstanding, no dilution has been permitted of the investigative obligations arising under articles 2 and 3.
129. The point is this: except where a state really does have effective control of territory, it cannot hope to secure Convention rights within that territory and, unless it is within the area of the Council of Europe, it is unlikely in any event to find certain of the Convention rights it is bound to secure reconcilable with the customs of the resident population. Indeed it goes further than that. During the period in question here it is common ground that the UK was an occupying power in Southern Iraq and bound as such by Geneva IV and by the Hague Regulations. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides that the occupant “shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” The appellants argue that occupation within the meaning of the Hague Regulations necessarily involves the occupant having effective control of the area and so being responsible for securing there all Convention rights and freedoms. So far as this being the case, however, the occupants' obligation is to respect “the laws in force", not to introduce laws and the means to enforce them (for example, courts and a justice system) such as to satisfy the requirements of the Convention. Often (for example where Sharia law is in force) Convention rights would clearly be incompatible with the laws of the territory occupied.
130. Realistically the concept of the indivisibility of the Convention presents no problem in the categories of cases discussed in paras 119–126 above: these concern highly specific situations raising only a limited range of Convention rights.
131. In my judgment Issa should not be read as detracting in any way from the clear – and clearly restrictive – approach to article 1 jurisdiction adopted in Bankovic. I recognise that in two later decisions other chambers of the Court have, as so commonly occurs in Strasbourg judgments, repeated the substance of para 71 of Issa. But in neither of them does there appear to have been any relevant argument on the reach of article 1. Isaak v Turkey (Application No 44587) (unreported) 28 September 2006 concerned the death of a demonstrator through the actions of Turkish protesters and police in the UN buffer zone separating northern Cyprus from the south. The Court held (at page 20) that “Turkey’s jurisdiction must be considered to extend to securing the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional protocols which she has ratified, and that violations of those rights are imputable to Turkey.” Ben El Mahi v Denmark (Application No 5853/06) (unreported) 11 December 2006 concerned the publication in Denmark of cartoons allegedly breaching the Moroccan applicants’ article 9 rights. The application was unsurprisingly ruled inadmissible on the ground that there was no “jurisdictional link” between the respondent state and the applicants.
132. Taken as a whole, therefore, and according particular weight to Grand Chamber judgments, so far from weakening the principles established in Bankovic, subsequent Strasbourg case law to my mind reinforces them. Certainly, whatever else may be said of the Strasbourg jurisprudence, it cannot be said to establish clearly that any of the first five appellants come within the UK’s article 1 jurisdiction. As for the sixth case, I for my part would recognise the UK’s jurisdiction over Mr Mousa only on the narrow basis found established by the Divisional Court, essentially by analogy with the extra-territorial exception made for embassies (an analogy recognised too in Hess v United Kingdom (1975) 2 DR 72, a Commission decision in the context of a foreign prison which had itself referred to the embassy case of X v Federal Republic of Germany) …
151. In the final result I would dismiss the appeals of each of the first five appellants and dismiss too the cross-appeal by the respondent as to the applicability of the Human Rights Act to the sixth appellant’s case. That being so it is agreed between the parties that, in the light of factual developments since the Court of Appeal’s order, the sixth appellant’s case should be remitted to the Divisional Court to join the other cases which have been stayed for the substantive issues to be decided in the light of up to date evidence and amended pleadings. 
United Kingdom, House of Lords, Al-Skeini case, Judgment, 13 June 2007, §§ 100–103, 105–132 and 151.
[emphasis in original]
In summary, the UK 1998 Human Rights Act and the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights were found to be applicable to the sixth case, the ill-treatment and subsequent death of Mr Mousa in a British armed forces detention facility in Basra in September 2003, the detention facility being under the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the European Convention. In contrast, the Human Rights Act and the European Convention were found not to be applicable to cases one to five, the killings occasioned or allegedly occasioned by UK military action in Basra between August and November 2003.
United States of America
In its judgment in the Dostler case in 1945, the US Military Commission found the accused guilty of the summary execution of 15 US prisoners of war. The Commission considered that the execution of the prisoners of war without trial was contrary to the 1907 Hague Regulations and to customary international law. 
United States, Military Commission at Rome, Dostler case, Judgment, 12 October 1945.
United States of America
In its judgment in the Jaluit Atoll case in 1945, the US Military Commission in the Far East found the five accused guilty of
wilfully, feloniously, with malice aforethought without justifiable cause, and without trial or other due process, assault and kill, by shooting and stabbing to death, three American fliers … then … captured and unarmed prisoners of war in the custody of the … accused. 
United States, Military Commission in the Far East, The Jaluit Atoll case, Judgment, 7–13 December 1945.
United States of America
In the Isayama case in 1946, the US Military Commission at Shanghai tried Lieutenant-General Harukei Isayama and other members of the Japanese Military Tribunal on charges that members of the Japanese Military Tribunal did “permit, authorize and direct an illegal, unfair, unwarranted and false trial [of prisoners of war] … upon false and fraudulent evidence and without affording said prisoners of war a fair hearing”. The Commission found that the accused were executed in violation of international law. The Commission found Lieutenant-General Isayama and the seven other accused guilty of all counts alleged. 
United States, Military Commission at Shanghai, Isayama case, Judgment, 25 July 1946.
United States of America
In its judgment in the List case (The Hostages Trial) in 1948, the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg found ten of the accused, former high-ranking officers in the German army, guilty of offences committed by troops under their command, in particular murder of civilians, used as a means of maintaining order in occupied territories in the face of guerrilla opposition. 
United States, Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, List case (The Hostages Trial), Judgment, 19 February 1948.
United States of America
In its judgment in the Schultz case in 1969, a US Court of Military Appeal upheld a court-martial conviction of a soldier for killing a person who, the soldier believed, had signalled enemy guerrillas with a light. While the Court recognized that this act could have been considered as an unauthorized communication with the enemy, it held that the victim was entitled to protection against summary execution once he had been taken prisoner. The Court referred to the 1949 Geneva Convention IV and identified murder, manslaughter and assaults as “crimes universally recognized as properly punishable under the law of war”. 
United States, Court of Military Appeals, Schultz case, Judgment, 7 March 1969.
United States of America
The Agent Orange case in 2005 involved a class action suit filed on behalf of various Vietnamese nationals and an organization, The Vietnamese Association for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin, against Dow Chemical and other US chemical manufacturers, for harms allegedly done to them and their land through the United States’ use of Agent Orange and other herbicides during the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1971 and by the South Vietnamese Government’s subsequent use of such herbicides until 1975. In dismissing the claims, the Court found that, while recognizing the evolution of international law since 1975, the use of herbicides did not violate, at the time they were used, either customary or conventional international law binding on the United States. With regard to the question of whether the use of herbicides constituted extrajudicial killing, the Court stated:
The use of herbicides in Vietnam does not fit within the definition of either torture or extrajudicial killing. Plaintiffs were not within the defendants’ custody or physical control, nor that of the United States, when herbicides were used. Nor were herbicides used to intentionally inflict pain and suffering. They were used to kill plants.
Herbicide spraying by the United States did not constitute “willful killing” or “wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health” since the United States lacked the requisite criminal intent. 
United States, Eastern States District Court (EDNY), Agent Orange case, Judgment, 28 March 2005, pp. 176–177 and 179.
United States of America
In 2008, in the Khadr case, a Guantánamo Military Commission considered a Defence motion to dismiss Charge One for failure to state an offence and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In denying the Defence motion, the Commission firstly noted Charge One and its Specification:
CHARGE I: VIOLATION OF 10 U.S.C. §950v(b)(15), MURDER IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF WAR
Specification: In that [the accused], a person subject to trial by military commission as an alien unlawful enemy combatant, did, in Afghanistan, on or about July 27, 2002, while in the context of and associated with armed conflict and without enjoying combatant immunity, unlawfully and intentionally murder U.S. Army Sergeant First Class …, in violation of the law of war, by throwing a hand grenade at U.S. forces resulting in the death of Sergeant First Class …. 
United States, Guantánamo Military Commission, Khadr case, Ruling, 21 April 2008, § 2.
The Commission then noted that the US Manual for Military Commissions (2007) contained both the text of §950v(b)(15) and the Secretary [for Defense’s] implementation of the statute. Also noted was paragraph 6(13) of the manual, containing Comment to “Intentionally Causing Serious Bodily Injury”:
For the accused to have been acting in violation of the law of war, the accused must have taken acts as a combatant without having met the requirements for lawful combatancy. It is generally accepted international practice that unlawful enemy combatants may be prosecuted for offenses associated with armed conflicts, such as murder; such unlawful enemy combatants do not enjoy combatant immunity because they have failed to meet the requirements of lawful combatancy under the law of war. 
United States, Guantánamo Military Commission, Khadr case, Ruling, 21 April 2008, § 3.c.
The Commission then stated the following in relation to the lawfulness of the offence of murder being tried by US military commissions:
4. Congress possesses express enumerated authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution to enact the Military Commissions Act of 2006. The plenary power given to Congress “to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations” establishes the prima facie validity of the statute in question.
5. The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress could define offenses against the Law of Nations:
It is no objection that Congress in providing for the trial of such offenses has not itself undertaken to codify that branch of international law or to mark its precise boundaries, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which that law condemns. … Congress had the choice of crystallizing in permanent form and in minute detail every offense against the law of war, or of adopting the system of common law applied by military tribunals so far as it should be recognized and deemed applicable by the courts. It chose the latter course. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 12, 63 S.Ct. 2 (1942).
6. As if anticipating the defense motion in this case, the Supreme Court actually defined those who are protected by the Law of Nations and those who are not:
By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. … [A]n enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, … [is a familiar … example of a belligerent who is] generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be … [an offender] against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals. (Ex Parte Quirin, Id., at 12, emphasis added)
7. The commission has considered the cases and authorities cited by the defense and prosecution and finds:
1) There was a reasonable basis for Congress, in 2006, to determine that the offense of murder in violation of the law of war was part of the common law of war, before, on, and after 11 September 2001; and,
2) There was a reasonable basis for Congress, in 2006, to determine that the offense of murder in violation of the law of war was punishable by military commissions, before, on, and after 11 September 2001.
9. The commission has reviewed Charge I and its Specification. The Specification alleges a violation of the statute. The act alleged in the Specification, the killing of a lawful combatant by an unlawful combatant, is a violation of the law of war. 
United States, Guantánamo Military Commission, Khadr case, Ruling, 21 April 2008, §§ 4–7 and 9.
[emphasis in original]
Venezuela
In 2001, in the Ballestas case, the Colombian Government requested the preventive detention and extradition of a Colombian citizen belonging to the armed group known as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army) for the crimes of rebellion, kidnapping, wrongful death, seizure and diversion of aircraft. The Chamber of Criminal Appeals of Venezuela’s Supreme Tribunal of Justice stated:
In case of national armed conflict, Article 3 [common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions] establishes as a minimum the obligation to treat non-combatants “humanely”, thus prohibiting … in particular murder (of all kinds) … The standards of Article 3 are considered to be a part of customary law and constitute the minimum – in terms of obligations – that belligerents must always respect. 
Venezuela, Supreme Tribunal of Justice, Ballestas case, Judgment, 10 December 2001, p. 8.
In concluding on whether extradition can be granted for the crime of wrongful death, the tribunal held:
The Chamber … expressly notes: the extradition … is not granted … for the alleged commission of the offence of culpable homicide even though homicide should always give rise to extradition and [in particular] as it is presumed to be connected with the [offence] of kidnapping … [This is] because … the death of the passenger was caused because of the anguish suffered during the months of his kidnapping and the causal relationship … practically vanishes, and it would go to the extreme … of “causa causae est causa causati”: “The cause of the cause is the cause of the effect”. 
Venezuela, Supreme Tribunal of Justice, Ballestas case, Judgment, 10 December 2001, pp. 13–14.
[emphasis in original]
Algeria
It is reported that, during the Algerian war of independence, the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) stated that prisoners were only executed after having been tried and found guilty of violating the laws and customs of war. 
Le problème des prisonniers de guerre, El Moudjahid, Vol. 1, p. 474.
Algeria
In 2006, in its third periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Algeria stated:
57. Since 1991, Algeria has had to confront terrorism in an atmosphere of indifference and suspicion. Efforts to combat this scourge, requiring the implementation of special measures, have always been deployed within the framework of the law and respect for human dignity.
58. In order to deal with this exceptional situation, in February 1992 the Algerian authorities decided to declare – as they are entitled to do under the Constitution – a state of emergency. Although the state of emergency did impose some restrictions on the exercise of civil rights and liberties, it did not relieve the State of its obligations to guarantee the right to exercise the fundamental civil liberties provided for in the existing domestic constitutional order and in the international agreements ratified by Algeria.
59. The exceptional measures taken during the state of emergency were all accompanied by guarantees for the protection of human rights. No restrictions were placed on the rights and freedoms enshrined in inter alia, article 6] of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Algeria, Third periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 7 November 2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/DZA/3, submitted 22 September 2006, §§ 57–59.
Australia
On 8 February 2005, in response to a Question in Writing in the House of Representatives regarding the future trial of Australian citizen David Hicks before a US Military Commission for his alleged role in the armed conflict in Afghanistan, Australia’s Attorney-General stated that the United States had assured Australia that “the death penalty will not be sought in either Mr Hicks’ or Mr Habib’s case”. 
Australia, House of Representatives, Attorney-General, Question in Writing: Military Detention – Mr David Hicks, Hansard, 8 February 2005, p. 160.
Australia
On 7 November 2005, in response to a Question on Notice in the Senate regarding the impending trial of Australian citizen David Hicks before a US Military Commission for his alleged role in the armed conflict in Afghanistan, the Minister representing the Attorney-General responded:
The Australian Government has discussed the Military Commission procedures with the United States. As a result of those discussions, the Government secured several additional commitments relating to Australian detainees, which include the following:
• Based upon the specific facts of his case, the United States has assured Australia that it will not seek the death penalty in Mr Hicks’ case. 
Australia, Senate, Minister representing the Attorney-General, Question on Notice: Mr David Hicks, Hansard, 7 November 2005, pp. 202–203.
Australia
On 27 February 2006, in response to a Question in Writing in the House of Representatives regarding the trial of Australian citizen David Hicks before a US Military Commission for his alleged role in the armed conflict in Afghanistan, Australia’s Attorney-General stated:
The Government has had discussions with the United States administration regarding the Military Commission system. The Government obtained additional commitments relating to Australian detainees which will apply to Mr Hicks’ case. Those commitments include the following:
- Based upon the specific facts of his case, the United States has assured Australia that it will not seek the death penalty in Mr Hicks’ case. 
Australia, House of Representatives, Attorney-General, Question in Writing: Military Detention – Mr David Hicks, Hansard, 27 February 2006, p. 150.
Australia
On 29 November 2006, in response to a Question in Writing in the House of Representatives regarding the trial of Australian citizen David Hicks before a US Military Commission for his alleged role in the armed conflict in Afghanistan, Australia’s Attorney-General stated:
I have held several discussions with US Attorney-General Gonzales, in which I … reiterated the Government’s expectation that additional safeguards negotiated previously to apply to Mr Hicks’ case will apply to any new military commission trial of Mr Hicks. A number of issues which were the focus of those safeguards have been taken up in the new legislation. The additional safeguards previously negotiated included:
• Based upon the specific facts of his case, the United States has assured Australia that it will not seek the death penalty in Mr Hicks’ case. 
Australia, House of Representatives, Attorney-General, Question in Writing: Mr David Hicks, Hansard, 29 November 2006, p. 210.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
In 2005, in its initial report to the Human Rights Committee, Bosnia and Herzegovina stated: “The right to life is a fundamental human right that cannot be derogated, not even during a state of emergency that threatens the life of citizens”. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Initial report to the Human Rights Committee, 24 November 2005, UN Doc. CCPR/C/BIH/1, § 45.
Botswana
In 1995, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the situation in the former Yugoslavia, Botswana stated that if the information relative to the execution of captives were confirmed, these acts would constitute the most blatant and flagrant violations of IHL and accepted norms of international morality. 
Botswana, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.3591, 9 November 1995, p. 5.
Brazil
In 1994, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the situation in Rwanda, Brazil stated that the international community could not “stand still and allow the continuation of mass killings in Rwanda”. 
Brazil, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.3388, 8 June 1994, p. 4.
Brazil
In 2009, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations stated:
Today, August 12, 2009, the 60th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law is celebrated. The Conventions, which are the main legal instrument in this area, lay down universal rules on the treatment of the wounded, prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons. Brazil ratified the four Conventions in 1957. 
On the occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the Conventions, the Brazilian Government reaffirms its commitment to upholding International Humanitarian Law and calls on the international community to fully comply with the principles of the Conventions, in favor of the protection of life … in the midst of armed conflicts. 
Brazil, Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Relations, 60th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions on Humanitarian Law, Note No. 377, 12 August 2009.
Canada
In 2005, in a statement before the UN Commission on Human Rights on the human rights situation in Sudan, made on behalf of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the representative of Canada stated: “To our dismay, serious abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law have become common place in Darfur, including … arbitrary executions”. 
Canada, Statement by the representative of Canada to the UN Commission on Human Rights on the human rights situation in Sudan, made on behalf of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 2005, p. 1.
Canada
In 2012, in its written replies to the issues raised by the Committee against Torture with regard to Canada’s sixth periodic report, Canada stated that “war crime … includes … violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds”. 
Canada, Written replies by the Government of Canada to the Committee against Torture concerning the list of issues to be taken up in connection with the sixth periodic report of Canada, 2012, § 176.
Canada
In 2012, in a statement during a UN Security Council open debate in connection with the agenda item “Children and Armed Conflict”, the permanent representative of Canada stated: “This year’s Secretary General’s report continues to document grave violations and abuses being committed against girls and boys – including the killing … of children … These despicable actions must be stopped.” 
Canada, Statement by the permanent representative of Canada during a UN Security Council open debate in connection with the agenda item “Children and Armed Conflict”, 19 September 2012, p. 2.
Chad
In 2007, in its initial report to the Committee against Torture, Chad stated:
The Commission of Inquiry of the Ministry of Justice into the crimes and abuses of power of former President Habré and his accomplices
113. The Commission of Inquiry was created by Decree No. 014/P.CE/CJ/90 of 29 December 1990 at the end of Hissène Habré’s dictatorship and entrusted with the task of assessing the reign of terror that had cost so many human lives.
114. Placed under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, the Commission of Inquiry’s tasks were to:
- Investigate the … murders …
- Determine the amount of the contribution to the war effort and its use as of 1986. 
Chad, Initial report to the Committee against Torture, 22 September 2008, UN Doc. CAT/C/TCD/1, submitted 4 September 2007, §§ 113–114.
Regarding the report issued by this commission, Chad stated: “The … report points out that the outcome of eight years (1982–1990) of President Habré’s rule was some 40,000 dead”. 
Chad, Initial report to the Committee against Torture, 22 September 2008, UN Doc. CAT/C/TCD/1, submitted 4 September 2007, § 24.
China
During the Chinese civil war, the People’s Liberation Army’s policy forbade the killing of prisoners of war. The Chinese Communist Party issued instructions concerning the treatment of captured combatants which provided that “those must-be-killed notorious criminals shall be executed by shooting after being tried and convicted by court, and shall not be beaten to death or by other illegal manners which would make us lose the sympathy of the society”. According to Deng Xiaoping, prisoners of war considered “notorious criminals” were executed, but only following trial and conviction by a court. 
China, Political Report on the United Government to the Seventh Plenary Session of National Representatives of the Chinese Communist Party by Mao Zedong, 24 April 1945, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. IV, Foreign Language Press, Beijing, pp. 47–51, p. 1039; Instruction on Implementing the Works of Land Reform and Consolidation of the Party by Deng Xiaoping, 6 June 1948, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 1, The People’s Press, Beijing, p. 122.
