Practice Relating to Rule 85. The Use of Incendiary Weapons against Combatants

No data.
UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin
Section 6.2 of the 1999 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin states: “The use of certain conventional weapons, such as … incendiary weapons is prohibited.” 
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, Secretary-General’s Bulletin, UN Secretariat, UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999, Section 6.2.
Burundi
Burundi’s Regulations on International Humanitarian Law (2007) states that “weapons whose use is permitted in certain circumstances [include] … incendiary weapons”. 
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, p. 93; see also Part I bis, pp. 2 and 17.
Canada
Canada’s Code of Conduct (2001) provides that the use of “tracer rounds for other than marking” is forbidden. 
Canada, Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 4 June 2001, Rule 3, § 10(c).
Canada
Canada’s Code of Conduct (2005) provides that the use of “tracer rounds for other than marking” is forbidden. 
Canada, Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 2005, Rule 3, § 10(c).
Chad
Chad’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) prohibits the use of “incendiary weapons used to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering”. 
Chad, Droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces armées et de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 79.
Colombia
Colombia’s Basic Military Manual (1995) prohibits the use of weapons which “cause unnecessary and indiscriminate, widespread, long-term and severe damage to people and the environment. This includes, inter alia: … incendiary weapons, whose production, importation, possession and use are also prohibited by Article 81 of the National Constitution.” 
Colombia, Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual Básico para las Personerías y las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 1995, pp. 49–50.
Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states that war crimes include the “use of prohibited means or methods of warfare ([including] … incendiary weapons)”. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 31.a.(7); see also § 31.b.(2).(h).
The manual further states: “The use of tracer projectiles, whether incendiary or explosive, by or against an aircraft is not forbidden.” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 171.a.
Peru
Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states that war crimes include the “use of prohibited means or methods of warfare ([including] … incendiary weapons)”. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 32(a)(7), p. 248; see also § 32(b)(2)(h), p. 248.
The manual further states: “The use of tracer projectiles, whether incendiary or explosive, by or against an aircraft is not forbidden.” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 162(a), p. 343.
In its Glossary of Terms, the manual defines “incendiary weapons” as: “Weapons or ammunition which, by using any medium, are primarily designed to set fire to objects or to burn persons through the action of flame, heat or a combination of both.” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, p. 395.
Andorra
Andorra’s Decree on Arms (1989) provides:
The manufacture, importation, circulation, possession, use, buying and selling and propaganda of the following weapons is forbidden:
11th Ammunition with hard centre perforating, explosive, incendiary, expanding, “dum-dum” and lead shot bullets as well as the projectiles of this kind of ammunition. 
Andorra, Decree on Arms, 1989, Chapter 1, Section II, Article 2.
Belgium
Belgium’s Law Regulating Economic and Individual Activities with Weapons (2006) provides:
For the purposes of the present law and its implementing decrees, an “incendiary weapon” is considered as … any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or a combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target. 
Belgium, Law Regulating Economic and Individual Activities with Weapons, 2006, Article 2(6).
The Law further states: “[The following] arms shall be considered as prohibited: … incendiary weapons”. 
Belgium, Law Regulating Economic and Individual Activities with Weapons, 2006, Article 3(1)(2).
Hungary
Hungary’s Criminal Code (1978), as amended in 1998, prohibits incendiary weapons. It provides:
(1) Any person who uses or orders the use of a weapon or instrument of war prohibited by international treaty in a theatre of military operation or in an occupied territory against the enemy, civilians or prisoners of war commits a felony offence and shall be punishable by imprisonment of between 10 to 15 years or life imprisonment.
(2) Any person who makes preparations for the use of a weapon prohibited by international treaty commits a felony offence and shall be punishable by imprisonment of up to five years.
(3) For the purpose of Subsections (1)–(2) the following shall be construed as weapons prohibited by international treaty:
b) the following weapons listed in the Protocols to the Convention signed at Geneva on 15 October 1980 on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, as promulgated by Law-Decree 2 of 1984 …
3. incendiary weapons specified in Point 1 of Article 1 of Protocol III. 
Hungary, Criminal Code , 1978, as amended in 1998, Article 160/A, §§ 1, 2 and 3(b)(3).
Uruguay
Uruguay’s Law on Cooperation with the ICC (2006) states:
26.2. Persons and objects affected by the war crimes set out in the present provision are persons and objects which international law protects in international or internal armed conflict.
26.3. The following are war crimes:
45. Using incendiary booby-traps or weapons, understood as any weapon, ammunition or booby-trap primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat or the combination of both produced by chemical reaction. 
Uruguay, Law on Cooperation with the ICC, 2006, Article 26.2 and 26.3.45.
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
Under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Penal Code (1976), as amended in 2001, the use of, or the order to use, “means or methods of combat prohibited under the rules of international law, during a war or an armed conflict” is a war crime. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Penal Code, 1976, as amended in 2001, Article 148(1).
The commentary on the Code states: “The following weapons and means of combat are considered to be prohibited: … napalm bombs and other incendiary weapons”. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Penal Code, 1976, as amended in 2001, commentary on Article 148(1).
No data.
Australia
In 1973, with respect to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Australia stated that it “reaffirms the principles [in international agreements prohibiting the employment in war of weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering] and their application to the use of all classes of weapons, particular napalm”. It further stated that it “does not possess aerial or mechanized napalm-type weapons and does not intend to acquire them”. 
Australia, Reply of 21 September 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 4.
Austria
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Austria stated that development, production and use of incendiary weapons should be banned. 
Austria, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.13, 27 October 1977, p. 28.
Barbados
In 1973, with respect to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Barbados stated that it “supports the conclusions contained in chapter V of the report”, namely “the necessity of working out measures for the prohibition of the use, production, development and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons” (see infra). 
Barbados, Reply of 22 February 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 4.
Belgium
In 1972, during a debate preceding the adoption of Resolution 3032 (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly called upon “all parties to armed conflicts to observe the international humanitarian rules which are applicable, in particular the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907”, Belgium stated that this paragraph contained a very clear reference to napalm. 
Belgium, Statement before the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.1388, 9 December 1972, p. 468.
Canada
In 1973, in response to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Canada stated:
Both considerations of limitations on the use of specific weapons, such as napalm and other incendiary weapons, and efforts to promote the further development of the international humanitarian law of armed conflict, should be undertaken quickly and effectively. 
Canada, Reply sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207/Add.1, 11 October 1973, p. 3.
Chile
In 1972, during a debate on Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Chile stated that it preferred a firmer resolution, but that it accepted that the process banning incendiary weapons had not been developed to that point and acquiesced with the draft proposal. Regarding napalm, it stated: “International law is extremely out of date and deficient.” It added: “It is urgent that the United Nations adopt all necessary measures and arrive at a legal instrument prohibiting its production, stockpiling and use.” 
Chile, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1888, 9 November 1972, p. 18–19.
China
In 1973, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, China stated that it was against the use of incendiary weapons and condemned Israel’s use of them in the Yom Kippur War in 1973. 
China, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1968, 23 November 1973, p. 569.
China
At the 18th International Conference of the Red Cross, China condemned the use of napalm by US forces in the Korean War, stating: “Foreign invaders also wantonly bombarded the undefended cities and villages located far from the front line, for many times used the most inhumane napalm bombs.” 
China, Statement of 30 July 1952 at the 18th International Conference of the Red Cross, Toronto, 26 July–7 August 1952, reprinted in Documents on Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, World Knowledge Press, Beijing, Vol. 2, pp. 82–83.
Colombia
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Colombia supported the elimination of incendiary weapons. 
Colombia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.21, 2 November 1977, p. 11.
Cyprus
In 1973, with respect to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Cyprus concurred with the conclusions of the report and recommended that “both the General Assembly and the ICRC be involved in the measures for the prohibition of the use, production, development and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons”. 
Cyprus, Reply of 5 April 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 5.
Czechoslovakia
In 1973, with respect to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Czechoslovakia assured the UN Secretary-General that the competent Czechoslovak authorities were prepared to “exert every effort to achieve a solution leading to the final prohibition of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons”. 
Czechoslovakia, Reply of 31 August 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 6.
Ecuador
In 1972, during a debate on Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Ecuador stated that no pretext could justify the use of incendiary weapons and that the effects were especially grave in colonial conflicts in less-developed nations. 
Ecuador, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1883, 3 November 1972, p. 6.
