Practice Relating to Rule 81. Restrictions on the Use of Landmines

Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Article 2(1) of the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons provides:
“Mine” means any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle, and “remotely delivered mine” means any mine so defined delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped from an aircraft. 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980, Article 2(1).
Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Article 3 of the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons provides:
1. This Article applies to: (a) mines …
2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this Article applies, either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians.
3. The indiscriminate use of weapons to which this Article applies is prohibited. Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons: (a) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective; or (b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
4. All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of weapons to which this Article applies. Feasible precautions are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations. 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980, Article 3.
Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Article 4 of the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons provides:
1. This Article applies to:
(a) mines other than remotely delivered mines;
2. It is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article applies in any city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians in which combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear to be imminent, unless either:
(a) they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective belonging to or under the control of an adverse party; or
(b) measures are taken to protect civilians from their effects, for example, the posting of warning signs, the posting of sentries, the issue of warnings or the provision of fences. 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980, Article 4.
Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Article 5 of the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons provides:
1. The use of remotely delivered mines is prohibited unless such mines are only used within an area which is itself a military objective or which contains military objectives, and unless:
(a) their location can be accurately recorded in accordance with Article 7(1)(a); or
(b) an effective neutralizing mechanism is used on each such mine, that is to say, a self-actuating mechanism which is designed to render a mine harmless or cause it to destroy itself when it is anticipated that the mine will no longer serve the military purpose for which it was placed in position, or a remotely-controlled mechanism which is designed to render harmless or destroy a mine when the mine no longer serves the military purpose for which it was placed in position.
2. Effective advance warning shall be given of any delivery or dropping of remotely delivered mines which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980, Article 5.
Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Article 1(2) of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons provides:
This Protocol shall apply, in addition to situations referred to in Article I of this Convention, to situations referred to in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts. 
Protocol on Prohibitions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 3 May 1996, Article 1(2).
Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Article 2 of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons provides:
1. “Mine” means a munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle.
2. “Remotely-delivered mine” means a mine not directly emplaced but delivered by artillery, missile, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. Mines delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 metres are not considered to be “remotely delivered”, provided that they are used in accordance with Article 5 and other relevant Articles of this Protocol.
3.“Anti-personnel mine” means a mine primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. 
Protocol on Prohibitions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 3 May 1996, Article 2.
Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Article 3 of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons provides:
7. It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this Article applies, either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians or civilian objects.
8. The indiscriminate use of weapons to which this Article applies is prohibited. Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons:
(a) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective. In case of doubt as to whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used; or
(b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
9. Several clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects are not to be treated as a single military objective.
10. All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of weapons to which this Article applies. Feasible precautions are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations. These circumstances include, but are not limited to:
(a) the short- and long-term effect of mines upon the local civilian population for the duration of the minefield;
(b) possible measures to protect civilians (for example, fencing, signs, warning and monitoring);
(c) the availability and feasibility of using alternatives; and
(d) the short- and long-term military requirements for a minefield.
11. Effective advance warning shall be given of any emplacement of mines, booby-traps and other devices which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. 
Protocol on Prohibitions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 3 May 1996, Article 3.
Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Article 5 of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons provides:
1. This Article applies to anti-personnel mines other than remotely-delivered mines.
2. It is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article applies which are not in compliance with the provisions on self-destruction and self-deactivation in the Technical Annex, unless:
(a) such weapons are placed within a perimeter-marked area which is monitored by military personnel and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area. The marking must be of a distinct and durable character and must at least be visible to a person who is about to enter the perimeter-marked area; and
(b) such weapons are cleared before the area is abandoned, unless the area is turned over to the forces of another State which accept responsibility for the maintenance of the protections required by this Article and the subsequent clearance of those weapons.
3. A party to a conflict is relieved from further compliance with the provisions of sub-paragraphs 2 (a) and 2 (b) of this Article only if such compliance is not feasible due to forcible loss of control of the area as a result of enemy military action, including situations where direct enemy military action makes it impossible to comply. If that party regains control of the area, it shall resume compliance with the provisions of sub-paragraphs 2 (a) and 2 (b) of this Article.
4.If the forces of a party to a conflict gain control of an area in which weapons to which this Article applies have been laid, such forces shall, to the maximum extent feasible, maintain and, if necessary, establish the protections required by this Article until such weapons have been cleared.
5.All feasible measures shall be taken to prevent the unauthorized removal, defacement, destruction or concealment of any device, system or material used to establish the perimeter of a perimeter-marked area.
6.Weapons to which this Article applies which propel fragments in a horizontal arc of less than 90 degrees and which are placed on or above the ground may be used without the measures provided for in sub-paragraph 2 (a) of this Article for a maximum period of 72 hours, if:
(a) they are located in immediate proximity to the military unit that emplaced them; and
(b) the area is monitored by military personnel to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. 
Protocol on Prohibitions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 3 May 1996, Article 5.
Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Article 6 of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons provides:
1. It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered mines unless they are recorded in accordance with sub-paragraph I (b) of the Technical Annex.
2. It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines which are not in compliance with the provisions on self-destruction and self-deactivation in the Technical Annex.
3. It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered mines other than anti-personnel mines, unless, to the extent feasible, they are equipped with an effective self-destruction or self-neutralization mechanism and have a back-up self-deactivation feature, which is designed so that the mine will no longer function as a mine when the mine no longer serves the military purpose for which it was placed in position.
4.Effective advance warning shall be given of any delivery or dropping of remotely-delivered mines which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. 
Protocol on Prohibitions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 3 May 1996, Article 6.
Amendment to Article 1 of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
In 2001, States parties to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons decided to amend Article 1 of the Convention, governing its scope. This amendment, not yet in force, states:
1. This Convention and its annexed Protocols shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, including any situation described in paragraph 4 of Article I of Additional Protocol I to these Conventions.
2. This Convention and its annexed Protocols shall also apply, in addition to situations referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, to situations referred to in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. This Convention and its annexed Protocols shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.
3. In case of armed conflicts not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply the prohibitions and restrictions of this Convention and its annexed Protocols. 
Amendment to Article 1 of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), Geneva, 21 December 2001.
Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Paragraph 6 of the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requires that hostilities be conducted in accordance with the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of International Humanitarian Law between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Geneva, 27 November 1991, § 6.
Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Paragraph 2.5 of the 1992 Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina requires that hostilities be conducted in accordance with the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
Agreement between Representatives of Mr. Alija Izetbegović (President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and President of the Party of Democratic Action), Representatives of Mr. Radovan Karadžić (President of the Serbian Democratic Party), and Representative of Mr. Miljenko Brkić (President of the Croatian Democratic Community), Geneva, 22 May 1992, § 2.5.
Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1989) reproduces the content of Articles 2(1) and (4), 3, 4 and 5 of the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
Argentina, Leyes de Guerra, PC-08-01, Público, Edición 1989, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, aprobado por Resolución No. 489/89 del Ministerio de Defensa, 23 April 1990, §§ 4.17–4.22.
Australia
Australia’s Commanders’ Guide (1994) lists mines under the heading “Limitations on lawful weapons” and states: “The primary concern with the employment of mines and booby traps is that they could be disturbed by innocent parties.” It states, however, that the use of mines is permitted “if they can be confined to areas where only lawful combatants would encounter them”. 
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 316.
The Guide refers to the restrictions on the use of mines contained in Article 3(3) and (4) and Article 4 of the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The Guide also states:
Mines … may not be directed against civilians under any circumstances and they may not be used indiscriminately. Indiscriminate use is placement of such weapons which:
a. is not on, or directed at, a military objective; or
b. employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
c. may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 937.
The Guide further provides:
Remotely delivered mines may only be used within an area which is a military objective or which contains military objectives. Either the location of minefields containing remotely delivered mines must be accurately recorded or the mines themselves must be equipped with an effective neutralising mechanism which destroys or renders them harmless after a period of time. If circumstances permit, the civilian population should be warned in advance of the delivery of remotely delivered mines which may affect them. 
Australia, Commanders’ Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 940.
Australia
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) provides:
All feasible precautions must be taken to protect civilians from the effects of land mines … and similar devices. They must not be directed at civilians nor may they be used indiscriminately. It is indiscriminate to place them so that they are not on or not directed at a military objective, to use a means of delivery which cannot be directed at a military target, or to place them so that they may be expected to cause excessive collateral damage, that is, injury, loss or damage to civilians which is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 421.
The manual adds:
Land mines (other than remotely delivered mines) … must not be used in areas containing civilian concentrations if combat between ground forces is neither imminent nor actually taking place unless they are placed on, or in the vicinity, of an enemy military objective or there are protective measures for civilians such as warning signs, sentries, fences or other warnings to civilians. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 422.
With respect to remotely delivered landmines, the manual states that they “can be used within the area of a military objective if their location can be accurately recorded and they can be neutralised when they no longer serve the military purpose of which they were placed in position”. It further states: “If circumstances permit, effective advance warning should be given where remotely delivered mines are likely to affect civilians.” 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 425.
Australia
Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states:
Anti-Vehicle landmines
4.25 The use of anti-vehicle landmines is permitted so long as:
• they are not designed to be detonated by mine detectors;
• any anti-handling device is deactivated when the mine deactivates;
• they are either cleared, removed, destroyed, or appropriately maintained after cessation of active hostilities.
4.26 Restrictions on use. The following rules apply to anti-vehicle mines:
• they may only be deployed against or to protect military objectives,
• they may not be directed against civilians,
• indiscriminate use is prohibited,
• feasible precautions must be taken to protect civilians from their effects,
• effective advance warning must be given of any deployment of mines that might affect the civilian population unless circumstances do not permit, and
• mines must not be of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
4.27 Civilian protection factors. In considering the protection of the civilian population, regard should be had to the following factors, though these are not exclusive:
• the short and long-term effect of mines on the local civilian population;
• possible measures to protect civilians (for example fencing, signs, warning and monitoring);
• the availability and feasibility of using alternatives to mines; and
• the short and long-term military requirements for a minefield.
Landmines, booby traps and other devices
4.36 In addition to the specific prohibition on the use of anti-personnel mines, all feasible precautions must be taken to protect civilians from the effects of mines, booby traps and similar devices. They must not be directed at civilians nor may they be used indiscriminately. It is indiscriminate to place them so that they are not on or not directed at a military objective, to use a means of delivery which cannot be directed at a military target, or to place them so that they may be expected to cause excessive collateral damage, that is injury, loss or damage to civilians which is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Landmines
4.39 Landmines other than anti-personnel mines, are defined as any munition on, under or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle and includes remotely delivered mines, that is, mines delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or aircraft. Time delayed weapons are not landmines.
Other devices
4.44 “Other devices.” are manually emplaced munitions and devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which are activated either remotely or by time delay. Restrictions on the use of these other devices are as for landmines and booby traps. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, §§ 4.25–4.27, 4.36, 4.39 and 4.44.
The LOAC Manual (2006) replaces both the Defence Force Manual (1994) and the Commanders’ Guide (1994).
Belgium
Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) states, with reference to Article 3 of the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, that mines can only be used against military objectives. It also states, with reference to Article 5 of the Convention, that remotely delivered minefields are only permitted if the location of the mines is mapped and if the mines are fitted with self-neutralizing devices. The manual adds that the civilian population must be warned in advance of the emplacement of remotely delivered mines unless circumstances do not permit. 
Belgium, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit de la Guerre, Ecole Royale Militaire, par J. Maes, Chargé de cours, Avocat-général près la Cour Militaire, D/1983/1187/029, 1983, p. 38.
Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (1992) states that the restrictions contained in the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons must be scrupulously applied in order to avoid civilian casualties. The manual provides, therefore, that the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices must follow the rules on the prohibition of indiscriminate use and on the taking of all feasible precautions to protect civilians as provided for in Article 3 of the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, p. 123, § 441.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999), under the heading “Use of authorized land mines”, states:
All feasible precautions must be taken to protect civilians from the effects of land mines … They must not be directed at civilians nor may they be used indiscriminately. It is indiscriminate to:
(a) place mines … so that they are not on or not directed at a legitimate target;
(b) use a means of delivery for mines … that cannot be directed at a legitimate target; and
(c) place mines … so that they may be expected to cause collateral civilian damage that is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 5-5, § 44.
With respect to remotely delivered mines, the manual provides that they
can only be used within the area of a military objective if their location can be accurately recorded, and they can be neutralized when they no longer serve the military purpose for which they were placed in position. Each mine must have: (a) an effective self neutralizing or destroying mechanism; or (b) a remotely controlled mechanism designed to render the mine harmless or destroy it. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 5-5, § 50.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001), in its chapter entitled “Restrictions on the use of weapons”, states with respect to the use of authorized landmines:
All feasible precautions must be taken to protect civilians from the effects of land mines … They must not be directed at civilians nor may they be used indiscriminately. It is indiscriminate to:
a. place mines … so that they are not on or not directed at a legitimate target;
b. use a means of delivery for mines … that cannot be directed at a legitimate target; and
c. place mines … so that they may be expected to cause collateral civilian damage that is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 523.4.
With respect to the use of remotely-delivered mines, the manual states:
1. A “remotely-delivered mine” is a mine not directly emplaced but delivered by artillery, missile, rocket, mortar or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. Mines delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 metres are not considered to be “remotely delivered”.
2. Remotely-delivered land mines can only be used within the area of a military objective if their location can be accurately recorded, and they can be neutralized when they no longer serve the military purpose for which they were placed in position. Each mine must have:
a. an effective self neutralizing or destroying mechanism; or
b. a remotely controlled mechanism designed to render the mine harmless or destroy it.
