Practice Relating to Rule 8. Definition of Military Objectives
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Hague Convention (IX)
Article 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IX) allows the bombardment of “[m]ilitary works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war matériel, workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the harbour”. 
Hague Convention (IX) concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 2.

Geneva Conventions I and IV
Article 19 and Article 4 Annex I of the 1949 Geneva Convention I and Article 18 and Article 4 Annex I of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV use the term “military objectives” without, however, defining it. 
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 19 and Article 4 Annex I; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 18 and Article 4 Annex I.

Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property does not define a military objective, but Article 8 provides that refuges intended to shelter movable cultural property, centres containing monuments, and other immovable cultural property of very great importance may be placed under special protection, provided that they:
a) are situated at an adequate distance from any large industrial centre or from any important military objective constituting a vulnerable point, such as, for example, an aerodrome, broadcasting station, establishment engaged upon work of national defence, a port or railway station of relative importance or a main line of communication;
b) are not used for military purposes. 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954, Article 8.

Additional Protocol I
Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides:
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 52(2). Article 52 was adopted by 79 votes in favour, none against and 7 abstentions. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.41, 26 May 1977, p. 168.

Protocol II, Amended Protocol II, and Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
According to the identical definitions provided by Article 2(4) of the 1980 Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Article 2(6) of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and Article 1(3) of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons:
“Military objective” means, so far as objects are concerned, any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980, Article 2(4); Protocol on Prohibitions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 3 May 1996, Article 2(6); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980, Article 1(3).

Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
Article 1(f) of the 1999 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property defines a military objective as:
An object which by its nature, location, purpose, or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Second Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 26 March 1999, Article 1(f).

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Lieber Code
Article 15 of the 1863 Lieber Code provides:
Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of “armed” enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally “unavoidable” in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy’s country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army. Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God. 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Order No. 100 by President Abraham Lincoln, Washington D.C., 24 April 1863, Article 15.

Hague Rules of Air Warfare
Article 24(1) of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare provides: “Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military objective, that is to say, an object of which the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military advantage to the belligerent.” 
Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, Part II, drafted by a Commission of Jurists, The Hague, December 1922–February 1923, Article 24(1).

New Delhi Draft Rules
Article 7 of the 1956 New Delhi Draft Rules provides:
Only objectives belonging to the categories of objective which, in view of their essential characteristics, are generally acknowledged to be of military importance, may be considered as military objectives. Those categories are listed in the annex to the present rules.
However, even if they belong to one of those categories, they cannot be considered as a military objective where their total or partial destruction, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers no military advantage. 
Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, September 1956, submitted to governments for their consideration on behalf of the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross, New Delhi, 28 October–7 November, Res. XIII, Article 7.

San Remo Manual
Paragraph 40 of the 1994 San Remo Manual adopts the same definition of military objectives as Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
Louise Doswald-Beck (ed.), San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 12 June 1994, Prepared by international lawyers and naval experts convened by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, § 40.

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Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1989) states:
4.02 (2). … military objectives, that is, those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action or whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
4.19. Military objective. Military objectives, in so far as objects are concerned, are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action or whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Argentina, Leyes de Guerra, PC-08-01, Público, Edición 1989, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, aprobado por Resolución No. 489/89 del Ministerio de Defensa, 23 April 1990, §§ 4.02(2) and 4.19.

Australia
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) states:
525 – Military objectives are those persons and objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. The objective must be measured by its effect on the whole military operation or campaign and the attack should not be viewed in isolation. Military advantage includes the security of friendly forces.

916 – Civilian property or objectives are defined as anything which are not military objectives. Military objectives are:

c) objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, §§ 525 and 916c.

Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states:
5.27 The term “military objective” includes combatant members of the enemy armed forces and their military weapons, vehicles, equipment and installations. It may include other objects that have military value such as bridges, communications towers, electricity and refined oil production facilities. Objects are however, only military objectives if they come within the following definition:
“those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.” (Article 52 (2) G. P. I) [1977 Additional Protocol I]
5.28 These criteria require commanders and others planning, deciding on or launching attacks to exercise their discretion. In doing so they must necessarily reach their decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information from all sources which is practicably available to them at the relevant time.
5.29 The taxonomy of defining of military objectives contains a number of elements:
• The second part of the definition limits the first. Both parts must apply before an object can be considered a military objective.
• Nature refers to the type of object, for example, military transports, command and control centres or communications stations.
Location includes areas which are militarily important because they must be captured or denied to the enemy or because the enemy must be made to retreat from them. An area of land can, thus, be a military objective.
Purpose means the future intended use of an object while “use” means its present function.
• The words nature, location, purpose or use seem at first sight to allow a wide discretion, but they are subject to the qualifications later in the definition of “effective contribution to military action” and the offering of “a definite military advantage”. There does not have to be geographical proximity between “effective contribution” and “military advantage.” That means that attacks on military supply dumps in the rear or diversionary attacks, away from the area of actual military operations, can be launched.
Military action means military action generally, not a limited or specific military operation.
• The words in the circumstances ruling at the time are important. If, for example, the enemy moved a divisional headquarters into a disused textile factory, an attack on that headquarters would be permissible (even though the factory might be destroyed in the process) because of the prevailing circumstances. Once the enemy moved their headquarters away, the circumstances would change again and the protection of the factory as a civilian object would be restored.
Definite means a concrete and perceptible military advantage rather than a hypothetical and speculative one.
• The military advantage anticipated from an attack refers to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack. The advantage need not be immediate. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, §§ 5.27–5.29; see also § 6.37 regarding maritime operations.

Belgium
Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) states:
Considered as military objectives are:
1) Persons: combatants
2) Objects: a) objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action
3) Places: every defended position. This does not necessarily mean that it must be reinforced: it is sufficient that enemy troops go through it, or that it is protected by mine fields, or that its access is closed by artillery fire. 
Belgium, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit de la Guerre, Ecole Royale Militaire, par J. Maes, Chargé de cours, Avocat-général près la Cour Militaire, D/1983/1187/029, 1983, p. 27.

Belgium’s Regulations on the Tactical Use of Large Units (1994) states: “An objective is the final goal of an action. It is defined as either an area of land of tactical importance or as enemy elements that have to be destroyed or neutralized.” 
Belgium, L’Emploi Tactique des Grandes Unités, Règlement G 119, Ministère de la Défense Nationale, Etat-Major Général, Force Terrestre, Sections Operations et Entraînement, 1994 (édition provisoire), § 210.

Benin
Benin’s Military Manual (1995) states:
Military objectives comprise:

- Establishments, positions, buildings where armed forces or material belonging to them are situated (example: positions, barracks, stores);
- Other objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage (geographic spots of tactical importance, crests, thalwegs, mined areas). 
Benin, Le Droit de la Guerre, III fascicules, Forces Armées du Bénin, Ministère de la Défense nationale, 1995, Fascicule I, pp. 12–13.

Burundi
Burundi’s Regulations on International Humanitarian Law (2007) states that “military objectives [are] … objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, contribute to military action of the enemy and whose capture, destruction or neutralization offers a definite military advantage”. 
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, p. 16; see also pp. 9, 23, 32, 53 and 86.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (1992) states:
2.1.2 Military objective definition: Is considered a military objective:

- positions, barracks, warehouses;
- other goods whose existence or destruction contributes in some way to the military action.

3.2.1. Two categories of elements allow to define a military objective: those in relation with the military action and those in relation with the military advantage.
1- Elements necessary to the military action
A military objective can only be identified or defined by its importance to military action. Three different signs are relevant to this matter: the nature of the objective, the location of the objective and the function of the objective.
First, regarding the nature of the objective, it can be acknowledged that the military character of a good or objective can only be appreciated in relation to its value to armed forces. For example, a mortar is only valuable for combatants.
Second, regarding the location of the objective, it must be noted that the military character of a good or objective can also be defined by its location at the moment of the attack. However, it must be highlighted that it is always difficult to conduct an exact assessment, especially in large cities and forest areas, where military objectives and civilian goods are side by side.
Finally, regarding the function of the objective, it is important to indicate that a military objective is the one that is subjected to or may be subjected to attack from belligerents in order to obtain military advantage or its utilization to this end.
2- Elements enabling military advantage
In addition to the military action, the military objective is also defined with regard to the precise military advantage it provides. This is why, the capture or use of a military objective must enable, for example, putting the enemy to flight, the partial or total occupation of the enemy’s positions, the capture of a large number of prisoners, or the achievement of a partial or total military victory. 
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, p. 81; see also p. 17.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states that “military objectives [are] … objects which by virtue of their existence or destruction contribute in whatever way to military action”. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 92, § 352.12; see also p. 134, § 412.12.

The Elements of the Definition [of a Military Objective] (Article 52 First Protocol [1977 Additional Protocol I])
Two categories of elements define the military objective: those relating to the military action and those relating to the military advantage.
1. Elements necessary for military action
A military objective can only be defined or identified by its importance for military action.
Three aspects are relevant to this matter: the nature of the objective, the location of the objective and the function of the objective.
Firstly, regarding the nature of the objective, it must be noted that the military character of an object or an objective may only be appreciated in relation to its value for the armed forces. Thus, a mortar is only valuable for combatants.
Next, regarding the location of the objective, it must be noted that the military character of an object or objective is defined by its location at the moment of attack. It must be stressed that it is nonetheless always difficult to make an exact assessment, notably in large cities and forest areas where military objectives and civilian objects are located in close proximity to one another. It must further be noticed that the destination or use conferred upon an object can give it a military character. This is the case, for example, with schools which are transformed into military objects [objectives] [and] with objects indispensable for the survival of the [civilian] population which are used for the sole sustenance of members of the armed forces or other ends that support military action.
Lastly, regarding the function of the objective, it is important to specify that a military objective is one that is subjected or may be subjected to attacks by belligerents in order to obtain military advantages, or is used to these ends.
2. Elements enabling military advantage
In addition to the military action, the military objective is also defined by the relation to the precise military advantage which it procures. This is why the capture or use of a military objective must, for example, permit putting the enemy to flight, partially or totally occupying his positions, detaining large numbers of prisoners of war, or obtaining a partial or total military victory. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 215, § 521.

Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) states:
“Military objectives” are objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage. A specific area of land may constitute a military objective. 
Canada The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-1, § 8; see also Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 4 June 2001, Rule 1, § 4.

Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on targeting:
406. Definition of legitimate targets
1. “Legitimate targets” include combatants, unlawful combatants and military objectives.
2. “Military objectives” are objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage. A specific area of land may constitute a military objective. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 406.

Canada’s Code of Conduct (2005) states:
Military objectives are those objects which make an effective contribution to military action due to their nature, location, purpose or use. Secondly, to be a military objective, the destruction or neutralization of the same must offer a definite military advantage to your operation. Thus, the characteristics of a military objective will vary depending on the type of operation and the mission assigned to the CF [Canadian Forces]. For example a bridge or a military barracks may well be a military objective in an armed conflict yet are unlikely to be so during a peace support operation. 
Canada, Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 2005, Rule 1, § 4.

Canada’s Use of Force Manual (2008), in a section entitled “Principles and rules governing the use of force that directly relates to the conduct of armed conflict”, states:
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.  
Canada, Use of Force for CF Operations, Canadian Forces Joint Publication, Chief of the Defence Staff, B-GJ-005-501/FP-001, August 2008, § 112.1.b; see also Glossary, p. GL-3.

Central African Republic
The Central African Republic’s Instructor’s Manual (1999) states in Volume 1 (Basic and team leader instruction):
The following are considered military objectives:

- any other objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage (geographic spots of tactical importance, crests, thalwegs, mined areas). 
Central African Republic, Le Droit de la Guerre, Fascicule No. 1: Formation élémentaire toutes armés (FETA), formation commune de base (FCB), certificat d’aptitude technique No. 1 (Chef d’équipe), Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Centrafricaines, 1999, Chapter II, Section I, § 3.

Chad
Chad’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states that military objectives include “other property which, by their nature, location, objective or use effectively contribute to the military action”. 
Chad, Droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces armées et de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 57; see also p. 58.

Colombia
Colombia’s Military Manual (1999) states:
Objects that are normally of a civilian nature can, according to the military situation, become military objectives (for example, a house, a bridge tactically used by defenders, and therefore a target for the attackers). … Military objectives are those “objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage”. 
Colombia, Derechos Humanos & Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual de Instrucción de la Guía de Conducta para el Soldado e Infante de Marina, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Oficina de Derechos Humanos, Fuerzas Militares de Colombia, Santafé de Bogotá, 1999, pp. 16 and 17.

Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book I (Basic instruction):
I.2 Military objectives

- objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization offers a definite military advantage. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre I: Instruction de base, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 18; see also Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 2: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 2ème année, Manuel de l’instructeur, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 28; Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 25.

Croatia
Croatia’s LOAC Compendium (1991) states that military targets are:
- Armed forces,
- Military installations, positions,
- Objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use contribute to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization provide a certain military advantage. 
Croatia, Compendium “Law of Armed Conflicts”, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1991, p. 7.

Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) states:
Military objectives are combatants and those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, effectively contribute to the enemy’s war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of the attack. Military advantage may involve a variety of considerations, including the security of the attacking forces. 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 8.1.1.

France
France’s LOAC Teaching Note (2000) states:
Military objectives are those military units and objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage. 
France, Fiche didactique relative au droit des conflits armés, Directive of the Ministry of Defence, 4 January 2000, annexed to the Directive No. 147 of the Ministry of Defence of 4 January 2000, p. 2.

France’s LOAC Manual (2001) states:
Regarding objects, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 90.

Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) states:
Military objectives are armed forces – including paratroops in descent (…) but no crew members parachuting from an aircraft in distress … – and objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 442.

Hungary
Hungary’s Military Manual (1992) states that military objectives are:
- Armed forces
- Military establishments, positions
- Objects that by their nature, location, purpose [or] use, contribute to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture [or] neutralization offers a definite military advantage. 
Hungary, A Hadijog, Jegyzet a Katonai, Föiskolák Hallgatói Részére, Magyar Honvédség Szolnoki Repülötiszti Föiskola, 1992, p. 18.

Indonesia
Indonesia’s Directive on Human Rights in Irian Jaya and Maluku (1995) provides: “Only property which contributes to the objectives of rebels (‘GPK’) may be attacked.” 
Indonesia, Directive concerning Human Rights, issued by the Commander of the Regional Military Command of Irian Jaya and Maluku, 1995, § 9(a).

Ireland
Ireland’s Basic LOAC Guide (2005) states:
Military objectives are “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”. 
Ireland, Basic Guide to the Law of Armed Conflict, TP/TRG/01-2005, Director of Defence Forces Training, Department of Defence, July 2005, p. 4.

Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states: “A military target is any target that, if attacked, would damage the military competence/fitness of the other side.” 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 23.

A military target for attack is a target that, through its nature, content or use would make an effective contribution to the military actions of the other side, and the neutralisation thereof would give the attacker a clear military advantage. A soldier is an obvious military target, while a little girl playing on the swings in the playground is certainly not. A clear military target is, for example, an enemy position and a clear civilian target is a playground. However, in between these two extremes lie a whole spectrum of examples that are less clear-cut. For example, a factory that produces steel and that is used to built tanks, and a factory that produces the raw materials used in the production of gunpowder. Discussions regarding the distinction between military and non-military targets, and how far it might [be] possible to stretch the limits are very extensive in the modern era. These questions intensified during World War II, when air forces were involved in the extensive bombing of infrastructure. In that war the definition of a military target became overextended and were also applied to telecommunications centres, steel factories, power stations, strategic installations and more. 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, pp. 23–24.

Italy
Italy’s IHL Manual (1991) states:
Direct attacks are permitted against enemy objectives whose total or partial destruction offers a definite military advantage, and, in particular, against Armed Forces and military camps, the works and military establishments, the works and the equipment for defence, deposits, offices, installations, communication lines and means that are used by Armed Forces.
Military objectives are not only those which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage, but also a particular zone of land which would be convenient to acquire or to prohibit to the enemy. 
Italy, Manuale di diritto umanitario, Introduzione e Volume I, Usi e convenzioni di Guerra, SMD-G-014, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, Vol. I, § 12.

Kenya
Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997) states that military objectives are:
- the armed forces except medical service and religious personnel and objects
- the establishments, buildings and positions where armed forces or their material are located (e.g. positions, barracks, stores, concentration of troops).
- other objects:
- which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action
- whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Kenya, Law of Armed Conflict, Military Basic Course (ORS), 4 Précis, The School of Military Police, 1997, Précis No. 2, p. 11.

Madagascar
Madagascar’s Military Manual (1994) states:
C. Military objectives – DEFINITION
a) the armed forces except medical service and religious personnel and objects.
b) the establishments, buildings and positions where armed forces or their material are located (e.g. positions, barracks, stores, depots).
c) other objects: which make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Madagascar, Le Droit des Conflits Armés, Ministère des Forces Armées, August 1994, Fiche No. 2-SO, § C.

Mexico
Mexico’s IHL Guidelines (2009) states:
Military objectives are:

- … objects which by their nature, location or purpose make an effective contribution to military action and whose destruction or capture offers a military advantage. 
Mexico, Cartilla de Derecho Internacional Humanitario, Ministry of National Defence, 2009, § 8.

Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands states:
The concept of “military objective” is defined:
They are objects which:
- by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
- whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage.
Three elements of the definition have to be present. First, the objects have “to make an effective contribution to military action”, based on “their nature, location, purpose or use”. In addition, the attack must offer “a definite military advantage” in the circumstances ruling at the time. 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, pp. V-2 and V-3.

The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states: “Attacks are permissible only if directed against military targets, i.e. where total or partial destruction confers clear military advantage on the combatants.” 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0225.

0508. The term “military objective” is also defined. Military objectives are objects which:
- by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
- whose total or partial destruction, capture or deactivation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
0509. Under this definition, which deals with equipment and infrastructure, it must not be forgotten, first, that the armed forces constitute a military objective. This means the combatants who belong to the armed forces, and the equipment used by them (tanks, vehicles, aircraft, etc). A non-combatant, who may not take part in hostilities, but uses a weapon, also forms a military objective.

0511. The circumstances of the time are decisive as to whether an object constitutes a military objective. The definition leaves the necessary discretion to the commanding officer. The Dutch Government, in ratifying AP I [1977 Additional Protocol I], has declared in this connection that military commanders who are responsible for carrying out attacks must base their decisions on their evaluation of the information available to them at the time. The Government has also declared that a given piece of terrain may also form a military objective if it meets the above conditions.
0512. It is possible for objects to be classed, on the one hand, as military while, at the same time, they have a civilian purpose. These are known as mixed objects. Examples are a bridge, which can definitely count as a military objective while at the same time its internal structure carries the energy supply to the civilian population of the region. A television mast may not only serve a civilian purpose but perform a function in the telecommunications network of the armed forces. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, §§ 0508–0509 and 0511–0512.

New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states:
The military advantage at the time of attack is that advantage from the military campaign or operation of which the attack is a part considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of that campaign or operation. Military advantage involves a variety of considerations including the security of the attacking forces. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 516(1); see also § 623(1).

Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states: “Military objectives are those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization offers a definite military advantage.” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 98; see also § 172.c.

Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states:
89. Military Objectives
Objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization offers a definite military advantage. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 89, p. 291; see also § 163(c), pp. 343 and 410.

Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states:
military objectives include units of armed forces (personnel, weapons and military equipment), except for medical units and medical transports; objects (structures, buildings) used (ready to be used) for military purposes; other objects which by their nature, purpose, location or use make an effective contribution to military operations and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
Military objectives are legitimate targets for attack, except for cases when such objectives belong to the category of especially dangerous objects.
A military objective remains such even if it accommodates civilian persons. 
Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 1.

Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Instructor Manual (2007) states: “Military objectives are those objects which by their nature, purpose and location, when totally or partially destroyed, captured or neutralized will offer a definite military advantage.” 
Sierra Leone, The Law of Armed Conflict. Instructor Manual for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), Armed Forces Education Centre, September 2007, p. 24.
(emphasis in original)
South Africa
South Africa’s LOAC Manual (1996) defines military objectives as:
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action, and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the prevailing circumstances, offer a definite military advantage. 
South Africa, Presentation on the South African Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Appendix A, Chapter 4: International Humanitarian Law (The Law of Armed Conflict), National Defence Force, 1996, § 24(d)(iii). This manual is also included in Chapter 4 of the Draft Civic Education Manual of 1997).

South Africa’s Revised Civic Education Manual (2004) states that “military objectives” include:
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action, and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the prevailing circumstances, offer a definite military advantage. 
South Africa, Revised Civic Education Manual, South African National Defence Force, 2004, Chapter 4, § 47(d).

Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) states:
4.2.b. … military objectives are … objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action or whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
4.2.b.(2) … insofar as objects are concerned, there can only be considered military objectives those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action or whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a clear military advantage. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, §§ 4.2.b and 4.2.b.(2).

Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states:
Military objectives are those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 1.3.b.(1); see also § 4.2.b.(1).

Sweden
Sweden’s IHL Manual (1991) states:
According to the definition [of military objectives contained in Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I], it is up to the attacker to decide whether the nature, location, purpose or use of the property can admit of its being classified as a military objective and thus as a permissible object of attack. This formulation undeniably gives the military commander great latitude in deciding, but he must also take account of the unintentional damage that may occur. The proportionality rule must always enter into the assessment even though this is not directly stated in the text of Article 52. 
Sweden, International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, with reference to the Swedish Total Defence System, Swedish Ministry of Defence, January 1991, Section 3.2.1.5, p. 54.

Togo
According to Togo’s Military Manual (1996), “[m]ilitary objectives comprise”:
- Establishments, positions, buildings where armed forces or material belonging to them are situated (example: positions, barracks, stores);
- Other objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage (geographic spots of tactical importance, crests, thalwegs, mined areas). 
Togo, Le Droit de la Guerre, III fascicules, Etat-major Général des Forces Armées Togolaises, Ministère de la Défense nationale, 1996, Fascicule I, pp. 13–14.