China
In 1952, during the Korean War, the Chinese Government denounced the killing and injuring of prisoners of war by the US army, stating that “it destroyed the principle of humanity and essentially violated the Geneva Conventions”. 
China, Letter from Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai to the Chairman of the UN General Assembly Protesting the US Criminal Activity of Killing POWs on Fengyan Island, 21 December 1952, Documents on Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, World Knowledge Press, Beijing, pp. 115–116.
Colombia
In a press release issued in 1980, the Colombian Ministry of National Defence denounced the killing of an army officer after he had been taken prisoner by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). 
Colombia, Ministry of National Defence, Press Bulletin No. 041, 25 August 1980, reprinted in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.53 Doc. 22, 1981, p. 198.
Colombia
The Report on the Practice of Colombia refers to a draft working paper in which the Colombian Government stated that it was prohibited in particular to kill persons taking no active part in the hostilities. 
Report on the Practice of Colombia, 1998, Chapter 4.1, referring to Presidential Council, Proposal of the Government to the Coordinator Guerrillerra Simón Bolívar to humanise war, Draft Internal Working Paper, Part entitled “El Derecho Internacional Humanitario”, § 2.
Costa Rica
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, Costa Rica stated:
The human right to life has found support both within the United Nations Treaties, Declarations and Resolutions as well as in Regional and International Agreements.
Through the evolution from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the present time, the principles and articles, build upon each other to construct a strong structure where it is conclusive that the use of nuclear weapons violates the international law governing the Human Rights to Life and Health. 
Costa Rica, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 4 July 1995, pp. 6 and 7.
Croatia
In 2001, in its third periodic report to the Committee against Torture, Croatia stated: “Even in the case of a direct threat to the existence of the State, the implementation of the constitutional provisions cannot be restricted regarding the right to life”. 
Croatia, Third periodic report to the Committee against Torture, 22 July 2002, UN Doc. CAT/C/54/Add.3, submitted 3 December 2001, § 9.
Croatia
In 2007, in its second periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Croatia stated:
70. Not even in the case of an immediate threat to the existence of the State may restrictions be imposed on the application of the provisions of the Constitution concerning the right to life …
73. … [I]n the Republic of Croatia there is no death penalty, and every human being has the right to life. 
Croatia, Second periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 2 December 2008, UN Doc. CCPR/C/HRV/2, submitted 28 November 2007, §§ 70 and 73.
Cuba
In 2010, in its second periodic report to the Committee against Torture, Cuba stated:
In the case of offences committed as a prisoner of war, article 47.1 of the Military [Criminal Code (1979)] establishes that “a prisoner given a position of authority who performs acts of violence against the other prisoners, or mistreats them, shall be liable to a penalty of between five and 20 years’ imprisonment”. Paragraph (2) of this article increases the penalty to between eight and 20 years’ imprisonment, or death, “if … death of a prisoner results from the acts described in paragraph (1)”. 
Cuba, Second periodic report to the Committee against Torture, 22 March 2011, UN Doc. CAT/C/CUB/2, submitted 18 January 2010, § 109.
Cuba
In 2011, in a response to UN General Assembly Resolution 63/51 on the observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control, the representative of Cuba stated:
In addition, in the war of occupation of Iraq by the United States, the harm caused [inter alia to … human life has been devastating. This situation has been repeated, in the last few months, during the bombings carried out by NATO against the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 
Cuba, Response by the representative of Cuba to UN General Assembly Resolution 63/51 on the observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control, 7 June 2011, p. 2.
Cuba
In 2011, in a statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the representative of Cuba stated: “It is … outrageous to see how, under the justification of protecting civilians, NATO is carrying out genocide in Libya, in breach of arms control measures and using sophisticated highly lethal weaponry.” 
Cuba, Statement by the representative of Cuba before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 5 October 2011, p. 1.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
In 2005, in its third periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, the Democratic Republic of the Congo stated:
56. Article 134, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the transitional Constitution provide that: “In accordance with the provisions of article 73 of the present Constitution, the President of the Republic declares war on a decision of the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the National Defence Council and authorization of the National Assembly and Senate. The rights and duties of citizens in time of war or in the event of invasion or attack on the country by foreign forces shall be governed by an organization act.”
57. Although the Constitution does not explicitly state which rights may be derogated from, in the event of the proclamation of a state of war or emergency, by constitutional tradition there is no authorization for derogation from the following fundamental rights: the right to life, the right to physical integrity (right not to be tortured), the right to equality, the right not to be kept in slavery or servitude, the right not to be imprisoned for acts of commission or omission which did not constitute offences when they were perpetrated, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and recognition of legal personality. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Third periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/COD/2005/3, 3 May 2005, §§ 56–57.
Denmark
In 2006, in a report on the detention and transfer of persons in Afghanistan in 2002, the Danish Ministry of Defence stated:
International humanitarian law contains in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions a series of basic fundamental guarantees which apply to any person in a conflicting party’s custody. The persons to whom it applies, for example people who do not have the status of prisoners of war, must always be treated humanly and guaranteed right to personal integrity, honour, belief and religion. The following acts, which involve violence against persons life, health or physical or mental well being, are without exception prohibited, this is regardless of whether they relate to civilian or military officials:
- Murder. 
Denmark, Report on Factual and Legal Matters Relating to Danish Forces’ Detention and Transfer of Persons in Afghanistan in the First Half of 2002, Ministry of Defence, 13 December 2006, p. 4.
Djibouti
In 2010, in the History and Geography Textbook for 8th Grade, Djibouti’s Ministry of National Education and Higher Education, under the heading “Basic rules of IHL” and in a section on “Treatment”, stated that “murder ... [is] prohibited”. 
Djibouti, Ministry of National Education and Higher Education, History and Geography Textbook for 8th Grade, 2010, p. 194.
Djibouti
In 2011, in the History and Geography Textbook for 9th Grade, Djibouti’s Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training, under the heading “[O]ffences related to violations of humanitarian law”, listed “[i]ntentional homicide”. 
Djibouti, Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training, History and Geography Textbook for 9th Grade, 2011, p. 210.
The ministry also stated that “one of the objectives of the judicial system is to prevent abuse by demonstrating that violations such as … summary executions … will not go unpunished (fear of prosecution).” 
Djibouti, Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training, History and Geography Textbook for 9th Grade, 2011, p. 222.
Djibouti
In 2010, in its initial report to the Committee against Torture, Djibouti stated:
46. Following independence in 1977, Djibouti experienced a difficult period of internal tension, which led to a visible, steady rise in violations of human rights and individual freedoms. This state of affairs reached its height during the civil war between government forces and the armed opposition of the Front pour la restauration de l’unité et de la démocratie [Front for the restoration of unity and democracy] (FRUD).
47. With the signing of [the] peace agreement between the warring parties in 1994 and again in 2001, the human rights situation improved dramatically. …
78. The Government has been forced to … set up commissions of enquiry when police or army misconduct has been reported, as it did following the massacres at Arhiba on 18 December 1992.  
Djibouti, Initial report to the Committee against Torture, 18 January 2011, UN Doc. CAT/C/DJI/1, submitted 21 July 2010, §§ 46–47 and 78.
Djibouti also stated:
82. Article 40 of the 1992 Constitution provides that
when the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfilment of its international commitments are threatened and the regular functioning of the governmental authorities is interrupted, the President of the Republic may, after consulting the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Constitutional Council and after informing the nation in a message, take any measure, except for a constitutional amendment, designed to restore the regular functioning of the governmental authorities and ensure the safeguarding of the nation.
Within 15 days of their promulgation, the National Assembly, convening as of right, is seized of the legislative measures put into effect by the President, with a view to their ratification.
83. These exceptional measures cannot justify violations of the right to life … accorded to individuals. In theory, their application must be in keeping with administrative legality and human rights. 
Djibouti, Initial report to the Committee against Torture, 18 January 2011, UN Doc. CAT/C/DJI/1, submitted 21 July 2010, §§ 82–83.
Egypt
In 1967, in a note submitted to the ICRC, Egypt qualified the “extermination of great numbers of the wounded” as a “flagrant violation of the elementary principle of humanity, and a serious breach of the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions of 1949”. 
Egypt, Note to the International Committee of the Red Cross, 7 July 1967, annexed to Letter dated 17 July 1967 to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/8064, 17 July 1967, §§ 1 and 2(c).
Finland
In 2003, in its fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Finland stated:
The Emergency Powers Act (1080/1991) requires that the basic necessities of the population, the maintenance of law and order and the protection of the territorial integrity and independence of Finland be ensured in emergency situations. Section 9 (198/2000) specifically provides that the rights protected by the Constitution or other recognised rights may only be restricted under the Emergency Powers Act to the extent it is necessary in order to control the situation … The Emergency Powers Act may not be applied with a view to restricting the right to life and integrity of person. 
Finland, Fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 24 July 2003, UN Doc. CCPR/C/FIN/2003/5, submitted 17 June 2003, § 111.
France
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, France stated that the right to life was not absolute and that an armed conflict necessarily entailed attempts on life. It added that Article 15(2) of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and the travaux préparatoires of Article 6 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognized this. 
France, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 20 June 1995, p. 38; see also Oral pleadings before the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 2 November 1995, Verbatim Record CR 95/23, § 44.
France
The instructions given to the French armed forces for the conduct of Opération Mistral, simulating a military operation under the right of self-defence or a mandate of the UN Security Council, state that persons not participating in hostilities (particularly the civilian population) have the right to respect for their lives. 
France, Etat-major de la Force d’Action Rapide, Ordres pour l’Opération Mistral, 1995, Section 6, § 62.
France
In a white paper on “Defence and National Security” published in 2008, France’s Ministry of Defence stated:
The sovereignty of a State consists, first of all, of protecting its population. Neither the principle of non-interference nor the one of sovereignty can be evoked by a State in order to justify atrocities such as massacres and other massive violations of international humanitarian law. 
France, Ministry of Defence, Defence and National Security: The White Paper, 17 June 2008, p. 123.
France
In 2009, the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of France, in a statement calling for the respect of international humanitarian law, which provided examples of serious violations that had recently occurred in several armed conflicts around the world, noted:
“Modern” war disgusts us in the tragic consequences it has for civilians.
How could we not be horrified at the sight of bodies, atrociously maimed or burned; the bodies of women, men and children lying in the smoking ruins of their homes …
Somalia, Congo, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Darfur, Gaza: this depressing litany of conflicts with their multitude of innocent civilian victims swept away by the storms of war must not however leave us indifferent. 
France, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, “The Savaging of Humanitarian Law”, New York Times, 28 January 2009, p. 1.
Georgia
In 2012, in its fourth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Georgia stated:
During the armed conflict of August 2008 between Russia and Georgia, the right to life was largely violated. In this respect, competent Georgian authorities have initiated and are conducting [an] investigation of grave crimes allegedly committed during and [in the] aftermath of [the] armed conflict. The investigation conducted by Georgian authorities is not limited to the allegations of crimes by only one party to the conflict. Rather, it covers any and all facts which have come to the attention of the Chief Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia through the claims of victims or through other ways of crime-reporting. 
Georgia, Fourth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 1 November 2012, UN Doc. CCPR/GEO/4, submitted 25 June 2012, § 60.
Germany
In 2006, in reply to a minor interpellation in the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) entitled “Criminal prosecution of persons responsible for war crimes in Italy and compensation for Italian military internees”, the German Federal Government wrote:
17. a) How many mass shootings of civilian persons, suspected partisans, captured or surrendering soldiers were carried out by German troops in Italy between 1943 and 1945 (please list individually)?
b) How many mass shootings of Italian prisoners of war or Italian military internees were carried out by German troops outside Italy (please list individually)?
The Federal Government has no information on these questions.
c) From the point of view of the Federal Government, how are these mass shootings to be assessed under international law?
The methods applied by members of the German armed forces in Italy in many cases clearly contravened the applicable international law of war. This is in particular so as regards mass shootings. While fighting local resistance, Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS in other instances, however, also took measures which were quite in line with international law of war of the time. After the war, allied courts and courts of the Federal Republic came to differentiated judgements when assessing such cases. 
Germany, Bundestag, Reply by the Federal Government to the Minor Interpellation by the Members Ulla Jelpke, Sevim Dagdelen, Jan Korte, further Members and the Parliamentary Group DIE LINKE – BT-Drs. 16/2187, Criminal prosecution of persons responsible for war crimes in Italy and compensation for Italian military internees, BT-Drs. 16/2422, 21 August 2006, p. 7.
India
In 2012, in an explanation of a vote at the 19th Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council on the human rights situation in Syria and the recent killings in El-Houla, India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated: “We strongly condemn the El-Houla incident, which has resulted in [the] death of over a hundred innocent civilians[,] including women and children[,] and have therefore intended to vote for this resolution.” 
India, Ministry of External Affairs, Explanation of a vote at the 19th Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council on the human rights situation in Syria and the recent killings in El-Houla, 1 June 2012.
Indonesia
In its oral pleadings before the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, Indonesia stated:
The right to life is one of the four non-derogable rights which constitute the “irreducible core” of human rights … A non-derogable right is one which cannot be suspended by the State even in times of public emergency. 
Indonesia, Oral pleadings before the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 3 November 1995, Verbatim Record CR 95/25, § 51.
Iraq
In 2012, in its Report on Iraqi Children After 2003, the Ministry of Human Rights of Iraq stated:
After the collapse of the dictatorial regime and consequent collapse of state institutions and the continuation of military operations and resulting suffering of children [from] displacement, murder, kidnapping and trafficking[,] among other practices[,] which are a product of wars and bloody conflicts[,] … children and women … are among such vulnerable groups that are least capable to provide protection for themselves. 
Iraq, Ministry of Human Rights, Report on Iraqi Children After 2003, 19 December 2012, p. 1.
Israel
In 1973, during a debate in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly on the protection of human rights in times of armed conflict, Israel accused the Syrian Arab Republic of killing and maltreating Israeli prisoners of war.  
Israel, Statement before the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.1453, 4 December 1973, p. 316, § 62.
Malaysia
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, Malaysia stated: “The right to life is one of the four non-derogable rights which constitute the ‘irreducible core’ of human rights.” 
Malaysia, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 19 June 1995, p. 14; see also Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons (WHO) case, 1994, p. 12.
Mexico
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons (WHO) case in 1994, Mexico stated that both conventional and customary international law guaranteed the right to life. 
Mexico, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons (WHO) case, 9 June 1994, p. 8.
Mexico
In 2009, during a debate in the UN Security Council on children and armed conflict, the permanent representative of Mexico stated: “We condemn all acts that jeopardize the integrity of children, such as … killing”. 
Mexico, Statement by the permanent representative before the UN Security Council, 6114th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.6114, 29 April 2009, p. 29.
Nauru
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, Nauru indicated that the right to life was non-derogable and thus could not be suspended by the State even in times of public emergency. 
Nauru, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 15 June 1995, p. 21.
Netherlands
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, the Netherlands stated:
The use of nuclear weapons cannot be considered in itself to be a violation of the right to life, as enshrined, inter alia, in Article 6 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] or in Article 2 [of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights]. According to the Netherlands Government, these articles do not create an absolute right to life. Thus, the travaux préparatoires of Article 6 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] make it clear that instead of listing the circumstances in which the deprivation of life would not be considered contrary to the right to life, the drafters decided to agree on the formulation that “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life” … One of the instances mentioned in this connection by drafters as an example of a deprivation of life which is not arbitrary was “the performance of lawful acts of war”. 
Netherlands, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 16 June 1995, § 27; see also Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons (WHO) case, 6 June 1994, § 34.
Nigeria
In 1968, during the Nigerian civil war, following the killing of an unarmed Biafran soldier, the Nigerian army officer responsible was executed for committing murder and for violating the code of conduct of Nigerian soldiers. 
The Times, Execution of Nigerian Officer Filmed, London, 4 September 1968.
Nigeria
In 1994, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the situation in Rwanda, Nigeria noted with great concern the continuation of large-scale killings. 
Nigeria, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.3388, 8 June 1994, p. 5.
Oman
In 1994, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the situation in Rwanda, Oman expressed regret at “the killing of thousands of innocent civilians in Rwanda”. 
Oman, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.3377, 16 May 1994, p. 7.
Qatar
In its oral pleadings before the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, Qatar stated:
The right to life is one of the four non-derogable rights which constitute the “irreducible core” of human rights. This means that the right to life cannot be suspended by a State, even in times of public death. [sic] Although it is expected that in times of war human beings might perish, such killings should not exceed the limits of law. 
Qatar, Oral pleadings before the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 10 November 1995, Verbatim Record CR 95/29, § 30.
Russian Federation
In 1994, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the situation in Rwanda, the Russian Federation expressed serious concern at “the deliberate mass extermination of innocent people”. 
Russian Federation, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.3388, 8 June 1994, p. 6.
Russian Federation
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, the Russian Federation affirmed that the existence of the right to life did not mean that it was not possible to deprive a person of life through legitimate use of force, as confirmed, for instance, in Article 2(2) of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. 
Russian Federation, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 19 June 1995, p. 9.
Russian Federation
In 2011, in an interview for Russian media during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation stated:
The International [Criminal] Court is a body at which, in accordance with its Statute, legal action can be taken. In this case, as in the case of Libya, the Statute provides that the action shall be initiated by the UN Security Council. As for Libya, we turned to the International Court, which, in turn, stated that it would deal with crimes or allegations of crimes committed by not only the regime but also by the opposition. There, too, much has been done by militant rebel groups that may well fall under the mandate of the ICC. Gaddafi was one of those named in the Security Council resolution, but there was no trial against him. The International Court must now investigate how he was killed, which falls under the jurisdiction of this structure. You cannot kill war prisoners, it is necessary to ensure their safety. In the case of the murder of POWs a war crime is committed. This is one reason why the International Criminal Court can and should intervene. 
Russian Federation, Interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Russian media during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, 13 November 2011.
Rwanda
In a declaration issued in 1990, the Rwandan Minister of Justice denied the reported allegations of existing threats to physically exterminate certain political prisoners. 
Rwanda, Declaration of the Minister of Justice, Kigali, 29 November 1990.
Rwanda
Rwanda’s Ecole Supérieure Militaire teaches its students that the lives of captured enemy combatants shall be safeguarded. 
Rwanda, Ecole Supérieure Militaire, Cours de tactique, Leçon No. 22, p. 17.
Serbia and Montenegro
In 2003, in its initial report to the Human Rights Committee, Serbia and Montenegro reported:
151. According to Article 99, paragraph 11, of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, enactments adopted during a state of war may throughout the duration of the state of war restrict various rights and freedoms of man and the citizen, except specific rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution (… inviolability of physical and psychological integrity of the individual …
153. Pursuant to the Charter of Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties [of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, adopted in 2003], derogation from human and minority rights guaranteed by this Charter is allowed following the declaration of a state of war or a state of emergency, if the existence of the State Union or a member State is threatened, but only to the extent necessary under the given circumstances. Measures of derogation from human and minority rights cease to have effect following the end of the state of war or the state of emergency. No derogation is permitted even during the state of war or the state of emergency from the … right to life. 
Serbia and Montenegro, Initial report to the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SEMO/2003/1, 24 July 2003, §§ 151 and 153.
Serbia and Montenegro
In its oral pleadings before the ICJ in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) in 2006, Serbia and Montenegro stated:
58. … The killing of prisoners of war is a violation of the Geneva Conventions, it is a violation of the laws and customs of war as well, it is a war crime, a very serious international crime, but the issue is: can this crime, clearly a heinous one, be called genocide without cheapening the notion of genocide? …
62. [With regard to] the video showing the killing of six men in Trnovo … [, Serbia and Montenegro stated:]
65. … there is a possibility which cannot be excluded that the six men whose murder is shown on the video were captured on the Sarajevo front and then executed. This does not excuse the execution of these men; that is a crime, a horrible crime. 
