Practice Relating to Rule 73. Biological Weapons

Geneva Gas Protocol
According to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the States Parties accept the prohibition on the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and “agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare”. 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, 17 June 1925.
There are 20 reservations to the Protocol related to biological weapons. 
Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Fiji, India, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Viet Nam and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
These generally indicate that if an adverse party does not respect the Protocol, the ratifying State will no longer consider itself bound by the Protocol vis-à-vis that party. 
A number of reservations include non-respect by allies also as a reason for no longer being obliged to respect the Protocol.
There were an additional 17 reservations to this effect, but they have been withdrawn. 
By Ireland in 1972; by Australia in 1986; by New Zealand in 1989; by Slovakia in 1990; by Bulgaria, Canada (in relation to bacteriological weapons), Chile, Romania and the United Kingdom (in relation to bacteriological weapons) in 1991; by Spain in 1992; by the Netherlands in 1995; by France and South Africa in 1996; by Belgium in 1997; and by Estonia in 1999; by the Russian Federation in 2001; by the Republic of Korea in 2002.
Brussels Treaty
The three protocols to the 1948 Brussels Treaty deal with biological weapons. Article 1 Part I (Armaments not to be manufactured) of Protocol III states:
The High Contracting Parties, members of the Western European Union,  
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom.
take note of and record their agreement with the Declarations of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (made in London on 3rd October, 1954, and annexed hereto as Annex I) in which the Federal Republic of Germany undertook not to manufacture in its territory … biological … weapons. 
Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Brussels, 17 March 1948, Protocol III, Article 1, Part I.
Austrian State Treaty
Article 13(1) of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty provides:
Austria shall not possess, construct or experiment with –
(j) … biological substances in quantities greater than, or of types other than, are required for legitimate civil purposes, or any apparatus designed to produce, project or spread such materials or substances for war purposes. 
State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria (with Annexes and Maps), concluded between France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Austria, accession of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland and Yugoslavia, Vienna, 15 May 1955, Article 13(1) [entry into force generally on 27 July 1957, published in 217 UNTS 223 (1955), No. 2949 and in the Austrian Bundesgesetzblatt No. 152/1955].
Biological Weapons Convention
The preamble to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention provides:
The States Parties to this Convention,
Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Recognising the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,
Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,
Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, …
Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,
Recognising that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,
Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,
Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimise this risk. 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington, D.C., 10 April 1972, preamble.
Biological Weapons Convention
Article 1 of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention provides:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
1.microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
2.weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington, D.C., 10 April 1972, Article 1.
ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War
Articles 6 and 9 of the 1938 ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War provide:
Art. 6. The use of … bacterial weapons as against any State, whether or not a party to the present convention, and in any war, whatever its character, is prohibited.
Art. 9. The prohibition of the use of bacterial weapons shall apply to the use for the purpose of injuring an adversary of all methods for the dissemination of pathogenic microbes or of filter-passing viruses, or of infected substances, whether for the purpose of bringing them into immediate contact with human beings, animals or plants, or for the purpose of affecting any of the latter in any manner whatsoever, as, for example, by polluting the atmosphere, water, foodstuffs or any other objects of human use or consumption. 
Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War, adopted by the International Law Association, Fortieth Conference, Amsterdam, 29 August–2 September 1938, Articles 6 and 9.
New Delhi Draft Rules
Article 14 of the 1956 New Delhi Draft Rules prohibits the use of weapons
whose harmful effects – resulting in particular from the dissemination of … bacteriological … agents – could spread to an unforeseen degree or escape, either in space or in time, from the control of those who employ them, thus endangering the civilian population. 
Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, September 1956, submitted to governments for their consideration on behalf of the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross, New Delhi, 28 October–7 November, Res. XIII, Article 14.
Mendoza Declaration on Chemical and Biological Weapons
In September 1991, Argentina, Brazil and Chile signed the Mendoza Declaration on Chemical and Biological Weapons. Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay later acceded to the Declaration. In it, the parties state that they are “convinced that a complete ban on biological weapons will contribute to strengthening the security of all States”. In the first paragraph, they declare their “full commitment not to develop, produce, acquire in any way, stockpile or retain, transfer directly or indirectly, or use biological weapons”. 
Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons, signed by Argentina, Brazil and Chile, Mendoza, 5 September 1991, also known as the Mendoza Accord, annexed to Letter dated 11 September 1991 from the permanent representatives of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to the UN addressed to the Secretary-UN General, UN Doc. A/46/463, 12 September 1991.
Cartagena Declaration on Weapons of Mass Destruction
In December 1991, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela adopted the Cartagena Declaration on Weapons of Mass Destruction and agreed as follows:
1. They welcome the initiative of the Government of Peru concerning the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction in Latin America and the Caribbean as the beginning of a gradual process to strengthen security and mutual trust in the region;
2. They proclaim the commitment of their Governments to renounce the possession, production, development, use, testing and transfer of all weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, bacteriological (biological), toxin or chemical weapons, and to refrain from storing, acquiring or holding such categories of weapons, in any circumstances. 
Cartagena Declaration on Renunciation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, signed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, Cartagena de Indias, 4 December 1991, §§ 1–2.
Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and IHL in the Philippines
Under Article 4(4) of Part IV of the 1998 Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and IHL in the Philippines, “civilian population and civilians … shall be protected … from … the stockpiling near or in their midst, and the use of … biological weapons”. 
Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, The Hague, 16 March 1998, Part IV, Article 4(4).
UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin
Section 6.2 of the 1999 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin states:
The United Nations force shall respect the rules prohibiting or restricting the use of certain weapons and methods of combat under the relevant instruments of international humanitarian law. These include, in particular, the prohibition on the use of … biological methods of warfare. 
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, Secretary-General’s Bulletin, UN Secretariat, UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999, Section 6.2.
Australia
Australia’s Commanders’ Guide (1994) provides that States are prohibited “from manufacturing, storing and using biological weapons. Both chemical and biological weapons are prohibited because they cause unnecessary suffering and may affect the civilian population in an indiscriminate fashion.” 
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 306.
The Guide defines the use of “certain unlawful weapons and ammunition” as “grave breaches or serious war crimes”. 
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 1305(p).
Australia
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) states: “Bacteriological methods of warfare are prohibited.” It further provides that States are prohibited “from manufacturing, storing and using biological weapons. Both chemical and biological weapons are prohibited because they cause unnecessary suffering and may affect the civilian population in an indiscriminate fashion.” 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, §§ 411 and 414.
The manual defines the use of “certain unlawful weapons and ammunition” as “grave breaches or serious war crimes”. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 1315(p).
Australia
Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states in its chapter on “Weapons” that “[b]acteriological methods of warfare are prohibited”. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 4.14.
In the same chapter, the manual further states:
Nations are prohibited from manufacturing, storing and using biological weapons. Both chemical and biological weapons are prohibited because they cause unnecessary suffering and may affect the civilian population in an indiscriminate fashion. Australia is a party to the international convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons. As a party, Australia has undertaken not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain biological agents or toxins that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purpose. Further, Australia has undertaken not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 4.20.
In its chapter on “Compliance”, the manual states: “Among other war crimes generally recognised as forming part of the customary LOAC are … using bacteriological methods of warfare”. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 13.30.
The LOAC Manual (2006) replaces both the Defence Force Manual (1994) and the Commanders’ Guide (1994).
Belgium
Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) proscribes the use of biological weapons with reference to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. 
Belgium, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit de la Guerre, Ecole Royale Militaire, par J. Maes, Chargé de cours, Avocat-général près la Cour Militaire, D/1983/1187/029, 1983, p. 38.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Military Instructions (1992) states: “It is prohibited to use … bacteriological agents.” 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Instructions on the Implementation of the International Law of War in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of ABiH, No. 2/92, 5 December 1992, Item 11, § 1.
Burundi
Burundi’s Regulations on International Humanitarian Law (2007) states that “there are weapons whose use is prohibited … [such as] bacteriological weapons”. 
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, p. 27.
The Regulations also lists “employing toxic weapons” as a “violation of the laws and customs of war”. 
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, p. 27.
Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (1992) states, on the issue of biological and bacteriological weapons: “The restrictions here are clear. It is prohibited to use such weapons against enemy combatants as well as against civilian populations.” It also calls for the “total destruction of the existing stockpile”. 
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, p. 124, § 441.
Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states:
Biological weapons
The World Health Organization defines biological agents as “those which achieve their effects through their capacity to multiply in the attacked organism, designed to be used in case of war to cause the death or illness of human beings, animals or plants.”
The oldest text here is the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and of bacteriological methods [1925 Geneva Gas Protocol]. It was complemented by the London Convention of 10 April 1972 on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons or toxin weapons and on their destruction [1972 Biological Weapons Convention].
This convention stipulates general restrictions related to the prohibition of the use of such weapons against enemy combatants and civilian populations. States must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes their existing stockpiles. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 272, § 631.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) states:
Nations are prohibited from manufacturing, storing and using biological weapons. Both bacteriological and biological weapons are prohibited because they cause unnecessary suffering and may affect the civilian population in an indiscriminate fashion. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 5-3, § 25.
The manual further states that “using bacteriological methods of warfare” constitutes a war crime. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, pp. 16-3 and 16-4, § 21(i).
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) provides in its chapter entitled “Restrictions on the use of weapons”:
Bacteriological/biological methods of warfare are prohibited. Nations are prohibited from manufacturing, storing and using biological weapons. Both bacteriological and biological weapons are prohibited because they cause unnecessary suffering and may affect the civilian population in an indiscriminate fashion. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 516.
In its chapter on “War crimes, individual criminal liability and command responsibility”, the manual states that “using bacteriological methods of warfare” constitutes a war crime. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1609.3.i.
Chad
Chad’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) prohibits the use of “bacteriological weapons”. 
Chad, Droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces armées et de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 79.
Colombia
Colombia’s Basic Military Manual (1995) states that the use, production, possession and importation of biological weapons are banned. 
Colombia, Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual Básico para las Personerías y las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 1995, pp. 49–50.
Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book IV (Instruction of heads of division and company commanders):
II.1.7. Bacteriological weapons
Bacteriological/biological means are prohibited. States do not have the right to produce, stockpile and use biological weapons. Bacteriological and biological weapons are prohibited because they cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering and can affect the civilian population without distinction. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 53.
Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) states:
International law prohibits all biological weapons or methods of warfare whether they are directed against persons, animals or plants. Biological weapons include microbial or biological or toxin agents of any origin (natural or artificial) or method of production. 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 10.4.
France
France’s LOAC Summary Note (1992) states that it is prohibited to use biological weapons. 
France, Fiche de Synthèse sur les Règles Applicables dans les Conflits Armés, Note No. 432/DEF/EMA/OL.2/NP, Général de Corps d’Armée Voinot (pour l’Amiral Lanxade, Chef d’Etat-major des Armées), 1992, § 4.6.
France
France’s LOAC Teaching Note (2000) includes biological and bacteriological weapons in the list of weapons that “are totally prohibited by the law of armed conflict” because of their inhuman and indiscriminate character. 
France, Fiche didactique relative au droit des conflits armés, Directive of the Ministry of Defence, 4 January 2000, annexed to the Directive No. 147 of the Ministry of Defence of 4 January 2000, p. 6.
France
France’s LOAC Manual (2001) incorporates the content of Article 1 of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and makes reference to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 22.
The manual further includes biological and bacteriological weapons in the list of weapons that “are totally prohibited by the law of armed conflict” because of their inhuman and indiscriminate character. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 54.
Germany
Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (1991) provides: “The use … of bacteriological means of warfare is prohibited.” 
Germany, Taschenkarte, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, Bearbeitet nach ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, Zentrum Innere Führung, June 1991, p. 5.
Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) proscribes “the use of bacteriological weapons” and refers to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. It further states:
The development, manufacture, acquisition and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons is prohibited [Biological Weapons Convention]. These prohibitions shall apply both to biotechnological and synthetic procedures serving other but peaceful purposes. They also include genetic engineering procedures and micro-organisms altered through genetic engineering. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten KonfliktenHandbuch, August 1992, §§ 438–439.
Germany
Germany’s IHL Manual (1996) states: “International humanitarian law prohibits the use of a number of means of warfare which are of a nature to violate the principle of humanity and to cause unnecessary suffering, e.g. … bacteriological means of warfare, e.g. substances which cause disease”. 
Germany, ZDv 15/1, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, DSK VV230120023, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, June 1996, § 305.
Germany
Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (2006) states: “German service men or service women are prohibited from using in particular the following means of combat in armed conflicts: … bacteriological weapons”. 
Germany, Druckschrift Einsatz Nr. 03, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, Erarbeitet nach ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, DSK SF009320187, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, R II 3, August 2006, p. 5.
Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states:
In 1925, the countries of the world gathered in an international congress in Geneva and signed a protocol completely banning the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. All the leading countries in the world signed the Protocol, with the exception of the United States and Japan. Today, 133 countries have signed the Protocol, and its provisions are considered to be overriding, that is to say that they are binding on every country in the world, including those that never signed the Protocol. 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 18.
The Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) is a second edition of the Manual on the Laws of War (1998).
Italy
Italy’s IHL Manual (1991) provides: “The use of bacteriological means … is forbidden in conformity with the international provisions in force.” 
Italy, Manuale di diritto umanitario, Introduzione e Volume I, Usi e convenzioni di Guerra, SMD-G-014, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, Vol. I, § 19.
Kenya
Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997) prohibits the use of “bacteriological methods of warfare”. 
Kenya, Law of Armed Conflict, Military Basic Course (ORS), 4 Précis, The School of Military Police, 1997, Précis No. 3, p. 6.
Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands states that the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention “prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons (means of warfare). Logically this implies that the use of these weapons is also prohibited.” 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, pp. IV-7/IV-8, § 13.
Netherlands
The Military Handbook (1995) of the Netherlands states: “A general prohibition applies to the use of biological (bacteriological) means of warfare. The Netherlands shall in all circumstances respect this prohibition.” 
Netherlands, Handboek Militair, Ministerie van Defensie, 1995, p. 7-39.
Netherlands
The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states:
Section 12 - Biological (bacteriological) and toxic weapons
0459. Under the 1925 Gas Protocol it is also prohibited to use bacteriological means of warfare.
0460. Concerning such means, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 is now of primary importance. This Convention prohibits the development, production and storage of biological agents and toxins. The development, production and stockpiling of weapons, equipment or means of delivery to use (micro-)biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in an armed conflict is forbidden. Prohibition of the use of these biological weapons follows logically from this. Moreover; the use of bacteriological weapons in war was already explicitly prohibited in the 1925 Gas Protocol.
0461. Biological agents
Biological agents involve the use of living organisms (bacteria and micro-organisms such as viruses, Rickettsiae, fungi etc.) or infectious ingredients obtained from such organisms which, regardless of the type of infected material, are designed to cause sickness or death in humans, animals or plants and depend for their effect on their capacity to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked. Substances produced by living organisms, including substances of identical or similar structure and effect, which are produced chemically and can cause sickness or death in humans, animals or plants also fall under the definition of biological agents. Examples of bacterial diseases are: anthrax, plague, tularaemia, brucellosis and Q-fever. Examples of viral illnesses are smallpox and encephalitis.
0462. Toxins
Toxins are poisonous substances produced by living organisms (bacteria, moulds, but also plants and snakes). They do not multiply in the attacked organism. One example is the Botulin toxin, which causes the disease botulism.
0463. Because modern biological weapons are not without importance from the military viewpoint, many States still prepare for the possible use of such weapons. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, §§ 0459–0463.
In its chapter on non-international armed conflict, the manual states:
It is prohibited to use weapons causing unnecessary suffering or excessive injury, or that are indiscriminate. This means that biological, chemical, toxic or intoxicating weapons … are forbidden. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 1038.
In its chapter on peace operations, the manual states: “As for the use of resources, the rules of the humanitarian law of war also apply. Thus the use of chemical or biological weapons is prohibited”. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 1217.
New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states: “The [1925 Geneva Gas Protocol] prohibits the use … of bacteriological methods of warfare.” 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, §§ 512, 619 and 711.
The manual also includes “using bacteriological methods of warfare” in a list of “war crimes recognised by the customary law of armed conflict”. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 1704(5).
Nigeria
Nigeria’s Manual on the Laws of War mentions the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and states:
There is no rule to prevent measures being taken to dry up springs and destroy water-wells from which the enemy may draw water or devastate crops by means of chemicals and bacteria which are not harmful to human beings. Since 1925 a great number of States have signed a protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating gases or bacteriological means of warfare.
The manual includes “using bacteriological methods of warfare” in its list of war crimes. 
Nigeria, The Laws of War, by Lt. Col. L. Ode PSC, Nigerian Army, Lagos, undated, §§ 12 and 6(19).
Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states that “biological weapons” are prohibited weapons. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 31.b.(2).(d).
The manual also states that war crimes include the “use of prohibited means or methods of warfare ([including] … biological … weapons)”. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 31.a.(7).
Peru
Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states that “biological weapons” are prohibited weapons. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 32(b)(2)(d), p. 248.
The manual also states that war crimes include the “use of prohibited means or methods of warfare ([including] … bacteriological … weapons)”. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 32(a)(7), p. 248.
The manual further states with respect to air warfare that “using asphyxiating or toxic gases or bacteriological means of warfare” is prohibited. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 154(b)(2), p. 338.
Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Military Manual (1990) prohibits bacteriological (biological) weapons. It refers to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. 
Russian Federation, Instructions on the Application of the Rules of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the USSR, Appendix to Order of the USSR Defence Minister No. 75, 1990, § 6(e) and (f).
Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states: “The following shall be prohibited to use in the course of combat operations: … bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons.” 
Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 9.
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Instructor Manual (2007) provides: “It is prohibited to … [u]se biological or bacteriological weapons.” 
Sierra Leone, The Law of Armed Conflict. Instructor Manual for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), Armed Forces Education Centre, September 2007, p. 44.
South Africa
South Africa’s LOAC Manual (1996) states: “The use of certain weapons is expressly prohibited by international agreement, treaty or custom (e.g. biological and toxic weapons).” 
South Africa, Presentation on the South African Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Appendix A, Chapter 4: International Humanitarian Law (The Law of Armed Conflict), National Defence Force, 1996, p. 12, § 34.f.(iii).
South Africa
South Africa’s Revised Civic Education Manual (2004) states:
i. Prohibited Weapons. The following weapons have been prohibited:
(3) … Bacteriological Weapons. Geneva Protocol outlawing their use in 1925. This ban was later strengthened by the adoption of the Biological Weapons Convention (1972) … which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of such weapons. 
South Africa, Revised Civic Education Manual, South African National Defence Force, 2004, Chapter 4, § 56(f)(i).
Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) states: “It is prohibited to use … bacteriological weapons.” It repeats the content of Article 1 of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, §§ 3.2.c.(1) and 3.2.c(2).
Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states that there is an absolute prohibition on the use of certain weapons, including “[b]iological, bacteriological and toxin weapons”. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 3.2.b.
The manual repeats extracts from Articles I and II of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 3.2.b.(1).
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Teaching Manual (1986) states that the use of bacteriological means of warfare is prohibited. 
Switzerland, Droit des gens en temps de guerre, Programme d’instruction fondé sur le Manuel 51.7/III “Lois et coutumes de la guerre”, Cours de base pour recrues de toutes les armes 97.2f, Armée suisse, 1986, p. 41.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) prohibits the use of biological weapons. 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 22.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Regulation on Legal Bases for Conduct during an Engagement (2005) states:
16.1 Prohibited means of warfare
228 Prohibited are:
1 poison, chemical and biological weapons;
229 The production, stockpiling, import, export, transit and use of such means of combat are notably prohibited. 
Switzerland, Bases légales du comportement à l’engagement (BCE), Règlement 51.007/IVf, Swiss Army, issued based on Article 10 of the Ordinance on the Organization of the Federal Department for Defence, Civil Protection and Sports of 7 March 2003, entry into force on 1 July 2005, §§ 228–229.
Ukraine
Ukraine’s IHL Manual (2004) states that the use of “bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons” as a means of warfare is prohibited. 
Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, § 1.3.3.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK Military Manual (1958) states: “The use of bacteriological methods of warfare is forbidden.” A footnote explains: “The prohibition … in the [1925 Geneva] Gas Protocol was declaratory of the view generally accepted by the civilised world.” It adds:
As Japan was not a party to the Protocol, the Russian military tribunal at Khabarovsk … would therefore seem to have assumed that the prohibition of bacteriological warfare derived from the customary law of war prevailing among civilised nations and it was only declaratory of such customary law. 
United Kingdom, Military The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 111 and footnote 1(b).
The manual also provides: “In addition to the ‘grave breaches’ of the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions, … the following are examples of punishable violations of the laws of war, or war crimes: … using bacteriological methods of warfare.” 
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 626(s).
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) states: “The following are prohibited in international armed conflict: … f. bacteriological weapons.”  
United Kingdom, The Law of Armed Conflict, D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (Revised 1981), Ministry of Defence, prepared under the Direction of The Chief of the General Staff, 1981, Section 5, p. 20, § 1(f).
(emphasis in original)
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states:
6.5. The development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention and use of bacteriological, biological and toxin weapons are prohibited.
6.5.1. This does not interfere with the right of states to participate in the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological and biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes such as the prevention of disease.
6.5.2. The term “toxin” refers to agents that are chemical poisons of types that can be produced naturally by biological processes or synthesized artificially. The terms “bacteriological” and “biological” are not defined in the relevant treaties. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, §§ 6.5–6.5.1.
In its chapter on internal armed conflict, the manual prohibits the use of bacteriological weapons. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 15.28.