Ukraine
Ukraine’s IHL Manual (2004) states:
Military objectives are any objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, § 1.2.45.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) states that military objectives are:
objects which by their location, nature, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. They include buildings, minefields, weapons, concentrations of troops and individual enemy combatants. 
United Kingdom, The Law of Armed Conflict, D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (Revised 1981), Ministry of Defence, prepared under the Direction of The Chief of the General Staff, 1981, Section 4, p. 13, § 3(b)(2).

The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states:
5.4.1. The term “military objective” includes combatant members of the enemy armed forces and their military weapons, vehicles, equipment and installations. It may include other objects which have military value such as bridges, communications towers, electricity and refined oil production facilities. Objects are only military objectives if they come within the following definition:
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

5.4.4. The definition of military objectives contains various elements that require explanation:
a. The second part of the definition limits the first. Both parts must apply before an object can be considered a military objective.
b. Attacks on military objectives that cause incidental loss or damage to civilians are not prohibited so long as the proportionality rule is complied with.
c. “Nature” refers to the type of object, for example, military transports, command and control centres or communications stations.
d. “Location” includes areas which are militarily important because they must be captured or denied to the enemy or because the enemy must be made to retreat from them. An area of land can, thus, be a military objective.
e. “Purpose” means the future intended use of an object while “use” means its present function.
f. The words “nature, location, purpose or use” seem at first sight to allow a wide discretion, but they are subject to the qualifications later in the definition of “effective contribution to military action” and the offering of “a definite military advantage”. There does not have to be geographical proximity between “effective contribution” and “military advantage”. That means that attacks on military supply dumps in the rear or diversionary attacks, away from the area of actual military operations, can be launched.
g. “Military action” means military action generally, not a limited or specific military operation.
h. The words “in the circumstances ruling at the time” are important. If, for example, the enemy moved a divisional headquarters into a disused textile factory, an attack on that headquarters would be permissible (even though the factory might be destroyed in the process) because of the prevailing circumstances. Once the enemy moved their headquarters away, the circumstances would change again and the immunity of the factory would be restored.
i. “Definite” means a concrete and perceptible military advantage rather than a hypothetical and speculative one.
j. “Military advantage”. The military advantage anticipated from an attack refers to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack. The advantage need not be immediate. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, §§ 5.4.1 and 5.4.4.

Unless they are exempt from attack under paragraphs 13.35 [relating to hospital ships] or 12.29 [relating to conditions of exemption for medical aircraft], enemy warships and military aircraft and enemy auxiliary vessels and aircraft are military objectives. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 12.39.

There is no definition of military objectives or attacks in the treaty law dealing with non-international armed conflicts. Nevertheless, the definitions used in respect of international armed conflicts should be treated as applicable. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 15.9.1.

United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) states:
Insofar as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their own nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 5-3(b)(1).

The US Naval Handbook (1995) states:
Military objectives are combatants and those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, effectively contribute to the enemy’s war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of the attack. Military advantage may involve a variety of considerations, including the security of the attacking force. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 8.1.1.

The US Naval Handbook (2007) states:
An object is a valid military objective if by its nature (e.g., combat ships and aircraft), location (e.g., bridge over enemy supply route), use (e.g., school building being used as an enemy headquarters), or purpose (e.g., a civilian airport that is built with a longer than required runway so it can be used for military airlift in time of emergency) it makes an effective contribution to the enemy’s war fighting/war sustaining effort and its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstance at the time, offers a definite military advantage. Purpose is related to use, but is concerned with the intended, suspected, or possible future use of an object rather than its immediate and temporary use. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 5.3.1; see also § 8.2.

The US Manual for Military Commissions (2010), Part IV, Crimes and Elements, defines the term “military objective”:
The term “military objective” means—

(B) those objects during hostilities—
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Military Manual (1988) defines military objectives as “any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use effectively contributes to military action and whose total or partial destruction offers a military advantage during the attack or in the further course of the operations”. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Propisi o Primeri Pravila Medjunarodnog Ratnog Prava u Oruzanim Snagama SFRJ, PrU-2, Savezni Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu (Pravna Uprava), 1988, § 71.

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Italy
Italy’s Law of War Decree (1938), as amended in 1992, states: “It is lawful to bombard directly enemy targets whose destruction, whether total or partial, may be to the advantage of the military operations.” 
Italy, Law of War Decree, 1938, as amended in 1992, Article 40.

Peru
Peru’s Decree on the Use of Force by the Armed Forces (2010) states:
A military objective … is an objective which by its nature, location, purpose or use contributes to the actions of the hostile group and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization offers a military advantage. 
Peru, Decree on the Use of Force by the Armed Forces, 2010, Article 3(j).

United States of America
The US Military Commissions Act (2006), passed by Congress following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in 2006, amends Title 10 of the United States Code as follows:
§ 950v. Crimes triable by military commissions
“(a) DEFINITIONS AND CONSTRUCTION. – In this section:
“(1) MILITARY OBJECTIVE. – The term “military objective” means –
The US Military Commissions Act (2009) amends Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code as follows:
Ҥ 950p. Definitions; construction of certain offenses; common circumstances
“(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this subchapter:
“(1) The term “military objective” means … those objects during hostilities which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively contribute to the war-fighting or war-sustaining capability of an opposing force and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of an attack. 
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 950p(a)(1).

Uruguay
Uruguay’s Law on Cooperation with the ICC (2006) states:
For the purposes of the conduct described above [i.e. war crimes], military objectives are understood as objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage, excluding protected objects and objects designed for civilian purposes. 
Uruguay, Law on Cooperation with the ICC, 2006, Article 26.3.50.

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Germany
In 2010, in the Fuel Tankers case, the Federal Prosecutor General at Germany’s Federal Court of Justice investigated whether war crimes or other crimes under domestic law had been committed in the course of an airstrike which was ordered by a colonel (Oberst) of the German armed forces against two tankers transporting fuel for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan stolen by the Taliban near Kunduz and which resulted in the deaths of a number of civilians. The Federal Prosecutor General stated:
Pursuant to § 170 para. 2 StPO [Penal Procedure Code], the investigation proceedings which were initiated by the order of 12 March 2010 against Colonel ( Oberst) Klein and Company Sergeant Major (Hauptfeldwebel) Wilhelm due to suspected offences under the VStGB [International Crimes Code] and other offences are to be terminated as a result of the investigations conducted and based on the sources of information set out hereafter and on the reasons given in detail hereafter. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Federal Prosecutor General, Fuel Tankers case, Decision, 16 April 2010, p. 1.

The following is to be considered regarding the subjective element of § 11 (1) (3) VStGB [which states that carrying out an attack by military means and definitely anticipating that the attack will cause death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects on a scale out of proportion to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated is a war crime in international and non-international armed conflict]:

bb)

… According to Art. 52 para. 2 AP I [1977 Additional Protocol I] only objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Federal Prosecutor General, Fuel Tankers case, Decision, 16 April 2010, pp. 47–49.

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Algeria
The Report on the Practice of Algeria, referring expressly to the notion of “effective contribution” to military action resulting from the nature, location, purpose or use of an object, asserts that the criteria set forth in Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I were already taken into consideration during the Algerian war of independence. 
Report on the Practice of Algeria, 1997, Chapter 1.3.

Botswana
The Report on the Practice of Botswana asserts that the Government of Botswana endorses Article 52 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and that no official document was found rejecting the definition of a military objective provided in Article 52(2) of the Protocol. 
Report on the Practice of Botswana, 1998, Answers to additional questions on Chapter 1.3.

Canada
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Canada stated:
It is the understanding of the Government of Canada in relation to sub-paragraph 5 (b) of Article 51, paragraph 2 of Article 52, and clause 2 (a) (iii) of Article 57 [of the Protocol] that the military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not from isolated or particular parts of the attack. 
Canada, Reservations and statements of understanding made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 20 November 1990, § 10.

Colombia
The Report on the Practice of Colombia notes that the government and the Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman’s Office) have adopted the definition of military objectives laid down in Article 52 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I in order to draw a distinction between military objectives and civilian objects. 
Report on the Practice of Colombia, 1998, Chapter 1.3, referring to Defensoría del Pueblo, Cuarto informe anual del defensor del pueblo al congreso de Colombia, Santafé de Bogotá, September 1997, pp. 64–65.

Djibouti
In 2010, in the History and Geography Textbook for 8th Grade, Djibouti’s Ministry of National Education and Higher Education, under the heading “Terminology”, defined military objectives as: “Objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction offers a concrete military advantage.” 
Djibouti, Ministry of National Education and Higher Education, History and Geography Textbook for 8th Grade, 2010, p. 203.

Egypt
Upon signature of the 1998 ICC Statute, Egypt declared: “The military objectives referred to in article 8, paragraph 2 (b) of the Statute must be defined in the light of the principles, rules and provisions of international humanitarian law.” 
Egypt, Declarations made upon signature of the 1998 ICC Statute, 26 December 2000, § 4(b).

France
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, France stated that the term “military advantage” as used in Article 52(2) of the Protocol was understood to refer to “the advantage expected from the attack as a whole and not from isolated or particular parts of the attack”. 
France, Reservations and declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 11 April 2001, § 10.

Iraq
On the basis of the reply by Iraq’s Ministry of Defence to a questionnaire, the Report on the Practice of Iraq states that the Iraqi armed forces consider that the definition of a military objective set forth in Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I is part of customary international law. 
Report on the Practice of Iraq, 1998, Reply by the Iraqi Ministry of Defence to a questionnaire, July 1997, Chapter 1.3.

Islamic Republic of Iran
According to the Report on the Practice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, during the Iran–Iraq War, the Islamic Republic of Iran always insisted that it had no intention of attacking civilian objects, all targets being “military objectives or objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use made an effective contribution to military action”. 
Report on the Practice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1997, Chapter 1.3.

Israel
According to the Report on the Practice of Israel, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have no generally applicable definition of what constitutes a “military target”, but their practice most closely reflects the definition found in Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
Report on the Practice of Israel, 1997, Answers to additional questions on Chapter 1.3.

Israel
In 2006, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
The generally accepted definition of “military objective” is that set out in Article 52(2) Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, which provides:
Insofar as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
This definition has been criticized by some for being too narrow, and failing to pay sufficient attention to war sustaining capability, including economic targets. 
Israel, Responding to Hizbullah Attacks from Lebanon: Issues of Proportionality, Legal Background, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 25 July 2006, § 2.

Israel
In 2007, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in a diplomatic note:
Legitimate military objectives
The generally accepted definition of “military objective” is that set out in Article 52(2) Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, which provides:
Insofar as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
Regarding military targets, the IDF’s [Israel Defense Forces’] “Law of War on the Battlefield” provides: “A military target subject to attack is a target that by its nature, location, purpose or use effectively contributes to the military campaign of the other side, and its neutralization will offer a clear military advantage to the attacking side.” 
Israel, Israel’s War with Hizbullah. Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism, Diplomatic Notes No. 1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, April 2007, p. 5.

In 2008, in a background paper on Israel’s operations in Gaza, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
The generally accepted definition of “military objective” is that set out in Article 52(2) of [the 1977] Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, which provides:
Insofar as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Background paper, Responding to Hamas Attacks from Gaza: Issues of Proportionality, December 2008, § 2.
[footnote in original omitted]
In 2009, in a report on Israeli operations in Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009 (the “Gaza Operation”, also known as “Operation Cast Lead”), Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in referring to the definition of a “military objective” contained in Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, stated: “The determination of what is a lawful ‘military objective’ turns on an assessment of ‘military advantage’.” 
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Operation in Gaza 27 December 2008–18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects, 29 July 2009, § 101.

Jordan
Prior to the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 47/37 in 1992 on the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict, Jordan and the United States submitted a memorandum to the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly entitled “International Law Providing Protection to the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict”. The memorandum stated that “the customary rule that, in so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage” provides protection for the environment in times of armed conflict. 
Jordan and United States, International Law Providing Protection to the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, annexed to Letter dated 28 September 1992 to the Chairman of the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.6/47/3, 28 September 1992, § 1(i).

The Report on the Practice of Jordan states that the definition of a military objective set forth in Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I is part of customary international law. 
Report on the Practice of Jordan, 1997, Chapter 1.3.

Malaysia
The Report on the Practice of Malaysia notes that although no written law defines the term military objective, the security forces describe military objectives as “targets of military interest” and “military targets”. While the former may include civilian objects like the runway of a civilian airport, the latter only refers to objects belonging to the military. The military character of a target will thus depend on the circumstances and the degree of strategic advantage it offers.  
Report on the Practice of Malaysia, 1997, Chapter 1.3 and answers to additional questions on Chapter 1.3.

Mexico
At the CDDH, Mexico stated that it believed Article 47 of the draft Additional Protocol I (now Article 52) to be so essential that it “cannot be the subject of any reservations whatsoever since these would be inconsistent with the aim and purpose of Protocol I and undermine its basis”. 
Mexico, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.41, 26 May 1977, p. 193.

Philippines
Referring to military documents using similar wording, the Report on the Practice of the Philippines affirms the customary nature of Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
Report on the Practice of the Philippines, 1997, Chapter 1.3.

Spain
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Spain stated with respect to Articles 51, 52 and 57 of the Protocol:
It is the understanding [of the Spanish Government] that the “military advantage” which these articles mention refers to the advantage expected from the attack as a whole and not from isolated parts of it. 
Spain, Interpretative declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 21 April 1989, § 6.

Syrian Arab Republic
On the basis of a statement by the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs before the UN General Assembly in 1997, the Report on the Practice of the Syrian Arab Republic asserts that the Syrian Arab Republic considers Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to be part of customary international law. 
Report on the Practice of the Syrian Arab Republic, 1997, Chapter 1.3, referring to Statement by the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs before the UN General Assembly, 1 October 1997.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2003, during a debate in the House of Commons, the UK Secretary of State for Defence stated:
On the bombing campaign in Baghdad, I anticipate that the great majority of people there will see for themselves the nature of the targeting. It will be clear that regime targets – Saddam’s Ministries and palaces – are being destroyed. As the campaign evolves, there will be no clearer message to the people of Iraq that we have no quarrel with them, but that we do have a serious difference with Saddam Hussein. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence, Hansard, 21 March 2003, Vol. 401, Debates, cols. 1217–1218.

In 1991, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United Kingdom stated: “Operations by United Kingdom forces have involved aerial attacks on Iraqi installations supporting Iraq’s capacity to sustain its illegal occupation of Kuwait.” 
United Kingdom, Letter dated 21 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22115, 21 January 1991.

United States of America
In 1972, the General Counsel of the US Department of Defense stated:
In the application of the laws of war, it is important that there be a general understanding in the world community as to what shall be legitimate military objectives which may be attacked by air bombardment under the limitations imposed by treaty or by customary international law. Attempts to limit the effects of attacks in an unrealistic manner, by definition or otherwise, solely to the essential war making potential of enemy States have not been successful. For example, such attempts as the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare, proposed by an International Commission of Jurists, and the 1956 ICRC Draft Rules for the Limitation of Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War were not accepted by States and therefore do not reflect the laws of war either as customary international law or as adopted by treaty. [The General Counsel then refers to Articles 1 and 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IX) and Article 8 of the 1954 Hague Convention as reflecting customary international law.] The test applicable from the customary international law, restated in [Article 8 of] the Hague Cultural Property Convention, is that the war making potential of such facilities to a party to the conflict may outweigh their importance to the civilian economy and deny them immunity from attack. Turning to the deficiencies in the Resolutions of the Institut de Droit International [adopted at its Edinburgh Session in 1969], and with the foregoing in view, it cannot be said that Paragraph 2, which refers to legal restraints that there must be an “immediate” military advantage, reflects the law of armed conflict that has been adopted in the practices of States. 
United States, Letter from J. Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, to Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees of the Committee on the Judiciary, 22 September 1972, AJIL, Vol. 67, 1973, p. 123.

In 1987, the Deputy Legal Adviser of the US Department of State stated: “The United States has no great concern over the new definition of ‘military objective’ set forth in Article 52(2) of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I.” 
United States, Remarks of Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, US Department of State, The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, American University Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 2, 1987, p. 436.

In 1992, in its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the US Department of Defense stated:
When objects are used concurrently for civilian and military purposes, they are liable to attack if there is a military advantage to be gained in their attack. (“Military advantage” is not restricted to tactical gains, but is linked to the full context of a war strategy, in this instance, the execution of the Coalition war plan for liberation of Kuwait.) 
United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Appendix O, The Role of the Law of War, ILM, Vol. 31, 1992, p. 623.

In 1992, in a review of the legality of extended range anti-armour munition, the US Department of the Air Force relied on the definition of military objectives set forth in Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
United States, Department of the Air Force, The Judge Advocate General, Legal Review: Extended Range Antiarmor Munition (ERAM), 16 April 1992, § 7.

The Report on US Practice states:
The opinio juris of the U.S. government recognizes the definition of military objectives in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I as customary law. United States practice gives a broad reading to this definition, and would include areas of land, objects screening other military objectives, and war-supporting economic facilities as military objectives. The foreseeable military advantage from an attack includes increasing the security of the attacking force. In any event, the anticipated military advantage need not be expected to immediately follow the success of the attack, and may be inferred from the whole military operation of which the attack is a part. 
Report on US Practice, 1997, Chapter 1.3.

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Diplomatic Conference on the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
During the Diplomatic Conference on the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 1999, France, Israel, Turkey and the United States, at that time not party to the 1977 Additional Protocol I, referred to the definition of Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I as an authoritative definition of a military objective. Several other States, including Argentina, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, stressed that the definition of a military objective in the Second Protocol should follow the exact wording of Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. Another group of States, including Austria, Cameroon (speaking on behalf of the African group), China, Egypt, Greece, Romania and the Syrian Arab Republic (speaking on behalf of the Arab group) agreed to rely on Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I but to tighten its definition so that cultural property could only become a military objective “by its use” and not “by its location, nature or purpose”. 
Diplomatic Conference on the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, The Hague, 15–26 March 1999 (proceedings to be published by UNESCO).

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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
In its final report to the ICTY Prosecutor in 2000, the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stated that “the most widely accepted definition of ‘military objective’ is that of Article 52 of Additional Protocol I”. 
ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The Hague, 14 June 2000, § 35.

Although the Protocol I definition of military objective is not beyond criticism, it provides the contemporary standard which must be used when attempting to determine the lawfulness of particular attacks. That being said, it must be noted once again [that] neither the USA nor France is a party to Additional Protocol I. The definition is, however, generally accepted as part of customary law. 
ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The Hague, 14 June 2000, § 41.

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
In its judgment in the Galić case in 2003, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated:
A widely accepted definition of military objectives is given by Article 52 of Additional Protocol I as “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”. 
ICTY, Galić case, Judgment, 5 December 2003, § 51.

Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
In its Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims (Eritrea’s Claim) partial award in 2005, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, in considering the definition of military objectives, stated:
112. With respect to the applicable law, Eritrea pointed to Article 52, paragraph 2, of [the 1977 Additional] Geneva Protocol I, which defines the objects that are legitimate military objectives as follows:
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
113. This provision was not applicable as part of a treaty binding on both Parties to the conflict, but it is widely accepted as an expression of customary international law … The Commission notes that none of the 160 Parties to that Protocol has attached to its signature or instrument of ratification a reservation or statement of interpretation that would indicate disagreement with that definition. The Commission is of the view that the term “military advantage” can only properly be understood in the context of the military operations between the Parties taken as a whole, not simply in the context of a specific attack. Thus, with respect to the present claim, whether the attack on ... offered a definite military advantage must be considered in the context of its relation to the armed conflict as a whole at the time of the attack. The Commission finds that Article 52, paragraph 2, of Geneva Protocol I is a statement of customary international humanitarian law and, as such, was applicable to the conflict between the two Parties. 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea’s Claim, Partial Award, 19 December 2005, §§ 112–113.
[footnotes in original omitted]
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ICRC
To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces that the following can be considered military objectives:
a) the armed forces except medical service and religious personnel and objects;
b) the establishments, buildings and positions where armed forces or their materiel are located (e.g. positions, barracks, stores);
c) other objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action, and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage. 
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 55.

In an appeal issued in October 1973, the ICRC urged all the belligerents in the conflict in the Middle East (Egypt, Iraq, Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic) to observe forthwith, in particular, the provisions of, inter alia, Article 47(1) of the draft Additional Protocol I which defined military objectives as “those objectives which are, by their nature, purpose or use, recognized to be of military interest and whose total or partial destruction, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a distinct and substantial military advantage”. All governments concerned replied favourably. 
ICRC, The International Committee’s Action in the Middle East, IRRC, No. 152, 1973, pp. 584–585.

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Institute of International Law
In a resolution adopted during its Edinburgh Session in 1969, the Institute of International Law gave the following definition of a military objective:
There can be considered as military objectives only those which, by their very nature or purpose or use, make an effective contribution to military action, or exhibit a generally recognised military significance, such that their total or partial destruction in the actual circumstances gives a substantial, specific and immediate military advantage to those who are in a position to destroy them. 
Institute of International Law, Edinburgh Session, Resolution on the Distinction between Military Objectives and Non-military Objects in General and Particularly the Problems Associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction, 9 September 1969, § 2.

Amnesty International
In 2000, in a report on the NATO bombings in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Amnesty International, having referred to the definition of military objectives contained in Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, stated with regard to the bombing of the Serbian State radio and television (RTS):
Disrupting government propaganda may help to undermine the morale of the population and the armed forces, but … justifying an attack on a civilian facility on such grounds stretches the meaning of “effective contribution to military action” and “definite military advantage” beyond the acceptable bounds of interpretation. 
Amnesty International, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: ”Collateral Damage” or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force, AI Index EUR 70/18/00, London, June 2000, p. 43.