Serbia and Montenegro, Oral pleadings before the ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 4 May 2006, Verbatim Record CR 2006/42, pp. 29–31, §§ 58. 62 and 65.
Somalia
In 2011, in its report to the Human Rights Council, Somalia stated:
Somalia has not ratified AP II [1977 Additional Protocol II] and it is therefore not directly applicable to Somalia as a matter of treaty law. The Government is aware that many provisions of AP II represent customary IHL rules and therefore apply to the situation in Somalia. Such provisions include Article 4 providing guarantees to persons taking no active part in hostilities … due to the fact that these norms are reflected in Common Article 3 of the [1949] Geneva Conventions. 
Somalia, Report to the Human Rights Council, 11 April 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/11/SOM/1, § 75.
Somalia
In 2011, in its comments on the concluding observations of the Human Rights Council concerning Somalia’s report, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government stated: “The Government will undertake every effort to stop all violence in the context of the armed conflict, including summary executions, arbitrary, [and] extrajudicial killings”. 
Somalia, Comments by the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia on the concluding observations of the Human Rights Council concerning the report of Somalia, submitted 21 September 2011, § 98.71.
South Africa
In its report on “gross violations of human rights” committed between 1960 and 1993, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission stated:
Those combatants who were killed or seriously injured while they were unarmed or out of combat, executed after they had been captured, or wounded when they clearly could have been arrested were held to be victims of gross violations of human rights, and those responsible were held accountable. 
South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, 1998, Vol. 1, p. 76, § 102.
Sri Lanka
In 2008, in its initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child under the 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, Sri Lanka stated:
83. In accordance with resolution 1612 and Section VI, paragraph 2 of the Terms of Reference of the Working Group on the Security Council on children and armed conflict, the TFMR [Task Force for Monitoring and Reporting] will focus on violations against children affected by armed conflict …
84. … [V]iolations and abuses committed against children affected by armed conflict including … killing … of children … will … be addressed. 
Sri Lanka, Initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child under the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 15 February 2010, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/LKA/1, submitted 16 June 2008, §§ 83–84.
Reports from Iraq and Syria show gross, systematic and large-scale abuse of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law. Murder … occur[s] in large scale and minority groups and women and children are particularly exposed. The government has in the strongest terms condemned ISIL and their brutal acts. 
Sweden, Answer by the Minister for International Development Cooperation to written question 2014/15:31 in Parliament regarding the humanitarian situation for the victims of IS, 29 October 2014.
Switzerland
In 2005, in a report in response to a parliamentary postulate on private security and military companies, Switzerland’s Federal Council stated:
International humanitarian law is aimed not only at states. It also contains numerous provisions for individuals and even civilians to observe. Perhaps the most well known example is Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions, according to which persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed “hors de combat” by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated human[e]ly, without violence to life and person, in particular mutilation, torture and cruel treatment. 
Switzerland, Report by the Swiss Federal Council on Private Security and Military Companies, 2 December 2005, Section 5.3.2, p. 46.
[footnote in original omitted; emphasis in original]
Switzerland
Switzerland’s ABC of International Humanitarian Law (2009) states:
War crimes
War crimes are grave breaches of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 protecting persons and objects as well as other serious violations of the laws and customs that apply to an international or non-international Armed conflict. War crimes include notably: wilful killing[.] 
Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, ABC of International Humanitarian Law, 2009, p. 40.
Switzerland
In 2010, in its Report on IHL and Current Armed Conflicts, Switzerland’s Federal Council stated:
3.4 [Increasing use] of anti-guerrilla tactics
Apart from the direct fight against insurgents, international humanitarian law also addresses other anti-guerrilla tactics. … If members of militias or opposition groups fall into the hands of the government they benefit from the protection of art. 75 of [1977] Additional Protocol I as well as that of art. 3 common to the [1949] Geneva Conventions. 
Switzerland, Federal Council, Report on IHL and Current Armed Conflicts, 17 September 2010, Section 3.4, p. 15.
[footnotes in original omitted]
Switzerland
In 2012, Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs issued a press release entitled “Switzerland calls for an investigation into the massacre in Houla”, which stated:
Switzerland condemns in the strongest possible terms the massacre in Houla [Syria], in which almost 100 people were killed including 32 children aged 10 or under. It calls for an international investigation to establish the facts and those responsible for this abominable slaughter, which could constitute a war crime. 
Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Switzerland calls for an investigation into the massacre in Houla”, Press Release, 27 May 2012.
Switzerland
In 2012, in a statement at the 19th Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council, the representative of Switzerland stated:
Switzerland condemned in the strongest terms the heinous massacre of more than a hundred civilians, including dozens of children, at El-Houleh in the night from 25th to 26th May. The facts and the responsibility for what may constitute a war crime … have to be more accurately established. 
Switzerland, Statement by the representative of Switzerland at the 19th Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council, 1 June 2012.
Switzerland
In 2012, in a statement before the UN Security Council during a debate on children and armed conflict, the permanent representative of Switzerland stated:
[T]he situation of children affected by armed conflict remains alarming on a global scale. Children continue to be killed …
Pressure must be increased on persistent perpetrators. To that end, a close cooperation between the Security Council and national and international courts seeking to end impunity for serious violations of international humanitarian law is vital. 
Switzerland, Statement by the permanent representative of Switzerland before the UN Security Council during a debate on children and armed conflict, 19 September 2012.
Switzerland
In 2013, in a statement before the UN Human Rights Council during a debate on the human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, the representative of Switzerland stated: “Our country condemns the extrajudicial execution of seven individuals in Gaza last November. We urge the authorities in Gaza to conduct an independent investigation and bring to justice those responsible.” 
Switzerland, Statement by the representative of Switzerland before the UN Human Rights Council during a debate on the human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, 18 March 2013.
Syrian Arab Republic
In 2004, in its third periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, the Syrian Arab Republic stated:
61. The State of Emergency Act, which was promulgated in Legislative Decree No. 51 of 22 December 1962, as amended by Legislative Decree No. 1 of 9 March 1963, and which is currently in force in the Syrian Arab Republic, is an exceptional constitutional regime, based on the concept of an imminent threat to the country’s integrity, under which the competent authorities are empowered to take all the measures provided by law to protect the territory, territorial waters and air space of the State, in whole or in part, from the dangers arising from external armed aggression by transferring some of the powers of the civil authorities to the military authorities. Article 101 of the Constitution states that the President of the Republic can declare and terminate a state of emergency in the manner stated in the law. Article 1 of this Act specifies the reasons justifying its promulgation by stipulating that a state of emergency can be proclaimed in the event of war, a situation entailing the threat of war or a situation in which security or public order in the territory of the Republic, or any part thereof, is jeopardized by internal disturbances or the occurrence of general disasters.
62. Since 1948, the Syrian Arab Republic, which was a founding member of the United Nations, has been subjected, like other neighbouring Arab States, to a real threat of war by Israel and, on many occasions, this threat of war has culminated in actual aggression against the territory, territorial waters and air space of the Syrian Arab Republic, particularly in 1967 when Israel seized part of the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, which it is still occupying, and expelled a large proportion of its population. The latest incident of Israeli aggressions was in Ein El-Saheb on 5 October 2003.
63. This state of affairs, consisting in a real threat of war, the continued occupation of part of the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic and the existence of a real threat of seizure and ongoing occupation of further land in violation of United Nations resolutions, gave rise to an exceptional situation that necessitated the rapid and extraordinary mobilization of forces in the Syrian Arab Republic and, consequently, the promulgation of legislation to ensure the Administration’s ability to act rapidly in the face of these imminent threats when application of the ordinary legislation cannot guarantee rapid action in such circumstances. Accordingly, there was a need to promulgate this Act and maintain it in force. It should be borne in mind that all countries of the world have applied exceptional legislation, in one form or another, when they were faced with a state of war or a threat of war in order to protect their national security. This is a fundamental right recognized in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 4 of which stipulates that: “In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”.
68. The application of the provisions of the Emergency Act in Syria does not mean in any way a suspension of the provisions of the Constitution and other laws nor a derogation from other international obligations, including obligations in which Syria has entered by virtue of bilateral or multilateral international agreements, such as provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the obligation to submit reports under article 40 of the Covenant. Furthermore, the grounds for a declaration of a state of emergency do not involve any discrimination on grounds of race, colour, gender, language, religion or social origin. The declaration of the state of emergency has not led to any violations of inter alia, article 6] which remain[s] enforceable under the Constitution and laws, in conformity with the Covenant. 
Syrian Arab Republic, Third periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 19 October 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SYR/2004/3, submitted 5 July 2004, §§ 61–63 and 68.
Ukraine
In 1999, in its sixth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Ukraine stated:
72. In article 64, paragraph 2, the Constitution lists those rights and freedoms which may not be restricted under martial law or a state of emergency.
73. These rights and freedoms include, among others, the following:
- Every person has the inalienable right to life. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of life. 
Ukraine, Sixth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 11 April 2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/UKR/6, submitted 3 November 1999, §§ 72–73.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, the United Kingdom stated that it was entirely appropriate that the human rights agreements should, in effect, refer to the law of armed conflict in order to determine whether or not any particular instance of the deprivation of life in wartime was arbitrary. 
United Kingdom, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 16 June 1995, p. 68.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2003, during a debate in the House of Commons, the UK Prime Minister stated:
As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the United States is now talking about the right method by which to try anybody against whom charges would be brought. We will make active representations to the United States – indeed, we are already doing so – to make absolutely sure that any such trial will take place in accordance with proper international law.
It is of course important that the commission that tries these people is conducted according to proper rules. Those rules have not yet been drawn up, and it is precisely for that reason that we are making active representations, and our opposition to the death penalty is well known.
… It is worth remembering that the allegations revolve around what happened in Afghanistan some time ago, when British and American troops were putting their lives at risk there. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Statement by the Prime Minister, Hansard, 9 July 2003, Vol. 408, Debates, cols. 1152–1153.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2003, in a reply to a written question in the House of Commons, the UK Solicitor-General wrote:
The Attorney-General has been involved in discussions within Government about the position of UK nationals detained in Guantanamo Bay. He has also raised the matter with those responsible in the United States Administration, to express the Government’s profound concern … if the UK detainees are to be tried … and to make plain the Government’s opposition to the imposition of the death penalty. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Solicitor-General, Hansard, 10 July 2003, Vol. 408, Written Answers, col. 959W.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2003, in a reply to a written question in the House of Lords, the UK Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, wrote:
On 18 July the US announced that they would not commence any military commission proceedings against UK nationals, pending discussions between American and British legal experts. The Attorney-General visited Washington on 21–22 July for talks with the US Administration. He secured a number of assurances from the Administration, including that the US will not seek the death penalty against the two British detainees who have been designated as eligible for the commissions, and will be returning to the US shortly for further discussions.
The US announced on 18 July that they would not commence any military commission proceedings against UK nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay, pending discussions between American and British legal experts.  
United Kingdom, House of Lords, Written answer by the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hansard, 8 September 2003, Vol. 651, Written Answers, col. WA17.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2004, in reply to a question concerning Israel’s policy of targeted killings, the UK Foreign Secretary stated: “What I said is what I and the British Government believe, which is that assassinations or killings of this kind are unjustified, they are not lawful, and they are counter-productive.” 
United Kingdom, Statement by the Foreign Secretary, 5 May 2004, published in House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism: Seventh Report of the Session 2003–04, Vol. II: Oral and Written Evidence, HC 441-II, Minutes of Evidence, Question 244.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2005, in a written answer to a question concerning, inter alia, the use of “targeted assassinations” by the Israeli authorities, the UK Minister of State for the Middle East, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated: “Targeted killings are contrary to international law.” 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Minister of State for the Middle East, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hansard, 17 October 2005, Vol. 437, Written Answers, col. 737W.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK Government Strategy on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (2010) states: “IHL requires parties to a conflict to respect and protect civilians. … [C]ivilians must not be … subjected to acts of violence such as killing”. 
United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government Strategy on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, March 2010, p. 4.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2010, in its closing submissions to the public inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Baha Mousa and the treatment of those detained with him by UK armed forces in Iraq in 2003, the UK Ministry of Defence stated regarding common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: “On its face this protection is restricted to armed conflicts not of an international character. However, it is understood to apply in all forms of armed conflict as part of customary international law to set out the irreducible minimum standard.” 
United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Closing Submissions to the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry on Modules 1–3, 25 June 2010, § 10.2, p. 10.
United States of America
In 1992, in reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 5 of UN Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) on grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV committed in the former Yugoslavia, the United States described acts of “wilful killing” and “summary executions” perpetrated by the parties to the conflict. 
United States, Former Yugoslavia: Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention, annexed to Letter dated 22 September 1992 to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/24583, 23 September 1992, pp. 4–6; Former Yugoslavia: Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Second Submission), annexed to Letter dated 22 October 1992 to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/24705, 23 October 1992, pp. 4–10; Former Yugoslavia: Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Third Submission), annexed to Letter dated 5 November 1992 to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/24791, 10 November 1992, pp. 3–11; Former Yugoslavia: Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Fourth Submission), annexed to Letter dated 7 December 1992 to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/24918, 8 December 1992, pp. 3–11.
United States of America
In 1992, in its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the US Department of Defense listed Iraqi war crimes, including the murder of civilians. It also noted specific Iraqi war crimes, including wilful killing in violation of Articles 32 and 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV. 
United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Appendix O, The Role of the Law of War, ILM, Vol. 31, 1992, pp. 632 and 634.
United States of America
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, the United States held that none of the instruments asserting the right to life prohibited, directly or indirectly, the taking of life for legitimate purposes, including in the exercise of the right to self-defence. It added that these provisions were clearly understood by their drafters as to exclude the lawful taking of life. 
United States, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 20 June 1995, p. 20.
United States of America
In a concurrent resolution adopted in 2000, the US Congress expressed its sense concerning the war crimes committed by the Japanese military during the Second World War, in particular the beating to death and summary executions of many US military and civilian prisoners. 
United States, House of Representatives (Senate concurring), Concurrent Resolution, H.CON.RES. 357, 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 19 June 2000.
United States of America
According to the Report on US Practice, “Articles 4, 5 and 6 [of the 1977 Additional Protocol II] reflect general US policy on treatment of persons in the power of an adverse party in armed conflicts governed by common Article 3” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The report also notes: “It is the opinio juris of the US that persons detained in connection with an internal armed conflict are entitled to humane treatment as specified in Articles 4, 5 and 6 [of the 1977 Additional Protocol II].” 
Report on US Practice, 1997, Chapter 5.3.
Zimbabwe
According to the Report on the Practice of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe considers that civilians of any description should be protected from murder. 
Report on the Practice of Zimbabwe, 1997, Chapter 5.6.
UN Security Council
In a number of resolutions on South Africa adopted between 1976 and 1985, the UN Security Council condemned the wanton killing and maiming of defenceless demonstrators. 
UN Security Council, Res. 392, 19 June 1976, preamble and § 1, voting record: 15-0-0; Res. 417, 31 October 1977, preamble and § 3, voting record: 15-0-0; Res. 473, 13 June 1980, preamble, voting record: 15-0-0; Res. 556, 23 October 1984, preamble and § 2, voting record: 14-0-1; Res. 560, 12 March 1985, § 2, voting record: 15-0-0; Res. 569, 26 July 1985, preamble and § 2, voting record: 13-0-2.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1993, the UN Security Council expressed “its grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and especially in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including reports of mass killings”. 
UN Security Council, Res. 827, 25 May 1993, preamble, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1995, the UN Security Council referred to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and expressed its grave concern “at reports … of grave violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights in and around Srebrenica, and in the areas of Banja Luka and Sanski Most, including reports of mass murder”. 
UN Security Council, Res. 1019, 9 November 1995, preamble, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the UN Security Council:
Condemns in particular in the strongest possible terms the violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights by Bosnian Serb and paramilitary forces in the areas of Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most as described in the report of the Secretary-General of 27 November 1995 and showing a consistent pattern of summary executions. 
UN Security Council, Res. 1034, 21 December 1995, § 2, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1996, the UN Security Council expressed deep concern at the deterioration in security and the humanitarian situation in Burundi, including killings and massacres. 
UN Security Council, Res. 1072, 30 August 1996, preamble, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 2004, the UN Security Council strongly condemned certain crimes involving children in armed conflict, including the “killing and maiming of children”. 
UN Security Council, Res. 1539, 22 April 2004, § 1, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the situation in Georgia, the UN Security Council condemned “killings and abductions of civilians”. 
UN Security Council, Res.1554, 29 July 2004, § 23, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In 1998, in two statements by its President, the UN Security Council expressed its support for “the steps of the Secretary-General to launch investigations into alleged mass killings of prisoners of war and civilians in Afghanistan, the outcome of which will be submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council as soon as it becomes available”. 
UN Security Council, Statement by the President, UN Doc. S/PRST/1998/9, 6 April 1998; Statement by the President, UN Doc. S/PRST/1998/22, 14 July 1998.
UN Security Council
In 1998, in a statement by its President on the situation in Sierra Leone, the UN Security Council condemned as gross violations of IHL atrocities carried out against the civilian population, including widespread slaughter. 
UN Security Council, Statement by the President, UN Doc. S/PRST/1998/13, 20 May 1998.
UN Security Council
In 2003, in a statement by its President on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the UN Security Council stated:
… The Security Council strongly condemns all attacks and acts of violence directed against civilians or other protected persons under international law, in particular international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict, including such attacks and acts of violence against women, children, refugees, internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups; [and] reaffirms the need for parties to armed conflict to take all possible measures to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel as well as personnel of international humanitarian organizations in accordance with applicable international law. 
UN Security Council, Statement by the President, UN Doc. S/PRST/2003/27, 15 December 2003, p. 1.
UN Security Council
In 2004, in a statement by its President on the situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan, the UN Security Council stated:
The Council … expresses its deep concern at the continuing reports of large-scale violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law in Darfur, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians, sexual violence, forced displacement and acts of violence. 
UN Security Council, Statement by the President, UN Doc. S/PRST/2004/18, 25 May 2004, p. 1.
UN Security Council
In 2004, in a statement by its President on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the UN Security Council reaffirmed “its condemnation of all incitements to violence against civilians in situations of armed conflict, in particular the use of media to incite hatred and violence”. 
UN Security Council, Statement by the President, UN Doc. S/PRST/2004/46, 14 December 2004, p. 1.
UN Security Council
In 2006, in a statement by its President on children and armed conflict, the UN Security Council strongly condemned “the killing and maiming of children, rape and other sexual violence … by parties to armed conflict”. 
UN Security Council, Statement by the President, UN Doc. S/PRST/2006/48, 28 November 2006, p. 2.
UN Security Council
In 2007, in a statement by its President on women and peace and security, the UN Security Council stated:
The Security Council strongly condemns all violations of international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law, committed against women and girls in situations of armed conflict, including killing, maiming, sexual violence, exploitation and abuse. In this regard, the Council urges the complete cessation by all parties of such acts with immediate effect.
The Security Council is deeply concerned that despite its repeated condemnation of all acts of violence, including killing, maiming, sexual violence, exploitation and abuse in situations of armed conflict, and despite its calls addressed to all parties to armed conflict for the cessation of such acts with immediate effect, and for the adoption of specific measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape, and other forms of sexual abuse, as well as all other forms of violence, such acts remain pervasive, and in some situations have become systematic, and have reached appalling levels of atrocity. The Council stresses the need to end impunity for such acts as part of a comprehensive approach to seeking peace, justice, truth and national reconciliation. 