Finland
In 1973, with respect to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Finland deemed it important “to continue discussions and studies in order to find various ways and means to restrict the use of inhuman weapons and methods of warfare”. It recommended that the issue of incendiary weapons be discussed at the upcoming CDDH.  
Finland, Reply of 21 September 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 7.
Finland
In 1974, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Finland stated:
9. In view of the development of modern weaponry and warfare and their consequences on the civilian population, it was of prime importance to reach early agreement on general principles prohibiting or restricting the use of specific weapons … Reports … showed clearly that the deployment of extremely cruel weapons, such as napalm and other incendiary weapons, seemed to be most frequent in cases where their strict military value was least, namely, when directed against civilian targets. The suffering they caused was disproportionate to any military advantage gained.
10. … The Ad Hoc Committee should endeavour to define [specific categories of conventional weapons] and prepare a list mentioning, at least, napalm and other incendiary weapons. 
Finland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.1, 13 March 1974, p. 9, §§ 9–10.
Germany, Federal Republic of
In 1976, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany stated that “he did not think … that the time had come to renounce flame weapons. Security considerations prevented not only his country, but many others, from doing so.” He added:
Although his country had to look for solutions which were sound from a security point of view, it did not wish to minimize the seriousness of wounds caused by napalm and other flame weapons. Although he agreed with the United Kingdom representative, who had pointed out that with the elimination of napalm a number of burn casualties would be reduced by only a fairly small percentage, he favoured the widespread endeavours to prohibit the sources of those grave injuries. 
Germany, Federal Republic of, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.32, 1 June 1976, p. 336, §§ 30 and 32.
Germany, Federal Republic of
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1979, the Federal Republic of Germany stated that proposals made by delegations “for a total ban” on incendiary weapons or for “a ban with explicit exceptions” were
not only inconsistent with the mandate [set out in UN General Assembly Resolution 32/152] but were based on an unproven hypothesis, namely that incendiary weapons were excessively injurious in all circumstances. The exceptions, for their part, would give rise to a definite paradox since, if there was not excessive injury under all circumstances, it was illogical to start from the idea of a total ban. 
Germany, Federal Republic of, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./ II/SR.24, 9 April 1979, p. 6, § 23.
Guatemala
In 1973, in response to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Guatemala stated: “It is necessary to make renewed efforts for the legal prohibition of the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering in all armed conflicts, especially the mass use of incendiary weapons.” 
Guatemala, Reply of 10 August 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 8.
India
In 1976, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, the representative of India stated:
His delegation, for its part, was of the opinion that a country should not be placed at a disadvantage when the defence of its territory was at stake. It should accordingly be entitled to use incendiary weapons against the enemy on its own soil. Once the enemy had been driven back beyond the international borders, however, the use of incendiary weapons against him would be illegal. His delegation therefore proposed a complete prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons by the armed forces of a country outside that country’s own borders or the borders of its allies. It thought that that proposal would provide a fair solution to a very complicated problem. 
India, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.28, 20 May 1976, p. 284, § 5.
Iran
In 1973, in response to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Iran stated:
Given a general consensus within the international community to take action on these weapons, the Government of Iran would think that the most practical approach would be to consider a prohibition on the use of all incendiary weapons. 
Iran, Reply of 31 July 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 10, § 5.
Iraq
In 1976, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, the representative of Iraq stated:
27. … His Government considered incendiary weapons to be completely inhumane. The sufferings caused by their use could not be minimized, especially as such weapons did not discriminate between civilian and military objectives. There was a tendency for military forces to be more cautious in employing them in attacks, out of regard for the protection of their own forces, but in cities incendiary weapons could present a serious danger to the civilian population.
28. Some delegations seemed to favour criteria which would not prohibit the use of incendiary weapons altogether. In his opinion it was impossible to establish such criteria because of the inherently lethal nature of those weapons. That point had already been brought up by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his 1972 report entitled “Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use” … His delegation was in full agreement with the conclusions in that report to the effect that all efforts should be made to prohibit the use of incendiary weapons in warfare. 
Iraq, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.27, 19 May 1976, p. 279, §§ 27–28.
Iraq
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1978, Iraq stated that it “desired the prohibition of certain incendiary weapons”. 
Iraq, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./I/SR.8, 6 September 1978, p. 7.
Iraq
According to the Report on the Practice of Iraq, Iraq has “restrictions and limitations” on the use of incendiary weapons. 
Report on the Practice of Iraq, 1998, Chapter 3.5.
Islamic Republic of Iran
According to the Report on the Practice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in February 1981 an Iranian colonel announced that Iraq had used incendiary bombs against the Iranian city of Marivan. He called this act a “crime” and stated that these weapons were banned. 
Report on the Practice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1997, Chapter 3.4.
Israel
In 2009, in a report on Israeli operations in Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009 (the “Gaza Operation”, also known as “Operation Cast Lead”), Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
Use of Munitions Containing White Phosphorous
406. During the Gaza Operation, IDF [Israel Defense Forces] forces used munitions containing white phosphorous, which is in common use by militaries worldwide. In particular, IDF used two different types of munitions containing white phosphorous – exploding munitions and smoke projectiles.
407. Exploding munitions containing white phosphorous. A small number of exploding munitions containing white phosphorous were used by the IDF during the Operation as mortar shells fire by ground forces and as rounds from naval vessels. These munitions were fired only at open unpopulated areas and were used only for marking and signalling rather than in an anti-personnel capacity. … No exploding munitions containing white phosphorous were used in built-up areas of the Gaza Strip or for anti-personnel purposes. The restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons under Protocol III (relating to Incendiary Weapons) to the [1980] Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (“CCW Protocol III”) were observed at all times, even though Israel is not a party to the Protocol (for further elaboration, see below).
409. Smoke projectiles containing white phosphorous. The second and main type of munitions containing white phosphorous employed by the IDF during the Gaza Operation was smoke screening projectiles. …
410. … [S]moke-screening projectiles are designed to create a protective smoke screen for battlefield purposes, and were used exclusively for this purpose by the IDF during the Gaza Operation. The smoke projectiles may, on occasion, produce incidental incendiary effects, but this does not make them incendiary weapons for purposes of international law.
International Law Applicable to the use of Incendiary Weapons
411. The use of munitions containing white phosphorous is not prohibited by any international treaty, including CCW Protocol III. Article I of CCW Protocol III defines “incendiary weapon” as “… any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target.” Article I further expressly excludes from its purview: “… Munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling systems.”
412. Accordingly, although Israel is not a party to CCW Protocol III, it is clear that the use of munitions containing white phosphorous as a smokescreen is not regulated nor prohibited by it.
414. Although the use of weapons containing white phosphorous for smoke-screening purposes is not prohibited by any international treaty, it is still subject to the applicable norms of the Law of Armed Conflict, including the principles of distinction and proportionality, which regulate the employment of any types of weapons during an armed conflict.  
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Operation in Gaza 27 December 2008–18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects, 29 July 2009, §§ 406–412 and 414.
[footnotes in original omitted]
Israel
In January 2010, in an update of its July 2009 report on Israeli operations in Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
117. This investigation dealt with the use of weapons containing phosphorous by IDF [Israel Defense Forces] forces during the Gaza Operation. The investigation focused on the different types and number of weapons containing phosphorous used during the Operation, the purposes for which they were used, the applicable professional instructions and rules of engagement, and the extent of compliance with those instructions and rules. …
118. The Military Advocate General reviewed the entire record of the special command investigation. …
119. With respect to smoke projectiles, the Military Advocate General found that international law does not prohibit use of smoke projectiles containing phosphorous. Specifically, such projectiles are not “incendiary weapons,” within the meaning of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons [1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] because they are not primarily designed to set fire or to burn. The Military Advocate General further determined that during the Gaza Operation, the IDF used such smoke projectiles for military purposes only, for instance to camouflage IDF armour forces from Hamas’s antitank units by creating smoke screens. 
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaza Operation Investigations: An Update, 29 January 2010, §§ 117–119.
[footnotes in original omitted]
Israel
In July 2010, in a second update of its July 2009 report on Israeli operations in Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
The use of smoke-screening munitions containing phosphorus during the Gaza Operation was also addressed in a special command investigation dedicated to the issue. This investigation determined that the policy of using such munitions was consistent with Israel’s obligations under the Law of Armed Conflict. Nonetheless, following that investigation, the Chief of the General Staff ordered the implementation of the lessons learned from the investigation, particularly with regard to the use of such munitions near populated areas and sensitive installations. As a consequence, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] is in the process of establishing permanent restrictions on the use of munitions containing white phosphorus in urban areas. 