Note: For practice concerning attacks against combatants, see Rule 1, Section B.
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St. Petersburg Declaration
The preamble to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration states: “The only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.” 
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, St. Petersburg, 29 November–11 December 1868, preamble.

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Hague Rules of Air Warfare
According to Article 24(2) of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare, “military forces” are military objectives. 
Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, Part II, drafted by a Commission of Jurists, The Hague, December 1922–February 1923, Article 24(2).

ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War
Article 5(1) of the 1938 ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War provides that “aerial bombardment is prohibited unless directed at combatant forces”. 
Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War, adopted by the International Law Association, Fortieth Conference, Amsterdam, 29 August–2 September 1938, Article 5(1).

New Delhi Draft Rules
Paragraph I(1) of the proposed annex to Article 7(2) of the 1956 New Delhi Draft Rules stated that “armed forces, including auxiliary or complementary organizations, and persons who, though not belonging to the above-mentioned formations, nevertheless take part in the fighting” are military objectives considered to be of “generally recognized military importance”. 
Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, September 1956, submitted to governments for their consideration on behalf of the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross, New Delhi, 28 October–7 November, Res. XIII, § I(1) of the proposed annex to Article 7(2).

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Australia
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) lists among military objectives “all persons taking a direct part in hostilities, whether military or civilian”. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 527(d); see also § 916(a) (“armed forces except medical and religious personnel”).

Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states:
5.27 The term “military objective” includes combatant members of the enemy armed forces and their military weapons, vehicles, equipment and installations.

5.31 Military objectives may include a very wide range of persons, locations and objects. Some examples are:

• all persons taking a direct part in hostilities, whether military or civilian. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, §§ 5.27 and 5.31.

Belgium
Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) considers combatants to be military objectives. 
Belgium, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit de la Guerre, Ecole Royale Militaire, par J. Maes, Chargé de cours, Avocat-général près la Cour Militaire, D/1983/1187/029, 1983, p. 27.

Benin
Benin’s Military Manual (1995) considers the armed forces, with the exception of medical and religious personnel and objects, to be military objectives. 
Benin, Le Droit de la Guerre, III fascicules, Forces Armées du Bénin, Ministère de la Défense nationale, 1995, Fascicule I, p. 12.

Burundi
Burundi’s Regulations on International Humanitarian Law (2007) states that “civilians who take direct part in combat become military objectives”. 
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, p. 53.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (1992) states that the armed forces are considered military objectives, with the exception of religious and medical personnel. 
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, p. 17.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) qualifies “Armed Forces (with the exception of religious and medical personnel)” as “military objectives”. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 92, § 352.12; see also p. 134, § 412.12.

Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) considers that combatants, airborne troops and unlawful combatants are “legitimate targets”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-1, § 7 and p. 4-2, §§ 12–14.

Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on targeting:
406. Definition of legitimate targets
1. “Legitimate targets” include combatants, unlawful combatants and military objectives.

408. Combatants
1. Combatants are legitimate targets and may be attacked unless they have been captured, surrendered, expressed a clear intention to surrender, or are hors de combat (i.e., out of combat), provided they refrain from hostile acts and do not attempt to escape …
409. Airborne troops
1. Airborne troops are combatants and therefore legitimate targets. They may be attacked during their descent by parachute from aircraft.
410. Unlawful combatants
1. Unlawful combatants are legitimate targets for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. Unlawful combatants include:
a. civilians (except those who are lawful combatants because they are participating in levée en masse);
b. mercenaries; and
c. spies. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, §§ 406.1 and 408–410.1.

Central African Republic
The Central African Republic’s Instructor’s Manual (1999) states in Volume 1 (Basic and team leader instruction): “The following are considered military objectives: … the armed forces, other than medical personnel”. 
Central African Republic, Le Droit de la Guerre, Fascicule No. 1: Formation élémentaire toutes armés (FETA), formation commune de base (FCB), certificat d’aptitude technique No. 1 (Chef d’équipe), Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Centrafricaines, 1999, Chapter II, Section I, § 3.

Chad
Chad’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states that military objectives may include “members of the armed forces”. 
Chad, Droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces armées et de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 35; see also pp. 36, 57 and 58.

Colombia
According to Colombia’s Instructors’ Manual (1999), combatants are military objectives. 
Colombia, Derechos Humanos & Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual de Instrucción de la Guía de Conducta para el Soldado e Infante de Marina, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Oficina de Derechos Humanos, Fuerzas Militares de Colombia, Santafé de Bogotá, 1999, p. 15.

Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book I (Basic instruction):
I.2 Military objectives
- Combatants. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre I: Instruction de base, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 18.

II.1.1. Military objectives
Military objectives are:
- the armed forces with the exception of the medical service and religious personnel and objects. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 2: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 2ème année, Manuel de l’instructeur, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 28.

Croatia
According to Croatia’s LOAC Compendium (1991), military objectives include the armed forces. 
Croatia, Compendium “Law of Armed Conflicts”, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1991, p. 7; see also Basic Rules of the Law of Armed Conflicts – Commanders’ Manual, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1992, § 4 (“combatants”).

Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic’s Military Manual (1980) states: “Under the laws of war, you are not allowed to attack villages, towns, or cities. However, when your mission requires, you are allowed to engage enemy troops, equipment, or supplies in a village, town or city.” 
Dominican Republic, La Conducta en Combate según las Leyes de la Guerra, Escuela Superior de las FF. AA. “General de Brigada Pablo Duarte”, Secretaría de Estado de las Fuerzas Armadas, May 1980, p. 3.

Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) provides that combatants and troop concentrations are military objectives. 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 8.1.1.

Ethiopia
According to Ethiopia’s Standing Rules of Engagement (2007), “military objectives” include “regular members of the enemy army wearing a uniform”, “paramilitary forces and voluntary conscripts” and “identifiable armed rebel groups organized to bring down the constitutional order”. 
Ethiopia, Standing Rules of Engagement, National Defense Force, Addis Ababa, 2007, §§ 8.3.1–8.3.3.

France
According to France’s LOAC Summary Note (1992), combatants are military objectives. 
France, Fiche de Synthèse sur les Règles Applicables dans les Conflits Armés, Note No. 432/DEF/EMA/OL.2/NP, Général de Corps d’Armée Voinot (pour l’Amiral Lanxade, Chef d’Etat-major des Armées), 1992, § 1.2; see also Fiche didactique relative au droit des conflits armés, Directive of the Ministry of Defence, 4 January 2000, annexed to the Directive No. 147 of the Ministry of Defence of 4 January 2000, p. 2 (“military units”).

Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) provides that military objectives include, in particular, armed forces. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 443.

Hungary
According to Hungary’s Military Manual (1992), military objectives include the armed forces. 
Hungary, A Hadijog, Jegyzet a Katonai, Föiskolák Hallgatói Részére, Magyar Honvédség Szolnoki Repülötiszti Föiskola, 1992, p. 18.

Ireland
Ireland’s Basic LOAC Guide (2005) states: “Military objectives … obviously include enemy soldiers and combatants”. 
Ireland, Basic Guide to the Law of Armed Conflict, TP/TRG/01-2005, Director of Defence Forces Training, Department of Defence, July 2005, p. 4.

Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Laws of War (1998) states that “any soldier (male or female!) in the enemy’s army is a legitimate military target for attack, whether on the battlefield or outside of it”. 
Israel, Laws of War in the Battlefield, Manual, Military Advocate General Headquarters, Military School, 1998, p. 42.

Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states:
The fundamental rule is that war should be conducted between armies and each army should only attack the army of the enemy. A military target is any target that, if attacked, would damage the military competence/fitness of the other side. 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 23.

Italy
Italy’s IHL Manual (1991) provides that the armed forces are military objectives. 
Italy, Manuale di diritto umanitario, Introduzione e Volume I, Usi e convenzioni di Guerra, SMD-G-014, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, Vol. I, § 12; see also Regole elementari di diritto di guerra, SMD-G-012, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, § 4 (“combatants”).

Kenya
Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997) provides that “the armed forces except medical service and religious personnel and objects” are military objectives. 
Kenya, Law of Armed Conflict, Military Basic Course (ORS), 4 Précis, The School of Military Police, 1997, Précis No. 2, p. 11.

Madagascar
According to Madagascar’s Military Manual (1994), military objectives include “armed forces, with the exception of medical units and religious personnel and objects”. 
Madagascar, Le Droit des Conflits Armés, Ministère des Forces Armées, August 1994, Fiche No. 2-SO, § C; see also Fiche No. 2-O, § 4 and Fiche No. 4-T, § 1.

Mexico
Mexico’s IHL Guidelines (2009) states: “Military objectives are: … the armed forces except for the medical service and religious personnel and objects.” 
Mexico, Cartilla de Derecho Internacional Humanitario, Ministry of National Defence, 2009, § 8.

Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands notes that “combatants who are part of the armed forces” are military objectives “under all circumstances”. 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, p. V-3; see also Handboek Militair, Ministerie van Defensie, 1995, p. 7-36 (“combatants”).

The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states that “the armed forces constitute a military objective”. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0509.

New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states that combatants are military objectives. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 516(1); see also § 623(1).

Nigeria
According to Nigeria’s Military Manual (1994) and Soldiers’ Code of Conduct, combatants are military objectives. 
Nigeria, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Directorate of Legal Services, Nigerian Army, 1994, p. 39, § 5(a); see also Code of Conduct for Combatants, “The Soldier’s Rules”, Nigerian Army, undated, § 1.

Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states: “[Air] bombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively against the following objectives: military forces … .” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas , Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 172.d.

Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states: “[Air] bombardment is only legitimate when it is exclusively directed against the following objectives: military forces”. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 163(c), p. 343.

Philippines
According to the Soldier’s Rules (1989) of the Philippines, enemy combatants are military objectives. 
Philippines, Soldier’s Rules, in Handbook on Discipline, Annex C(I), General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 1989, § 2.

Republic of Korea
According to the Republic of Korea’s Military Law Manual (1996), combatants are military objectives. 
Republic of Korea, Military Law Manual, 1996, p. 86.

Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states: “military objectives include units of armed forces (personnel, weapons and military equipment), except for medical units and medical transports”. 
Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 1.

South Africa
South Africa’s LOAC Manual (1996) states that military objectives include “the armed forces, with the exception of medical and religious personnel and objects”. 
South Africa, Presentation on the South African Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Appendix A, Chapter 4: International Humanitarian Law (The Law of Armed Conflict), National Defence Force, 1996, § 24(d)(i); see also § 34. This manual is also included in Chapter 4 of the Draft Civic Education Manual of 1997.

South Africa’s Revised Civic Education Manual (2004) states that “military objectives” include “the armed forces, with the exception of medical and religious personnel”. 
South Africa, Revised Civic Education Manual, South African National Defence Force, 2004, Chapter 4, § 47(d).

Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) states that “the armed forces, except medical and religious personnel” are military objectives. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 4.2.b; see also § 4.2.b.(1).

Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states that “the armed forces, except medical personnel, religious personnel and personnel engaged solely in civil defence tasks,” are military objectives. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 4.2.b; see also § 7.3.a.(6).

Sweden
Sweden’s IHL Manual (1991) states: “Persons participating in hostilities … are thereby legitimate objectives.” 
Sweden, International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, with reference to the Swedish Total Defence System, Swedish Ministry of Defence, January 1991, Section 3.2.1.5, p. 40.

Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) considers that the armed forces are military objectives liable to attack. 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 28.

Togo
Togo’s Military Manual (1996) considers the armed forces, with the exception of medical and religious personnel and objects, to be military objectives. 
Togo, Le Droit de la Guerre, III fascicules, Etat-major Général des Forces Armées Togolaises, Ministère de la Défense nationale, 1996, Fascicule I, p. 13.

Ukraine
Ukraine’s IHL Manual (2004) states: “Using military violence against combatants in hostilities up to their destruction shall be considered lawful.” 
Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, § 1.2.22.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) states that military objectives include “concentrations of troops and individual enemy combatants”. 
United Kingdom, The Law of Armed Conflict, D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (Revised 1981), Ministry of Defence, prepared under the Direction of The Chief of the General Staff, 1981, Section 4, p. 13, § 3(b)(2).

The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states: “The term “military objective” includes combatant members of the enemy armed forces and their military weapons, vehicles, equipment and installations.” 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 5.4.1.

United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) considers that “troops in the field are military objectives beyond any dispute”. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 5-3(b)(2).

According to the US Naval Handbook (1995), combatants and troop concentrations are military objectives. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 8.1.1.

The US Naval Handbook (2007) states: “Military objectives are combatants”. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 8.2.

The US Manual for Military Commissions (2010), Part IV, Crimes and Elements, states that: “The term ‘military objective’ means – (A) combatants”. 
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, § 1(a)(1), p. IV-1.

Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
According to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Military Manual (1988), the armed forces are a military objective. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Propisi o Primeri Pravila Medjunarodnog Ratnog Prava u Oruzanim Snagama SFRJ, PrU-2, Savezni Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu (Pravna Uprava), 1988, § 49.

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Italy
Italy’s Law of War Decree (1938), as amended in 1992, provides that the armed forces are military objectives. 
Italy, Law of War Decree, 1938, as amended in 1992, Article 40.

United States of America
The US Military Commissions Act (2009) amends Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code as follows:
Ҥ 950p. Definitions; construction of certain offenses; common circumstances
“(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this subchapter:
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Germany
In 2010, in the Fuel Tankers case, the Federal Prosecutor General at Germany’s Federal Court of Justice investigated whether war crimes or other crimes under domestic law had been committed in the course of an airstrike which was ordered by a colonel (Oberst) of the German armed forces against two tankers transporting fuel for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan stolen by the Taliban near Kunduz and which resulted in the deaths of a number of civilians. The Federal Prosecutor General stated:
Pursuant to § 170 para. 2 StPO [Penal Procedure Code], the investigation proceedings which were initiated by the order of 12 March 2010 against Colonel (Oberst) Klein and Company Sergeant Major (Hauptfeldwebel) Wilhelm due to suspected offences under the VStGB [International Crimes Code] and other offences are to be terminated as a result of the investigations conducted and based on the sources of information set out hereafter and on the reasons given in detail hereafter. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Federal Prosecutor General, Fuel Tankers case, Decision, 16 April 2010, p. 1.

The following is to be considered regarding the subjective element of § 11 (1) (3) VStGB [which states that carrying out an attack by military means and definitely anticipating that the attack will cause death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects on a scale out of proportion to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated is a war crime in international and non-international armed conflict]:
aa)
Insurgents who continuously take part in the armed conflict, as the Taliban in this case, are not civilians but legitimate military objectives which may be lawfully attacked even outside of ongoing armed hostilities. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Federal Prosecutor General, Fuel Tankers case, Decision, 16 April 2010, p. 47.

aa)

It is not questioned that the armed Taliban fighters who abducted the fuel tankers and who make up a significant part of the victims of the bombing were members of an organized armed group which is a party to the armed conflict. These fighters thus constitute a legitimate military objective whose “destruction” is legal within the limits of military necessity. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Federal Prosecutor General, Fuel Tankers case, Decision, 16 April 2010, p. 60.

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United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1991, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United Kingdom stated that attacks had been directed against Iraq’s air force and land army. 
United Kingdom, Letter dated 28 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22156, 28 January 1991, p. 1.

United States of America
In 1950, the US Secretary of State stated: “The air activity of the United Nations forces in Korea has been, and is, directed solely at military targets of the invader. These targets [include] enemy troop concentrations.” 
United States, Statement by the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, 6 September 1950, reprinted in Marjorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, Department of State Publication 8367, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 140.

In 1991, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United States stated that it considered the “occupation forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq” as legitimate military targets. It also stated that it had attacked Iraq’s naval forces in the northern Gulf and specified: “These attacks have been on Iraqi units that are engaged in operations against coalition forces.” 
United States, Letter dated 22 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22130, 22 January 1991, p. 1.

In 1991, during a news briefing concerning the Gulf War, the US Secretary of Defense stated that the “mainstay of Saddam’s command forces, the Republican Guard units located near the Iraqi/Kuwaiti border” were considered military targets and had been attacked. 
United States, News Briefing by the US Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 23 January 1991, annexed to Letter dated 25 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22168, 29 January 1991, p. 3.

In 1992, in its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the US Department of Defense stated that Iraq’s air forces, naval forces and army units, including the Republican Guard, had been included among the 12 target sets for the coalition’s attacks. 
United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Chapter VI, The Air Campaign, pp. 96–98.

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ICRC
To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces that military objectives include: “the armed forces except medical service and religious personnel and objects”. 
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 55.

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Americas Watch
In 1985, in a report on violations of the laws of war in Nicaragua, Americas Watch listed “members of the Popular Sandinista Army and militias”, as well as “members of ARDE, FDN, MISURA and MISURASATA [two indigenous organizations fighting against the Nicaraguan government]”, as persons which “can arguably be regarded as legitimate military objectives subject to direct attack”. 
Americas Watch, Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua: 1981–1985, New York, March 1985, p. 33.

In 1986, in a report on the use of landmines in the conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua, Americas Watch listed the following persons as legitimate military objectives subject to direct attack:
1. In Nicaragua
(a) Members of the Popular Sandinista Army and Militias
(b) Members of ARDE, FDN, KISAN and MISURASATA [two indigenous organizations fighting against the Nicaraguan government]
2. In El Salvador
(a) Members of the Salvadoran combined armed forces and civil defense forces
(b) Members of the FMLN [Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional]. 
Americas Watch, Land Mines in El Salvador and Nicaragua: The Civilian Victims, New York, December 1986, pp. 99–100.

Africa Watch
In 1989, in a report on violations of the laws of war in Angola, Africa Watch listed “members of the armed forces and civil defense of Angola and other armed forces assisting the defense of Angola, such as the Cuban armed forces”, as well as “members of UNITA [União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola] armed forces and other armed forces assisting UNITA, such as the South African Defense Force and South West Africa armed forces”, as persons which “may be regarded as legitimate military objectives subject to direct attack by combatants and mines”. 
Africa Watch, Angola: Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides, New York, April 1989, p. 139.

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Hague Convention (IX)
Article 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IX) allows the bombardment of “military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war matériel”. 
Hague Convention (IX) concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 2.

Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
Under Article 8 of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, cultural property may be placed under special protection provided, inter alia, that it is situated “at an adequate distance … from any important military objective constituting a vulnerable point, such as, for example, … [an] establishment engaged upon work of national defence”. 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954, Article 8.

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Hague Rules of Air Warfare
According to Article 24(2) of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare, “military works [and] military establishments or depots” are military objectives. 
Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, Part II, drafted by a Commission of Jurists, The Hague, December 1922–February 1923, Article 24(2).

ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War
Article 5(1) of the 1938 ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War provides that “aerial bombardment is prohibited unless directed at … belligerent establishments”. 
Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War, adopted by the International Law Association, Fortieth Conference, Amsterdam, 29 August–2 September 1938, Article 5(1).

New Delhi Draft Rules
Paragraph I of the proposed annex to Article 7(2) of the 1956 New Delhi Draft Rules stated that “the objectives belonging to the following categories are those considered to be of generally recognized military importance”, that is:
(2) Positions, installations or constructions occupied by the [armed forces], as well as combat objectives (that is to say, those objectives which are directly contested in battle between land or sea forces including airborne forces).
(3) Installations, constructions and other works of a military nature, such as barracks, fortifications, War Ministries (e.g. Ministries of Army, Navy, Air Force, National Defence, Supply) and other organs for the direction and administration of military operations.
(4) Stores of arms or military supplies, such as munition dumps, stores of equipment or fuel, vehicle parks. 
Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, September 1956, submitted to governments for their consideration on behalf of the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross, New Delhi, 28 October–7 November, Res. XIII, Paragraph I of the proposed annex to Article 7(2).

UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin
Section 5.4 of the 1999 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin states: “Military installations and equipment of peacekeeping operations, as such, shall not be considered military objectives.” 
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, Secretary-General’s Bulletin, UN Secretariat, UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999, Section 5.4.

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Australia
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) gives “military equipment, units and bases” as examples of military objectives. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 527(a); see also § 916(b).

Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) gives “military equipment, units and bases” as examples of military objectives. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 5.31.

Belgium
Belgium’s Teaching Manual for Soldiers considers that “all objects occupied or used by enemy military forces (positions, barracks, depots, etc.)” are military objectives. 
Belgium, Droit de la Guerre, Dossier d’Instruction pour Soldat, à l’attention des officiers instructeurs , JS3, Etat-Major Général, Forces Armées belges, undated, p. 20.

Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) considers that “the army, its positions, provision of its supplies, its stores, workshops, arsenals, depots, defence works, … war buildings, etc.” are military objectives. 
Belgium, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit de la Guerre, Ecole Royale Militaire, par J. Maes, Chargé de cours, Avocat-général près la Cour Militaire, D/1983/1187/029, 1983, p. 26.

Benin
Benin’s Military Manual (1995) considers “the establishments, positions and constructions where armed forces and their materiel are located (e.g. positions, barracks and depots)” as military objectives. 
Benin, Le Droit de la Guerre, III fascicules, Forces Armées du Bénin, Ministère de la Défense nationale, 1995, Fascicule I, p. 12.

Burundi
Burundi’s Regulations on International Humanitarian Law (2007) states that “[m]ilitary objectives [are] … units, buildings and positions where armed forces and their material are located (positions, barracks, depots)”. 
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, p. 16; see also pp. 32, 53 and 86.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (1992) considers military positions, barracks and depots as military objectives. 
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, p. 17.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) qualifies “positions, barracks and depots” as “military objectives”. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 92, § 352.12; see also p. 134, § 412.12.

Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) considers that “military bases, warehouses, … ; and … buildings and objects that provide administrative and logistical support for military operations” are “generally accepted as being military objectives”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-2, § 9.

Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on targeting:
1. The following are generally accepted as being military objectives:
a. military bases, warehouses, petroleum storage areas, ports and airfields; and
b. military aircraft, weapons, ammunition, buildings and objects that provide administrative and logistical support for military operations.
2. Civilian vessels, aircraft, vehicles and buildings are military objectives if they contain combatants, military equipment or supplies. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 407.1-2.

Central African Republic
The Central African Republic’s Instructor’s Manual (1999) states in Volume 1 (Basic and team leader instruction): “The following are considered military objectives: … establishments, positions or buildings where armed forces or material belonging to them are located (for example positions, barracks, stores)”. 
Central African Republic, Le Droit de la Guerre, Fascicule No. 1: Formation élémentaire toutes armés (FETA), formation commune de base (FCB), certificat d’aptitude technique No. 1 (Chef d’équipe), Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Centrafricaines, 1999, Chapter II, Section I, § 3.

Chad
Chad’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states that military objectives may include:

(2) The establishments, buildings and positions where the armed forces are located (site), the places where weapons, munitions and equipment are made;
(3) The materials of war (logistics) … ;
(4) Munitions and weapons stores. 
Chad, Droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces armées et de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 58; see also pp. 35 and 57.

Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book III, Volume 2 (Instruction of second-year trainee officers):
II.1.1. Military objectives
Military objectives are:

- the establishments, buildings and positions where the armed forces and their materiel are located (barracks, munitions depot, command position). 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 2: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 2ème année, Manuel de l’instructeur, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 28; see also Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre I: Instruction de base, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 18.

The following objects are generally recognized as military objectives:
- warehouses, petrol storage sites, harbours, airfields and military bases;
- … buildings and objects providing administrative and logistical support to military operations. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 26.

Croatia
According to Croatia’s LOAC Compendium (1991) and Commanders’ Manual (1992), military objectives include military establishments and positions. 
Croatia, Compendium “Law of Armed Conflicts”, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1991, p. 7; Basic Rules of the Law of Armed Conflicts – Commanders’ Manual, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1992, § 4.

Ecuador
According to Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989), proper targets for naval attack include such military objectives as naval and military bases ashore; warship construction and repair facilities; military depots and warehouses; storage areas for petroleum and lubricants; and buildings and facilities that provide administrative and personnel support for military and naval operations, such as barracks, headquarters buildings, mess halls and training areas. 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 8.1.1.

France
France’s LOAC Summary Note (1992) considers military establishments, installations, and materiel and positions of tactical importance to be military objectives. 
France, Fiche de Synthèse sur les Règles Applicables dans les Conflits Armés, Note No. 432/DEF/EMA/OL.2/NP, Général de Corps d’Armée Voinot (pour l’Amiral Lanxade, Chef d’Etat-major des Armées), 1992, Part I, § 1.2.

Ethiopia
According to Ethiopia’s Standing Rules of Engagement (2007), “military objectives” include the “property, constructions and institution of the armed forces”. 
Ethiopia, Standing Rules of Engagement, National Defense Force, Addis Ababa, 2007, § 8.3.5.

Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) provides that military objectives include, in particular, “buildings and objects for combat service support”. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 443.

Greece
The Hellenic Navy’s International Law Manual (1995) states with regard to naval bombardment:
1. … [T]he provisions of the otherwise obsolete IX Hague Convention concerning the respect and protection of the victims of armed conflict should be considered as bearing a perpetual binding effect.
2. To the above effect, the significance of the codified text of IX Hague Convention is great and the following provisions should be applied by the belligerents:

c. Bombardment only of targets excluded by the prohibition of art. 1 (military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war material, workshops or plants which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army and the ships of war in the harbour) (art. 2). 
Greece, International Law Manual, Hellenic Navy General Staff, Directorate A2, Division IV, 1995, Chapter 7, Part II, §§ 1–2.

Hungary
According to Hungary’s Military Manual (1992), military objectives include military establishments and positions. 
Hungary, A Hadijog, Jegyzet a Katonai, Föiskolák Hallgatói Részére, Magyar Honvédség Szolnoki Repülötiszti Föiskola, 1992, p. 18.

Ireland
Ireland’s Basic LOAC Guide (2005) states: “Military objectives … obviously include military equipment … barracks and other military sites.” 
Ireland, Basic Guide to the Law of Armed Conflict, TP/TRG/01-2005, Director of Defence Forces Training, Department of Defence, July 2005, p. 4.

Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states:
The war effort is not only expressed in attacking fighters at the front, but also in striking at the enemy’s logistical infrastructure – depots, factories, mobilisation centres and communications. A soldier understandably constitutes a military target, as do weapons, bases, installations, airfields and army vehicles. 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 23.

Italy
According to Italy’s IHL Manual (1991), “military quarters, military works and establishments, defence works and preparations” are military objectives. 
Italy, Manuale di diritto umanitario, Introduzione e Volume I, Usi e convenzioni di Guerra, SMD-G-014, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, Vol. I, § 12.

According to Italy’s LOAC Elementary Rules Manual (1991), military objectives include military establishments and positions. 
Italy, Regole elementari di diritto di guerra, SMD-G-012, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, § 4.

Kenya
Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997) provides that “the establishments, buildings and positions where armed forces or their material are located (e.g. positions, barracks, stores, concentrations of troops)” are military objectives. 
Kenya, Law of Armed Conflict, Military Basic Course (ORS), 4 Précis, The School of Military Police, 1997, Précis No. 2, p. 11.

Madagascar
According to Madagascar’s Military Manual (1994), military objectives include “establishments, constructions and positions where the armed forces and their materiel are located (for example positions, army barracks, depots)”. 
Madagascar, Le Droit des Conflits Armés, Ministère des Forces Armées, August 1994, Fiche No. 2-SO, § C; see also Fiche No. 2-O, § 4 and Fiche No. 4-T, § 1.

Mexico
Mexico’s IHL Guidelines (2009) states: “Military objectives are: … the establishments, buildings and positions of the armed forces.” 
Mexico, Cartilla de Derecho Internacional Humanitario, Ministry of National Defence, 2009, § 8.

Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands considers that positions of military units, such as artillery positions, constitute military objectives “under all circumstances”. 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, p. V-3.

The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states:
Naturally, locations of military units also form military objectives, e.g., artillery and guided-weapon positions. Mention must also be made of military aircraft, air bases, communication and radar installations, and storage sites of military equipment. All these objects constitute military objectives, in all circumstances. Whether a road or railway line forms a military objective depends on the military situation in the field. The answer to the question whether neutralization of such an object at that time confers military advantage is decisive to the object’s classification. This applies even more strictly to objects which, by nature, are intended for civilian purposes (e.g. houses and school buildings). However, these may become military objectives by virtue of their use (e.g. as military billets and equipment as command posts). 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0510.

New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states: “Military bases, warehouses … buildings and objects that provide administrative and logistic support for military operations are examples of objects universally regarded as military objectives.” 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 516(2); see also § 623(2).

Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states: “[Air] bombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively against the following objectives: … military works, military establishments or depots”. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 172.d.

Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states: “[Air] bombardment is only legitimate when it is exclusively directed against the following objectives: … military works, military establishments or depots”. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 163(c), p. 343.

Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states: “military objectives include … objects (structures, buildings) used (ready to be used) for military purposes”. 
Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 1.

South Africa
South Africa’s LOAC Manual (1996) states that military objectives include “the establishments, buildings and positions where armed forces or their material are located”. 
South Africa, Presentation on the South African Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Appendix A, Chapter 4: International Humanitarian Law (The Law of Armed Conflict), National Defence Force, 1996, § 24(d)(ii). This manual is also included in Chapter 4 of the Draft Civic Education Manual of 1997.

South Africa’s Revised Civic Education Manual (2004) states that “military objectives” include “the establishments, buildings and positions where armed forces or their material are located”. 
South Africa, Revised Civic Education Manual, South African National Defence Force, 2004, Chapter 4, § 47(d).

Spain
According to Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996), “establishments, constructions and positions where armed forces are located [and] establishments and installations of combat support services and logistics” are military objectives. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 4.5.b.(2).a.

Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states that “establishments, constructions and positions where armed forces are located [and] establishments and facilities of combat support services and logistics services” are military objectives. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 4.5.b.(2).(a).

Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) lists the armed forces and “their materiel, sites and buildings occupied by them (barracks, fortresses, arsenals) … and establishments directly linked to the activity of the armed forces” among military objectives. 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 28.

Togo
Togo’s Military Manual (1996) considers “the establishments, positions and constructions where armed forces and their materiel are located (e.g. positions, barracks and depots)” as military objectives. 
Togo, Le Droit de la Guerre, III fascicules, Etat-major Général des Forces Armées Togolaises, Ministère de la Défense nationale, 1996, Fascicule I, p. 13.

Ukraine
Ukraine’s IHL Manual (2004) states that “military objectives” include “objects (such as constructions, buildings, positions, quarters, warehouses) used or prepared to be used for military purposes”. 
Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, § 1.2.45.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) states that military objectives include “buildings”. 
United Kingdom, The Law of Armed Conflict, D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (Revised 1981), Ministry of Defence, prepared under the Direction of The Chief of the General Staff, 1981, Section 4, p. 13, § 3(b)(2).

The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states: “The term ‘military objective’ includes combatant members of the enemy armed forces and their military weapons, vehicles, equipment and installations.” 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 5.4.1.

United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) considers that “an adversary’s military encampments … are military objectives beyond any dispute”. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 5-3(b).

According to the US Naval Handbook (1995), proper targets for naval attack include such military objectives as naval and military bases ashore; warship construction and repair facilities; military depots and warehouses; petroleum/oils/lubricants (POL) storage areas; and buildings and facilities that provide administrative and personnel support for military and naval operations, such as barracks, headquarters buildings, mess halls and training areas. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 8.1.1.

The US Naval Handbook (2007) states:
Proper objects of attack include, but are not limited to, such military objectives as … naval and military bases ashore, warship construction and repair facilities, military depots and warehouses, petroleum/oils/lubricants storage areas … buildings and facilities that provide administrative and personnel support for military and naval operations such as barracks, … headquarters buildings, mess halls, and training areas. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 8.2.5.

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Cuba
Cuba’s Military Criminal Code (1979) includes “military installations, other military objects and objects intended for use by military units or institutions” in a list of military objects. 
Cuba, Military Criminal Code , 1979, Article 33(1).

Italy
According to Italy’s Law of War Decree (1938), as amended in 1992, “military quarters, military works and establishments, defence works and preparations, depots of arms and war materiel” are military objectives. 
Italy, Law of War Decree, 1938, as amended in 1992, Article 40.

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Algeria
The Report on the Practice of Algeria states that tanks and munitions and ammunition stores were considered military objectives during the war of independence. 
Report on the Practice of Algeria, 1997, Chapter 1.3.

Iraq
In 1983, in reply to criticism of alleged attacks against civilian objects during the hostilities against Islamic Republic of Iran, the President of Iraq stated: “Our aircraft did not bomb civilian targets in Baneh during their raid of 5 June; they bombed a camp in which a large body of Iranian forces was concentrated.” 
Iraq, Message from the President of Iraq, annexed to Letter dated 10 June 1984 to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/16610, 19 June 1984, p. 2.

Lebanon
The Report on the Practice of Lebanon states that, according to an advisor of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, any position used by the occupying army for military purposes is considered a military objective. 
Report on the Practice of Lebanon, 1998, Interview with an advisor of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chapter 1.3.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1991, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United Kingdom listed ammunition storage depots among the targets the Royal Air Force had attacked. 
United Kingdom, Letter dated 13 February 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22218, 13 February 1991, p. 1.

United States of America
In 1950, the US Secretary of State stated: “The air activity of the United Nations forces in Korea has been, and is, directed solely at military targets of the invader. These targets [include] … supply dumps”. 
United States, Statement by the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, 6 September 1950, reprinted in Marjorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, Department of State Publication 8367, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 140.

In 1966, in the context of the Vietnam War, the US Department of Defense stated: “Military targets include but are not limited to … POL [petroleum/oils/lubricants] facilities, barracks and supply depots. In the specific case of Nam Dinh and Phu Li, targets have been limited to … POL dumps”. 
United States, Department of Defense, Statement on targeting policy in Vietnam, 26 December 1966, reprinted in Marjorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, Department of State Publication 8367, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 427.

In 1992, in its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the US Department of Defense stated that Iraq’s military storage and production sites had been included among the 12 target sets for the coalition’s attacks. 
United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Chapter VI, The Air Campaign, p. 98.

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Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
In 1997, in the case concerning the events at La Tablada in Argentina, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated that a military base is a “quintessential military objective”. 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 11.137 (Argentina), Report, 18 November 1997, § 155.

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ICRC
To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces that military objectives include “the establishments, buildings and positions where armed forces or their material are located (e.g. positions, barracks, stores)”. 
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 55.

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Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN)
In 1985, in the context of the conflict in El Salvador, the FMLN declared “those places visited by military elements, both from the army of the puppet regime as well as foreign military personnel involved in repressive and genocidal activities against the popular revolutionary movement” to be military objectives. It also considered houses or any other property leased to foreign military advisers as military objectives. 
Communication by the FMLN, June 1985, § 4, Estudios Centroamericanos, Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, Vol. XL, Nos. 441–442, July–August 1985, p. 581.

Americas Watch
In 1985, in a report on violations of the laws of war in Nicaragua, Americas Watch listed “military works, military and naval establishments, supplies, vehicles, camp sites, fortifications, and fuel depots or stores which are or could be utilized by either party to the conflict” as objects which “can arguably be regarded as legitimate military objectives subject to direct attack”. 
Americas Watch, Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua: 1981–1985, New York, March 1985, p. 33.

Africa Watch
In 1989, in a report on violations of the laws of war in Angola, Africa Watch listed “military works, military and naval establishments, supplies, vehicles, camp sites, fortifications, and fuel depots or stores that are, or could be, utilized by any party to the conflict” as objects which “may be regarded as legitimate military objectives subject to direct attack by combatants and mines”. 
Africa Watch, Angola: Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides, New York, April 1989, pp. 139–140.

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Hague Convention (IX)
Article 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IX) allows the bombardment of “the ships of war in the harbour”. 
Hague Convention (IX) concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 2.

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New Delhi Draft Rules
According to paragraph I(5) of the proposed annex to Article 7(2) of the 1956 New Delhi Draft Rules, “rocket launching ramps” are military objectives considered to be of “generally recognized military importance”. 
Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, September 1956, submitted to governments for their consideration on behalf of the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross, New Delhi, 28 October–7 November, Res. XIII, § I(5) of the proposed annex to Article 7(2).

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Australia
Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) gives “enemy armed forces and their military weapons” as examples of military objectives. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 5.27.

Belgium
Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) considers that military vehicles and aircraft are military objectives. 
Belgium, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit de la Guerre, Ecole Royale Militaire, par J. Maes, Chargé de cours, Avocat-général près la Cour Militaire, D/1983/1187/029, 1983, p. 26.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (1992) considers that enemy warships are military objectives. 
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, p. 111.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states in relation to the rules on the distinction between warships and merchant ships that “after the identification, only a military objective may be attacked, in this case [only] the warship”. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 258, § 613.

Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) considers that “military aircraft, weapons [and] ammunition” are “generally accepted as being military objectives”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-2, § 9(b); see also p. 8-7, § 47 (enemy warships and military aircraft).

Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on targeting: “The following are generally accepted as being military objectives: … military aircraft, weapons, ammunition”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 407.1.b.


In its chapter on naval warfare, the manual states:
Enemy warships, military aircraft, auxiliary vessels, and auxiliary aircraft … are legitimate targets and may be attacked. Such vessels and aircraft may not be attacked if they are protected under paragraph 41 [of the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, which states that: ‘Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives’]”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 833.

Chad
Chad’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states that military objectives may include “tanks [and] ships”. 
Chad, Droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces armées et de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 58.

Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book IV (Instruction of heads of division and company commanders): “The following objects are generally recognized as military objectives: … military aircraft, weapons, munitions”. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 26.

Croatia
Croatia’s LOAC Compendium (1991) states that proper targets in the air include “enemy military aircraft violating national airspace or flying over the high seas”. 
Croatia, Compendium “Law of Armed Conflicts”, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1991, p. 44.

Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) states: “Proper targets for naval attack include such military objectives as enemy warships and military aircraft, naval and military auxiliaries … military vehicles, armour, artillery, ammunition stores”. 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 8.1.1.

Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) provides that military objectives include, in particular, “military aircraft and warships”. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 443.

Greece
The Hellenic Navy’s International Law Manual (1995) states with regard to naval bombardment:
1. … [T]he provisions of the otherwise obsolete IX Hague Convention concerning the respect and protection of the victims of armed conflict should be considered as bearing a perpetual binding effect.
2. To the above effect, the significance of the codified text of IX Hague Convention is great and the following provisions should be applied by the belligerents:

c. Bombardment only of targets excluded by the prohibition of art. 1 (military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war material, workshops or plants which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army and the ships of war in the harbour) (art. 2). 
Greece, International Law Manual, Hellenic Navy General Staff, Directorate A2, Division IV, 1995, Chapter 7, Part II, §§ 1–2.

Hungary
Hungary’s Military Manual (1992) states that proper targets in the air include “enemy military aircraft violating national airspace or flying over the high seas”. 
Hungary, A Hadijog, Jegyzet a Katonai, Föiskolák Hallgatói Részére, Magyar Honvédség Szolnoki Repülötiszti Föiskola, 1992, p. 71.

Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states: “A soldier understandably constitutes a military target, as do weapons, bases, installations, airfields and army vehicles.” 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 23.

Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands considers that materiel used by armed forces, such as tanks, vehicles, and aircraft, constitute military objectives “under all circumstances”. 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, p. V-3.

The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands qualifies “artillery and guided-weapon positions” as military objectives. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0510.

New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states: “Military aircraft, weapons [and] ammunition are examples of objects universally regarded as military objectives.” 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 516(2); see also § 623(2).

Peru
Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states: “Unless they enjoy immunity from attack, enemy warships and aircraft as well as enemy auxiliary vessels and aircraft are military objectives and can be attacked.” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 121(c), p. 313.

Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states: “military objectives include … weapons and military equipment”. 
Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 1.

When conducting combat operations:
a) in the air – military objectives include –
- military aircraft and
- auxiliary aircraft.
b) at sea – military objectives include –
- war-ships, which means all vessels belonging to the armed forces of a state bearing the external marks which distinguish the war-ships of their nationality; the commander must be in the service of the state, his name figuring on the list of the officers of the fighting fleet or in a similar document; the crew must be subject to military discipline;
- vessels converted into war-ships, namely, those meeting the following conditions: it is placed under the direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the power whose flag it flies; bear the external marks which distinguish the war-ships of their nationality; are under the command of an officer who is in the service of the state, his name figuring on the list of the officers of the fighting fleet or in a similar document; the crew must be subject to military discipline.
Possession of weapons by the civil vessel’s crew does not give grounds to consider such class of ships as converted into war-ships. Such vessels shall be considered civil vessels if they are innocently used in their normal role, comply with identification and visit requirements and do not intentionally hamper the movement of war-ships. 
Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 89.

Spain
Spain’s Field Regulations (1882) stipulates that objects useful in war, inter alia, arms, munitions, machines and tanks, are objects on which an attack is lawful. 
Spain, El Reglamento para el Servicio de Campaña, 4 January 1882, § 880.

According to Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996), “military vehicles, warships and military aircraft [and] materiel, objects and goods belonging to the armed forces and which serve no medical or religious purpose” are military objectives. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 4.5.b.(2).a.

Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states that “military vehicles, ships and aircraft [and] materiel, objects and property of the armed forces that are not of a medical or religious nature” are military objectives. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 4.5.b.(2).(a).

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) states that military objectives include “minefields [and] weapons”. 
United Kingdom, The Law of Armed Conflict, D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (Revised 1981), Ministry of Defence, prepared under the Direction of The Chief of the General Staff, 1981, Section 4, p. 13, § 3(b)(2).

The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states: “The term ‘military objective’ includes combatant members of the enemy armed forces and their military weapons, vehicles, equipment and installations.” 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 5.4.1.

United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) considers that an adversary’s “armament, such as military aircraft, tanks, antiaircraft emplacements … are military objectives beyond any dispute”. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 5-3(b)(2).

The US Naval Handbook (1995) specifies that “proper targets for naval attack include such military objectives as enemy warships and military aircraft, naval and military auxiliaries, … military vehicles, armor, artillery, ammunition stores”.  
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 8.1.1.

The US Naval Handbook (2007) states: “Proper objects of attack include, but are not limited to, such military objectives as enemy warships and military aircraft, naval and military auxiliaries … military vehicles, armor, artillery, [and] ammunition stores”. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 8.2.5; see also § 8.6.1.

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Cuba
Cuba’s Military Criminal Code (1979) includes “weapons and munitions” in a list of military objects. 
Cuba, Military Criminal Code, 1979, Article 33(1).

Italy
According to Italy’s Law of War Decree (1938), as amended in 1992, “warships and military aircraft” are legitimate military targets. 
Italy, Law of War Decree, 1938, as amended in 1992, Article 40.

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Kuwait
In 1991, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, Kuwait stated: “Kuwait Air Force aircraft also took part in joint air operations directed primarily against ground-to-ground missile sites, missile launchers, artillery positions and concentrations of Iraqi mechanized units.” 
Kuwait, Letter dated 28 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22164, 28 January 1991, p. 1.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1991, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United Kingdom stated that it had targeted Iraq’s fixed and mobile SCUD missile launchers and its chemical and biological warfare installations, production and storage capability. 
United Kingdom, Letter dated 28 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22156, 28 January 1991, p. 1.

In 2003, during a debate in the House of Commons, the UK Secretary of State for Defence made a statement and replied to questions by Members:
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I would like to make a statement about military operations to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.

