Practice Relating to Rule 150. Reparation

Paris Agreement on Reparation from Germany
The 1946 Paris Agreement on Reparation from Germany was concluded
in order to obtain an equitable distribution among [the signatory governments] of the total assets which … are or may be declared to be available as reparation from Germany … in order to establish an Inter-Allied Reparation Agency, and to settle an equitable procedure for the restitution of monetary gold. 
Agreement on Reparation from Germany, on the Establishment of an Inter-Allied Reparation Agency and on the Restitution of Monetary Gold, concluded between Albania, the United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece, India, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Union of South Africa and Yugoslavia, Paris, 14 January 1946.
Paris Agreement on Reparation from Germany
Article 2(A) of Part I of the 1946 Paris Agreement on Reparation from Germany states:
The Signatory Governments agree among themselves that their respective shares of reparation, as determined by the present Agreement, shall be regarded by each of them as covering all its claims and those of its nationals against the former German Government and its Agencies, of a governmental or private nature, arising out of the war (which are not otherwise provided for). 
Agreement on Reparation from Germany, on the Establishment of an Inter-Allied Reparation Agency and on the Restitution of Monetary Gold, concluded between Albania, the United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece, India, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Union of South Africa and Yugoslavia, Paris, 14 January 1946, Part I, Article 2(A).
Paris Agreement on Reparation from Germany
Article 8 of Part I of the 1946 Paris Agreement on Reparation from Germany contains provisions regarding the allocation of a reparation share to non-repatriable victims of German action. Article 8(I) provides:
Nothing in this Article shall be considered to prejudice the claims which individual refugees may have against a future German Government, except to the amount of the benefits that such refugees may have received from the sources referred to … above. 
Agreement on Reparation from Germany, on the Establishment of an Inter-Allied Reparation Agency and on the Restitution of Monetary Gold, concluded between Albania, the United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece, India, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Union of South Africa and Yugoslavia, Paris, 14 January 1946, Part I, Article 8.
Austrian State Treaty
Article 21 of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, which in its preamble considers that “on 13 March 1938, Hitlerite Germany annexed Austria by force and incorporated its territory in the German Reich”, provides: “No reparation shall be exacted from Austria arising out of the existence of a state of war in Europe after 1 September 1939.” 
State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria (with Annexes and Maps), concluded between France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Austria, accession of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland and Yugoslavia, Vienna, 15 May 1955, Article 21.
Joint Declaration on Soviet-Japanese Relations
Article 6 of the 1956 Joint Declaration on Soviet-Japanese Relations provides:
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics renounces all reparation claims against Japan. The USSR and Japan agree to renounce all claims by either State, its institutions or citizens, against the other State, its institutions or citizens, which have arisen as a result of the war since 9 August 1945. 
Joint Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan concerning the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries, Moscow, 19 October 1956, Article 6.
ICC Statute
Article 75 of the 1998 ICC Statute provides:
1. The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims …
6. Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims under national or international law. 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 75(1) and (6).
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
Article 38 of the 1999 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property provides: “No provision in this Protocol relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international law, including the duty to provide reparation.” 
Second Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 26 March 1999, Article 38.
Convention on Enforced Disappearance
The 2006 Convention on Enforced Disappearance provides:
Recalling … relevant international instruments in the fields of human rights, humanitarian law and international criminal law,
Considering the right of … victims [of enforced disappearance] to justice and to reparation … ,
Article 24
1. For the purposes of this Convention, “victim” means the disappeared person and any individual who has suffered harm as the direct result of an enforced disappearance.
4. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victims of enforced disappearance have the right to obtain reparation and prompt, fair and adequate compensation.
5. The right to obtain reparation referred to in paragraph 4 of this article covers material and moral damages and, where appropriate, other forms of reparation such as:
(a) Restitution;
(b) Rehabilitation;
(c) Satisfaction, including restoration of dignity and reputation;
(d) Guarantees of non-repetition.
6. Without prejudice to the obligation to continue the investigation until the fate of the disappeared person has been clarified, each State Party shall take the appropriate steps with regard to the legal situation of disappeared persons whose fate has not been clarified and that of their relatives, in fields such as social welfare, financial matters, family law and property rights.
7. Each State Party shall guarantee the right to form and participate freely in organizations and associations concerned with attempting to establish the circumstances of enforced disappearances and the fate of disappeared persons, and to assist victims of enforced disappearance. 
International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res. 61/177, 20 December 2006, Annex, Preamble and Article 24.
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2000)
Article 2 of the 2000 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law provides: “States shall ensure that domestic law is consistent with international legal obligations by: … making available adequate, effective and prompt reparation.”  
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, annexed to The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Final Report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, submitted in accordance with UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/33, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62,18 January 2000, Article 2.
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2000)
Article 3 of the 2000 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law provides:
The obligation to respect, ensure respect for and enforce international … humanitarian law includes, inter alia, a State’s duty to:
(d) Afford appropriate remedies to victims; and
(e) Provide for or facilitate reparation to victims. 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, annexed to The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Final Report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, submitted in accordance with UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/33, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62,18 January 2000, Article 3.
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility
Article 31 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility provides:
1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.
2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State. 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001, Article 31.
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of IHL (2005)
Paragraphs 8, 9, 11 to 17 and 24 of the 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law state:
8. For purposes of the present document, victims are persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations of international humanitarian law. Where appropriate, and in accordance with domestic law, the term “victim” also includes the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization.
9. A person shall be considered a victim regardless of whether the perpetrator of the violation is identified, apprehended, prosecuted, or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between the perpetrator and the victim.
VII. Victims right to remedies
11. Remedies for gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law include the victim’s right to the following as provided for under international law:
(a) Equal and effective access to justice;
(b) Adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered;
(c) Access to relevant information concerning violations and reparation mechanisms.