UN Security Council, Statement by the President, UN Doc. S/PRST/2007/40, 23 October 2007, p. 3.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution on South Africa adopted in 1986, the UN General Assembly strongly condemned the use of capital punishment against freedom fighters and patriots and demanded that death sentences be annulled. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 41/35 A, 10 November 1986, §§ 6–9, voting record: 130-8-18-3.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on the situation of human rights in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the UN General Assembly:
Also gravely concerned at reports … of grave violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights in and around Srebrenica, and in the areas of Banja Luka and Sanski Most, including reports of mass murder …
2. Expresses its outrage at the instances of massive and systematic violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including … killings. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 50/193, 22 December 1995, preamble and § 2, voting record: 144-1-20-20.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1998 on the situation of human rights in Kosovo, the UN General Assembly: “Strongly condemns the overwhelming number of human rights violations … including summary executions.” 
UN General Assembly, Res. 53/164, 9 December 1998, §8, voting record: 122-3-34-26.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution on illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory adopted during an emergency special session in 2003, the UN General Assembly deplored “the extrajudicial killings and their recent escalation” and underlined that “they are a violation of international law and international humanitarian law”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. ES-10/12, 19 September 2003, preamble, voting record: 133-4-15-39.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution on illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory adopted during an emergency special session in 2003, the UN General Assembly deplored “the extrajudicial killings and their recent intensification, in particular the attack on 20 October 2003 in Gaza”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. ES-10/13, 21 October 2003, preamble, voting record: 144-4-12-31.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the UN General Assembly demanded that “Israel, the occupying Power, comply fully with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and cease immediately all measures and actions taken in violation of the Convention, including the extrajudicial executions”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 58/99, 9 December 2003, § 2, voting record: 150-6-19-16.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel, the UN General Assembly strongly condemned “acts of murder and other forms of violence … to which those participating in humanitarian operations are increasingly exposed”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 58/122, 17 December 2003, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on special assistance for the economic recovery and reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN General Assembly:
Strongly condemns the acts of violence, including the latest massacres in Ituri, systematically perpetrated against civilians, including the massacres, as well as other atrocities and violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, in particular sexual violence against women and girls. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 58/123, 17 December 2003, § 6, voting record: 169-1-0-21.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance, the UN General Assembly urged States to ensure that “no one within their jurisdiction is, because of their religion or belief, deprived of the right to life … and to protect their physical integrity and bring to justice all perpetrators of violations”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 58/184, 22 December 2003, § 3, voting record: 179-0-1-11.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN General Assembly condemned “the cases of summary or arbitrary execution, disappearance, torture, harassment, unlawful arrest, widespread persecution and arbitrary detention for long periods”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 58/196, 22 December 2003, § 2(e), voting record: 81-2-91-17.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on UNRWA operations, the UN General Assembly deplored “the killing of twelve Agency staff members by the Israeli occupying forces since September 2000” and also deplored “the killing and wounding of children in the Agency’s schools by the Israeli occupying forces”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/119, 10 December 2004, preamble, voting record: 163-6-7-15.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, the UN General Assembly especially condemned “the excessive and indiscriminate use of force against the civilian population, including extrajudicial executions, which has resulted in more than 3,400 Palestinian deaths, including those of more than 750 children”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/121, 10 December 2004, § 4, voting record: 84-9-80-18.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the UN General Assembly:
2. Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, comply fully with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and cease immediately all measures and actions taken in violation and in breach of the Convention, including the extrajudicial executions;
6. Condemns also the killing of Palestinian civilians … by Israel, the occupying Power. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/124, 10 December 2004, §§ 2 and 6, voting record: 149-7-22-13.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the UN General Assembly urged all governments:
(a) To take all necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, including those occurring in custody;
(b) To take all necessary and possible measures, in conformity with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to prevent loss of life, in particular that of children, during public demonstrations, internal and communal violence, civil unrest and public emergencies or armed conflicts, and to ensure that the police, law enforcement agents and security forces act with restraint and in conformity with international human rights law and international humanitarian law. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/197, 20 December 2004, § 8(a)(b), voting record: 142-0-43-6.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance, the UN General Assembly urged States to ensure that “no one within their jurisdiction is, because of their religion or belief, deprived of the right to life … and to protect their physical integrity and bring to justice all perpetrators of violations”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/199, 20 December 2004, § 3, voting record: 186-0-0-5.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel, the UN General Assembly strongly condemned “acts of murder and other forms of violence … to which those participating in humanitarian operations are increasingly exposed”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/211, 20 December 2004, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the UN General Assembly called upon the Government of Myanmar to “end the systematic violations of human rights in Myanmar, including extrajudicial killings”.  
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/263, 23 December 2004, § 3(a), adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine, the UN General Assembly emphasized “the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians in the whole Middle East region” and condemned “all acts of violence and terror against civilians on both sides, including the suicide bombings [and] the extrajudicial executions”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/39, 1 December 2005, preamble, voting record: 156-6-9-20.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on UNRWA operations, the UN General Assembly deplored “the killing of twelve Agency staff members by the Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory since September 2000” and also deplored “the killing and wounding of children in the Agency’s schools by the Israeli occupying forces”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/102, 8 December 2005, preamble, voting record: 159-6-3-23.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, the UN General Assembly:
Expresses grave concern about the critical situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000, as a result of unlawful Israeli practices and measures, and especially condemns all Israeli settlement activities and the construction of the wall, as well as the excessive and indiscriminate use of force against the civilian population, including extrajudicial executions. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/104, 8 December 2005, § 4, voting record: 86-10-74-21.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the UN General Assembly demanded that Israel “comply fully with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and cease immediately all measures and actions taken in violation and in breach of the Convention, including … the extrajudicial executions”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/107, 8 December 2005, § 2, voting record: 148-7-17-19.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of UN personnel, the UN General Assembly strongly condemned “acts of murder and other forms of violence … to which those participating in humanitarian operations are increasingly exposed”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/123, 15 December 2005, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief, the UN General Assembly urged States to ensure that “no one within their jurisdiction is deprived of the right to life, liberty or security of person because of religion or belief”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/166, 16 December 2005, § 4(f), adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN General Assembly called upon the governments of countries in the region, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo:
(a) To contribute to preventing armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo from perpetrating killings and other serious crimes …
(b) To work with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to take urgent steps towards the disarmament and resettlement or repatriation of foreign armed groups, which remain a threat to regional peace and perpetrate killings and serious crimes against the civilian population of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/170, 16 December 2005, § 7(a) and (b), voting record: 102-3-67-19.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the UN General Assembly expressed grave concern at “violations suffered by persons belonging to ethnic nationalities, women and children, especially in non-ceasefire areas, including but not limited to extrajudicial killings”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/233, 23 December 2005, § 2(a), adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine, the UN General Assembly emphasizedthe importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians in the whole Middle East region” and condemned “all acts of violence and terror against civilians on both sides, including the suicide bombings, the extrajudicial executions and the excessive use of force”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/25, 1 December 2006, preamble, voting record: 157-7-10-18.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on UNRWA operations, the UN General Assembly deplored “the killing of fourteen Agency staff members by the Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory since September 2000 and of one Agency staff member by the Israeli air force in Lebanon in August 2006” and also deplored “the killing and wounding of refugee children, including in the Agency’s schools, by the Israeli occupying forces”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/114, 14 December 2006, preamble, voting record: 169-6-8-9.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on the work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, the UN General Assembly:
Expresses grave concern about the critical situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000, as a result of unlawful Israeli practices and measures, and especially condemns all Israeli settlement activities and the construction of the wall, as well as the excessive and indiscriminate use of force against the civilian population, including extrajudicial executions. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/116, 14 December 2006, § 4, voting record: 90-9-81-12.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the UN General Assembly demanded that Israel “comply fully with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and cease immediately all measures and actions taken in violation and in breach of the Convention, including … the extrajudicial executions”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/119, 14 December 2006, § 2, voting record: 157-9-14-12.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief, the UN General Assembly urged States to ensure that “no one within their jurisdiction is deprived of the right to life, liberty or security of person because of religion or belief”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/161, 19 December 2006, § 4(f), adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the UN General Assembly:
Welcoming the universal ratification of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, which alongside human rights law provide an important framework of accountability in relation to extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions during armed conflict,
Mindful of all its resolutions on the subject of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights on the subject,
Noting with deep concern that impunity continues to be a major cause of the perpetuation of violations of human rights, including extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Acknowledging that international human rights law and international humanitarian law are complementary and not mutually exclusive,
Noting with deep concern the growing number of civilians and persons hors de combat killed in situations of armed conflict and internal strife,
Acknowledging that extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions may under certain circumstances amount to genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, as defined in international law, including in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Affirming the obligation of States to prevent the abuse of persons deprived of their liberty and to investigate and respond to deaths in custody,
Convinced of the need for effective action to prevent, combat and eliminate the abhorrent practice of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, which represent a flagrant violation of the right to life,
1. Strongly condemns once again all the extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions that continue to occur throughout the world;
2. Demands that all States ensure that the practice of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions is brought to an end and that they take effective action to prevent, combat and eliminate the phenomenon in all its forms;
3. Reiterates the obligation of all States to conduct exhaustive and impartial investigations into all suspected cases of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, to identify and bring to justice those responsible, while ensuring the right of every person to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, to grant adequate compensation within a reasonable time to the victims or their families, and to adopt all necessary measures, including legal and judicial measures, to put an end to impunity and to prevent the further occurrence of such executions, as recommended in the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions;
4. Calls upon all States in which the death penalty has not been abolished to comply with their obligations under relevant provisions of international human rights instruments, including in particular articles 6, 7 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and articles 37 and 40 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, bearing in mind the safeguards and guarantees set out in Economic and Social Council resolutions 1984/50 of 25 May 1984 and 1989/64 of 24 May 1989;
5. Urges all States:
(a) To take all necessary and possible measures, in conformity with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to prevent loss of life, in particular that of children, during public demonstrations, internal and communal violence, civil unrest, public emergencies or armed conflicts, and to ensure that the police, law enforcement agents, armed forces and other agents acting on behalf of or with the consent or acquiescence of the State act with restraint and in conformity with international humanitarian law and international human rights law, including the principles of proportionality and necessity, and in this regard to ensure that police and law enforcement officials are guided by the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials;
(b) To ensure the effective protection of the right to life of all persons under their jurisdiction and to investigate promptly and thoroughly all killings, including those targeted at specific groups of persons, such as racially motivated violence leading to the death of the victim, killings of members of national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, of refugees, internally displaced persons, migrants, street children or members of indigenous communities, killings of persons for reasons related to their activities as human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists or demonstrators, killings committed in the name of passion or in the name of honour, all killings committed for any discriminatory reason, including sexual orientation, as well as all other cases where a person’s right to life has been violated, and to bring those responsible to justice before a competent, independent and impartial judiciary at the national or, where appropriate, international level, and to ensure that such killings, including those committed by security forces, police and law enforcement agents, paramilitary groups or private forces, are neither condoned nor sanctioned by State officials or personnel;
6. Also urges all States to ensure that persons deprived of their liberty are treated humanely and with full respect for their human rights and to ensure that their treatment, including judicial guarantees, and conditions conform to the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and, where applicable, to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 8 June 1977 in relation to all persons detained in armed conflict, as well as to other pertinent international instruments;
7. Welcomes the International Criminal Court as an important contribution to ending impunity concerning extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the fact that one hundred and four States have already ratified or acceded to and a further forty-one States have signed the Rome Statute of the Court, and calls upon all those States that have not ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute to consider doing so;
8. Encourages Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to organize training programmes and to support projects with a view to training or educating military forces, law enforcement officers and government officials in human rights and humanitarian law issues connected with their work and to include a gender and child rights perspective in such training, and appeals to the international community and requests the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to support endeavours to that end. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/173, 19 December 2006, preamble and §§ 1–8, voting record: 137-0-43-12.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the UN General Assembly expressed grave concern at “violations suffered by persons belonging to ethnic nationalities of Myanmar, including extrajudicial killings … [and] deaths in custody”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/232, 22 December 2006, § 2(a), voting record: 82-25-45-40.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the situation in Afghanistan, the UN General Assembly noted with concern “reports of continued violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law and violent or discriminatory practices including ‘honour killings’ in certain parts of the country, particularly targeting women and girls”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/6, 11 November 2007, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on UNRWA operations, the UN General Assembly deplored “the killing of fourteen Agency staff members by the Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory since September 2000 and of one Agency staff member by the Israeli air force in Lebanon in August 2006” and also deplored “the killing and wounding of refugee children, including in the Agency’s schools, by the Israeli occupying forces”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/104, 17 December 2007, preamble and § 10, voting record: 170-6-3-13.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, the UN General Assembly:
Expresses grave concern about the critical situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000, as a result of unlawful Israeli practices and measures, and especially condemns all Israeli settlement activities and the construction of the wall, as well as the excessive and indiscriminate use of force against the civilian population, including extrajudicial executions. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/106, 17 December 2007, § 4, voting record: 93-8-74-17.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the UN General Assembly demanded that Israel “cease all practices and actions that violate the human rights of the Palestinian people, including the extrajudicial executions”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/109, 17 December 2007, § 7, voting record: 156-7-11-18.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief, the UN General Assembly urged States to ensure that “no one within their jurisdiction is deprived of the right to life, liberty or security of person because of religion or belief”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/157, 18 December 2007, § 10(b), adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1980 in the context of the conflict in Kampuchea, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged the parties to “spare the lives of those enemy combatants who surrender or are captured”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 29 (XXXVI), 11 March 1980, § 5, voting record: 20-4-6.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1989 on the question of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Afghanistan, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged “all parties to the conflict to treat all prisoners in their custody in accordance with internationally recognized principles of humanitarian law and to protect them from all acts of reprisals and violence, including ill-treatment, torture and summary executions”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1989/67, 8 March 1989, § 11, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In numerous resolutions, the UN Commission on Human Rights has denounced summary executions and/or extra-judicial killings committed during the armed conflicts in Afghanistan, 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1986/40, 12 March 1986, § 6, voting record: 28-9-5. UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1987/58, 11 March 1987, § 6, voting record: 26-8-7.
El Salvador, 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1990/77, 7 March 1990, § 2, adopted without a vote. UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1991/75, 6 March 1991, § 5, adopted without a vote.
Georgia, 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1994/59, 4 March 1994, § 1, adopted without a vote.
Guatemala, 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1985/36, 13 March 1985, § 2, voting record: 32-0-1. UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1991/51, 6 March 1991, §§ 5 and 7, adopted without a vote.
the Sudan, 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1993/60, 10 March 1993, § 1, voting record: 35-9-8. UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1994/79, 9 March 1994, § 2, voting record: 35-9-9. UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1996/73, 23 April 1996, § 2, adopted without a vote.
the former Yugoslavia 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1993/7, 23 February 1993, § 10, adopted without a vote.
and Zaire. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1997/58, 15 April 1997, § 2, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1990 on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged “all parties to the conflict to respect the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, to halt the use of weapons against the civilian population, to protect all prisoners from acts of reprisals and violence, including ill-treatment, torture and summary execution”.  
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1990/53, 6 March 1990, § 5, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1991 on the situation of human rights in Kuwait under Iraqi occupation, in the context of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Strongly condemns the failure of Iraq to treat all prisoners of war and detained civilians in accordance with the internationally recognized principles of humanitarian law and insists that it refrains from subjecting them to acts of violence, including … summary execution. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1991/67, 6 March 1991, § 5, voting record: 41-1-0..
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1991 on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Also urges all parties to the conflict to respect accepted humanitarian rules, as set out in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto to halt the use of weapons against the civilian population, to protect all prisoners from acts of reprisals and violence, including ill-treatment, torture and summary executions. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1991/78, 6 March 1991, § 6, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1992 in the context of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Strongly condemns the failure of Iraq to treat all prisoners of war and detained civilians in accordance with the internationally recognized principles of humanitarian law and insists that it refrains from subjecting them to acts of violence, including … summary execution. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1992/60, 3 March 1992, § 3, voting record: 47-1-1.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1992 on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Urges all parties to the conflict to respect accepted humanitarian rules, as set out in the Geneva Conventions of 1 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, to halt the use of weapons against the civilian population, to protect all prisoners from acts of reprisals and violence, including ill-treatment, torture and summary executions. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1992/68, 4 March 1992, § 6, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1996, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Condemns in the strongest terms all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law during the conflict, in particular in areas which were under the control of the self-proclaimed Bosnian and Croatian Serb authorities, in particular massive and systematic violations, including, inter alia, systematic ethnic cleansing. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1996/71, 23 April 1996, § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, the UN Commission on Human Rights called upon all parties to hostilities to protect all civilians from violations of human rights and IHL, including summary executions. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1996/73, 23 April 1996, § 15, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Gravely concerned at the continued deterioration of the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory and at the gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, in particular, acts of extrajudicial killing,
5. Strongly condemns anew the practice of “liquidation” or “extrajudicial executions” carried out by the Israeli army against Palestinians. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/6, 15 April 2003, preamble and § 5, voting record: 33-5-15.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressed its grave concern at “extrajudicial killings”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/12, 16 April 2003, § 3(c), adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned:
(a) The massacres that have occurred in the province of Ituri, particularly the recent massacres at Drodro, and supports the efforts of MONUC and the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to investigate them;
(e) The cases of summary or arbitrary execution, disappearance, torture, harassment, arrest, widespread persecution and arbitrary detention for long periods. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/15, 17 April 2003, § 3(a) and (e), adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the UN Commission Human Rights:
Acknowledging that extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions are crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
1. Strongly condemns once again all the extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions that continue to take place throughout the world;
2. Notes with deep concern that impunity continues to be a major cause of the perpetuation of violations of human rights, including extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions;
3. Demands that all States ensure that the practice of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions is brought to an end and that they take effective action to combat and eliminate the phenomenon in all its forms;
4. Reiterates the obligation of all States to conduct exhaustive and impartial investigations into all suspected cases of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, to identify and bring to justice those responsible, while ensuring the right of every person to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, to grant adequate compensation within a reasonable time to the victims or their families and to adopt all necessary measures, including legal and judicial measures, in order to bring an end to impunity and to prevent the recurrence of such executions, as stated in the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions;
8. Stresses the importance of States taking effective measures to end impunity with regard to extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, inter alia through the adoption of preventive measures, and calls upon States to ensure that such measures are included in post-conflict peace-building efforts. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/53, 24 April 2003, preamble and §§ 1–4 and 8, voting record: 37-0-16.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged States:
To ensure, in particular, that no one within their jurisdiction is deprived of the right to life or the right to liberty and security of person because of religion or belief, or is subjected to torture or arbitrary arrest or detention on that account, and to bring to justice all perpetrators of violations of these rights. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/54, 24 April 2003, § 4(b), voting record: 51-0-2.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the question of the death penalty, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged all States that still maintain the death penalty:
(b) Not to impose the death penalty for any but the most serious crimes and only pursuant to a final judgement rendered by an independent and impartial competent court, and to ensure the right to a fair trial and the right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence;
(c) To ensure that all legal proceedings, including those before special tribunals or jurisdictions, and particularly those related to capital offences, conform to the minimum procedural guarantees contained in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/67, 24 April 2003, § 4(b)–(c), voting record: 23-18-10.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on assistance to Somalia in the field of human rights, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressed its deep concern “at reported cases of rape, arbitrary and summary executions, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and violence, in particular against women and children”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/78, 25 April 2003, § 5, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the grave situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 2003/6 of 15 April 2003, in which it strongly condemned the practice of “liquidation” and “extrajudicial executions” carried out by the Israeli army against Palestinians,
1. Strongly condemns the continuing grave violations of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in particular the tragic assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin on 22 March 2004, in contravention of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
3. Calls upon Israel to respect to the fullest the principles of international humanitarian law and to desist from all forms of violation of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.  