President Bush announced at 3.15 this morning on behalf of the coalition that operations had begun with attacks on selected targets of military importance. Those attacks were carried out by coalition aircraft and cruise missiles on more than one target in the vicinity of Baghdad, following information relating to the whereabouts of very senior members of the Iraqi leadership. Those leaders are at the very heart of Iraq’s command and control system, responsible for directing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

In addition to those attacks, coalition forces yesterday carried out certain preliminary operations against Iraqi artillery, surface-to-surface missiles, and air defence systems within the southern no-fly zone. Those were prudent preparatory steps, using coalition air capabilities previously used in the no-fly zones, designed to reduce the threat to coalition forces in Kuwait. The protection of our servicemen and women is a matter of paramount importance. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Statements by the Secretary of State for Defence, Hansard, 20 March 2003, Vol. 401, Debates, col. 1087.

United States of America
In 1966, in the context of the Vietnam War, the US Department of Defense stated that military targets “also include those anti-aircraft and SAM sites which endanger the lives of American pilots … In the specific case of Nam Dinh and Phu Li, targets have been limited to … air defense sites.” 
United States, Department of Defense, Statement on targeting policy in Vietnam, 26 December 1966, reprinted in Marjorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, Department of State Publication 8367, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 427.

In 1991, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United States stated that military targets included “Iraqi biological and chemical warfare facilities, mobile and fixed surface-to-surface missile sites … and the air defense networks that protect these facilities” as well as “Iraqi artillery positions”. 
United States, Letter dated 22 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22130, 22 January 1991, p. 1.

In 1991, during a news briefing concerning the Gulf War, the US Secretary of Defense stated that “air defence units and radars”, “SCUD missile launchers” and “the factories where Iraq has produced chemical and biological weapons, and until recently, continued working on nuclear weapons” were considered military targets and had been attacked. 
United States, News Briefing by the US Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 23 January 1991, annexed to Letter dated 25 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22168, 29 January 1991, p. 3.

In 1992, in its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the US Department of Defense stated that Iraq’s strategic integrated air defense system, its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons research, production and storage facilities and its Scud missiles, launchers, and production and storage facilities had been included among the 12 target sets for the coalition’s attacks. 
United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Chapter VI, The Air Campaign, pp. 96 and 98.

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Americas Watch
In 1985, in a report on violations of the laws of war in Nicaragua, Americas Watch listed “weapons [and] other war materiel” as objects which “can arguably be regarded as legitimate military objectives subject to direct attack”. 
Americas Watch, Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua: 1981–1985, New York, March 1985, p. 33.

Africa Watch
In 1989, in a report on violations of the laws of war in Angola, Africa Watch listed “weapons and other war material” as objects which “may be regarded as legitimate military objectives subject to direct attack by combatants and mines”. 
Africa Watch, Angola: Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides, New York, April 1989, p. 139.

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Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
Under Article 8 of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, cultural property may be placed under special protection provided, inter alia, that it is situated “at an adequate distance … from any important military objective constituting a vulnerable point, such as, for example, … [a] broadcasting station … or a main line of communication”. 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954, Article 8.

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Hague Rules of Air Warfare
According to Article 24(2) of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare, “lines of communication … used for military purposes” are military objectives. 
Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, Part II, drafted by a Commission of Jurists, The Hague, December 1922–February 1923, Article 24(2).

ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War
Article 5(1) of the 1938 ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War provides: “Aerial bombardment is prohibited unless directed at … lines of communication or transportation used for military purposes”. 
Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War, adopted by the International Law Association, Fortieth Conference, Amsterdam, 29 August–2 September 1938, Article 5(1).

New Delhi Draft Rules
Paragraph I of the proposed annex to Article 7(2) of the 1956 New Delhi Draft Rules provided: “The objectives belonging to the following categories are those considered to be of generally recognized military importance: … (7) The installations of broadcasting and television stations; telephone and telegraph exchanges of fundamental military importance.” 
Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, September 1956, submitted to governments for their consideration on behalf of the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross, New Delhi, 28 October–7 November, Res. XIII, § I of the proposed annex to Article 7(2).

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Australia
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) identifies “facilities which support or enhance command and control, such as communications facilities” as military objectives. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 527(c).

Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) identifies “facilities which support or enhance command and control, such as communications facilities” as examples of military objectives. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 5.31.

Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) considers communications and command and control (C3) facilities, as well as “lines of communication and other objects used to conduct or support military operations”, as proper targets for naval attack. 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 8.1.1.

Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states: “The war effort is not only expressed in attacking fighters at the front, but also in striking at the enemy’s logistical infrastructure … mobilisation centres and communications.” 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 23.

Italy
According to Italy’s IHL Manual (1991), “lines and means of communication which can be used for the needs of the armed forces” are military objectives. 
Italy, Manuale di diritto umanitario, Introduzione e Volume I, Usi e convenzioni di Guerra, SMD-G-014, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, Vol. I, § 12.

Netherlands
The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states that “communication and radar installations … constitute military objectives, in all circumstances”. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0510.

New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states that “command and control points are examples of objects universally regarded as military objectives”. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 516(2); see also § 623(2).

Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states: “[Air] bombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively against the following objectives: … lines of communication … which are used for military purposes.” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 172.d.

Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states: “[Air] bombardment is only legitimate when it is exclusively directed against the following objectives: … lines of communication … which are used for military purposes.” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 163(c), p. 343.

Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea’s Military Law Manual (1996) states that “transmission towers and electronic communication facilities used for military operations” can be regarded as military objectives. 
Republic of Korea, Military Law Manual, 1996, p. 87.

Sweden
Sweden’s IHL Manual (1991) states:
How and to what extent a given object can effectively contribute to the adversary’s military operations must be decided by the commander. This need not imply that the property in question is being used by the adversary for a given operation … It may even be a question of means of communication … that indirectly contribute to the adversary’s military operations. 
Sweden, International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, with reference to the Swedish Total Defence System, Swedish Ministry of Defence, January 1991, Section 3.2.1.5, p. 54.

Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) considers “lines of communication … of military importance” as military objectives. 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 28.

United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) states:
Controversy exists over whether, and the circumstances under which, other objects, such as civilian transportation and communications systems, dams and dikes can be classified properly as military objectives … A key factor in classification of objects as military objectives is whether they make an effective contribution to an adversary’s military action so that their capture, destruction or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 5-3(b)(2).

The US Naval Handbook (1995) considers communications and command and control facilities, as well as “lines of communication and other objects used to conduct or support military operations”, as proper targets for naval attack. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 8.1.1.

The US Naval Handbook (2007) states:
Proper objects of attack include, but are not limited to, such military objectives as … lines of communication and other objects used to conduct or support military operations … [and] communications and command and control facilities. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 8.2.5.

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Cuba
Cuba’s National Defence Act (1994) lists “communications facilities and equipment” among the objects integrated within the “Military Reserve of Facilities and Equipment of the National Economy” to guarantee the necessities of defence in wartime. 
Cuba, National Defence Act, 1994, Article 119(c).

Italy
According to Italy’s Law of War Decree (1938), as amended in 1992, “lines and means of communication which can be used for the needs of the armed forces” are military objectives. 
Italy, Law of War Decree, 1938, as amended in 1992, Article 40.

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Algeria
The Report on the Practice of Algeria states:
Leaving aside the objects which do not really raise questions of interpretation such as tanks or weapons and munition depots, the National Liberation Army of Algeria resorted to “economic sabotage” throughout the war. Roads, bridges, railway tracks and telephone lines were preferred targets. It even happened that harvests of important French colonisers were burned or fuel depots used by the French army destroyed … Even the petroleum industry which had barely emerged was not spared. In fact, everything which was considered to form part of “the economic machinery of the enemy” had to be brought down. 
Report on the Practice of Algeria, 1997, Chapter 1.3, referring to El Moudjahid, Vol. 1, pp. 22 and 25–26, El Moudjahid, Vol. 2, p. 151 and El Moudjahid, Vol. 3, pp. 153–154.

Islamic Republic of Iran
According to the Report on the Practice of Islamic Republic of Iran, radio and television stations were considered military objectives during the Iran–Iraq War. 
Report on the Practice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1997, Chapter 1.3.

Israel
In 2006, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
IDF [Israel Defense Force] operations in Lebanon have also included operations directed against infrastructure and property. These have included:

Al Manar TV station – Operating as the Hizballah television station, Al Manar’s was used to relay messages to terrorists as well as incite acts of terrorism. The ICRC list of accepted military objectives includes “the installations of broadcasting and television stations”. Similarly, the Committee established to review NATO bombings in Yugoslavia noted in relation to NATO attacks on radio and television stations in Belgrade: “If the media is used to incite crimes then it is a legitimate target … Insofar as the attack actually was aimed at disrupting the communications network it was legally acceptable.” 
Israel, Responding to Hizbullah Attacks from Lebanon: Issues of Proportionality, Legal Background, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 25 July 2006, § 4.

In 2007, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in a diplomatic note:
The guiding principle adopted by the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] was to target only infrastructure that was making a significant contribution to the operational capabilities of the Hizbullah terrorists …

Al Manar TV station – Operating as the Hizbullah television station, Al Manar was used to relay messages to terrorists and to incite acts of terrorism. The ICRC list of accepted military objectives includes “the installations of broadcasting and television stations.” Similarly, the Committee established to review NATO bombings in Yugoslavia noted in relation to NATO attacks on radio and television stations in Belgrade: “If the media is used to incite crimes then it is a legitimate target … Insofar as the attack actually was aimed at disrupting the communications network it was legally acceptable.”  
Israel, Israel’s War with Hizbullah. Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism, Diplomatic Notes No. 1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, April 2007, pp. 15 and 17.

Lebanon
The Report on the Practice of Lebanon refers to a communiqué issued in 1997 by the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs which stated: “All radio stations and media installations in Lebanon are civilian targets. Israel does not have the right to attack them, regardless of their political orientation.” 
Report on the Practice of Lebanon, 1998, Chapter 1.3, referring to Communiqué of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 February 1997.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1991, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United Kingdom stated: “Iraqi military command and control has been severely damaged and increasingly Iraq has moved to alternative, less effective means of communication. Iraq’s ability to sustain a war has been steadily reduced.” 
United Kingdom, Letter dated 28 January 1991 from the United Kingdom to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22156, 28 January 1991, p. 1.

In 2003, during a debate in the House of Commons on “Iraq (Overnight events)”, the UK Secretary of State for Defence made a statement and replied to questions by Members:
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I would like to make a statement about military operations to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.

President Bush announced at 3.15 this morning on behalf of the coalition that operations had begun with attacks on selected targets of military importance. Those attacks were carried out by coalition aircraft and cruise missiles on more than one target in the vicinity of Baghdad, following information relating to the whereabouts of very senior members of the Iraqi leadership. Those leaders are at the very heart of Iraq’s command and control system, responsible for directing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Simon Thomas (Ceredigion): … Will the Secretary of State confirm that the attacks last night were in residential areas of Baghdad and were, in fact, an attempt to assassinate Saddam Hussein? Will he take this opportunity to spell out in more detail the UK MOD processes for ensuring the protection of civilians in such situations? What advice is taken and given in order to achieve that? …
Mr. Hoon: The hon. Gentleman probably understands more about the nature of Iraqi society than he is letting on. In the past, we have heard many references to the palaces that the regime has constructed. Those palaces are residential – if the hon. Gentleman chooses to describe them as such – but they are also command and control centres that are operated by leaders of the regime simply because they are afraid of any close contact with their own people. In reality, those targets are perfectly legitimate military targets because they are the places from which Saddam Hussein exercises command and control over his own people and over weapons of mass destruction. It is entirely consistent with our campaign objectives that such military command and control facilities should be targeted.

Mr. George Osborne (Tatton): It is clear from the action overnight that the military is targeting Saddam Hussein himself. Should Saddam Hussein be killed or overthrown, would military action cease immediately? If not, how would the Iraqi military bring the conflict to a close? What would it have to say to us to bring the conflict to an end?
Mr. Hoon: We are pursuing lawful military targets. Clearly, part of that effort is designed to disrupt the command and control of the regime. As I have said, and as the Prime Minister made clear yesterday, we are seeking to remove weapons of mass destruction from Iraq. However, with the expiry of the ultimatum to the regime and to Saddam Hussein, the means of achieving that will be through the removal of the regime. The removal of the regime will be the specific focus of our military operations. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Statements by the Secretary of State for Defence, Hansard, 20 March 2003, Vol. 401, Debates, cols. 1087 and 1093–1094.

In 2003, during a debate in the House of Commons, the UK Prime Minister replied to a question by a Member:
Mr. Duncan Smith: Given the Prime Minister’s answer about losing grip on power with regard to Saddam Hussein, he knows that television is a powerful medium and that it is never more so than during times of war when it is used by a ruthless dictator, like Saddam Hussein. Will the Prime Minister tell us what progress is being made to take Iraqi television off air permanently, how successful coalition attempts have been to jam Iraqi radio broadcasts in Iraq, and what methods are being used to pass information to the Iraqi people to let them know that, if and when they rise up, they will be supported?
The Prime Minister: In relation to any military targets, we have to ensure that they have a military objective – that is the legal requirement as well as the stated political objective that we have set. There is no doubt that one of the issues is how we can best communicate with the Iraqi people. That is being urgently looked at. There are different ways in which we can communicate with them, including through people inside Iraq who can tell them exactly what is happening. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Statement by the Prime Minister, Hansard, 26 March 2003, Vol. 402, Debates, col. 282.

In 2003, in reply to a written question in the House of Commons, the UK Secretary of State for Defence wrote:
The military campaign is crafted around the principle of minimum use of force. We attack only military objectives and combatants subject to the constraints of proportionality …

Television offices and studios have not been the object of coalition attacks. The coalition has attacked, and reserves the right to continue to attack systems (such as transmitters) which are used by the regime for conveying military command and control information. Coalition attacks are designed to minimise damage to civilian infrastructure. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Secretary of State for Defence, Hansard, 9 April 2003, Vol. 403, Written Answers, col. 297W.

United States of America
During the Korean War, the United States reportedly attacked communication centres in North Korea. 
Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953, Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., Revised edition, 1983, p. 516.

In 1950, the US Secretary of State stated: “The air activity of the United Nations forces in Korea has been, and is, directed solely at military targets of the invader. These targets [include] … communications lines.” 
United States, Statement by Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, 6 September 1950, reprinted in Marjorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, Department of State Publication 8367, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 140.

In 1991, in reports submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United States included command and control centres among Iraq’s military targets. 
United States, Letter dated 22 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22130, 22 January 1991, p. 1; Letter dated 8 February 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22216, 13 February 1991, p. 1.

In 1991, during a news briefing concerning the Gulf War, the US Secretary of Defense stated that “command and control [and] communications facilities” were considered military targets and had been attacked. 
United States, News Briefing by the US Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 23 January 1991, annexed to Letter dated 25 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22168, 29 January 1991, p. 3.

In 1992, in its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the US Department of Defense stated that Iraq’s leadership command facilities, its telecommunications and command, control and communication nodes had been included among the 12 target sets for the coalition’s attacks. 
United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Chapter VI, The Air Campaign, pp. 95–96.

To challenge [Saddam Hussein’s] C3 [command, control and communication], the Coalition bombed microwave relay towers, telephone exchanges, switching rooms, fiber optic nodes, and bridges that carried coaxial communications cables … More than half of Iraq’s military landline communications passed through major switching facilities in Baghdad. Civil TV and radio facilities could be used easily for C3 backup for military purposes. The Saddam Hussein regime also controlled TV and radio and used them as the principal media for Iraqi propaganda. Thus, these installations were also struck. 
United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Chapter VI, The Air Campaign, p. 96; see also James P. Coyne, Plan of Attack, Air Force Magazine, April 1992, pp. 40–42.

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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
In its final report to the ICTY Prosecutor in 2000, the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stated:
The precise scope of “military-industrial infrastructure, media and other strategic targets” as referred to in the US statement and “government ministries and refineries” as referred to in the NATO statement is unclear. Whether the media constitutes a legitimate target group is a debatable issue. If the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it is a legitimate target. If it is merely disseminating propaganda to generate support for the war effort, it is not a legitimate target. 
ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The Hague, 14 June 2000, § 47.

The media as such is not a traditional target category. To the extent particular media components are part of the C3 (command, control and communications) network they are military objectives. If media components are not part of the C3 network then they may become military objectives depending upon their use. As a bottom line, civilians, civilian objects and civilian morale as such are not legitimate military objectives. The media does have an effect on civilian morale. If that effect is merely to foster support for the war effort, the media is not a legitimate military objective. If the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, it can become a legitimate military objective. If the media is the nerve system that keeps a war-monger in power and thus perpetuates the war effort, it may fall within the definition of a legitimate military objective. 
ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The Hague, 14 June 2000, § 55.

The attack appears to have been justified by NATO as part of a more general attack aimed at disrupting the FRY Command, Control and Communications network, the nerve centre and apparatus that keeps Miloševic in power, and also as an attempt to dismantle the FRY propaganda machinery. Insofar as the attack actually was aimed at disrupting the communications network, it was legally acceptable.
If, however, the attack was made because equal time was not provided for Western news broadcasts, that is, because the station was part of the propaganda machinery, the legal basis was more debatable. Disrupting government propaganda may help to undermine the morale of the population and the armed forces, but justifying an attack on a civilian facility on such grounds alone may not meet the “effective contribution to military action” and “definite military advantage” criteria required by the Additional Protocols … While stopping such propaganda may serve to demoralize the Yugoslav population and undermine the government’s political support, it is unlikely that either of these purposes would offer the “concrete and direct” military advantage necessary to make them a legitimate military objective. 
ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The Hague, 14 June 2000, §§ 75–76.

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Americas Watch
In 1985, in a report on violations of the laws of war in Nicaragua, Americas Watch listed “objects which, while not directly connected with combat operations, effectively contribute to military operations in the circumstances ruling at the time, such as transportation and communication systems and facilities” as objects which “can arguably be regarded as legitimate military objectives subject to direct attack”. 
Americas Watch, Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua: 1981–1985, New York, March 1985, p. 33.

Africa Watch
In 1989, in a report on violations of the laws of war in Angola, Africa Watch listed “objects that, while not directly connected with combat operations, effectively contribute to military operations in the circumstances ruling at the time, such as transportation and communication systems and facilities” as objects which “may be regarded as legitimate military objectives subject to direct attack by combatants and mines”. 
Africa Watch, Angola: Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides, New York, April 1989, p. 140.

Human Rights Watch
In 1999, in a letter to the NATO Secretary-General concerning NATO’s bombing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Human Rights Watch stated, with respect to the argument that the Serbian State radio and television headquarters in Belgrade was a legitimate target for NATO to attack:
While stopping such propaganda may serve to demoralize the Yugoslav population and undermine the government’s political support, neither purpose offers the “concrete and direct” military advantage necessary to make them a legitimate target. 
Human Rights Watch, Letter to the NATO Secretary-General, 13 May 1999.

In a report on the NATO bombings in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia issued in 2000, Human Rights Watch stated that it considered the bombing of the Serbian State radio and television headquarters in Belgrade to be “one of the worst incidents of civilian death” with respect to target selection. It asserted that there was no evidence that the radio and television headquarters met the legal test of military necessity in target selection, as it made no direct contribution to the military effort in Kosovo, and added that in this case the purpose of the attack seemed to have been more “psychological harassment of the civilian population” than to obtain direct military effect. The report further stated that “the risks involved to the civilian population in undertaking the urban attack thus grossly outweighed any perceived military benefit”. 
Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, New York, 7 February 2000, p. 7.

Amnesty International
In 2000, in a report on the NATO bombings in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Amnesty International concluded that “in one instance, the attack on the headquarters of Serbian state radio and television (RTS), NATO launched a direct attack on a civilian object, killing 16 civilians. Such attack breached article 52(1) of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I and therefore constitutes a war crime.” 
Amnesty International, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: “Collateral Damage” or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force, AI Index EUR 70/18/00, London, June 2000, p. 25.

Note: Practice concerning military vehicles, ships and aircraft has been included in Rule 8, Section D. Weapons and weapon systems.
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Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
Under Article 8 of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, cultural property may be placed under special protection provided, inter alia, that it is situated “at an adequate distance … from any important military objective constituting a vulnerable point, such as, for example, an aerodrome … a port or railway station of relative importance or a main line of communication”. 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954, Article 8.

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Hague Rules of Air Warfare
According to Article 24(2) of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare, “lines of … transportation used for military purposes” are military objectives. 
Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, Part II, drafted by a Commission of Jurists, The Hague, December 1922–February 1923, Article 24(2).

ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War
Article 5(1) of the 1938 ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War provides that “aerial bombardment is prohibited unless directed at … lines of communication or transportation used for military purposes”. 
Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War, adopted by the International Law Association, Fortieth Conference, Amsterdam, 29 August–2 September 1938, Article 5(1).

New Delhi Draft Rules
Paragraph I of the proposed annex to Article 7(2) of the 1956 New Delhi Draft Rules provided:
The objectives belonging to the following categories are those considered to be of generally recognized military importance:

(5) Airfields …
(6) Those of the lines and means of communication (railway lines, roads, bridges, tunnels and canals) which are of fundamental military importance. 
Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, September 1956, submitted to governments for their consideration on behalf of the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross, New Delhi, 28 October–7 November, Res. XIII, § I of the proposed annex to Article 7(2).

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Australia
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) cites “transport facilities which support military operations” and “transportation systems for military supplies, transportation centres where lines of communication converge, [and] rail yards” as examples of military objectives. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, §§ 527(b) and 527(f).

Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) identifies “transport facilities which support military operations” and “transportation systems for military supplies, transportation centres where lines of communication converge, [and] rail yards” as examples of military objectives. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 5.31.

8.56 … If there is doubt as to the status of a civil aircraft, it should be called upon to clarify that status. If it fails to do so, or is engaged in non-civil activities, such as ferrying troops, it may be attacked …
8.57 Civil aircraft, which have been absorbed into a belligerent’s air force and are being ferried from the manufacturer to a belligerent for this purpose, may be attacked.