3. If circumstances permit, effective advance warning should be given where remotely-delivered mines are likely to affect civilians. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 524.
Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book IV (Instruction of heads of division and company commanders):
II.2.3. Remotely-delivered mines
A “remotely-delivered mine” is a mine not directly emplaced but delivered by artillery, missile, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. Mines delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 metres are not considered to be “remotely delivered”.
Remotely-delivered landmines can only be used in the area of a military objective, if their location can be precisely recorded and if they can be neutralized if they are no longer necessary for serving the military purpose for which they were placed in position.
Every mine must have:
- an effective automatic destruction or neutralization mechanism;
- a remotely-controlled mechanism designed to render harmless or destroy the mine.
If circumstances permit, effective advance warning should be given if remotely-delivered mines are likely to affect civilians. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, pp. 56–57.
France
France’s LOAC Teaching Note (2000) states:
The use of mines except from anti-personnel mines is allowed on the condition that the exact location of mine fields is recorded. All feasible precautions must be taken to protect civilians from the effects of these mines. 
France, Fiche didactique relative au droit des conflits armés, Directive of the Ministry of Defence, 4 January 2000, annexed to the Directive No. 147 of the Ministry of Defence of 4 January 2000, p. 7.
France
According to France’s LOAC Manual (2001), employing landmines (except anti-personnel mines) is allowed on condition that all feasible precautions are taken to protect civilians from the effects of these mines. At the end of hostilities, the mine fields have to be indicated and as far as possible neutralized. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, pp. 55 and 82.
Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) states that the “use of mines and other devices on land is, in principle, permissible”. It adds:
It is prohibited to direct the above mentioned munitions – neither by way of reprisals – against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians. Any indiscriminate use of these weapons is prohibited. All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians also from unintended effects of these munitions. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten KonfliktenHandbuch, August 1992, §§ 409–411.
The manual further provides:
Mines and other devices shall not be used in any built-up area or other area predominantly inhabited by civilians in which combat between ground forces is neither taking place nor imminent. Exceptions are permissible if: these munitions are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective; or measures are taken to protect civilians from their effects, for example, the posting of warning signs, the posting of sentries, the provision of fences or the issue of warnings. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten KonfliktenHandbuch, August 1992, p. 38.
With respect to the use of remotely delivered mines, the manual provides:
This kind of weapon is prohibited unless such mines are only used within an area which is itself a military objective or which contains military objectives … If a mine does no longer serve its military purpose, a self-actuating mechanism shall ensure its destruction or neutralization within a reasonable lapse of time.
The manual also states: “Effective advance warning shall be given of any delivery or dropping of remotely delivered mines which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.” 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten KonfliktenHandbuch, August 1992, §§ 413–414.
Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Laws of War (1998) states:
The mining of areas for protection against invasion of a country’s territory is permitted. The problem arises when mines are used as aggressive weapons and concealed within enemy territory (where the concealing party has no control over the movement of people). Such mines are liable to lie in the path of innocent civilians and injure them rather than combatants. In other words, the prohibition is not on the weapon itself but on the manner of its employment. Likewise, it is forbidden to use mines flung from a plane or fired in shells. 
Israel, Laws of War in the Battlefield, Manual, Military Advocate General Headquarters, Military School, 1998, p. 14.
Kenya
Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997) states that mines, other than remotely delivered, may be used in populated areas “when they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective belonging to or under the control of the enemy; or when measures are taken to protect civilian persons (e.g. warning signs, sentries, issue of warnings, provision of fences)”. According to the manual, remotely delivered mines may be used
a) only within an area being itself a military objective, or containing military objectives, and
b) when their location can be accurately recorded, or an effective neutralising mechanism is issued on each mine;
c) subject to effective advanced warning to the civilian population when the tactical situation permits. 
Kenya, Law of Armed Conflict, Military Basic Course (ORS), 4 Précis, The School of Military Police, 1997, Précis No. 3, pp. 3–4.
Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands reproduces Articles 4 and 5 of the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, pp. IV-6/IV-10.
Netherlands
The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states:
0429. The weapons concerned here are those named in Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The protocol contains rules relating to mines, etc., which are always forbidden, and rules relating to mines, etc., which are not forbidden in themselves but which, in order to protect the civilian population, can only be used under certain conditions, or when fitted with certain technical devices.
0445. Restrictions on permitted mines, booby-traps and other devices
In establishing the conditions, it was decided that the use of mines, booby-traps, etc. constituted an attack under the law of war (see point 0507). For the use of permitted mines, booby-traps, etc., a distinction is made between “remotely delivered mines” and “non-remotely delivered mines” (the latter being laid by hand or with a mine layer). Remotely delivered mines are laid by being fired from artillery, rockets and mortars and by dropping from aircraft.
0446. The protection of the civilian population is central to the rules for the use of permitted mines, etc. It is prohibited, in all circumstances, to direct mines, booby-traps and other devices against the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian targets, either offensively or defensively or by way of reprisals.
0447. It is forbidden to use mines, booby-traps and other devices indiscriminately. In general this means devices that make no distinction between combatants and civilians, or between military targets and civilian objects. Indiscriminate use, in any case, is any placement of such weapons:
- which is not directed against a military target;
- which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
- which may be expected to cause excessive collateral damage.
Effective warning should be given before any delivery of mines, booby-traps and other mechanisms which might affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit this. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, §§ 0429 and 0445–0447.
In its chapter on peace operations, the manual states: “As for the use of resources, the rules of the humanitarian law of war also apply … the use of mines is tied to strict rules”. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 1217.
New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states: “Protocol II to the [Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] … restricts the use of mines … It also contains specific provisions on the use of remotely delivered mines.” The manual reproduces Articles 3–8 of the Protocol. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 514.
Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states:
138. It is prohibited to use minefields against the civilian population and objects.
139. Whenever mines are laid the civilian population shall be warned in advance about the danger area (a mined area), except for cases when the situation does not permit to do so.
140. Specific requirements imposed by international humanitarian law on the use of antipersonnel mines consist in additional measures and restrictions described in Annex 6 to the present Regulations [which refers to the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices as amended on May 3, 1996 (Protocol II to the Geneva Convention of 1980)].
141. It is allowed to use without restrictions:
- command-detonated (by radio or wire) fragmentation mines capable of target selection;
- fragmentation directional mines if placed for a period of up to 72 hours;
- antipersonnel mines fitted with a delay action fuse.
142. Minefields reference (minefields location registration) shall be done in relation to the coordinates of at least two reference points.
143. Decision to mark a minefield with a fence shall be taken by the mining unit commander.
144. Minefields made up of antipersonnel mines, other than those described in Paragraph 141, shall be marked with signs (see Annex 1 to the present Regulations) visible and clear for a civilian persons approaching the minefield perimeter from such a distance that is sufficient to identify it. The minefield may be fenced with barbed wire or any other means hampering trespass. After the mines have been placed within such marked and fenced area, the minefield shall remain under protection (observation).
145. When the mine obstacles are erected in the forward edge of the battle area (line of contact) manually, with the use of portable mining sets, by mobile obstacle units or in different conditions when there is a direct threat to the personnel engaged in the fencing of the mine obstacles, it is allowed not to mark and fence the mine obstacles made up of antipersonnel high explosive, circular area fragmentation and antipersonnel cluster mines. However, when the situation changes (the above-mentioned threat vanishes), the fence shall be erected as soon as possible.
146. After the termination of combat operations, in order to ensure the protection of civilian persons against the effects of antipersonnel mines and to prevent civilians from getting into the mined areas, all minefields, mines and booby-traps shall be destroyed (removed) or left within the marked and fenced perimeter that is maintained under proper protection (observation). 
Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, §§ 138–146.
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Instructor Manual (2007) states:
The use of anti-vehicle mines. If used (only on higher authority), they must be placed in close vicinity of a military objective, warning measures must be taken, and records established. They must be removed after that operation. 
Sierra Leone, The Law of Armed Conflict. Instructor Manual for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), Armed Forces Education Centre, September 2007, pp. 44–45.
South Africa
South Africa’s Revised Civic Education Manual (2004) states that landmines “may only be used when placed in close proximity to military objects” and “when the tactical situation demands them”, and that warning signs must be posted. 
South Africa, Revised Civic Education Manual, South African National Defence Force, 2004, Chapter 4, § 56(f)(i); see also § 56(f)(iv) (on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons).
Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) contains the same restrictions and prohibitions on the use of mines and remotely delivered mines as in Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, § 2.4.c.(2).
The manual also states:
Independent of the type of target, its location, the kind of military operation, the given mission or any other circumstances, it is prohibited to use this type of weapon [i.e., inter alia, mines] … wherever its location is indiscriminate … wherever it cannot be guided towards a specific military target and wherever there is reason to believe that it will cause disproportionate collateral damage. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, § 3.2.a.(3).
Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) contains the same restrictions and prohibitions on the use of mines and remotely delivered mines as in Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 3.2.c.
The manual also states: “All ‘feasible precautions’ must be taken to protect civilians from the effects of mines … ”. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 2.4.c.(2).
Sweden
Sweden’s IHL Manual (1991), with reference to the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, states that landmines cannot be “used against civilian populations or individual civilians, which is in full agreement with [Additional Protocol I] (Art. 51)”. It adds: “It is particularly stated that the indiscriminate use of mines … is prohibited.” It further states: “The new method of remote delivery, i.e. planting mines from aircraft or dispersing them over large areas by firing them with missiles or artillery, may be used only against an area which is itself a military objective or which contains military objectives.” 
Sweden, International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, with reference to the Swedish Total Defence System, Swedish Ministry of Defence, January 1991, Section 3.3.2, pp. 80–81.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Regulation on Legal Bases for Conduct during an Engagement (2005) states:
16.1 Prohibited means of warfare
228 Prohibited are:
2 anti-personnel mines and booby-traps;*
(* = Convention not yet ratified by all States)
229 The production, stockpiling, import, export, transit and use of such means of combat are notably prohibited.
16.2 Means of warfare permitted under conditions
231 These include:
1 anti-tank mines: the details are regulated by the corresponding convention;
2 sea mines (not available in Switzerland)[.] 
Switzerland, Bases légales du comportement à l’engagement (BCE), Règlement 51.007/IVf, Swiss Army, issued based on Article 10 of the Ordinance on the Organization of the Federal Department for Defence, Civil Protection and Sports of 7 March 2003, entry into force on 1 July 2005, §§ 228(2), 229 and 231.
Ukraine
Ukraine’s IHL Manual (2004) states that the use as a means of warfare of “remotely-delivered mines, unless they are laid in accordance with the technical regulations [details provided in Annex 3 to the manual]” is prohibited. 
Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, § 1.3.3.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states:
6.14.2. The following rules apply to anti-vehicle mines:
a. they may only be deployed against or to protect military objectives,
b. may not be directed against civilians, even by way of reprisals,
c. indiscriminate use is prohibited,
d. feasible precautions must be taken to protect civilians from their effects,
e. effective advance warning must be given of any deployment of mines that might affect the civilian population unless circumstances do not permit, and
f. mines must not be of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
Civilian protection factors
6.14.3. In considering the protection of the civilian population, regard should be had to the following factors, though these are not exclusive:
a. The short and long-term effect of mines on the local civilian population for the duration of the minefield;
b. Possible measures to protect civilians (for example, fencing, signs, warning and monitoring);
c. The availability and feasibility of using alternatives to mines;
d. The short and long-term military requirements for a minefield.
Self-deactivation
6.14.4. It is prohibited to use remotely delivered anti-vehicle mines “unless, to the extent feasible, they are equipped with an effective self-destruction or self-neutralization mechanism and have a back-up self-deactivation feature, which is designed so that the mine will no longer function as a mine when the mine no longer serves the military purpose for which it was placed in position.”
Warning symbol
6.14.5. There is an international warning symbol for mined areas.
Protection
6.14.7. If requested by the head of a relevant force or mission, and in the case of UN forces or missions so far as they are able, armed forces in conflict are required to protect the following from the effects of mines:
a. UN peacekeeping forces or missions;
b. Any of the following if they have the consent of the state in whose territory they are operating:
(1) UN missions under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter,
(2) UN humanitarian and factfinding missions,
(3) Missions of the International Committee of the Red Cross or national Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies or similar humanitarian missions.
6.14.8. The protection that can be afforded will depend on the circumstances and the tactical situation but commanders will need to consider:
a. Clearance of devices or clearing lanes or routes;
b. Giving information to the head of the mission about the location of devices or about safe routes.
6.14.9. Any information provided is to be treated in strict confidence by the recipient and not released outside the force or mission without the express authority of the giver of the information. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, §§ 6.14.2–6.14.5 and 6.14.7–6.14.9.
In its chapter on the application of the law of armed conflict during peace-support operations, the manual states:
Insofar as a party to an armed conflict is not subject to a more extensive prohibition or restriction on the use of landmines, the Mines Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons [the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] requires it to take certain steps to protect United Nations forces from mines and booby-traps. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 14.14.
United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) states:
Aerial dropped mines … are not prohibited under international law, provided that they do not in their design or inherent characteristics cause unnecessary suffering. The manner of use of such weapons, however, is regulated by the rules of armed conflict … Necessary precautions must be taken in the use of all weapons, including delayed action weapons, to avoid or minimize incidental civilian casualties. Also mines must not be used for the purpose of preventing rescue of or protection to wounded or sick persons or to deny other humanitarian protections. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 6-6(d).