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaza Operation Investigations: Second Update, 19 July 2010, § 97.
Japan
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1978, Japan declared that while it “was not sure it would be practicable to ban completely” all incendiary weapons, the use of incendiary weapons containing yellow phosphorus should be prohibited. 
Japan, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./I/ SR.12, 12 September 1978, p. 2, § 3.
Jordan
According to the Report on the Practice of Jordan, the “Jordanian army was constantly bombarded with napalm bombs throughout the 1967 War. Jordan condemned officially the use by Israel of these horrible weapons.” 
Report on the Practice of Jordan, 1997, Chapter 3.5, referring to Press Conference by his Majesty the King of Jordan, 19 June 1967.
Kuwait
In 1973, in response to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Kuwait stated that it “will whole-heartedly support any action that may be taken by the United Nations to prevent the use of napalm in armed conflicts and especially against the civilian population”. 
Kuwait, Reply of 20 February 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 11.
Kuwait
In 1975, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Kuwait stated:
16. There were several types of weapon which could be included in the category of incendiary weapons, and military authorities would claim that their use was necessary without concerning themselves with the humanitarian side of the question.
17. Several types of incendiary weapons such as napalm, flame-throwers and incendiary munitions, should be prohibited forthwith, regardless of military considerations. The other incendiary weapons should be classified as defensive or offensive, and as anti-personnel or anti-matériel. Incendiary weapons would thus be divided into two categories from the operational point of view.
18. His delegation suggested that incendiary weapons used indiscriminately against members of the armed forces and the civilian population should be prohibited. It also suggested that incendiary weapons used against civilian objects should be prohibited. It considered, moreover, that incendiary weapons other than napalm and flame-throwers should be used only for defence or for attacking military matériel. It would support any measure designed to prohibit or restrict the use of destructive weapons. 
Kuwait, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.10, 19 February 1975, pp. 94–95, §§ 16–18.
Madagascar
In 1975, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Madagascar welcomed the establishment of the Committee and stated that this “would enable the [CDDH] to … draw up rules prohibiting the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons”. It also condemned “the use of incendiary weapons and all methods of destruction employing napalm or phosphorus, which caused terrible injuries. In such cases no argument or subterfuge could prevail over humanitarian law.” 
Madagascar, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.10, 19 February 1975, p. 103, § 55.
Mexico
In 1973, in response to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Mexico stated that it was in favour of the total prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons, including napalm, to be achieved by an international agreement. 
Mexico, Reply of 29 August 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 11.
Mexico
In 1975, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, the representative of Mexico stated:
33. … The ban on incendiary weapons should, in fact, be a total one.
34. He expressed satisfaction that the United Nations General Assembly had reflected the wishes of international opinion regarding the prohibition of incendiary weapons. 
Mexico, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.10, 19 February 1975, p. 98, §§ 33–34.
Mexico
In 1976, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Mexico, with respect to the draft protocol relative to the prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons submitted by Norway (see infra), stated:
The actual content of the Norwegian proposal … was discouraging in so far as it appeared to constitute a further attempt to restrict the use of incendiary weapons on the basis of the targets attacked, whereas negotiations thus far had been directed towards the total prohibition of incendiary weapons, or at least of some of them. The extensive information considered at previous meetings of the Committee and at the two sessions of the Conference of Government Experts showed that incendiary weapons were particularly cruel and caused wounds which were difficult to treat. The same sources also showed that the military effectiveness of such weapons was limited, that their tactical value lay mainly in the terror which fire inspired in everyone except trained troops, and that substitutes could be used in practically all the circumstances for which incendiary weapons were employed. Moreover, such weapons were par excellence weapons which caused superfluous injury. [The prohibition to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering] was absolute. To accept restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons on the basis of the targets attacked would entail the acceptance of one of two assumptions: either incendiary weapons did not cause superfluous injury and therefore did not fall within the meaning of the absolute prohibition laid down in article 33, paragraph 2; or else the Ad Hoc Committee was going to limit the scope of what had already been approved in Committee III. His delegation could accept neither of those assumptions. 
Mexico, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.25, 13 May 1976, p. 259, § 33.
Mexico
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1978, Mexico stated that its earlier proposal on the prohibition of incendiary weapons ought to be a base for the future treaty. 
Mexico, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./I/ SR.3, 31 August 1978, p. 3.
Mexico proposed the following:
Art. 1. It is prohibited to use incendiary weapons …
Art. 2. The prohibition referred to in the foregoing article shall apply to the use of any munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame and/or heat produced by chemical reaction of the substance delivered on the target. Such munitions include flame-throwers, incendiary shells, rockets, grenades, mines and bombs.
Art. 3. The prohibition referred to in article 1 above shall not apply to munitions which may have secondary or incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling systems.  
Mexico, Draft clauses relating to the prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons submitted to the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./L.4, 11 September 1978.
Mongolia
In 1973, in response to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Mongolia stated that it “fully associates itself with the views of the consultant expert as to the necessity of working out measures for the prohibition of the use, production, development and stockpiling of napalm and incendiary weapons”. 
Mongolia, Reply of 21 July 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 12, § 5.
Mozambique
At the CDDH, Mozambique stated: “While this Conference is meeting here, the people of Mozambique are being bombed by the illegal and racist régime of Ian Smith, which is using napalm and other materials causing superfluous injury.” 
Mozambique, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 303.
Netherlands
In 1992, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Netherlands implied that universal adherence to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons would give it effect in internal conflicts. 
Netherlands, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/47/PV.26, 4 December 1992, p. 21.
Netherlands
The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states:
An incendiary weapon means any weapon or munition primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injuries to persons through the action of flame, heat or a combination of both. They include: flame throwers, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of incendiary substances. One such substance is napalm. It is also important to know which weapons are not incendiary weapons: these are mainly munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants and tracers. Anti-tank grenades, which have the capacity to pierce armour by developing a very high temperature, are not incendiary weapons. The incendiary effect here is not specifically intended to cause burn injuries to persons. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0472.
In its chapter on non-international armed conflict, the manual states:
It is prohibited to use weapons causing unnecessary suffering or excessive injury, or that are indiscriminate. This means that … firearms whose primary purpose is to cause burn injuries to persons are forbidden. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 1038.
New Zealand
In 1973, during a debate in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, New Zealand stated that it “believed that there was a strong case for a total prohibition of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons”. 
New Zealand, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.1453, 4 December 1973, p. 308.
New Zealand
In 1975, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, the representative of New Zealand stated:
38. … As the New Zealand delegation had already said in the United Nations General Assembly and as was also stated in [a] working paper, a rule prohibiting the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons in all circumstances was much more likely to be complied with than a restriction on particular uses …
39. So far as concerned the principle of prohibiting or restricting the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, he recalled that on a number of occasions since 1973 his Government had stated its position, which was that, while the paramount requirement was to protect civilians, such protection should not be restricted to civilians. If the use of incendiaries was prohibited only in particular circumstances or against particular targets, there would be substantial difficulties of implementation. There was a strong case for a total prohibition of such weapons. 
New Zealand, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.10, 19 February 1975, pp. 99–100, §§ 38–39.
Nigeria
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1979, Nigeria expressed “great concern over the fact that the negotiations on incendiary weapons had not yielded positive results”. It hoped, on behalf of the African bloc, that the Conference would result in “a treaty or convention restricting or prohibiting certain conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects”. 
Nigeria, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF/II/ SR.24, 9 April 1979, p. 5, § 17.
Norway
In 1973, in response to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Norway stated that a prohibition on production, development and stockpiling of incendiary weapons would be extremely complicated to implement, since production of incendiary weapons was easy. Consequently, it preferred a total prohibition of the use of some or all incendiary weapons. 
Norway, Reply of 11 September 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 16.
Norway
Norway submitted a “Draft Protocol Relative to the Prohibition of the Use of Incendiary Weapons” to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH which read, inter alia, as follows:
Article 1 – Field of application
The present Protocol shall apply in the situations referred to in articles 2 and 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of War Victims… .
Article 3 – General prohibition
With the further limitations spelled out in the present Protocol and subject to the provisions of [the Additional Protocol I], incendiary weapons may only be used against objects that are military objectives in the sense of article 47, paragraph 2 of the said Protocol, including in close support of friendly forces.