In its chapter on enforcement of the law of armed conflict, the manual refers to “using bacteriological methods of warfare” as a war crime “traditionally recognized by the customary law of armed conflict”. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 16.29.
United States of America
The US Field Manual (1956) states:
The reservation of the United States [to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol] does not, however, reserve the right to retaliate with bacteriological methods of warfare against a state if that state or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions of the Protocol. The prohibition concerning bacteriological methods of warfare which the United States has accepted under the Protocol, therefore, proscribes not only the initial but also any retaliatory use of bacteriological methods of warfare. In this connection, the United States considers bacteriological methods of warfare to include not only biological weapons but also toxins, which, although not living organisms and therefore susceptible of being characterized as chemical agents, are generally produced from biological agents. All toxins, however, regardless of the manner of production, are regarded by the United States as bacteriological methods of warfare within the meaning of the proscription of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. 
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 38(d).
United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) states:
International law prohibits biological weapons or methods of warfare whether they are directed against persons, animals or plants. The wholly indiscriminate and uncontrollable nature of biological weapons has resulted in the condemnation of biological weapons by the international community, and the practice of states in refraining from their use in warfare has confirmed this rule. The Biological Weapons Convention prohibits also the development, preparation, stockpiling and supply to others of such weapons. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 6-4(b).
United States of America
The US Air Force Commander’s Handbook (1980) states: “The United States has renounced the use of bacteriological weapons under all circumstances, and their possession is forbidden by a 1972 Treaty.” 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-34, Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict, Judge Advocate General, US Department of the Air Force, 25 July 1980, § 6-3(b).
United States of America
The US Operational Law Handbook (1993) states: “The US has renounced … all use of biological weapons.” 
United States, Operational Law Handbook, JA 422, Center for Law and Military Operations and International Law Division, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia 22903-1781, 1993, p. Q-182, § (i).
United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (1995) states:
The United States considers the prohibition against the use of biological weapons during armed conflict to be part of customary international law and thereby binding on all nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 [Geneva] Gas Protocol or the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.
The United States has, therefore, formally renounced the use of biological weapons under any circumstance. Pursuant to its treaty obligations, the United States has destroyed all its biological and toxin weapons and restricts its research activities to development of defensive capabilities. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 10.4.2.
United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (2007) states:
10.4 Biological Weapons
International law prohibits all biological weapons or methods of warfare whether directed against persons, animals, or plant life. Biological weapons include microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin (i.e., natural or artificial) or methods of production.
10.4.1 Treaty Obligations
… The United States … [is a party] to both the 1925 [Geneva] Gas Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.
10.4.2 U.S. Policy Regarding Biological Weapons
The United States considers the prohibition against the use of biological weapons during armed conflict to be part of customary international law and thereby binding on all nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 [Geneva] Gas Protocol or the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.
The United States has, therefore, formally renounced the use of biological weapons under any circumstance. Pursuant to its treaty obligations, the United States has destroyed all its biological and toxin weapons and restricts its research activities to development of defensive capabilities. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, §§ 10.4, 10.4.1 and 10.4.2.
United States of America
The US Manual for Military Commissions (2010), Part IV, Crimes and Elements, includes in the list of crimes triable by military commissions:
EMPLOYING POISON OR SIMILAR WEAPONS.
a. Text. “Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally, as a method of warfare, employs a substance or weapon that releases a substance that causes death or serious and lasting damage to health in the ordinary course of events, through its asphyxiating, bacteriological, or toxic properties, shall be punished, if death results to one or more of the victims, by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct, and, if death does not result to any of the victims, by such punishment, other than death, as a military commission under this chapter may direct.”
b. Elements.
(1) The accused intentionally employed a substance or a weapon that releases a substance as a result of its employment;
(2) The substance was such that causes death or serious damage to health in the ordinary course of events through its asphyxiating, poisonous, bacteriological properties;
(3) The accused employed the substance or weapon with the intent of utilizing such asphyxiating, poisonous, bacteriological properties as a method of warfare;
(4) The accused knew or should have known of the nature of the substance or weapon employed; and
(5) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with hostilities.
c. Comment.
(1) The “death or serious damage to health” required of the offense must be a direct result of the substance’s effect or effects on the human body (e.g., asphyxiation caused by the depletion of atmospheric oxygen secondary to a chemical or other reaction would not give rise to this offense).
(2) The clause “serious damage to health” does not include temporary incapacitation or sensory irritation.
(3) The use of the “substance or weapon” at issue must be proscribed under the law of armed conflict. It may include chemical or biological agents.
(4) The specific intent element for this offense precludes liability for mere knowledge of potential collateral consequences (e.g., mere knowledge of a secondary asphyxiating or toxic effect would be insufficient to complete the offense).
d. Maximum punishment. Death, if the death of any person occurs as a result of the employment of the substance or weapon. Otherwise, confinement for life. 
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, § 5(8), pp. IV-7 and IV-8.
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Military Manual (1988) prohibits the use of bacteriological (biological) means of warfare. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Propisi o Primeri Pravila Medjunarodnog Ratnog Prava u Oruzanim Snagama SFRJ, PrU-2, Savezni Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu (Pravna Uprava), 1988, § 99.
Armenia
Under Armenia’s Penal Code (2003), the development, production, acquisition, sale, use and testing of biological weapons and weapons of mass destruction constitute crimes against the peace and security of mankind. 
Armenia, Penal Code, 2003, Articles 386 and 387(2).
Australia
Australia’s Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act (1976) [previously the Biological Weapons Act 1976], as amended to 2001, provides:
(1) It is unlawful to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
(a) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; or
(b) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflicts;
(2) A corporation that, or a natural person who, does an act or thing declared by subsection (1) to be unlawful is guilty of an offence and is punishable, on conviction:
(a) in the case of a corporation – by a fine not exceeding $200,000; and
(b) in the case of a natural person – by a fine not exceeding $10,000, or by imprisonment for a specified period or for life, or both. 
Australia, Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act 1976 [previously Biological Weapons Act 1976], as amended to 2001, § 8(1)–(2).
Australia
Australia’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act (1995), as amended to 2003, states:
3 Interpretation
Weapons of Mass Destruction program or WMD program means a plan or program for the development, production, acquisition or stockpiling of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.
9 Prohibition on supplying goods for WMD program
(1) If:
(a) a person supplies any goods to another person; and
(b) the first-mentioned person believes or suspects, on reasonable grounds, that the goods will or may be used in a WMD program; and
(c) the supply of the goods is not authorised by a permit or is in contravention of a condition stated in a permit; and
(d) the Minister has not given a written notice to the first-mentioned person under section 12 stating that the Minister has no reason to believe or suspect that the goods will or may be used in a WMD program;
the first-mentioned person is guilty of an offence punishable on conviction by imprisonment for not more than 8 years.
10 Prohibition on exporting goods for WMD program
(1) If:
(a) a person exports any non-regulated goods; and
(b) the person believes or suspects, on reasonable grounds, that the goods will or may be used in a WMD program; and
(c) the export of the goods is not authorised by a permit or is in contravention of a condition stated in a permit; and
(d) the Minister has not given a written notice to the person under section 12 stating that the Minister has no reason to believe or suspect that the goods will or may be used in a WMD program;
the person is guilty of an offence punishable on conviction by imprisonment for not more than 8 years.
11 Prohibition on providing services for WMD program
(1) If:
(a) a person provides any services to another person; and
(b) the first-mentioned person believes or suspects, on reasonable grounds, that the services will or may assist a WMD program; and
(c) the provision of the services is not authorised by a permit or is in contravention of a condition stated in a permit; and
(d) the Minister has not given a written notice to the first-mentioned person under section 12 stating that the Minister has no reason to believe or suspect that the provision of the services will or may assist a WMD program;
the first-mentioned person is guilty of an offence punishable on conviction by imprisonment for not more than 8 years. 
Australia, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act, 1995, as amended to 2003, §§ 3 and 9–11, pp. 3 and 6–7.
Belarus
Belarus’s Criminal Code (1999) provides that “production, acquisition, stockpiling, transport, transfer or sale of weapons of mass destruction prohibited by international treaties binding upon the Republic of Belarus” is a criminal offence, while the use of such weapons is a war crime. 
Belarus, Criminal Code, 1999, Articles 129 and 134.
Belgium
Belgium’s Law Regulating Economic and Individual Activities with Weapons (2006) provides: “[The following] arms shall be considered as prohibited: … devices which are intended to affect people by toxic, asphyxiating … and other similar substances”. 
Belgium, Law Regulating Economic and Individual Activities with Weapons, 2006, Article 3(1)(10).
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Criminal Code (2003), as amended in 2006, states:
(2) Whoever uses in any way … biological weapons …
shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of five years or a long-term imprisonment.
(4) Whoever, in time of war or armed conflict, orders the use of … biological weapons … or whoever uses them,
shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than three years. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Code, 2003, as amended on 18 June 2006, Article 193a(2) and (4).
Brazil
Brazil’s Military Penal Code (1969) prohibits the spreading of epidemics or infestations in a location under military control which could result in damage to forests, crops, grazing pastures or animals used for economic or military purposes. 
Brazil, Military Penal Code, 1969, Article 278.
China
China’s Law Governing the Trial of War Criminals (1946) provides that “use of … bacteriological warfare” constitutes a war crime. 
China, Law Governing the Trial of War Criminals, 1946, Article 3(12).
China
China’s Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies (2002) states:
The State shall exercise strict control on the export of dual-use biological agents and related equipment and technologies so as to prevent dual-use biological agents and related equipment and technologies from being used for the purpose of biological weapons. 
China, Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies, 2002, Article 4.
The Regulations further states:
The receiving party of dual-use biological agents and related equipment and technologies shall guarantee … not to use the imported dual-use biological agents and related equipment and technologies for the purpose of biological weapons. 
China, Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies, 2002, Article 7(1).
Colombia
Colombia’s Constitution (1991) prohibits the “manufacture, import, possession and use of … biological … weapons”. 
Colombia, Constitution, 1991, Article 81.
Croatia
Under Croatia’s Criminal Code (1997), the manufacture, improvement, production, stockpiling, offering for sale, purchase, interceding in purchasing or selling, possession, transfer, transport, use of, and order to use, biological weapons are war crimes. 
Croatia, Criminal Code, 1997, Article 163(1) and (2).
Croatia
Croatia’s Criminal Code (1997), as amended to 2006, imposes a criminal sanction on:
(1) Whoever makes or improves, produces, stores, offers for sale or buys, or intercedes in a purchase or sale, possesses, transfers, or transports … biological weapons …
(2) Whoever, in time of war or armed conflict, orders the use of … biological weapons. 
Croatia, Criminal Code, 1997, as amended to 2006, Article 163(1) and (2).
Denmark
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (1973), as amended in 1978, provides:
Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 1973, as amended in 1978, § 25(1).
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (2005) provides:
Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 2005, § 36(2).
Denmark
Denmark’s Weapons and Explosives Act (2009), as amended to 2012, states: “It is prohibited to import, export, transport, purchase, transfer, possess, carry, use, manufacture, develop or to develop research into … biological … weapons and delivery systems specifically designed or modified for such weapons”. 
Denmark, Weapons and Explosives Act, 2009, as amended to 2012, Article 5.
Estonia
Estonia’s Penal Code (2001) punishes any “person who designs, manufactures, stores, acquires, hands over, sells or provides or offers for use in any other manner … biological or bacteriological weapons”. 
Estonia, Penal Code, 2001, § 93(1).
Under the Code, “use of biological [or] bacteriological … weapons” is a war crime. 
Estonia, Penal Code, 2001, § 103.
Fiji
Fiji’s Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Decree (2011) provides:
In exercise of the power vested in me as the President of the Republic of Fiji and the Commander in Chief of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces by virtue of the Executive Authority Decree 2009, I hereby make the following Decree –
TO PROHIBIT THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, MANUFACTURE, POSSESSION, STOCKPILING, OTHER ACQUISITION OR RETENTION, IMPORTATION, EXPORTATION, RE-EXPORTATION, TRANSPORTATION, TRANSIT, TRANS-SHIPMENT, TRANSFER OR USE OF CERTAIN BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND TOXINS AND OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND TO IMPLEMENT IN FIJI THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION OF 10 APRIL 1972 AND THE PROTOCOL FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES, AND OF BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE OF 17 JUNE 1925.
PART 2 – IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION
Purpose
3. The purpose of this Decree is to fulfill Fiji's obligations under the Convention and the Protocol as amended from time to time.
Decree to bind the State
5. This Decree is binding on the State.
Prohibitions
6. It is an offence for a person to develop, produce, manufacture, possess, stockpile, acquire, retain, import, export, re-export, transport, transit, trans-ship, transfer to any recipient directly or indirectly, or use –
(a) any microbial or other biological agent, or any toxin whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; or
(b) any weapon, equipment, means of delivery, designed to use or share such an agent or toxin for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
Aiding and abetting
7. No person shall aid, abet, encourage, assist, counsel, procure, incite or finance the commission of, or attempt or conspire to commit, an offence under section 6.
Licensing
8. – (1) Except as hereby authorised or specifically licensed under any written law, no person shall develop, produce, manufacture, possess, stockpile, acquire, retain, transport, transfer or use any microbial or other biological agent, any toxin or any related equipment designated in the regulations.
(3) Any person who, aids, abets, encourages, assists, counsels, procures, incites or finances the commission of, or attempts or conspires to commit, is guilty of an offence under this section.
Offences
27. – (1) Any person who contravenes section 6 or 7 is guilty of an offence under the Crimes Decree 2009 and is liable upon conviction –
(a) in the case of an individual, imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or to a fine not exceeding 150 penalty units or both;
(b) in the case of a body corporate, a fine not exceeding 500 penalty units.
(3) Every person who contravenes sections 8, … is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to –
(a) in the case of an individual, imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or to a fine no[t] exceeding 150 penalty units or both;
(b) in the case of a body corporate, a fine not exceeding 500 penalty units.
Extra-territorial application
28. – (1) A person who is alleged to have committed an offence under sections 8, … outside the territory of Fiji, may be prosecuted for that offence if –
(a) at the time the offence is alleged to have been committed –
(i) the person was a citizen of Fiji or was employed in a civilian or military capacity, or
(ii) the person was a citizen of a State that engaged in an armed conflict against Fiji or was employed in a civilian or military capacity by such a State, or
(iii) the victim of the alleged offence was a citizen of Fiji; or
(iv) the victim of the alleed offence was a citizen of a State that was allied with Fiji in an armed conflict, or
(v) the person is a stateless person whose habitual residence is in Fiji; or
(b) after the time of the offence is alleged to have been committed, the person is present in Fiji.
(2) “Person” in subsection (1) includes any bodies corporate, including those incorporated, registered or otherwise organised and members of partnerships or trustees of trusts recognised under the laws of Fiji. 
Fiji, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Decree, 2011, Articles 3, 5–8 and 27–28.
Finland
Finland’s Criminal Code (1889), as amended in 2008, provides that any person who “uses … biological or other prohibited weapons or ordnance” shall be “sentenced for a war crime to imprisonment for at least one year or for life”. 
Finland, Criminal Code, 1889, as amended in 2008, Chapter 11, Section 5(1)(14).
(emphasis in original)
The Criminal Code further states:
Section 9 - Breach of the prohibition of biological weapons
A person who
(1) uses a biological or a toxin weapon in a manner not referred to in sections 1 through 3 of this chapter,
(2) unlawfully prepares, transports or delivers a biological weapon or a toxin weapon, or
(3) in violation of an international convention on the development, production and storage of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction (Treaties of Finland 15/1975) develops, prepares, otherwise procures, stores or possesses a biological weapon or a toxin weapon or weapons, devices or equipment for the dissemination of a biological weapon or a toxin weapon,
shall be sentenced, unless the same or a more severe penalty for the act has been provided elsewhere in the law, for a breach of the prohibition of biological weapons to imprisonment for at least four months and at most six years. 
Finland, Criminal Code, 1889, as amended in 2008, Chapter 11, Section 9.
[emphasis in original]
France
France’s Law on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (1972) prohibits the production, retention, acquisition, stockpiling and transfer of biological weapons. 
France, Law on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, 1972, Article 1.
France
France’s Code of Defence (2004) states:
The development, production, possession, stockpiling, acquisition, and transfer of microbiological agents, other biological agents and biological toxins, whatever their origin and mode of production, which are of a kind and quantity not suited for prophylactic, protection or other pacific purposes, are prohibited. 
France, Code of Defence, 2004, Article L. 2341-1; see also Article L. 2341-2.
Georgia
Under Georgia’s Criminal Code (1999), “the production, acquisition or sale of … biological, or other kinds of weapon of mass destruction, prohibited by an international treaty” and the “use during hostilities or in armed conflict of such means and materials or weapons of mass destruction which are prohibited by an international treaty” are crimes. 
Georgia, Criminal Code, 1999, Articles 406 and 413(c).
Germany
Germany’s Law Introducing the International Crimes Code (2002) punishes anyone who, in connection with an international or non-international armed conflict, “employs biological … weapons”. 
Germany, Law Introducing the International Crimes Code, 2002, Article 1, § 12(1)(2).
Hungary
Hungary’s Law/Decree on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (1975) prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery as specified in Article 1 of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. 
Hungary, Law/Decree on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, 1975.
Hungary
Under Hungary’s Criminal Code (1978), as amended in 1998, employing “bacteriological methods of warfare” as set forth in the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol is a war crime. 
Hungary, Criminal Code, 1978, as amended in 1998, Section 160, § A(3)(a).
Hungary
Hungary’s Criminal Code (1978), as amended in 2007, prohibits:
Bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons as defined by Article 1 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, adopted at Session XXVI of the United Nations on 10 December 1971 and promulgated by Law No. 11 of 1975. 
Hungary, Criminal Code, 1978, as amended in 2007, Section 160/A(3)(b).
India
India’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act (2005) states:
“biological weapons” are –
(i) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; and
(ii) weapons, equipment or delivery systems specially designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
India, Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005, Section 4(a).
Iraq
The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (2004) states:
PREAMBLE
This Law is now established to govern the affairs of Iraq during the transitional period until a duly elected government, operating under a permanent and legitimate constitution achieving full democracy, shall come into being.
CHAPTER ONE – FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
Article 2.
(A) The term “transitional period” shall refer to the period beginning on 30 June 2004 and lasting until the formation of an elected Iraqi government pursuant to a permanent constitution as set forth in this Law, which in any case shall be no later than 31 December 2005, unless the provisions of Article 61 are applied.
CHAPTER THREE – THE IRAQI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT
Article 27.
(E) The Iraqi Transitional Government shall respect and implement Iraq’s international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production, and non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and associated equipment, materiel, technologies, and delivery systems for use in the development, manufacture, production, and use of such weapons. 
Iraq, Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, 2004, Preamble and Articles 2(A) and 27(E).
Iraq
Iraq’s Constitution (2006) states:
The Iraqi Government shall respect and implement Iraq’s international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production, and non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and shall prohibit associated equipment, materiel, technologies, and delivery systems for use in the development, manufacture, production, and use of such weapons. 
Iraq, Constitution, 2006, Article 9(1)(E).
Iraq
Iraq’s Law on the National Monitoring Authority to Ban Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons (2012) states:
Article (3)
The National Monitoring Authority to ban nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is hereby established and is affiliated to the Ministry of Science and Technology.
Article (6)
The Authority aims to prohibit the use of the Republic of Iraq’s territories and its regional waters and aerospace, as well as every location subject to Iraqi sovereignty, for any banned activities related to agreements and conventions on [the] non[-]proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons that the country is part of.
Article (7)
The Authority shall achieve its objectives through the following means:
First. Establishment of a national system for monitoring, authentication, and inspection, that ensures compliance of Iraq [with] international agreements and conventions on the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
Second. Monitoring of peaceful activities to ensure that they are not turned into banned activities in accordance with agreements and conventions on the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in all parts of Iraq[,] including production, ownership, use, storage, export, import, shipment, transfer, disposal of, and management of any materials, equipment, and technologies or any other activities defined by the authority.
Article 8
The Authority assumes the following tasks:
First. Pursue and follow-up [the] implementation of Iraq’s commitments to international, regional, and bilateral agreements and conventions and [their] attached protocols and control systems of import and export of materials related to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and consider the same as part of the Iraqi law.
Second. To ensure that no nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and any material related thereto are designed, or developed, or produced, or used, or transferred, or shipped, or imported, or exported within the territories of the [R]epublic of Iraq. 
Iraq, Law on the National Monitoring Authority to Ban Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons, 2012, Articles 3, 6–7(2), 8(1)–(2).
Italy
Italy’s Law of War Decree (1938), as amended in 1992, states: “The use of bacteriological means … is forbidden in conformity with the international provisions in force.” 
Italy, Law of War Decree, 1938, as amended in 1992, Article 51.
Italy
Italy’s Law on the Export, Import and Transit of Armaments (1990) provides: “The manufacture, import, export and transit of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons are prohibited, as is research designed for their production or the provision of the relevant technology.” 
Italy, Law on the Export, Import and Transit of Armaments, 1990, Chapter 1, Section 1, § 7.
Japan
Japan’s Law on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (1982), as amended in 2001, states:
(Purpose)
1. With a view to ensuring an appropriate and competent implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (hereinafter referred to as the “Biological Weapons Convention”), and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, this Law aims to prohibit the production, retention, transfer and acquisition of biological and toxin weapons and to take measures to restrict acts of discharging biological agents and toxins.
(Prohibitions)
4. No person shall produce biological or toxin weapons.
4-2. No person shall retain, transfer or acquire biological or toxin weapons.