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/1, 24 March 2004, preamble and §§ 1 and 3, voting record: 31-2-18.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressed its grave concern at:
(c) And strongly condemns all acts of violence, including indiscriminate terrorist attacks killing and injuring civilians, provocation, incitement and destruction, and urges the Palestinian Authority to demonstrate concretely its determination in the fight against terrorism and extremist violence;
(d) The continuing high level of casualties on both sides, particularly civilians, and, while recognizing Israel’s right to selfdefence in the face of terrorist attacks against its citizens, urges the Government of Israel to exert maximum effort to avoid civilian casualties and to put a halt to extrajudicial killings, which are contrary to international law. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/9, 15 April 2004, § 2(c)–(d), voting record: 27-2-24.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Taking into consideration the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949 (Fourth Geneva Convention), the provisions of Additional Protocol I thereto of 1977 and the Hague Convention IV, of 18 October 1907, and Annexed Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Recalling resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights relating to the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since the 5 June 1967 war,
Reaffirming the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Palestinian territories occupied since the June 1967 war, including East Jerusalem,
Gravely concerned at the continued deterioration of the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and at the gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, in particular acts of extrajudicial killing, … and incursions into towns, villages and camps to kill innocent men, women and children, as was the case in Jenin, Balata, Khan Younis, Rafah, Ramallah, Gaza, Nablus, AlBirah, AlAmari, Jabalia, Bethlehem and Dheisheh and in the AlDaraj and AlZaitoun neighbourhoods in the city of Gaza, and also during recent months in Rafah and in AlShajai’ia neighbourhood in Gaza, as well as during the last Israeli massacres in the AlNusseirat and AlBurreij refugee camps in the centre of the Gaza Strip on 7 March 2004,
5. Strongly condemns anew the practice of “liquidation” or “extrajudicial executions” carried out by the Israeli army against Palestinians … and urges the Government of Israel to respect international law and immediately to put an end to such practices;
11. Strongly condemns acts of mass killing of Palestinians at the hands of the Israeli occupation authorities, including the killing of children, such as recently took place in Nablus, Gaza, Rafah, AlNusseirat and AlBurreij and which persist to this day. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/10, 15 April 2004, preamble and §§ 5 and 11, voting record: 31-7-15.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged States:
To ensure, in particular, that no one within their jurisdiction is deprived of the right to life or the right to liberty and security of person because of religion or belief, or is subjected to torture or arbitrary arrest or detention on that account, and to bring to justice all perpetrators of violations of these rights. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/36, 19 April 2004, § 4(b), adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Acknowledging that extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions are crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (A/CONF.183/9) and noting the 93 ratifications or accessions by States and the 139 signatures to date by States of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
1. Strongly condemns once again all extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, in all their forms, that continue to take place throughout the world;
2. Notes with deep concern that impunity continues to be a major cause of the perpetuation of violations of human rights, including extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions;
4. Demands that all States ensure that the practice of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions is brought to an end and that they take effective action to combat and eliminate the phenomenon in all its forms;
5. Reiterates the obligation of all States to conduct exhaustive and impartial investigations into all suspected cases of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, to identify and bring to justice those responsible, while ensuring the right of every person to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, to grant adequate compensation within a reasonable time to the victims or their families and to adopt all necessary measures, including legal and judicial measures, in order to bring an end to impunity and to prevent the recurrence of such executions, as stated in the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions;
6. Reaffirms the obligation of States to protect the inherent right to life of all persons under their jurisdiction and calls upon concerned States to investigate promptly and thoroughly all killings committed in the name of passion or in the name of honour, all killings committed for any discriminatory reason, including sexual orientation; racially motivated violence leading to the death of the victim; killings of members of national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, of refugees, of internally displaced persons, of street children or of members of indigenous communities; killings of persons for reasons related to their activities as human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists or as demonstrators, in particular as a consequence of their exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; as well as other cases where a person’s right to life has been violated, all of which are being committed in various parts of the world, and to bring those responsible to justice before a competent, independent and impartial judiciary, and to ensure that such killings, including those committed by security forces, police and law enforcement agents, paramilitary groups or private forces, are neither condoned nor sanctioned by government officials or personnel;
8. Urges all States to undertake all necessary and possible measures, in conformity with human rights law and international humanitarian law, to prevent loss of life, in particular that of children, during situations of all forms of public demonstrations, internal and communal violence, civil unrest and public emergency or armed conflicts, and to ensure that the police and security forces receive thorough training in human rights matters, in particular with regard to restrictions on the use of force and firearms in the discharge of their functions;
9. Stresses the importance of States taking effective measures to end impunity with regard to extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, inter alia through the adoption of preventive measures, and calls upon States to ensure that such measures are included in postconflict peacebuilding efforts. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/37, 19 April 2004, preamble and §§ 1–2, 4–6 and 8–9, voting record: 39-0-12.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressed its grave concern at “extrajudicial killings”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/61, 21 April 2004, § 3(d), adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the question of the death penalty, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged all States that still maintain the death penalty:
(d) Not to impose the death penalty for any but the most serious crimes and only pursuant to a final judgement rendered by an independent and impartial competent court, and to ensure the right to a fair trial and the right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence;
(e) To ensure that all legal proceedings, including those before special tribunals or jurisdictions, and particularly those related to capital offences, conform to the minimum procedural guarantees contained in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/67, 21 April 2004, § 4(d)–(e), voting record: 29-19-5.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the protection of UN personnel, the UN Commission on Human Rights strongly condemned “acts of murder … against United Nations and associated personnel and other personnel acting under the authority of United Nations operations, as well as personnel of international humanitarian organizations”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/77, 21 April 2004, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on assistance to Somalia in the field of human rights, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
5. Expresses deep concern at reported cases of rape, arbitrary and summary executions, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and violence, in particular against women and children …
7. Expresses deep concern at the prevalence of sexual violence, in particular among displaced children, imprisoned children and children engaged in exploitative and hazardous labour, including those working and living on the streets, and at discrimination against children belonging to minority clans, who are vulnerable to violence, including murder … 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/80, 21 April 2004, §§ 5 and 7, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on technical cooperation and advisory services in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned “[t]he cases of summary or arbitrary execution”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/84, 21 April 2004, § 3(c), adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Recalling the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civil Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the Commission on Human Rights,
Expressing grave concern about the extrajudicial executions and the use of force by Israel against the Palestinian civil population, inflicting heavy casualties, and the continued targeting of schoolchildren, which led to loss of lives and fatal injuries,
1. Reiterates that all actions and punitive measures taken by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in violation of the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, are illegal and have no validity, and thereby demands that Israel, the occupying Power, comply fully with its provisions and cease immediately all measures and actions taken in violation and in breach of the Convention, including extrajudicial executions;
2. Condemns the use of force by the Israeli occupying forces against Palestinian civilians, resulting in extensive loss of life, vast numbers of injuries and massive destruction of homes, properties, agricultural lands and vital infrastructure. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/7, 14 April 2005, preamble and §§ 1–2, voting record: 29-10-14.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressed its grave concern at “[e]xtrajudicial killings”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/10, 14 April 2005, § 3(f), adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Acknowledging that extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions can amount to genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, as defined under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and noting the 98 ratifications or accessions by States and the 139 signatures to date by States to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as well as the first referrals by States and the Security Council of a situation to the Court and the ongoing investigations by the Prosecutor,
1. Strongly condemns once again all extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions that continue to take place throughout the world;
3. Demands that all States ensure that the practice of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions is brought to an end and that they take effective action to combat and eliminate the phenomenon in all its forms;
4. Reiterates the obligation of all States to conduct exhaustive and impartial investigations into all suspected cases of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, to identify and bring to justice those responsible, while ensuring the right of every person to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, to grant adequate compensation within a reasonable time to the victims or their families and to adopt all necessary measures, including legal and judicial measures, in order to bring an end to impunity and to prevent the recurrence of such executions, as stated in the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions;
5. Reaffirms the obligation of States to protect the inherent right to life of all persons under their jurisdiction and calls upon States concerned to investigate promptly and thoroughly all cases of killings, including those committed in the name of passion or in the name of honour, all killings committed for any discriminatory reason, including sexual orientation; racially motivated violence leading to the death of the victim; killings of members of national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, of refugees, of internally displaced persons, of street children, of members of indigenous communities or of migrants; killings of persons for reasons related to their activities as human rights defenders, lawyers, doctors, journalists or as demonstrators, in particular as a consequence of their exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; as well as other cases where a person’s right to life has been violated, all of which are being committed in various parts of the world, and to bring those responsible to justice before a competent, independent and impartial national tribunal or, where appropriate, international tribunal, and to ensure that such killings, including those committed by security forces, police and law enforcement agents, paramilitary groups or private forces, are neither condoned nor sanctioned by government officials or personnel;
7. Urges all States to take all necessary and possible measures, in conformity with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to prevent loss of life, in particular that of children, during internal and communal violence, civil unrest, public demonstrations, public emergency and armed conflicts, and to ensure, through education, training and other measures, that police, law enforcement officials, armed forces and other government officials act with restraint and in conformity with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and to include a gender perspective in such measures;
8. Notes with deep concern that impunity continues to be a major cause of the perpetuation of violations of human rights, including extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/34, 19 April 2005, preamble and §§ 1, 3–5 and 7–8, voting record: 36-0-17.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged States:
To ensure that no one within their jurisdiction is deprived of the right to life, liberty, or security of person because of religion or belief and that no one is subjected to torture or arbitrary arrest or detention on that account, and to bring to justice all perpetrators of violations of these rights. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/40, 19 April 2005, § 4(f), adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the elimination of violence against women, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Strongly condemns violence against women and girls committed in situations of armed conflict, such as murder, rape, including widespread and systematic rape, sexual slavery and forced pregnancy, and calls for effective responses to these violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/41, 19 April 2005, § 18, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on abduction of children in Africa, the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned “the abduction of children from camps of refugees and internally displaced persons by armed forces and armed groups, and their subjection of children to participation in fighting, torture, killing and rape as victims and as perpetrators”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/43, 19 April 2005, § 2, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the rights of the child, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged “all parties to armed conflict to end … violations against children, including killing”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/44, 19 April 2005, § 36, voting record: 52-1-0.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on technical cooperation and advisory services in Nepal, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Deeply concerned about the situation of human rights in Nepal, including violations attributed to the security forces, in particular unlawful killings … and also deeply concerned about the prevailing situation of impunity,
Strongly condemning all acts of violence against civilians and other criminal acts such as attacks against life, physical integrity and personal liberty and safety, including unlawful killings … committed by members of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist),
2. Requests the Government of Nepal to bear in mind that, in accordance with article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, certain rights, in particular the right to life … are recognized as nonderogable in all circumstances and that any measures derogating from the provisions of the Covenant must be in accordance with that article in all cases, and underlining the exceptional and temporary nature of any such derogations, as stated in general comment No. 29 (2001) on derogations to the Covenant during a state of public emergency of the Human Rights Committee;
4. Strongly condemns the repeated practices of members of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), such as:
(a) Unlawful killings …
(b) Persecution and attacks against the life, integrity and safety of political leaders and party members, human rights defenders, journalists, peace activists and others;
8. Urges the Government of Nepal:
(a) To take all necessary measures to prevent and put an end to extrajudicial and summary killings … 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/78, 20 April 2005, preamble and §§ 2, 4(a)–(b) and 8(a), adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on assistance to Somalia in the field of human rights, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressed deep concern at:
(a) The reported cases of rape, arbitrary and summary executions, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and violence … in particular against women and children …
(b) The prevalence of sexual violence and abuse, in particular among displaced children, children engaged in exploitative and hazardous labour, including those working and living on the streets, and imprisoned children, who should be separated from adult prisoners, and at discrimination against children belonging to minority clans, who are vulnerable to violence, including murder … 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/83, 21 April 2005, § 5(a)(b), adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on technical cooperation and advisory services in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned “[t]he massacres that have been perpetrated, including those reported in Lukweti, Nyabiondo, Walikale, Bweremana and Kanyabayonga in North Kivu and in Kalehe, Bukavu, Kaniola and Uvira in South Kivu”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/85, 21 April 2005, § 4(c), adopted without a vote.
UN Human Rights Council
In a resolution adopted in 2006 entitled “The grave situation of human rights in Lebanon caused by Israeli military operations”, the UN Human Rights Council:
Emphasizing that human rights law and international humanitarian law are complementary and mutually reinforcing,
Emphasizing that attacks and killings of innocent civilians and the destruction of houses, property and infrastructure in Lebanon are a breach of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and international humanitarian law as well as flagrant violations of human rights. 
UN Human Rights Council, Res. S-2/1, 11 August 2006, preamble, voting record: 27-11-8.
UN Human Rights Council
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on human rights violations emanating from Israeli military incursions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including the recent one in northern Gaza and the assault on Beit Hanoun, the UN Human Rights Council:
Emphasizing that the Israeli wilful killing of Palestinian civilians, including women and children, constitutes a gross violation of human rights law and international humanitarian law,
1. Expresses its shock at the horror of Israeli killing of Palestinian civilians in Beit Hanoun while asleep and other civilians fleeing earlier Israeli bombardment;
2. Condemns the Israeli killing of Palestinian civilians, including women and children, as well as of medics in Beit Hanoun and other Palestinian towns and villages, and calls for bringing the perpetrators thereof to justice. 
UN Human Rights Council, Res. S-3/1, 15 November 2006, preamble and §§ 1–2, voting record: 32-8-6.
UN Secretary-General
In 1995, in reports to the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General concluded that there was significant prima facie evidence that violations of IHL had occurred during and after the Bosnian Serb offensive on Srebrenica. The Secretary-General mentioned information presented by UNPROFOR, by the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights and by the US Government on massacres near Nova Kasaba where civilians and captured soldiers were detained. 
UN Secretary-General, Report submitted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1010, UN Doc. S/1995/755, 30 August 1995; Report submitted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1019, UN Doc. S/1995/988, 27 November 1995, § 21.
UN Secretary-General
In 2000, in his report on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, the UN Secretary-General stated that common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 4 of the 1977 Additional Protocol II “have long been considered customary international law”. 
UN Secretary-General, Report on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/915, 4 October 2000, § 14.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1991, in a report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights stated that he had received reports alleging that armed opposition groups had carried out mass executions of soldiers and civilians after the surrender of a garrison in 1990. Other instances of summary executions of militia members and governmental troops had also been reported. The Special Rapporteur made reference to common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the 1949 Geneva Convention III. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1991/31, 28 January 1991, §§ 61 and 65–66.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1992, in a report on the situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights reported the discovery of mass graves near Vukovar and stated that according to expert forensic opinion, bodies bore signs of trauma sustained around the time of death. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10, 27 October 1992, Annex II.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1992, in a report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights stated that the leader of a party to the conflict in Afghanistan had issued a written order which provided: “No person is allowed to … murder a prisoner of war.” 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/33, Report, 17 February 1992, § 51.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1993, in a report on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights called upon the Government of Turkey to ensure full respect for the right to life of members of the armed opposition who had been captured or had laid down their arms “in accordance with the international instruments governing the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7, 7 December 1993, §§ 595, 604, 610 and 706.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1994, in a report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights pointed out that many of the alleged acts, such as murder, political assassination, execution of hostages and other inhumane acts committed against unarmed soldiers by the armed forces of the two parties, constituted war crimes in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their common Article 3. The Rapporteur also noted that the Front Patriotique Rwandais had told the ICRC that it considered itself bound by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7, 28 June 1994, § 54.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
On several occasions, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions made urgent appeals to the Israeli Government to ensure the right to life and physical security of all persons hors de combat in Lebanon. The Special Rapporteur also called on all parties to conflicts, whether international or internal, to respect the norms and standards of international human rights and IHL which were enacted to protect the lives of the civilian population and of combatants who were captured or who had laid down their arms. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/61, 14 December 1994, §§ 394–396; Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/4, 25 January 1996, § 589; Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60, 24 December 1996, § 39.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1995, in a report on the situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights reported with regard to attacks by Bosnian Serb forces on people fleeing after the fall of Srebrenica: “A number of accounts describe physical assaults on men who had surrendered and thus had the status of prisoners of war. Such assaults sometimes led to their death.” The Rapporteur concluded: “Prisoners of war were … in all likelihood executed in flagrant violation of international humanitarian law.” 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Fifth periodic report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/9, 22 August 1995, §§ 33 and 53.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1995, in a joint report, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights on Torture and the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions reported, under the section “Violations of the right to life”, that members of the security forces captured in combat were often executed by Colombian rebel groups. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Torture and Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Joint report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/111, 16 January 1995, § 33.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1996, in a report on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights stated: “Those captured have been and are … summarily executed”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/62, 20 February 1996, § 9.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1997, in a report on the situation of human rights in Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo), the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights noted:
None of the parties involved – the rebels, FAR [Forces Armées Rwandaises], the interahamwe or the Government – were properly respecting the provisions of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which should unquestionably have governed the situation.  
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Zaire, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/6, 28 January 1997, § 171.
In the section relative to violations of common Article 3, the Rapporteur noted killings by Zairean troops and rebel forces of “soldiers who had laid down their arms or were not participating in military operations”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Zaire, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/6, 28 January 1997, §§ 190, 191 and 198.
UN Secretary-General
Following allegations by both the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq of the killing of prisoners of war and the execution of captured soldiers during the Iran–Iraq War, the UN Secretary-General sent a mission of enquiry which reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had denied allegations that captured combatants had been executed and that Iraq had denied the allegation that orders had been issued by Iraqi authorities to treat “Khomeini Guards” as “war criminals in the battlefield”. The mission also informed the UN Security Council that the Iraqi authorities had pointed out that such orders “would contradict humanitarian law and would thus be against Iraqi principles”. 
UN Secretary-General, Prisoners of war in Iran and Iraq: the report of a mission dispatched by the Secretary-General, January 1985, UN Doc. S/16962, 22 February 1985, §§ 72–73.
UN Observer Mission in El Salvador
In 1991, in the context of the conflict in El Salvador, ONUSAL examined the case of the summary execution of a member of the rural police a few days after his capture by the Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). The local FMLN Command argued that it had to carry out such an extreme measure at the request of the community that feared his release. ONUSAL considered the case to be a violation of the guarantees offered by the 1977 Additional Protocol II, in particular Articles 4(2)(a), 5 and 6. 
ONUSAL, Director of the Human Rights Division, Report, UN Doc. A/46/658-S/23222, 15 November 1991, Annex, §§ 62–63.
UN Commission on the Truth for El Salvador
In its report in 1993, the UN Commission on the Truth for El Salvador found that “the execution of an individual, whether a combatant or a non-combatant, who is in the power of a guerrilla force and who does not put up any resistance is not a combat operation” and that the executions carried out during the internal conflict in El Salvador were in violation of IHL and human rights law. 
UN Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, Report, UN Doc. S/25500, 1 April 1993, Annex, p. 151.
The Commission further stated:
International humanitarian law … and international human rights law … expressly prohibit … the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted independent and impartial tribunal attaching all the judicial guarantees generally recognized as indispensable … In none of the cases mentioned above is there any evidence that a proper trial was held prior to the execution. 
UN Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, Report, UN Doc. S/25500, 1 April 1993, Annex, pp. 152–153.
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
The report of the Political Affairs Committee accompanying a resolution on Afghanistan adopted by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in 1985 expressed alarm at reports of the systematic execution of captured combatants. 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Political Affairs Committee, Deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, Report, Doc. 5495, 15 November 1985, p. 7.
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2000 on violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Chechnya, the European Parliament called upon the Russian authorities to ensure that the right to life of the Chechen people was protected. 