The use of incendiary weapons against personnel is prohibited.
Nevertheless, the presence of combatants or civilians within or in the immediate vicinity of legitimate targets as described in this article does not render such targets immune from attacks with incendiary weapons …
Article 5 – Precaution in attack
Any use of incendiary weapons is subject to article 50 of [the Additional Protocol I].
In addition, it is prohibited to launch an attack with incendiary weapons except when:
(a) the location of the target is known and properly recognized, and
(b) all feasible precaution is taken to limit the incendiary effects to the specific military objectives and to avoid incidental injury or incidental loss of lives.
Article 6 – Protection against environmental effects
Before deciding upon the launching of attack with incendiary weapons, special care must be taken to ensure that environmental effects as described in article 48 bis of [the Additional Protocol I] will be avoided. 
Norway, Draft protocol relative to the prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/207 within CDDH/IV/226, pp. 567–569.
Peru
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Peru stated that incendiary weapons should be prohibited. 
Peru, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.16, 28 October 1977, p. 22.
Peru
In 1995, in an official communiqué released by the Joint Command of the Peruvian armed forces, Peru denied having used flame-throwers in its conflict with Ecuador. 
Peru, Joint Command of the Armed Forces, Official Communiqué No. 011 CCFFAA, Lima, 24 February 1995.
Philippines
A 1998, in a statement issued in reply to a question from the ICRC on the customary norms of IHL, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs declared that the Philippines had renounced the use of napalm. 
Philippines, Statement by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Office of United Nations and International Organizations (UNIO), Manila, 6 March 1998, Report on the Practice of the Philippines, 1997, additional material on Chapter 3.
Poland
In 1973, in response to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Poland stated that it considered that the report could “serve as a suitable basis for further considerations of the direction and manner of negotiating with a view to reaching an agreement on the prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons and, subsequently, their total elimination from military arsenals”.  
Poland, Reply of 25 September sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 17.
Poland
In 1974, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Poland stated that “napalm and other incendiary weapons … should be banned”. 
Poland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.1, 13 March 1974, p. 13, § 28.
Poland
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1979, Poland stated that “it was disappointing” that the Conference had not reached an agreement on the prohibition or restriction of incendiary weapons. It hoped that “the extensive debate on the total prohibition of the use of such weapons in inhabited areas would eventually lead to the elimination of at least the most drastic and indiscriminate weapons in that category”. 
Poland, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF/II/ SR.28, 18 April 1979, p. 2, § 2.
Russian Federation
At the International Conference on the Protection of War Victims in 1993, the Russian Federation declared: “In order to protect the civilian population against indiscriminate weapons … incendiary weapons … should be completely banned in internal conflicts.” 
Russian Federation, Statement at the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims, Geneva, 30 August–1 September 1993.
Sudan
In 1974, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, the representative of the Sudan stated:
Recent experience had shown the untold sufferings produced by the use of … incendiary weapons. His country was ready to co-operate with the ICRC in its endeavours to ensure respect for all the rules laid down concerning their prohibition. 
Sudan, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.3, 15 March 1974, p. 27, § 11.
Sweden
In 1973, in response to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Sweden stated: “If total prohibition of use were attained as regards some or all incendiary weapons the question of a ban on production, development and stockpiling, etc. could subsequently be taken up.” 
Sweden, Reply of 5 June 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 23.
Sweden
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Sweden stated that it, “together with many others”, was convinced that incendiary weapons could be restricted and partially banned without “upsetting any military balance”. 
Sweden, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.32, 15 November 1977, p. 26.
Sweden
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1979, Sweden stated: “No category of conventional weapons had evoked greater public revulsion than incendiary weapons, including napalm.” It also stated that, given the difficulty of applying partial bans on incendiary weapons, it was of the view that a “complete prohibition was the preferable course”. 
Sweden, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./II/ SR.28, 18 April 1979, p. 3, § 7.
Sweden
In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Sweden stated that further restrictions on incendiary weapons should be enacted. 
Sweden, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.32, 12 October 1987, p. 6.
Sweden reiterated this view in 1992. 
Sweden, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/47/PV.26, 4 December 1992, p. 18.
Switzerland
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1978, Switzerland stated that “although civilians and combatants could be distinguished in theory, it was impossible to do so in practice” and therefore it “advocated the total prohibition of the main types of incendiary weapons”. 
Switzerland, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/ PREP.CONF./I/SR.12, 12 September 1978, p. 2, § 3.
Syrian Arab Republic
In 1973, in response to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, the Syrian Arab Republic endorsed “all the provisions contained in the report, and in particular, those concerning the ban on [napalm and other incendiary weapons]”. 
Syrian Arab Republic, Reply of 31 July 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 23.
Togo
In 1974, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Togo stated that the CDDH “should prohibit the use of weapons such as napalm, incendiary and area weapons”. 
Togo, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.1, 13 March 1974, p. 16, § 45.
Turkey
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Turkey stated that it supported the prohibition or restrictions on incendiary weapons, but held that it would only be effective if it reflected a consensus in the world community. 
Turkey, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.44, 25 November 1977, p. 23.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
In 1969, in the context of the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), the USSR stated:
For the purpose of crushing the resistance of the Arabs [in the territories occupied by Israel], the aggressors from Israel are continuing to use napalm, which is forbidden by international law.
The criminal, inhuman acts of the imperialist States are a shameful violation of international law, and also of the resolutions of the International Conferences of the Red Cross. 
USSR, Reply dated 30 December 1969 to the UN Secretary-General regarding the preparation of the study requested in paragraph 2 of General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), annexed to Report of the Secretary-General on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, UN Doc. A/8052, 18 September 1970, Annex III, p. 120.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
In 1972, during a debate in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, the USSR stated that it “was in favour of the prohibition of means of warfare which were particularly cruel, because their use was incompatible with the norms of international law. One such means was napalm.” 
USSR, Statement before the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.1388, 9 December 1972, p. 469.
United Arab Emirates
In 1975, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, the representative of the United Arab Emirates stated that “he himself would be grateful if the Diplomatic Conference succeeded in prohibiting certain deadly weapons which were already condemned by world public opinion, such as napalm and other incendiary weapons”. 
United Arab Emirates, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.16, 12 March 1975, p. 158, § 20.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1976, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, the representative of the United Kingdom stated:
18. His country had at present no requirement for napalm, but that it possessed other weapons capable of causing death by burning … His delegation could not subscribe to [a] prohibition [of these weapons].
19. The United Kingdom, which was seriously concerned about the suffering caused by flame weapons, was participating actively in negotiations designed to ascertain ways in which the international community might reduce such suffering… .
21. … Incendiary weapons could be both effective and discriminating …
22. The issue at stake was the right of States to use incendiary weapons when they felt their security threatened. It was not easy to deny them that right; but at the same time there was good reason to believe that the great majority of delegations at the current Conference would be happy to see some limitation on the use of such weapons … The Netherlands proposal [submitted as an annex to a working paper on incendiary weapons, see supra] provided an excellent basis for negotiation, and it was greatly to be hoped that the Committee would reach agreement along these lines. 
United Kingdom, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.28, 20 May 1976, p. 287, §§ 18–22.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2008, in response to a question in the House of Commons, the UK Secretary of State for Defence wrote:
In Afghanistan, white phosphorus munitions are routinely used to protect troops on operations by producing a smoke screen to provide cover. Records show white phosphorus munitions were last used for the same purpose in Iraq in 2005.
In accordance with the UN third convention on conventional weapons [i.e. Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons], UK training in the use of white phosphorus emphasises that it should be used solely for its intended purpose. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence, Hansard, 23 February 2009, Vol. 488, Written Statements, col. 18W.
United States of America
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1978, the United States felt that an “early agreement” on the use of incendiary weapons was unlikely and that “continued insistence on the total prohibition of such weapons, or prohibition of their use against people, would preclude the possibility of agreement” as “a compromise could be reached only if consideration was given both to humanitarian concerns and to military requirements and if the effects of alternative weapons were taken into account”. 
United States, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./I/SR.5, 1 September 1978, p. 3, § 7.
Zaire
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Zaire stated that development, production and use of incendiary weapons should be banned. 
Zaire, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.28, 9 November 1977, p. 4.