United States of America
The US Air Force Commander’s Handbook (1980) states:
The main legal problem raised by mine warfare is to make sure that civilian persons and property are not unnecessarily endangered, both during and after the conflict, and the parties to the conflict should take reasonable measures to this end. Depending on the circumstances, these measures might include warning civilians, using mines that self-destruct after a period of time and clearing minefields after the end of hostilities. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-34, Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict, Judge Advocate General, US Department of the Air Force, 25 July 1980, § 6-5.
United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (1995) states:
As with all weapons, to be lawful, land mines must be directed at military objectives. The controlled nature of command detonated land mines provides effective target discrimination. In the case of non-command detonated land mines, however, there exists potential for indiscriminate injury to noncombatants. Accordingly special care must be taken when employing land mines to ensure non-combatants are not indiscriminately injured. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 9.3.
United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (2007) states:
As with all weapons, to be lawful, land mines must be directed at military objectives. The controlled nature of command-detonated land mines provides effective target discrimination. In the case of noncommand-detonated land mines, however, there exists potential for indiscriminate injury to civilians. Accordingly, special care must be taken when employing land mines to ensure civilians are not indiscriminately injured. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 9.3.
Denmark
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (1973), as amended in 1978, provides:
Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 1973, as amended in 1978, § 25(1).
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (2005) provides:
Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 2005, § 36(2).
Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea’s Conventional Weapons Act (2001) provides:
The commander of the military unit that emplaces mines … must take all necessary measures including advance warning so as to prevent damage to the life, body, and property of the civilians residing in the vicinity. 
Republic of Korea, Conventional Weapons Act, 2001, Article 6.
The Act adds:
1. The Commander of the military unit that has emplaced mines or controls over the mine-emplaced area that can potentially harm civilians (herein after referred to as “minefield”) must place warning signs that fulfil the conditions specified in the attached material in or around the minefield.
2. The Commander of the military unit that holds jurisdiction over the minefield with non remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines which do not fulfil the conditions of Article 3, paragraph 3, must take the necessary precautions and measures to deny access of civilians in addition to the warning sign as stipulated in Article 1. However, an exceptional case would be: if the angle of flight taken by the fragment is less than 90 degrees from the horizontal level, the use of the anti-personnel mine occurs within 72 hours since it has been placed and the military unit that emplaced the anti-personnel mine is adjacent.
3. No one is allowed to remove, damage, destroy, hide or otherwise undermine the proper utility of the warning signs placed as per the Article 1. 
Republic of Korea, Conventional Weapons Act, 2001, Article 7.
Senegal
Senegal’s Penal Code (1965), as amended in 2007, states:
Committing an act or activity prohibited by any of the following conventions or protocols constitutes a crime under international law:
3. the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects … and its Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices. 
Senegal, Penal Code, 1965, as amended in 2007, Article 431-5(3).
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Child Rights Act (2007), states:
(2) The Government shall not -
(b) use or permit the use of land mines and other weapons declared by international instruments to be adverse to children. 
Sierra Leone, Child Rights Act, 2007, § 28(2)(b).
United States of America
Under the US War Crimes Act (1996), wilfully killing or causing serious injury to civilians in relation to an armed conflict and in violation of the provisions of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons is a war crime. 
United States, War Crimes Act, 1996, Section 2441(c)(4).
Uruguay
Uruguay’s Law on Cooperation with the ICC (2006) states:
26.2. Persons and objects affected by the war crimes set out in the present provision are persons and objects which international law protects in international or internal armed conflict.
26.3. The following are war crimes:
44. Using mines … and other similar devices against the civilian population or protected persons or objects in violation of the provisions of international law. 
Uruguay, Law on Cooperation with the ICC, 2006, Article 26.2 and 26.3.44.
No data.
Afghanistan
In 2012, the Office of the President of Afghanistan issued a press release entitled “The President strongly condemned planting of [a] mine in Logar Province and labeled perpetrators enemies of Islam and humanity”. The press release stated:
Hamid Karzai, President of [the] Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, has strongly condemned mine planting in Logar province that killed and injured a number of civilians.
Today afternoon, near to Pule Alam District of Logar Province, a vehicle of passengers was damaged by a roadside mine installed by enemies of the Afghans that killed at least three women, four children and injured three men.
The President of [the] Islamic Republic of Afghanistan strongly condemned this action. 
Afghanistan, Office of the President, “The President strongly condemned planting of [a] mine in Logar Province and labeled perpetrators enemies of Islam and humanity”, Press Release, 20 June 2012.
Afghanistan
In 2012, the Office of the President of Afghanistan issued a press release entitled “There is no human, moral or Islamic justification for massacre of innocent women and children”, which stated:
President Hamid Karzai strongly condemned the roadside bombing in Greshk district of Helmand province.
According to [the] Helmand Governor’s Office, a vehicle hit a roadside bomb on Friday afternoon in Greshk district of Helmand province, leaving 12 civilians dead, most of whom were women and children from two families.
Denouncing the act in the strongest possible terms, President Karzai said, “There is no human, moral or Islamic justification for massacre of innocent women and children, it is extremely against religious values and human principles …”. 
Afghanistan, Office of the President, “There is no human, moral or Islamic justification for massacre of innocent women and children”, Press Release, 15 September 2012.
Afghanistan
In 2012, the Office of the President of Afghanistan issued a press release entitled “President Karzai: Placing bombs on public roads to harm civilians is enmity with humanity”, which stated:
President Hamid Karzai strongly condemns the road bombing that killed and injured innocent people in the province of Balkh.
Reports by the Ministry of Interior indicate that a passenger bus … with people heading to a wedding party struck a roadside bomb in Daulat Abad district of Balkh province, leaving 19 dead and 16 others wounded. 
Afghanistan, Office of the President, “President Karzai: Placing bombs on public roads to harm civilians is enmity with humanity”, Press Release, 19 October 2012.
Australia
In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Australia stated that the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons “should apply to non-international as well as to international conflicts”, that “mines should not be exported to States that are not party to Protocol II” and that “anti-personnel mines should be detectable and incorporate a self-destruct mechanism”. 
Australia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/49/PV.3, 17 October 1994, p. 15.
Australia
In 1995, in response to a report of the Australian Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade that recommended that “international conventions relating to land mines could be couched in terms of rights and obligations, thereby making international criminal law applicable and making breaches subject to international criminal tribunals or war crimes tribunals”, the Government of Australia stated:
One of our proposals for the Review Conference [of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] was to have the States parties acknowledge in their conference declaration that a deliberate or indiscriminate use of land mines against civilians ought to attract the same criminal responsibility as it does under other humanitarian instruments. 
Australia, Senate, Debates, 29 November 1995, Vol. 176, pp. 4246–4281, reprinted in Australian Yearbook of International Law, 1995, pp. 737 and 741–742.
Australia
In response to a written parliamentary question regarding the Australian Defence Force’s position on anti-vehicle mines (2006), the Australian Minister for Defence stated:
(2) … Australia does not support a global ban on anti-vehicle mines but, instead, supports global restrictions on such mines that ensure that they are detectable by commonly available mine detection equipment, and that remotely deployable anti-vehicle mines are engineered to self-destruct/self-neutralise and self-deactivate within a set time frame.
Anti-handling devices provide a legitimate means of preventing enemy forces deliberately interfering with anti-vehicle mines which, if not protected, might subsequently be used by those forces.
(3) Australia does not support a global ban on anti-vehicle mines, or a ban on anti-vehicle mines that are not command detonated. Australia’s position is that anti-vehicle mines have legitimate military utility and that humanitarian concerns, including those posed by persistent anti-vehicle mines which remain active after the cessation of conflict, are best addressed through technical restrictions of the type proposed in the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention Experts’ Group Meetings. 
Australia, House of Representatives, Minister for Defence, Question in Writing: Anti-Vehicle Mines, Hansard, 9 February 2006, p. 160.
Australia
In 2009, in a statement before a meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the counsellor and deputy permanent representative of Australia for disarmament stated:
We welcomed the opportunity to discuss how to tackle problems associated with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during the group of experts meeting in April 2009.
As Australia stated at the Group of Experts meeting in April, IEDs are a threat to military forces and the broader civilian population in those countries where these weapons are indiscriminately deployed. Through terrorist bombings in Bali and Jakarta and in our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Australia, like many other countries represented here, has been affected by IEDs. We have lost many of our citizens and our soldiers to these devices and we are investing in the development of effective countermeasures to these weapons and their deployment.
Australia considers that continued dialogue and exchange of expertise on IEDs is valuable in the context of Amended Protocol II [to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons]. 
Australia, Statement by the counsellor and deputy permanent representative, disarmament, at a meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 11 November 2009.
Austria
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Austria stated:
The provisions of the amended Protocol which by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at all times …
It is the understanding of Austria that the word “primarily” is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped. 
Austria, Declaration made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 27 July 1998.
Belgium
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Belgium stated:
It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium that the provisions of Protocol II as amended which by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at all times.
It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium that the word “primarily” is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of amended Protocol II to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped. 
Belgium, Interpretative declarations made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 10 March 1999.
Belgium
In 2007, in his introductory remarks at the “New Perspectives for a World without Landmines” conference, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated:
Belgium’s campaign to ban landmines sets out both to ensure that victims are cared for and to prevent human suffering. We are committed to promoting – and achieving – a world free of landmines … , the humanitarian consequences of which are simply unacceptable. 
Belgium, Introductory remarks by the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the “New Perspectives for a World without Landmines” conference, Brussels, 9 May 2007, p. 1.
Canada
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Canada stated:
Canada reserves the right to transfer and use a small number of mines prohibited under this Protocol to be used exclusively for training and testing purposes. Canada will ensure that the number of such mines shall not exceed that absolutely necessary for such purposes. 
Canada, Reservation made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 26 June 1998.
Canada also declared:
1. It is understood that the provisions of Amended Protocol II shall, as the context requires, be observed at all times.
2. It is understood that the word “primarily” is included in Article 2, paragraph 3 of Amended Protocol II to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
3. It is understood that the maintenance of a minefield referred to in Article 10, in accordance with the standards on marking, monitoring and protection by fencing or other means set out in Amended Protocol II, would not be considered as a use of the mines contained therein. 
Canada, Statements of understanding made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 26 June 1998, §§ 1–3.
Canada
At the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1999, Canada stated that it
continues to have serious concerns about reports concerning the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines by the Russian military in the context of the ongoing conflict in Chechnya … Many of these mines were remotely delivered against no apparent military target … Moreover, Russian forces appear to have undertaken few if any steps to protect civilians in that conflict from the effects of mines, for example through the posting of signs, sentries or fences around known mined areas.
It also voiced its concerns
about recent public reports that representatives of the state-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories are alleged to have offered anti-personnel mines for sale to a private UK citizen in direct violation of their obligations under the Amended Protocol II to the [Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons]. 
Canada, Statement at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 15 December 1999.
Canada
At the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines in 2000, Canada stated:
It is important to highlight the indiscriminate use of landmines by both Russian and Chechen forces in Chechnya – surely one of the most serious setbacks for the already minimal norms regarding mine use contained within the Landmines Protocol of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
Canada, Statement at the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines, Geneva, 11–15 September 2000.
Canada
In 2013, Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development issued a press release entitled “Harper Government observes the International Day for Mine Awareness”, which stated:
Today, on the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action, the Honourable Julian Fantino, Minister of International Cooperation, highlighted a few of the ways that Canada is helping to eradicate the use of landmines and enhance the lives of landmine survivors.
Most often the victim of a landmine isn’t a combatant: instead it’s a child, a woman, or a man simply going about their daily lives … Our Government is proud to contribute to programs that help prevent future accidents. 
Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, “Harper Government observes the International Day for Mine Awareness”, Press Release, 4 April 2013.
China
Upon signature of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, China stated:
The Protocol [to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices fails to lay down strict restrictions on the use of such weapons by the aggressor on the territory of his victim and to provide adequately for the right of a state victim of an aggressor to defend itself by all necessary means. 
China, Declaration made upon signature of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 14 September 1981, § 3.
China
In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, China stated that it “understood the desire to avoid the killing of civilians by land mines, but oversimplified measures limited to halting the export of those weapons could not solve the problem”. 
China, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.28, 18 November 1993, p. 7.
China
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, China declared:
[T]he word “primarily” is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped. 
China, Declaration made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 4 November 1998.
China
At the Second Session of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1996, China expressed its concern about the suffering of and casualties among civilians caused by the “irresponsible use of landmines, especially anti-personnel landmines”. It added:
China has made enormous efforts on a series of important issues such as the scope of application, technical specifications on the detectability, self-destruction and self-deactivation of landmines and transfer of landmines.
China further announced:
Pending the entry-into-force of the Amended Protocol, it will implement a moratorium on its export of anti-personnel landmines which do not meet the technical specifications on detectability, self-destruction and self-deactivation as provided for by the Protocol. 
China, Statement at the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Second Session), Geneva, 22 April–3 May 1996, UN Doc. CCW/CONF.I/SR.11, 29 January 1996, § 20.
China
At the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 2001, the representative of China declared:
His country, a party to the Convention and all its protocols, faithfully discharged its obligations under them. His Government had launched a number of education campaigns concerning the Convention … Furthermore, the Government had amended domestic law in order to guarantee the enforcement of the Convention. 
China, Statement at the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 11–21 December 2001, UN Doc. CCW/CONF.II/SR.2, 16 January 2002, § 44.