(Penalties)
9. Persons who use biological or toxin weapons and discharge biological agents or toxins filled in the said biological or toxin weapons shall be liable to either imprisonment with labor for an indefinite period, or for a minimum [period of] two years, or a maximum fine of ten million yen. 
Japan, Law on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, 1982, as amended in 2001, Articles 1, 4, 4-2 and 9.
Kazakhstan
Under Kazakhstan’s Penal Code (1997), “the production, acquisition, or sale of biological weapons” is a criminal offence. 
Kazakhstan, Penal Code, 1997, Articles 158 and 159(2).
New Zealand
New Zealand’s Disarmament Act (1987) provides: “No person shall manufacture, station, acquire, or possess, or have control over any biological weapon in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.” 
New Zealand, Disarmament Act, 1987, Section 8.
Norway
Norway’s Penal Code (1902) provides:
Any person shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years who develops, produces, stores or otherwise obtains or possesses:
(1) bacteriological or other biological substances or toxins regardless of their origin or method of production, of such a kind and in such quantities that they are not justified for preventive, protective or other peaceful purposes,
(2) weapons, equipment or means of dissemination made for using such substances or toxins as are mentioned in item 1 for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
Accomplices shall be liable to the same penalty. 
Norway, Penal Code, 1902, § 153a.
Norway
Norway’s Penal Code (1902), as amended in 2008, states: “Any person is liable to punishment for a war crime who in connection with an armed conflict … employs biological … weapons.” 
Norway, Penal Code, 1902, as amended in 2008, § 107(b).
Pakistan
Pakistan’s Export Control Act (2004) states:
2. Definitions. – In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. –
(b) “biological weapon” means any weapon designed to kill or harm or infect people, animals or plants on a large scale through effects of the infectious or toxic properties of a biological warfare agent;
4. Control Lists
(4) The Federal Government shall control export, re-export, transhipment, transit of goods, technologies, material and equipment, subject to the provisions of this Act, which may contribute to the designing, development, production, stockpiling, maintenance or use of nuclear and biological weapons and their delivery systems.
5. Licensing
(3) An exporter is under legal obligation to notify to the competent authority if the exporter is aware or suspects that the goods or technology are intended, in their entirety or in part, in connection with nuclear or biological weapons or missiles capable of delivering such weapons. 
Pakistan, Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004, Section 2(b), 4(4) and 5(3).
Peru
Peru’s Code of Military and Police Justice (2006) states:
A member of the military or police shall be imprisoned for a period of no less than eight and no more than 15 years if he or she in the context of an international or non-international armed conflict:
2. Uses biological … weapons.  
Peru, Code of Military and Police Justice, 2006, Article 102(2).
This article is no longer in force. Along with certain other articles in this legislation, it was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court (en banc decision for case file No. 0012-2006-PI-TC, 8 January 2007) because it does not stipulate a crime committed in the line of duty that would fall under the jurisdiction of a military court pursuant to Article 173 of Peru’s Constitution.
Peru
Peru’s Military and Police Criminal Code (2010), in a chapter entitled “Crimes involving the use of prohibited means in the conduct of hostilities”, states:
A member of the military or the police shall be punished with deprivation of liberty of not less than eight years and not more than fifteen years if, in a state of emergency and when the Armed Forces assume control of the internal order, he or she:
2. Uses biological weapons. 
Peru, Military and Police Criminal Code, 2010, Article 92(2).
Philippines
The Philippines’ Republic Act No. 8438 (1997) provides: “It is the policy of the Cordillera Autonomous Region to prohibit the development, storage, use or transport of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons within the region.” 
Philippines, Republic Act No. 8438, 1997, Section 19.
Poland
Poland’s Penal Code (1997) punishes “any person who uses a means of mass destruction prohibited by international law” and “any person who, against the prohibition by international law or by the provision of law, produces, stockpiles, acquires, sells, retains, transports or sends means of mass destruction or means of combat, or conducts research aimed at the production or use of such means”. 
Poland, Penal Code, 1997, Articles 120 and 121.
Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea’s ICC Act (2007) provides for the punishment of anyone who commits the war crime of employing biological weapons in both international and non-international armed conflicts. 
Republic of Korea, ICC Act, 2007, Article 14(1)(2)
South Africa
South Africa’s Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (1993) provides:
The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, determine the general policy to be followed with a view to:
(d) the imposition of a prohibition, whether for offensive or defensive purposes, on the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, maintenance or transit of any weapons of mass destruction. 
South Africa, Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 1993, Section 2(1)(d).
Spain
Spain’s Penal Code (1995), as amended in 2003, states:
Resorting to genetic engineering in order to produce biological or other weapons capable of exterminating the human species shall be punished with three to seven years’ imprisonment and a special prohibition to hold public office or position or to undertake public work or activities for seven to ten years. 
Spain, Penal Code, 1995, as amended on 25 November 2003, Article 160(1).
The Penal Code further states:
1. Any person who manufactures, commercializes or stockpiles weapons or munitions without authorization by law or competent authority shall be punished:
1.° In the case of … biological weapons, with five to ten years’ imprisonment for promoters and organizers, and three to five years’ imprisonment in the case of accessories.
3.° The same penalties shall apply, considering the perpetrators’ degree of participation, to the trafficking of … biological weapons.
2. The same penalties as established in point 1.° in sub-section 1 shall apply to whoever develops or uses … biological weapons or makes preparations for their use. 
Spain, Penal Code, 1995, as amended on 25 November 2003, Article 566(1)–(2).
The Penal Code also states:
1. … Stockpiling of … biological weapons is understood as the manufacture, commercialization or possession of these weapons.
2. … [B]iological weapons are understood as defined by the international treaties and covenants to which Spain is a party.
The development of … biological weapons is understood as any activity comprising scientific or technical research or examination leading to the creation of a new … biological weapon or the modification of an existing biological … weapon. 
Spain, Penal Code, 1995, as amended on 25 November 2003, Article 567(1)–(2).
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Military Criminal Code (1927), as amended, punishes “whoever will intentionally spread a dangerous and transmissible human disease”. 
Switzerland, Military Criminal Code, 1927, as amended, Article 167.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Military Criminal Code (1927), taking into account amendments entered into force up to 2011, states in a chapter entitled “War crimes”:
Art. 110
Articles 112–114 apply in the context of international armed conflicts, including in situations of occupation, and, if the nature of the offence does not exclude it, in the context of non-international armed conflicts.
Art. 112d
1 The penalty shall be a custodial sentence of not less than three years for any person who, in the context of an armed conflict:
b. employs biological or chemical weapons, including poisonous or asphyxiating gases, substances or liquids. 
Switzerland, Military Criminal Code, 1927, taking into account amendments entered into force up to 2011, Articles 110 and 112d (1)(b).
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Penal Code (1937), taking into account amendments entered into force up to 2011, states under the title “War crimes”:
Art. 264b
Articles 264d–264j apply in the context of international armed conflicts, including in situations of occupation, and, if the nature of the offence does not exclude it, in the context of non-international armed conflicts.
Art. 264h
1 The penalty shall be a custodial sentence of not less than three years for any person who, in the context of an armed conflict:
b. employs biological or chemical weapons, including poisonous or asphyxiating gases, substances or liquids. 
Switzerland, Penal Code, 1937, taking into account amendments entered into force up to 2011, Articles 264b and 264h (1)(b).
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Federal Law on War Equipment (1996), as amended in 2001, provides:
It is prohibited:
a.to develop, produce, deliver to anyone, acquire, import, export, procure the transit of or stockpile biological weapons, engage in the brokerage thereof or otherwise dispose of them;
b.to induce anyone to commit an act mentioned under letter a;
c.to facilitate the commission of an act mentioned under letter a. 
Switzerland, Federal Law on War Equipment, 1996, as amended in 2001, Article 7.
Tajikistan
Tajikistan’s Criminal Code (1998) punishes the
creation, production, acquisition, storage, transportation, sending or sale of … biological (bacteriological) … weapons of mass destruction, prohibited by an international treaty, as well as transfer to any other State, which does not possess nuclear weapons, of initial or special fissionable material, technologies, which can knowingly be used to produce weapons of mass destruction, or providing anyone with any other kind of weapons of mass destruction or components necessary for their production, prohibited by an international treaty.
The Code further prohibits the “use of … biological (bacteriological) … weapons”. 
Tajikistan, Criminal Code, 1998, Articles 397 and 399; see also Article 405.
Ukraine
Under Ukraine’s Criminal Code (2001), “the use of weapons of mass destruction prohibited by international instruments consented to be binding by the [parliament] of Ukraine” is a war crime. 
Ukraine, Criminal Code, 2001, Article 439(1).
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK Biological Weapons Act (1974) provides:
No person shall develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain … any biological agent or toxin … in a quantity not justified for peaceful purposes … any weapon, equipment or means of delivery designed to use biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
United Kingdom, Biological Weapons Act, 1974, Section 1.
United States of America
In Executive Order 12735 issued in 1990, the US President stated: “The proliferation of … biological weapons constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” The order also provided for the possibility of imposing sanctions against foreign persons and governments found to have “knowingly and materially” contributed to efforts to “use, develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire … biological weapons”. 
United States, Executive Order 12735, Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation, 16 November 1990, preamble and Section 4(b)(1), Federal Register, Vol. 55, 1990, p. 48587.
United States of America
The US Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act (1989) criminalizes “whoever knowingly develops, produces, stockpiles, transfers, acquires, retains, or possesses any biological agent, toxin or delivery system for use as a weapon or knowingly assists a foreign State or any organization to do so”. 
United States, Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act, 1989, § 175.
United States of America
The US Military Commissions Act (2009) amends Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code as follows:
§ 950t. Crimes triable by military commission
“The following offenses shall be triable by military commission under this chapter at any time without limitation:
“ …
“(8) EMPLOYING POISON OR SIMILAR WEAPONS.—Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally, as a method of warfare, employs a substance or weapon that releases a substance that causes death or serious and lasting damage to health in the ordinary course of events, through its asphyxiating, bacteriological, or toxic properties, shall be punished, if death results to one or more of the victims, by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct, and, if death does not result to any of the victims, by such punishment, other than death, as a military commission under this chapter may direct. 
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 950t(8).
Uruguay
Uruguay’s Organizational Law of Armed Forces (1974) states that it is forbidden for residents of the republic to possess war material for any purpose. Biological agents are included in this category. 
Uruguay, Organizational Law of Armed Forces, 1974, Article 49.
Uruguay
Uruguay’s Law on Cooperation with the ICC (2006) states:
26.2. Persons and objects affected by the war crimes set out in the present provision are persons and objects which international law protects in international or internal armed conflict.
26.3. The following are war crimes:
26. Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices.
46. Using … biological (bacteriological or toxic) or other weapons of mass destruction, irrespective of their nature. 
Uruguay, Law on Cooperation with the ICC, 2006, Article 26.2, 26.3.26 and 26.3.46.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan’s Regulation on the Commission on Biological Weapons (1998), as amended, states:
In accordance with the commitments undertaken by the Republic of Uzbekistan concerning the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, and to coordinate the activities of the ministries and departments … the Cabinet of Ministers decides … [t]o establish, under the Cabinet of Ministers, a Commission on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. 
Uzbekistan, Regulation on the Commission on Biological Weapons, 1998, as amended, Article 1.
The Regulation also states:
The Commission shall:
– study, compile and disseminate international experience with the destruction of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons;
– support any initiative aimed at banning bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons. 
Uzbekistan, Regulation on the Commission on Biological Weapons, 1998, as amended, Annex 1, Section III.
The Regulation further states:
In order to carry out its tasks and functions, the Commission shall have the right to:
– take, in the prescribed manner and within its jurisdiction, decisions aimed at the prohibition of the development, production and storage of biological or biotechnical materials in the territory of the Republic; such decisions shall be binding on ministries, on the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, on regions, cities and districts, enterprises, institutions and organizations. 
Uzbekistan, Regulation on the Commission on Biological Weapons, 1998, as amended, Annex 1, Section IV.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan’s Defence Law Amendment Act (2001) states:
The main principles of the national defence policy are:
– renunciation of the production, development, acquisition, storage, distribution and deployment of nuclear weapons or of other types of weapons of mass destruction. 
Uzbekistan, Defence Law Amendment Act, 2001, Article 4.
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
Under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Penal Code (1976), as amended in 2001, the use of, or the order to use, “means or methods of combat prohibited under the rules of international law, during a war or an armed conflict” is a war crime. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic, Penal Code, 1976, as amended in 2001, Article 148(1).
The commentary on the Code adds: “The following weapons and means of combat are considered to be prohibited: … bacteriological agents.” 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic, Penal Code, 1976, as amended in 2001, commentary on Article 148(1).
Colombia
In 1995, in a ruling on the constitutionality of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, Colombia’s Constitutional Court stated in relation to the prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury:
Although none of the treaty rules expressly applicable to internal conflicts prohibits indiscriminate attacks or the use of certain weapons, the Taormina Declaration consequently considers that the bans (established partly by customary law and partly by treaty law) on the use of … bacteriological weapons … apply to non-international armed conflicts, not only because they form part of customary international law but also because they evidently derive from the general rule prohibiting attacks against the civilian population. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-225/95, Judgment, 18 May 1995, § 23.
Japan
The Report on the Practice of Japan states that there is no national legislation specifically dealing with the prohibition of the use of bacteriological weapons, but that the judgment in the Shimoda case in 1963 held that “bacteria” were part of “prohibited materials” under international law. 
Report on the Practice of Japan, 1998, Chapter 3.1, referring to District Court of Tokyo, Shimoda case, Judgment, 7 December 1963, § 11.
South Africa
In its judgment in the Basson II case in 2005, the Constitutional Court of South Africa stated:
[179] … There can be no doubt that the use of instruments of state to murder captives long after resistance had ceased would in the 1980s, as before and after, have grossly transgressed even the most minimal standards of international humanitarian law.
[180] The same has to be said of … the provision of cholera bacteria for placement in water supplies. Such means of warfare are abhorrent to humanity and forbidden by international law. … In 1925 the Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. In 1972 the ban on bacteriological means of warfare was restated and strengthened by a specific convention designed to prohibit the manufacture and stockpiling of these agents of destruction. 
South Africa, Constitutional Court, Basson II case¸ Judgment, 9 September 2005, §§ 179–180.
Afghanistan
In 1989, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan stated:
The Republic of Afghanistan, while once again confirming its pledges on the non-use and elimination of chemical weapons, announces that it will never resort to the production, use, development, storage, or export of … biological weapons. 
Kabul Radio, “Foreign Minister Returns from Paris Conference”, 10 January 1989, as translated in FBIS-NES-89-006.
Algeria
At the CDDH, Algeria supported the Philippine amendment because “it was a simple reaffirmation of the principles of positive humanitarian law”. 
Algeria, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 286, § 37.
Argentina
In 1993, Argentina’s Minister of Defence said: “We will not manufacture bacteriological weapons because we deem them immoral.” 
“Minister Admits ‘US Pressure’ To Suspend Condor-2 Project”, Noticias Argentinas, Buenos Aires, 6 August 1993, as translated from Spanish in FBIS-LAT-93-151, 9 August 1993, p. 27.
Australia
In 1982, in response to a parliamentary question on notice regarding chemical and biological defence research, Australia’s Minister for Defence stated: “Australia has not, is not, and has no plans to become, engaged in research into the handling of disease producing biological agents.”  
Australia, House of Representatives, Minister for Defence, Question on Notice: Chemical and Biological Defence Research, Hansard, 21 April 1982.
Australia
In its oral pleadings before the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, Australia stated:
Both conventions have widespread adherence. The Biological Weapons Convention has 131 States parties. The very new Chemical Weapons Convention has already 159 signatories and 40 ratifications or acceptances. The final preambular paragraph to the Biological Weapons Convention expresses the conviction of the States Parties that the use of biological weapons “would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimise this risk”. Clearly, this is a strong international statement that the use of such weapons would be contrary to fundamental general principles of humanity. 
Australia, Oral pleadings before the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 30 October 1995, Verbatim Record CR 95/22, § 39.
Austria
In 1992, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, which dealt mostly with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, Austria stated that the elimination of biological weapons was important. 
Austria, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/47/PV.5, 14 October 1992, p. 10.
Bahrain
In 1992, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Bahrain stated that the Middle East had to be free from biological weapons. 
Bahrain, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.20, 28 October 1991, p. 32.
Bangladesh
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, Bangladesh affirmed its commitment to “general and complete disarmament”. It added: “Any effort to try to contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction, biological weapons included, must be combined with measures for their complete elimination.” 
Bangladesh, Statement of 26 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
Belarus
In 1970, in the context of the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), Belarus stated:
The need for all States without exception to abide, in any armed conflict, by the existing international conventions defining and limiting the means, ways and methods of waging war assumes particular importance. Among these conventions are … the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925. 
Belarus, Reply dated 2 March 1970 to the UN Secretary-General regarding the preparation of the study requested in paragraph 2 of General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), annexed to Report of the Secretary-General on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, UN Doc. A/8052, 18 September 1970, Annex III, p. 118, § 5.
Belarus
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Belarus ensured “the fulfilment of undertakings assumed by it under articles I, II, III, and IV, and also under the relevant parts of the preamble of the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention]”. 
Belarus, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 32.
Belarus
In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Belarus referred to a declaration in which all States which had emerged from the Soviet Union had expressed support for biological disarmament. 
Belarus, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.8, 22 October 1993, § 5.
Belgium
At the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Belgium stated: “With regard to article IV [of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention], Belgium, in common with many other States, had taken the necessary domestic measures, the Belgian Parliament having enacted legislation approving the Convention.” 
Belgium, Statement of 7 March 1980 at the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/SR.6, 7 March 1980, § 3.
Benin
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Benin confirmed that it “has developed no weapon of that kind, and intends to continue to respect its undertakings under the Convention, to which Benin is a party”. 
Benin, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 31.
Benin
In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Benin advocated the elimination of bacteriological weapons. 
Benin, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/49/PV.3, 17 October 1994, p. 21.
Brazil
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, Brazil stated that biological weapons, “given their sheer destructive force, indiscriminate effects and ghastly human toll … have from their inception generated international abhorrence”. It further emphasized that it had always been a keen participant in efforts to rid the world of biological weapons. With reference to the Biological Weapons Convention, it stated that it had “spared no effort in giving its contribution with a view to perfectioning and strengthening this major international instrument”. 
Brazil, Statement of 25 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
Brazil
In 2005, Brazil’s president adopted the National Defence Policy, which states: “Brazil supports an international order based on … the prohibition of … biological … weapons”. 
Brazil, National Defence Policy, approved by decree of the President of the Republic, Decree No. 5.484, 30 June 2005, published in Diário Oficial da União, 1 July 2005, § 4.7.
Brunei Darussalam
In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Brunei Darussalam declared that it had prohibited biological weapons. 
Brunei Darussalam, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.20, 28 October 1991, p. 38.
Bulgaria
At the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, the representative of Bulgaria stated:
10. His Government had already informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that his country had never developed, produced, stockpiled or acquired by other means bacteriological (biological) weapons or toxins, and had stressed that it was strictly observing its commitments under the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention]. That policy … provided a safeguard against any violations.
11. In the light of the obligations undertaken by … Bulgaria in ratifying all the international legal instruments banning or limiting the weapons or means used in armed conflicts, article 415 of the Bulgarian [Penal Code as amended] established severe penalties for anyone who in violation of the existing international rules of conduct in armed conflicts used, or ordered the use of, prohibited methods of warfare. 
Bulgaria, Statement of 6 March 1980 at the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/SR.5, 10 March 1980, §§ 10–11.
Burma
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Burma declared that the elimination of biological weapons was a goal of the Burmese Socialist Party. 
Burma, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.10, 24 October 1977, p. 2.
Canada
At the CDDH, Canada voted against the Philippine amendment because “the particular weapons are forbidden by international law and their use, other than by way of reprisal, already constitutes a war crime”. 
Canada, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 298.
Canada
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Canada stated:
As a matter of national policy and in keeping with the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925, Canada does not “develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain” microbiological agents, toxins, weapons or other means of delivery for purposes of use in armed conflict. 
Canada, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 33, Article I.
Canada
In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Canada stated: “Biological weapons have no place in this world.” 
Canada, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/49/PV.4, 18 October 1994, p. 10.
Canada
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, Canada stressed that it “believes that the time has … come to strengthen” the Biological Weapons Convention and that “the purpose of the Convention is to prohibit an entire class of abhorred weapons” (i.e. biological weapons). 
Canada, Statement of 26 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
Canada
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, Canada, when talking about weapons of mass destruction, especially biological weapons, stated: “We need to make sure that they are never used.” It added that biological weapons “cannot even be weapons of last resort, for their very preparation is banned”. 
Canada, Statement of 19 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Cabo Verde
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Cabo Verde stated that it “has never been in violation of the provisions of Articles I, II, III, IV, V and X of the Convention on biological weapons and respects the obligations undertaken pursuant to the above-mentioned articles”. 
Cabo Verde, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 34.
Chile
In 1992, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, which dealt mostly with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, Chile referred to the 1991 Mendoza Declaration on Chemical and Biological Weapons, stating: “The region’s participation in the Mendoza Accord on the complete prohibition of … biological weapons is an unequivocal demonstration of the will for disarmament that inspires the countries of South America.” 
Chile, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/47/PV.4, 13 October 1992, p. 6.
China
In 1986, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the Iran–Iraq War, China held that it “consistently opposed the use of … bacteriological … weapons at any place and time”. 
China, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2666, 24 February 1986, pp. 29–30.
China
In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, China stated that it had always “stood for the complete prohibition of … biological weapons”. 
China, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.9, 21 October 1991, p. 15.