VIII. Access to justice
12. A victim of a gross violation of international human rights law or of a serious violation of international humanitarian law shall have equal access to an effective judicial remedy as provided for under international law. Other remedies available to the victim include access to administrative and other bodies, as well as mechanisms, modalities and proceedings conducted in accordance with domestic law. Obligations arising under international law to secure the right to access justice and fair and impartial proceedings shall be reflected in domestic laws. To that end, States should:
(a) Disseminate, through public and private mechanisms, information about all available remedies for gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law;
(b) Take measures to minimize the inconvenience to victims and their representatives, protect against unlawful interference with their privacy as appropriate and ensure their safety from intimidation and retaliation, as well as that of their families and witnesses, before, during and after judicial, administrative, or other proceedings that affect the interests of victims;
(c) Provide proper assistance to victims seeking access to justice;
(d) Make available all appropriate legal, diplomatic and consular means to ensure that victims can exercise their rights to remedy for gross violations of international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law.
13. In addition to individual access to justice, States should endeavour to develop procedures to allow groups of victims to present claims for reparation and to receive reparation, as appropriate.
14. An adequate, effective and prompt remedy for gross violations of international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law should include all available and appropriate international processes in which a person may have legal standing and should be without prejudice to any other domestic remedies.
IX. Reparation for harm suffered
15. Adequate, effective and prompt reparation is intended to promote justice by redressing gross violations of international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law. Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered. In accordance with its domestic laws and international legal obligations, a State shall provide reparation to victims for acts or omissions which can be attributed to the State and constitute gross violations of international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law. In cases where a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable for reparation to a victim, such party should provide reparation to the victim or compensate the State if the State has already provided reparation to the victim.
16. States should endeavour to establish national programmes for reparation and other assistance to victims in the event that the parties liable for the harm suffered are unable or unwilling to meet their obligations.
17. States shall, with respect to claims by victims, enforce domestic judgements for reparation against individuals or entities liable for the harm suffered and endeavour to enforce valid foreign legal judgements for reparation in accordance with domestic law and international legal obligations. To that end, States should provide under their domestic laws effective mechanisms for the enforcement of reparation judgements.
X. Access to relevant information concerning violations and reparation mechanisms
24. States should develop means of informing the general public and, in particular, victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law of the rights and remedies addressed by these Basic Principles and Guidelines and of all available legal, medical, psychological, social, administrative and all other services to which victims may have a right of access. Moreover, victims and their representatives should be entitled to seek and obtain information on the causes leading to their victimization and on the causes and conditions pertaining to the gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law and to learn the truth in regard to these violations. 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, annexed to UN General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, §§ 8, 9, 11–17 and 24.
Philippines
The Joint Circular on Adherence to IHL and Human Rights (1991) of the Philippines states:
If, in the course of legitimate security/police operations, private properties are damaged, measures shall be undertaken whenever practicable, utilizing available unit’s manpower and equipment, to repair the damage caused as a matter of AFP/PNP [Armed Forces of the Philippines/Philippine National Police] Civic Action Policy. 
Philippines, Implementation Guidelines for Presidential Memorandum Order No. 393, dated 9 September 1991, Directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippines National Police to Reaffirm their Adherence to the Principles of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in the Conduct of Security/Police Operations, Joint Circular Number 2-91, Department of National Defense, Department of Interior and Local Government, 1991, § 2(a)(4).
Philippines
The Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (2006) provides:
During combat operation:
12. Avoid destroying crops, properties and possessions. During military operations, avoid damaging plants and properties along the way. Avoid using incendiary that […] would set fire combustible materials such as “sawali,” “nipa” and other indigenous materials usually used for huts in the village. If unavoidable, pay for the damaged properties as soon as the combat operations are over or else repair or replace the damages. 
Philippines, Philippine Army Soldiers Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, A Practical Guide for Internal Security Operations, 2006, p. 58, § 12.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states:
It is a principle of international law that a state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is obliged to make full reparation for the injury caused by that act. This principle extends to the law of armed conflict in that a state is responsible for violations of the law committed by persons forming part of its armed forces and, if the case demands, is liable to pay compensation. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 16.15.
El Salvador
El Salvador’s Decree Creating the National Commission for Tracing Missing Children (2010) states:
Art. 1.- The National Commission for Tracing Girls and Boys Missing during the Internal Armed Conflict, which will be referred to as “Commission” or “Tracing Commission” hereinafter.
Art. 3.- The Commission shall have the mandate to:
f) Promote coordination with public institutions and the participation of private, national and international, organizations, … to [contribute to] … full reparation [of missing girls and boys].” 
El Salvador, Decree Creating the National Commission for Tracing Missing Children, 2010, Articles 1 and 3(f).
El Salvador
El Salvador’s Decree Creating the National Commission for Reparation to Victims (2010) states:
The “National Commission for Reparation to Victims of Violations of Human Rights that occurred in the context of the internal armed conflict”, hereinafter referred to as the “Commission” is created. … [The Commission’s] aim is to propose to the President of the Republic, through a duly founded report, the establishment of a presidential program for reparation to victims of serious violations of human rights. 
El Salvador, Decree Creating the National Commission for Reparation to Victims, 2010, Article 1.
The decree further states:
In the accomplishment of its functions, the Commission will take into account:
a) The standards for reparation [to victims] established by international human rights law and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in particular;
b) The opinion of Salvadoran non-governmental organizations that represent the interests of the victims of serious violations of human, referred to in article 7 of this Decree;
c) That reparations must have a collective character;
d) Previously elaborated reports on the situation of human rights in the country in the context of the internal armed conflict; and,
e) The fiscal, economic and financial situation of the country. 