China
In 2004, in a position paper submitted to the UN General Assembly, China stated:
China understands and attaches importance to the humanitarian concerns of the international community over indiscriminate injuries to innocent civilians caused by landmines. It has always supported and taken an active part in international efforts to solve the problem. As a State Party to the amended Landmine Protocol to the [1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons], China has strictly honored its commitments and vigorously participated in international de-mining assistance. 
China, Position Paper at the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly, 5 August 2004.
China
In 2005, in a working paper relating to mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM), China proposed:
37. All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects from the hazard posed by MOTAPM.
38. To the extent feasible, appropriate provisions shall be adopted aimed at the establishment of an effective and efficient system of warnings to civilians and mine risk education on the threat of MOTAPM. 
China, Package Solution to the Issue of MOTAPM, Working Paper prepared by the People’s Republic of China for the Eleventh Session of the Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. CCW/GGE/XI/WG.2/WP.2, 28 July 2005, §§ 37–38.
With regard to fuse design and sensors, China proposed:
44. To determine basic categories of fuzes and adopt Best Practices on fuze mechanisms so as to increase the discriminatory capacity of MOTAPM to the greatest extent and to prevent them from being actuated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person.
45. All MOTAPM shall incorporate, to the extent feasible, multi-sensor fuzes technology in order to reduce the possibility of inadvertent or accidental activation. If a single fuze or sensor fulfills the safety requirements of the Best Practices referred to in the previous paragraph, the incorporation of multi-sensor fuzes shall be discretionary.
46. The influence of environmental factors – particularly (i) of weather and climate as well as (ii) of storage, handling and other external conditions – shall be taken into account when selecting the types of fuzes and determining the sensitivity of fuzes.
47. Considerations and proposals of technical measures shall take into account operational, procurement as well as life cycle factors; they shall address clearly identified humanitarian issues.
48. Based on information and data provided by States Parties the following broadly available fuzes and sensors shall be considered as relevant: acoustic sensors, break wires, fiber-optic wires, infrared-sensors, magnetic sensors, pressure sensors, roller arms, scratch wire sensors, seismic/vibration sensors, tilt rods, trip wires.
49. The aforementioned broadly available fuzes and sensors shall be graded into the following categories:
(a) Category One: Fuzing systems that cannot be designed not to be excessively sensitive.
(b) Category Two: Fuzing systems that can be designed not to be excessively sensitive, but are best used in conjunction with other sensors, i.e. acoustic sensors, infrared-sensors, and seismic/vibration sensors.
(c) Category Three: Fuzing systems that can be designed not to be excessively sensitive and can be designed to operate satisfactorily on their own, i.e. fiber-optic wires, magnetic sensors, pressure sensors, roller arms and scratch wire sensors. 
China, Package Solution to the Issue of MOTAPM, Working Paper prepared by the People’s Republic of China for the Eleventh Session of the Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. CCW/GGE/XI/WG.2/WP.2, 28 July 2005, §§ 44–49.
On anti-handling devices, China proposed:
52. MOTAPM with anti-handling devices (AHD) are a defensive weapon permissible according to international humanitarian law.
53. There is detailed stipulation in APII [the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] on the definition and use of AHD, which prohibits the use of a self-deactivating mine equipped with an AHD that is designed in such a manner that the AHD is capable of functioning after the mine has ceased to be capable of functioning. This is sufficient to address the humanitarian concerns caused by AHD and States Parties should strictly implement this stipulation. 
China, Package Solution to the Issue of MOTAPM, Working Paper prepared by the People’s Republic of China for the Eleventh Session of the Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. CCW/GGE/XI/WG.2/WP.2, 28 July 2005, §§ 52–53.
China
In 2005, in a white paper on “China’s Endeavours for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation”, China stated: “China supports appropriate and reasonable restrictions on the use of landmines, so as to prevent their indiscriminate use against civilians.” 
China, White Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China: China’s Endeavours for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 1 September 2005.
China
In 2005, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, China stated:
China earnestly fulfills its obligations under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and has been dedicated to enhancing its effectiveness and universality. China has always been deeply concerned about civilian casualties caused by inappropriate use of landmines, in particular anti-personnel landmines (APL). China supports appropriate and reasonable restrictions on the use of landmines, and has strictly implemented the provisions of the Amended Protocol on Landmines [the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons]. 
China, Statement by Head of Chinese Delegation at Thematic Debate of First Committee of UNGA 60th Session on Conventional Weapons, 13 October 2005.
China
In 2006, in a white paper on “China’s National Defence in 2006”, China stated:
China fully honors its obligations under the amended Landmine Protocol [the 1996 Amended Protocol II] to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] keeps its troops fully informed of China’s obligations, and has implemented the technical standards and limitations specified in the Protocol. It has carried out a general check of all the anti-personnel landmines that do not meet the standards of the Protocol, and has destroyed several hundred thousand old landmines in a planned way. China has made technical modifications to usable anti-infantry landmines in inventory to make them conform to the technical standards of the Protocol. 
China, White Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China: China’s National Defence in 2006, 29 December 2006.
China
In 2007, at a conference in Phnom Penh on “Mine Action and Implications for Peace and Development”, China stated:
China attaches great importance to the humanitarian concerns caused by the indiscriminate use of landmines. As a State Party to the amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, China has always honored its obligations under the instrument. 
China, Statement by Ambassador to Cambodia at Conference on “Mine Action and Implications for Peace and Development”, Phnom Penh, 14 March 2007.
China
In 2007, during a debate on conventional weapons in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, China stated:
China understands the humanitarian concerns caused by the indiscriminate use of anti-vehicle landmines. China is ready to work with other parties to explore effective ways to address the issue with a pragmatic and constructive attitude. 
China, Statement by the Chinese Delegation at the Thematic Debate on Conventional Weapons at the First Committee of the 62nd Session of the UNGA, 29 October 2007.
Cuba
In 2008, in a statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly during the thematic debate on conventional weapons, the representative of Cuba stated:
As a State Party to the [1980] Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Cuba fully shares the legitimate humanitarian concerns relating to the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines.
At the same time, it is well known that our country has been subjected for more than five decades to a continuous policy of hostility and aggression by the military superpower. As a result, Cuba is not able to renounce the use of this type of weapon for the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, in accordance with the legitimate right of self-defence recognized by the [1945] United Nations Charter. …
We will continue to fully support all efforts that, while maintaining the necessary balance between humanitarian and national security concerns, are aimed at eliminating the terrible effects that the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel land mines have on the civilian population and the economies of many countries. 
Cuba, Statement by the representative of Cuba before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly during the thematic debate on conventional weapons, 21 October 2008, p. 2.
Cuba
In 2010, in a statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly during the thematic debate on conventional weapons, the representative of Cuba stated:
Cuba fully shares the legitimate humanitarian concerns relating to the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines.
At the same time, it is well known that our country has been subjected for more than five decades to a continuous policy of hostility and aggression by the military superpower.
As a result, Cuba is not able to renounce the use of this type of weapon for the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, in accordance with the legitimate right of self-defence recognized by the [1945] United Nations Charter. …
We will continue to fully support, … as a State Party to the [1980] Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, all efforts that, while maintaining the necessary balance between humanitarian and national security concerns, are aimed at eliminating the terrible effects that the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel land mines have on the civilian population and the economies of many countries. 
Cuba, Statement by the representative of Cuba before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly during the thematic debate on conventional weapons, 19 October 2010, p. 2.
Czech Republic
In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Czech Republic stated that it supported proposals concerning “the detectability of landmines and the limitation of their functioning after the end of conflicts”, as well as “a moratorium on the export of such land-mines”. 
Czech Republic, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/49/PV.6, 19 October 1994, p. 15.
Denmark
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Denmark stated:
The provisions of the amended Protocol which by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at all times …
It is the understanding of Denmark that the word “primarily” is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped. 
Denmark, Declaration made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 30 April 1997.
Egypt
In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Egypt stated that it supported the comments made by several other delegations which had expressed the view that export restrictions alone “would not achieve the desired results” and that “a resolution dealing with the production and use of anti-personnel mines would have been preferable”. 
Egypt, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.28, 18 November 1993, p. 9.
Finland
In 1974, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Finland stated:
In the case of weapons, the draft Additional Protocols did little more than reaffirm existing law and should be supplemented with prohibitions and restrictions of the use of specific categories of conventional weapons. The Ad Hoc Committee should endeavour to define such weapons and prepare a list mentioning, at least, … delayed action weapons including mines. 
Finland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.1, 13 March 1974, p. 9, § 9.
Finland
In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Finland stated that it wished to prevent “future indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel land-mines”. 
Finland, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/49/PV.4, 18 October 1994, p. 17.
Finland
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Finland stated:
The provisions of the amended Protocol which by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at all times …
It is the understanding of Finland that the word “primarily” is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped. 
Finland, Declaration made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 3 April 1998.
France
Upon ratification of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, France stated:
With reference to the scope of application defined in article 1 of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, … it will apply the provisions of the Convention and its three Protocols [I, II and III] to all armed conflicts referred to in articles 2 and 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 [international and non-international armed conflicts]. 
France, Reservations made upon ratification of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 4 March 1988.
France
In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, France stated that while it
strongly supported international action on the indiscriminate laying of non-self-destructing mines … Protocol II to the inhuman weapons convention permitted self-destructing or self-neutralizing anti-personnel mines as legitimate forms of self-defence if directed at military targets. 
France, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.28, 18 November 1993, p. 7.
France
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, France stated:
The provisions of the amended Protocol which by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at all times …
It is the understanding of France that the word “primarily” is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped. 
France, Declarations made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 23 July 1998.
Germany
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Germany stated:
It is understood that the provisions of the protocol shall, as the context requires, be observed at all times…
It is the understanding of Germany that the word “primarily” is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
It is understood that article 5, paragraph 2(b) does not preclude agreement among the states concerned, in connection with peace treaties or similar arrangements, to allocate responsibilities under paragraph 2(b) in another manner which nevertheless respects the essential spirit and purpose of the article. 
Germany, Declarations made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 2 May 1997.
Germany
In 2010, in reply to a Minor Interpellation in the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) entitled “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”, Germany’s Federal Government wrote:
13. How does the Federal Government ensure that there are no civilian victims when using anti-vehicle mines that self-deactivate after a period of time?
Which rules of engagement exist on this matter?
The Bundeswehr only has anti-tank mines in its stockpile which only remain active in the ground for a certain period of time. The mines are technically constructed so that they fulfil the criteria of self-neutralization, self-deactivation and self-destruction. The rules of engagement state that active mine barriers put in place by the Bundeswehr must in principle be guarded by own troops. 
Germany, Lower House of Federal Parliament (Bundestag), Reply by the Federal Government to the Minor Interpellation by Members Agnes Malczack, Dr. Gerhard Schick, Marieluise Beck (Bremen), further Members and the Parliamentary Group BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, BT-Drs. 17/3185, 5 October 2010, p. 6.
Ghana
In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Ghana stated: “It would have been preferable for the resolution to cover the production, use and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines, as well as their export.” 
Ghana, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.28, 18 November 1993, p. 9.
Greece
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Greece stated:
It is understood that the provisions of the protocol shall, as the context requires, be observed at all times…
It is the understanding of Greece that the word “primarily” is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
It is understood that article 5, paragraph 2(b) does not preclude agreement among the states concerned, in connection with peace treaties or similar arrangements, to allocate responsibilities under paragraph 2(b) in another manner which nevertheless respects the essential spirit and purpose of the article. 
Greece, Declarations made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 20 January 1999.
Holy See
Upon accession to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Holy See declared:
The Holy See … reiterates the objective hoped for by many parties: an agreement that would totally ban anti-personnel mines, the effects of which are tragically well-known.
In this regard, the Holy See considers that the modifications made so far in the second Protocol are insufficient and inadequate. It wishes, by means of its own accession to the Convention, to offer support to every effort aimed at effectively banning anti-personnel mines. 
Holy See, Declaration made upon accession to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 22 July 1997.
Hungary
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Hungary declared:
The Republic of Hungary …
4) announces a total ban on the development, production, acquisition, export and transfer of all types of anti-personnel landmines;
9) reiterates her commitment to promote the early conclusion of and wide adherence to an international convention stipulating a total and comprehensive ban on anti-personnel landmines, by reaffirming her determination to contribute actively to the success of international efforts furthering this goal. 
Hungary, Declaration made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 30 January 1998, §§ 4 and 9.
India
In 2003, at the 5th Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the head of the Indian delegation stated:
India remains committed to full and effective implementation of the Amended Protocol II and has taken all the required measures to ensure the compliance with its provisions …
Mr. President, in India only the armed forces are permitted to use landmines. They have well- established Standard of Operation Procedures whereby minefields are laid along border areas as a part of military operations and are explicitly marked and fenced to prevent causalities to innocent civilians or grazing cattle. 
India, Statement by the head of the Indian delegation at the 5th Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 26 November 2003.
India
In 2005, in a statement at the 7th Annual Conference of the States Parties to 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the head of the Indian delegation stated:
All of us present here share the vision of a mine-free world. India remains committed to the ultimate objective of a universal and global ban on anti-personnel landmines, in a manner that would also address the legitimate national security concerns of States. We hope that the availability of appropriate militarily effective, non-lethal and cost-effective alternative technologies will greatly facilitate achieving the complete elimination of anti-personnel landmines.
The Amended Protocol II [AP II] embodies two general principles of International Humanitarian Law: that the civilian population requires protection against the effects of hostilities and that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. AP II is the most comprehensive legally-binding instrument that addresses the humanitarian risks posed by the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of all types of mines, anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines and other explosive devices. If implemented in letter and spirit, it would go a long way in addressing humanitarian concerns, while permitting States to use these mines in a responsible and regulated fashion for legitimate requirements.