European Parliament, Resolution on violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Chechnya, 16 March 2000, § 2.
Council of Europe (Rapporteur)
In 2000, the Rapporteur of the Council of Europe reported an account by a Russian soldier of the summary execution of captured combatants “because they were snipers”. In the report’s recommendations, the Rapporteur asked the Russian federal authorities to treat captured fighters in accordance with IHL and in particular to stop summary executions of captured snipers. 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion on the Russian Federation’s request for membership in the light of the situation in Chechnya, Doc. 7231, 2 February 1995, § 75.
GCC Supreme Council
In the Final Communiqué of its 13th Session in 1992, the GCC Supreme Council reaffirmed its conviction that “acts of brutality [and] murder … represent a total contravention of all the Charters, Laws and Conventions of the International Community of Nations”. 
GCC, Supreme Council, 13th Session, Abu Dhabi, 21–23 December 1992, Final Communiqué, annexed to Letter dated 24 December 1992 from the United Arab Emirates to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/47/845-S/25020, 30 December 1992, p. 6.
League of Arab States Council
In a resolution on Tunisia adopted in 1961, the League of Arab States Council strongly condemned
the tyrannical French aggression against Tunisia … and the genocidal war against the defenceless Tunisian people, including the old, the women and the children, burning villages and houses and killing internees and unarmed civilians in all kinds of ways, which stands in contradiction with France’s commitment to the International Conventions and Charters that prohibit genocidal practices, such as the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, the Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter. 
League of Arab States, Council, Res. 1778, 20 July 1961, preamble.
World Conference on Human Rights
In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, expressed dismay and condemnation that “gross and systematic violations and situations that constitute serious obstacles to the full enjoyment of all human rights continue to occur in all parts of the world, [including] … summary and arbitrary executions”. 
World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14–25 June 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, § I(30).
International Conference for the Protection of War Victims
In the Final Declaration adopted by the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims in 1993, the participants declared that they refused “to accept that wounded are shown no mercy, children massacred …”. 
International Conference for the Protection of War Victims, Geneva, 30 August–1 September 1993, Final Declaration, § I(1), ILM, Vol. 33, 1994, p. 298.
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (1999)
The Plan of Action for the years 2000–2003 adopted in 1999 by the 27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent requested that all parties to an armed conflict take effective measures to ensure that “strict orders are given to prevent all serious violations of international humanitarian law, including massacres, summary executions … and threats to carry out such actions”. 
27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 31 October–6 November 1999, Res. I, Annex 2, Plan of Action for the years 2000–2003, Actions proposed for final goal 1.1, § 1(b).
African Parliamentary Conference on International Humanitarian Law for the Protection of Civilians during Armed Conflict
The Final Declaration adopted by the African Parliamentary Conference on International Humanitarian Law for the Protection of Civilians during Armed Conflict in 2002 expressed deep concern about “the number and expansion of conflicts in Africa” and alarm at “the spread of violence, in particular in the form of … murder … which seriously violate[s] the rules of International Humanitarian Law”. 
African Parliamentary Conference on International Humanitarian Law for the Protection of Civilians during Armed Conflict, Niamey, 18–20 February 2002, Final Declaration, preamble.
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
In the Nuon case before the ECCC in 2007, the accused, a former Cambodian acting prime minister, chairman of the Democratic Kampuchea People’s Assembly and senior member of the Central and Standing Committees of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), was charged, inter alia, with wilful killing as a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, murder as a crime against humanity, and extermination as a crime against humanity. 
ECCC, Nuon case, Provisional Detention Order, 19 September 2007, § 1.
The basis for these charges was the role alleged to the accused in
exercising authority and effective control over the internal security apparatus of Democratic Kampuchea (detention centres) and by directing, implementing and enforcing Party policy characterised by forcible transfers of the population, enslavement, forced labour and other inhumane acts. 
ECCC, Nuon case, Provisional Detention Order, 19 September 2007, § 2.
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
In the Ieng Sary case before the ECCC in 2007, the accused, a former Cambodian Minister of Foreign Affairs and senior leader of the Central and Standing Committees of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), was charged, inter alia, with wilful killing as a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, murder as a crime against humanity, and extermination as a crime against humanity. 
ECCC, Ieng Sary case, Provisional Detention Order, 14 November 2007, § 1.
The basis for these charges was the role alleged to the accused in
directing, encouraging, enforcing, or otherwise rendering support to CPK policy and practice which was characterised by murder, extermination, imprisonment, persecution on political grounds and other inhumane acts such as forcible transfers of the population, enslavement, and forced labour. 
ECCC, Ieng Sary case, Provisional Detention Order, 14 November 2007, § 2.
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
In the Khieu case before the ECCC in 2007, the accused, a former Cambodian head of State and senior leader of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), was charged, inter alia, with wilful killing as a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, murder as a crime against humanity, and extermination as a crime against humanity. 
ECCC, Khieu case, Provisional Detention Order, 19 November 2007, § 1.
The basis for these charges was the role alleged to the accused in
directing, encouraging, enforcing, or otherwise rendering support to CPK policy and practice which was characterised by murder, extermination, imprisonment, persecution on political grounds and other inhumane acts such as forcible transfers of the population, enslavement, and forced labour. 
ECCC, Khieu case, Provisional Detention Order, 19 November 2007, § 2.
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
In the Kaing case before the ECCC, the accused was charged, both individually and as a superior, with, inter alia, various crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In its judgment in 2010, the Trial Chamber set out the definition of murder, stating:
331. Murder, a well-established crime under customary international law, requires the death of the victim resulting from an unlawful act or omission by the perpetrator. The conduct of the perpetrator must have contributed substantially to the death of the victim.
332. The elements of murder can be satisfied whether or not it is shown that a victim’s body has been recovered. The fact of a victim’s death can be inferred circumstantially, including from proof of the following: incidents of mistreatment directed against the victim, patterns of mistreatment and disappearances of other individuals, a general climate of lawlessness at the place where the acts were allegedly committed, the length of time that has elapsed since the person disappeared, and the fact that the victim has failed to contact other persons that he or she might have been expected to contact, such as family members. The victim’s death as a result of the perpetrator’s act or omission must be the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence.
333. It must be shown that the act or omission of the perpetrator was undertaken with the intent either to kill or to cause serious bodily harm in the reasonable knowledge that the act or omission would likely lead to death. 
ECCC, Kaing case, Judgment, 26 July 2010, §§ 331–333.
[footnotes in original omitted]
The Trial Chamber also considered the crime of extermination, stating:
334. Extermination, whose customary status is also undisputed, is characterized by an act, omission or combination of each that results in the death of persons on a massive scale.
335. The perpetrator’s role in the death of persons on a massive scale may be remote or indirect. Actions constituting extermination include creating conditions of life that are aimed at destroying part of a population, such as withholding food or medicine.
336. There is no minimum threshold for the number of victims targeted. Rather, the question of whether the requirement of scale has been met is assessed on a case-by-case basis against all relevant circumstances. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that one or a limited number of killings would not be sufficient to constitute extermination.
337. Extermination contemplates acts or omissions that are collective in nature rather than directed towards specific individuals. There is however no requirement that the perpetrator intended to destroy a group or part of a group to which the victims belong. Knowledge of a “vast scheme of collective murder” is not an element of extermination.
338. It must be shown that the perpetrator acted with “the intent to kill persons on a massive scale, or to inflict serious bodily injury or create conditions of life that lead to death in the reasonable knowledge that such act or omission is likely to cause the death of a large number of persons.” [ICTR, Bagosora case, Judgement, § 2191]. 
ECCC, Kaing case, Judgment, 26 July 2010, §§ 334–338.
[footnotes in original omitted]
Regarding the crime of wilful deprivation of the right to a fair and regular trial, the Trial Chamber stated:
458. The offence of wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial is expressly prohibited as a grave breach in [the 1949] Geneva Convention IV and Geneva Convention III, respectively.
459. The perpetrator must have deprived one or more persons of a fair and regular trial by denying judicial guarantees as defined, in particular, in Geneva Convention IV and Geneva Convention III. These judicial guarantees include … the right not to be … executed without a previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court.
460. The jurisprudence of the ICTY has established that the requisite mental element for this offence includes both culpable intent and recklessness. 
ECCC, Kaing case, Judgment, 26 July 2010, §§ 458–460.
[footnotes in original omitted]
International Court of Justice
In its judgment in the Nicaragua case (Merits) in 1986, the ICJ held that the rules contained in common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions reflected what the Court in 1949 in the Corfu Channel case (Merits) had called “elementary considerations of humanity”. 
ICJ, Nicaragua case (Merits), Judgment, 27 June 1986, § 218.
International Court of Justice
In its advisory opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1996, the ICJ held:
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life [contained in Article 6 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the [1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself. 
ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, § 25.
International Court of Justice
In its judgment in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) in 2005, the ICJ stated:
209. The Court considers that there is … persuasive evidence that the UPDF [Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces] incited ethnic conflicts and took no action to prevent such conflicts in Ituri district. The reports of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights … state that the Ugandan presence in Ituri caused a conflict between the Hema (of Ugandan origin) and the Lendu. According to these reports, land was seized from the Lendu by the Hema with the encouragement and military support of Ugandan soldiers. The reports also state that the confrontations in August 2000 resulted in some 10,000 deaths and the displacement of some 50,000 people, and that since the beginning of the conflict the UPDF had failed to take action to put an end to the violence. The Sixth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC [United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo] … stated that “UPDF troops stood by during the killings and failed to protect the civilians”. It is also indicated in MONUC’s special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002–December 2003 … , that “Ugandan army commanders already present in Ituri, instead of trying to calm the situation, preferred to benefit from the situation and support alternately one side or the other according to their political and financial interests”. The above reports are consistent in the presentation of facts, support each other and are corroborated by other credible sources, such as the [Human Rights Watch] Report “Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo”, July 2003.
211. Having examined the case file, the Court considers that it has credible evidence sufficient to conclude that the UPDF troops … committed acts of killing, and … did not take measures to ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in the occupied territories. 
ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, §§ 209 and 211.
The Court subsequently found that Uganda, by the conduct of its armed forces, “violated its obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law”, including for having “committed acts of killing”. 
ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, § 345(3).
International Court of Justice
In its judgment on the merits in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) in 2007, the ICJ found with regard to events in various areas and camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
276. … [T]he Court finds that it is established by overwhelming evidence that massive killings in specific areas and detention camps throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina were perpetrated during the conflict. Furthermore, the evidence presented shows that the victims were in large majority members of the protected group, which suggests that they may have been systematically targeted by the killings. The Court notes in fact that, while the Respondent contested the veracity of certain allegations, and the number of victims, or the motives of the perpetrators, as well as the circumstances of the killings and their legal qualification, it never contested, as a matter of fact, that members of the protected group were indeed killed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court thus finds that it has been established by conclusive evidence that massive killings of members of the protected group occurred and that therefore the requirements of the material element, as defined by Article II (a) of the [Genocide] Convention [Article II (a): Killing members of the group], are fulfilled. At this stage of its reasoning, the Court is not called upon to list the specific killings, nor even to make a conclusive finding on the total number of victims.
277. The Court is however not convinced, on the basis of the evidence before it, that it has been conclusively established that the massive killings of members of the protected group were committed with the specific intent (dolus specialis) on the part of the perpetrators to destroy, in whole or in part, the group as such. The Court has carefully examined the criminal proceedings of the ICTY and the findings of its Chambers, cited above, and observes that none of those convicted were found to have acted with specific intent (dolus specialis). The killings outlined above may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, but [in the present case] the Court has no jurisdiction to determine whether this is so. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention, the Court finds that it has not been established by the Applicant that the killings amounted to acts of genocide prohibited by the Convention. As to the Applicant’s contention that the specific intent (dolus specialis) can be inferred from the overall pattern of acts perpetrated throughout the conflict, examination of this must be reserved until the Court has considered all the other alleged acts of genocide (violations of Article II, paragraphs (b) to (e)). 
ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, Judgment, 26 February 2007, §§ 276–277.
The ICJ could not make further findings on the question of war crimes or crimes against humanity, as its jurisdiction in the present case was based exclusively on Article IX of the 1948 Genocide Convention.
With regard to acts committed at Srebrenica, the ICJ found:
The Court concludes that the acts committed at Srebrenica falling within Article II (a) and (b) of the [1948 Genocide] Convention [Article II (a): Killing members of the group; Article II (b): Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group] were committed with the specific intent to destroy in part the group of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina as such; and accordingly that these were acts of genocide, committed by members of the VRS [Army of Republika Srpska] in and around Srebrenica from about 13 July 1995. 
ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, Judgment, 26 February 2007, § 297.
International Court of Justice
In its judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) in 2012, the ICJ stated:
One category of cases involved the large-scale killing of civilians in occupied territory as part of a policy of reprisals, exemplified by the massacres committed on 29 June 1944 in Civitella (Val di Chiana), Cornia and San Pancrazio by members of the “Hermann Goring” division of the German armed forces involving the killing of 203 civilians taken as hostages after resistance fighters had killed four German soldiers a few days earlier (Max Josef Milde case, Military Court of La Spezia, judgment of 10 October 2006 (registered on 2 February 2007)) … The Court considers that there can be no doubt that this conduct was a serious violation of the international law of armed conflict applicable in 1943–1945. 
ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, 3 February 2012, § 52.
International Criminal Court
In the Kony case before the ICC in 2005, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II issued an arrest warrant for Joseph Kony, the alleged founder, chairman and commander-in-chief of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an armed group carrying out an insurgency against the Government of Uganda. He was charged, inter alia, with four counts of murder for “ordering the commission of war crimes which in fact occurred, namely the unlawful killings of civilian residents of … IDP Camp[s] in … Uganda”, punishable under Article 8(2)(c)(i) and Article 25(3)(b) of the 1998 ICC Statute. 
ICC, Kony case, Warrant of arrest, 8 July 2005 as amended 27 September 2005, § 43, Counts 12, 17, 23, and 30.
In addition, the accused was charged with a further four counts of murder for “ordering the commission of crimes against humanity which in fact occurred, namely the unlawful killings of civilian residents of … IDP Camp[s] in … Uganda”, punishable under Article 7(1)(a) and Article 25(3)(b) of the 1998 ICC Statute. 
ICC, Kony case, Warrant of arrest, 8 July 2005 as amended 27 September 2005, § 43, Counts 10, 16, 20, and 27.
These crimes were alleged to have been committed during attacks on various IDP camps in Uganda between 2002 and 2004. According to the arrest warrant, the LRA had engaged in
a cycle of violence and established a pattern of “brutalization of civilians” by acts including murder, abduction, sexual enslavement, mutilation, as well as mass burnings of houses and looting of camp settlements; that abducted civilians, including children, are said to have been forcibly “recruited” as fighters, porters and sex slaves to serve the LRA and to contribute to attacks against the Ugandan army and civilian communities. 
ICC, Kony case, Warrant of arrest, 8 July 2005 as amended 27 September 2005, § 5.
International Criminal Court
In the Otti case before the ICC in 2005, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II issued an arrest warrant for Vincent Otti, the alleged Vice-Chairman and Second-in-Command of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an armed group carrying out an insurgency against the Government of Uganda. He was charged, inter alia, with four counts of murder for “ordering the commission of war crimes which in fact occurred, namely the unlawful killings of civilian residents of … IDP Camp[s] in … Uganda”, punishable under Article 8(2)(c)(i) and Article 25(3)(b) of the 1998 ICC Statute. 
ICC, Otti case, Warrant of arrest, 8 July 2005, § 42, Counts 12, 17, 23, and 30.
In addition, the accused was charged with a further four counts of murder for “ordering the commission of crimes against humanity which in fact occurred, namely the unlawful killings of civilian residents of … IDP Camp[s] in … Uganda”, punishable under Article 7(1)(a) and Article 25(3)(b) of the 1998 ICC Statute. 
ICC, Otti case, Warrant of arrest, 8 July 2005, § 42, Counts 10, 16, 20, and 27.
These crimes were alleged to have been committed during attacks on various IDP camps in Uganda between 2002 and 2004. According to the arrest warrant, the LRA had engaged in
a cycle of violence and established a pattern of “brutalization of civilians” by acts including murder, abduction, sexual enslavement, mutilation, as well as mass burnings of houses and looting of camp settlements; that abducted civilians, including children, are said to have been forcibly “recruited” as fighters, porters and sex slaves to serve the LRA and to contribute to attacks against the Ugandan army and civilian communities. 
ICC, Otti case, Warrant of arrest, 8 July 2005, § 5.
International Criminal Court
In the Ongwen case before the ICC in 2005, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, dealing with the situation in Uganda, issued an arrest warrant for Dominic Ongwen, allegedly a brigade commander in the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The decision was based, inter alia, on charges of murder as a war crime, punishable under Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the 1998 ICC Statute, and of murder as a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 7(1)(a) of the 1998 ICC Statute. 
ICC, Ongwen case, Warrant of Arrest, 8 July 2005, Counts 30 and 27.
The war crimes charge was based on allegations of “ordering the commission of war crimes which in fact occurred, namely, the killings of … civilian residents of [an] IDP Camp [in] Uganda”. 
ICC, Ongwen case, Warrant of Arrest, 8 July 2005, Count 30.
Similarly, the charge of crimes against humanity was based on allegations of “ordering the commission of crimes against humanity which in fact occurred, namely, the unlawful killings of … civilian residents of [an] IDP Camp [in] Uganda”. 
ICC, Ongwen case, Warrant of Arrest, 8 July 2005, Count 27.
International Criminal Court
In the Odhiambo case before the ICC in 2005, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued an arrest warrant for Okot Odhiambo, an alleged senior commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, for his role in the commission of war crimes (murder, enlisting children, attacks against the civilian population, and pillage), punishable under Article 8(2)(c)(i), (e)(vii), (e)(i) and (e)(v) of the 1998 ICC Statute, and crimes against humanity (murder and enslavement), punishable under Article 7(1)(a) and (c) of the 1998 ICC Statute. 
ICC, Odhiambo case, Warrant of Arrest, 8 July 2005, § 32, Counts 10–19.
With regard to the war crime of murder under counts 10 and 16 of the arrest warrant, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that it was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to believe Odhiambo was responsible for “ordering the commission of war crimes which in fact occurred, namely, the unlawful killings of … civilian residents” in an IDP camp in Uganda. 
ICC, Odhiambo case, Warrant of Arrest, 8 July 2005, § 32, Counts 12 and 17.
In addition to two counts of murder as war crimes, Odhiambo was also charged with two counts of murder as crimes against humanity. 
ICC, Odhiambo case, Warrant of Arrest, 8 July 2005, § 32, Counts 10 and 16.
International Criminal Court
In the Katanga case before the ICC in 2007, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an arrest warrant for Germain Katanga, the alleged former commander of an armed group known as the Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He was charged, inter alia, with murder as a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 7(1)(a) of the 1998 ICC Statute, and wilful killing as a war crime, punishable under Article 8(2)(a)(i) or (c)(i) of the 1998 ICC Statute. 
ICC, Katanga case, Warrant of arrest, 2 July 2007, p. 6.
These crimes were alleged to have been committed during a joint attack by the FRPI and members of another armed group, the Front des nationalistes et intégrationnistes (FNI), on the village of Bogoro, in the territory of Ituri, on or about 24 February 2003. This attack, described as indiscriminate, is alleged to have resulted in “(i) the murder of about 200 civilians; (ii) causing serious bodily harm to civilians; (iii) arresting, threatening with weapons and imprisoning civilians in a room filled with corpses; (iv) pillaging; and (v) the sexual enslavement of several women and girls.” 
ICC, Katanga case, Warrant of arrest, 2 July 2007, p. 4.