Zimbabwe
According to the Report on the Practice of Zimbabwe, it is not the military practice of Zimbabwe to use incendiary weapons. 
Report on the Practice of Zimbabwe, 1998, Chapter 3.5.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1972 on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, the UN General Assembly condemned “the ruthless use of napalm and chemical substances in Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde and Mozambique”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2918 (XXVII), 14 November 1972, preamble, voting record: 98-6-8-20.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1972 on general and complete disarmament, the UN General Assembly:
Conscious that incendiary weapons have always constituted a category of arms viewed with horror and that the International Conference on Human Rights, held at Teheran in 1968, in its resolution XXIII on human rights in armed conflicts considered napalm bombing to be among the methods and means that erode human rights,
Noting that complete proposals for both elimination and non-use of incendiary weapons were advanced at the disarmament negotiations in 1933 and that proposals have recently been made to prohibit or restrict their use,
Noting that the report of the Secretary-General entitled Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use concludes that the massive spread of fire through incendiary weapons is largely indiscriminate in its effects on military and civilian targets,
Noting further the conclusion that burn injuries, whether sustained directly from the action of incendiaries or as a result of fires initiated by them, are intensely painful and require exceptional resources for their medical treatment that are by far beyond the reach of most countries,
Noting finally the conclusion that the rapid increase in the military use of these weapons is but one aspect of the more general phenomenon of the increasing mobilization of science and technology for purposes of total war, alongside which the long-upheld principle of the immunity of the non-combatant appears to be receding from the military consciousness, and that these trends have grave implications for the world community,
1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General entitled Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use and expresses appreciation to him for having submitted it without delay;
2. Takes note of the views expressed in the report regarding the use, production, development and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons;
3. Deplores the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons in all armed conflicts. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2932 A (XXVII), 29 November 1972, preamble and §§ 1-3, voting record: 99-0-15-18.
The resolution’s paragraph deploring the use of incendiary weapons in “all armed conflicts” was part of an amendment sponsored by Jordan, Kenya, the Syrian Arab Republic and Uganda. 
Jordan, Kenya, Syrian Arab Republic and Uganda, Proposal submitted to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1894, 16 November 1972, p. 5.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted following the 1972 Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, the UN General Assembly expressed its concern that no agreement had been reached concerning, inter alia, weapons that cause unnecessary suffering. It reiterated its call upon “all parties to armed conflicts to observe the international humanitarian rules which are applicable, in particular the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3032 (XXVII), 14 December 1972, § 2, voting record: 103-0-25-4.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1972, the UN General Assembly deplored “the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons in all armed conflicts”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2932 A (XXVII), 29 November 1972, § 3, voting record: 99-0-15-18.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1973 on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, the UN General Assembly:
Considering that the efficacy of these general principles [of international law prohibiting the use of weapons which are likely to cause unnecessary suffering and means and methods of warfare which have indiscriminate effects] could be further enhanced if rules were elaborated and generally accepted prohibiting or restricting the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as other specific conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects,
1. Invites the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts to consider … the question of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as other specific conventional weapons which may be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or to have indiscriminate effects, and to seek agreement on rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3076 (XXVIII), 6 December 1973, preamble and § 1, voting record: 103-0-18-14.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1973 on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, the UN General Assembly:
Condemns in the strongest possible terms the persistent refusal of the Government of Portugal to comply with the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and, in particular, the intensified armed repression by Portugal of the peoples of the Territories under its domination, including … the ruthless use of napalm and chemical substances. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3113 (XXVIII), 12 December 1973, § 3, voting record: 105-8-16-6.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1974 on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, the UN General Assembly:
Invites the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts to continue … its search for agreement on possible rules prohibiting or restricting the use of [incendiary] weapons. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3255 A (XXIX), 9 December 1974, § 3, voting record: 108-0-13-17.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1974 on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, the UN General Assembly:
1. Condemns the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons in armed conflicts in circumstances where it may affect human beings or may cause damage to the environment and/or natural resources;
2. Urges all States to refrain from the production, stockpiling, proliferation, and use of such weapons pending the conclusion of agreements on the prohibition of these weapons. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3255 B (XXIX), 9 December 1974, §§ 1 and 2, voting record: 98-0-27-13.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1976 on incendiary and other specific conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons, the UN General Assembly:
Convinced that the work of the fourth session of the Diplomatic Conference [on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts] should be inspired by a sense of urgency and the wish to attain concrete results which was stressed in the appeal by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, concerning particularly the prohibition of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons,
2. Invites the Diplomatic Conference to accelerate its consideration of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, and to do its utmost to agree for humanitarian reasons on possible rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 31/64, 10 December 1976, preamble and § 2, adopted without a vote;
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1977 on incendiary and other specific conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons, the UN General Assembly:
Decides to convene in 1979 a United Nations conference with a view to reaching agreements on prohibitions or restrictions of the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, taking into account humanitarian and military considerations. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 32/152, 19 December 1977, § 2, voting record: 115-0-21-13.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1980 on the UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly welcomed the successful conclusion of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocols and commended the Convention and the three annexed Protocols to all States “with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 35/153, 12 December 1980, § 4, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1981 on the UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the successful conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which resulted in a Convention and three Protocols, adopted by the Conference on 10 October 1980,
1. Urges those States which have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to sign and ratify the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible so as to obtain its entry into force, and ultimately its universal adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 36/93, 9 December 1981, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1982 on the UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
1. Urges those States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols annexed thereto, as early as possible, so as to obtain their entry into force and, ultimately, their universal adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 37/79, 9 December 1982, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1983 on the UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States which have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto, as early as possible, so as to obtain ultimately universal adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 38/66, 15 December 1983, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1984 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 39/56, 12 December 1984, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1985 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 40/84, 12 December 1985, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1986 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 41/50, 3 December 1986, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1987 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 42/30, 30 November 1987, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1988 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 43/67, 7 December 1988, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1990 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 45/64, 4 December 1990, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1991 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 46/40, 6 December 1991, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1992 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, as well as successor States to take appropriate action so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 47/56, 9 December 1992, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1993 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately access to this instrument will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 48/79, 16 December 1993, § 3, voting record:169-0-3-19.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1994 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately access to this instrument will be universal.  
UN General Assembly, Res. 49/79, 15 December 1994, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and its Protocols and upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately access to these instruments will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 50/74, 12 December 1995, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and its Protocols, and upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 51/49, 10 December 1996, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1997 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols thereto, and in particular to amended Protocol II, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument at an early date, and calls upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 52/42, 9 December 1997, § 2, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1998 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols thereto, and particularly to amended Protocol II, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument at an early date, and calls upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 53/81, 4 December 1998, § 5, adopted without a vote
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1999 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols thereto, and in particular to the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument at an early date, and calls upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 54/58, 1 December 1999, § III(3), adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly recalled with satisfaction “the decision by the Second Review Conference, on 21 December 2001, to extend the scope of the Convention and the Protocols thereto to include armed conflicts of a non- international character”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 58/69, 8 December 2003, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
1. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols thereto, as amended, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments at an early date, and so as to ultimately achieve their universality;
2. Calls upon all States parties to the Convention that have not yet done so to express their consent to be bound by the Protocols to the Convention and the amendment extending the scope of the Convention and the Protocols thereto to include armed conflicts of a non-international character. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/107, 3 December 2004, §§ 1–2, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
1. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects1 and the Protocols thereto, as amended, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments at an early date, and so as to ultimately achieve their universality;
2. Calls upon all States parties to the Convention that have not yet done so to express their consent to be bound by the Protocols to the Convention and the amendment extending the scope of the Convention and the Protocols thereto to include armed conflicts of a non-international character. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/93, 8 December 2005, §§ 1–2, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling with satisfaction the adoption and the entry into force of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and its amended article 1, and the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and its amended version, the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III) and the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV),
1. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols thereto, as amended, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments at an early date, and so as to ultimately achieve their universality;
2. Calls upon all States parties to the Convention that have not yet done so to express their consent to be bound by the Protocols to the Convention and the amendment extending the scope of the Convention and the Protocols thereto to include armed conflicts of a non-international character. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/100, 6 December 2006, preamble and §§ 1–2, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling with satisfaction the adoption and the entry into force of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and its amended article 1, and the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and its amended version, the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), and the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V),
1. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols thereto, as amended, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments at an early date, and so as to ultimately achieve their universality;
2. Calls upon all States parties to the Convention that have not yet done so to express their consent to be bound by the Protocols to the Convention and the amendment extending the scope of the Convention and the Protocols thereto to include armed conflicts of a non-international character. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/57, 5 December 2007, preamble and §§ 1–2, adopted without a vote.