China
A White Paper issued by the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China in 1995 states that China has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons. It opposes the production of biological weapons by any country and their proliferation in any form by any country. In 1984, China acceded to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, and “since that date it has fully and conscientiously fulfilled its obligations under the convention”. 
White Paper on arms control and disarmament in China issued by the People’s Republic of China, 16 November 1995, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, as translated in BBC-SWB, 17 November 1995.
China
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, China stated that it
has all along stood against the arms race and for genuine disarmament, for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all weapons of mass destruction such as … biological weapons. The Chinese government gives full confirmation to the active role of the Convention, always supports the purposes and objectives of the Convention, and faithfully fulfils its obligations assumed as a State Party. China does not develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain biological agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery prohibited under Article I of the Convention. China has always been against the proliferation of biological weapons and related technology. China has never in any way encouraged, assisted or induced any state, group of states or international organisation to conduct activities prohibited under the Convention. 
China, Statement of 26 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
China
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, China stated that it
is in favour of the complete prohibition and the thorough destruction of biological … weapons. Based on this very position, the Chinese government attaches great importance to the Convention and has always abided strictly its provisions in a serious and comprehensive manner.
It added that China “supports the effort to strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention. To this end, China has, since 1991, deeply involved itself in in-depth studies and exploration of possible verification measures within the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts.” 
China, Statement of 19 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
China
In 2003, in a statement at the Meeting of Experts on the Biological Weapons Convention, the ambassador for disarmament affairs of China stated:
States Parties should guarantee, through legal and administrative measures, that pathogenic microorganisms and toxins be used for purposes not prohibited by the Convention rather than for biological weapons or bio-terrorism purposes. 
China, Statement by the Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs at the Meeting of Experts on the Biological Weapons Convention, 18 August 2003, p. 2.
The Chinese Ambassador further stated: “China is a victim of biological weapons. We have all along stood for the comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons and opposed the proliferation of such weapons.” 
China, Statement by the Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs at the Meeting of Experts on the Biological Weapons Convention, 18 August 2003, p. 2.
China
In 2004, in a position paper submitted to the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly, China stated:
China stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and firmly opposes the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery.
China supports the purposes and objectives of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and has been implementing its obligations under the Convention in a comprehensive and strict manner. China is willing to continue to make positive contributions to strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention within the multilateral framework. 
China, Position Paper submitted to the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly, 5 August 2004.
China
In 2005, in a position paper on the UN reforms, China stated:
- China has always stood for the comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and opposed any forms of proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems …
- China supports and actively participates in multilateral efforts aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and takes a positive attitude towards the immediate resumption of negotiation on a verification protocol of the Convention. China supports the conclusion of a new biological security protocol by the State Parties to the Convention through negotiations so as to classify dangerous biological agents and establish binding international standards for the export of agents of this kind.
- China is in favor of strengthening the universality of the BTWC and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
China, Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms, 7 June 2005.
China
In 2005, in a statement at the Meeting of Experts on the Biological Weapons Convention, the ambassador for disarmament affairs of China stated: “Scientists should firmly oppose the research, production and use of biological weapons, and should not participate in and assist such activities.” 
China, Statement by the Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs at the Meeting of Experts on the Biological Weapons Convention, 13 June 2005, p. 2.
The ambassador further stated:
At the state level, the Chinese Government promulgated, in December 2001, the Amendment III to the Criminal Law, which clearly provides that any illegal manufacturing, transporting, storing or using toxic substances or infectious pathogens constitutes a crime and shall be punished. In October 2002, the Chinese Government promulgated the Regulation on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies, carrying our strict controls over the exports and exchange of dual-use biological agents and related equipment and technologies with foreign countries to prevent relevant activities from being used for biological weapons purposes. The above-mentioned laws and regulations provide a solid legal basis in regulating the public, including the scientific personnel’s conduct. 
China, Statement by the Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs at the Meeting of Experts on the Biological Weapons Convention, 13 June 2005, p. 2.
China
In 2005, in a white paper on “China’s Endeavours for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation”, China stated: “China stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological and chemical weapons and firmly opposes proliferation of such weapons.” 
China, White Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China: China’s Endeavours for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 1 September 2005.
Croatia
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, Croatia asked for the “immediate re-commencement of the work of the Ad Hoc Group, in whatever form delegations see fit”. 
Croatia, Statement of 19 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Cuba
In 1991, in a debate preceding UN Security Council Resolution 699 concerning the destruction of biological weapons in Iraq, Cuba stated that it favoured the “universal elimination of … biological weapons”. 
Cuba, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2994, 17 June 1991, p. 23.
Cuba
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, Cuba expressed the hope that the work of the Conference would lead to the crystallization of the proposal to liberate the world of biological weapons. 
Cuba, Statement of 26 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
Cuba
In 1997, Cuba alleged that a US State Department aircraft, apparently on an approved flight to Grand Cayman Island, had dispensed Thrips Palmi insecticide over Cuba, which caused significant crop damage. 
Cuba, Information about the appearance in Cuba of the Thrips Palmi plague, annexed to Note verbale dated 28 April 1997 to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/52/128, 29 April 1997; see also Anthony Goodman, “Cuba accuses US of ‘biological aggression’”, Reuter, New York, 5 May 1997.
The US Department of State categorically denied “the outrageous charges made by the Cuban Government” and noted that it had “not engaged in any act which would be in violation” of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and that it had “unilaterally destroyed all stockpiled biological agents prior to entry into force of the Convention”. 
United States, Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Press Statement by Acting Spokesman, “Cuba: No Use of Biological Weapons”, 6 May 1997.
Cuba
In 2009, in a statement during a general debate of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the representative of Cuba stated:
Cuba reiterates its unwavering commitment to the [1993] Chemical Weapons Convention and the [1972] Biological Weapons Convention and supports all actions taken to make them universal. …
We reiterate that the only way to strengthen and perfect the Biological Weapons Convention is through the negotiation and adoption of a legally binding Protocol that fills the gaps still contained in this instrument. 
Cuba, Statement by the representative of Cuba during a general debate of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 6 October 2009, p. 2.
Cuba
In 2009, in a statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on other weapons of mass destruction, the representative of Cuba stated:
The Cuban delegation fully aligns itself with the statement made on this subject by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non Aligned Movement.
The existence of weapons of mass destruction continues to constitute a grave threat to international peace and security. Cuba reiterates its call for general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction.
Efforts made by States in the context of disarmament processes must be aimed at the complete and total elimination of such weapons and at the prevention of the emergence of new kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Cuba reaffirms the importance of compliance by all States with their obligations in connection with arms control, disarmament and prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in all its aspects.
Cuba reiterates its unwavering commitment to the [1972] Biological Weapons Convention and supports all actions taken to make it universal. The possibility of any use of bacteriological and toxin agents as weapons must be completely eliminated. …
… Cuba believes that the only way to genuinely strengthen and improve the Convention is by negotiating and adopting a legally binding protocol that is effective against the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of biological weapons. …
Cuba does not possess, nor has it any intention of possessing, weapons of mass destruction of any kind. As a State Party to the international legal instruments that prohibit weapons of mass destruction, Cuba renews its firm commitment to the total and effective implementation of all their provisions.
Cuba remains fully committed to the objective of the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction. 
Cuba, Statement by the representative of Cuba before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on other weapons of mass destruction, 16 October 2009, pp. 1–2.
Cuba
In 2010, in a statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the representative of Cuba stated:
Cuba emphasizes its commitment with the strict application of the … [1972] Biological Weapons Convention. …
We reiterate that the only way to strengthen and perfect the Biological Weapons Convention is through the negotiation and adoption of a legally binding Protocol that will resolve some of the lacunas that this instrument still has. 
Cuba, Statement by the representative of Cuba before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 8 October 2010.
Cuba
In 2010, in a statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on other weapons of mass destruction, the representative of Cuba stated:
The existence of weapons of mass destruction continues to constitute a grave threat to international peace and security.
Efforts made by States in the context of disarmament processes must be aimed at the complete and total elimination of such weapons and at the prevention of the emergence of new kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Cuba reaffirms the importance of compliance by all States with their obligations in connection with arms control, disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in all its aspects.
Cuba does not possess, nor has it any intention of possessing, weapons of mass destruction of any kind. As a State Party to the international legal instruments that prohibit weapons of mass destruction, Cuba renews its firm commitment to the total and effective implementation of all their provisions.
Cuba reiterates its unwavering commitment to the [1972] Biological Weapons Convention and supports all actions taken to make it universal. The possibility of any use of bacteriological and toxin agents as weapons must be completely eliminated. …
Cuba believes that the only way to genuinely strengthen and improve the Convention is by negotiating and adopting a legally binding protocol that is effective against the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of biological weapons. …
… [Cuba] reaffirms its commitment to the objective of the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Cuba … reiterates its call for general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction. 
Cuba, Statement by the representative of Cuba before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on other weapons of mass destruction, 22 October 2010, pp. 1–2.
Cuba
In 2011, in a response to UN General Assembly Resolution 63/51 on the observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control, the representative of Cuba stated:
The Republic of Cuba has accumulated vast experience in the adoption and application of laws and policies that allow it to observe environmental norms … including their application in various International Instruments in the field of disarmament and arms control to which it is a State Party: [including] the [1972] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), … among others.
Cuba affirms that the only truly effective solution to avoid the dire consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction continues to be the total elimination of this type of weapons, and considers the universalisation of international treaties that prohibit them of great importance. The existence and continuous refinement of weapons of mass destruction constitute the most serious threat to international peace and security, the fragile environmental balance of our planet and the sustainable development of all peoples without distinction.
Strengthening the Convention on Biological Weapons is essential to protecting the environment and preserving the biodiversity of our planet. The draft protocol for strengthening the Convention, which was the subject of negotiations some years ago, included proposals … [for measures for protecting the environment in the implementation of the Convention]. Negotiations for the adoption of this protocol must be resumed, and Cuba hopes that this will be decided at the upcoming Seventh Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in December 2011. 
Cuba, Response by the representative of Cuba to UN General Assembly Resolution 63/51 on the observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control, 7 June 2011, pp. 1–2.
Cuba
In 2011, in a statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the representative of Cuba stated:
Cuba emphasizes its commitment to the strict implementation of the … Biological Weapons Convention.
Cuba reiterates that the only way to strengthen and improve the Biological Weapons Convention is through the negotiation and adoption of a legally binding Protocol that will fill the gaps still contained in this instrument. 
Cuba, Statement by the representative of Cuba before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 5 October 2011, p. 2.
Cyprus
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Cyprus stated that it “fully complies with the provisions of the Convention, as the Republic of Cyprus does not have at its disposal weapons of any such nature”. 
Cyprus, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 35.
Czechoslovakia
At the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1986, Czechoslovakia stated that it “fully complies with the obligations enshrined in its provisions and does not carry any weapons of that sort”. 
Czechoslovakia, Statement at the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 8–26 September 1986, UN Doc. BWC/CONF.II/3, 25 August 1986, p. 2.
Czech Republic
At the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Czech Republic stated that it
attaches great importance to the prohibition, elimination and non-proliferation of biological and toxin weapons. It regards the [Biological Weapons Convention] as a binding international document and although it neither possesses nor develops any kind of biological weapons, it has been annually providing all necessary data in the form of non-mandatory declarations. 
Czech Republic, Statement at the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.733, 28 March 1996, p. 17.
Czech Republic
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, the Czech Republic underlined “the importance the country attaches to the Biological Weapons Convention and strict compliance with its terms and provisions”. 
Czech Republic, Statement of 20 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Denmark
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Denmark stated:
Prior to ratification of the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention], the Danish governmental departments concerned ascertained that no legislation, amendments of existing national law or other measures would be necessary in order to secure compliance with the obligations of the Convention. Accordingly, the requirements contained in the 1972 [Biological Weapons Convention] have been implemented in Danish law and practice. 
Denmark, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 36.
Ecuador
In 1988, in a statement before the Fifteenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, Ecuador stated:
Among disarmament measures, Ecuador believes that priority should be given to the following: … a complete ban on the testing or production of new weapons of mass destruction, including … biological [weapons]. 
Ecuador, Statement before the Fifteenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/S-15/PV.2, 1 June 1988, § 158.
Ecuador
In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, Ecuador stated:
It is … timely to insist on observance of the international agreements which prohibit the use of asphyxiating and toxic gases and bacterial warfare and which seek the universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons. 
Ecuador, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2981, 3 April 1991, p. 107.
Egypt
At the CDDH, Egypt expressed “its disappointment at the failure of the Philippine amendment, establishing as a grave breach the use of prohibited weapons, to be adopted”, but noted that Article 74 of the draft Additional Protocol I (now Article 85) “as it stands now does cover the use of such weapons through their effects”. 
Egypt, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 300.
Finland
At the CDDH, Finland stated that it “attached the greatest importance … to the prohibition of … bacteriological warfare in the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925”. 
Finland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 285, § 34.
Finland
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Finland stated:
With regard to the compliance by the Government of Finland to articles I–V and X, I wish to communicate the following information: (1) the obligations set out in articles I–III have been complied with; (2) the legislation of Finland is in harmony with the obligations set out in article IV. 
Finland, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 37.
France
At the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War in 1925, France, with regard to a Polish proposal to extend the prohibition contained in what became the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol to bacteriological warfare, begged “to second the Polish proposal”. 
France, Statement of 8 June 1925 at the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War, Geneva, 4 May-17 June 1925, League of Nations, Records of the Conference, Doc. A.13.1925.IX, September 1925, p. 341.
France
At the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1986, France stated that it
had not initially signed the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention] taking a critical view of the lack of provisions relating to verification, it nevertheless recognised the importance of its purpose. It therefore adopted at the national level provisions similar to those of the Convention with regard to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their destruction. Thus, since that date France has for its part assumed the obligations in this field stemming from the Convention of 10 April 1972.
Accordingly, it added, all technological research and work on biological weapons have been interrupted. The biological agents and toxins produced have been destroyed. Since then no research has been undertaken on the production for hostile purposes of biological or toxin weapons or on the dissemination of such agents. No aid has been given to third countries in these fields. Therefore, France has fulfilled all the obligations stemming from Articles I, II, III, and IV since 1972, in other words, well before its accession to the Convention (27 September 1984). 
France, Statement at the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 8–26 September 1986, UN Doc. BWC/CONF.II/3Add. 5, 25 August 1986, pp. 1–2.
France
In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council preceding the adoption of Resolution 699 concerning the destruction of biological weapons in Iraq, France held that the ban on Iraqi possession of biological weapons was carried out with the perspective of regional and global disarmament. 
France, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2981, 3 April 1991, p. 92.
France
A French Government publication issued in 2005 and entitled “Fighting Proliferation, Promoting Arms Control and Disarmament: France’s Contribution” states:
Biological weapons
A biological weapon is a system capable of disseminating pathogens (biological or toxic agents). These may be natural, or genetically modified to enhance their characteristics.
Developments in biotechnology could be used for the production or the improvement of biological weapons and provide access to new biological agents better suited to military uses. In such cases, the development of vaccines and treatments could prove to be more complex.
France’s approach
Faced with the threat posed by biological weapons, France’s approach is based on a recognition of the unique nature of these weapons, and notably the potentially dual nature of research activities in biology.
France’s primary aim is to combat biological proliferation and weapons. To that end, adherence to export control measures, together with stronger international control measures, are of crucial importance. France played an active role in negotiating, in 1995, a protocol strengthening the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and is working in concert with its EU partners to achieve its universalization.
It is also necessary to be able to respond to the consequences of a biological attack. In order to protect its civilian population and armed forces against the effects of biological weapons, France is developing measures for protection, prophylaxis and treatment, early-warning and detection procedures, and means for decontamination. The BIOTOX plan is one element of this approach.
Actions undertaken
France has consistently sought to strengthen measures to combat the biological threat. France is the depositary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In 1996, France lifted its reserv[ations] on the possible use of such weapons in reprisal which, like most signatories, it had appended to the Protocol upon ratifying. The aim of this decision was to strengthen the obligation to ban all use of such weapons.
In 1984, France became party to the 1972 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC). It had previously considered the text weakened by the absence of verification provisions and, as early as 1972, had adopted national legislation on biological weapons incorporating provisions similar to the obligations laid down by the BTWC. Since ratifying the Convention, France has worked ceaselessly towards strengthening it and improving its implementation.
Following the failure in 2001 of negotiations on a protocol to strengthen the 1972 Convention, one important aim of which was to establish an inspection regime, France, along with its EU partners, expressed its commitment to the adoption of an alternative monitoring mechanism: an annual conference combined with a meeting of experts charged with studying implementation measures. These annual meetings have the task of examining specific measures: including, in 2003, national legislation and the securing of pathogens; in 2004, international control in the event of alleged use of biological weapons and surveillance of epidemics; and in 2005, a code of conduct for scientists.
The results achieved so far underscore the wisdom of this approach aimed at working towards the strengthening of the 1972 Convention. For example, examination of national legislation and of the control of pathogens is a prerequisite for any further consideration of the ways in which the authority of the BTWC can be consolidated.
Other means of control
As in the case of chemical non-proliferation, states have adopted a series of national export control measures in the biological sphere, coordinated through the Australia Group. 
France, Government, Fighting Proliferation, Promoting Arms Control and Disarmament: France’s Contribution, 2005, pp. 34–40.
France
In a white paper on “Defence and National Security” published in 2008, France’s Ministry of Defence stated:
The fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery will indeed continue to be a priority …
In order to be efficient, the fight against proliferation must be based on … the universalization and full implementation of the international conventions signed by the vast majority of States (… [including the] Biological Weapons Convention, or BWC …).
The Proliferation Security Initiative or PSI … initially comprised 11 States. It now includes almost 90 signatories. It aims at improving operational cooperation among governmental actors in order to identify and prohibit the transfer of materials or equipment that may contribute to programmes on … biological … weapons and their means of delivery.
In December 2003, the European Union adopted … an action plan against the proliferation of CBRN weapons [chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons], which covers all aspects of the fight against proliferation. In particular, the EU made the implementation of its commercial or cooperation agreements with third countries conditional on the latter’s respect for their international commitments regarding non-proliferation.
Biological weapons are [a] point of concern. All Western countries have renounced their programmes in this domain, and have continued only with the activities [needed] for protection against potential attacks.
The BWC was adopted in 1972. It has been signed by 161 States but so far does not provide for any verification system.
[France] will contribute to the aid proposed to States by the European Union in order for them to sign and apply the [BWC] … In general, [France] will develop its military and technical expertise that can eventually serve in the detection and repression of the trafficking in material and equipment for the conception and production of these weapons [biological weapons].
Basic and applied research in these fields will be funded, as well as work conducted by French scientific laboratories. An effort regarding the training in clandestine programmes will be undertaken for the customs officers who are in charge of controlling war-related material as well as objects of both civilian and military use.
[Carrying out] missions for the fight against proliferation and the control over disarmament agreements will be among the objectives of both the armed forces and civil security, taking into account the predictable increase in control activities. Priority will be given to means of safely destroying illegal biological … installations, as well as to means of defence and protection, in particular the biological ones.
[France] will be particularly active in the fight against the proliferation of … biological … weapons, as well as of missiles that could deliver them. 
France, Ministry of Defence, Defence and National Security: The White Paper, 17 June 2008, pp. 117–119, 161–162 and 315.
[emphasis in original]
German Democratic Republic
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) stated:
Being a Party to the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention], the German Democratic Republic has been fulfilling conscientiously its obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention. Since the GDR has not developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained such agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery as specified in article I, the ruling in article II calling for their destruction and diversion to peaceful purposes is not applicable.
… Violations by individuals of the provisions of the Convention are to be regarded as impossible to occur so that, for its part, the German Democratic Republic definitely can declare that the Convention is being strictly observed. 
German Democratic Republic, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 38.
German Democratic Republic
At the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, the representative of the German Democratic Republic stated:
His country had been among the first to accede to the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention] and … it had strictly abided by the obligations it had thereby assumed. His Government held the view that the Convention also covered the prohibition of all new scientific and technological developments in the field of microbiological and other biological agents and toxins and recombinant DNA techniques. The Convention thus prohibited their misuse for military purposes. 
German Democratic Republic, Statement of 6 March 1980 at the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/SR.5, 10 March 1980, § 16.
Germany
In 1983, the German Government declared in Parliament that biological weapons were as such prohibited. 
Germany, Lower House of Parliament, Reply by the government to a question in Parliament, Kriegsvölkerrechtliche Verträge, 5 October 1983, BT-Drucksache 10/445, 1983, p. 14.
Germany, Federal Republic of
At the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1986, the Federal Republic of Germany stated that it had
never researched, developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained microbial or other biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, as well as weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict … Furthermore, in 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany gave an internationally binding pledge within the WEU [Western European Union] not to manufacture … biological … weapons … The legislation in force in the Federal Republic of Germany guarantees observance of the Convention’s provisions. 
Germany, Federal Republic of, Statement at the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 8–26 September 1986, UN Doc. BWC/CONF.II/3/Add. 3, 25 August 1986, p. 2.
Ghana
In 1968, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Ghana supported the prohibition of all biological weapons. 
Ghana, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1614, 21 November 1968, p. 6.
Ghana
At the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Ghana stated that it “had abided strictly by its obligations under the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention] and, as a developing country, had no intention of developing bacteriological weapons”. 
Ghana, Statement of 7 March 1980 at the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/SR.7, 11 March 1980, § 19.
Greece
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Greece stated that it “complies with and applies the obligations set out in Articles I, II, III, IV, V and X” of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. 
Greece, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 39.