El Salvador, Decree Creating the National Commission for Reparation to Victims, 2010, Article 5.
In Article 7, the decree states: “As part of its work methodology, the Commission will hear the opinion of the organizations of victims of human rights violations through the establishment of a regular dialogue with these organizations.” 
El Salvador, Decree Creating the National Commission for Reparation to Victims, 2010, Article 7.
The decree also states:
The Commission will exclusively circumscribe its work to the serious violations of human rights that took place in the context of the internal armed conflict, which ended on 16 January 1992 with the signature of the “Chapultepec Agreement” [El Salvador Peace Agreement].
The reparation processes, initiated by the State in fulfilment of the reports or rulings of the competent international or national organisms, will be carried out and completed without prejudice to the fulfilment of the responsibilities that this Decree grants to the Commission. 
El Salvador, Decree Creating the National Commission for Reparation to Victims, 2010, Article 8.
Georgia
Georgia’s Law on Occupied Territories (2008) states:
Protection of Human Rights and Cultural Monuments in the Occupied Territories.
3. The responsibility of the Russian Federation, as the State carrying out the military occupation, to reimburse moral and material damages inflicted in the Occupied Territories upon citizens of Georgia, persons without citizenship, and citizens of foreign countries who entered the territory of Georgia and moved to the Occupied Territory … [with] the required permission shall be determined in accordance with the norms and principles of international law. 
Georgia, Law on Occupied Territories, 2008, Article 7(3).
Liberia
Liberia’s Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2005) states:
Preamble
Considering that the civil conflict was generally characterized by gross violations of human rights and the widespread commission of gruesome and heinous crimes against humanity in further violation of international humanitarian laws and standards;
Article VII. Functions and Powers
Section 26. The TRC [Truth and Reconciliation Commission] shall enjoy and exercise such functions and powers as are relevant for the realization of its mandates. Its functions and powers shall include, but not be limited to:
(j) Making recommendations to the Head of State with regard to … [r]eparations and rehabilitation of victims and perpetrators in need of specialized psycho-social and other rehabilitative services. 
Liberia, Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2005, Preamble and Article VII, Section 26.
Peru
Peru’s Law Creating the Comprehensive Reparations Plan (2005) states:
The purpose of the present law is to create the legal framework for the Comprehensive Reparations Plan – CRP for victims of the violence that took place between May 1980 and November 2000 in accordance with the conclusions and recommendations in the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
Peru, Law Creating the Comprehensive Reparations Plan, 2005, Article 1.
The Law also states:
For purposes of the present law, beneficiary is the victim, relatives of the victims or groups who … were subjected to a violation of their human rights on an individual basis and those who experienced harm to the social fabric [of their community] by being subjected to a violation of their collective rights[. They] … shall benefit from the Comprehensive Reparations Plan recommended by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
Peru, Law Creating the Comprehensive Reparations Plan, 2005, Article 5.
The Law further states:
For purposes of the present law, victims are considered to be persons or groups of persons who have experienced acts or omissions that constitute human rights violations such as enforced disappearance, kidnapping, extrajudicial execution, murder, forced displacement, arbitrary detention, forced recruitment, torture, rape or killings, as well as the relatives of persons who died or disappeared within the timeframe stipulated by Article 1 of the present law. 
Peru, Law Creating the Comprehensive Reparations Plan, 2005, Article 3.
Peru
Peru’s Regulations to the Law Creating the Comprehensive Reparations Plan (2006) state:
Reparations
are actions taken by the State for the benefit of the victims of the process of violence mentioned in Article 3 of the Law [Creating the Comprehensive Reparations Plan] in order to explicitly recognize them as victims. [Such actions have the objective] of providing the victims with access to justice, restitution of their rights, the resolution of after-effects of human rights violations as well as material and moral reparation, be it specific or symbolic, for the harm suffered. 
Peru, Regulations to the Law Creating the Comprehensive Reparations Plan, 2006, Article 3.
The Regulations also provide:
State action regarding reparations shall be based on concurrent and specific actions carried out by State entities and shall be aimed at promoting programmes of reparations that allow victims of the process of violence to obtain restitution for the rights violations they experienced during the internal armed conflict. 
Peru, Regulations to the Law Creating the Comprehensive Reparations Plan, 2006, Article 5.
The Regulations further states:
The determination and allocation of reparations for victims and beneficiaries under any reparations programme for victims and beneficiaries shall be carried out in a way that treats persons in the same situation equally and proportionately and that treats differently persons in different situations. 
Peru, Regulations to the Law Creating the Comprehensive Reparations Plan, 2006, Article 6(c).
The Regulations also states:
The determination and allocation of reparations under any reparations programme for victims and beneficiaries shall be carried out without any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference of any nature that would have the objective or consequence of annulling or discrediting the acknowledgment, allocation and enjoyment of the reparations in conditions of equality. 
Peru, Regulations to the Law Creating the Comprehensive Reparations Plan, 2006, Article 6(d).
The Regulations further states:
The Comprehensive Reparations Plan … has the following objectives:
d) To provide reparation and/or compensate for the human, social, moral, material, and economic harm caused by the process of violence to the affected persons, families, indigenous communities and populations. 
Peru, Regulations to the Law Creating the Comprehensive Reparations Plan , 2006, Article 10(d).
The Regulations also states:
Victims shall be considered to be any persons or groups of persons who during the process of violence suffered from acts or omissions that violated international human rights law, such as:
a) extrajudicial execution,
b) murder,
c) enforced disappearance,
d) rape,
e) torture,
f) kidnapping,
g) forced displacement,
h) arbitrary detention,
i) forced recruitment,
j) violation of due process. 