8.59 Civil aircraft on the ground may only be attacked in accordance with the normal rules relating to military objectives. However, since they may be used for transporting troops or supplies, their status will frequently depend upon the prevailing military situation. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, §§ 8.56–8.57 and 8.59.

Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) considers that “military bases, … ports and airfields; and … military aircraft” are “generally accepted as being military objectives”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-2, § 9(a).

The manual adds that “transportation systems for military supplies; … transportation centres where lines of communication converge; [and] railyards” “depending on the circumstances, may constitute military objectives”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-2, § 11(a), (b) and (c).

Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on targeting:
1. The following are generally accepted as being military objectives:
a. military bases, … ports and airfields; and
b. military aircraft …
2. Civilian vessels, aircraft, vehicles and buildings are military objectives if they contain combatants, military equipment or supplies.
3. The following objects, depending on the circumstances, may constitute military objectives:
a. transportation systems for military supplies;
b. transportation centres where lines of communication converge;
c. rail yards. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 407.1–3(a–c).

Central African Republic
The Central African Republic’s Instructor’s Manual (1999) states in Volume 2 (Instruction for group and patrol leaders): “Only ships that are military objectives at sea may be attacked. Examples of these include: ships in convoy; ships carrying goods of military significance and members of the enemy armed forces; ships breaking a blockade.”  
Central African Republic, Le Droit de la Guerre, Fascicule No. 2: Formation pour l’obtention du certificat technique No. 2 (Chef de Groupe), du certificat Inter-Armé (CIA), du certificat d’aptitude de Chef de Patrouille (CACP), Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Centrafricaines, 1999, Chapter II, Section 1.2; see also Le Droit de la Guerre, Fascicule No. 3: Formation pour l’obtention du Brevet d’Armes No. 1, du Brevet d’Armes No. 2 et le stage d’Officier de Police Judiciaire (OPJ), Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Centrafricaines, 1999, Chapter III, Section 4.

Chad
Chad’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states that military objectives may include “airports [and] means of transport”. 
Chad, Droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces armées et de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 58.

Croatia
Croatia’s Commanders’ Guide (1992) includes “military means of transportation” among military objectives. 
Croatia, Basic Rules of the Law of Armed Conflicts – Commanders’ Manual, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1992, § 4.

Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) lists airfields, bridges, railyards, docks, port facilities, harbours and embarkation points as military objectives. 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 8.1.1.

France
According to France’s LOAC Summary Note (1992), “military means of transportation” are military objectives. 
France, Fiche de Synthèse sur les Règles Applicables dans les Conflits Armés, Note No. 432/DEF/EMA/OL.2/NP, Général de Corps d’Armée Voinot (pour l’Amiral Lanxade, Chef d’Etat-major des Armées), 1992, § 1.2.

Ireland
Ireland’s Basic LOAC Guide (2005) states: “Military objectives … obviously include military … vehicles”. 
Ireland, Basic Guide to the Law of Armed Conflict, TP/TRG/01-2005, Director of Defence Forces Training, Department of Defence, July 2005, p. 4.

Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states: “The war effort is not only expressed in attacking fighters at the front, but, also in striking at the enemy’s logistical infrastructure – … mobilisation centres and communications.” 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 23.

Italy
Italy’s LOAC Elementary Rules Manual (1991) includes “military means of transportation” among military objectives. 
Italy, Regole elementari di diritto di guerra, SMD-G-012, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, § 4.

Madagascar
Madagascar’s Military Manual (1994) states that “military means of transportation” are military objectives. 
Madagascar, Le Droit des Conflits Armés, Ministère des Forces Armées, August 1994, Fiche No. 2-O, § 4.

Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands states:
Whether a road or railway constitutes a military objective depends on the military situation on the spot. The answer to the question of whether the acquisition of such an object at that moment yields a definite military advantage is decisive for the qualification of the object. 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, p. V-3.

The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states that “the equipment used by [armed forces] (tanks, vehicles, aircraft, etc)” constitutes military objectives. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0509.

New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states that “[military] transport, ports [and] airfields are examples of objects universally regarded as military objectives”. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 516(2); see also § 623(2).

Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states: “[Air] bombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively against the following objectives: … lines of … transport which are used for military purposes.” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 172.d.

Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states: “[Air] bombardment is only legitimate when it is exclusively directed against the following objectives: … lines of … transport which are used for military purposes.” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 163(c), p. 343.

a. Enemy Merchant Ships
(1) Enemy merchant ships can only be attacked if they meet the definition of military objective.
(2) The following activities can turn an enemy merchant ship into a military objective:
b. Enemy Civil Aircraft
(1) Enemy civil aircraft can only be attacked if it meets the definition of military objective.
(2) The following activities can turn an enemy civil aircraft into a military objective:
Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea’s Military Law Manual (1996) considers highways, railways, ports and airfields used for military operations as military objectives. 
Republic of Korea, Military Law Manual, 1996, p. 87.

Spain
Spain’s Field Regulations (1882) stipulates that bridges and railway equipment are legitimate objects of attack. 
Spain, El Reglamento para el Servicio de Campaña, 4 January 1882, § 880.

Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states that military objectives include:
[C]ivilian vehicles, ships and aircraft when they take part in hostilities, transport troops or military supplies, are escorted by military personnel (unless there is an agreement to the contrary), cross duly marked prohibited areas (unless there is an agreement to the contrary), disobey an order to stop or actively resist inspection. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 4.5.b.(2).(a).

Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) considers “means of transportation of military importance” as military objectives. 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 28.

United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) states:
Controversy exists over whether, and the circumstances under which, other objects, such as civilian transportation and communications systems, dams and dikes can be classified properly as military objectives … A key factor in classification of objects as military objectives is whether they make an effective contribution to an adversary’s military action so that their capture, destruction or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 5-3(b)(2).

The US Naval Handbook (1995) lists airfields, bridges, railyards, docks, port facilities, harbours and embarkation points as military objectives. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 8.1.1.

The US Naval Handbook (2007) states: “Proper objects of attack include, but are not limited to, such military objectives as … embarkation points … docks, port facilities, harbors, bridges, [and] airfields”. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 8.2.5.

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Cuba
Cuba’s Military Criminal Code (1979) includes “means of transportation” in a list of military objects. 
Cuba, Military Criminal Code, 1979, Article 33(1).

Cuba’s National Defence Act (1994) lists “means of land, air and water transport [and] airfields, ports and port installations, and plants, workshops, service centres, fuel stores and other installations intended for the exploitation, maintenance and repair of transport facilities and equipment” among the objects integrated within the “Military Reserve of Facilities and Equipment of the National Economy” to guarantee the necessities of defence in wartime. 
Cuba, National Defence Act, 1994, Article 119(a) and (d).

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Germany
In 2010, in the Fuel Tankers case, the Federal Prosecutor General at Germany’s Federal Court of Justice investigated whether war crimes or other crimes under domestic law had been committed in the course of an airstrike which was ordered by a colonel (Oberst) of the German armed forces against two tankers transporting fuel for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan stolen by the Taliban near Kunduz and which resulted in the deaths of a number of civilians. The Federal Prosecutor General stated:
Pursuant to § 170 para. 2 StPO [Penal Procedure Code], the investigation proceedings which were initiated by the order of 12 March 2010 against Colonel (Oberst) Klein and Company Sergeant Major (Hauptfeldwebel) Wilhelm due to suspected offences under the VStGB [International Crimes Code] and other offences are to be terminated as a result of the investigations conducted and based on the sources of information set out hereafter and on the reasons given in detail hereafter. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Federal Prosecutor General, Fuel Tankers case, Decision, 16 April 2010, p. 1.

The following is to be considered regarding the subjective element of § 11 (1) (3) VStGB [which states that carrying out an attack by military means and definitely anticipating that the attack will cause death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects on a scale out of proportion to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated is a war crime in international and non-international armed conflict]:

bb)
At the time of the order to drop the bombs, both fuel tankers, the fuel contained therein and the two towing vehicles located in close proximity to the fuel tankers constituted legitimate military objectives under the international law of armed conflict.

… The fuel tankers and the fuel … became military objectives with the abduction by the Taliban because they were suited to effectively contribute to military action from this moment on. The fuel could be used to refuel vehicles used for attacks and used in combination with explosives as improvised explosive devices. It thus constitutes a military objective in any case as its destruction would offer a considerable military advantage. The fuel tankers also constituted a military objective … The reason is that they could be used for attacks with vehicle-based explosive devices as already happened in Afghanistan five times in 2009 until 4 September 2009. It is irrelevant that the fuel tankers were immobilized on a sandbank. Colonel (Oberst) Klein wanted to prevent any future movement of the tankers. There was the risk that the insurgents would successfully free the tankers and use them for military purposes. … The same holds true for both vehicles present in the immediate surroundings of the fuel tankers. Because of their concrete use they were meant to make an effective contribution to the Taliban’s military action. Therefore, criminal responsibility under § 11 para. 11 no. 3 VStGB can be excluded. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Federal Prosecutor General, Fuel Tankers case, Decision, 16 April 2010, pp. 47–50.

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Algeria
According to the Report on the Practice of Algeria, the destruction of railways, bridges and roads was part of a policy of “economic sabotage” conducted by the ALN during the war of independence. 
Report on the Practice of Algeria, 1997, Chapter 1.3, referring to El Moudjahid, Vol. 1, pp. 25–26.

Israel
In 2006, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
IDF [Israel Defense Force] operations in Lebanon have also included operations directed against infrastructure and property. These have included:
Bridges and roads – The activity of terrorist groups in Lebanon is dependent on major transportation arteries, through which weaponry and ammunition, as well as missile launchers and terrorist reinforcements are transported. Damage to key routes is intended to prevent or obstruct the terrorists in planning and perpetrating their attacks. In this case it is also intended to prevent the kidnapped soldiers being smuggled out of the country.
Under international law there is widespread recognition that lines of transportation which can serve military purposes are a legitimate military target. In its Commentary on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC includes in its list of military objectives considered to be of “generally recognized military importance”: “Lines and means of communications (railway lines, roads, bridges, tunnels and canals) which are of fundamental military importance”.
A useful practical test for gauging the military importance of lines of transportation is proposed in the US Air Force Pamphlet, which asks “whether they make an effective contribution to an adversary’s military action so that their capture, destruction or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time”.
In the current situation, notwithstanding the security justifications for targeting major roads, the IDF takes pains to ensure that sufficient routes remain open to enable civilians to leave combat zones, and to permit the access of humanitarian supplies. Efforts are also made to ensure that damage to civilian vehicles is minimized.
Runways at Beirut International Airport – In the view of the IDF, rendering the runways unusable constituted the most appropriate method of preventing reinforcements and supplies of weaponry and military materiel reaching the terrorist organizations. It is also a response to reports that it is the intention of the terrorists to fly the kidnapped Israelis out of Lebanon.
Airports are widely recognized to be legitimate military targets. The Canadian Law of Armed Conflict Manual, for example, notes that “ports and airfields are generally accepted as being military objectives” (14) while the ICRC list of generally recognized military objectives includes: “airfields, rocket launching ramps and naval base installations”.
It should be also be noted that, in its operation at Beirut Airport, the IDF was careful not to damage the central facilities of the airport, including the radar and control towers, allowing the airport to continue to control international flights over its airspace. 
Israel, Responding to Hizbullah Attacks from Lebanon: Issues of Proportionality, Legal Background, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 25 July 2006, § 4.

In 2007, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in a diplomatic note:
The guiding principle adopted by the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] was to target only infrastructure that was making a significant contribution to the operational capabilities of the Hizbullah terrorists. This meant that, for the most part, Israeli attacks were limited to the transportation infrastructure. Most of the other infrastructure (medical, cultural, railroad, tunnels, ports, banking, manufacturing, farming, tourism, sewage, financial, electricity, drainage, water and the like) was left almost completely untouched.
All IDF operations in Lebanon were directed against legitimate military objectives, and specifically in relation to infrastructure, included the following:
Bridges and roads – The activity of terrorist groups in Lebanon was dependent on major transportation arteries through which weaponry and ammunition, as well as missile launchers and terrorist reinforcements, were transported. Damage to key routes was intended to prevent or obstruct the planning and perpetrating of attacks by the terrorists. It was also intended to prevent the kidnapped Israeli soldiers from being smuggled out of the country.
Under international law there is widespread recognition that lines of transportation which can serve military purposes are a legitimate military target. In its Commentary on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) includes in its list of military objectives considered to be of “generally recognized military importance”: “Lines and means of communications (railway lines, roads, bridges, tunnels and canals) which are of fundamental military importance.”
A useful practical test for gauging the military importance of lines of transportation is proposed in the US Air Force Pamphlet, which asks “whether they make an effective contribution to an adversary’s military action so that their capture, destruction or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time.”
Notwithstanding the operational justifications for targeting major roads in Lebanon, the IDF took pains to ensure that sufficient routes remained open to enable civilians to leave combat zones and to permit access for humanitarian supplies. Efforts were also made to ensure that damage to civilian vehicles was minimized.
Runways at Beirut International Airport – In the view of the IDF, rendering the runways unusable constituted one of the most important and appropriate methods of preventing reinforcements and supplies of weaponry and military materiel reaching the terrorist organizations. It was also a response to reports that the Hizbullah terrorists intended to fly the kidnapped Israelis out of Lebanon.
Airports are widely recognized to be legitimate military targets. The Canadian Law of Armed Conflict Manual, for example, notes that “ports and airfields are generally accepted as being military objectives” while the ICRC list of generally recognized military objectives includes: “airfields, rocket launching ramps and naval base installations.”
It should also be noted that, in its operation at Beirut Airport, the IDF was careful not to damage the central facilities of the airport, including the radar and control towers, allowing the airport to continue to control international flights over its airspace. 
Israel, Israel’s War with Hizbullah. Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism, Diplomatic Notes No. 1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, April 2007, pp. 15–16.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1991, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United Kingdom stated that it had attacked “main Iraqi military airfields”. 
United Kingdom, Letter dated 28 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22156, 28 January 1991, p. 1.

United States of America
During the Korean War, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur that mass air operations against industrial targets in North Korea were “highly desirable”. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly designated, inter alia, the following targets: the railway yards and shops at Pyongyang, the railway yards and shops at Wonsan, the railway yards and shops and the harbour facilities at Chongjin, the railway yards at Chinnampo, the railway yards and shops and the docks and storage areas at Songjin, the railway yards at Hamhung and the railway yards at Haeju. 
United States, Letter dated 13 February 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22218, 13 February 1991, p. 1.

In 1966, in the context of the Vietnam War, the US Secretary of Defense stated:
We are directing the aircraft against military targets, only military targets, and those particularly associated with the lines of communication between North Vietnam and South Vietnam over which they are sending the men and equipment which are the foundation of the Viet Cong effort to subvert the Government of South Vietnam. 
United States, Secretary of Defense, Statement on targeting policy in Vietnam, 2 February 1966, reprinted in Marjorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, Department of State Publication 8367, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 427.

In 1966, in the context of the Vietnam War, the US Department of Defense stated:
U.S. policy is to target military targets only, particularly those which have a direct impact on the movement of men and supplies into South Vietnam. These targets include but are not limited to roads, railroads, bridges [and] road junctions … In the specific case of Nam Dinh and Phu Li, targets have been limited to railroad and highway bridges, railroad yards … 
United States, Department of Defense, Statement on targeting policy in Vietnam, 26 December 1966, reprinted in Marjorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, Department of State Publication 8367, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 427.

In 1991, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United States included “supply lines” among Iraq’s military targets. 
United States, Letter dated 22 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22130, 22 January 1991, p. 1.

In 1991, during a news briefing concerning the Gulf War, the US Secretary of Defense stated that “airfields” were considered military targets and had been attacked. 
United States, News Briefing by the US Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 23 January 1991, annexed to Letter dated 25 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22168, 29 January 1991, p. 3.

In 1992, in its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the US Department of Defense stated that Iraq’s airfields, its port facilities, and its railroads and bridges had been included among the 12 target sets for the coalition’s attacks. 
United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Chapter VI, The Air Campaign, pp. 96–98.

A bridge or highway vital to daily commuter and business traffic can be equally crucial to military traffic, or support for a nation’s war effort. Railroads, airports, seaports and the interstate highway system in the United States have been funded by the Congress in part because of US national security concerns, for example; each proved invaluable to the movement of US military units to various ports for deployment to Southwest Asia (SWA) for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Destruction of a bridge, airport, or port facility, or interdiction of a highway can be equally important in impeding an enemy’s war effort. 
United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Appendix O, The Role of the Law of War, ILM, Vol. 31, 1992, p. 623; see also James P. Coyne, Plan of Attack, Air Force Magazine, April 1992, pp. 40–42.

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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
In its final report to the ICTY Prosecutor in 2000, the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stated, concerning the “attack on a civilian passenger train at the Grdelica Gorge on 12 April 1999”, that the railway bridge on which the train was hit “was a legitimate military objective”. 
ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The Hague, 14 June 2000, § 62.

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Americas Watch
In 1985, in a report on violations of the laws of war in Nicaragua, Americas Watch listed “objects which, while not directly connected with combat operations, effectively contribute to military operations in the circumstances ruling at the time, such as transportation and communication systems and facilities” as objects which “can arguably be regarded as legitimate military objectives subject to direct attack”. 
Americas Watch, Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua: 1981–1985, New York, March 1985, p. 33.

Africa Watch
In 1989, in a report on violations of the laws of war in Angola, Africa Watch listed “objects that, while not directly connected with combat operations, effectively contribute to military operations in the circumstances ruling at the time, such as transportation and communication systems and facilities, airfields, ports” as objects which “may be regarded as legitimate military objectives subject to direct attack by combatants and mines”. 
Africa Watch, Angola: Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides, New York, April 1989, p. 140.

Human Rights Watch
Following NATO’s air campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, Human Rights Watch stated:
The attacks on the Novi Sad bridge and six other bridges in which civilian deaths occurred … also were of questionable military effect. All are road bridges. Most are urban or town bridges that are not major routes of communications. Human Rights Watch questions individual target selection in the case of these bridges. U.S. military sources have told Human Rights Watch that bridges were often selected for attack for reasons other than their role in transportation (for example, they were conduits for communications cables, or because they were symbolic and psychologically lucrative, such as in the case of the bridge over the Danube in Novi Sad). The destruction of bridges that are not central to transportation arteries or have a purely psychological importance does not satisfy the criterion of making an “effective contribution to military action” or offering a “definite military advantage, “ the baseline tests for legitimate military targets codified in [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I, art. 52. 
Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, New York, 7 February 2000, p. 11.

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Hague Convention (IX)
Article 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IX) allows the bombardment of “workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army”. 
Hague Convention (IX) concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 2.

Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
Under Article 8 of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, cultural property may be placed under special protection provided, inter alia, that it is situated “at an adequate distance from any large industrial centre or from any important military objective constituting a vulnerable point”. 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954, Article 8.

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Hague Rules of Air Warfare
According to Article 24(2) of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare, “factories constituting important and well-known centres engaged in the manufacture of arms, ammunition or distinctively military supplies” are military objectives. 
Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, Part II, drafted by a Commission of Jurists, The Hague, December 1922–February 1923, Article 24(2).

New Delhi Draft Rules
Paragraph I of the proposed annex to Article 7(2) of the 1956 New Delhi Draft Rules provided:
The objectives belonging to the following categories are those considered to be of generally recognized military importance:

(8) Industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the war:
(a) industries for the manufacture of armaments such as weapons, munitions, rockets, armoured vehicles, military aircraft, fighting ships, including the manufacture of accessories and all other war material;
(b) industries for the manufacture of supplies and material of a military character, such as transport and communications material, equipment for the armed forces;
(c) factories or plants constituting other production and manufacturing centres of fundamental importance for the conduct of war, such as the metallurgical, engineering and chemical industries, whose nature and purpose is essentially military;
(d) storage and transport installations whose basic function it is to serve the industries referred to in (a)–(c);
(e) installations providing energy mainly for national defence, e.g. coal, other fuels, or atomic energy, and plants producing gas or electricity mainly for military consumption.
(9) Installations constituting experimental, research centres for experiments on and the development of weapons and war material. 
Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, September 1956, submitted to governments for their consideration on behalf of the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross, New Delhi, 28 October–7 November, Res. XIII, § I of the proposed annex to Article 7(2).

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Australia
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) gives as an example of military objectives:
power stations [and] industry which support military operations … industrial installations producing materiel for combat forces, fuel dumps and distribution centres supplying military users, industrial installations that repair and replenish lines of communication and other economic targets the destruction, capture or neutralisation of which offers a definite military advantage. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, §§ 527(b) and 527(f).

Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) provides as an example of military objectives:
… power stations [and] industry which support military operations … industrial installations producing materiel for combat forces, fuel dumps and distribution centres supplying military users, industrial installations that repair and replenish lines of communication and other economic targets the destruction, capture or neutralisation of which offers a definite military advantage.
Belgium
Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) states:
The purpose of combat between belligerents is to weaken and eliminate the power of resistance of the enemy.
This resistance is provided in the first place by the armed forces of a Party to the conflict. As a result, acts of violence are in the first place directed against the military potential of the adversary (the army, its positions, provision of its supplies, its stores, workshops, arsenals, depots, defence works, vehicles, aircraft, war buildings, etc.).
But this resistance also depends on the economic power of the adversary (its war industry, its production capacity, its sources of supply, etc.); in short, its economic potential. The breaking up of this economic potential has of course a direct influence on the armed forces’ capacity to resist, so that this economic potential also becomes a war objective. 
Belgium, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit de la Guerre, Ecole Royale Militaire, par J. Maes, Chargé de cours, Avocat-général près la Cour Militaire, D/1983/1187/029, 1983, p. 26.

Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) considers that “military bases, warehouses, petroleum storage areas” are “generally accepted as being military objectives”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-2, § 9(a).