Guinea
In 1992, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, which dealt mostly with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, Guinea stated that Africa “should also become a region free from biological weapons”. 
Guinea, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/47/PV.3, 12 October 1992, p. 59.
Hungary
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Hungary declared that it
has never been in possession of any agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, and as a Party to the Convention has always complied and continues to comply fully and in good faith with [articles I, II, III, IV, V and X] of the Convention. 
Hungary, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 40.
India
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, India stated: “As a party to the Biological Weapons Convention, India continues to comply with all the obligations under the Convention.” 
India, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 41.
India
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, India stated: “It has been our consistent belief that the only certain defence against the inhumane weapons is their destruction and total elimination.” 
India, Statement of 26 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
India
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, India expressed its feeling that “the comprehensive legal norm against biological weapons, embodied by the Biological and Toxins Convention, needs to be strengthened”. 
India, Statement of 20 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
India
In 2004, in a statement to the Conference on Disarmament at the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, the permanent representative of India stated:
India believes that norms against biological weapons enshrined in the [1972] Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention [BTWC] must be upheld, particularly at a time of heightened threat of biological weapons proliferation and bio-terrorism. Meaningful multilateral efforts should be pursued to strengthen these norms, since biological weapons could well become the weapon of choice for the terrorists due to ever increasing access to requisite technologies, materials and equipment. We have to guard against the increased risk, in this context, of hostile use of advances in biotechnology and the constant need to prevent misuse of biological agents.
The BTWC is the first disarmament instrument that bans the development, production, stockpiling and use of an entire class of weapons. India fully supports initiatives to strengthen the Convention, ensure its full implementation by all States Party and make it universal. 
India, Statement by the permanent representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament at the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, 6 December 2004.
India
In 2008, in a statement at the Meeting of Experts on the Biological Weapons Convention, the permanent representative of India stated:
India attaches the highest priority towards the further strengthening of the [1972] Biological Weapons Convention and its full implementation. Along with the CWC [1993 Chemical Weapons Convention], the Biological Weapons Convention eliminated an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. …
Recent advances in biotechnology, genetic engineering and life sciencese, and their dual use nature pose particular dangers of proliferatrion and the hostile use of biological agents. The possibility that non-state actors, including terrorists[,] could acquire and resort to the use of biological warfare agents and toxins has added a new dimension to this danger. India, therefore, supports international cooperation efforts to address these challenges. We have undertaken initiatives at the United Nations General Assembly, including sponsoring a resolution on “Measures to prevent terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction[”].
In May 2005, India adopted a legislation called the “Weapons of Mass Destruction and their [D]elivery Systems Act” which builds upon existing regulatory framework relating to prohibiting unlawful WMD [weapons of mass destruction] activities and strengthen national export controls. This Act covers all the prohibitions that are required under the Biological Weapons Convention. 
India, Statement by the permanent representative of India at the Meeting of Experts of the Biological Weapons Convention, 18 August 2008.
India
In 2008, in a statement at the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, the permanent representative of India stated:
The [1972] Biological Weapons Convention [BWC] was the first disarmament treaty that eliminated an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. India attaches the highest priority towards the further strengthening of the BWC …
Recent advances in biotechnology, genetic engineering and life sciences and their dual use nature pose particular danger of proliferation and the hostile use of biological weapons. The possibility of non-state actors, including terrorists acquiring such toxins or agents have added a new dimension to this danger. We believe that international cooperative efforts are an important component in addressing these challenges. India’s resolution at the UN General Assembly “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction” has been adopted by consensus reflecting the common concern and determination of the international community on this issue.
India has put together a broad-based legislative framework to prevent the misuse of macro-organisms and to regulate biomedical research. The Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Delivery System Act of 2005, defines biological weapons in the same manner as in the Biological Weapons Convention. This Act prohibits unlawful acquisition, possession, storage, handling, development or transport of biological weapons or its means of delivery. 
India, Statement by the permanent representative of India at the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, 1 December 2008.
India
In 2010, in a statement at the Meeting of Experts on the Biological Weapons Convention, the permanent representative of India stated:
India attaches the highest importance to the full implementation of all provisions of the BWC [1972 Biological Weapons Convention]. The topic of this year’s meetings, i.e. assistance and coordination in case of alleged use of biological weapons is especially relevant. We note that Articles VI and VII of the BWC provide the mechanism for investigation into alleged use of biological and toxin weapons and to provide assistance in such cases.
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that India attaches the highest priority to the further strengthening of the BWC, ensure its full implementation by all States Parties and to make it universal. 
India, Statement by the permanent representative of India at the Meeting of Experts of the Biological Weapons Convention, 23 August 2010.
India
In 2011, in a statement at the Preparatory Committee for the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, the permanent representative of India stated:
India attaches the highest importance to the BTWC [1972 Biological Weapons Convention] as the first non-discriminatory disarmament treaty banning a complete category of weapons of mass destruction. It is thus more than a non-proliferation or an arms control treaty. States Parties to the Treaty have committed not to use in any way and under any circumstances biological agents or toxins not consistent with the prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. As per the Final Document of the 6th Review Conference, we have all undertaken in Article I never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict in order to exclude completely and forever the possibility of their use.
We reiterate our commitment to the full implementation of the BTWC and its universalization. States Parties must ensure that their commitments and obligations under the Convention are fully and effectively implemented. The Seventh Review Conference will be an important opportunity to review the operation of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention. It will also give us the opportunity to discuss and agree on measures that would strengthen the Convention and ensure its full implementation. This is necessary in view of the new challenges to international peace and security emanating from proliferation trends, including the threat posed by terrorists or other non-state actors seeking access to biological agents or toxins for terrorist purposes. The Review Conference should send a clear signal of the collective determination of all States Parties to address these common challenges.  
India, Statement by the permanent representative of India at the Preparatory Committee for the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 13–15 April 2011.
India
In 2011, in a statement at the 7th Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, the permanent representative of India stated:
India attaches high importance to the BTWC [1972 Biological Weapons Convention] as the first disarmament treaty banning an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Through this instrument, 165 States Parties to the treaty have pledged never to “develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain” biological weapons and have committed not to use in any way and under any circumstances biological agents or toxins not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.
India is committed to improving the effectiveness of the BTWC and strengthening its implementation. We also support efforts for its universalization. Since 1994, strengthening the Convention and its effective implementation has been the overriding imperative for states parties. …
This is an important opportunity to review the operation of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, while providing an opportunity to agree on measures to strengthen the Convention and ensure its full implementation. This is also necessary in view of the new challenges to international peace and security emanating from proliferation trends, including the threat posed by terrorists or other non-state actors seeking access to biological agents or toxins for terrorist purposes. The Review Conference should send a clear signal of the collective determination of all States Parties to address these common challenges, especially bioterrorism.
Further, the Review Conference should underline that a central element of the operation of the Convention is compliance by all States parties with their obligations under the Convention. This is a multilateral treaty … National implementation remains the bedrock of the Convention.
In conclusion, we would like to stress our commitment to the BTWC and its full and effective implementation. 
India, Statement by the permanent representative of India at the 7th Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 5–22 December 2011.
India
In 2012, in a statement at the Meeting of Experts on the Biological Weapons Convention, the representative of India stated:
First, India attaches high priority to the further strengthening of the [1972] Biological Weapons Convention and its full implementation. This is necessary in view of the new challenges to international peace and security emanating from proliferation trends, including the threat posed by terrorists or other non-state actors seeking access to biological agents or toxins for terrorist purposes.
Fifth, India believes that national implementation is an important pillar of the Convention. We have a broad-based regulatory framework to prevent the misuse of biological science and technology. 
India, Statement by the representative of India at the Meeting of Experts of the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 16–20 July 2012.
India
In 2012, in a statement at the Annual Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, the Joint Secretary of the Disarmament and Security Affairs Division of India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated:
India attaches high importance to the BWC [1972 Biological Weapons Convention] as the first non-discriminatory disarmament treaty which eliminated an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. At the 7th Review Conference, States Parties again reaffirmed the undertaking to never in any circumstances develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain biological weapons in order to exclude completely and forever the possibility of their use.
We reiterate our commitment to improving the effectiveness of the BWC and strengthening its implementation and universalization. We believe this is necessary in view of the new challenges to international peace and security emanating from proliferation trends, including the threat posed by terrorists or other non-state actors seeking access to biological agents or toxins for terrorist purposes. States Parties must ensure that their commitments and obligations under the Convention are fully and effectively implemented.
India has always emphasized the responsibility of State Parties to fully implement their obligations under the Convention and adopt requisite national measures to this end. India has a broad-based regulatory framework to prevent the misuse of biological sciences and technology. 
India, Statement by the Joint Secretary of the Disarmament and Security Affairs Division of the Ministry of External Affairs at the Annual Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, 10 December 2012.
Indonesia
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, Indonesia stated: “Biological … weapons have no place in today’s world and should be considered things of the past.” 
Indonesia, Statement of 27 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
Indonesia
The Guidance Book in the Field for the Indonesian Army concerning the Use of Biological Weapons states that the use of biological weapons is prohibited. 
Report on the Practice of Indonesia, 1997, Chapter 3.4, referring to Guidance Book in the Field for the Indonesian Army concerning the Use of Biological Weapons, No. 42-01-06, p. 24, § 28.
Iraq
In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council preceding the adoption of Resolution 699 concerning the destruction of biological weapons in Iraq, Iraq stated that it accepted not to “use, develop, manufacture or acquire any material referred to in the resolution”. 
Iraq, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2994, 17 June 1991, p. 6.
Iraq
In 2012, in a speech at the ministerial meeting of the member States of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq stated:
Iraq supports and works within the framework of [the] international community to have the Middle East free from mass destruction weapons, and nuclear weapons in particular, and supports efforts to hold the UN meeting [on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone] in Helsinki, Finland[,] next December to come out with positive results regarding making such area free of [] said weapons, as failure of such meeting could only lead to more armament races in an area that is in dire need of stability and peace. 
Iraq, Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq at the ministerial meeting of the member States of the Non-Aligned Movement, Tehran, 28–29 August 2012, pp. 4–5.
Islamic Republic of Iran
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that it believed in a total ban on the use of biological weapons which was explicit and devoid of judgemental interpretations. It noted:
The use of biological weapons is already in contradiction to the provisions and the spirit of the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol and the [Biological Weapons Convention]. In fact, the predominant Opinio Juris considers the prohibition of use a matter of customary international law. Yet, lack of explicit reference in the Convention on the one hand, and persistence of reservations on the Geneva [Gas] Protocol on the other, can leave the door ajar for those who have held a different opinion in the past or may perhaps continue to do so in future. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Statement of 26 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
Islamic Republic of Iran
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, the Islamic Republic of Iran recalled the “urgent need for an international legally binding instrument, for the strengthening of the Convention to be followed by establishment of an organization in order to implement its provisions”. It added that it “supported the Ad Hoc Group negotiation and expected the successful conclusion and final adoption of a protocol”. According to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the fact that the use is not expressly included in the Convention can be solved by using one of these alternatives: “insert the clause ‘use’ in the title and Article I, or the reservation to Geneva Protocol be withdrawn”. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Statement of 19 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Furthermore, while exercizing its right of reply, it accused the United States of not complying with its obligation by “transferring deadly agents to Israel and other allies as well as conducting research and development in the area of biological weapons”. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Statement of 19 November 2001 (right of reply) at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Italy
At the CDDH, Italy abstained in the vote on the Philippine amendment stating: “It would not be useful because it dealt with means and methods of warfare which were already prohibited by the existing law.” 
Italy, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 285, § 30.
Japan
The Japanese army allegedly disseminated cholera and plague pathogens in several incidents in the USSR and Mongolia in the period 1939–1940 and in China between 1940 and 1944. These allegations were documented by Dr Robert Lim, the then head of the Chinese Red Cross, Dr R. Pollitzer, a League of Nations epidemiologist stationed in Hunan Province at the time of the alleged attacks, Dr P.Z. King, Director General of the Chinese National Health Administration, and a number of other sources. 
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. I, The Rise of CB Weapons, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1971, pp. 217–221; see also British Medical Association, Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity, Harwood Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, 1999, pp. 15–17; Erhard Geissler (ed.), Biological and Toxin Weapons Today, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 10–12; Thomas Stock, Maria Haug and Patricia Radler, Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control, SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 687.
Japan
In 1968, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Japan stated that it should not only be prohibited to use biological weapons, but that this prohibition should also cover production and stockpiling. 
Japan, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1616, 22 November 1968, p. 8.
Japan
In 1992, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Japan stated that it “attached great importance to the prohibition of biological weapons”. 
Japan, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.4, 19 October 1993, § 23.
Japan
In its oral pleadings before the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, Japan stated that the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention “and similar laws all rest on the desire to prevent the most irrational deeds of humankind. International law has always sought to play a humanitarian role.” 
Japan, Oral pleadings before the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 7 November 1995, Verbatim Record CR 95/27, p. 30.
Japan
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, Japan stated: “It is extremely important that more countries accede to the Convention so that we can achieve the desired universality.” 
Japan, Statement of 26 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
Japan
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, Japan stated that it had “undertaken legislative measures to strengthen the national legislation with further punitive actions against those who use biological weapons as well as those who disseminate biological agents and toxins”. 
Japan, Statement of 19 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Jordan
At the CDDH, Jordan supported the principle behind the Philippine amendment (see infra), but stated: “It would be more generally acceptable if it were amended to apply only to the first user of weapons prohibited by international conventions.” 
Jordan, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 283, § 21.
Kuwait
In 1976, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Kuwait stated that it supported “the prohibition of all weapons, including biological weapons, which caused mass destruction and genocide”. 
Kuwait, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.34, 3 June 1976, p. 355, § 18.
Kuwait
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Kuwait stated:
With regard to Article I of the Biological Weapons Convention, Kuwait has not developed, produced or stockpiled such weapons or placed them at the disposal of its armed forces. Kuwait has not in any manner used microbial or other biological agents or toxins for non-peaceful purposes.
Kuwait does not intend to acquire or retain weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
Kuwait, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 42.
Kuwait
In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Kuwait said it supported all international efforts to destroy weapons of mass destruction. 
Kuwait, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.7, 21 October 1993, § 81.
Kuwait
In an article published in a military review, a member of the Kuwaiti armed forces stated that, during war, belligerents must:
respect restrictions and limits provided for in international conventions, such as restriction of the use of some weapons, and prohibition of using others, e.g. … biological weapons … This is in application of well-established principles in wars, such as considerations of military honour and humanitarian considerations. 
Fellah Awad Al-Anzi, “The Law of War”, Homat Al-Watan, No. 168, p. 57.
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic stated that it:
has rigorously observed the relevant provisions of [the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention] and favours their strict application in order to contribute to the cause of general and complete disarmament. Furthermore, the Lao People’s Republic has conducted no scientific or technical research with a view to developing and manufacturing such weapons. 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 43.
Lebanon
In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Lebanon held that a local ban on biological weapons was part of the concept of a global ban on the same weapons. 
Lebanon, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.12, 26 October 1993, § 10.
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya expressed its belief that there was a “need to prevent the human race from … biological warfare”. 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.22, 29 October 1991, p. 34.
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
In 1992, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly dealing mainly with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya supported an Egyptian initiative for a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/47/PV.10, 20 October 1992, pp. 9–10.
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya supported a regional ban on weapons of mass destruction. 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.13, 26 October 1993, § 64.
Malaysia
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons (WHO) case in 1995, Malaysia stated: “Biological weapons … have been banned.” 
Malaysia, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons (WHO) case, 19 June 1995, p. 2.
In a part entitled “Principle of Non-Toxicity”, Malaysia also referred to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and the 1956 New Delhi Draft Rules. 
Malaysia, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons (WHO) case, 19 June 1995, pp. 23–24.
Malaysia made the same reference in its oral pleadings in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995. 
Malaysia, Oral pleadings before the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 7 November 1995, Verbatim Record CR 95/27, p. 57.
Malta
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, Malta stated that it “strongly supports the [Biological Weapons Convention] and is firmly committed to the total and comprehensive banning of biological weapons and to the control of the spread and use of such weapons”. 
Malta, Statement of 26 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
Mexico
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, Mexico noted
a series of international instruments … [which] led to a prohibition on the use of certain weapons. Such instruments included … the Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use in war … of bacteriological methods of warfare (The Geneva Gas Protocol); and the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their destruction of 10 April 1972, etc. 
Mexico, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 19 June 1995, p. 12, § 72.
Mexico
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, Mexico stated: “The 1972 Convention broadens the provisions of the 1925 [Geneva Gas] Protocol and renders obsolete the reservations that had restricted the latter to an instrument of first use prohibition.” It encouraged “the States that have not yet done so to withdraw these reservations”. It also urged that the “goal must be to review and strengthen the compliance with the regime on the prohibition of biological weapons to protect nations and individuals from the risk of the possible use of weapons of mass destruction”. 
Mexico, Statement of 20 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Mexico
In 2009, Mexico submitted a proposal to the UN Secretary General to amend Article 8(2)(c) of the 1998 ICC Statute in accordance with Article 121(1) of the Statute, stating:
Within the category of serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflicts, the use of certain weapons whose effects are of an indiscriminate nature or cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is included. Such weapons are: … b) asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials and devices … The use of these … kinds of weapons is prohibited by conventional and customary international law. 
Mexico, Proposal of Amendment to Article 8(2)(c) of the 1998 ICC Statute, submitted to the UN Secretary General in accordance with Article 121(1) of the ICC Statute, 29 September 2009, p. 2.
[footnotes in original omitted]
Mongolia
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Mongolia stated that, as a party to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, it “strictly complies with all the obligations under the Convention and particularly with Articles I, II, III, IV, V and X of the said Convention”. 
Mongolia, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 44.
New Zealand
At the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, the representative of New Zealand stated: “Since New Zealand possessed none of the weapons or delivery systems referred to in article I of the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention], his Government had not considered it necessary to enact any special legislation prohibiting the activities in question”. 
New Zealand, Statement of 7 March 1980 at the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/SR.6, 7 March 1980, § 13.
New Zealand
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, New Zealand stressed that it was “strongly committed to the [Biological Weapons Convention]”. Moreover, it stated that it was very conscious that
biological weapons pose as great a threat to humanity as nuclear weapons. But they are much easier to manufacture and conceal. For that reason States Parties to the Convention have a major responsibility to strengthen the Convention and establish a mechanism to ensure that the Parties to the Convention comply with its prohibition. 
New Zealand, Statement of 25 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
Nigeria
At the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Nigeria reported that it “had complied fully with its obligations under the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention]. As Nigeria did not possess biological weapons, as defined in article I, it followed that it had no such weapons to destroy, as required by article II, or, indeed, to transfer.” 
Nigeria, Statement of 7 March 1980 at the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/SR.7, 11 March 1980, § 13.
Nigeria
In 1995, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Nigeria stated that it was committed to the total prohibition of biological weapons. 
Nigeria, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/50/PV.9, 25 October 1995, p. 18.
Nigeria
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, Nigeria stated: “It is our hope that all weapons of mass destruction – be they biological, … – will be under ban, their production prohibited and their transfer and use outlawed”. 
Nigeria, Statement of 25 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
Norway
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Norway stated that it “has never developed, produced or stored any biological weapons, and has never had the intention of using such weapons in a conflict (arts. I and II)”. 
Norway, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 45.
Norway
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, Norway stated: “A multilateral, legally binding instrument is needed now more than ever to fill the existing gap in the non-proliferation regime.” It stated that such a legally binding instrument was “very important aspects of our fight against the use, or threat of use, of biological weapons”. 
Norway, Statement of 20 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Pakistan
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, Pakistan stated that “the 1925 [Geneva Gas Protocol] and the [Biological Weapons Convention] is a manifestation of a moral and cultural ethos that is over 1400 years old”. 
Pakistan, Statement of 26 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
Pakistan
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, Pakistan stated that it “has been fully abiding by all the provisions of the [Biological Weapons Convention]”. 
Pakistan, Statement of 19 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Peru
In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Peru stated that it had invited the countries of the Rio Group to reach an agreement on the prohibition of biological weapons. 
Peru, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.8, 18 October 1991, p. 48.
Philippines
At the CDDH, the Philippines proposed an amendment to include “the use of weapons prohibited by International Conventions, namely: … bacteriological methods of warfare” in the list of grave breaches in Article 74 of the draft Additional Protocol I (now Article 85). 
Philippines, Proposal of amendment to Article 74 of the draft Additional Protocol I submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. III, CDDH/418, 26 May 1977, p. 322.
The proposal was rejected because it failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority (41 votes in favour, 25 against and 25 abstentions). 
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, pp. 288–289. (Against: Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Luxembourg, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Ukraine, USSR, United Kingdom, United States and Zaire. Abstaining: Brazil, Cameroon, Cyprus, Cuba, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda and Viet Nam.)
Philippines
The Report on the Practice of the Philippines states with reference to the prohibition of biological weapons: “The country holds such prohibition customary.” 
Report on the Practice of the Philippines, 1997, Answers to additional questions on Chapter 3, referring to Statement by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Office of United Nations and International Organizations (UNIO), Manila, 6 March 1998.
Poland
At the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War in 1925, Poland proposed to complete what became the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol as follows:
In the third paragraph of the draft concerning chemical warfare, we would say: “declare that the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already parties to treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, and extend it to means of bacteriological warfare, and agree to be bound thereby as between themselves.” 
Poland, Proposal made on 8 June 1925 at the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War, Geneva, 4 May–17 June 1925, League of Nations, Records of the Conference, Doc. A.13.1925.IX, September 1925, p. 341.