Peru, Regulations to the Law Creating the Comprehensive Reparations Plan, 2006, Article 45.
Uruguay
Uruguay’s Law on Cooperation with the ICC (2006) states:
The State shall be responsible for the reparation of victims of the crimes set out in Titles I to III of Part II of the present law [which include war crimes] committed in the territory of the Republic or abroad by agents of the State or by persons who were not agents of the State but who acted under the authorization, support or acquiescence of State agents. 
Uruguay, Law on Cooperation with the ICC, 2006, Article 14.1.
Colombia
In 2007, in the Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, the Plenary Chamber of Colombia’s Constitutional Court stated:
At the international level, the State obligation to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law is found in Article 1 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and has acquired customary status.
[T]he general obligation to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law is the foundation for a number of more specific duties such as … the duty to … provide reparations for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed during internal armed conflicts. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, Judgment of 25 April 2007, p. 61.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
In 2009, in the Basele Lutula and Others case, the Military Garrison Court of Kisangani convicted several Mai-Mai militia members of various crimes. The Court stated:
Regarding the civil parties … , the Court sentences the defendants Basele Lutula, Osumaka-Loleka, Okanga Likunda, Kipeleka Nyembo Bumba and Koti Okeke to pay, jointly with the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], the equivalent in francs of 10,000 USD … to each of [the civil parties] as compensation for the harm suffered.
Regarding the victims of [the crime of] beating and wounding … , the Military Garrison Court of Kisangani sentences the above-mentioned defendants to pay, in solidum with the DRC, the equivalent in francs of 2,500 USD … to each of them as damages. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Garrison Court of Kisangani, Basele Lutula and Others case, Judgment, 3 June 2009, pp. 38–39.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
In 2010, in the Barnaba Yonga Tshopena case, the Military Garrison Court of Ituri-Bunia convicted a leader of the Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (FRPI) of several war crimes. The Court stated:
147 … [T]he acts of the present case are closely related to the armed conflicts that took place in the Ituri District, in the Eastern Province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], from 2001 to 2004. Ituri was in turmoil during that period, following armed confrontations between several armed groups and other tribal militias supported by political-military movements in this part of the republic, which was outside the control and authority of the central government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
148 … [T]he most virulent of these groups was the UPC [Union of Congolese Patriots] and its armed branch called FPLC [Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo], along with their allies from the Ugandan army called UPDF [Uganda People’s Defence Force]. During that period, they implemented strategies aimed at exacerbating the armed conflict by launching military operations of a large scale in Ituri, most often against armed groups and militias in Hema or Gegere, but mainly the Lendu civilians and similar ethnicities, in particular the Ngiti combatants from the FRPI militia, thus spreading terror, violence and death throughout Ituri.
149 … [T]he civil parties [to the present case] argued that the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should ensure to restore the safety of persons and their property throughout the national territory, including in Ituri, as well as ensure the safety of all of its borders.
150 … [A]ccording to the civil parties, the central government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, exasperated by the scale of the armed conflicts in this part of the territory and concerned about restoring its authority and peace throughout the national territory, especially in Ituri, decided, at about the end of the second trimester of 2002, with the aim of neutralizing the UPC, to establish a secret collaboration with certain armed groups and tribal militias present in Ituri which were hostile to the UPC and … the UPDF, and to strengthen their military capacities in the field.
151 … [I]n order to achieve such objective, the central government of the DRC focused on providing weapons and ammunition in abundance to armed groups and other tribal militias hostile to the UPC, in particular the FRPI Ngiti combatants, through the armed group RCD KML [Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani Movement for Liberation] of Mbusa Nyamwisi, as the latter was already an ally and controlled the aerodrome of Aveba, where planes carrying weapons and ammunition landed.
152 … [T]he civil parties concluded that it was in these circumstances that the FRPI Ngiti combatants were strengthened, through the supply of weapons and ammunition by the central Government of the DRC; and that it was with such weapons and ammunition that Collectivité Chefferie de Nyankunde and Groupement Mensudzo were attacked by such combatants … in September 2002, at the same time as the assaults launched by the same combatants against the positions of the armed branch of the UPC and the bases in Nyankunde centre of their allies of the Ugandan army, the UPDF, with the aim of dislodging them.
153 … [A]ccording to the civil parties, by proceeding this way, the central government of the DRC has de facto assigned to armed groups and tribal militias such as the FRPI Ngiti combatants a specific task which was related to the government’s national duty of putting an end to the armed conflicts in Ituri and restoring peace and the effectivity of its authority through the neutralization of the UPC, … FPLC and … UPDF.
154 … [T]he civil parties thus concluded that the Congolese government failed to fulfil its primary mission of ensuring the safety of the population of Ituri, including the inhabitants of Nyankunde and Musedzo; that the central government of the DRC created a relationship of principal and agent with those armed groups and tribal militias, including the FRPI Ngiti combatants; and that such relationship, according to article 260 of the Congolese Civil Code … , irreversibly and indubitably engages the civil responsibility of the principal, that is, the central government of the DRC, for the harm caused to third parties by FRPI Ngiti combatants.
155 … [This] Military Garrison Court finds that the civil parties raised contradictory arguments with the aim of holding the Congolese State civilly responsible in the present case … [T]he contradiction [is] blatant when they state that “there is evidence about [the defendant’s] indisputable membership of the FRPI: when arrested on 5 August 2007 fleeing from the sweep operations launched by the FAR[D]C [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo] against residual positions of the FRPI, … [he] was found in possession of a roadmap … signed by … the Chief of Staff of the FRPI, for the [the defendant’s] displacement to the [latter’s] residence in Nyavo” … However, if there were a relationship between the supposed principal, [that is], the central government of the DRC, and the agents, [that is], armed groups and tribal militias [including] the FRPI Ngiti combatants, the FARDC, which is DRC’s regular army, would not have carried out such sweep operations against the residual positions of the FRPI … [This armed group] is still present in Chefferie de WaLendu Bindi and still fights against the FARDC.