India supports measures undertaken by the States Parties for the universalization of AP II … I take this opportunity to urge those who have not done so to ratify the [1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] and its five protocols as soon as possible. My delegation looks forward to a useful exchange of views on the implementation of the Protocol, to which we have committed ourselves with the objective of securing a mine-free world. 
India, Statement by the head of the Indian delegation at the 7th Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 23 November 2005.
Ireland
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Ireland stated:
The provisions of the amended Protocol which by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at all times …
It is the understanding of Ireland that the word “primarily” is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped. 
Ireland, Declaration made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 27 March 1997.
Israel
Upon accession to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Israel stated:
With reference to the scope of application defined in article 1 of the [1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons], the Government of the State of Israel will apply the provisions of the Convention and those annexed Protocols to which Israel has agreed [I, II and III] to become bound to all armed conflicts involving regular forces of States referred to in article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, as well as to all armed conflicts referred to in article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 
Israel, Declarations and statements of understanding made upon accession to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 22 March 1995, § a.
Italy
In 1976, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Italy stated: “The obligation to record the location of minefields and to fit a neutralising mechanism on remotely delivered mines provided a satisfactory guarantee for the civilian population.” 
Italy, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.29, 25 May 1976, p. 297.
Italy
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Italy stated:
The provisions of the amended Protocol which by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at all times …
Under article 2 of the amended Protocol II, in order to fully address the humanitarian concerns raised by anti-personnel land-mines, the Italian Parliament has enacted and brought into force a legislation containing a far more stringent definition of those devices. In this regard, while reaffirming its commitment to promote the further development of international humanitarian law, the Italian Government confirms its understanding that the word “primarily” is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped. 
Italy, Declarations made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 13 January 1999.
Japan
In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Japan stated that it would “participate actively in the work of reviewing the [1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] in order to tighten the controls on the use and availability of land-mines”. 
Japan, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/49/PV.4, 18 October 1994, p. 21.
Liechtenstein
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Liechtenstein declared: “The provisions of the amended Protocol II which by their contents or nature may also be applied in peacetime, shall be observed at all times.” 
Liechtenstein, Declaration made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 19 November 1997.
Kuwait
In 1974, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, the representative of Kuwait stated:
17. … As a defensive measure, the practice of laying mine-fields – provided that they were properly marked for the benefit of the local population and friendly forces – could not be prohibited. it supported restrictions on the use of mines as a defensive weapon and that their use as offensive weapons should be prohibited … He himself considered that the use of anti-personnel landmines for the purpose of paralysing the enemy’s movements was acceptable.
18. On the other hand, he stressed the danger to civilians as well as to members of the armed forces of air-delivered mines, which were likely to strike indiscriminately, especially if they were scattered over a wide area. He therefore considered that, in the case of delayed-action and treacherous weapons, it was better to make every effort to provide a rule for limiting their use rather than to try to lay stress on their inhuman aspects or the medical results they produced, and that the best course would be to regard them as defensive weapons and to prohibit their use as offensive weapons. 
Kuwait, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.13, 28 February 1975, p. 127, §§ 17–18.
Mexico
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Mexico stated that it had already submitted proposals concerning the “limitation of the use of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines and booby traps to military targets and their immediate surroundings, with effective precautions to protect civilians”. 
Mexico, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./I/ SR.3, 30 August 1978, pp. 3–4.
Netherlands
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Netherlands stated:
With regard to Article 1, paragraph 2:
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands takes the view that the provisions of the Protocol which, given their content or nature, can also be applied in peacetime, must be observed in all circumstances.
With regard to Article 2, paragraph 3:
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands takes the view that the word “primarily” means only that mines that are designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle and that are equipped with an anti-handling device are not regarded as anti-personnel mines because of that device. 
Netherlands, Declaration made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 25 March 1999, §§ 1 and 2.
New Zealand
In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, New Zealand advocated a “tougher regime of controls on the use … of mines”. 
New Zealand, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/49/PV.4, 18 October 1994, p. 14.
Norway
In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Norway called for restrictions “on the production and use of such land-mines” and the development of “an efficient verification regime” for the enforcement of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocols. 
Norway, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/49/PV.6, 19 October 1994, p. 7.
Pakistan
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Pakistan stated:
Article 1:
The provisions of the Protocol must be observed at all times, depending on the circumstances …
Article 2 (paragraph 3):
In the context of the word “primarily”, it is understood that such anti-tank mines which use anti-personnel mines as a fuse but do not explode on contact with a person are not anti-personnel mines.  
Pakistan, Declarations made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 9 March 1999, §§ 3 and 4.
Pakistan
In 2000, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Pakistan stated:
Although our security environment does not permit us to accept a comprehensive ban on [anti-personnel landmines], Pakistan will strictly abide by its commitments and obligations under the amended Protocol II on landmines. 
Pakistan, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 13 October 2000, UN Doc. A/C.1/55/PV.13, 13 October 2000, p. 12.
Pakistan
At the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 2001, Pakistan declared its full commitment to the Convention and proposed that during the Review Conference a method would be examined to accelerate the process of achieving universal adherence to the Convention and its Protocols. 
Pakistan, Statement of 11 December 2001 at the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 11–21 December 2001, UN Doc. CCW/CONF.II/SR.2, 16 January 2002, §§ 26–28.
Peru
In government communiqués in 1995, Peru stated that it considered Ecuador’s “indiscriminate use” of anti-personnel landmines in the border dispute between them as a violation of Articles 35(2) and 51(4) the 1977 Additional Protocol I and as a violation of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
Peru, Government Communiqué, Geneva, 6 March 1995; Official Communiqué No. 011 of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, 24 February 1995.
Peru
In 1995, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Peru stated that it deemed it “essential to … set up standards to determine the responsibilities of States and the application of sanctions for damage caused to non-combatant victims and the environment”. 
Peru, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/50/PV.9, 25 October 1995, p. 11.
Poland
In 1995, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Poland stated that it had “declared a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines that do not have self-destruct or self-neutralizing devices”. 
Poland, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/50/PV.9, 25 October 1995, p. 7.
Republic of Korea
In 2000, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Republic of Korea stated that it was intending to accede to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
Republic of Korea, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 6 October 2000, UN Doc. A/C.1/55/PV.7, 6 October 2000, p. 14.
South Africa
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, South Africa stated:
The provisions of the amended Protocol which by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at all times …
It is the understanding of South Africa that the word “primarily” is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
It is understood that article 5, paragraph 2(b) does not preclude agreement among the states concerned, in connection with peace treaties or similar arrangements, to allocate responsibilities under paragraph 2(b) in another manner which nevertheless respects the essential spirit and purpose of the article. 
South Africa, Declaration made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 26 June 1998.
Spain
In 2008, in response to a question concerning the prohibition of cluster munitions, Spain’s Secretary of State for Constitutional and Parliamentary Matters wrote:
The Spanish government is at all times supporting the measures advanced within the international community in which humanitarian considerations have primacy over the expected operational advantages that the use by the military of certain weapons, considered to cause excessive suffering to, or that have indiscriminate effects on, the civilian population, such as … anti-personnel mines, could have. 
Spain, Response by the Secretary of State for Constitutional and Parliamentary Matters to Question No. 184/002509, 11 July 2008, p. 92,
Sri Lanka
In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Sri Lanka stated that it felt that the proposed moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines was inadequate as it did not deal with production or use, and in particular the use of anti-personnel landmines by non-State entities. 
Sri Lanka, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.28, 18 November 1993, pp. 8–9.
Sweden
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Sweden stated:
The provisions of the amended Protocol which by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at all times …
It is the understanding of Sweden that the word “primarily” is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
It is understood that article 5, paragraph 2(b) does not preclude agreement among the states concerned, in connection with peace treaties or similar arrangements, to allocate responsibilities under paragraph 2(b) in another manner which nevertheless respects the essential spirit and purpose of the article. 
Sweden, Declaration made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 16 July 1997.
Switzerland
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Switzerland stated that it supported “the prohibition or extensive restriction of the use of mines and booby-traps, backed by the necessary guarantees”. 
Switzerland, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./II/SR.28, 18 April 1978, p. 3.
Switzerland
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Switzerland declared that it “interprets the definition of ‘anti-personnel mine’ as excluding any mine designed to explode in the presence or proximity of, or upon contact with, a vehicle, when such mine is equipped with an anti-handling device”. 
Switzerland, Declaration made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 24 March 1998.
Switzerland
In 2007, in its Mine Action Strategy 2008 to 2011, Switzerland states:
- Legal obligations: In the course of the 1990s, the international community pursued significant efforts aimed at limiting the grave humanitarian consequences of the problems associated with landmines … New legal instruments were created that restrict the use of landmines. 
Switzerland, Mine Action Strategy 2008 to 2011, 31 December 2007, Part 1.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s ABC of International Humanitarian Law (2009) states:
Mines
Mines are weapons that explode in direct or indirect contact with people (or animals) or vehicles (anti-personnel mines/anti-vehicle mines). They can be deployed on top of the ground, below ground or near the ground surface or on a different type of surface. The Second Protocol to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons regulates the deployment and transfer of all types of land mines. The so-called “Ottawa Convention” of 1997 prohibits the use, stockpiling, manufacture, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines. It also addresses such issues as mine clearance and destruction, as well as measures to help the victims of mines. The Ottawa Convention has yet to be ratified however by some of the most important military powers.
Weapons
International humanitarian law imposes limitations, in some cases a total ban, on the use of weapons whose impact goes beyond the permissible purpose of weakening the enemy. Weapons are prohibited on the basis of three fundamental criteria: if their use inevitably leads to death; if they cause disproportionate injury or Unnecessary suffering; if they strike indiscriminately. On the basis of these three criteria a number of specific weapons have been explicitly prohibited by international conventions, including Anti-personnel mines, … . Some of these bans are part of Customary international law. 
Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, ABC of International Humanitarian Law, 2009, pp. 31 and 41.
Switzerland
In 2013, in a statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the permanent representative of Switzerland stated:
In this context, Switzerland is also deeply concerned about the use of cluster munitions and antiper-sonnel landmines in Syria. It is essential that all parties to the conflict abide by all their obligations under international law, particularly the obligation to take all necessary measures to protect the civilian population as well as persons who are not or no longer participating in hostilities.  
Switzerland, Statement by the permanent representative of Switzerland before the First Committee of UN General Assembly, 7 October 2013, p. 5.
Switzerland
In 2013, in a statement at the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the permanent representative of Switzerland stated:
The community of States cannot remain indifferent to the human suffering caused by armed conflicts. It was in direct response to this fundamental concern that the CCW [1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] and its protocols were adopted, with a view to prohibiting or limiting the use of certain specific types of weapon known to inflict superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or to strike indiscriminately.
In this regard, Switzerland is deeply concerned by the alleged use of weapons in Syria falling within the ambit of the CCW and its respective protocols, such as the alleged use of anti-personnel mines as well as the alleged use of incendiary weapons in populated areas causing severe human suffering. We call upon all parties to the conflict to comply with their obligations under international law, in particular the principles of distinction, precaution, and proportionality.
Another subject which remains important for Switzerland is that of mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM). The impact of these mines in humanitarian terms on civilian populations and personnel engaged in peacekeeping missions, humanitarian activities or development work has been a matter of concern to Switzerland for a long time and it is our view that clear standards must be set in this area. 
Switzerland, Statement by the permanent representative of Switzerland at the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 14 November 2013.
Ukraine
In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Ukraine advocated “strong action to reduce the threat posed to civilian populations by the indiscriminate use of landmines”. 
Ukraine, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 49/PV.7, 20 October 1994, p. 17.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1976, during a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, the United Kingdom, introducing a working paper on the regulation of the use of landmines and other devices on behalf of France, Netherlands and United Kingdom, stated:
Article 2 of the present working paper … required the location of minefields to be recorded. It should, however, be noted that the amount of detail in which the recording was made would depend on the type of minefield in question. Where mines were laid by engineers, it might be possible to record the location of each one; in minefields laid by artillery, however, it would only be possible to record the area covered. 
United Kingdom, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.28, 25 May 1976, p. 289, § 24.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the United Kingdom stated that while it “strongly supported international action on the indiscriminate laying of non-self-destructing mines … Protocol II to the inhumane weapons convention permitted self-destructing or self-neutralizing anti-personnel mines as legitimate forms of self-defence if directed at military targets”. 
United Kingdom, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.28, 18 November 1993, § 31.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1995, during a debate in the House of Commons, the UK Minister of State for Defence Procurement stated: “The parties in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia have indiscriminately sown anti-personnel land mines. That may be in direct contravention of the [1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons].” 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Statement by the Minister of State for Defence Procurement, Hansard, 31 January 1995, Vol. 253, cols. 842–3.
United States of America
In 1976, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, the representative of the United States stated:
35. It was clearly desirable to place certain restrictions on the use of land mines and other devices … Her delegation supported reasonable and feasible requirements for recording the location of minefields. In that respect she agreed with the statement of the United Kingdom representative at [another meeting of the Committee on Conventional Weapons] that the nature and extent of the recording would depend on the type of minefield in question and the circumstances and method of its emplacement.
36. She also supported a prohibition on the use of remotely delivered mines unless such mines were fitted with a neutralizing mechanism or the area in which they were delivered was clearly marked. Furthermore, her delegation welcomed and shared the concern evidenced in the various proposals for the protection of the civilian population against the effects of mines and similar devices. 