Poland
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Poland stated that it “does not conduct any activities contrary to the provisions of [the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention] and that the bacteriological and toxin weapons have never been nor are at present part of the equipment of its armed forces”. 
Poland, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 46.
Poland
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, Poland confirmed its “strong and constant support for the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention … especially for the work on effectiveness and implementation of the Convention”. 
Poland, Statement of 20 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Republic of Korea
In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Republic of Korea stated that it was dedicated to the elimination of biological weapons. 
Republic of Korea, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/49/PV.6, 19 October 1994, pp. 12–13.
Republic of Korea
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, the Republic of Korea stated: “The Republic of Korea, since it acceded in 1987, has faithfully implemented the obligations and duties under the [Biological Weapons Convention]”. It added that it “has never developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained any biological agents, nor the means for their delivery”. It further stated that the need for a legally binding verification regime of the Biological Weapons Convention “has been reaffirmed in the light of the recent evidence that biological materials have been illegally acquired and developed by some states parties to the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention], and sub-state organisations”. 
Republic of Korea, Statement of 26 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
Republic of Korea
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, the Republic of Korea stated that it “has faithfully implemented its obligations and duties under the [Biological Weapons Convention] since its accession to it in 1987”. 
Republic of Korea, Statement of 20 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Republic of Korea
According to the Report on the Practice of the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea is of the opinion that the prohibition of the use of biological weapons is customary. 
Report on the Practice of the Republic of Korea, 1997, Chapter 3.4.
Romania
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, Romania stated:
The [1972 Biological Weapons Convention] together with complementary efforts aimed at the non-proliferation of biological and toxin weapons constitutes at present and in the years to come one of the main pillars of international stability and security, both at regional and global levels. To that effect, Romania … has a consistent policy of strict observance of the provisions of the Convention and the export controls of biological agents, equipment and technologies which could be used for the production of biological and toxin weapons.
Strongly supporting the view that export controls are an essential lever of enforcing non-proliferation, Romania has established the necessary mechanisms, procedures and lists of items, all similar to those convened within existing international non-proliferation regimes.
We re-emphasize the significance of this international norm against biological and toxin weapons, the importance of full implementation by all parties of the provisions of the Convention, as well as the need to make all efforts to secure universal adherence to [the Biological Weapons Convention]. 
Romania, Statement of 25 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996, pp. 2–3.
Russian Federation
During a tripartite meeting on biological weapons held in Moscow in September 1992 between the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, the Russian President admitted that the Russian Federation had conducted an offensive biological warfare programme in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. 
J. Dahlburg, “Russia Admits it Violated Pact on Biological Warfare”, Los Angeles Times, 15 September 1992, p. A1.
However, the Russian Government stated that it had taken steps to resolve compliance concerns, stating that it:
A. Noted that President Yeltsin had issued on 11 April 1992 a decree on securing the fulfilment of international obligations in the area of biological weapons. This affirms the legal succession of the Russian Federation to the obligations of the Convention and states that the development and carrying out of biological programs in violation of the Convention is illegal. Pursuant to that decree, the Presidential Committee on Convention-related problems of chemical weapons and biological weapons was entrusted with the oversight of the implementation of the 1972 Convention in the Russian Federation.
B. Confirmed the termination of offensive research, the dismantlement of experimental technological lines for the production of biological agents, and the closure of the biological weapons testing facility …
H. The Russian Parliament has recommended to the President of the Russian Federation that he propose legislation to enforce Russia’s obligations under the 1972 Convention.
As a result of these exchanges, the Russian Federation agreed to the followings steps:
A. Visits to any non-military biological site at any time in order to remove ambiguities, subject to the need to respect proprietary information on the basis of agreed principles. Such visits would include unrestricted access, sampling interviews with personnel, and audio and video taping. After initial visits to Russian facilities there will be comparable visits to such US and UK facilities on the same basis.
B. The provision, on request, of information about dismantlement accomplished to date.
In addition, the three governments agreed to create working groups to examine several different issues, including the establishment of a system of reciprocal visits to military biological facilities; a review of potential monitoring mechanisms for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention; consideration of cooperation in developing biological weapons defence and “consideration of an exchange of information on a confidential, reciprocal basis concerning past offensive programmes not recorded in detail in the declarations to the UN”.  
Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States, Joint Statement on Biological Weapons, 14 September 1992.
Russian Federation
On Primetime Live in 1998, the former First Deputy Director of Biopreparat from 1988 to 1992, Dr Kanatjan Alibekov (a.k.a. Ben Alibek), stated that in the Russian Federation, under the guise of the development of defensive biological weapons, research continued on new biological agents. In Moscow, this allegation was described as “sheer nonsense” by one member of the President’s Committee on CBW Convention Problems, who also said that “Russia has carried out no research and development of biological weapons since all work in the field was cancelled in 1990”. 
“Russia – biological weapons”, AP, New York, 25 February 1998.
The Russian Defence Ministry also issued a denial, saying that the Russian Federation “scrupulously observes” the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. 
ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow) in English, 27 February 1998, BBC-SWB, 2 March 1998.
Russian Federation
In 1998, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman told a news briefing that the offensive military biological programme of the USSR had been discontinued. 
Aleksei Meshkov, “There are no reasons to doubt Russia’s undeviating observance of all its commitments under convention banning biological weapons, says Russian Foreign Ministry”, RIA Novosti, Moscow, 31 March 1998, via RIA-Novosti Hotline; A. Mironov and I. Chumakova, “Russia denies allegations of violating biological weapons ban”, TASS, Moscow, 31 March 1998.
Russian Federation
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, the Russian Federation asserted that it was standing “for creating a verification mechanism on a multilateral basis”. 
Russian Federation, Statement of 19 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Rwanda
According to the Report on the Practice of Rwanda, Rwanda has prohibited the use of bacteriological means of warfare as stipulated by the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. 
Report on the Practice of Rwanda, 1997, Chapter 3.4.
Saudi Arabia
In 1968, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Saudi Arabia advocated a total prohibition of the use and production of biological weapons. 
Saudi Arabia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1608, 14 November 1968, pp. 4 and 7.
Saudi Arabia
In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Saudi Arabia stated that it had worked tirelessly to reach a global elimination of weapons of mass destruction. 
Saudi Arabia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.14, 28 October 1993, § 24.
Saudi Arabia
In 1995, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Saudi Arabia stated that it supported “all treaties and conventions that aim at eliminating all types of weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons”. 
Saudi Arabia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/50/PV.9, 25 October 1995, p. 12.
Saudi Arabia
In 2004, in its second periodic report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Saudi Arabia stated:
The laws in force in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia … [outlaw] the deployment of chemical and bacteriological weapons during military operations in accordance with the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Saudi Arabia, Second periodic report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 21 April 2005, UN Doc. CRC/C/136/Add.1, submitted 12 November 2004, § 275.
South Africa
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, South Africa declared that it remained “committed to achieving a world free of all weapons of mass destruction and to addressing the proliferation of conventional weapons”. It also reaffirmed its “commitment to strengthening the [Biological Weapons Convention] by establishing a verifiable compliance protocol for the Convention”. 
South Africa, Statement of 26 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
South Africa
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, South Africa stated: “The use of disease – in this case anthrax – as a weapon of terror should … be condemned in the strongest possible terms.” It further emphasized
the importance of the work that had been undertaken to negotiate a legally binding Protocol to strengthen the implementation of the Convention … South Africa continues to see the strengthening of the implementation of the [Biological Weapons Convention] as a core element of the international security architecture. 
South Africa, Statement of 19 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Spain
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Spain stated: “Since Spain is not developing or producing bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons or acquiring them from any other country, the conditions referred to in articles I, II, III, IV, V and X of the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention] do not exist [for Spain].” 
Spain, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 47.
Sweden
In 1968, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Sweden advocated a process leading to a total prohibition of the use, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. 
Sweden, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1609, 18 November 1968, p. 11.
Sweden
In 1970, during a debate in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, Sweden stated: “The rationale for a comprehensive ban on biological weapons in international armed conflicts would seem to be equally valid in internal armed conflicts. At all events, there should be no hesitation in imposing a complete ban in internal conflicts.” 
Sweden, Statement before the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1784, 10 November 1970, p. 273, § 5.
Sweden
In 1974, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Sweden stated: “All weapons could be used indiscriminately, but some were incapable of being directed at military objectives alone. One example was bacteriological weapons: germs could not distinguish between soldiers and civilians.” 
Sweden, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.1, 13 March 1974, p. 12, § 21.
Sweden
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Sweden stated:
In 1970 the Swedish Government declared that Sweden does not possess and does not intend to acquire biological … weapons. National investigations in 1974 showed that no ongoing activity violated the provisions of the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention] …
… The prohibition of the development and production of biological and toxin weapons is covered by national Swedish legislation passed in 1935 on the control of production of war materials according to which no such production may take place without the Government’s permission. The provisions of the Convention concerning stockpiling, acquisition and possession of these weapons have not resulted in any special legislation. The provisions may, as necessary, be enforced in accordance with national legislation of 1974 on the handling of dangerous goods. 
Sweden, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 48; see also Statement of 5 March 1980 at the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/SR.3, 7 March 1980, § 36.
Sweden
In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Sweden urged States to withdraw reservations to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol in order to make “it possible finally to exclude the possibility that biological weapons may be used in the future”.  
Sweden, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.8, 18 October 1991, p. 27.
Switzerland
At the CDDH, Switzerland voted in favour of the Philippine amendment (see supra) because:
It would be a step forward to state expressly that any violation of The Hague Declaration of 1899 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 would constitute a grave breach. The rules laid down in those two instruments were undisputed and indisputable, and the amendment would have a deterrent effect on any State tempted to violate them, by exposing the members of its armed forces to the penalties applicable under the Geneva Conventions. 
Switzerland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 281, § 9.
Switzerland
At the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Switzerland stated:
Since it had possessed no bacteriological or toxin weapons before the conclusion of the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention], Switzerland had had no stocks to destroy. With regard to the other States parties, he regretted that they had not all given formal assurances on that point. The Swiss army actually had a biological branch, but its sole purpose was to care for the health of army personnel; it would play only a protective role if bacteriological weapons were used against Switzerland in an armed conflict. 
Switzerland, Statement of 7 March 1980 at the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/SR.6, 7 March 1980, § 7.
Switzerland
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, Switzerland stated that it had never equipped itself with biological weapons and that its research in this field was strictly limited to protective measures. It further stated that since 30 June 1972, it had enacted a law which subjects the production, importation and exportation of all weaponry to authorization. 
Switzerland, Statement of 25 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
Switzerland
In 2005, in a report in response to a parliamentary postulate on private security and military companies, Switzerland’s Federal Council stated: “International humanitarian law also limits the conduct of military operations permissible under international law. … The use of certain weapons such as biological or chemical weapons is also forbidden.” 
Switzerland, Report by the Swiss Federal Council on Private Security and Military Companies, 2 December 2005, Section 5.3.1, pp. 45–46.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s ABC of International Humanitarian Law (2009) states:
Biological weapons
Biological Weapons are also known as bacteriological weapons. These are designed to cause disease and death. Biological weapons contain living organisms that reproduce and release toxins dangerous to humans, animals and plants. As well as endangering health they cause damage to the environment. The use of biological weapons has been prohibited since 1925. The Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 prohibits the development, production or stockpiling of weapons that contain microbiological and bacteriological agents and toxins, as well as their means of delivery. It also recommends the destruction of such weapons.
Weapons
International humanitarian law imposes limitations, in some cases a total ban, on the use of weapons whose impact goes beyond the permissible purpose of weakening the enemy. Weapons are prohibited on the basis of three fundamental criteria: if their use inevitably leads to death; if they cause disproportionate injury or Unnecessary suffering; if they strike indiscriminately. On the basis of these three criteria a number of specific weapons have been explicitly prohibited by international conventions, including … Biological and Chemical weapons. Some of these bans are part of Customary international law. …
Weapons of mass destruction
The definition of weapons of mass destruction includes Nuclear weapons as well as Biological and Chemical weapons. They differ from other Weapons in their capability to injure and kill people and destroy property on a massive scale, as well as to cause extensive and lasting damage to the environment. 
Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, ABC of International Humanitarian Law, 2009, pp. 9, 40 and 41.
Switzerland
In 2009, in its Report on Foreign Policy, Switzerland’s Federal Council stated:
Switzerland’s second priority focuses on the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and the prevention of their dissemination … The absence of progress, in particular on nuclear and biological weapons more and more erodes the value of the instruments concerning them. 
Switzerland, Federal Council, Report on Foreign Policy 2009, 2 September 2009, Section 3.3.5.2, p. 5786.
[emphasis in original]
Switzerland
In 2010, in its Report on Foreign Policy, Switzerland’s Federal Council stated:
Nationally, Switzerland endeavours to apply the BTWC [1972 Biological Weapons Convention] to the best of its abilities. In 2009, the first series of demonstrations took place in universities and research institutes in order to raise awareness of the Swiss research community on the problems of dual use in biotechnological research. The next scheduled step is institutionalizing these activities to fulfil a commitment established by the BTWC, namely the prevention of the proliferation of biological materials. 
Switzerland, Federal Council, Report on Foreign Policy 2010, 10 December 2010, Section 4.5.2, pp. 1139–1140.
[emphasis in original]
Switzerland
In 2012, in the report on Switzerland’s arms control and disarmament policy, Switzerland’s Federal Council stated: “Switzerland is in favour of the prohibition of all types of weapons of mass destruction, as these pose heavy threats against international security as well as against populations”. 
Switzerland, Report of the Federal Council on Switzerland’s arms control and disarmament policy, 30 November 2012, p. 10.
Switzerland
In 2013, in a statement at the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the ambassador of Switzerland stated: “[C]luster munitions have been now classified in Swiss law in the category of prohibited arms, which already include nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as well as anti-personnel mines.” 
Switzerland, Statement by the ambassador of Switzerland at the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 10 September 2013.
Syrian Arab Republic
In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Syrian Arab Republic advocated a proposal to make the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. 
Syrian Arab Republic, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.9, 22 October 1993, § 44.
Syrian Arab Republic
In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Syrian Arab Republic supported an initiative to make the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. 
Syrian Arab Republic, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/49/PV.7, 20 October 1994, p. 20.
Thailand
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, Thailand declared that it had “always solemnly adhered to our commitments under the [Biological Weapons Convention]”. 
Thailand, Statement of 20 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Tunisia
In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Tunisia advocated a complete ban on biological weapons. 
Tunisia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.11, 22 October 1991, p. 7.
Turkey
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Turkey stated: “No weapons, equipment or other materials that are the subject of the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention] exist within the Turkish Armed Forces.” 
Turkey, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 49.
Ukraine
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, Ukraine stated that “the Ukrainian SSR is fully complying with its obligations under articles I, II, III, IV, V and X of the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention], taking into account the relevant parts of the preamble to the Convention”.  
Ukraine, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 50; see also Statement of 6 March 1980 at the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/SR.4, 7 March 1980, § 8.
Ukraine
In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Ukraine stated that it wanted to “rid the densely populated European continent, as well as other regions, of these deadly weapons by the beginning of next century”. 
Ukraine, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/49/PV.7, 20 October 1994, p. 17.
Ukraine
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, Ukraine stated that it “fully complies with its obligations under the Convention and has never had the intention to develop, produce, stockpile or acquire in any way the biological weapons, equipment or means of its delivery”. 
Ukraine, Statement of 20 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
In 1970, in the context of the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), the USSR stated:
The use of … bacteriological methods of warfare … was prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925. The United States signed that Protocol, but did not ratify it. However, that does not mean that the prohibition of the use of poisonous substances does not extend to the United States. That prohibition has become a generally recognized rule of international law, and countries which violate it must bear responsibility before the international community. 
USSR, Reply dated 30 December 1969 to the UN Secretary-General regarding the preparation of the study requested in paragraph 2 of General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), annexed to Report of the UN Secretary-General on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, UN Doc. A/8052, 18 September 1970, Annex III, p. 120.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
In 1970, during a debate in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, the USSR stated that the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol was fully applicable in situations where freedom fighters struggled for liberation against colonial powers. 
USSR, Statement before the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1786, 12 November 1970, p. 284, § 6.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, the USSR stated:
In accordance with the law and practice of the Soviet Union, compliance with the provisions of the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention] which was ratified by a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 11 February 1975 is guaranteed by the appropriate State institutions of the USSR. The Soviet Union does not possess any of the bacteriological (biological) agents or toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery mentioned in article I of the Convention. Thus, the implementation of articles I, II, III and IV of the Convention is reliably ensured. 
USSR, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 51.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the USSR stated: “Measures to consolidate the regime of the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol prohibiting the use of bacteriological weapons in war are in the interest of all.” 
USSR, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/42/PV.23, 28 October 1987, p. 28.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the USSR, with regard to UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991), stated:
The most acute issue is that of creating an effective barrier against the use of weapons of mass destruction in that region. From that viewpoint, of great importance are the provisions in the resolution regarding Iraq’s destruction of … biological weapons … and in the context of Iraq’s confirmation of its obligations of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 to bring into play the International Atomic Energy Agency … It is also important that all Middle Eastern countries accede to … those international agreements prohibiting … biological weapons. 
USSR, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2981, 3 April 1991, pp. 101-102.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
The development of a biological weapons programme by the USSR between 1973 and 1992 was widely documented and detailed in a number of different sources. 
British Medical Association, Biotechnology Weapons and Humanity, Harwood Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, 1999, pp. 44-45.
The Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Chemical and Biological Weapons Problems, in response to a question about Soviet non-compliance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, said in an interview published in the journal Rossiyskiye Vesti in 1992:
Indeed, these clear violations … were only admitted after the totalitarian regime collapsed and duplicity in politics was abandoned. We admitted that after the convention was ratified, the offensive programs in the area of biological warfare were not immediately curtailed, research in this area continued, and production went on … The first palpable move … toward the offensive programs finally being wound down was made in 1985 when it was proposed that the Soviet Union present a report to the United Nations on its compliance with the convention. At this time research also began to be wound down, and the equipment for producing biological preparations began to be dismantled. But this winding down process went on for several years. The remnants of the offensive programs in the area of biological weapons were still around as recently as 1991. It was only in 1992 that Russia absolutely stopped this work. 
Lev Chernenko, “In order to live we should destroy the deadly weapons stockpiles”, Rossiyskiye Vesti, Moscow, 22 September 1992, p. 2, as translated from Russian in FBIS-SOV–92-186, 24 September 1992, pp. 2-4; Viktor Litovkin, “Yeltsin bans work on bacteriological weapons. This means: work was under way, and we were deceived”, Izvestiya, Moscow, 27 April 1992, p. 1, as translated from Russian in BBC-SWB, 30 April 1992.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
At the CDDH, the United Kingdom voted against the Philippine amendment (see supra) because:
A significant number of the States party to the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 had entered a reservation thereto; for those States the Protocol contained no absolute prohibition on the use of the weapons mentioned in it, but rather a prohibition on the first use only. Nor was it convincing to state that the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 represented no more than the existing customary law of war; ever since the adoption of resolution XXVIII by the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross (Vienna 1965), States had been urged in United Nations resolutions to accede to that Protocol in accordance with its express terms. Such a situation was entirely inconsistent with the contention made in debate that the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 reflected existing customary international law. That contention could not be supported. 
United Kingdom, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 282, § 17.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, the United Kingdom stated:
The United Kingdom has never possessed and has not acquired microbial or other biological agents and toxins in quantities which could be employed for weapons purposes. The United Kingdom maintains only small quantities of such agents and toxins for peaceful purposes, primarily prophylaxis and research … No system designed to apply these agents for hostile purposes exists, nor are being developed. 
United Kingdom, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 52, Article I.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
At the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, the United Kingdom stated:
Since the United Kingdom has never possessed any of the agents proscribed by the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention] in quantities other than those explicitly permitted, related action had been confined to the passing of domestic legislation [i.e. the Biological Weapons Act] in compliance with the provisions of article IV. In addition, the United Kingdom had, over the period since the Convention’s entry into force, concluded a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements on public health and medical research which, inter alia, supported the provisions of article X. 
United Kingdom, Statement of 5 March 1980 at the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/SR.3, 7 March 1980, § 42.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1983, in reply to a question in the House of Lords on the subject of the use of chemical weapons in South-East Asia, the UK Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated: “The use of toxins in South-East Asia would represent a breach of the 1972 Convention banning biological and toxin weapons.” 
United Kingdom, House of Lords, Reply by the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hansard, 7 June 1983, Vol. 431, col. 92.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1990, during a debate in the UN Security Council on a peaceful and just post-Cold War world, the United Kingdom recalled that, under paragraph 12 of Resolution 670 (1990), individuals were held responsible for grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It added: “We should also hold personally responsible those involved in violations of the laws of armed conflict, including the prohibition against initiating the use of … biological weapons contrary to the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925, to which Iraq is a party.” 
United Kingdom, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2963, 29 November 1990, § 78.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1991, during a debate in the House of Commons on the Gulf conflict, the UK Prime Minister stated: “Contrary to international agreements, Iraq has produced and threatened to use both chemical and biological weapons, the use of which would be wholly contrary to international agreements.” 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Statement by the Prime Minister, Hansard, 15 January 1991, Vol. 183, col. 735.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1991, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United Kingdom stated: “The Iraqi Ambassador [to the United Kingdom] was also reminded of Iraq’s obligations under the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol in respect of … biological weapons. The United Kingdom would take the severest view of any use of these weapons by Iraq.” 
United Kingdom, Letter dated 21 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22117, 21 January 1991, p. 1; see also Statement by Foreign and Commonwealth Office spokesperson, 21 January 1991, reprinted in BYIL, Vol. 62, 1991, p. 680.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the United Kingdom explained that it intended to withdraw its reservation to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, in which it had reserved the right to retaliate with biological weapons. 