156 … [This] Military Garrison Court … dismisses the hypothesis of a principal’s civil liability pursuant to article 260 of the Congolese Civil Code … in favour of [the application of] article 258 of the same code, according to which any act committed by a person which causes damage to another obliges the one by whose fault it occurred to repair it. This view by the Court does not deviate from the individual criminal responsibility of the defendant by omission as explained above. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Garrison Court of Ituri-Bunia, Barnaba Yonga Tshopena case, Judgment, 9 July 2010, §§ 147–156.
France
In 2010, in the Kaplan case, France’s Paris Administrative Court was called to rule on a matter of compensation related to art works despoiled in occupied France during World War II:
[T]he Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Despoliation received an application for compensation regarding … pieces of art that were deposited in the safe of a bank in Bordeaux in 1941. According to the inventory of the deposit, there were 151 pieces, including 78 paintings, and all of them were seized by the occupying forces on 15 March 1943, while three of them were returned after the conflict. [The applicants] allege that the commission should have assessed the amount of the damage caused by the despoliation … with regards to [the value of the property at the] date when the damage was assessed rather than its value as recognized in 1962 by the German government … [The applicants allege also that] the prime minister, by adopting [the assessment of the damage as] recommended by the commission, violated the principle of integral reparation.
[A]ccording to article 1 of the Decree [No. 99-778] of 10 September 1999: “… a commission is established before the prime minister with the mandate of reviewing individual claims submitted by victims or their legal heirs or assignees in order to receive reparation for damages following the despoliation of their property resulting from anti-Semitic legislation adopted during the Occupation by either the occupying power or the Vichy government”.
… This decree does not aim at ensuring the integral reparation of the damage, but rather at allowing the State to restore the balance destroyed by the damage in a fashion that appears to be the most exact possible and taking into account in particular the difficulties related to the long time elapsed since the facts, the diversity of the stolen property and the determination of its value. 
France, Paris Administrative Court, Kaplan case, Judgment, 25 June 2010, pp. 1–2.
Greece
In Case No. 894/2001 in 2001, Greece’s Court of Appeal of Piraeus stated:
The international responsibility of the belligerent party was considered in the past as a responsibility towards the states and not the individuals, since the latter were only exceptionally recognized as subjects of international law … However the individuals are already recognized as direct subjects of international law in many sectors (e.g. human rights) and this is the contemporary tendency in international relations … [T]herefore it should be accepted that the violation of the Regulation of Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the fourth Hague Convention (19th October 1907) … creates an individual right for reparation of the victims of the violation and therefore the plaintiffs can raise against the German state an individual claim before the Greek courts. 
Greece, Court of Appeal of Piraeus, Judgment No 894/2001.
Nepal
In 2009, in the Bhandari case, Nepal’s Supreme Court described the facts of the case as follows:
The petitioners who were living in their own ancestral place have been wandering as … landless paupers and internal refugees in different parts of the country due to the conflict that started in the year 1996 following which the Maoists seized their land, house, industry, factory including movable and immovable property allegedly for professing political faith opposed by the Maoists. Since the internally displaced families had played [a] very important role during the movement of 2006/2007 they were confident that following the success of the movement, peace and order would be restored in the country resulting in the onset of New Nepal. Then movable and immovable property seized during the conflict would be easily returned and all the families would be allowed to settle in their respective settlements and make their living. As expected, the movement was successful and the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007, was promulgated which guaranteed fundamental rights and also inscribed that the property seized during the armed conflict would be returned. But their fate took a further downturn.
The Government of Nepal, the political parties and the respondents who were signatory to Art 5.1.8 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement annexed to the Constitution pursuant Article 166(3) did not return the seized movable and immovable property of the petitioners. Complaints were filed a number of times for the return of the property before the political party who were supposedly called the vanguards of the New Nepal, before the Human Rights Commission and the Nepal[ese] Government. However, no initiative was taken [by] them. 
Nepal, Supreme Court, Division Bench, Bhandari case, Order, 7 January 2009, p. 1.
The Court held:
At a time following the conclusion of the peace agreement, when the parties who were in conflict have tried to re-establish the[ir] relations in a new way, a question may be raised as to whether … scratching the issue of injustice of the past would not jeopardize the already established new relations. In this, there may also be people who would like to see justice and peace as mutually opposing. True, one cannot always say that every past atrocity should be settled through judicial process and [the] payment of reparation. Several disputes that occur in the course of the conflict may be settled by dialogue and amicable settlement forged between the parties. Inconveniences of the people may be removed by infrastructure development as well. But when incidents causing damage to the life, body and property occur or where violations of humanitarian laws also take place, such matters need to be dealt with by providing rehabilitation and reparation where the nature of [the] case so demands, and in others through the judicial process. Where violations of humanitarian laws result in the destruction of life and property, in such cases if due attention is not paid to such incidents, this may give rise to growth or flourishing of impunity. The impunity in reality is a situation opposed to the rule of law. Whether in peace or war, there are fundamental principles of rule of law that unite the society, and if they are disregarded, then justification of living in such society vanishes.
Therefore, there should be no negligence in the enforcement of human rights and humanitarian laws. Rather every situation of violations of human rights laws and humanitarian laws should be brought within the legal process and taken to the right conclusion. The society should be assured of the protection that could be offered by the law. If the State tries to escape from shouldering responsibility that result from the acts causing damage to [a] person’s body and property or gross violations of humanitarian laws, then the impact caused by such incidents to the person, family or society lingers. They may at any time and in any pretext resurface in the society in the form of reaction. Therefore, until the impacts of the conflicts are satisfactorily resolved, sustainable peace seems to be impossible. For that reason also the proper management of transitional justice appears important. 