International Criminal Court
In the Harun case before the ICC in 2007, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, dealing with the situation in Darfur, Sudan, issued an arrest warrant for Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”), Minister of State for the Interior of the Government of Sudan from in or about April 2003 until in or about September 2005, and Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs of the Government of Sudan since 2006. The decision was based, inter alia, on counts of murder as a war crime and as a crime against humanity.
As regards war crimes, the Pre-Trial Chamber considered that there were reasonable grounds to believe that:
On or about 15 August 2003, Ahmad Harun, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the murder of civilians from the primarily Fur population of the Kodoom villages and surrounding areas, while those civilians were taking no active part in hostilities (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);
On or about 31 August 2003, Ahmad Harun, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the murder of civilians from the primarily Fur population of the Kodoom villages and surrounding areas, while those civilians were taking no active part in hostilities (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);
On or about 15 August 2003, Ahmad Harun, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the murder of over 100 civilians from the primarily Fur population of Bindisi town and surrounding areas while those civilians were taking no active part in hostilities (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);
Between September 2003 and October 2003, Ahmad Harun, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the murder of at least 20 men from the primarily Fur population of Mukjar town and surrounding areas while those men were taking no active part in hostilities (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);
In or around December 2003, Ahmad Harun, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the murder of at least 21 men from the primarily Fur population of Mukjar town and surrounding areas while those men were taking no active part in hostilities (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);
In or around March 2004, Ahmad Harun, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the murder of at least 32 men from the primarily Fur population of Mukjar town and surrounding areas while those men were taking no active part in hostilities (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);
In or around December 2003, Ahmad Harun, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the murder of at least 26 civilians from the primarily Fur population of Arawala town and surrounding areas, while those civilians were taking no active part in hostilities (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute). 
ICC, Harun case, Warrant of Arrest, 27 April 2007, Counts 3, 5, 12, 23, 26, 30 and 41.
International Criminal Court
In the Kushayb case before the ICC in 2007, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, dealing with the situation in Darfur, Sudan, issued an arrest warrant for Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), a member of the Popular Defence Force (PDF) and a senior leader of the Militia/Janjaweed. The decision was based, inter alia, on counts of murder as a war crime and as a crime against humanity.
As regards war crimes, the Pre-Trial Chamber considered that there were reasonable grounds to believe that:
On or about 15 August 2003, Ali Kushayb, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the murder of civilians from the primarily Fur population of the Kodoom villages and surrounding areas, while those civilians were taking no active part in hostilities (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);
On or about 31 August 2003, Ali Kushayb, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the murder of civilians from the primarily Fur population of the Kodoom villages and surrounding areas, while those civilians were taking no active part in hostilities (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);
On or about 15 August 2003, Ali Kushayb, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the murder of over 100 civilians from the primarily Fur population of Bindisi town and surrounding areas while those civilians were taking no active part in hostilities (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);
Between September 2003 and October 2003, Ali Kushayb, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the murder of at least 20 men from the primarily Fur population of Mukjar town and surrounding areas while those men were taking no active part in hostilities (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);
In or around December 2003, Ali Kushayb, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the murder of at least 21 men from the primarily Fur population of Mukjar town and surrounding areas while those men were taking no active part in hostilities (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);
In or around December 2003, Ali Kushayb committed, jointly with others, the murder of at least 21 men from the primarily Fur population of Mukjar town and surrounding areas while those men were taking no active part in hostilities, by transporting them under armed guard to their place of execution (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(a) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);
In or around March 2004, Ali Kushayb, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the murder of at least 32 men from the primarily Fur population of Mukjar town and surrounding areas while those men were taking no active part in hostilities (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);
In or around March 2004, Ali Kushayb committed, jointly with others, the murder of at least 32 men from the primarily Fur population of Mukjar town and surrounding areas while those men were taking no active part in hostilities, by transporting them under armed guard to their place of execution (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(a) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);
In or around December 2003, Ali Kushayb, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the murder of at least 26 civilians from the primarily Fur population of Arawala town and surrounding areas, while those civilians were taking no active part in hostilities (articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute). 
ICC, Kushayb case, Warrant of Arrest, 27 April 2007, Counts 3, 5, 12, 23, 26, 27, 30, 31 and 41.
International Criminal Court
In the Ngudjolo Chui case before the ICC in 2007, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an arrest warrant for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, a Congolese national and alleged former leader of an armed group known as the Front des nationalistes et intégrationnistes (FNI). At the time his arrest warrant was issued he was a colonel in the National Army of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). He was charged, inter alia, with murder as a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 7(1)(a) of the 1998 ICC Statute, and wilful killing as a war crime, punishable under Article 8(2)(a)(i) or (c)(i) of the 1998 ICC Statute. 
ICC, Ngudjolo Chui case, Warrant of arrest, 6 July 2007, p. 6.
These crimes were alleged to have been committed during a joint attack by the FNI and members of another armed group, the Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI), on the village of Bogoro, in the territory of Ituri, on or about 24 February 2003. This attack, described as indiscriminate, is alleged to have resulted in “(i) the murder of about 200 civilians; (ii) causing serious bodily harm to civilians; (iii) arresting, threatening with weapons and imprisoning civilians in a room filled with corpses; (iv) pillaging; and (v) the sexual enslavement of several women and girls.” 
ICC, Ngudjolo Chui case, Warrant of arrest, 6 July 2007, p. 4.
International Criminal Court
In the Katanga and Chui case before the ICC, the accused, respectively the alleged commander of the Front for Patriotic Resistance of Ituri (FRPI) and the alleged former leader of the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, were charged with jointly committing through other persons various crimes against humanity and war crimes under Articles 7 and 8 of the 1998 ICC Statute. In its decision on the confirmation of charges in 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber considered the offence of “wilful killing”, stating:
286. The war crime provided for in article 8(2)(a)(i) of the [1998 ICC] Statute is defined as the “wilful killing” of any of the persons protected by the [1949] Geneva Conventions. In addition to a nexus with an international armed conflict and the perpetrator’s awareness of the factual circumstances establishing the existence of such a conflict, this war crime requires the following three elements: (i) “the perpetrator killed one or more persons”; (ii) “such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949”; and (iii) “the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the protected status”.
287. Pursuant to article 8(2)(a)(i) of the Statute, the war crime of wilful killing occurs when it is committed by someone who, by action or omission, causes the death of one or more persons referred to in articles 13, 24, 25 and 26 GC [Geneva Convention] I, articles 13, 36 and 37 GC II, article 4 GC III and articles 4,13 and 20 GC IV.
289. … [F]urther to article 4 GC IV, protected persons are those individual civilians who “at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the Conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals”.
290. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case found that “nationality”, as provided for in article 4 GC IV, is not the crucial test for determining whether an individual civilian has protected status under GC IV. According to the ICTY Appeals Chamber:
[…] not only the text and the drafting history of the Convention but also, and more importantly, the Convention’s object and purpose suggests that allegiance to a Party to the conflict and correspondingly, control by this Party over persons in a given territory, may be regarded as the crucial test. [ICTY, Tadić case, Judgement on Appeal, § 166]
291. This Chamber also adopts the approach that the term “nationals” in article 4 GC IV, which was drafted in 1949, reflected, at that time, the perceived importance of nationality in determining the allegiances of individual civilians. Although the nexus between nationality and allegiance remains an important factor in determining protected status for persons involved in international armed conflicts, as the ICTY jurisprudence demonstrates, it is no longer the definitive test.
292. Consequently, article 8(2)(a)(i) of the Statute applies to those cases in which protected civilians are killed “in the hands of” a party to the conflict. Under the case law of the international tribunals, an individual civilian falls “into the hands of” a party to the conflict when that individual is in the territory under the control of such a party.
293. Therefore, in the view of the Chamber, as the attacking forces of a party to the conflict gradually gain control of a targeted village, individual civilians in these successive areas automatically become protected persons within the meaning of article 4 GC IV, provided they do not claim allegiance to the party in question. Article 8(2)(a)(i) of the Statute thus prohibits the wilful killing of those civilians in such a circumstance.
294. Additionally, article 8(2)(a)(i) of the Statute also applies to the wilful killing of the protected persons by an attacking force, when such killings occur after the overall attack has ended, and defeat or full control of the targeted village has been secured.
295. Article 30 of the Statute sets out the subjective element for crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the Court, including the war crime under article 8(2)(a)(i). Thus, this offence includes the mens rea of, first and foremost, dolus directus of the first degree.
296. The Chamber also adopts the ICTY conclusion that “the conduct of the accused must be a substantial cause of the death of the victim.”
297. Finally, article 8(2)(a)(i) of the Statute also requires that the perpetrator is “aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status” of the victim. Thus, it is not necessary for the perpetrator to have evaluated and concluded that the victim was in fact a protected person under any of the Geneva Conventions. The objective element of the crime against humanity of murder as provided in article 7(1 )(a) of the Statute and the Elements of Crimes occurs when the perpetrator kills or causes the death of one or more persons. 
ICC, Katanga and Chui case, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 30 September 2008, §§ 286–287 and 289–297.
[footnotes in original omitted; emphasis in original]
The Pre-Trial Chamber also considered the offence of murder. The Pre-Trial Chamber stated:
422. … The Chamber observes that, pursuant to article 7(1)(a) of the [1998 ICC] Statute, it is sufficient to demonstrate that there are substantial grounds to believe that the suspects intended to cause and did cause the death of civilians as part of the widespread or systematic attack, even if their identities are unknown.
423. Article 30 of the Statute governs the subjective element of the crime against humanity of murder and requires the perpetrator’s intent to kill one or more persons. Thus, this offence encompasses, first and foremost, cases of dolus directus of the first and second degree. 
ICC, Katanga and Chui case, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 30 September 2008, §§ 422–423.
[footnotes in original omitted]
In 2012, the ICC Trial Chamber II acquitted Mr Ngudjolo Chui of all the charges against him. 
ICC, Ngudjolo Chui case, Judgment, 18 December 2012, Disposition.
International Criminal Court
In the Bemba case before the ICC, the accused, the alleged President and Commander-in-chief of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), was charged, inter alia, with murder, rape and torture as war crimes and as crimes against humanity, pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 of the 1998 ICC Statute. In its decision on the confirmation of charges in 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber set out the definition of murder as a crime against humanity, stating:
131. The act of murder as a crime against humanity within the meaning of article 7(1) (a) of the [1998 ICC] Statute is not defined as such in the Statute. However, the [2000 ICC] Elements of Crimes offer limited guidance as to the actus reus in that they stipulate that “the perpetrator killed 171 one or more persons”.
132. As recognised by the Court’s jurisprudence, for the act of murder to be committed the victim has to be dead and the death must result from the act of murder. The act itself may be committed by action or omission. The Chamber stresses that the death of the victim can be inferred from factual circumstances, and that the Prosecutor must prove the causal link between the act of murder and the victim’s death.
133. In determining whether the legal requirements of the act of murder as a crime against humanity are met, the Chamber points out the Prosecutor’s obligation to provide the particulars in the charging document when seeking to prove that the perpetrator killed specific individuals. While the Chamber concedes that there is no need to find and/or identify the corpse, the Prosecutor is still expected to specify, to the extent possible, inter alia, the location of the alleged murder, its approximate date, the means by which the act was committed with enough precision, the circumstances of the incident and the perpetrator’s link to the crime.
134. However, the Chamber bears in mind the evidentiary threshold to be met at the pre-trial stage – “substantial grounds” threshold – and the fact that in case of mass crimes, it may be impractical to insist on a high degree of specificity. In this respect, it is not necessary for the Prosecutor to demonstrate, for each individual killing, the identity of the victim and the direct perpetrator. Nor is it necessary that the precise number of victims be known. This allows the Chamber to consider evidence referring to “many” killings or “hundreds” of killings without indicating a specific number.
bb) Mens rea required pursuant to article 30 of the Statute
135. The Chamber takes the view that article 30 of the Statute encompasses two forms of dolus, namely dolus directus in the first degree and dolus directus in the second degree. This interpretation applies to all specific acts as crimes against humanity as referred to in article 7 of the Statute, as well as to all specific acts of war crimes listed under article 8 of the Statute.
136. The express language of article 30(1) of the Statute denotes that the provision is meant to function as a default rule for all crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, “unless otherwise provided”. Consequently, it must be established that the material elements of the respective crime were committed with “intent and knowledge”, unless the Statute or the Elements of Crimes require a different standard of fault. This conclusion finds support in paragraph 2 of the General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes which reads:
2. As stated in article 30, unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge. Where no reference is made in the Elements of Crimes to a mental element for any particular conduct, consequence or circumstances listed, it is understood that the relevant mental element, i.e., intent, knowledge or both, set out in article 30 applies. Exceptions to the article 30 standard, based on the Statute, including applicable law under its relevant provisions, are indicated below.
137. The Chamber further notes that paragraph 3 of the General Introduction of the Elements of Crimes stipulates that the “existence of intent and knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances”.
138. Taking into account that no mental element is specified in article 7(l)(a) of the Statute, the Chamber applies article 30 of the Statute. The legal requirements to be proven are thus “intent and knowledge”. The Chamber has to be satisfied that the perpetrator meant to cause death or was aware that death “will occur in the ordinary course of events” required by article 30(2)(b) of the Statute. In the case of murder as a crime against humanity, the intent can be inferred from the use of a firearm against unarmed persons. 
ICC, Bemba case, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 15 June 2009, §§ 131–138.
[footnotes in original omitted]
The Pre-Trial Chamber also considered the war crime of murder, stating:
273. With regard to article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute, the Elements of Crimes require that:
(1) The perpetrator killed one or more persons;
(2) Such person or persons were either hors de combat, or were civilians, medical personnel, or religious personnel taking no active part in the hostilities.
274. The Chamber reiterates its previous finding whereby the crime of murder pursuant to article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute may be committed by action or omission. It further recalls its previous findings that the death of the victim must result from the perpetrator’s conduct, thus establishing a causal link between the conduct and the result.
bb) Mens rea
275. With regard to the mental element the perpetrator (1) must have committed the crime of murder with intent and knowledge pursuant to article 30 of the Statute, and (2) must have been aware of the factual circumstances that established the status of the persons concerned. 
ICC, Bemba case, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 15 June 2009, §§ 273–275.
[footnotes in original omitted]
International Criminal Court
In its decision on the confirmation of charges in the Banda and Jerbo case in 2011, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I stated:
4. Count 1: Violence to life
4.1 Objective elements of the crime
89. According to the Elements of Crimes, the following objective elements are required in order to constitute the crime provided for in article 8(2)(c)(i)-l of the [1998 ICC] Statute: (i) the perpetrator killed one or more persons; and (ii) such person or persons were either hors de combat, or were civilians, medical personnel, or religious personnel taking no active part in the hostilities.
95. On the basis of the evidence, the Chamber is satisfied that there are substantial grounds to believe that the relevant eight AMIS [African Union Mission in Sudan] personnel in question did indeed sustain serious injuries during and in the context of the attack. For the Chamber to be satisfied that those injuries constitute the crime of attempted murder, it must determine that there are substantial grounds to believe that those injuries qualify as such under articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(f). The Chamber notes that article 25 sets out various modes of individual criminal responsibility. However, the Chamber recalls the ruling made in the Katanga case that “the attempt to commit a crime is a crime.” The Chamber will thus examine the allegations made under article 25(3)(f) of the Statute in the context of crimes charged under Count 1.
101. In relation to the second objective requirement of the crime of violence to life in the form of murder pursuant to article 8(2)(c)(i) (whether committed or attempted), it is necessary to establish that at the time of the commission of the crime the victims were taking no active part in the hostilities.
102. In the Abu Garda Decision, the Chamber noted that under the Statute personnel involved in peacekeeping missions enjoy protection from attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities or in combat-related activities. It also concluded that the protection does not cease if such persons only use armed force in exercise of their right to self-defence and that any determination as to whether a person is directly participating in hostilities must be carried out on a case-by-case basis. The Chamber reiterates these findings for the purposes of this decision.
103. The Chamber recalls its findings made earlier in the present Decision that there are substantial grounds to believe that AMIS was a peacekeeping mission established in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, that it was impartial and its personnel was not allowed to use force except in self-defence and that AMIS personnel was entitled to the protection afforded to civilians at all the times relevant to the present case. Furthermore, the Chamber recalls its previous findings that there is no evidence suggesting that prior to the attack or at the time of the attack AMIS personnel took any direct part in hostilities or used force beyond self-defence. On the contrary, the evidence adduced in the present case gives the Chamber substantial grounds to believe that, when faced with hostilities from different rebel groups present in the area, AMIS personnel reduced their activities and promptly accommodated the wishes of the rebels, in order to avoid any type of conflict with them.
104. On this basis, the Chamber is satisfied that there are substantial grounds to believe that the individuals who were murdered and severely injured (amounting to attempted murders) within the context of the attack on the MGS Haskanita [military observer group site established by AMIS at Haskanita], enjoyed the protection afforded to persons taking no active part in hostilities, within the meaning of article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute.
4.2 Subjective element of the crime
105. For the crime under article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute to be established, the perpetrator must have been aware of the factual circumstances that established the victims’ status as persons taking no active part in the hostilities.
106. As regards the subjective element of the attempted murders, as this Chamber has previously stated elsewhere, “the attempt to commit a crime is a crime in which the objective elements are incomplete, while the subjective elements are complete”, Therefore, no distinction will be made in the assessment of the subjective elements in relation to murders, whether attempted or completed. 
ICC, Banda and Jerbo case, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 7 March 2011, §§ 89, 95 and 101–106.
[footnotes in original omitted]
The charges against Mr Banda and Mr Jerbo related to alleged war crimes. The Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the charges. 
ICC, Banda and Jerbo case, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 7 March 2011, § 164.
By decision of ICC Trial Chamber IV of 4 October 2013, proceedings against Mr Jerbo were terminated because of evidence pointing towards his death. 
ICC, Banda and Jerbo case, Decision Terminating the Proceedings against Mr Jerbo, 4 October 2013.
International Criminal Court
In its decision on the confirmation of charges in the Mbarushimana case in 2011, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I stated:
(i) Whether the war crimes of attacking civilians (Count 1) and murder (Count 3) were committed
141. The Defence argues that the attack on Busurungi was simply planned as a military assault on an enemy stronghold in the more general context of a defensive military campaign. The Defence also suggests that civilians were killed only as “collateral damage”.
151. In light of the foregoing, the Chamber is satisfied that there are substantial grounds to believe that the attack on Busurungi and surrounding villages on or about 9–10 May 2009 was launched by the FDLR [Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda] with the aim of targeting both military objectives (FARDC [Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo] positions in the village and surroundings) and the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in the hostilities. The Chamber is further satisfied that the FDLR soldiers who took part in the attack were aware of the civilian status of the victims and intended to attack the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in the hostilities since they were considered enemies. The Chamber therefore finds substantial grounds to believe that the war crimes of attacking civilians under article 8(2)(e)(i) of the [1998 ICC] Statute and murder under article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute were committed by the FDLR troops in Busurungi and surrounding villages on or about 9–10 May 2009. 
ICC, Mbarushimana case, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, §§ 141 and 151.
[footnotes in original omitted]
The charges against Mr Mbarushimana related to alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Pre-Trial Chamber did not confirm the charges. 
ICC, Mbarushimana case, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, § 340.
In its judgment of 30 May 2012, the ICC Appeals Chamber confirmed that decision and dismissed the appeal. 
ICC, Mbarushimana case, Judgment on Appeal, 30 May 2012.
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
In the Rutaganira case before the ICTR in 1996, the accused, councillor of the Mubuga sector (Gishyita commune, Kibuye prefecture) until the end of July 1994, was charged with: conspiracy to commit genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(a) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; murder, extermination and other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity, punishable under Article 3(a), (b) and (i) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; and
A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, a violation of Article 4(a) of the Tribunal Statute; and
… A VIOLATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II, a violation of Article 4(a) of the Tribunal Statute, [emphasis in original]
for his alleged role in the killing of Tutsi individuals in the Kibuye Prefecture and especially at the church in Mubuga, Gishyita commune. 