United States, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.29, 25 May 1976, p. 300, §§ 35–36.
United States of America
Upon ratification of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the United States declared:
With reference to the scope of application defined in article 1 of the Convention, … the United States will apply the provisions of the Convention, Protocol I, and Protocol II to all armed conflicts referred to in articles 2 and 3 common to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of August 12, 1949 [international and non-international armed conflicts]. 
United States, Declaration made upon ratification of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 24 March 1995.
United States of America
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the United States declared:
(2) EFFECTIVE EXCLUSION. – The United States understands that, for the purposes of Article 5(6)(b) of the Amended Mines Protocol, the maintenance of observation over avenues of approach where mines subject to that Article are deployed constitutes one acceptable form of monitoring to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians.
(5) PEACE TREATIES. – The United States understands that the allocation of responsibilities for landmines in Article 5(2)(b) of the Amended Mines Protocol does not preclude agreement, in connection with peace treaties or similar arrangements, to allocate responsibilities under that Article in a manner that respects the essential spirit and purpose of the Article.
(6) BOOBY-TRAPS AND OTHER DEVICES. – For the purposes of the Amended Mines Protocol, the United States understands that –
(B) a trip-wired hand grenade shall be considered a “booby-trap” under Article 2(4) of the Amended Mines Protocol and shall not be considered a “mine” or an “anti-personnel mine” under Article 2(1) or Article 2(3), respectively; and
(C) none of the provisions of the Amended Mines Protocol, including Article 2(5), applies to hand grenades other than trip-wired hand grenades. 
United States, Statements of understanding made upon acceptance of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 24 May 1999, §§ 2, 5 and 6(B)–(C).
United States of America
Following a decision by the US President in 1996, the United States unilaterally undertook
not to use, and to place in inactive stockpile status with intent to demilitarize by the end of 1999, all non-self-destructing [anti-personnel landmines] not needed for (a) training personnel engaged in demining and countermining operations, and (b) to defend the United States and its allies from armed aggression across the Korean demilitarized zone. 
United States, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Implementation of the President’s Decision on Anti-Personnel Landmines, 17 June 1996.
UN Security Council
In two resolutions adopted in 1994, the UN Security Council condemned all acts by parties to the conflict in Angola “including the laying of landmines, that imperil or inhibit humanitarian relief efforts”. 
UN Security Council, Res. 945, 29 September 1994, § 10, voting record: 15-0-0; Res. 952, 27 October 1994, § 7, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1994 on the situation in Angola, the UN Security Council noted: “The widespread dispersal of landmines is causing hardship to the civilian population and is hampering the return of refugees and displaced persons and other humanitarian relief efforts.” 
UN Security Council, Res. 965, 30 November 1994, preamble, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1995, the UN Security Council noted “with concern that unexploded landmines constitute a substantial hazard to the population of Rwanda” and underlined “the importance the Council attaches to efforts to eliminate the threat posed by unexploded landmines in a number of States”. 
UN Security Council, Res. 1005, 17 July 1995, preamble, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1996, the UN Security Council expressed “its regret at the civilian casualties inflicted by landmines” and called upon all parties in Afghanistan “to desist from the indiscriminate use of landmines”. 
UN Security Council, Res. 1076, 22 October 1996, §§ 6 and 9, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1996, the UN Security Council expressed its “serious concern at the indiscriminate use of landmines in Tajikistan and the threat which this poses to the population and UNMOT personnel”. 
UN Security Council, Res. 1089, 13 December 1996, § 11, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1997 on the situation in Georgia, the UN Security Council:
Deeply concerned at the continued deterioration of the security conditions in the Gali region, with an increase of acts of violence by armed groups, and indiscriminate laying of mines, …
14. Condemns the continued laying of mines, including new types of mines, in the Gali region, which has already caused several deaths and injuries among the civilian population and the peacekeepers and the observers of the international community. 
UN Security Council, Res. 1096, 30 January 1997, preamble and § 14, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1980 on the UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly welcomed the successful conclusion of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocols and commended the Convention and the three annexed Protocols to all States “with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 35/153, 12 December 1980, § 4, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1981 on the UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the successful conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which resulted in a Convention and three Protocols, adopted by the Conference on 10 October 1980,
1. Urges those States which have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to sign and ratify the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible so as to obtain its entry into force, and ultimately its universal adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 36/93, 9 December 1981, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1982 on the UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
1. Urges those States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols annexed thereto, as early as possible, so as to obtain their entry into force and, ultimately, their universal adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 37/79, 9 December 1982, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1983 on the UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States which have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto, as early as possible, so as to obtain ultimately universal adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 38/66, 15 December 1983, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1984 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 39/56, 12 December 1984, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1985 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 40/84, 12 December 1985, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1986 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 41/50, 3 December 1986, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1987 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 42/30, 30 November 1987, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1988 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 43/67, 7 December 1988, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1990 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 45/64, 4 December 1990, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1991 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 46/40, 6 December 1991, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1992 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, as well as successor States to take appropriate action so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 47/56, 9 December 1992, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1993 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately access to this instrument will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 48/79, 16 December 1993, § 3, voting record: 169-0-3-19.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1994 on a moratorium on the exports of anti-personnel land-mines, the UN General Assembly:
Gravely concerned with the suffering and casualties caused to non-combatants as a result of the proliferation, as well as the indiscriminate and irresponsible use, of anti- personnel land-mines,
4. Emphasizes the importance of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its Protocols as the authoritative international instrument governing the responsible use of anti-personnel land-mines and related devices;
5. Urges States that have not done so to adhere to the Convention and its Protocols. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 49/75 D, 15 December 1994, preamble and §§ 4-5, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1994 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately access to this instrument will be universal.  
UN General Assembly, Res. 49/79, 15 December 1994, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1994 on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, the UN General Assembly:
Expresses grave concern at the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel land-mines in Cambodia and the devastating consequences and destabilizing effects such mines have on Cambodian society, and encourages the Government of Cambodia to continue its support for the removal of these mines. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 49/199, 23 December 1994, § 13, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on a moratorium on the exports of anti-personnel land-mines, the UN General Assembly:
Gravely concerned with the suffering and casualties caused to non-combatants as a result of the proliferation, as well as the indiscriminate and irresponsible use, of anti-personnel land-mines,
1. Emphasizes the importance of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its Protocols as the authoritative international instrument governing the responsible use of anti-personnel land-mines and related devices;
5. Encourages the widest possible accession to the Convention and to Protocol II thereto, and further urges all States to comply immediately and fully with the applicable rules of Protocol II. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 50/70 O, 12 December 1995, preamble and §§ 1-5, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and its Protocols and upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately access to these instruments will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 50/74, 12 December 1995, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, the UN General Assembly:
Expresses grave concern at the devastating consequences and destabilizing effects of the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines on Cambodian society, encourages the Government of Cambodia to continue its support and efforts for the removal of these mines, and welcomes the intention of the Government of Cambodia to ban all anti-personnel landmines. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 50/178, 22 December 1995, § 13, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on an international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines, the UN General Assembly:
Gravely concerned about the suffering and casualties caused to non-combatants as a result of the proliferation, as well as the indiscriminate and irresponsible use, of anti-personnel landmines,
2. Urges States that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention on [Certain Conventional Weapons] and Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996, and urges all States immediately to comply to the fullest extent possible with the applicable rules of Protocol II as amended. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 51/45 S, 10 December 1996, preamble and § 2, voting record: 155-0-10-20.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and its Protocols, and upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 51/49, 10 December 1996, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, the UN General Assembly:
Expresses grave concern at the devastating consequences and destabilizing effects of the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines on Cambodian society, encourages the Government of Cambodia to continue its support and efforts for the removal of these mines, and urges the Government to ban all anti-personnel landmines. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 51/98, 12 December 1996, § 25, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In three resolutions adopted between 1994 and 1996, the UN General Assembly deplored the use of landmines against civilians in the Sudan. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 49/198, 23 December 1994, voting record: 101-13-49-22. (Against: Afghanistan, China, Cuba, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic and Viet Nam. Abstaining: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan and United Arab Emirates); Res. 50/197, 22 December 1995, voting record: 94-15-54. (Against: Afghanistan, China, Cuba, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic and Viet Nam. Abstaining: Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu); Res. 51/112, 12 December 1996 voting record: 100-16-50. (Against: Afghanistan, China, Cuba, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic and Viet Nam. Abstaining: Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Zaire.)
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Particularly welcoming the adoption on 3 May 1996 of the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II),
Welcoming the national measures adopted by an increasing number of Member States relating to bans, moratoriums or restrictions on the transfer, use or production of anti-personnel landmines or to the reduction of existing stockpiles of such mines,
Desirous of reinforcing international co-operation in the area of prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 51/49, 8 January 1997, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1997 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
2. Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols thereto, and in particular to amended Protocol II, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument at an early date, and calls upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal.
3. Calls, in particular, upon the States parties to the Convention to express their consent to be bound by the amended Protocol II with a view to its entry into force as soon as possible, and, pending its entry into force, to respect and ensure respect for its substantive provisions to the fullest extent possible.  
UN General Assembly, Res. 52/42, 9 December 1997, §§ 2 and 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1998 on contributions towards banning anti-personnel landmines, the UN General Assembly:
Welcomes as interim measures, the various bans, moratoriums and other restrictions already declared by States on anti-personnel landmines, and calls upon States that have not yet done so to declare and implement such bans, moratoriums and other restrictions as soon as possible. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 52/38 H, 8 January 1998, § 2, voting record: 147-0-15-23. Abstaining: Benin, Botswana, Cuba, Eritrea, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Philippines, South Africa, Togo, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1998 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
2. Welcomes the adherence to the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) by twenty-one States and its entry into force on 3 December 1998, and calls, in particular, on all States parties to the Convention that have not yet done so to express their consent to be bound by the Protocol;
5. Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols thereto, and particularly to amended Protocol II, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument at an early date, and calls upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 53/81, 4 December 1998, §§ 2 and 5, adopted without a vote
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1999, the UN General Assembly:
Welcoming the additional ratifications and acceptances of or accessions to the Convention, as well as the ratifications and acceptances of or accessions to amended Protocol II and Protocol IV,
1. Welcomes the entry into force on 3 December 1998 of the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), and calls, in particular, upon all States parties to the Convention that have not yet done so to express their consent to be bound by the Protocol;
3. Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols thereto, and in particular to the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument at an early date, and calls upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 54/58, 1 December 1999, preamble and § III(1) and (3), adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2000 on the situation of human rights in Sudan, the UN General Assembly expressed its deep concern:
At the impact of the current armed conflict, worsened by the breakdown of the ceasefire in June 2000 and by the upsurge of armed confrontations, on the situation of human rights and its adverse effects on the civilian population, in particular women and children, and the continuing serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by all parties, in particular:
(v) The use of weapons, including indiscriminate artillery shelling and landmines, against the civilian population. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 55/116, 4 December 2000, § 2(a)(v), voting record: 85-32-49-23. (Against: Algeria, Bahrain, Chad, China, Comoros, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Viet Nam. Abstaining: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, Palau, Philippines, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania and United States.)
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling with satisfaction the adoption and the entry into force of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and its amended article 1, and the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and its amended version, the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III) and the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV),
1. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols thereto, as amended, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments at an early date, and so as to ultimately achieve their universality;
2. Calls upon all States parties to the Convention that have not yet done so to express their consent to be bound by the Protocols to the Convention and the amendment extending the scope of the Convention and the Protocols thereto to include armed conflicts of a non-international character. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/100, 6 December 2006, preamble and §§ 1–2, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling with satisfaction the adoption and the entry into force of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and its amended article 1, and the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and its amended version, the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), and the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V),
1. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols thereto, as amended, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments at an early date, and so as to ultimately achieve their universality;
2. Calls upon all States parties to the Convention that have not yet done so to express their consent to be bound by the Protocols to the Convention and the amendment extending the scope of the Convention and the Protocols thereto to include armed conflicts of a non-international character. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/57, 5 December 2007, preamble and §§ 1–2, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1994 on the effects of armed conflicts on children’s lives, the UN Commission on Human Rights requested “all States to render full support for prevention of the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines and for protection and assistance for the victims”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1994/94, 9 March 1994, § 7, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Also calls upon parties to the hostilities to respect fully the applicable provisions of international humanitarian law including article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, [and] to halt the use of weapons, including land mines, against the civilian population. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1995/77, 8 March 1995, § 15, voting record: 33-7-10.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Expresses grave concern at the devastating consequences and destabilizing effects of the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel land-mines on Cambodian society, encourages the Government of Cambodia to continue its support and efforts for the removal of these mines, and welcomes the intention of the Government of Cambodia to ban all anti-personnel land-mines. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1996/54, 19 April 1996, § 22, adopted without a vote
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Calls upon all parties to the hostilities to respect fully the applicable provisions of international humanitarian law including article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, [and] to halt the use of weapons, including land-mines, against the civilian population.  