Nepal, Supreme Court, Division Bench, Bhandari case, Order, 7 January 2009, p. 10.
Peru
In 2009, in the Fujimori case, the Special Criminal Chamber of Peru’s Supreme Court of Justice was called upon to decide whether a former Peruvian president incurred criminal and civil liability for acts committed in 1991 and 1992 in the context of anti-terror operations, including the abduction of two individuals (the so-called SIE Basement Case) and the murder and injury of numerous individuals in Barrios Altos and at the so-called La Cantuta university in Lima. All of these acts were carried out by State officials whilst [the accused] was president. The Court held:
[T]o the extent that the acts before us qualify as “… gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law constituting crimes under international law, …” as identified in the fourth principle [of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of IHL (2005)], the provisions of the [aforementioned] Basic Principles and Guidelines are applicable before domestic courts. 
Peru, Supreme Court of Justice, Fujimori case, 7 April 2009, § 800.
United States of America
In 2006, in the El Masri case, a civil suit in which the plaintiff claimed to have been an innocent victim of the US extraordinary rendition program and sought redress from the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, private corporations allegedly involved in the program, and unknown employees of both the CIA and the private corporations, the Court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss, finding that the claim of State secrets was valid. The Court stated:
[I]t is important to note that, unlike other privileges, the state secrets privilege is absolute and therefore once a court is satisfied that the claim is validly asserted, the privilege is not subject to a judicial balancing of the various interests at stake.
[T]he substance of El-Masri’s publicly available complaint alleges a clandestine intelligence program, and the means and methods the foreign intelligence services of this and other countries used to carry out the program. And, as the public declaration makes pellucidly clear, any admission or denial of these allegations by defendants in this case would reveal the means and methods employed pursuant to this clandestine program and such a revelation would present a grave risk of injury to national security.
To succeed on his claims, El-Masri would have to prove that he was abducted, detained, and subjected to cruel and degrading treatment, all as part of the United States’ extraordinary rendition program. As noted above, any answer to the complaint by the defendants risks the disclosure of specific details about the rendition argument.
[W]hile dismissal of the complaint deprives El-Masri of an American judicial forum for vindicating his claims, well-established and controlling legal principles require that in the present circumstances, El-Masri’s private interests must give way to the national interest in preserving state secrets. The United States’ motion to dismiss must therefore be granted.
It is important to emphasize that the result reached here is required by settled, controlling law. It is in no way an adjudication of, or comment on, the merit or lack of merit of El-Masri’s complaint. Nor does this ruling comment or rule in any way on the truth or falsity of his factual allegations; they may be true or false, in whole or in part. Further, it is also important that nothing in this ruling should be taken as a sign of judicial approval or disapproval of rendition programs; it is not intended to do either. In times of war, our country, chiefly through the Executive Branch, must often take exceptional steps to thwart the enemy. Of course, reasonable and patriotic Americans are still free to disagree about the propriety and efficacy of those exceptional steps. But what this decision holds is that these steps are not proper grist for the judicial mill where, as here, state secrets are at the center of the suit and the privilege is validly invoked.
Finally, it is worth noting that putting aside all the legal issues, if El-Masri’s allegations are true or essentially true, then all fair-minded people, including those who believe that state secrets must be protected, that this lawsuit cannot proceed, and that renditions are a necessary step to take in this war, must also agree that El-Masri has suffered injuries as a result of our country’s mistake and deserves a remedy. Yet, it is also clear from the result reached here that the only sources of that remedy must be the Executive Branch or the Legislative Branch, not the Judicial Branch. 
United States, District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, El Masri case, Judgment, 12 May 2006.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
In 2006, in its oral pleadings before the ICJ in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Bosnia and Herzegovina stated:
1. the basic principle, enunciated by the [Permanent Court of International Justice] in the Factory at Chorzów case, “is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act has not been committed”; this basic principle is incorporated in Article 31 of the 2001 Articles of the International Law Commission [ILC];
2. pursuant to the provisions of Article 34 of those same Articles, “[f]ull reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction …”;
3. inasmuch as making restitution means “to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed” – this being a quotation from the ILC – it constitutes a prime means of reparation, since it is, by definition, the one best suited to effectively ensuring full redress for the injury sustained;
4. however, to the extent that restitutio in integrum proves materially impossible or “out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation”, reparation may take the form of compensation involving “payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear”;
5. and lastly, “[t]he State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation”. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Oral pleadings before the ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 7 March 2006, Verbatim Record CR 2006/11, pp. 29–30, § 8.
Chile
In 2006, in its fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Chile stated:
Since March 1990, Chile’s democratic governments have been committed to taking legal and administrative measures to establish the truth and provide justice and reparation for the victims of human rights violations committed under the military regime. Such measures began to be implemented virtually from the moment President Patricio Aylwin took office, through the work carried out in 1990 by the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation and the publication of its report in February 1991. 
Chile, Fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 5 July 2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CHL/5, submitted 7 February 2006, § 99.
Chile also stated:
Right to effective redress, compensation and rehabilitation for the victims of torture and other ill-treatment
141. The right to fair and adequate compensation for the victims of torture is guaranteed under the general provisions and principles of Chilean legislation. Every offence is followed up by criminal proceedings in order to investigate the punishable act and punish the persons responsible for it, as well as civil proceedings to provide redress for the civil consequences of the offence. Such civil proceedings, one of the purposes of which may be to seek compensation for damage caused, may originate in the criminal proceedings themselves. In conformity with the general provisions of Chilean law, the victim of torture, certain family members and the heirs of a person who has suffered torture and died as a consequence may initiate civil proceedings to seek compensation.