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1996, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights listed napalm as “a weapon of mass destruction or with indiscriminate effects”. It also stated that “the use of napalm is incompatible with human rights and humanitarian law”. 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1996/16, 29 August 1996, § 1 and preamble.
UN Secretary-General
In 1969, in his report on respect for human rights in armed conflict, the UN Secretary-General stated that there was no consensus on the legal status of incendiary weapons. Some experts stated that napalm could be used discriminately and that this use must be controlled. 
UN Secretary-General, Report on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, UN Doc. A/7720, 20 November 1969, p. 62.
UN Secretary-General
In 1973, in his report on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, the UN Secretary-General noted that Article 22 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV), “the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited”, and Article 23(e) prohibiting means of warfare which caused unnecessary suffering were applicable to incendiary weapons. These principles were deemed to be of a customary nature. The report concluded by bringing “to the attention of the General Assembly the necessity of working out measures for the prohibition of the use, production, development and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons”.  
UN Secretary-General, Report on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/8803/Rev.1, April 1973, p. 56.
UN Secretariat
The UN Secretariat’s survey on respect for human rights in armed conflicts in 1973 analysed practice and doctrine on incendiary weapons. A majority of the sources supported the view that there were restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons. 
UN Secretariat, Respect for human rights in armed conflicts, Existing rules of international law concerning the prohibition or restriction of use of specific weapons, UN Doc. A/9215, 7 November 1973, p. 120.
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (Rapporteur)
In 1985, in a report on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, the Rapporteur of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly stated: “According to several concordant accounts, … chemical substances and incendiary bombs producing gases of various colours have been discharged.” In this respect, he added that the report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights deserved mention. 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Rapporteur, Report on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, Doc. 5495, 15 November 1985, pp. 7–8, § 16(e).
In that report, the UN Special Rapporteur had recommended that “the parties to the conflict, namely government and opposition forces, should be reminded that it is their duty to apply fully the rules of international humanitarian law without discrimination”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, Report, Recommendations, reprinted in Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. 5495, Appendix 1, 15 November 1985, p. 11, § 190.
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1996, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly invited,
in particular, the governments of the member states of the Council of Europe, of the states whose parliaments enjoy or have applied for special guest status with the Assembly, of the states whose parliaments enjoy observer status, namely Israel, and of all other states to:
b. ratify, if they have not done so, … the United Nations Convention of 1980 on the prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons and its protocols …
j. promote extension of the aforesaid United Nations Convention of 1980 to non-international armed conflicts, and inclusion in its provisions of effective procedures for verification and regular inspection. 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Res. 1085, 24 April 1996, § 8(b) and (j).
OAU Council of Ministers
In a resolution adopted in 1994 on respect for IHL and support for humanitarian action in armed conflicts, the OAU Council of Ministers invited “all States that have not yet become party to the … [1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons], to consider, or reconsider, without delay the possibility of doing so in the near future”. 
OAU, Council of Ministers, Res. 1526 (LX), 6–11 June 1994, § 6.
Organization of American States
In two resolutions adopted in 1994 and 1996 on respect for IHL, the OAS General Assembly urged member States to accede to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
OAS, General Assembly, Res. 1270 (XXIV-O/94), 10 June 1994, § 1; Res. 1408 (XXVI-O/96), 7 June 1996, § 1.
Organization of the Islamic Conference
In 1994, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) denounced the use of napalm by Serb forces during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, Declaration of the Enlarged Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group of the OIC and OIC States Contributing Troops to UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Geneva, 6 December 1994, § 6.
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
A draft provision prohibiting the use of incendiary weapons was proposed to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH by Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, Colombia, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Norway, the Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It stated:
Incendiary weapons shall be prohibited for use.
A. This prohibition shall apply to:
the use of any munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame and/or heat produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target. Such munitions include flame-throwers, incendiary shells, rockets, grenades, mines and bombs.
B. This prohibition shall not apply to:
1. Munitions which may have secondary or incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants, tracers, smoke, or signalling systems;
2. Incendiary munitions which are designed and used specifically for defence against aircraft or armoured vehicles. 
CDDH, Proposal submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons by Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, Colombia, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Norway, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/20 at CDDH/IV/226, p. 556.
A slightly revised proposal was later presented to the Committee by Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Norway, Romania, the Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Zaire. This proposal changed the second exception (B2) to “munitions which combine incendiary effects with penetration or fragmentation effects and which are specifically designed for use against aircraft, armoured vehicles and similar targets”. 
CDDH, Proposal submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons by Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Norway, Romania, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Zaire, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/Inf.220 at CDDH/IV/226, pp. 560–561.
No data.
No data.
Jane’s Infantry Weapons
Jane’s Infantry Weapons reported that the DNG incendiary smoke hand grenade, which contains “a charge of stabilised red phosphorus composition which gives both incendiary and smoke-producing effects”, is being produced in Austria. 
Terry J. Gander (ed.), Jane’s Infantry Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Twenty-fourth edition, 1998–1999, pp. 506.
Jane’s Ammunition Handbook
Jane’s Ammunition Handbook reported that the 81 mm smoke/incendiary bomb RPI Mk 3, which is filled in order to “provide a greater fire raising capability while still producing a useful amount of screening smoke”, is being manufactured in Austria. 
Terry J. Gander and Charles Q. Cutshaw (eds.), Jane’s Ammunition Handbook, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Seventh edition, 1998–1999, p. 414.
Jane’s Infantry Weapons
Jane’s Infantry Weapons reported that Brazil’s arsenal contains the Hydroar LC T1 M1 flame-thrower. 
Terry J. Gander (ed.), Jane’s Infantry Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Twenty-fourth edition, 1998–1999, p. 231.
Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons
According to Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, AV-BI bombs are being manufactured in Brazil and included in its arsenal. 
Duncan Lennox (ed.), Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Issue 33, August 1999.
Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons
According to Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Chile produces and possesses napalm bombs. 
Duncan Lennox (ed.), Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Issue 27, June 1997.
Jane’s Infantry Weapons
According to Jane’s Infantry Weapons, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stockpiles the NORINCO portable flame-thrower, which is also offered for export sale. 
Terry J. Gander (ed.), Jane’s Infantry Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Twenty-fourth edition, 1998–1999, p. 232.
Jane’s Ammunition Handbook
Jane’s Ammunition Handbook also reports that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stockpiles the 82 mm incendiary bomb Type 53 for 82 mm mortars which “is filled with an unidentified incendiary agent (probably red phosphorus) in the form of pellets”. 
Terry J. Gander and Charles Q. Cutshaw (eds.), Jane’s Ammunition Handbook, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Seventh edition, 1998–1999, p. 440.
Jane’s Infantry Weapons
According to Jane’s Infantry Weapons, “various European countries” stockpile the Haley and Weller E108 incendiary grenade. The grenade “was developed for use as a sabotage and a destruction weapon … It burns at a temperature in excess of 2,700° C and will melt through 2mm of steel.” 
Terry J. Gander (ed.), Jane’s Infantry Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Twenty-fourth edition, 1998–1999, p. 539.
Jane’s Infantry Weapons
According to Jane’s Infantry Weapons, “the former Warsaw-pact nations and others” use the RPO-A Schmel Rocket Infantry flame-thrower and the LPO-50 flame-thrower. 
Terry J. Gander (ed.), Jane’s Infantry Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Twenty-fourth edition, 1998–1999, p. 247.
Jane’s Infantry Weapons
Jane’s Infantry Weapons reported that the DM 24 incendiary smoke hand grenade is being produced in Germany. The grenade is an “incendiary mass”, which “burns for about five minutes at a temperature of approximately 1, 200°C. This heat ignites any combustible material the burning mass touches.” 
Terry J. Gander (ed.), Jane’s Infantry Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Twenty-fourth edition, 1998–1999, p. 520.
Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons
According to Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, the Russian Federation produces and possesses ZB-500GD and ZB-500ShM, which are “napalm type fire bombs”. 
Duncan Lennox (ed.), Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Issue 33, August 1999.