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1996/73, 23 April 1996, § 15, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Urges all the Afghan parties to respect fully international humanitarian law, to protect civilians, to halt the use of weapons against the civilian population, including the rocket attacks against civilian suburbs of Kabul, [and] to stop the laying of land-mines. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1996/75, 23 April 1996, § 4, adopted without a vote
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on the rights of child, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Welcomes international efforts aimed at restricting and prohibiting the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines and calls upon Governments to contribute to demining activities, thereby reducing the number of child victims. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1996/85, 24 April 1996, § 18, adopted without a vote
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1998 on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Calls upon all parties to the hostilities to respect fully the applicable provisions of international humanitarian law, including article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, [and] to halt the use of weapons, including landmines. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1998/67, 21 April 1998, § 6, voting record: 31-6-16.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the human rights of persons with disabilities, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Expressing grave concern that situations of armed conflict have especially devastating consequences for the human rights of persons with disabilities,
Concerned at the extent of disabilities caused by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines and other weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, and at the long-lasting impact of these weapons which prevent the full and effective enjoyment of human rights, particularly among civilian populations, and welcoming increased international efforts to address this issue. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/49, 23 April 2003, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the human rights of persons with disabilities, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Expressing grave concern that situations of armed conflict have especially devastating consequences for the human rights of persons with disabilities,
Concerned at the extent of disabilities caused by the indiscriminate use of antipersonnel mines and other weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, and at the longlasting impact of these weapons which prevent the full and effective enjoyment of human rights, particularly among civilian populations, and welcoming increased international efforts to address this issue. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/52, 20 April 2004, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the human rights of persons with disabilities, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Expressing grave concern that situations of armed conflict have especially devastating consequences for the human rights of persons with disabilities,
Concerned at the extent of disabilities caused by the indiscriminate use of antipersonnel mines and other weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, and at the longlasting impact of these weapons which prevent the full and effective enjoyment of human rights, particularly among civilian populations, and welcoming increased international efforts to address this issue. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/65, 20 April 2005, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights
In two resolutions adopted in 1995 and 1996 respectively, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights urged States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocols. 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1995/24, 24 August 1995, § 2; Res. 1996/15, 23 August 1996, § 2.
UN Secretary-General
In 1994, in an article concerning landmines published in the journal Foreign Affairs, the UN Secretary-General recommended that the restrictions in the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocol II be strengthened. 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “The Land Mine Crisis”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73(5), September/October 1994, pp. 8–13.
UN Secretary-General
In 1998, in a report on mine clearance, the UN Secretary-General emphasized the importance of the 1997 Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines and the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, as well as the desirability of achieving the adherence of all States to both of these instruments. 
UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/53/496, Report of the Secretary-General on Assistance in Mine-Clearance, 14 October 1998, §§ 16–21.
UN Verification Mission in Guatemala
In 1995, in a report concerning the conflict in Guatemala, the Director of MINUGUA stated:
The Mission recommends that URNG [Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca] issue precise instructions to its combatants to refrain from causing unnecessary harm to individuals and property, to take due care not to create additional risks to life in attacking military targets and, in particular, to end the practice of laying mines or explosives in areas where civilians work, live or circulate. 
MINUGUA, Director, Second Report, UN Doc. A/49/929, 29 June 1995, Annex, § 197.
ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly
In a resolution on landmines in Angola adopted at its Dakar Session in February 1995, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly appealed to the Government of Angola “to finally sign and ratify the 1980 [Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] including [its] 1980 Protocol II, and abide by its provisions”. 
ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution on land mines in Angola, Doc. 95/C 245/04, Dakar, 2 February 1995, § 6.
ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly
In a resolution on landmines adopted at its Brussels Session in September 1995, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly called upon African and Asian countries which had not yet done so to ratify the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution on land mines, Doc. 95/C 61/04, Brussels, 28 September 1995, § 6.
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly/UNICEF
In a joint statement in 1993, the Social, Health and Family Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and UNICEF condemned “the widespread use of antipersonnel mines, particularly those which look like toys, of which the main victims are children”. 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Report on the situation of women and children in the former Yugoslavia, Doc. No. 6903, 22 September 1993, p. 11.
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
In a resolution on Rwanda and the prevention of humanitarian crises adopted in 1994, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly invited all member States to ratify the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and support a revision of Protocol II, particularly with a view to making self-destruct mechanisms compulsory on landmines. 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Res. 1050, 10 November 1994.
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
In 1995, in a written declaration on landmines and blinding laser weapons, 25 European parliamentarians declared their support for a strengthened 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to be applicable in non-international armed conflict. 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Written declaration No. 242 on landmines and blinding laser weapons, Doc. 7343, 29 June 1995.
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1996, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly invited,
in particular, the governments of the member states of the Council of Europe, of the states whose parliaments enjoy or have applied for special guest status with the Assembly, of the states whose parliaments enjoy observer status, namely Israel, and of all other states to:
b. ratify, if they have not done so, … the [1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] and its protocols …
j. promote extension of the aforestated United Nations Convention of 1980 to non-international armed conflicts, and inclusion in its provisions of effective procedures for verification and regular inspection. 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Res. 1085, 24 April 1996, § 8b and j.
EU Council of Ministers
In 1995, the EU Council of Ministers adopted a decision concerning a joint action on anti-personnel landmines, the aim of which was “to help combat the indiscriminate use and spread throughout the world of anti-personnel landmines which are very dangerous for civilian populations”. It stated that the member States “shall work to strengthen [the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons], in particular by … extending its scope to non-international armed conflicts [and] substantially strengthening restrictions or bans on anti-personnel mines”. 
EU, Council Decision 95/170/CFSP concerning the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty of the European Union on anti-personnel mines, 12 May 1995, Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 115, 22 May 1995, Articles 1 and 3(2). (The decision is no longer in force.)
European Commission
In 1995, in answer to a question from the European Parliament, the European Commission stated that it was conscious of the suffering inflicted by landmines and that it supported “further measures for the curtailment of the availability and use of antipersonnel-landmines, through multilateral action, with an effective regime of control and verification and with the ultimate goal of eliminating such weapons”. 
European Commission, Answer to Written Question E-1384/95 from the European Parliament, Doc. 95/C 257/59, 30 June 1995.
EU Council
In 1996, the EU Council adopted a decision concerning a joint action on anti-personnel landmines stating: “The European Union has resolved to combat and end the indiscriminate use and spread throughout the world of anti-personnel landmines as well as to contribute to solving problems already caused by these weapons.” 
EU, Council Decision 96/588/CFSP concerning the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty of the European Union on anti-personnel landmines, 1 October 1996, Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 260, 12 October 1996, Article 1.
European Union
At the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1999, the EU stated: “Wide adherence to Amended Protocol II to the [Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] is … important … The EU is committed to the goal of total elimination of anti-personnel mines world-wide as well as to contributing to solving problems caused by these weapons.” 
EU, Statement at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 15 December 1999.
OAU Council of Ministers
In a resolution adopted in 1994 on respect for international humanitarian law and support for humanitarian action in armed conflicts, the OAU Council of Ministers invited its members to “consider, or reconsider, without delay the possibility” of adhering to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
OAU, Council of Ministers, Res. 1526 (LX), 6–11 June 1994, § 6(b).
OAU Council of Ministers
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and problems posed by the proliferation of anti-personnel mines in Africa, the OAU Council of Ministers stated that it was “deeply concerned over the tragic consequences resulting from the generalised and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines and the fact that of all the regions of the world, Africa is the continent with the largest number of these weapons”. It further condemned “cases of flagrant violation of the IHL by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines” and urged member States to support an African common position advocating “the extension of the field of application of the 1980 Convention to non-international armed conflicts”. 
OAU, Council of Ministers, Res. 1593 (LXII), 21–23 June 1995, preamble and §§ 2, 3 and 4(ii).
OAU Council of Ministers
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on the revision of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and problems posed by the proliferation of anti-personnel mines in Africa, the OAU Council of Ministers noted that the African continent had the largest presence of landmines of all continents. It condemned the indiscriminate use of landmines and urged all member States which had not yet acceded to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons “to consider doing so as early as possible, particularly to its Protocol II”. 
OAU, Council of Ministers, Res. 1628 (LXIII), 26–28 February 1996, preamble and §§ 2 and 3.
OAU/ICRC Seminar on IHL
In the recommendations of the second OAU/ICRC seminar on IHL for diplomats accredited to the OAU in 1995, the participants expressed “their deep concern about the scourge of mines and their generalised and indiscriminate use and the attendant harmful consequences”. They recommended the “establishment and adoption … of an African common position on the following issues: … The extension of the scope of implementation of the 1980 Convention to non-international armed conflicts [and] inclusion, in the Convention, of a mechanism to guarantee an effective implementation of the Convention.” 
OAU/ICRC, Second seminar on IHL for diplomats accredited to the OAU, Addis Ababa, 12 April 1995, Recommendations, p. 3, § 3(c).
OAS General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1994 on respect for international humanitarian law, the OAS General Assembly stated that it was “deeply disturbed by the testing, production, sale, transfer, and use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects”. It urged all member States to accede to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
OAS, General Assembly, Res. 1270 (XXIV-O/94), 10 June 1994, preamble and § 1.
OAS General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on respect for international humanitarian law, the OAS General Assembly stated that it was “alarmed by the terrible and lasting consequences for the civilian population of the use of anti-personnel mines”. It urged member States “to consider the possibility of becoming parties to the 1980 [Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] and … to take part in the Review Conference on that Convention”. 
OAS, General Assembly, Res. 1335 (XXV-O/95), 9 June 1995, preamble and § 1.
OAS General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on respect for international humanitarian law, the OAS General Assembly stated that it was “particularly alarmed at the indiscriminate effects of land mines on the civilian population and on humanitarian action” and urged those countries that deemed it desirable to consider the possibility of taking steps internally to prohibit the manufacture, sale and exportation of anti-personal mines”. It urged non-parties to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to accede to it. 
OAS, General Assembly, Res. 1408 (XXVI-O/96), 7 June 1996, preamble and § 1.
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
Mexico and Switzerland proposed a draft article to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH entitled “Anti-tank and anti-personnel mines” which read:
1. It is prohibited to lay mines in an area which contains a concentration of civilians and in which combat between ground forces is neither taking place nor imminent, unless:
(a) they are placed on or in the immediate vicinity of a military objective; and
(b) effective precautions have been taken to protect civilians from their effects.
2. The location of methodically laid minefields shall be recorded on sketches or plans, or shown on topographic maps. Such documents shall, so far as possible, be prepared in respect of mines laid during combat. These documents shall be preserved in order to make possible the subsequent removal of the mines without danger.
3. It is prohibited to lay remotely-delivered mines or similar explosive devices which are dropped, fired or teleguided, unless:
(a) they are equipped with a self-destruct or neutralization mechanism which becomes operative on the expiry of … hours at most, and
(b) the area in which they are employed is inside the combat zone of the ground forces. 
CDDH, Draft article entitled “Anti-tank and anti-personnel mines” submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons by Mexico and Switzerland, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/211 within CDDH/IV/226, p. 585.
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
In the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, a proposal entitled “Anti-personnel land-mines” which stated that “anti-personnel land-mines must not be laid by aircraft” was supported by Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, Colombia, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Norway, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
CDDH, Proposal entitled “Anti-personnel land-mines” submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons by Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, Colombia, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Norway, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/201 (V) within CDDH/IV/226, p. 581.
According to an explanatory memorandum:
The use of anti-personnel mines is a generally accepted means of hampering enemy advance and of putting combatants out of action.
However, certain ways of employing anti-personnel landmines may easily lead to injuries indiscriminately being inflicted upon combatants and civilians. The risks for such results are especially high if such mines are laid, perhaps in very large numbers, by aircraft. The limits of the mines will often be very uncertain with this method. The results are apt to be particularly cruel if the mines are not equipped with self-destruction devices which will function reliably after a relatively short time. The risk of indiscriminate effects may be reduced also through marking of minefields – this is not possible, however, when the mines are scattered over a vast area. 
CDDH, Explanatory Memorandum on “Anti-personnel land-mines” submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons by Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, Colombia, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Norway, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/201 within CDDH/IV/226, pp. 581–582.
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
A draft text entitled “The Regulation of the Use of Land-Mines and Other Devices” proposed by Denmark, France, Netherlands and the United Kingdom to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH elaborated upon an earlier proposal made at the Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons in Lugano in 1976. This draft text suggested a number of measures including: the compulsory recording of pre-planned minefields (Article 2); a prohibition on the use of remotely delivered mines unless these mines were self-neutralizing or the target area was marked (Article 3); and the prohibition of manually emplaced mines in towns or civilian areas unless “they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective” or “due precautions are taken to protect civilians from their effects” (Article 4). 
CDDH, Proposal entitled “The Regulation of the Use of Land-Mines and Other Devices” submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons by Denmark, France, Netherlands and United Kingdom, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/213 within CDDH/IV/226, pp. 588–591.
The proposal was generally favourably received and was explicitly supported by the Federal Republic of Germany and Libya. 
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.30, 26 May 1976, p. 308 (Federal Republic of Germany); Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.40, 19 May 1977, p. 411 (Libya).
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
A draft article was introduced by Austria, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, which read, inter alia, as follows:
1. It is forbidden to use mines and devices to which this article applies in an area containing a concentration of civilians and in which combat between ground forces is not taking place or is not imminent unless effective precautions are taken to protect civilians from their effects.
2. The location of pre-planned minefields shall always be recorded. Minefields laid during combat and the location of certain explosive and non-explosive devices shall be recorded as far as possible. These records shall be preserved in order to make possible the subsequent removal of the mines and devices and to make the records public when it is necessary.
3. The use of remotely-delivered mines is prohibited unless
(a) each such mine is fitted with a neutralizing mechanism which renders the mine harmless within a period of …, and
(b) they are used within the combat zone. 
CDDH, “Draft article on the Use of Land Mines and the Use of Certain Explosive and Non-Explosive Devices” submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons by Austria, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/222 within CDDH/IV/226, p. 593.