Redress for victims of political imprisonment and torture during the military regime
142. The President’s proposal on human rights “No tomorrow without yesterday” expressly states that Chile owes a debt to those persons who suffered unfair and humiliating deprivation of liberty during the military regime, often accompanied by torture, and who have not been recognized as the victims of repression nor been granted any compensation.
National Commission on Political Prisoners and Torture
143. As a result of the President’s proposal, the National Commission on Political Prisoners and Torture was established as an advisory body to the President. Its functions were (a) to classify persons who suffered deprivation of liberty and torture on political grounds during the period between 11 September 1973 and 10 March 1990, and (b) to propose to the President the conditions, characteristics, forms and methods of compensation that could be granted to persons recognized as political prisoners or victims of torture who had not already received any benefits by way of compensation on those grounds.
144. The Commission launched its activities on 11 November 2003 in the Metropolitan Region, and on 10 December in the other regions and in Chilean consulates abroad. One year later it issued a report describing the historical context in which the torture had taken place, the attitude of the different State bodies to this practice, the different periods and types of political imprisonment and torture in Chile, the methods of torture used, places of detention, the profile of the victims and the effects of this abuse on them. In a year of activity the Commission received testimony from 35,868 people, of whom 28,000 residents in Chile and abroad were classified as victims; the remaining 7,000 testimonies were reviewed by the Commission, which classified a further 1,204 persons as victims. All the victims recognized by the Commission receive an annual pension and benefits from the Programme of Compensation and Comprehensive Health Care (PRAIS). 
Chile, Fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 5 July 2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CHL/5, submitted 7 February 2006, §§ 141–144.
[footnotes in original omitted]
Croatia
In its views and comments on the 1997 Draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Victims of [Gross] Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, as they were then called, Croatia stated:
It is clear that the right to claim reparation for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law should be given primarily to the direct victim; in cases where the direct victim is unable to claim or precluded from claiming reparation, such right should be enjoyed by the descendants of the direct victim, and subsidiarily to the persons closely connected with the direct victim. 
Croatia, Views and Comments on the note and revised Draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of [Gross] Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, 19 August 1997, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/34, 22 December 1997, § 6.
El Salvador
In 2009, in its written replies to the Committee against Torture concerning its second periodic report, El Salvador stated:
4. Indicate:
c) If a reparation program for victims [persons disappeared during the armed conflict of 1980 to 1992, including children] has been implemented; and if not the reasons for this.
d) If a comprehensive program for the search of disappeared persons exists.
10. With regards to subparagraphs c) and d), there is, to date, no comprehensive program for reparation to victims, favouring disappeared children; however, in the context of the work of the Inter-institutional Tracing Commission, psychological attention has been given to the found children and to their adoptive and biological families; as well as social assistance to these children in accordance with their needs (medical care, judicial and financial assistance, family reunion workshops, communication with their families abroad, among others).
11. On this point, it should be mentioned that given the new government vision, it has included as part of its 2009–2014 Government Program in the framework of Political Reform – Human Rights – a strategic guideline on “justice, reparation and truth” … [The latter will] establish the “Promotion and guarantee of a justice, truth and reparation policy for current and past grave violations of human rights. A comprehensive reparation policy – material and moral – will be adopted for victims of these violations”, as well as a “ … State reparation program for victims of violations of human rights with a legal basis, State resources and the cooperation of the international community”. In the context of Social Reform … Policy for Childhood and Adolescence … [the government has] a commitment to … [grant] “social support to families when their sons or daughters are in a difficult situation or at risk, such as: … 3) aid to families of sons and daughters disappeared during the war, among others”; and the commitment of the government of President Mauricio Funes Cartagena to implement the above-mentioned strategic guidelines. 
El Salvador, Written replies by the Government of El Salvador to the list of issues formulated by the Committee against Torture in connection with its consideration of the second periodic report of El Salvador, 12 October 2009, UN Doc. CAT/C/SLV/Q/2/Add.1, submitted 1 October 2009, Question 4(c–d), §§ 10 and 11.
El Salvador
In 2009, in its written replies to the Committee on the Rights of the Child concerning its third and fourth periodic reports, El Salvador stated in regard to the progress made and the current situation of the search for children who disappeared during the internal armed conflict:
62. … El Salvador, through its Minister for Foreign Affairs, has established an official dialogue with the Association for the Search for Disappeared Children, in furtherance of its obligations to comply with the judgement [of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights] in the case [on the disappearance] of the Serrano Cruz sisters and with the Court’s demands in other cases of disappeared children. It should be borne in mind that the Serrano Cruz judgement, although related to a specific case, contemplates a programme of reparation for all victims of enforced disappearance in El Salvador, including the creation of the aforementioned search commission, but also a webpage and the establishment of a genetic database. In the particular case of the Serrano sisters, progress has been made in medical care and in the approval of psychosocial attention by an expert known to the Serrano Cruz family. El Salvador wishes to inform the Committee of its determination to comply with these pending obligations in good faith and to the extent of its possibilities.
63. At the previously mentioned hearing of 6 November 2009 [on five cases of disappeared children, held in Washington, D.C.] before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, El Salvador radically altered its former positions regarding the problem of children who disappeared during the armed conflict. It recognized the existence of a pattern of child disappearances during that period, fully acknowledged the rights of victims to truth, justice and reparation, and promised to endeavour to discharge in good faith its international human rights obligations in this matter.