ICTR, Rutaganira case, First Amended Indictment, 29 April 1996, §§ 32–34 and 49–54, Counts 1 and 14–19.
Following a plea agreement, the accused pleaded guilty to “complicity by omission in the crime of extermination (crime against humanity) under Article 3(b) of the [1994 ICTR Statute], as charged in Count 16 of the Indictment”. 
ICTR, Rutaganira case, Judgment and Sentence, 14 March 2005, §§ 14–15 and 27.
The ICTR Trial Chamber accepted the plea and entered a corresponding finding of guilt; the remaining charges were dismissed. The Trial Chamber imposed a sentence of six years’ imprisonment. 
ICTR, Rutaganira case, Judgment and Sentence, 14 March 2005, §§ 28–30, 100, 104–105, chapter VIII (Disposition).
Its judgment and sentence were not appealed. 
ICTR, Rutaganira case, Decision on Appeal of a Decision of the President on Early Release, Appeals Chamber, 24 August 2006, § 2.
In the judgment and sentence, the Trial Chamber further noted on the elements of extermination as a crime against humanity:
49. Nahimana et al. held that “in order to be guilty of the crime of extermination, the Accused must have been involved in killings of civilians on a large scale”. Akayesu ruled that extermination “is a crime which by its very nature is directed against a group of individuals [and] differs from murder in that it requires an element of mass destruction”. In Bagilishema, the Trial Chamber found that “extermination is unlawful killing on a large scale”, and that “large scale” does not suggest a numerical minimum. It must be determined on a case-by-case basis using a common-sense approach”.
50. Therefore, the Chamber notes that the Tribunal has consistently held that, by its very nature, extermination is a crime which is directed against a group of individuals as distinct from murder in that it must be perpetrated on a “large scale.” 
ICTR, Rutaganira case, Judgment and Sentence, 14 March 2005, §§ 49–50.
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
In the Sikubwabo case before the ICTR in 1996, the accused (Charles Sikubwabo, bourgmestre of Gishyita commune, Kibuye prefecture; Aloys Ndimbati, bourgmestre of Gisovu commune, Kibuye prefecture; Ryandikayo, manager of a restaurant in Gishyita commune) were charged with conspiracy to commit genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute, for their alleged roles in the killing of Tutsi individuals in Kibuye prefecture. 
ICTR, Sikubwabo case, First Amended Indictment, 29 April 1996, §§ 32–34, Count 1.
For their alleged roles in the events at the church in Mubuga, Gishyita commune, Charles Sikubwabo and Ryandikayo were further charged, inter alia, with: genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(a) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; murder and extermination as crimes against humanity, punishable under Article 3(a) and (b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; and
A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, a violation of Article 4(a) of the Tribunal Statute; and
… A VIOLATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II, a violation of Article 4(a) of the Tribunal Statute. 
ICTR, Sikubwabo case, First Amended Indictment, 29 April 1996, §§ 49–54, Counts 14–16, 18–19.
[emphasis in original]
For their alleged roles in the events in the area of Bisesero, Kibuye prefecture, Charles Sikubwabo and Aloys Ndimbati were also charged, inter alia, with: genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(a) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; murder and extermination as crimes against humanity, punishable under Article 3(a) and (b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; and
A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, a violation of Article 4(a) of the Tribunal Statute; and
… A VIOLATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II, a violation of Article 4(a) of the Tribunal Statute. 
ICTR, Sikubwabo case, First Amended Indictment, 29 April 1996, §§ 55–60, Counts 20–22, 24–25.
[emphasis in original]
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
In the Ntakirutimana case before the ICTR in 1998, the accused, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, former pastor in Mugonero, Kibuye prefecture, and Gérard Ntakirutimana, a former physician at Mugonero hospital, were charged, respectively, with: two counts of genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(a) of the 1994 ICTR Statute, inter alia, for killing members of the Tutsi population, and/or complicity in genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(e) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; two counts of conspiracy to commit genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; two counts of murder and extermination as crimes against humanity, punishable under Article 3(a) and (b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; two counts of other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity, punishable under Article 3(i) of the 1994 ICTR Statute, inter alia, by “persistent searching for and killing of individuals”; and one count of
violence to life, health and physical and mental well-being of persons, including murder and serious bodily and mental harm, … thereby committ[ing] SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II THEREOF, as recognized by Article 4(a) [of the 1994 ICTR Statute]. 
ICTR, Ntakirutimana case, Amended Indictment (Bisesero), 7 July 1998, Count s 1A-5 and 7.
[emphasis in original]
In its judgment in 2003, the ICTR Trial Chamber found Elizaphan Ntakirutimana guilty of two counts of aiding and abetting genocide, and found Gérard Ntakirutimana guilty of two counts of genocide and of two counts of murder as a crime against humanity. 
ICTR, Ntakirutimana case, Judgment, 21 February 2003, §§ 790, 795, 810, 831, 836, 849, 877–878.
Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment and Gérard Ntakirutimana to 25 years’ imprisonment. 
ICTR, Ntakirutimana case, Judgment, 21 February 2003, §§ 921 and 924.
In its judgment in 2004, the ICTR Appeals Chamber clarified the requirements of murder as a crime against humanity:
Murder as a crime against humanity under Article 3(a) [of the 1994 ICTR Statute] does not require the Prosecution to establish that the accused personally committed the killing. Personal commission is only one of the modes of liability identified under Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute. All modes of liability under that Article are applicable to the crimes defined in Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute. Similarly, an accused can also be convicted of a crime defined in Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute on the basis of his responsibility as a superior according to Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute. 
ICTR, Ntakirutimana case, Judgment on Appeal, 13 December 2004, § 546.
As regards the requirements of extermination as a crime against humanity, the Appeals Chamber stated:
516. In its Judgement, the Trial Chamber followed the Akayesu Trial Judgement in defining extermination as “a crime which by its very nature is directed against a group of individuals. Extermination differs from murder in that it requires an element of mass destruction, which is not required for murder.” The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber that the crime of extermination is the act of killing on a large scale. The expressions “on a large scale” or “large number” do not, however, suggest a numerical minimum. As a crime against humanity, for the purposes of the ICTR Statute, the act of killing must occur within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population for national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.
517. In finding that an element of the crime of extermination was the “killing of certain named or described persons” the Trial Chamber purported to be following the Akayesu Trial Judgement, which it found had since been followed in Rutaganda and Musema. More recently, this element was also stated in the Niyitegeka Trial Judgement. In other judgements issued by ICTR Trial Chambers “certain named or described persons” has not been considered to be an element of the crime of extermination. Further, none of the judgements of the ICTY which have considered the charge of extermination has identified killing “certain named or described persons” to be an element of the crime of extermination.
518. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Prosecution that customary international law does not consider a precise description or designation by name of victims to be an element of the crime of extermination. There is no mention of such an element in Article 6(c) of the Statute of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, nor was extermination interpreted by that Tribunal as requiring proof of such an element in judgements rendered. The International Law Commission Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind also does not consider a precise description or designation of the victims by name to be an element of the crime of extermination:
“Extermination is a crime which by its very nature is directed against a group of individuals. In addition, the act used to carry out the offence of extermination involves an element of mass destruction which is not required for murder. […] In this regard, extermination is closely related to the crime of genocide in that both crimes are directed against a large number of victims. However, the crime of extermination would apply to situations that differ from those covered by the crime of genocide. Extermination covers situations in which a group of individuals who do not share any common characteristics are killed […]”
519. Incidentally, that the victims be “certain named or described persons” is not identified as an element of the crime of extermination under Article 7(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.
520. In the Rutaganda, Musema and Niyitegeka Trial Judgements, from which the Trial Chamber purported to derive this element, the majority of victims were identified by the Trial Chamber as civilians of Tutsi origin, without designating them by name or describing them with greater precision. The interpretation they placed upon the requirement that the victims be “certain named or described persons” was met by the identification of civilians of a particular origin. In these cases, the requirement to designate the victims by name or to give a precise description of the victims killed was not extended to embrace the literal meaning, but seems rather to have been understood as expressing the fact that all crimes against humanity under the ambit of the ICTR Statute must be committed because of a victim belonging to a national, political, ethnic, racial or religious group.
521. It is not an element of the crime of extermination that a precise identification of “certain named or described persons” be established. It is sufficient that the Prosecution satisfy the Trial Chamber that mass killings occurred. In this case that element was satisfied by the Trial Chamber’s findings that hundreds of people were killed at the Mugonero Complex and that thousands of people were killed in Bisesero. To require greater identification of those victims would, as the Prosecution argued, increase the burden of proof to such an extent that it hinders a large number of prosecutions for extermination.
522. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that the crime of extermination requires proof that the accused participated in a widespread or systematic killing or in subjecting a widespread number of people or systematically subjecting a number of people to conditions of living that would inevitably lead to death, and that the accused intended by his acts or omissions this result. Applying this definition, the Trial Chamber erred in law by interpreting the requirement of “killing of certain named or described persons” to be an element of the crime of extermination. 
ICTR, Ntakirutimana case, Judgment on Appeal, 13 December 2004, §§ 516–522.
As regards Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, the Appeals Chamber quashed one of the convictions for aiding and abetting genocide, but affirmed the second; it also entered a conviction for aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against humanity; in conclusion, it upheld the sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. As regards Gérard Ntakirutimana, the Appeals Chamber affirmed one of the genocide convictions, affirmed the second conviction for genocide, but found that the responsibility was that of an aider and abettor, and entered a further conviction for aiding and abetting genocide; it further quashed one of the convictions for murder as a crime against humanity, but affirmed the second, and it entered two convictions for aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against humanity; in conclusion, it upheld the sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment. 
ICTR, Ntakirutimana case, Judgment on Appeal, 13 December 2004, Part IX (Disposition).
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
In the Ntaganzwa case before the ICTR in 1998, the accused, bourgmestre (mayor) of Nyakizu commune, Butare prefecture, and chairman of the Mouvement républicain national pour le développement et la démocratie (MRND) for Nyakizu commune, was charged, inter alia, with: conspiracy to commit genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(a) of the 1994 ICTR Statute, inter alia, for “killing … members of the Tutsi population”; complicity in genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(e) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; direct and public incitement to commit genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(c) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; murder and extermination as crimes against humanity, punishable under Article 3(a) and (b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; and
killing … of civilians as part of an armed internal conflict, … thereby committ[ing] SERIOUS VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II, a crime stipulated in Article 4(a) of the [1994 ICTR Statute]. 
ICTR, Ntaganzwa case, Amended Indictment, 1 December 1998, Counts 1–6 and 9.
[emphasis in original]
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
In the Bizimungu case before the ICTR in 1999, the accused were four members of the Rwandan interim government created on 9 April 1994 and led by Jean Kambanda:
- Casimir Bizimungu, Minister of Health from 9 April until mid-July 1994;
- Justin Mugenzi, Minister of Trade and Industry from 9 April until mid-July 1994;
- Jérôme Bicamumpaka, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation from 9 April until mid-July 1994; and
- Prosper Mugiraneza, Minister of the Civil Service from 9 April until mid-July 1994. 
ICTR, Bizimungu case, Indictment, 7 May 1999, §§ 4.1–4.20.
For their respective roles, they were charged, inter alia, with: conspiracy to commit genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(a) of the 1994 ICTR Statute, inter alia by “killing … members of the Tutsi population”; complicity in genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(e) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; direct and public incitement to commit genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(c) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; murder and extermination as crimes against humanity, punishable under Article 3(a) and (b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; and
causing violence to life … of civilians as part of an armed internal conflict, and thereby committ[ing] SERIOUS VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II, a crime stipulated in Article 4(a) of the [1994 ICTR Statute]. 
ICTR, Bizimungu case, Indictment, 7 May 1999, Counts 1–7 and 9.
[emphasis in original]
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The indictments in the Nyiramasuhuko case before the ICTR in 1999 were based on charges of involvement in massacres committed mainly against the Tutsi population in the Butare prefecture from April 1994 onwards.
The accused Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, member of the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement (MRND) and Minister of Family and Women’s Development in the interim government led by Kambanda, was charged, inter alia, with: conspiracy to commit genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(a) of the 1994 ICTR Statute, inter alia, for “killing … members of the Tutsi population”, or, alternatively, complicity in genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(e) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; direct and public incitement to commit genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(c) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; murder and extermination as crimes against humanity, punishable under Article 3(a) and (b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; and
killing … of civilians as part of an armed internal conflict, … thereby committ[ing] SERIOUS VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II, a crime stipulated in Article 4(a) of the [1994 ICTR Statute]. 
ICTR, Nyiramasuhuko case, Amended Indictment (Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and Arsène Shalom Ntahobali), 1 March 2001, Counts 1–6 and 10.
[emphasis in original]
The same charges were brought against the following accused, for their respective roles in the events in Butare:
- Arsène Shalom Ntahobali, the son of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, a student and leader of Interahamwe (youth wing of the MRND) militiamen in Butare prefecture; 
ICTR, Nyiramasuhuko case, Amended Indictment (Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and Arsène Shalom Ntahobali), 1 March 2001, Counts 1–6 and 10.
- Joseph Kanyabashi, bourgmestre (mayor) of Ngoma commune in Butare prefecture from 1974 until July 1994; 
ICTR, Nyiramasuhuko case, Amended Indictment (Joseph Kanyabashi), 2 November 2000, Counts 1–6 and 9.
- Sylvain Nsabimana, prefect of Butare from 19 April to 17 June 1994; 
ICTR, Nyiramasuhuko case, Amended Indictment (Sylvain Nsabimana and Alphonse Nteziryayo), 12 August 1999, Counts 1–6 and 9.
- Alphonse Nteziryayo, prefect of Butare from 17 June 1994 until he left Rwanda in July 1994 and, before that, director of the civil defence of Butare; 
ICTR, Nyiramasuhuko case, Amended Indictment (Sylvain Nsabimana and Alphonse Nteziryayo), 12 August 1999, Counts 1–6 and 9.
- Elie Ndayambaje, bourgmestre (mayor) of Muganza commune in Butare prefecture from 1983 to 1992, and again from 22 June 1994. 
ICTR, Nyiramasuhuko case, Amended Indictment (Elie Ndayambaje), 11 August 1999, Counts 1–6 and 9.
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The indictments in the Bagosora case before the ICTR in 1999 were based on charges of involvement in various massacres committed mainly against the Tutsi population in Rwanda between April and July 1994, including specified massacres that took place in Kigali, Butare, Gisenyi and Gitarama.
The principal accused, Théoneste Bagosora, Colonel (Rtd), who was directeur de cabinet, Rwandan Ministry of Defence, during the period specified, was charged, inter alia, with: conspiracy to commit genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(a) of the 1994 ICTR Statute, inter alia, for “killing … members of the Tutsi population”; complicity in genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(e) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; murder (two counts, including one involving the murder of 10 Belgian soldiers from UNAMIR) and extermination as crimes against humanity, punishable under Article 3(a) and (b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; and
killing … of (a) civilians as part of an armed internal conflict, … and (b) ten Belgian soldiers from UNAMIR … thereby committ[ing] SERIOUS VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II, a crime stipulated in Article 4(a) of the [ICTR Statute]. 
ICTR, Bagosora case, Amended Indictment (Théoneste Bagosora), 12 August 1999, Counts 1–6 and 10–11.
[emphasis in original]
The same charges (with the exception of those involving the murder/killing of 10 Belgian soldiers) were brought against the following accused (all of them military officers or ex-military officers at the time of the alleged crimes), for their alleged participation in specified massacres:
- Gratien Kabiligi, Brigadier, chief of military operations (G3) within the High Command of the Rwandan Army; 
ICTR, Bagosora case, Amended Indictment (Gratien Kabiligi), 13 August 1999, Counts 1–5 and 9.
- Anatole Nsengiyumva, lieutenant colonel, commander of military operations for Gisenyi sector (who was additionally charged with direct and public incitement to commit genocide); 
ICTR, Bagosora case, Amended Indictment (Anatole Nsengiyumva), 12 August 1999, Counts 1–6 and 10.
and
- Aloys Ntabakuze, major, commander of the Para-Commando Battalion in the Rwandan Army. 
ICTR, Bagosora case, Amended Indictment (Aloys Ntabakuze), 13 August 1999, Counts 1–5 and 9.
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
In the Bagilishema case before the ICTR in 1999, the accused, bourgmestre (mayor) of Mabanza commune, Kibuye prefecture, from 1980 until July 1994, was charged, inter alia, with: genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(a) of the 1994 ICTR Statute, inter alia, for “killing … members of the Tutsi population”; complicity in genocide, punishable under Article 2(3)(e) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; “murder of civilians” as a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 3(a) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; “extermination of civilians” as a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 3(b) of the 1994 ICTR Statute; and
causing violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in the course of a non-international armed conflict, in particular, murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture or any form of corporal punishment, and has hereby committed SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II thereof, in violation of Article 4 (a) [of the 1994 ICTR Statute]. 
ICTR, Bagilishema case, Amended Indictment, 17 September 1999, Counts 1–4 and 6.
[emphasis in original]
In its judgment in 2001, the ICTR Trial Chamber noted regarding the elements of genocide by “killing members of the group”:
53. The definition of genocide, as provided in Article 2 of the [1994 ICTR] Statute, cites, verbatim, Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the “Genocide Convention”).
54. The Genocide Convention is undeniably considered part of customary international law, as reflected in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (1951) on reservations to the Convention …
55. The definition of the crime of genocide has been interpreted in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal, namely in the Akayesu, Kayishema and Ruzindana, Rutaganda and Musema Judgements. The Chamber adheres to the definitions of genocide as elaborated in these judgements. It therefore considers that a crime of genocide is proven if it is established beyond reasonable doubt, firstly, that one of the acts listed under Article 2(2) of the Statute was committed and, secondly, that this act was committed against a specifically targeted national, ethnical, racial or religious group, with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, that group. Genocide therefore invites analysis under two headings: the prohibited underlying acts and the specific genocidal intent or dolus specialis.
2.1.1 Underlying Acts
56. The acts underlying the crime of genocide may in each case be analysed into physical and mental elements. The offences relevant to the present case are considered below.
(i) Killing – Article 2(2)(a) of the Statute
57. Article 2(2)(a) of the Statute, like the corresponding provisions of the Genocide Convention, uses “meurtre” in the French version and “killing” in the English version. The concept of killing includes both intentional and unintentional homicide, whereas meurtre refers exclusively to homicide committed with the intent to cause death. In such a situation, pursuant to the general principles of criminal law, the version more favourable to the Accused must be adopted …
58. The Chamber therefore finds that Article 2(2)(a) of the Statute must be interpreted as a homicide committed with intent to cause death. Furthermore, to constitute a crime of genocide, the enumerated acts under Article 2(2)(a) must be committed with intent to destroy a specific group in whole or in part. Therefore, by their very nature the enumerated acts are conscious, intentional, volitional acts that an individual cannot commit by accident or as a result of mere negligence. 
ICTR, Bagilishema case, Judgment, 7 June 2001, §§ 53–58.
[emphasis in original]
On murder and extermination as underlying acts of a crime against humanity, the Trial Chamber noted:
3.2 Underlying Acts
82. As discussed above, a crime against humanity is constituted by an offence committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds. However, an underlying offence need not contain elements of the broader attack. For example, an offence may be committed without discrimination, or be neither widespread nor systematic, yet still constitutes a crime against humanity if the other prerequisites of the principal crime are met. A single act by a perpetrator may thus constitute a crime against humanity.
83. E