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
A proposal submitted by Austria, Denmark, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH provided:
1. Scope of application
The proposals relate to the use in armed conflict on land of the mines and other devices defined therein …
3. Recording of the location of minefields and other devices
(1) The Parties to a conflict shall record the location of:
(a) all pre-planned minefields laid by them; and
(b) all areas in which they have made large-scale and pre-planned use of explosive or non-explosive devices.
(2) The Parties shall endeavour to ensure the recording of the location of all other minefields, mines and explosive and non-explosive devices which they have laid or placed in position.
(3) All such records shall be retained by the Parties and the location of all recorded minefields, mines and explosive or non-explosive devices remaining in territory controlled by an adverse Party shall be made public after the cessation of hostilities.
4. Restrictions on the use of remotely delivered mines
The use of remotely delivered mines is prohibited unless:
(a) each such mine is fitted with an effective neutralizing mechanism, that is to say a self-actuating or remotely controlled mechanism which is designed to render a mine harmless or cause it to destroy itself when it is anticipated that the mine will no longer serve the military purpose for which it was placed in position;
or
(b) the area in which they are delivered is marked in some definite manner in order to warn the civilian population,
and, in either case, they are only used within an area containing military objectives.
5. Restrictions on the use of mines and other devices in populated areas
(1) This proposal applies to mines (other than remotely delivered [anti-tank] mines), explosive and non-explosive devices, and other manually-emplaced munitions and devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time.
(2) It is prohibited to use any object to which this proposal applies in any city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians in which combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear to be imminent, unless either:
(a) they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective belonging to or under the control of an adverse Party; or
(b) effective precautions are taken to protect civilians from their effects. 
CDDH, Proposal submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons by Austria, Denmark, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom, Working Group Document CDDH/IV/GT/4*, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/408/Rev. 1, pp. 544–546.
UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
The Final Report of the UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons submitted to the UN General Assembly stated in connection with Article 3 of the 1980 Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons:
The parties must take whatever measures are open to them to protect civilians wherever they are. They may use records for this purpose by, for example, marking minefields or otherwise warning the civilian population of the dangers of mines and booby traps. 
UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Second Session, Geneva, 15 September–10 October 1980, Final Report to the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/15, 27 October 1980, p. 9.
International Conference of the Red Cross (1986)
The 25th International Conference of the Red Cross in 1986 adopted a resolution on work on international humanitarian law in armed conflicts at sea and on land in which it urged all States to become parties to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocols “as early as possible so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence”. It also noted “the dangers to civilians caused by mines … employed during an armed conflict and the need for international co-operation in this field consistent with Article 9 of Protocol II attached to the 1980 Convention”. 
25th International Conference of the Red Cross, Geneva, 23–31 October 1986, Res. VII, § B(2) and (5).
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (1995)
The 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 1995 adopted a resolution on the protection of the civilian population in period of armed conflict in which it urged “all States which have not yet done so to become party to the [1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] and in particular to its Protocol II on landmines, with a view to achieving universal adherence thereto” and further underlined “the importance of respect for its provisions by all parties to armed conflict”. 
26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 3–7 December 1995, Res. II, § G(g).
First Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
At the Second Session of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1996, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States each made statements of understanding concerning the word “primarily” in Article 2(3) of Amended Protocol II. All stated in similar terms that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle, as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices shall not be considered to be anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.  
First Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Second Session), Interpretative statements on article 2 of Amended Protocol II, UN Doc. CCW/CONF.I/SR.14, 3 May 1996, pp. 3 and 4, § 8.
ICRC Regional Seminar for Asian Military and Strategic Studies Experts
In the Final Declaration of the ICRC Regional Seminar for Asian Military and Strategic Studies Experts in 1997, the participants called upon States of the Asian region but also the international community to consider the following urgent measures especially
for those States which are not yet Parties, adherence to the 1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, including its Protocol II on landmines (as amended on 3 May 1996), and for current States party to this Convention that have not yet done so adherence to its amended Protocol II at the earliest possible date to ensure its early entry into force. 
ICRC Regional Seminar for Asian Military and Strategic Studies Experts, Manila, 20–23 July 1997, Final Declaration, Anti-personnel Mines: What Future for Asia?, pp. 3–4.
Inter-Parliamentary Conference (1999)
In a resolution adopted in 1999 on challenges posed by calamities arising from armed conflict, the 93rd Inter-Parliamentary Conference called on States “to lay down a ban on anti-personnel mines” during the review of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and, pending their total prohibition,
(a) to stipulate that all anti-personnel mines must be equipped with effective self-destruction devices;
(b) to ban all mines which cannot be easily localized and to recommend specifications to this end;
(c) to broaden the Convention to cover all internal conflicts. 
93rd Inter-Parliamentary Conference, Madrid, 27 March–1 April 1999, Resolution on the International Community in the Face of the Challenges posed by Calamities Arising from Armed Conflicts and by Natural or Man-made Disasters: The Need for a Coherent and Effective Response through Political and Humanitarian Assistance Means and Mechanisms Adapted to the Situation, § 16.
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
In a resolution on anti-personnel mines adopted in 1995, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights urged African States to “participate in large numbers in the 1996 Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to press for the introduction of a clause on the prohibition or restriction of the use of mines in that Convention”. 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Res. 4 (XVII), 13–22 March 1995, §§ 1 and 2.
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
In its Central Front (Ethiopia’s Claim) partial award in 2004, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, in considering the permitted uses of landmines, stated:
For liability, the Commission would have to conclude that landmines were used in ways that intentionally targeted civilians or were indiscriminate. However, the available evidence suggests that landmines were extensively used as part of the defenses of … trenches and field fortifications. … In principle, the defensive use of minefields to protect trenches would be a lawful use under customary international law. 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Central Front, Ethiopia’s Claim, Partial Award, 28 April 2004, § 95.
ICRC
To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces that:
Mines other than remotely delivered, booby-traps and other devices may be use in populated areas:
a) when they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective belonging to or under the control of the enemy; or
b) when measures are taken to protect civilian persons (e.g. warning signs, sentries, issue of warnings, provision of fences).
The location shall be recorded of
a) pre-planned minefields;
b) areas where large-scale and pre-planned use is made of booby-traps;
c) other minefields, mines and booby-traps, when the tactical situation permits.
Remotely delivered mines may be used:
a) only within an area
– being itself a military objective, or
– containing military objectives; and
b) when their location can be accurately recorded, or an effective neutralizing mechanism is used on each mine;
c) subject to effective advance warning to the civilian population, when the tactical situation permits. 
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, §§ 924–930.
ICRC
In May 1993, in a publication entitled “Mines: A Perverse Use of Technology”, the ICRC condemned the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines. 
ICRC, Mines: A Perverse Use of Technology, May 1993, extracts reprinted in Louis Maresca and Stuart Maslen (eds.), The Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 257–263.
Council of Delegates (1993)
At its Birmingham Session in 1993, the Council of Delegates adopted a resolution on mines, in which it urged States
which have not yet done so to ratify the 1980 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and to seek, during the forthcoming Review Conference, effective means to deal with the problem caused by mines by reinforcing the normative provisions of the Convention and by introducing implementation mechanisms. 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Council of Delegates, Birmingham Session, 29–30 October 1993, Res. 3, § 1.
ICRC
At the Second Session of the Meeting of Governmental Experts to prepare the Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in May 1994, the ICRC made several different proposals on prohibitions and restrictions on anti-personnel mines. While the ICRC’s preferred option was a blanket prohibition on the use, manufacture, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines, it also proposed an alternative prohibiting the use, manufacture, stockpiling or transfer of certain types of mines including: mines that are not easily detectable; mines with anti-handling devices; mines without an effective self-destruction mechanism; and “anti-vehicle mines that are not equipped with an effective integrated self-neutralizing mechanism together with an effective locating mechanism”. 
ICRC, Proposal at the Meeting of Governmental Experts to Prepare the CCW Review Conference (Second Session), UN Doc. CCW/CONF.I/GE/CRP.24, 27 May 1994, reprinted in Louis Maresca and Stuart Maslen (eds.), The Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 322–324.
ICRC
In 1994, in a statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the ICRC, after expressing its support for a total ban on anti-personnel mines, added: “As a minimum all anti-personnel mines should automatically and reliably render themselves harmless within a specified period of time.” 
ICRC, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 49/PV.10, 24 October 1994, p. 11.
ICRC
In 1995, in a position paper on landmines, the ICRC stated:
If States are unable, in the short term, to agree to a total prohibition on the use of anti-personnel mines, the ICRC proposes, as a minimum, the banning of all anti-personnel landmines lacking effective self-destruct mechanisms.
The paper also outlined other “essential minimum steps” that must be taken in order to protect civilians and to facilitate mine clearance including: the prohibition of mines that are not easily detectable; an extension of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to cover all internal conflicts; reinforcing implementation mechanisms for the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; and encouraging universal adherence to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
ICRC, Position Paper No. 1 Landmines and Blinding Weapons: From Expert Group to the Review Conference, February 1995, reprinted in Louis Maresca and Stuart Maslen (eds.), The Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 328–331.
Council of Delegates (1995)
At its Geneva Session in 1995, the Council of Delegates adopted a resolution on anti-personnel landmines in which it expressed its “great concern about the indiscriminate effects of anti-personnel landmines and the consequences for civilian populations and humanitarian action”. 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Council of Delegates, Geneva Session, 1–2 December 1995, Res. 10, § 1.
ICRC
In 1996, in a statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the ICRC welcomed the improvements that had been made in the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. These improvements included: the extension of the Protocol to non-international conflicts; protections for humanitarian workers; annual meetings of States parties; and a requirement that States punish serious violations of the Amended Protocol. The ICRC went on to make the case for a total ban on the basis that “the new limitations on the use of anti-personnel mines are both weak and complex” and “the implementation of new provisions on detectability and self-destruction can be delayed for up to nine years after entry into force of the revised Protocol”.  
ICRC, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 51/PV.8, 18 October 1996, p. 9.
Council of Delegates (1999)
At its Geneva Session in 1999, the Council of Delegates adopted a resolution in which it approved the Movement Strategy on Landmines, one of the core elements of which was to “achieve universal adherence to and effective implementation of the norms established by the Ottawa Convention and amended Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons”. 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Council of Delegates, Geneva Session, 29–30 October 1999, Res. 10, § 1.
Americas Watch
In 1986, in a report on landmines in El Salvador and Nicaragua, Americas Watch listed the following uses of landmines, booby-traps and related devices among those that “should be prohibited in the conduct of hostilities in both countries”:
1. Their direct use against individual or groups of unarmed civilians where no legitimate military objective, such as enemy combatants or war material, is present. Such uses of these weapons are indiscriminate.
2. The direct use against civilian objects, i.e., towns, villages, dwellings or buildings dedicated to civilian purposes where no military objective is present. Such weapons’ use is also indiscriminate.
3. The use of any remotely delivered mines which are not effectively marked and have no self-actuating or remotely controlled mechanism to cause its destruction or neutralization once its military purpose has been served. Such mines are “blind weapons” and their use is indiscriminate as to time.
4. The use of hand delivered mines, such as Claymore varieties, and booby-traps in or near a civilian locale containing military objectives which are deployed without any precaution, markings or other warnings, or which do not self-destruct or are not removed once their military purpose has been served. Such uses are similarly indiscriminate. 
Americas Watch, Land Mines in El Salvador and Nicaragua: The Civilian Victims, New York, December 1986, pp. 100–101.
[emphasis in original]
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)
According to the Report on the Practice of El Salvador, the FMLN acknowledged in 1987 that landmines are important for its strategy, but has stated that they were directed exclusively against the army. 
Report on the Practice of El Salvador, 1997, Chapter 3.3, referring to “La guerra en el mes de julio y el informe castrense”, Estudios Centroamericanos, Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, Vol. XLII, No. 465, July 1987, p. 65.
The report alleges that the FMLN did not comply with the requirement of sign-posting minefields. 
Report on the Practice of El Salvador, 1997, Chapter 3.3, referring to IDHUCA, Instituto de Derechos Humanos, Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, Los Derechos Humanos en El Salvador en 1989, San Salvador, 1991.
International Institute of Humanitarian Law
The Rules of International Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-international Armed Conflicts, adopted in 1990 by the Council of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, state:
In application of the general rules listed in section A above, especially those on the distinction between combatants and civilians and on the immunity of the civilian population, mines, booby-traps and other devices within the meaning of Protocol II to the [1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] may not be directed against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians, nor used indiscriminately.
To ensure the protection of the civilian population referred to in the previous paragraphs, precautions must be taken to protect them from attacks in the form of mines, booby-traps and other devices. 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Rules of International Humanitarian Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-international Armed Conflicts, Rule B4, IRRC, No. 278, 1990, p. 399.
Economic and Political Weekly
An editorial in Economic and Political Weekly in 1997 stated that India was in favour of a “‘phased approach’ [to restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines] which will for the present allow the use of land-mines in the defence of countries’ borders”. 
Editorial entitled “Welcome Movement”, Economic and Political Weekly, 27 September 1997, p. 2433.
Africa Watch
In 1998, in a report on violations of the laws of war by both sides in Angola, Africa Watch stated:
It is prohibited to use landmines near a civilian object, even if it contains military objectives, without any precautions, markings or other warnings or if such devices do not self-destruct or are not removed after their military purpose has been served. 
Africa Watch, Angola: Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides, New York, April 1998, p. 58.