United Kingdom, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.27, 5 November 1991, p. 6.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the United Kingdom, with regard to UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), stated:
The resolution contains tough provisions for the destruction of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons … It is surely right to do so. For Iraq alone in the region has not only developed many of these weapons, it has actually used them both against a neighbouring State and against its own population, and it has made the threat of their use part of the daily discourse of its diplomacy as it has attempted to bully and coerce its neighbours. 
United Kingdom, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2981, 3 April 1991, pp. 113–114.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, the United Kingdom stated that it was of the utmost importance
to send out a strong message. That the 1972 Convention remains the unequivocal and comprehensive ban on Biological Weapons. But that recent history has proved that a ban alone is not enough. That the overwhelming majority of States Parties believe that strengthening the Convention is both necessary and possible; and that we are all determined to work to achieve this as quickly as possible. 
United Kingdom, Statement of 26 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1998, in response to a question in the House of Commons on the United Kingdom’s position on biological weapons at a meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, the UK Prime Minister stated:
The UK delegation supported proposals to include within the jurisdiction of the ICC war crimes under existing customary international law. For that reason, the delegation supported the inclusion of the use of methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering; these included bacteriological (biological) agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Reply by the Prime Minister, Hansard, 20 January 1998, Vol. 304, Written Answers, col. 477.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
According to the Report on UK Practice, representatives of the United Kingdom have repeatedly expressed condemnation of the use of biological weapons. 
Report on UK Practice, 1997, Chapter 3.4.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2003, in a reply to a written question in the House of Commons, the UK Minister of State for the Home Office wrote:
The Government are fully committed to meeting our obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which was implemented under the Biological Weapons Act 1974. More recently, we took new powers to deal with noxious substances. Sections 54 and 55 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (as amended in Section 120 of the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001) make it an offence to provide, receive or invite another to receive instruction or training in the making or use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. In addition, section 113 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 makes it an offence to use any noxious substance or thing with the intention of causing serious harm to public or property, and section 114 creates an offence of hoaxing using alleged noxious substances. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has taken forward initiatives – including the Green Paper laid before the House in April 2002 – intended to strengthen international efforts, and mechanisms, to counter proliferation. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Minister of State, Home Office, Hansard, 5 February 2003, Vol. 399, Written Answers, cols. 320W–321W.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2003, in a reply to a written question in the House of Commons, the UK Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, wrote:
The Government’s policy towards the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) is to work towards their universal adoption and universal compliance with their obligations.
The United Kingdom abandoned its offensive chemical and biological weapons programmes in the 1950s. Subsequently we have played a leading role in the negotiations both of the BWC of 1975, for which we are a depositary government, and the CWC which entered into force in 1997. We are fully compliant with our obligations under both Conventions and continue to press for their full and effective implementation. To this end, both nationally and with our EU partners, we have conducted a series of demarches world-wide, with particular attention to regions of tension such as the Middle East.
The United Kingdom was instrumental in securing a successful outcome to the BWC Review Conference in November 2002, which saw agreement on a three year work programme of practical measures to deal with the BW threat. At the forthcoming CWC Review Conference (28 April–-9 May 2003) the UK will be presenting a number of important technical and scientific papers. The strength of our political support and commitment to both Conventions, as well as the technical expertise we contribute, are second to none. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hansard, 24 February 2003, Vol. 400, Written Answers, col. 49W.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2003, in a reply to a written question in the House of Commons, the UK Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Hoon, stated:
Lynne Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make it his policy to withdraw British troops from military action where an ally uses (a) biological and (b) chemical weapons.
Mr. Hoon: Our NATO allies are State Parties to both the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and have renounced the use of such weapons. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Secretary of State for Defence, Hansard, 3 March 2003, Vol. 40, Written Answers, col. 812W.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2003, during a debate in the House of Commons, the UK Prime Minister replied to a question by a Member:
Mr. Duncan Smith: The House will have seen pictures confirming that Iraqi troops have been issued with chemical weapons protection equipment and will have read reports that they have access to chemical and biological weapons. Is it not essential that we make it clear to every Iraqi commander that the use of such weapons is a war crime, that obeying orders is no defence and that anyone guilty of such crimes will be prosecuted after the war?
The Prime Minister: Yes, that is important. We are making it clear to Iraqi commanders in the field that if they use chemical or biological weapons, they will be deservedly prosecuted with the utmost severity. There are increasing reports about the distribution of equipment to Iraqi forces. It is difficult to be sure of their accuracy, but we have obviously been prepared for such an eventuality from the outset. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Statement by the Prime Minister, Hansard, 26 March 2003, Vol. 402, Debates, col. 283.
United States of America
At the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War in 1925, the United States, with regard to a Polish proposal to extend the prohibition contained in what became the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol to bacteriological warfare (see supra), stated:
Bacteriological warfare is so revolting and so foul that it must meet with the condemnation of all civilized nations, and hence my delegation … accepts this amendment proposed by the Polish delegate. 
United States, Statement made on 8 June 1925 at the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War, Geneva, 4 May–17 June 1925, League of Nations, Records of the Conference, Doc. A.13.1925.IX, September 1925, p. 341.
United States of America
On 25 November 1969, the US President formally renounced the use of biological agents as weapons. On the same day, the US Secretary of State stated in a memo to the National Security Council that biological research and development would be limited to “defensive” activities and that research into “offensive” aspects of biological agents would only be permitted to the extent that it was pursued for “defensive” reasons. 
Alfred Mechtersheimer, “US military strategy and chemical and biological weapons”, in Erhard Geissler (ed.), Biological and Toxin Weapons Today, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 79.
United States of America
On 14 February 1970, the US President stated: “The United States renounces offensive preparations for and the use of toxins as a method of warfare.” The reason given for the decision on toxins by the Office of the White House Press Secretary was that their production in any significant quantities “would require facilities similar to those needed for the production of biological agents. If the United States continued to operate such facilities, it would be difficult for others to know whether they were being used to produce only toxins but not biological agents.” 
Erhard Geissler, “Introduction”, in Erhard Geissler (ed.), Biological and Toxin Weapons Today, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 18.
United States of America
At the CDDH, the United States voted against the Philippine amendment (see supra) because:
Grave breaches were meant to be the most serious type of crime; Parties had an obligation to punish or extradite those guilty of them. Such crimes should therefore be clearly specified, so that a soldier would know if he was about to commit an illegal act for which he could be punished. The amendment, however, was vague and imprecise … It would also punish those who used the weapons, namely, the soldiers, rather than those who made the decision as to their use, namely, Governments. 
United States, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, pp. 280–281, § 7.
United States of America
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, the United States stated:
Article I
The United States is in full compliance with the obligations contained in article I. Facilities previously used for development, production or stockpiling of biological weapons were now devoted to peaceful purposes …
Article IV
The US has taken, and is taking, a number of steps to prohibit and prevent activities contrary to the provisions of the Convention:
1.… all heads of federal departments and agencies certified to the President at his request, that their organizations were in compliance.
2.Detailed regulations have been established to ensure that the small remaining quantities of biological and toxin agents are used only for peaceful purposes.
3.Existing legislation already controls certain private actions concerning items prohibited under article I, including provisions of the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Transportation of Dangerous Articles Act, and the regulations issued pursuant to these laws. 
United States, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 53, Articles I and IV.
United States of America
In 1982, at the CSCE review meeting in Madrid, the US delegation directly accused the USSR of “seriously and deliberately” violating both the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. The Soviet delegation rejected the charges as “monstrous accusations, false from beginning to end” and denied that the USSR had ever used chemical weapons “anywhere under any circumstances or by any means”. 
Julian Perry Robinson, “Chemical and biological warfare: developments in 1982”, SIPRI Yearbook 1983: World Armaments and Disarmament, Taylor & Francis, London, 1983, p. 393.
United States of America
In 1991, in a diplomatic note to Iraq concerning operations in the Gulf War, the United States stated that it “expects the Government of Iraq to respect its obligations under the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 not to use … biological weapons”. 
United States, Department of State, Diplomatic Note to Iraq, Washington, 19 January 1991, annexed to Letter dated 21 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22122, 21 January 1991, Annex I, p. 2.
United States of America
In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the United States stated that it had worked for the elimination of bacteriological weapons. 
United States, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.5, 19 October 1993, p. 10.
United States of America
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, the United States stated that it had “unilaterally renounced all use of biological and toxin weapons and destroyed its offensive stockpile before the Convention’s effective date in 1975”. In its concluding statement, the United States stressed that it was important that biological weapons were “not just renounced, but banished from the face of the earth”. 
United States, Statement of 26 November 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
United States of America
In 1997, Cuba alleged that a US State Department aircraft, apparently on an approved flight to Grand Cayman Island, had dispensed Thrips Palmi insecticide over Cuba, which caused significant crop damage. 
Cuba, Information about the appearance in Cuba of the Thrips Palmi plague, annexed to Note verbale dated 28 April 1997 to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/52/128, 29 April 1997; see also Anthony Goodman, “Cuba accuses US of ‘biological aggression’“, Reuter, New York, 5 May 1997.
The US Department of State categorically denied “the outrageous charges made by the Cuban Government” and noted that it had “not engaged in any act which would be in violation” of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and that it had “unilaterally destroyed all stockpiled biological agents prior to entry into force of the Convention”. 
United States, Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Press Statement by Acting Spokesman, “Cuba: No Use of Biological Weapons”, 6 May 1997.
United States of America
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, the United States accused a number of countries of not complying with their obligations under the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. It named the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Sudan as violating the Convention and specified: “This list is not meant to be exhaustive.” 
United States, Statement of 19 November 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
In a written statement, the US President declared:
All civilized nations reject as intolerable the use of disease and biological weapons as instruments of war and terror … The vast majority of nations has banned all biological weapons in accordance with the 1972 Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC) … The United States unilaterally destroyed its biological weapons stockpiles and dismantled or converted to peaceful uses the facilities that had been used for developing and producing them. 
United States, Written statement dated 1 November 2001 by the US President submitted to the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
United States of America
In May 2010 the US President issued the 2010 National Security Strategy, which stated:
Counter Biological Threats: The effective dissemination of a lethal biological agent within a population center would endanger the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and have unprecedented economic, societal, and political consequences. We must continue to work at home with first responders and health officials to reduce the risk associated with unintentional or deliberate outbreaks of infectious disease and to strengthen our resilience across the spectrum of high-consequence biological threats. We will work with domestic and international partners to protect against biological threats by promoting global health security and reinforcing norms of safe and responsible conduct; obtaining timely and accurate insight on current and emerging risks; taking reasonable steps to reduce the potential for exploitation; expanding our capability to prevent, attribute, and apprehend those who carry out attacks; communicating effectively with all stakeholders; and helping to transform the international dialogue on biological threats. 
United States, Report by the President, “2010 National Security Strategy”, The White House, Washington DC, 26 May 2010, p. 24.
Yemen
In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council preceding the adoption of Resolution 699 concerning the destruction of biological weapons in Iraq, Yemen stated that it supported eradication of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, but that unilateral disarmament of Iraq would create imbalance in the region. 
Yemen, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2981, 3 April 1991, p. 42.
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
In 1970, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia informed the First Committee of the UN General Assembly “of the decision of the Yugoslav Government on a unilateral renunciation of biological weapons”. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1750, 4 November 1970, p. 3, § 18.
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
At the CDDH, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia voted in favour of the Philippine amendment (see supra). When the amendment was rejected it stated that it
deeply regrets that the use of unlawful methods or means of combat was not included in the grave breaches, particularly since to have done so would merely have been to have codified an already existing rule of customary law, because there can be no doubt that to use prohibited weapons or unlawful methods of making war is already to act unlawfully, that is, it is a war crime punishable by existing international law. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 306.
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
In the preliminary stages of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1980, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stated:
The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia strictly adheres to and fulfils the obligations regarding the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons, as set forth in articles I, II, IV, V and X of the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention]. The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia further declares that it has never possessed biological weapons. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Response to the request by the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, excerpted in UN Doc. BWC/CONF.I/4, 20 February 1980, § 54.
Zimbabwe
According to the Report on the Practice of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe’s practice in international fora shows that it believes that the prohibition of the use of biological weapons is customary. 
Report on the Practice of Zimbabwe, 1998, Chapter 3.4.
Zimbabwe
In 2009, during the opening session of the seventh parliament of Zimbabwe, the President of Zimbabwe stated:
The provisions of the [1972 Biological Weapons] Convention are consistent with the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which Zimbabwe has acceded to and incorporated into her domestic law. The Bacteriological [i.e. Biological] Weapons Convention will therefore be incorporated into national legislation during this session. 
Zimbabwe, Address by the President of Zimbabwe during the opening session of the seventh Parliament of Zimbabwe, 6 October 2009.
Zimbabwe
In 2014, in a speech on the occasion of a workshop on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Crimes Bill, the Director of Procurement, Research and Administration in Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Defence stated:
As some of you may be aware, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Bill falls into the category of [c]hemical disarm[a]ment legislation that seeks to criminalise and prohibit the use of harmful chemicals and toxins in warfare. The bill seeks to protect the society from the indiscriminate effects of biological and toxin weapons in the event of armed conflict. You are aware, ladies and gentlemen[,] that once these biological and toxin weapons are unleashed, they don’t discriminate between a combatant and an innocent civilian and this is undesirable. It is our duty as Government to protect our people and as such we do not want our people to become victims of such atrocious substances.
This Bill seeks to domesticate the provisions of two treaties which Zimbabwe signed and ratified[,] namely the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction of 1972 … and the Geneva Protocol [for] the Prohibition of the Use [in War] of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol 1925).
It would be folly for us as Government to seek to develop our economy and allow our people to perish through the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction such as Biological and Toxin Weapons … Such economic development will be useless for as long as our people remain vulnerable to the use of such weapons in the event of armed conflict in this country. It is therefore pertinent that as we deliberate on this proposed bill, we have this at the back of our minds. We have to weigh the pros and cons of adopting this kind of legislation. 
Zimbabwe, Speech by the Director of Procurement, Research and Administration in the Ministry of Defence on the occasion of the Workshop on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Crimes Bill, 24 November 2014, pp. 3–5.
League of Nations Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1938 on the protection of civilian populations against air bombardment in case of war, the Assembly of the League of Nations reaffirmed: “The use of … bacterial methods in the conduct of war is contrary to international law.” 
League of Nations, Assembly, Resolution adopted on 30 September 1938, § II, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 182, Records of the XIXth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, pp. 15–17.
UN Security Council
In Resolution 687 adopted in 1991 after the Gulf War, the UN Security Council recalled the objective of universal elimination of biological weapons and created a “Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s biological … capabilities”. 
UN Security Council, Res. 687, 8 April 1991, preamble and section C, voting record: 12-1-2.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1991, the UN Security Council confirmed that the Special Commission (UNSCOM) had the authority to destroy biological weapons in Iraq. 
UN Security Council, Res. 699, 17 June 1991, § 2, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the UN Security Council:
Affirming that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;
2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them. 
UN Security Council, Res. 1540, 28 April 2004, preamble and §§ 1–2, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1966 on the question of general and complete disarmament, the UN General Assembly:
1. Calls for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and condemns all actions contrary to those objectives;
2. Invites all States to accede to the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of June 1925. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2162 (XXI) B, 5 December 1966, §§ 1 and 2, voting record: 91-0-4-26.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1968 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly called upon “all States which have not yet done so to become parties to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949”.  
UN General Assembly, Res. 2444 (XXIII), 19 December 1968, § 5, voting record: 111-0-0-15.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1968 on the question of general and complete disarmament, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the recommendations contained in its resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966 calling for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, condemning all actions contrary to those objectives and inviting all States to accede to that Protocol. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2454 (XXIII) A, 20 December 1968, preamble, voting record: 107-0-2-17.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1969 on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly stated that the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol “embodies the generally recognised rules of international law prohibiting the use in international armed conflicts of all biological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any technical developments”. It declared:
as contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law, as embodied in the [1925 Geneva Gas Protocol], the use in international armed conflicts of:
(b) Any biological agents of warfare – living organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them – which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2603 A (XXIV), 16 December 1969, preamble and § (b), voting record: 80-3-36-7 (3 against: Australia, Portugal and United States – and 36 abstentions: Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, El Salvador, France, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Venezuela), UN Doc. A/PV.1836, 16 December 1969, p. 4.
The large number of abstentions in the vote on this resolution (36) was partly due to disagreement on the scope of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. Other States thought that the UN General Assembly should not interpret multilateral treaties. 
Debates in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1716, 9 December 1969; UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1717, 10 December 1969.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1969 on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Invites all States which have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva [Gas] Protocol in the course of 1970 in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of its signing and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2603 B (XXIV), 16 December 1969, § 2, voting record: 120-0-1-5.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1970 on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
1. Reaffirms its resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966 and calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.
2. Invites all States that have not already done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva [Gas] Protocol. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2662 (XXV), 7 December 1970, §§ 1–2, voting record: 113-0-2-12.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1970 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Considers that the principles of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 should be strictly observed by all States and that States violating these international instruments should be condemned and held responsible to the world community. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2674 (XXV), 9 December 1970, § 3, voting record: 77-2-36-12.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1970 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all parties to any armed conflict to observe the rules laid down in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts, and invites those States which have not yet done so to adhere to those instruments. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2677 (XXV), 9 December 1970, § 1, voting record: 111-0-4-12.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1970 on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, the UN General Assembly called upon the Government of Portugal
not to use biological methods of warfare against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law embodied in the [1925 Geneva Gas Protocol] and to General Assembly 2603 (XXIV) of 16 December 1969. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2707 (XXV), 14 December 1970, § 9, voting record: 94-6-16-11. (Against: Brazil, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom and United States. Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay and Sweden.)
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1971 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly expressed the hope for “the widest possible adherence to the Convention”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2826 (XXVI), 16 December 1971, § 3, voting record: 110-0-1-21.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1971 on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling that the General Assembly has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
6. Invites all States that have not already done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva [Gas] Protocol. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2827 (XXVI) A, 16 December 1971, preamble and § 6, voting record: 110-0-1-21.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1971 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Calls again upon all parties to any armed conflict to observe the rules laid down in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts, and invites those States which have not yet done so to adhere to those instruments. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2852 (XXVI), 20 December 1971, § 1, voting record: 110-1-5-16.
[emphasis added]
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1971 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Reiterates its call upon all parties to any armed conflict to observe the rules laid down in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts, and invites those States which have not yet done so to adhere to those instruments. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2853 (XXVI), 20 December 1971, § 1, voting record: 83-15-14-20.
[emphasis added]
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1972 on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling that the General Assembly has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
5. Invites all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 and/or ratify this Protocol, and calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives contained therein. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2933 (XXVII), 29 December 1972, preamble and § 5, voting record: 113-0-2-17.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1972 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to observe the international humanitarian rules which are applicable, in particular the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and, to this end, to provide instruction concerning these rules to their armed forces and information concerning the same rules to the civilian population.  
UN General Assembly, Res. 3032 (XXVII), 18 December 1972, § 2, voting record: 103-0-25-4.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1973 on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling that the General Assembly has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
4. Reaffirms its hope for the widest possible adherence to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction;
5. Invites all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 and/or ratify this Protocol, and calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives contained therein. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3077 (XXVIII), 6 December 1973, preamble and §§ 4 and 5, voting record: 118-0-0-17.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1973 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to acknowledge and to comply with their obligations under the humanitarian instruments and to observe the international humanitarian rules which are applicable, in particular the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3102 (XXVIII), 12 December 1973, § 4, voting record: 107-0-6-22.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1974 on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling that it has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
4. Invites all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, with a view to its entry into force and effective implementation at an early date.
5. Invites all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, in the course of 1975 in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of its signing, and calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives contained therein. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3256 (XXIX), 9 December 1974, preamble and §§ 4–5, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1974 on the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, the UN General Assembly stated:
The use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in the course of military operations constitutes one of the most flagrant violations of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the principles of international humanitarian law and inflicts heave losses on civilian populations, including defenceless women and children, and shall be severely condemned. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3318 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, § 2, voting record: 110-0-14-14.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1974 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to acknowledge and to comply with their obligations under the humanitarian instruments and to observe the international humanitarian rules which are applicable, in particular the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3319 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1975 on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling that it has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of that Protocol,
4. Invites all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction;
5. Invites all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 and calls again for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of that Protocol. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3465 (XXX), 11 December 1975, preamble and §§ 4–5, adopted without a vote
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1975 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to acknowledge and to comply with their obligations under the humanitarian instruments and to observe the international humanitarian rules which are applicable, in particular the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3500 (XXX), 15 December 1975, § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1976 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to acknowledge and to comply with their obligations under the humanitarian instruments and to observe the international humanitarian rules which are applicable, in particular the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 31/19, 24 December 1976, § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1976 on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
4. Invites all States that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as to accede to or ratify the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and calls again for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of those instruments. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 31/65, 10 December 1976, preamble and § 4, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1977 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to acknowledge and to comply with their obligations under the humanitarian instruments and to observe the international humanitarian rules which are applicable, in particular the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 32/44, 8 December 1977, § 6, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1977 on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
3. Invites all States that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as to accede to or ratify the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and calls again for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of those instruments. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 32/77, 12 December 1977, preamble and § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In the Final Document of its Tenth Special Session in 1978, the UN General Assembly stated:
72. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.