Jane’s Infantry Weapons
Jane’s Infantry Weapons reported that the arsenal of South Africa’s National Defence Force contains a red phosphorus hand grenade and the M1A1 60 mm red phosphorus bomb. The effect of the grenade is to
spread the burning red phosphorous granules over the immediate area. The grenade can be used in a defensive role where screening smoke is required and as an offensive weapon when the acrid smoke and incendiary effect can be used for bunker or room clearance. The burning granules will also ignite various materials. 
Terry J. Gander (ed.), Jane’s Infantry Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Twenty-fourth edition, 1998–1999, pp. 534 and 619.
Jane’s Infantry Weapons
Jane’s Infantry Weapons reported that the EXPAL incendiary hand grenade is being produced in Spain. There are three versions of this grenade: the GWP, which “is filled with white phosphorous and therefore has applications as a smoke-producer, an antipersonnel weapon or as an incendiary grenade”; the GRP, which “has a primary role as a smoke-producer but will also act as an incendiary device with easily ignited substances”; and the CTE grenade, which “is filled with thermite and is therefore purely an incendiary device which will ignite anything capable of being burned”. 
Terry J. Gander (ed.), Jane’s Infantry Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Twenty-fourth edition, 1998–1999, p. 535.
Furthermore, according to Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Spain produces and possesses BIN incendiary bombs. 
Duncan Lennox (ed.), Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Issue 28, November 1997.
Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons
According to Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Spain produces and possesses BIN incendiary bombs. 
Duncan Lennox (ed.), Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Issue 28, November 1997.
Jane’s Infantry Weapons
Jane’s Infantry Weapons reported that the arsenal of the Taiwan Army and Marine Corps contains the Type 67 flame-thrower. 
Terry J. Gander (ed.), Jane’s Infantry Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Twenty-fourth edition, 1998–1999, p. 254.
Jane’s Infantry Weapons
Jane’s Infantry Weapons reported that the arsenal of the US army contains the AN-M14 TH3 incendiary hand grenade. The grenade is used
primarily to provide a source of intense heat to destroy equipment. It generates heat to 2,200°C. The grenade filler will burn from 30 to 45 seconds … The grenade is normally hand thrown, although it may be rifle-launched using a special M2 series projection adapter. 
Terry J. Gander (ed.), Jane’s Infantry Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Twenty-fourth edition, 1998–1999, p. 543.
Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons
According to Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, the United States of America produces and possesses M 116 napalm bombs. 
Duncan Lennox (ed.), Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Issue 31, November 1998.
Jeune Afrique Economie
Jeune Afrique Economie reported in 1996 that Portugal allegedly used napalm in the conflict in Angola. 
“Savimbi, l’Unita et l’Angola”, Jeune Afrique Economie, hors série, April 1996, collection Marchés Nouveaux, p. 117.
No data.
ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War
Articles 6 and 8 of the 1938 ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War provide:
Art. 6. The use of … incendiary … weapons as against any State, whether or not a party to the present convention, and in any war, whatever its character, is prohibited.
The application of this rule shall be regulated by the following … articles.
Art. 8. The prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons shall apply to all projectiles specifically intended to cause fires except when used for defence against aircraft. The prohibition shall not apply:
I. to projectiles specially constructed to give light or to be luminous;
II. to pyrotechnics not normally likely to cause fires;
III. to projectiles of all kinds which, though capable of producing incendiary effects accidentally, are not normally likely to produce such effects;
IV. to incendiary projectiles designed specifically for defence against aircraft when used exclusively for that purpose;
V. to appliances, such as flame-projectors, used to attack individual combatants by fire. 
Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War, adopted by the International Law Association, Fortieth Conference, Amsterdam, 29 August–2 September 1938, Articles 6 and 8.
Australia
Australia’s Commanders’ Guide (1994) states, with reference to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons: “There are no prohibitions on the use of incendiary weapons against combatants.” 
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 935.
Belgium
Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) states: “The use of [incendiary] weapons against persons is prohibited because they cause unnecessary suffering, but their use against military objectives, such as bunkers, tanks, depots, etc. is permitted.” 
Belgium, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit de la Guerre, Ecole Royale Militaire, par J. Maes, Chargé de cours, Avocat-général près la Cour Militaire, D/1983/1187/029, 1983, p. 38.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) states: “The use of incendiary weapons against combatants is not prohibited unless such use results in superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 5-4, § 35.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter entitled “Restrictions on the use of weapons”: “The use of incendiary weapons against combatants is not prohibited unless such use results in superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 521.3.
Colombia
Colombia’s Basic Military Manual (1995) prohibits the use of weapons which
cause unnecessary and indiscriminate, widespread, long-term and severe damage to people and the environment. This includes, inter alia: … incendiary weapons, whose production, importation, possession and use are also prohibited by Article 81 of the National Constitution. 
Colombia, Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual Básico para las Personerías y las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 1995, pp. 49–50.
Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book IV (Instruction of heads of division and company commanders): “The use of incendiary weapons against combatants is not prohibited unless that use entails superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 55.
Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states: “Phosphorus is permitted for use, as long as its use is directed against combatants and not against civilians.” 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 50.
(emphasis in original)
The Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) is a second edition of the Manual on the Laws of War (1998).
New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states:
There are no provisions on the use of incendiaries against combatants in [the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons]. The use of incendiary weapons to cause unnecessary suffering is prohibited. A value judgement must be made in particular circumstances to determine whether or not the suffering caused is unnecessary. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, §§ 513(7) and 620(7).
The manual also recalls that:
The UN Conference which negotiated the [1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] was unable to agree on any requirement to protect combatants from the effects of incendiary weapons. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 510(f), footnote 49 and § 617(f), footnote 37.
Sweden
Sweden’s IHL Manual (1991) states:
[The 1980] Protocol III [to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] contains restrictions applying where incendiary weapons are used.
At the same time it must be noted that it has not been possible to reach agreement on a rule that would also afford combatants protection against these weapons.
There is a need to supplement the present Protocol III so that the agreement constitutes a complete prohibition of incendiary weapons. In this way, protection of civilians could be further enhanced, and this should be extended to cover combatants. For, in fact, the latter also experience injury from incendiary weapons as unnecessary suffering. 
Sweden, International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, with reference to the Swedish Total Defence System, Swedish Ministry of Defence, January 1991, Section 3.3.2, pp. 81–83.
[emphasis in original]
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK Military Manual (1958) states: “The use of flame throwers when directed against military targets is lawful. However, their use against personnel is contrary to the law of war in so far as it is calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.” 
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 110, footnote 1.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states:
6.12.1. Although [incendiary weapons] can cause severe injury to personnel, their use is lawful provided the military necessity for their use outweighs the injury and suffering which their use may cause.
6.12.6. Use of weapons such as napalm and flame-throwers against combatant personnel is not dealt with specifically in the Conventional Weapons Convention or any other treaty. Such uses are governed by the unnecessary suffering principle so that they should not be used directly against personnel but against armoured vehicles, bunkers and built-up emplacements, even though personnel inside may be burnt. The same applies to white phosphorous, which is designed to set fire to targets such as fuel and ammunition dumps or for use to create smoke, and which should not be used directly against personnel. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, §§ 6.12.1 and 6.12.6.
United States of America
The US Field Manual (1956) states:
The use of weapons which employ fire, such as tracer flame-throwers, napalm and other incendiary agents, against targets requiring their use is not a violation of international law. They should not, however, be employed in such a way as to cause unnecessary suffering to individuals. 
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 36.
United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) states:
Incendiary weapons, such as incendiary ammunition, flame throwers, napalm and other incendiary agents have widespread uses in armed conflict. Although evoking intense international concern, combined with attempts to ban their use, state practice indicates clearly they are regarded as lawful in situations requiring their use. Conventional incendiary weapons are normally employed against materiel targets and combatants in the vicinity of such targets, such as pill boxes, tanks, vehicles, fortifications, etc. Use in ground support of friendly troops in close contact with enemy troops is an important use. Such uses are justified by the military effectiveness of incendiary weapons demonstrated during World War I, Word War II, Korea, Vietnam and other conflicts. Controversy over incendiary weapons has evolved over the years partly as the result of concern about the medical difficulties in treating burn injuries, as well as arbitrary attempts to analogise incendiary weapons to prohibited means of chemical warfare … Additionally, incendiary weapons must not be used so as to cause unnecessary suffering. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 6-6(c).
Denmark
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (1973), as amended in 1978, provides:
Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 1973, as amended in 1978, § 25(1).