The manual adds that “industrial installations producing material for armed forces; … conventional power plants; and … fuel dumps” “depending on the circumstances, may constitute military objectives”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-2, § 11(d), (e) and (f).

Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on targeting:
1. The following are generally accepted as being military objectives:
a. military bases, warehouses, petroleum storage areas, ports and airfields;

3. The following objects, depending on the circumstances, may constitute military objectives:

d. industrial installations producing material for armed forces;
e. conventional power plants; and
f. fuel dumps. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 407.1.a and 3.d–f.

Croatia
Croatia’s LOAC Compendium (1991) considers that supply and maintenance bases, namely locations where goods other than medical are produced, processed or stored, are military objectives. 
Croatia, Compendium “Law of Armed Conflicts”, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1991, p. 51.

Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) states:
Proper economic targets for naval attack include enemy lines of communication used for military purposes, rail yards, bridges, rolling stock, barges, lighters, industrial installations producing war-fighting products, and power generation plants. Economic targets of the enemy that indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability may also be attacked. 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 8.1.1.

Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) provides that military objectives include, in particular, “economic objectives which make an effective contribution to military action (transport facilities, industrial plants, etc.)”. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 443.

Greece
The Hellenic Navy’s International Law Manual (1995) states with regard to naval bombardment:
1. … [T]he provisions of the otherwise obsolete IX Hague Convention concerning the respect and protection of the victims of armed conflict should be considered as bearing a perpetual binding effect.
2. To the above effect, the significance of the codified text of IX Hague Convention is great and the following provisions should be applied by the belligerents:

c. Bombardment only of targets excluded by the prohibition of art. 1 (military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war material, workshops or plants which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army and the ships of war in the harbour) (art. 2). 
Greece, International Law Manual, Hellenic Navy General Staff, Directorate A2, Division IV, 1995, Chapter 7, Part II, §§ 1–2.

Hungary
Hungary’s Military Manual (1992) considers that supply and maintenance bases, namely locations where goods other than medical are produced, processed or stored, are military objectives. 
Hungary, A Hadijog, Jegyzet a Katonai, Föiskolák Hallgatói Részére, Magyar Honvédség Szolnoki Repülötiszti Föiskola, 1992, p. 83.

Italy
According to Italy’s IHL Manual (1991), “depots, workshops [and] installations … which can be used for the needs of the armed forces” are military objectives. 
Italy, Manuale di diritto umanitario, Introduzione e Volume I, Usi e convenzioni di Guerra, SMD-G-014, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, Vol. I, § 12.

New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states that “energy installations [and] war supporting industries are examples of objects universally regarded as military objectives”. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 516(2); see also § 623(2).

Industrial installations producing materiel for combat forces, fuel dumps and distribution centres supplying military users, and industrial installations that repair and replenish lines of communication (such as conventional power plants and vehicle plants), and other economic targets may be attacked if they meet the criteria for military objectives. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 516(4); see also § 623(4).

Economic targets that indirectly but effectively support enemy operations may also be attacked to gain a definite military advantage. For example, an 1870 international arbitral tribunal recognized that the destruction of cotton was justified during the American Civil War since the sale of cotton provided funds for almost all Confederate arms and ammunition. Authorization to attack such targets will be reserved to higher authority. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 516(5); see also § 623(5).

Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states: “[Air] bombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively against the following objectives: … manufacturing plants constituting important and well-known centres for the production of arms, ammunition or characterized military supplies.” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 172.d.

Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states: “[Air] bombardment is only legitimate when it is exclusively directed against the following objectives: … factories constituting important and well-known centres for the production of weapons, ammunition or supplies that are clearly of a military character”. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 163(c), p. 343.

Spain
According to Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996), “economic–industrial objectives which make an effective and real contribution to military action” are military objectives. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 4.5.b.(2).a.

Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states that “economic and industrial objectives that make a real and effective contribution to military action” are military objectives. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 4.5.b.(2).(a).

Sweden
Sweden’s IHL Manual (1991) states:
How and to what extent a given object can effectively contribute to the adversary’s military operations must be decided by the commander. This need not imply that the property in question is being used by the adversary for a given operation … It may even be a question of … energy resources or factories that indirectly contribute to the adversary’s military operations. 
Sweden, International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, with reference to the Swedish Total Defence System, Swedish Ministry of Defence, January 1991, Section 3.2.1.5, p. 54.

Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) considers “plants, factories and establishments directly linked to the activity of the armed forces” as military objectives. 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 28.

United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (1995) states:
Proper economic targets for naval attack include enemy lines of communication, rail yards, bridges, rolling stock, barges, lighters, industrial installations producing war-fighting products, and power generation plants. Economic targets of the enemy that indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability may also be attacked. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 8.1.1.

The US Naval Handbook (2007) states:
Proper objects of attack also include enemy lines of communication, rail yards, bridges, rolling stock, barges, lighters, industrial installations producing war-fighting products, and power generation plants. Economic objects of the enemy that indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability may also be attacked. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 8.2.5.

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Cuba
Cuba’s National Defence Act (1994) lists among the objects integrated within the “Military Reserve of Facilities and Equipment of the National Economy” to guarantee the necessities of defence in wartime:
facilities and equipment for the handling and storage of cargo, agricultural machinery, construction machinery, and other facilities, installations and machinery intended for works of engineering [and] facilities and equipment for … automation, meteorology, topographical and geodesic systems. 
Cuba, National Defence Act, 1994, Article 119(b) and (c).

Italy
According to Italy’s Law of War Decree (1938), as amended in 1992, “depots, workshops [and] installations … which can be used for the needs of the armed forces” are military objectives. 
Italy, Law of War Decree, 1938, as amended in 1992, Article 40.

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Islamic Republic of Iran
According to the Report on the Practice of Islamic Republic of Iran, during the Iran–Iraq War, the Islamic Republic of Iran always insisted that it had no intention of attacking civilian objects, all targets being “military objectives or objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use made an effective contribution to military action, and thus most economic objectives were regarded as military objectives”. The report cites refineries, petrochemical complexes, power stations, railway stations, radio and television stations and bridges as examples of economic objectives which were targeted by the Iranian air force and concludes that “the definition of military objectives from the Islamic Republic of Iran’s point of view is a broad one which includes economic objectives too”. 
Report on the Practice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1997, Chapter 1.3.

Israel
In 2006, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
IDF [Israel Defense Force] operations in Lebanon have also included operations directed against infrastructure and property. These have included:

Fuel reserves – Terrorist activity is dependent, inter alia, on a regular supply of fuel without which the terrorists cannot operate. For this reason a number of fuel depots which primarily serve the terrorist operations were targeted. From intelligence Israel has obtained, it appears that this step has had a significant effect on reducing the capability of the terrorist organizations.
The legitimacy of directing attacks on fuel and power installations has been widely noted. The Canadian Law of Armed Conflict Manual, for example, lists “petroleum storage areas” as “generally accepted as being military objectives”, while the ICRC list of military objectives also includes “Installations providing energy mainly for national defence, e.g. coal, other fuels, or atomic energy, and plants producing gas or electricity mainly for military consumption”. 
Israel, Responding to Hizbullah Attacks from Lebanon: Issues of Proportionality, Legal Background, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 25 July 2006, § 4.

Israel
In 2007, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in a diplomatic note:
The guiding principle adopted by the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] was to target only infrastructure that was making a significant contribution to the operational capabilities of the Hizbullah terrorists …

Fuel reserves – Terrorist activity is dependent, inter alia, on a regular supply of fuel without which the terrorists cannot operate. For this reason a number of fuel depots which primarily served the terrorist operations were targeted. From intelligence Israel has obtained, it appears that this step had a significant effect on reducing the capability of the terrorist organizations.
The legitimacy of directing attacks on fuel and power installations has been widely noted. The Canadian Law of Armed Conflict Manual, for example, lists “petroleum storage areas” as “generally accepted as being military objectives”, while the ICRC list of military objectives also includes “Installations providing energy mainly for national defense, e.g. coal, other fuels, or atomic energy, and plants producing gas or electricity mainly for military consumption.”
One of the claims that have been made against Israel concerns the oil spill that occurred off the shores of Lebanon during the war. Without making any comment regarding the factual validity of such claims, it should be emphasized that Israel ensured that sea and air access was allowed to any assistance offered with regard to the oil spill, even in the midst of a naval and aerial blockade which had to be imposed for operational and security reasons.” 
Israel, Israel’s War with Hizbullah. Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism, Diplomatic Notes No. 1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, April 2007, p. 17.

Lebanon
The Report on the Practice of Lebanon refers to a statement by the General Director of the Ministry of Justice in 1997 in which he stated that he considered the bombardment of economic installations to be a war crime. 
Report on the Practice of Lebanon, 1998, Chapter 6.5, referring to Statement by the General Director of the Lebanese Ministry of Justice, al Raii al ordonia, 23 December 1997.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1991, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United Kingdom stated that Iraq’s oil refining capacity had been specifically targeted with the objective of “reducing Iraq’s military sustainability”. 
United Kingdom, Letter dated 28 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22156, 28 January 1991, p. 1.

United States of America
During the Korean War, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur that mass air operations against industrial targets in North Korea were “highly desirable”. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly designated, inter alia, the following targets: the two munitions plants at Pyongyang, the three chemical plants at Hungnam, the oil refinery at Wonsan, the naval oil-storage tank farm at Rashin, the “Tong Iron Foundry” and the “Sam Yong Industrial Factory” at Chinnampo. 
Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953, Office of Air Force History, US Air Force, Washington, D.C., Revised edition, 1983, pp. 186–187; see also pp. 517–518 (discussing the North Korean metals and mining business as a target category).

In 1950, the US Secretary of State stated: “The air activity of the United Nations forces in Korea has been, and is, directed solely at military targets of the invader. These targets [include] … war plants.” 
United States, Statement by the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, 6 September 1950, reprinted in Marjorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, Department of State Publication 8367, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 140.

In 1966, in reply to an inquiry from a member of the House of Representatives asking for a restatement of US policy on targeting in North Vietnam, a US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense wrote: “The United States has not targeted such installations as textile plants, fruit-canning plants, silk factories and thread cooperatives.” 
United States, Letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Goulding to US Representative Ogden Reid from New York, 30 December 1966, reprinted in Marjorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, Department of State Publication 8367, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 428.

In 1992, in its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the US Department of Defense stated that Iraq’s electricity production facilities, its oil refining and distribution facilities and its military production sites had been included among the 12 target sets for the coalition’s attacks. 
United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Chapter VI, The Air Campaign, pp. 96–98.

In 1993, in its report to Congress on the protection of natural and cultural resources during times of war, the US Department of Defense stated:
Natural resources that may be of value to an enemy in his war effort are legitimate targets. The 1943 air raids on the Ploesti oil fields in Romania, and the Combined Bomber Offensive campaign against Nazi oil, were critical to allied defeat of Germany in World War II, for example … During Desert Storm, Coalition planners targeted Iraq’s ability to produce refined oil products (such as gasoline) that had immediate military use, but eschewed attack on its long-term crude oil production capability. 
United States, Department of Defense, Report to Congress on International Policies and Procedures Regarding the Protection of Natural and Cultural Resources During Times of War, 19 January 1993, p. 204.

The Report on US Practice states:
The opinio juris of the U.S. government recognizes the definition of military objectives in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I as customary law. United States practice gives a broad reading to this definition, and would include … war-supporting economic facilities as military objectives. 
Report on US Practice, 1997, Chapter 1.3.

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UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1989 on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in El Salvador, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressed its concern at “the systematic destruction of the economic infrastructure as a consequence of the armed conflict” and requested that all parties put an end to “attacks on the economic infrastructure”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1989/68, 8 March 1989, preamble and § 5, adopted without a vote.

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Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
In its Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims (Eritrea’s Claim) partial award in 2005, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, in considering whether power plants came within the definition of military objective, stated:
As a first step, the Commission must decide whether the power plant was an object that by its nature, location, purpose or use made an effective contribution to military action at the time it was attacked. … [E]lectric power stations are generally recognized to be of sufficient importance to a State’s capacity to meet its wartime needs of communication, transport and industry so as usually to qualify as military objectives during armed conflicts. The Commission also recognizes that not all such power stations would qualify as military objectives, for example, power stations that are known, or should be known, to be segregated from a general power grid and are limited to supplying power for humanitarian purposes, such as medical facilities, or other uses that could have no effect on the State’s ability to wage war. 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea’s Claim, Partial Award, 19 December 2005, § 117.

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Americas Watch
In 1985, in a report on violations of the laws of war in Nicaragua, Americas Watch listed as objects which “can arguably be regarded as legitimate military objectives subject to direct attack”:
objects which, while not directly connected with combat operations, effectively contribute to military operations in the circumstances ruling at the time, such as … otherwise non-military industries of importance to the ability of a party to the conflict to conduct military operations, such as raw or processed coffee destined for export. 
Americas Watch, Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua: 1981–1985, New York, March 1985, p. 33.

Africa Watch
In 1989, in a report on violations of the laws of war in Angola, Africa Watch listed as objects which “may be regarded as legitimate military objectives subject to direct attack by combatants and mines”:
objects that, while not directly connected with combat operations, effectively contribute to military operations in the circumstances ruling at the time, such as … otherwise non-military industries of importance to the ability of a party to the conflict to conduct military operations, such as diamonds or petroleum destined for export. 
Africa Watch, Angola: Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides, New York, April 1989, p. 140.

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Australia
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) includes among military objectives “areas of land which are of direct use to defending or attacking forces, eg land through which an adversary is likely to move its forces or which may be used as a forming up point preceding an attack”. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 527(h); see also § 916(b) (“areas of land which armed forces use or which have military significance such as hills and bridgeheads”).

Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) provides as an example of military objectives “areas of land which are of direct use to defending or attacking forces, eg land through which an adversary is likely to move its forces or which may be used as a forming up point preceding an attack”. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 5.31.

Belgium
Belgium’s Regulations on Armoured Infantry Squads (1972) defines the objective of a mission as “a vital area of land to be conquered or defended”. 
Belgium, Le Peloton d’Infanterie Blindée, Règlement G 176, Ministère de la Défense Nationale, Etat-Major Général, Force Terrestre, Direction de l’Infanterie, des Paras-Commandos et de la Police Militaire, 1972, p. 3.

Belgium’s Regulations on Tank Squadrons (1982) states that the objective of a tank squadron in attack is “an area of land whose capture requires the enemy’s destruction or withdrawal”. 
Belgium, L’Escadron de Chars, Règlement G 287, Ministère de la Défense Nationale, Etat-Major Général, Force Terrestre, Ecole des Troupes Blindées, 1982, § 537(b)(2); see also §§ 536(b)(2) and 539(b)(2).

Belgium’s Regulations on the Tactical Use of Large Units (1994) states: “An objective is the final goal of an action. It is defined as either an area of land of tactical importance or as enemy elements that have to be destroyed or neutralized.” 
Belgium, L’Emploi Tactique des Grandes Unités, Règlement G 119, Ministère de la Défense Nationale, Etat-Major Général, Force Terrestre, Sections Operations et Entraînement, 1994 (édition provisoire), § 210.

Benin
Benin’s Military Manual (1995) considers “an area of land of tactical importance” as a military objective. 
Benin, Le Droit de la Guerre, III fascicules, Forces Armées du Bénin, Ministère de la Défense nationale, 1995, Fascicule I, p. 13.

Canada
According to Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999), a “specific area of land may constitute a military objective”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-1, § 8.

Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on targeting: “A specific area of land may constitute a military objective.” 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 406.2.

Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book IV (Instruction of heads of division and company commanders): “A specific sector of land can constitute a military objective.” 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 26.

Croatia
According to Croatia’s Commanders’ Manual (1992), military objectives include “tactically relevant points of terrain”. 
Croatia, Basic Rules of the Law of Armed Conflicts – Commanders’ Manual, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1992, § 4.

Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) states: “Proper naval targets also include geographic targets, such as a mountain pass.” 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 8.1.1.

France
France’s LOAC Summary Note (1992) includes “areas of land of tactical importance” among military objectives. 
France, Fiche de Synthèse sur les Règles Applicables dans les Conflits Armés, Note No. 432/DEF/EMA/OL.2/NP, Général de Corps d’Armée Voinot (pour l’Amiral Lanxade, Chef d’Etat-major des Armées), 1992, Part I, § 1.2.

Italy
Italy’s IHL Manual (1991) states that “areas of land that would be useful to capture or deny to the enemy in order to achieve a military operation” are military objectives. 
Italy, Manuale di diritto umanitario, Introduzione e Volume I, Usi e convenzioni di Guerra, SMD-G-014, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, Vol. I, § 12.

Italy’s LOAC Elementary Rules Manual (1991) includes “areas of tactical importance” among military objectives. 
Italy, Regole elementari di diritto di guerra, SMD-G-012, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, § 4.

Madagascar
Madagascar’s Military Manual (1994) states that military objectives include “areas of land of tactical importance”. 
Madagascar, Le Droit des Conflits Armés, Ministère des Forces Armées, August 1994, Fiche No. 2-O, § 4.

Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands notes that the government of the Netherlands has declared that “an area of land can constitute a military objective as long as it fulfils the conditions thereof”. 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, p. V-3.

The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states that “[t]he [Dutch] Government has also declared that a given piece of terrain may also form a military objective”. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0511.

New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states:
An area of land may be a military objective, provided that the particular area offers a definite military advantage to the defending forces or those attacking. This would include a tract of land through which the adverse Party would be likely to move its forces, or an area the occupation of which would provide the occupant with the possibility of mounting a further attack. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 516(6); see also § 623(6).

Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) states:
The capture or preservation of a specific area of land constitutes a military objective when it meets all the requirements laid down in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I and it confers a concrete military advantage taking into account the circumstances ruling at the time. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 4.4.d; see also § 2.3.b.(1).

Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states:
Taking or holding a certain area of land is considered a military objective, when all the requirements laid down in article 52 of [the 1977] Additional Protocol I are met and it provides a concrete military advantage, taking into account the circumstances prevailing at the time. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 4.4.d; see also §§ 2.3.b.(1) and 4.2.b.

Sweden
Sweden’s IHL Manual (1991) states:
The definition [of military objectives contained in Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I] is intended to apply only to property or objects. Thus, for example, areas of land cannot be included; but this does not prevent an area objective if it is a matter of hindering an enemy advance by means of artillery fire or mining. Attacks on an area are permitted as long as the attack cannot be classified as indiscriminate.  
Sweden, International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, with reference to the Swedish Total Defence System, Swedish Ministry of Defence, January 1991, Section 3.2.1.5, p. 54.

Togo
Togo’s Military Manual (1996) considers “an area of land of tactical importance” as a military objective. 
Togo, Le Droit de la Guerre, III fascicules, Etat-major Général des Forces Armées Togolaises, Ministère de la Défense nationale, 1996, Fascicule I, p. 13.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) states that military objectives include “areas of land which either have military significance such as hills, defiles or bridgeheads or which contain military objects; or … minefields”. 
United Kingdom, The Law of Armed Conflict, D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (Revised 1981), Ministry of Defence, prepared under the Direction of The Chief of the General Staff, 1981, Section 4, p. 13, § 3(b)(1).

United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (1995) states: “Proper naval targets also include geographic targets, such as a mountain pass.” 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 8.1.1.

The US Naval Handbook (2007) states: “Proper objects of attack include, but are not limited to, such military objectives as … geographic features, such as a mountain pass”. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 8.2.5.

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Spain
The Report on the Practice of Spain (1998) notes that the fact that a particular zone may be considered a military objective provided it fulfils the requirements of Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I is consistent with the possibility provided for under Spanish law of establishing zones of interest for national defence, comprising “expanses of land, sea, or airspace declared as such because they constitute or may constitute a permanent base or an effective aid to offensive action necessary for such purpose”. 
Report on the Practice of Spain, 1998, Chapter 1.3, referring to Zones and Installations Law, 1975, Article 2.

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Belgium
In an explanatory memorandum submitted to the Belgian parliament in 1985 in the context of the ratification procedure of the 1977 Additional Protocols, the Belgian government stated:
The notion of “military objective” must be understood as meaning that a specific zone, as such, which by its location or other criteria enumerated in Article 52 makes an effective contribution to enemy military action, can be considered a military objective. 
Belgium, House of Representatives, Explanatory memorandum on a draft bill for the approval of the Additional Protocols, 1984–1985 Session, Doc. 1096-1, 9 January 1985, p. 10.

Canada
At the CDDH, Canada stated:
A specific area of land may also be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in Article 47 [now Article 52 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I], its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Canada, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.41, 26 May 1977, p. 179.

Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Canada stated:
It is the understanding of the Government of Canada in relation to Article 52 that: a. a specific area of land may be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in the Article as to what constitutes a military objective, its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization in the circumstances governing at the time offers a definite military advantage. 
Canada, Statements of understanding made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 20 November 1990, § 8(a).

France
In a declaration made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, France stated:
A specific zone may be considered as a military objective if, due to its location or for any other criteria mentioned in Article 52 [of the 1977 Additional Protocol I], its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation in the circumstances governing at the time offers a decisive military advantage. 
France, Reservations and declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 11 April 2001, § 12.

In an interpretative declaration made upon ratification of the 1998 ICC Statute, France stated:
The Government of the French Republic declares that a specific area may be considered a “military objective” as referred to in article 8, paragraph 2 (b) as a whole if, by reason of its situation, nature, use, location, total or partial destruction, capture of neutralization, taking into account the circumstances of the moment, it offers a decisive military advantage. 
France, Interpretative declarations made upon ratification of the 1998 ICC Statute, 9 June 2000, § 6.

Germany, Federal Republic of
At the CDDH, the Federal Republic of Germany stated that it had been able to vote in favour of Article 47 of the draft Additional Protocol I (now Article 52) on the basis of the understanding that:
A specific area of land may be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in Article 47 [now Article 52 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I], its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Germany, Federal Republic of, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.41, 26 May 1977, p. 188.

Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, the Federal Republic of Germany stated:
Article 52 of Additional Protocol I is understood by the Federal Republic of Germany to mean that a specific area of land may also be a military objective if it meets all requirements of Article 52, paragraph 2. 
Germany, Federal Republic of, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 14 February 1991, § 7.

Italy
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Italy stated:
A specific area of land may be a “military objective” if, because of its location or other reasons specified in Article 52, its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers definite military advantage. 
Italy, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 27 February 1986, § 7.

Netherlands
At the CDDH, the Netherlands stated that it interpreted Article 47 of the draft Additional Protocol I (now Article 52) to mean that:
A specific area of land may be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in Article 47 [now Article 52 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I], its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Netherlands, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.41, 26 May 1977, p. 195.

Upon ratification of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Netherlands stated:
1. With regard to article 2, paragraph 4, of Protocol II: It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands that a specific area of land may also be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in paragraph 4, its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage;

4. With regard to article 1, paragraph 3, of Protocol III: It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands that a specific area of land may also be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in paragraph 3, its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Netherlands, Declaration made upon ratification of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 18 June 1987, §§ 1 and 4.

Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, the Netherlands stated:
It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands that a specific area of land may also be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in paragraph 2 [of Article 52 of the Protocol], its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Netherlands, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 26 June 1987, § 7.

Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Netherlands stated with regard to Article 2(6) of the Amended Protocol:
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands takes the view that a specific area of land may also be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in paragraph six, its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Netherlands, Declaration made upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 25 March 1999, § 3.

New Zealand
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, New Zealand stated:
In relation to Article 52, it is the understanding of the Government of New Zealand that a specific area of land may be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in the Article, its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation in the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage. 
New Zealand, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 8 February 1988, § 4.

Pakistan
Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Pakistan stated:
It is understood that an area of land can itself be a legitimate military objective for the purposes of the use of landmines, if its neutralisation or denial, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
Pakistan, Declaration made upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 9 March 1999, § 5.

Spain
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Spain stated:
It is the understanding [of the Spanish Government] that the capture or holding of a specific area of territory constitutes a military objective when all the conditions set out in this paragraph [paragraph 2 of Article 52] together offer a concrete military advantage taking into account the circumstances at the relevant time. 
Spain, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 21 April 1989, § 7.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
At the CDDH, the United Kingdom stated:
A specific area of land might be a military objective if, because of its location or for other reasons specified in Article 47 [now Article 52 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I], its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offered a definite military advantage. 
United Kingdom, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.41, 26 May 1977, p. 169, § 153.

Upon signature of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, the United Kingdom stated in relation to Article 52 of the Protocol:
In relation to Article 52, that a specific area of land may be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in the Article, its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation in the circumstances ruling at the time offers definite military advantage. 
United Kingdom, Declaration made upon signature of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 12 December 1977, § f.

Upon ratification of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the United Kingdom stated with respect to Protocol II, Article 2 and Protocol III, Article 1:
A specific area of land may be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in this article, its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation in the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage. 
United Kingdom, Declaration made upon ratification of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 13 February 1995, § (b).

Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, the United Kingdom stated:
It is the understanding of the United Kingdom that a specific area of land may be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in this Article 52, its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation in the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage. 
United Kingdom, Reservations and declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 28 January 1998, § j.

United States of America
At the CDDH, the United States expressed its understanding that:
A specific area of land may be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in Article 47 [now Article 52 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I], its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
United States, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.41, 26 May 1977, p. 204.

In 1992, in a review of the legality of extended range anti-armour munition, the US Department of the Air Force stated:
An area of land can be a military objective if by its nature, location, purpose or use it makes an effective contribution to military action and its total or partial destruction, denial, capture or neutralization offers a definite military advantage, in the circumstances ruling at the time. Most areas which would be mined in war would meet this definition. 
United States, Department of the Air Force, The Judge Advocate General, Legal Review: Extended Range Antiarmor Munition (ERAM), 16 April 1992, § 7.

The Report on US Practice states:
The opinio juris of the U.S. government recognizes the definition of military objectives in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I as customary law. United States practice gives a broad reading to this definition, and would include areas of land … as military objectives. 
Report on US Practice, 1997, Chapter 1.3.

Upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the United States stated:
The United States understands that an area of land itself can be a legitimate military objective for the purpose of the use of landmines, if its neutralization or denial, in the circumstances applicable at the time, offers a military advantage. 
United States, Declaration made upon acceptance of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 24 May 1999, § 4.

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Australia
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) states:
The presence of noncombatants in or around a military objective does not change its nature as a military objective. Noncombatants in the vicinity of a military objective must share the danger to which the military objective is exposed.
Civilians working in a store on a military air base may not necessarily be taking … a direct part [in hostilities]. However, stores, depots, supply columns and military installations are clearly military objectives which may be attacked, regardless of the presence of civilian workers.
Civilians who are not directly involved in combat but are performing military tasks are not combatants. If they are killed or injured during an attack on a legitimate military objective there is no breach of LOAC provided the death or injury is not disproportionate to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated from the attack. The presence of civilians on or near the proposed military objective (either in a voluntary capacity or as a shield) is merely one of the factors that must be considered when planning an attack. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, §§ 526, 532 and 550.

Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states:
5.30 The presence of non-combatants, including civilians, in or around a military objective does not change its nature as a military objective. Non-combatants in the vicinity of a military objective must share the danger to which the military objective is exposed …

5.36 … [C]ivilians working in a store on a military air base may not necessarily be taking … a direct part [in hostilities]. However, stores depots, supply columns and military installations are clearly military objectives which may be attacked, regardless of the presence of civilian workers.

5.55 Civilians who are not directly involved in combat but are performing military tasks are not combatants. If they are killed or injured during an attack on a legitimate military objective there is no breach of the LOAC provided the death or injury is not disproportionate to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated from the attack. The presence of civilians on or near the proposed military objective (either in a voluntary capacity or as a shield) is one of the factors that must be considered when planning an attack. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, §§ 5.30, 5.36 and 5.55.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states:
[The following] are considered military objectives:

- objects which by virtue of their existence or destruction contribute in whatever way to military action. Civilians located within a military objective or in its surroundings immediately share the danger to which it is exposed. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 92, § 352.12; see also p. 134, § 412.12.

Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) states:
For targeting purposes, the presence of civilians who are authorized to accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof (such as crews of military aircraft, war correspondents, supply contractors or members of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces) does not render a legitimate target immune from attack. Such persons run the risk of being attacked as part of a legitimate target. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-4, § 34.

Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on targeting:
For targeting purposes, the presence of civilians who are authorized to accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof (such as crews of military aircraft, war correspondents, supply contractors or members of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces) does not render a legitimate target immune from attack. Such persons run the risk of being attacked as part of a legitimate target.  
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 425.

Chad
Chad’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states: “A military objective remains one even if civilians are inside. They share the danger to which they are exposed.” 
Chad, Droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces armées et de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 57; see also p. 58.

Colombia
Colombia’s Instructors’ Manual (1999) states that “a military objective remains a military objective even if civilians are inside it. Civilians within or in the immediate vicinity of a military objective share the risk to which the objective is exposed.” 
Colombia, Derechos Humanos & Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual de Instrucción de la Guía de Conducta para el Soldado e Infante de Marina, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Oficina de Derechos Humanos, Fuerzas Militares de Colombia, Santafé de Bogotá, 1999, p. 18.

Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) notes in Book I (basic instruction): “Civilians situated inside or near a military objective share the risk to which the military objective is exposed.” 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre I: Instruction de base, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 18.

II.1.6. Civilians accompanying the armed forces
The presence of civilians who are authorized to accompany the armed forces without really being members of these forces (members of crews of military aircraft, war correspondents, suppliers, members of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces) does not render a legitimate objective exempt from attacks. These persons run the risk of being attacked as elements of the legitimate objective. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 27.

Croatia
Croatia’s LOAC Compendium (1991) considers that supply and maintenance bases are military objectives and that civilian personnel working there share the risk of attack. 
Croatia, Compendium “Law of Armed Conflicts”, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1991, p. 51.

Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) states:
Deliberate use of noncombatants to shield military objectives from enemy attack is prohibited. The presence of non-combatants within or near military objectives does not preclude an attack on such objectives … Unlike military personnel (other than those in a specially protected status such as medical personnel and the sick and wounded) who are always subject to attack, whether on duty or in a leave capacity, civilians are immune from attack unless they are engaged in direct support of the enemy’s armed forces or provide them with logistical support. Civilians who provide command, administrative or logistical support to military operations are exposed to attacks while performing such duties. Similarly, civilian employees of navy shipyards, the merchant navy personnel working on ships carrying military cargo, and the workers on military fortifications can be attacked while they carry out such activities. 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, §§ 11.2 and 11.3.

Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) states:
Civilians present in military objectives are not protected against attacks directed at these objectives; the presence of civilian workers in an arms production plant, for instance, will not prevent opposing armed forces from attacking this military objective. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 445.

Hungary
Hungary’s Military Manual (1992) considers that supply and maintenance bases are military objectives and that civilian personnel working there share the risk of attack. 
Hungary, A Hadijog, Jegyzet a Katonai, Föiskolák Hallgatói Részére, Magyar Honvédség Szolnoki Repülötiszti Föiskola, 1992, p. 83.

Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states:
It is the duty of the attacker to distinguish between military targets and civilian targets, and the attacker should take into account the presence of civilian targets when planning the attack. No area in which military targets are combined with civilian targets may be considered as merely another target.
Upon attacking a military target that is located at the heart of [a] civilian district, for example, a group of enemy soldiers who are holed up in the heart of a city and surrounded by civilians, they may be attacked, but only if the expected military benefit to one’s side from the offensive exceeds the expected damage that might be caused to civilians. There is no set formula according to which it is possible to weigh the civilian damage against the expected military benefit from the offensive; but it is a question of degree. An offensive would not be considered legitimate if it presented a significant risk to many civilian lives in return for gaining a subordinate military objective. 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 27.

Civilians must not be used to screen the military movements and for the purpose of concealment amongst them. This is also the reason why soldiers are under an obligation to wear uniform or identification insignia so as to make it possible to distinguish clearly between them and civilians.
It is nevertheless unreasonable to expect a military force to completely hold its fire in every incident in which opening fire could endanger civilians; if this were the case, the best defence would be simply to surround military targets with civilians.
How should you behave when your adversary breaks this rule and intersperses military targets with civilian installations? (for example, when a military force is located inside a village or a squad of soldiers shelters in a civilian structure – is a commander entitled to shell the entire village? To bomb the building and to demolish it with all its occupants, soldiers and civilians alike?)
It is difficult to provide unequivocal answers to these questions. Each army and each commander needs to deal with this dilemma in ways that stem from the ethical outlook, the degree of risk that can be assumed in order to prevent the killing of innocent people and the nature of the enemy that is being contended with. The answer often depends on the circumstances. The situation can range from that of a large force pursuing a small company of enemy soldiers besieged from every angle, to a situation in which a unit in distress is under fire from a civilian target, for example from the rooftop of a museum. In the first incident the commander should display much more restraint, and in the second, the military needs [to] justify and permit an attack on the party that has misused the location, consequently weakening the protection afforded to the museum. 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 27.

Madagascar
Madagascar’s Military Manual (1994) states: “A military objective remains a military objective even if civilians are present inside it.” 
Madagascar, Le Droit des Conflits Armés, Ministère des Forces Armées, August 1994, Fiche No. 2-SO, § D.

Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands considers that:
Acts such as the manufacturing and transport of military materiel in the hinterland certainly do not constitute a direct participation in hostilities. In addition, it has to be borne in mind that the fact that civilians are working in, for example, a weapons factory does not convert such an industrial object into a civilian object. Such a case has to be assessed in the light of the definition of a military objective. 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, p. V-5.

New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states: “Civilians employed in industries or other activities connected with the war effort may lose while on the job some or all of their protection as civilians but they do not, as a result, become combatants.” 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 802(2).

Philippines
The Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (2006) notes in its glossary: “Civilian in military objective – A military objective remains a military objective even if civilian persons are in it. The civilian persons within such an objective or its immediate surroundings share the danger to which it is exposed.” 
Philippines, Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, A Practical Guide for Internal Security Operations, 2006, p. 67, Glossary.

Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states: “A military objective remains such even if it accommodates civilian persons.” 
Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 1.

Spain
Spain’s Field Regulations (1882) deals with the question of whether protection should be granted to “individuals who, forming part of a field army, are nonetheless not combatants in the strict sense of the word, such as employees and operatives of administrative and technical bodies, drivers, cleaners”. 
Spain, El Reglamento para el Servicio de Campaña, 4 January 1882, Article 853.

Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) states that “indirect objectives” are objectives:
which may not be the object of a direct attack but which can suffer the consequences of an attack upon a military objective. Such is the case for civilians … who may suffer the effects of an attack upon a legitimate military objective due to:
– their proximity to a military objective aimed at shielding that objective against attack;
– their carrying out activities supporting military operations (units of workers, workers in arms factories, etc.). 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 4.4.e; see also § 2.3.b.(1).

Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states: “A military objective continues to be considered as such even if there are civilians or civilian property in the vicinity.”  
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 2.3.b.(1).

Indirect objectives are those that cannot be directly attacked, but may suffer the consequences of an attack on a military objective.
Civilians … are considered to be indirect objectives that may suffer the effects of an attack on a legitimate military target in the following cases:
- presence in the vicinity of a military objective, with a view to shielding it from attacks;
- activities that support military operations (labour units, workers in weapons factories, etc.). 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 4.4.e.

Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) considers that:
Civilians who are inside or in the immediate vicinity of military objectives run the risks to which the military objectives are exposed. For example, the presence of civilian workers inside a weapons factory does not prevent the enemy from attacking this military objective. 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 28 and commentary.

Ukraine
Ukraine’s IHL Manual (2004) states: “Military objectives can be lawfully attacked. The presence of civilians at the military objective does not influence the status of the military objective.” 
Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, § 1.2.45.

United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (1995) states:
Deliberate use of noncombatants to shield military objectives from enemy attack is prohibited. Although the principle of proportionality underlying the concept of collateral damage and incidental injury continues to apply in such cases, the presence of non-combatants within or adjacent to a legitimate target does not preclude attack of it … Unlike military personnel (other than those in a specially protected status such as medical personnel and the sick and wounded) who are always subject to attack whether on duty or in a leave capacity, civilians, as a class, are not to be the object of attack. However, civilians that are engaged in direct support of the enemy’s war-fighting or war-sustaining effort are at risk of incidental injury from attack on such activities. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), §§ 11.2 and 11.3.

The US Naval Handbook (2007) states:
Although the principle of proportionality underlying the concept of collateral damage continues to apply in such cases, the presence of civilians within or adjacent to a legitimate military objective does not preclude attack of it. Such military objectives may be lawfully targeted and destroyed as needed for mission accomplishment. In such cases, responsibility for the injury and/or death of such civilians, if any, falls on the belligerent so employing them.
The presence of civilian workers, such as technical representatives aboard a warship or employees in a munitions factory, in or on a military objective, does not alter the status of the military objective. These civilians may be excluded from the proportionality analysis.
Civilians who voluntarily place themselves in or on a military objective as “human shields” in order to deter a lawful attack do not alter the status of the military objective. While the law of armed conflict is not fully developed in such cases, such persons may also be considered to be taking a direct part in hostilities or contributing directly to the enemy’s warfighting/war-sustaining capability, and may be excluded from the proportionality analysis. Attacks under such circumstances likely raise political, strategic, and operational issues that commanders should identify and consider when making targeting decisions. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 8.3.2.

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Japan
According to the Report on the Practice of Japan, the judgment of the Tokyo District Court in the Shimoda case in 1963, which concerned the dropping of the atomic bomb, can be interpreted as having denied the existence of the concept of so-called quasi-combatants, whereby civilians who do not directly partake in hostilities, but indirectly contribute to hostile acts by working in transportation, communication and industrial facilities would be regarded as military objectives. 
Report on the Practice of Japan, 1998, Chapter 1.2, referring to Tokyo District Court, Shimoda case, Judgment, 7 December 1963.

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Belgium
In an explanatory memorandum submitted to the Belgian parliament in 1985 in the context of the ratification procedure of the 1977 Additional Protocols, the Belgian government stated that “each person, even a civilian, who is located inside a military objective, is exposed to the consequences of the risks that objective runs”. 
Belgium, House of Representatives, Explanatory memorandum on a draft bill for the approval of the Additional Protocols, 1984–1985 Session, Doc. 1096-1, 9 January 1985, p. 10.

Israel
In 2006, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
But the presence of civilians in the area does not stop a military objective from being a legitimate target. This is not just the law, as noted above, but also the practice of states. The Australian Defence Force Manual reflects the prevailing practice:
The presence of non-combatants in or around a military objective does not change its nature as a military objective. Non-combatants in the vicinity of a military objective must share the danger to which the military objective is exposed.
In practice Israel does not adopt the position reflected here that civilians in the vicinity of a military objective must “share the danger”, but rather takes significant efforts to avoid or minimize civilian casualties. 
Israel, Responding to Hizbullah Attacks from Lebanon: Issues of Proportionality, Legal Background, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 25 July 2006, § 2.

Israel
In 2007, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in a diplomatic note:
The presence of civilians in the area, however, does not stop a military objective from being a legitimate target. This is the law, as noted above, and reflected in state practice. Thus, for example, the Australian Defense Force Manual states:
The presence of non-combatants in or around a military objective does not change its nature as a military objective. Non-combatants in the vicinity of a military objective must share the danger to which the military objective is exposed. 
Israel, Israel’s War with Hizbullah. Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism, Diplomatic Notes No. 1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, April 2007, p. 14.

Israel
In 2008, in a background paper on Israel’s operations in Gaza, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
If a location is a legitimate military objective, it does not cease to be one because civilians are in the vicinity. As Article 28 of … [1949] Geneva Convention [IV] provides:
The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations.
Clearly, the deliberate placing of military targets in the heart of civilian areas is a serious violation of humanitarian law, and those who chose to locate such targets in these areas must bear responsibility for the injury to civilians which this decision engenders. … The defender has the primary duty of protecting the civilian population and removing civilians from military targets, if necessary. And … [s]hould civilian casualties ensue from an attempt to shield combatants or a military objective, the ultimate responsibility lies with the belligerent placing innocent civilians at risk.
Nonetheless the callous disregard of those who hide behind civilians does not absolve the state seeking to respond to such attacks from the responsibility to avoid or at least minimize injury to civilians and their property in the course of its operations. In particular this raises the complex issue of proportionality. 
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Background paper, Responding to Hamas Attacks from Gaza: Issues of Proportionality, December 2008, § 2.
[emphasis in original; footnotes in original omitted]
In 2009, in a report on Israeli operations in Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009 (the “Gaza Operation”, also known as “Operation Cast Lead”), Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
99. … [T]the presence of civilians at a site (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) does not by itself forbid an attack on an otherwise legitimate military target. …
100. The expected presence of civilians, though, does impact the analysis of the proportionality of an attack. 
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Operation in Gaza 27 December 2008–18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects, 29 July 2009, §§ 99–100.
[emphasis in original]
United States of America
In 1989, a US memorandum of law concerning the prohibition of assassination stated:
Civilians who work within a military objective are at risk from attack during the times in which they are present within that objective, whether their injury or death is incidental to the attack of that military objective or results from their direct attack … The substitution of a civilian in a position or billet that normally would be occupied by a member of the military will not make that position immune from attack. 
United States, Department of the Army, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, 2 November 1989, The Army Lawyer, Pamphlet 27-50-204, December 1989.

In 1992, in its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the US Department of Defense stated:
Civilians using those bridges or near other targets at the time of their attack were at risk of injury incidental to the legitimate attack of those targets … The presence of civilians will not render a target immune from attack; legitimate targets may be attacked wherever located (outside neutral territory and waters). 
United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Appendix O, The Role of the Law of War, ILM, Vol. 31, 1992, pp. 624 and 625.

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ICRC
To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces that: “A military objective remains a military objective even if civilian persons are in it. The civilian persons within such an objective or its immediate surroundings share the danger to which it is exposed.” 
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 56.

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Oppenheim
Oppenheim states:
Sections of the civilian population, like munition workers, which are closely identified with military objectives proper, may, while so identified, be legitimately exposed to air attack and to other belligerent measures aiming at the destruction of the objectives in question. 
Lassa Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise, Vol. II, Disputes, War and Neutrality, Sixth edition, revised, Hersch Lauterpacht (ed.), Longmans, Green and Co., London/New York/Toronto, 1944, p. 416, § 214ea.

Americas Watch
In 1985, in a report on violations of the laws of war in Nicaragua, Americas Watch stated:
Persons providing only indirect support to the Nicaraguan army by, inter alia, working in defense plants, distributing or storing military supplies in rear areas, supplying labor and food, or serving as messengers or disseminating propaganda … may not be subject to direct individualized attack or execution since they pose no immediate threat to the adversary. However, they assume the risk of incidental death or injury arising from attacks against legitimate military targets. 
Americas Watch, Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua: 1981–1985, New York, March 1985, p. 32.
[emphasis in original]
Africa Watch
In 1989, in a report on violations of the laws of war in Angola, Africa Watch stated:
Persons providing only indirect support to the Angolan, Cuban, or South African armed forces or UNITA [União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola] by, inter alia, working in defense plants, distributing or storing military supplies behind conflict areas, supplying labor and food, serving as messengers, or disseminating propaganda … may not be subject to direct individualized attack because they pose no immediate threat to the adversary. They assume, however, the risk of incidental death or injury arising from attacks and the use of weapons against legitimate military targets. 
Africa Watch, Angola: Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides, New York, April 1989, p. 138.