73. All States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. 
UN General Assembly, Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, UN Doc. A/S-10/2, 30 June 1978, §§ 72–73.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1978 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
4. Invites all States that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as to accede to or ratify the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and calls again for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of those instruments. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 33/59 A, 14 December 1978, preamble and§ 4, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1979 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming also the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 34/72, 11 December 1979, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1980 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all signatory States which have not ratified the Convention to do so without delay and upon those States which have not yet signed the Convention to consider doing so at an early date as a significant contribution to international confidence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 35/144 A, 12 December 1980, § 2, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1980 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming also the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 35/144 B, 12 December 1980, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1980 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
1. Calls upon all States parties to the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare to reaffirm their determination strictly to observe all their obligations under the Protocol;
2. Calls upon all States which have not yet done so to accede to the [1925 Geneva Gas] Protocol;
3. Appeals to all States to comply with the principles and objectives of the [1925 Geneva Gas] Protocol. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 35/144 C, 12 December 1980, §§ 1–3, voting record: 78-17-36-23.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1981 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming also the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 36/96 A, 9 December 1981, preamble, voting record: 147-0-1-9.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1982 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 37/98 B, 13 December 1982, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1982 on provisional procedures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the provisions of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods in Warfare signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, which entered into force on 8 February 1928,
1. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to accede to the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;
2. Calls upon all States to comply with the provisions of the [1925 Geneva Gas] Protocol. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 37/98 D, 13 December 1982, preamble and §§ 1–2, voting record: 86-119-33-19.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1982 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling that the use of … biological weapons has been declared incompatible with the accepted norms of civilization,
2. Calls anew for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and condemns all actions contrary to those objectives. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 37/98 E, 13 December 1982, preamble and § 2, voting record: 83-22-33-29.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1983 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the necessity … of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 38/187 B, 20 December 1983, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1984 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity … of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,
1. Calls for strict observance of existing international obligations regarding prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons and condemns actions that contravene them. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 39/65 A, 12 December 1984, preamble and § 1, voting record: 118-16-14-11.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1984 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity … of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 39/65 C, 12 December 1984, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1985 on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Stressing the continuing importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed sixty years ago at Geneva,
5. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 40/92 A, 12 December 1985, preamble and § 5, voting record: 93-15-41-10
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1985 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity … of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 40/92 B, 12 December 1985, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1985 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity … of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,
1. Reaffirms the need for strict observance of existing international obligations regarding prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons and condemns all actions that contravene those obligations.  
UN General Assembly, Res. 40/92 C, 12 December 1985, preamble and § 1, voting record: 112-16-22-9.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1986 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all signatory States that have not ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay, and also calls upon those States that have not yet signed the Convention to join the States parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention and to strengthening of international confidence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 41/58 A, 3 December 1986, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1986 on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Stressing the continuing importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the earliest conclusion and implementation of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 17 June 1925,
5. Calls upon all Sates that have not yet done so to accede to the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 41/58 B, 3 December 1986, preamble and § 5, voting record: 100-11-43-5.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1986 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,
1. Calls for compliance with existing international obligations regarding prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons, and condemns all actions that contravene those obligations. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 41/58 C, 3 December 1986, preamble and § 1, voting record: 137-0-14-8.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1986 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 41/58 D, 3 December 1986, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1987 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity … of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 42/37 A, 30 November 1987, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1987 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and to support the conclusion of a Chemical Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the provisions of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and other relevant rules of customary international law,
Recalling also the necessity of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,
1. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and condemns all actions that violate this obligation. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 42/37 C, 30 November 1987, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1988 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and to support the conclusion of a Chemical Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling also the necessity of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,
1. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and condemns all actions that violate this obligation;
2. Calls upon all Sates that have not yet done so to accede to the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 43/74 A, 7 December 1988, preamble and §§ 1–2, adopted without a vote
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1988 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all States that have not ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention and to strengthening of international confidence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 43/74 B, 7 December 1988, § 5, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1988 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming also the urgent necessity of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 43/74 C, 7 December 1988, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1989 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 44/115 A, 15 December 1989, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1989 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and to support the conclusion of a Chemical Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling also the provisions of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of other rules and principles of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict,
Recalling further the necessity of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,
1. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and condemns vigorously all actions that violate that obligation;
2. Calls upon all Sates that have not yet done so to accede to the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 44/115 B, 15 December 1989, preamble and §§ 1–2, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1990 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming also the urgent necessity of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,
1. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and to abide by the commitments undertaken in the Final Declaration of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris in 1989. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 45/57 A, 4 December 1990, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1990 on the implementation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all States that have not ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention and to strengthening of international confidence.  
UN General Assembly, Res. 45/57 B, 4 December 1990, § 7, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1990 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
Bearing in mind the reaffirmation in the Final Declaration of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris 7 to January 11, of the importance and the continuing validity of the 1925 Protocol,
1. Condemns vigorously all actions that violate or threaten to violate the obligations assumed under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and other relevant provisions of international law;
2. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 45/57 C, 4 December 1990, preamble §§ 1–2, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1991 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all signatory States that have not ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay, and also calls upon those States that have not yet signed the Convention to join the States parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 46/35 A, 6 December 1991, § 5, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1991 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
1. Condemns vigorously all actions that violate or threaten to violate the obligations assumed under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and other relevant provisions of international law;
2. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 46/35 B, 6 December 1991, §§ 1–2, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1991 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and to their destruction,
Reaffirming the urgent necessity, particularly in the light of the past use of and recent threats to use chemical weapons, of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
1. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 46/35 C, 6 December 1991, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1993 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and also calls upon those other States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 48/65, 16 December 1993, § 6, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1994 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and also calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 49/86, 15 December 1994, § 5, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and also calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 50/79, 12 December 1995, § 6, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
Renews its previous call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 51/45 P, 10 December 1996, § 1, voting record: 165-0-7-13.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1996, on the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and also calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 51/54, 10 December 1996, § 5, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1997 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and also calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 52/47, 9 December 1997, § 5, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1998 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
Renews its previous call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 53/77 L, 4 December 1998, § 1, voting record: 168-0-5-12.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1999 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Notes with satisfaction the increase in the number of States parties to the Convention, and reaffirms the call upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and also calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention, duly noting the forthcoming anniversary of the twenty-fifth year of the entry into force of the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 54/61, 1 December 1999, § 2, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2000 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,38 as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions,
1. Renews its previous call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,38 and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 55/33 J, 20 November 2000, preamble and § 1, voting record: 163-0-5-21.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2000 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Notes with satisfaction the increase in the number of States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, reaffirms the call upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 55/40, 20 November 2000, § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and to their destruction,
Noting with satisfaction that there are one hundred and fifty States parties to the [Biological Weapons Convention], including all of the permanent members of the Security Council,
Welcoming the reaffirmation made in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their development, production and stockpiling are effectively prohibited under article I of the Convention
1. Notes with satisfaction the increase in the number of States parties to the [1972 Biological Weapons Convention], reaffirms the call upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 58/72, 8 December 2003, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions,
Welcoming the recent initiatives by three more States Parties to withdraw their reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
2. Renews its previous call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions;
3. Calls upon those States that continue to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw them. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/70, 3 December 2004, preamble and §§ 2–3, voting record: 179-0-5-7.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Welcoming the reaffirmation made in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their development, production and stockpiling are effectively prohibited under article I of the [Biological Weapons Convention],
1. Notes with satisfaction the increase in the number of States parties to the [Biological Weapons Convention], reaffirms the call upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/110, 3 December 2004, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Welcoming the reaffirmation made in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their development, production and stockpiling are effectively prohibited under article I of the [Biological Weapons Convention],
1. Notes with satisfaction the increase in the number of States parties to the [Biological Weapons Convention], reaffirms the call upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/96, 8 December 2005, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions,
2. Renews its previous call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions;
3. Calls upon those States that continue to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw them. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/61, 6 December 2006, preamble and §§ 2–3, voting record: 173-0-4-15.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Welcoming the reaffirmation made in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their development, production and stockpiling are effectively prohibited under article I of the Convention,
1. Reaffirms the call upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction to do so without delay, and calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/102, 6 December 2006, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and to their destruction,
Noting with satisfaction that there are one hundred and fifty-nine States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, including all of the permanent members of the Security Council,
Welcoming the reaffirmation made in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their development, production and stockpiling are effectively prohibited under article I of the Convention,
Welcoming also the successful outcome of the Sixth Review Conference, which adopted a Final Document after a gap of ten years, conducted a consensus article-by-article review of the operation of the Convention and reached decisions on the continuity of the intersessional meetings of experts and States parties,
1. Notes with satisfaction the increase in the number of States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, reaffirms the call upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/60, 5 December 2007, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1996, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights stated that biological weapons were weapons of mass destruction and had indiscriminate effects. It also stated that the use of these weapons was incompatible with human rights and IHL. 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1996/16, 29 August 1996, § 1 and preamble.
UN Secretary-General
In 1969, in a report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use, the UN Secretary-General included an analysis by a group of experts on the effects of the use of biological weapons. The experts recommended the elimination of all biological weapons in order to make the world more peaceful. The UN Secretary-General urged all UN members: to accede to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol; to affirm that the prohibition covers all sorts of biological weapons; and to reach agreement to eliminate biological weapons. 
UN Secretary-General, Report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/7575, 1 July 1969, p. xii.
UN Secretary-General
In reports in 1995 and 1996, the UN Secretary-General noted that the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), which was mandated to inspect and destroy facilities for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq following the Gulf War, had extensively documented an Iraqi biological weapons programme. 
UN Secretary-General, Report on the status of the implementation of the Special Commission’s plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with the relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), UN Doc. S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, Annex; Report on the activities of the Special Commission Established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution 687 (1991), UN Doc. S/1996/848, 11 October 1996; Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission Established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution 687 (1991), UN Doc. S/1997/301, 11 April 1997.
UN Special Commission (Iraq)
In 1999, the report of an UNSCOM panel (constituted to examine issues of disarmament, monitoring and verification in Iraq following the decision to re-evaluate the work of UNSCOM) noted:
22. UNSCOM uncovered the proscribed biological weapons (BW) programme of Iraq, whose complete existence had been concealed by Iraq until 1995 …
23. UNSCOM ordered and supervised the destruction of Iraq’s main declared BW production and development facility, Al Hakam. Some 60 pieces of equipment from three other facilities involved in proscribed BW activities as well as some 22 tonnes of growth media for biological weapons production collected from four other facilities were also destroyed. As a result, the declared facilities of Iraq’s biological weapons programme have been destroyed and rendered harmless.
Current status/remaining questions
24. In the biological area, Iraq’s Full Final and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) has not been accepted by UNSCOM as a full account of Iraq’s biological weapons programme … It has also been recognised that due to the fact that biological weapons agents can be produced using low technology and simple equipment, generally dual-use, Iraq possesses the capability and knowledge base through which biological warfare agents could be produced quickly and in volume. 
UNSCOM, Panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues, Final report of 27 March 1999 annexed to Letters dated 27 and 30 March 1999 respectively from the Chairman of the panels established pursuant to the Note by the President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100) addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1999/356, 30 March 1999, Annex I, §§ 22–24.
UN Secretary-General
In his message at the opening of the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, held in Geneva in 2001, the UN Secretary-General stated:
144 States have now undertaken the commitment never, under any circumstances, to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain biological or toxin weapons. They have recognised that the use of biological agents and toxins as weapons would, in the words of the Convention’s preamble, “be repugnant to the conscience of mankind”.
He added: “The challenge for the international community is clear: to implement, to the fullest extent possible, the prohibition regime offered by the Convention.” 
UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Statement of 19 November 2001 on behalf of the UN Secretary-General at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
European Union
In 1995, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Spain, on behalf of the EU, expressed support for the strengthening of the prohibition against biological weapons. 
EU, Statement by Spain on behalf of the EU before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/50/PV.3, 16 October 1995, p. 12.
European Union
At the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, the EU stated that it believed that “there is an urgent need to strengthen compliance with the international system of non-proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction including through the reinforcement of the Biological Weapons Convention with a legally binding and effective verification regime”. It further stated:
The strengthening of the [Biological Weapons Convention] through agreement on a legally binding verification regime would contribute to international peace and security and must henceforth be accorded the priority it warrants in international arms control and disarmament negotiations. 
EU, Statement of 25 November 1996 by Ireland on behalf of the EU and associated countries at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996. (The statement was also given on behalf of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.)
European Union
At the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001, Spain, on behalf of the EU, explained:
In its conclusion of 11 June 2001, the Council of the European Union confirmed its commitment to contribute to drawing up a Protocol including the set of concrete measures which the EU’s Common Position of 17 May 1999 defined as essential for the establishment of an instrument which would effectively reinforce the Convention. 
EU, Statement of 19 November 2001 by Belgium on behalf of the EU at the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001.
GCC Supreme Council
In the Final Communiqué of its 12th Session in 1991, the GCC Supreme Council confirmed “the need to rid the entire Middle East region of all types of weapons of mass destruction, including … biological weapons”. 
GCC, Supreme Council, 12th Session, Kuwait, 23–25 December 1991, Final Communiqué, annexed to Letter dated 30 December 1991 from Kuwait to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/46/833-S/23336, 30 December 1991, p. 5.
GCC Supreme Council
In the Final Communiqué of its 16th Session in 1995, the GCC Supreme Council expressed “its deep regret that the Government of Iraq was continuing to produce bacteriological weapons of a pestilential nature to inflict overwhelming damage on Iraq itself and on the region as a whole”. It called for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons, and confirmed “its concern for the elimination of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, as a means of arriving at a Middle East region entirely free of such weapons”. 
GCC, Supreme Council, 16th Session, Muscat, 4–6 December 1995, Final Communiqué, annexed to Letter dated 29 December 1995 from Oman to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/51/56-S1995/1070, 29 December 1995, p. 4.
International Conference of the Red Cross (1965)
The 20th International Conference of the Red Cross in 1965 adopted a resolution on the protection of civilian populations against the dangers of indiscriminate warfare which expressly invited “all Governments who have not yet done so to accede to the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use of … bacteriological methods of warfare”. 
20th International Conference of the Red Cross, Vienna, 2–9 October 1965, Res. XXVIII.
Tehran International Conference on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1968, the Tehran International Conference on Human Rights stated: “The widespread violence and brutality of our times, including … the use of … biological means of warfare … erode human rights and engender counter-brutality.” 
International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, 22 April–13 May 1968, Res. XXIII on Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, preamble.
International Conference of the Red Cross (1969)
The 21st International Conference of the Red Cross in 1969 adopted a resolution appealing to States to accede to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and “to comply strictly with its provisions”. The Conference further urged governments “to conclude as rapidly as possible an agreement banning the production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons”. 
21st International Conference of the Red Cross, Istanbul, 6–13 September 1969, Res. XIV.
Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention
There have so far been six review conferences of the Biological Weapons Convention (1980, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2006), during which numerous States declared their commitment to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and to the prohibition of the use of biological weapons.
Conference of State Parties to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and Other Interested States
The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference of State Parties to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and Other Interested States in 1989 affirmed:
The participating States recognise the importance and continuous validity of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed on 17 June 1925 in Geneva. The States party to the Protocol solemnly reaffirm the prohibition prescribed therein. 
Conference of State Parties to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and Other Interested States, Paris, 7–11 January 1989, Final Declaration, 11 January 1989, § 2, annexed to letter dated 19 January 1989 from France to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/44/88, 20 January 1989.
International Court of Justice
In its advisory opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1996, the ICJ stated:
The pattern until now has been for weapons of mass destruction to be declared illegal by specific instruments. The most recent such instruments are the Convention of 10 April 1972 on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their destruction (which prohibits the possession of bacteriological and toxin weapons and reinforces the prohibition of their use). 
ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case , Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, § 57.
ICRC
To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces that it is prohibited to use “bacteriological methods of warfare”. 
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 919(c).
ICRC
In a Memorandum on the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law sent in 1990 to all States party to the Geneva Conventions in the context of the Gulf War, the ICRC stated: “The use of … bacteriological weapons is prohibited (1925 Geneva Protocol).” 
ICRC, Memorandum on the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law, 14 December 1990, § II, IRRC, No. 280, 1991, p. 25.
ICRC
In a press release issued in 1991 in the context of the Gulf War, the ICRC reminded the parties: “The use of … bacteriological weapons is prohibited under international humanitarian law.” 
ICRC, Press Release No. 1658, Gulf War: ICRC reminds States of their obligations, 17 January 1991, IRRC, No. 280, 1991, p. 26.
ICRC
In 1994, in a Memorandum on Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Angola, the ICRC stated: “In particular, the use of … bacteriological weapons … is prohibited.” 
ICRC, Memorandum on Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Angola, 8 June 1994, § II, IRRC, No. 320, 1997, p. 504.
ICRC
In its statement at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1996, the ICRC, referring to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, stated: “The norms which your predecessors so carefully constructed have now become elements of customary international law. With few exceptions, they have been respected even in times of armed conflict.” It called upon States to adhere to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and to consider withdrawing any reservations that they might have to the Geneva Gas Protocol. The ICRC concluded by stating:
Biological warfare, in whatever form and by whatever party, is rightfully considered abhorrent by the public conscience and by the world’s most ancient cultures. This Conference’s most important task will be to reaffirm, in both word and action, that no party should even think of using biological knowledge to inflict harm and to assure anyone who does that this will not be tolerated by the international community. 
ICRC, Statement at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996.
ICRC
In its working paper on war crimes submitted in 1997 to the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, the ICRC stated:
The applicability of weapons prohibitions to internal conflicts and the prohibitions now clearly attached to the use of such weapons as … biological weapons … in time of non-international armed conflicts is to be related to the more general principle that all means and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering are unlawful. 
ICRC, Working paper on war crimes submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 14 February 1997, p. 29.
Robinson, Harley Guillemin and Meselson
According to commentators, between 1978 and 1987 the United States repeatedly accused Soviet forces of having used toxin weapons in South-east Asia in the period 1978–1984. The allegations charged that attacks had been conducted by Soviet aircraft spraying a yellow material that fell like rain and contained trichothecene toxins, causing illness and death among thousands of victims, most of them among people from Laos living in Thai refugee camps. The USSR consistently denied the accusations concerning its alleged use of biological weapons in the region. In 1982, a UK government scientist analysed a sample of the “yellow rain” and concluded that it consisted largely of pollen. The United Kingdom finding was later independently corroborated by scientists in Australia, Canada, France, Sweden and Thailand. The US administration responded to this discovery by arguing that the USSR had deliberately added pollen when manufacturing the yellow rain. Between 1983 and 1986, following further scientific analysis, government and university researchers from France, Thailand, United Kingdom and United States reported that the samples contained no trace of trichothecenes and concluded that the powder was actually the faeces of wild honeybees. 
Julian Robinson, Jeanne Harley Guillemin and Matthew Meselson, “Yellow Rain in Southeast Asia: The Story Collapses”, in Susan Wright (ed.), Preventing a Biological Arms Race, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990, pp. 220-238.
International Institute of Humanitarian Law
The Rules of International Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-international Armed Conflicts, adopted in 1990 by the Council of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, provide: “The customary rule prohibiting … the use of bacteriological (biological) weapons is applicable in non-international armed conflicts.” 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Rules of International Humanitarian Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-international Armed Conflicts, Rule B1, IRRC, No. 278, 1990, p. 395.
Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards
The Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, adopted by an expert meeting convened by the Institute for Human Rights of Åbo Akademi University in Turku/Åbo, Finland in 1990, states: “Weapons or other material or methods prohibited in international armed conflicts must not be employed in any circumstances.” 
Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, adopted by an expert meeting convened by the Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, Turku/Åbo, 30 November–2 December 1990, Article 5(3), IRRC, No. 282, 1991, p. 332.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
SIPRI has documented a number of allegations concerning the use of biological weapons since the Second World War. However, it noted: “There are no indisputably verified instances of their having been used.” 
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. I, The Rise of CB Weapons, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1971, pp. 217–230.
Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law
The participating experts in the Workshop on International Criminalisation of Biological and Chemical Weapons at the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law in 1998 developed the text of a Draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Developing, Producing, Acquiring, Stockpiling, Retaining, Transferring or Using Biological and Chemical Weapons. The Draft Convention makes it an international criminal offence to use chemical or biological weapons. 
Workshop on International Criminalisation of Biological and Chemical Weapons, Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, Cambridge, 1–2 May 1998, Draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Developing, Producing, Acquiring, Stockpiling, Retaining, Transferring or Using Biological and Chemical Weapons, reprinted in The CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue No. 42, December 1998, pp. 1–5.
British Medical Association
In 1999, the British Medical Association reported that in the light of the existence of non-parties to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and the reservations of some States to the Protocol which permitted retaliatory use in kind of biological weapons, a number of countries undertook research in and developed and stockpiled biological agents for military retaliation purposes in the 20th century, although this practice had been progressively abandoned, in particular since the adoption of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. 
British Medical Association, Biotechnology Weapons and Humanity, Harwood Academic Publishers, London, 1999, pp. 14–32.
Monterey Institute of International Studies
According to a report by the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Algeria and India carry out research programmes into biological weapons. However, it emphasizes that there is no evidence of production of such agents by those States. It adds that China, Egypt and the Islamic Republic of Iran are likely to have maintained a research programme into biological weapons. It notes that Iraq had previously a research and production programme and emphasizes that in the absence of UN inspections and monitoring it is possible that Iraq has resumed its research programmes on biological agents. The report notes that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Israel, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and the Syrian Arab Republic conduct research programmes and that the production of biological weapons remains possible. It further states that the Russian Federation has a research programme. According to the report, it is also possible that the Sudan and Taiwan have research programmes on biological agents. 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present, last updated in 2002.