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (2005) provides:
Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 2005, § 36(2).
No data.
China
Upon signature of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, China stated:
The Protocol [to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons does not stipulate restrictions on the use of such weapons against combat personnel. 
China, Declaration made upon signature of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 14 September 1981, § 3.
Denmark
At the Preparatory Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1978, Denmark and Norway presented a proposal prohibiting, inter alia, making military personnel as such the object of attack by incendiary weapons except when “the personnel is engaged or about to engage in combat or being deployed for combat engagement” or “the personnel is under armoured protection, in field fortifications or under similar protection”. 
Denmark and Norway, Draft proposal on incendiary weapons submitted to the Preparatory Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./L.12, 13 September 1978.
Indonesia
At the Preparatory Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Indonesia submitted a draft proposal, which developed the proposal submitted during the CDDH. 
See Indonesia, Proposal concerning incendiary weapons submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/223 within CDDH/IV 226, 21 April 1977, p. 578.
Indonesia proposed a prohibition of the use of incendiaries, except against “military objects other than personnel” and “against combatants holding positions in field fortifications such as bunkers and pillboxes where the use of alternate weapons will inevitably render more casualties”. 
Indonesia, Draft proposal on incendiary weapons submitted to the Preparatory Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./L.13, 22 March 1979.
Italy
In 2005, in reply to a question concerning the use of chemical weapons in Iraq, the Italian Under-Secretary of State for Defence stated:
[T]he operational procedures regarding the employment of man-portable and detachment arms envisage the possibility to space out some tracer cartridges, which have on the bottom of the bullet the quantity of phosphorus needed to show a trace in order to verify the shots’ destination and to proceed to the adjustment of the selective fire, which is necessary to prevent the undesired effects of the fire. Such employment is absolutely consistent with international law provisions. 
Italy, Chamber of Deputies, Statement by the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, 1 December 2005, published in Italian Yearbook of International Law, vol. XV, 2005, pp. 381–382.
Jordan
With reference to a press conference by the King of Jordan in 1967, the Report on the Practice of Jordan states: “The Jordanian army was constantly bombarded with napalm bombs throughout the 1967 War. Jordan condemned officially the use by Israel of this horrible weapon.” 
Report on the Practice of Jordan, 1997, Chapter 3.5, referring to press conference by his Majesty the King of Jordan, 19 June 1967.
Norway
Norway submitted a “Draft Protocol Relative to the Prohibition of the Use of Incendiary Weapons” to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH which read, inter alia, as follows:
Article 1 – Field of application
The present Protocol shall apply in the situations referred to in articles 2 and 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of War Victims.
Article 3 – General prohibition
With the further limitations spelled out in the present Protocol and subject to the provisions of [the 1977 Additional Protocol I], incendiary weapons may only be used against objects that are military objectives in the sense of article 47, paragraph 2 of the said Protocol, including in close support of friendly forces.
The use of incendiary weapons against personnel is prohibited.
Nevertheless, the presence of combatants or civilians within or in the immediate vicinity of legitimate targets as described in this article does not render such targets immune from attacks with incendiary weapons.
Article 5 – Precaution in attack
Any use of incendiary weapons is subject to article 50 of [the 1977 Additional Protocol I].
In addition, it is prohibited to launch an attack with incendiary weapons except when:
(a) the location of the target is known and properly recognized, and
(b) all feasible precaution is taken to limit the incendiary effects to the specific military objectives and to avoid incidental injury or incidental loss of lives. 
Norway, Draft protocol relative to the prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/207 within CDDH/IV/226, pp. 567–569.
Norway
At the Preparatory Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1978, Denmark and Norway presented a proposal prohibiting, inter alia, making military personnel as such the object of attack by incendiary weapons except when “the personnel is engaged or about to engage in combat or being deployed for combat engagement” or “the personnel is under armoured protection, in field fortifications or under similar protection”. 
Denmark and Norway, Draft proposal on incendiary weapons submitted to the Preparatory Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./L.12, 13 September 1978.
Poland
At the Preparatory Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1979, during the general debate on the second proposal made by Australia and the Netherlands, Poland stated that it hoped that
the extensive debate on the total prohibition of the use of such weapons in inhabited areas would eventually lead to the elimination of at least the most drastic and indiscriminate weapons in that category, and might help to restrict the use of incendiaries against military personnel when they inflicted unnecessary suffering. 
Poland, Statement at the Preparatory Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF/II/ SR.28, 18 April 1979, p. 2, § 2.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2008, in response to a question in the House of Commons, the UK Secretary of State for Defence wrote regarding operations in Afghanistan: “In accordance with the UN third convention on conventional weapons [i.e. Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons], UK training in the use of white phosphorus emphasises that it should … not [be used] as an anti-personnel weapon.” 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence, Hansard, 23 February 2009, Vol. 488, Written Statements, col. 18W.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
In 1969, in the context of the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), the USSR stated:
For the purpose of crushing the resistance of the Arabs [in the territories occupied by Israel], the aggressors from Israel are continuing to use napalm, which is forbidden by international law.
The criminal, inhuman acts of the imperialist States are a shameful violation of international law, and also of the resolutions of the International Conferences of the Red Cross. 
USSR, Reply dated 30 December 1969 to the UN Secretary-General regarding the preparation of the study requested in paragraph 2 of General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), annexed to Report of the Secretary-General on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, UN Doc. A/8052, 18 September 1970, Annex III, p. 120.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1973, in response to Resolution 2932 A (XXVII) in which the UN General Assembly asked States to comment on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, the United Kingdom emphasized that incendiary weapons must not be used to create unnecessary suffering and recommended further study of this issue.  
United Kingdom, Reply sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207/rev.1 add.1, 11 October 1973.
United States of America
At the Preparatory Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1979, the United States explained that it could not accept a restriction on the use of incendiaries against combatants for two reasons. First, “troops in or near the targets attacked with incendiaries would inevitably be killed, and commanding officers would risk being charged with violating the antipersonnel restriction”. Second, “the establishment of any rule embodying a comprehensive set of exceptions would not change present practices and its effect would be purely cosmetic”. 
United States, Statement at the Preparatory Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF/II/ SR.28, 18 April 1979, pp. 2–3, §§ 5–6.
United States of America
Course material from the US Army War College, which is also used by the US Marine Corps, states: “a) Incendiaries are lawful when utilized for the purpose(s) for which they were designed. b) There is NO prohibition on the use of napalm or flame-throwers against enemy personnel.” 
United States, Marine Corps, Reference Material for Marine Corps Law of Warfare Course, Army War College Selected Readings, Advanced Course Law for the Joint Warfighter, Vol. II, Second edition, 1989, p. 256.
(emphasis in original)
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1974, the UN General Assembly condemned “the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons in armed conflicts in circumstances where it may affect human beings”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3255 (XXIX), 9 December 1974, § 1, voting record: 108-0-13-17.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1976 on incendiary and other specific conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons, the UN General Assembly:
Invites the Diplomatic Conference [on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts] to accelerate its consideration of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious … and to do its utmost to agree for humanitarian reasons on possible rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 31/64, 10 November 1976, § 2, adopted without a vote.
No data.
Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Towards the end of the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1979, Austria, Egypt, Ghana, Jamaica, Mexico, Romania, Sweden, Venezuela, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Zaire, which had earlier sponsored a proposal which called for a total ban, submitted a proposal which restricted the ban on the use of incendiary weapons to use against civilians and against “combatants except when they are in, or in the vicinity of, armoured vehicles, field fortifications or other similar objectives”. 
Draft protocol on incendiary weapons submitted to the Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons by Austria, Egypt, Ghana, Jamaica, Mexico, Romania, Sweden, Venezuela, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Zaire, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/ CW/L.1, 26 September 1979, pp. 1–2.
No data.
No data.
Human Rights Watch
In 1994, in a report on the arms trade and violations of IHL in Angola, Human Rights Watch stated that UN officials had accused the Angolan Government of systematically bombing UNITA-controlled areas with incendiary bombs in 1992. 
Human Rights Watch, Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections, New York, November 1994, p. 77.
Ofcansky and Berry
It has been reported that in the context of the conflict in Ethiopia, “the Ethiopian armed forces had used napalm and cluster bombs against separatists in Eritrea and Tigray”. 
Thomas P. Ofcansky and LaVerle Berry (eds.), Ethiopia: A Country Study, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., Fourth edition, 1993, p. 328.