64. In connection with that hearing, the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Republic officially informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of its decision to conduct a criminal investigation into five cases of disappeared children which had not been adequately dealt with in the past …
65. These changes hold out the prospect of a historic breakthrough … in honouring and providing redress to the victims. 
El Salvador, Written replies by the Government of El Salvador to the list of issues prepared by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in connection with the consideration of the third and fourth periodic reports of El Salvador, UN Doc. CRC/C/SLV/Q/3–4/Add.1, submitted 10 December 2009, Question 13, §§ 62–65.
El Salvador
In 2010, in its written replies to the Human Rights Committee concerning its sixth periodic report, El Salvador stated in response to a question on the recommendation to review the General Amnesty for Consolidation of Peace Act of 1993:
As the State has already mentioned to the Committee against Torture, since the new Government assumed its functions on 1 June 2009, … the State of El Salvador has recognized the rights of victims of violations of human rights to know the truth, to have access to justice and to receive adequate reparations. 
El Salvador, Written replies by the Government of El Salvador to the list of issues formulated by the Human Rights Committee in connection with its consideration of the sixth periodic report of El Salvador, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SLV/Q/6/Add.1, 21 September 2010, § 5.
El Salvador also stated:
11. With regard to the reparation of victims of serious violations of human rights that occurred in the context of internal armed conflict [1980–1992], the State recognizes that this obligation has not been fulfilled despite the recommendations that have been emitted by several international bodies. As a result of the above, in the context of the new Government of the Republic, … the State has decided to advance in the process of implementation of this obligation. In this sense, Executive Decree No. 57 of 5 May 2010, creating the “National Commission for Reparation to Victims of Grave Violations of Human Rights that occurred in the context of the internal armed conflict”, was approved.
12. This Commission, composed of high officials of the current Government, will have the mandate of designing a comprehensive collective reparations program with a working procedure that will necessarily include the participation of victims of serious violations of human rights that occurred during the internal armed conflict through civil society organizations representing them. 
El Salvador, Written replies by the Government of El Salvador to the list of issues formulated by the Human Rights Committee in connection with its consideration of the sixth periodic report of El Salvador, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SLV/Q/6/Add.1, 21 September 2010, §§ 11–12.
On the question of the search for persons, El Salvador further stated:
61. … [I]n the context of the current Government of El Salvador (which assumed its functions on 1 June 2009), the state has recognized that practices such as the enforced disappearance of persons took place in the context of the internal armed conflict, causing profound suffering to the affected families.
In addition, it has recognized the right of the families of victims of enforced disappearance to know the truth on the whereabouts of their loved ones, to have access to a judicial remedy and to obtain reparations in accordance with the standards of International Human Rights Law applicable to El Salvador.
62. This recognition of state responsibility materialized in a public act of reparation that met the internationally recognized standards for this type of state act. It was presided by the head of the Executive Branch, …, Constitutional President of El Salvador, on the occasion of the 18th Anniversary of the Peace Agreement on 16 January 2010. In this event, the President, on behalf of the Salvadoran State, asked for forgiveness to those who were victims of grave violations of human rights during the past internal conflict, due to acts like the enforced disappearance of persons. This act of pardon was extended to the families that have not been able to finish their grieving process due to the unknown whereabouts of their loved ones and to not having had the protection of the [State’s] institutions. During the same event, the President of El Salvador signed an Executive Decree for the creation of the “National Commission for Tracing Boys and Girls Missing during the internal armed conflict” in accordance with the standards required by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; he also announced the creation of a “National Commission for Reparation to victims of grave violations of human rights that occurred in the context of the internal armed conflict”, which has been recently established by an Executive Decree in May 2010. 
El Salvador, Written replies by the Government of El Salvador to the list of issues formulated by the Human Rights Committee in connection with its consideration of the sixth periodic report of El Salvador, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SLV/Q/6/Add.1, 21 September 2010, §§ 61–62.
On the issue of the search for children, El Salvador also stated:
[O]n 18 January 2010, Executive Decree No. 5, giving legal validity to the current “National Commission for Tracing Boys and Girls Missing during the internal armed conflict”, was published in the Official Journal. … This Commission, … which will be instituted in July 2010, will have within its functions … promoting the right of victims to have access to justice, among others. 
El Salvador, Written replies by the Government of El Salvador to the list of issues formulated by the Human Rights Committee in connection with its consideration of the sixth periodic report of El Salvador, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SLV/Q/6/Add.1, 21 September 2010, § 67.
France
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in 2004, France stated:
As the Permanent Court of International Justice stated in a famous passage: “The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act … is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed” [Permanent Court of International Justice, Factory at Chorzów, Judgment No. 13, 13 September 1928, Series A, No. 17, p. 47]. 
France, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 30 January 2004, § 63.
Germany
In 1995, in reply to a question from members of the Lower House of Parliament with respect to reparation payments to Greek victims of the German National Socialist regime, the German Government stated:
The … alleged claims of Greece with regard to Germany are claims for reparation … After 50 years have passed since the end of the war and [after] decades of peaceful, trustingly and fruitful co-operation of the Federal Republic of Germany with the international community of States, the issue of reparations has lost its legitimacy. Since the end of the Second World War, Germany has made reparations to a high degree, which, according to general public international law, the States concerned should use to compensate their nationals … Additionally, reparations [made] 50 years after the end of hostilities would constitute an exception without precedence in the practice of public international law. 
Germany, Lower House of Parliament, Response by the federal government to a question from members of parliament, Payments in compensation to Greek victims of the National Socialist regime, BT-Drucksache 13/2878, 7 November 1995.
Germany
In 2009, in reply to a Minor Interpellation in the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) entitled “Gaza War”, Germany’s Federal Government wrote:
b) Does the Federal Government consider it necessary to require Israel to make reparation for Gaza in order to repair the damage caused by the war?
In principle a State’s responsibility under international law is only engaged in case the State acted contrary to international law. In this respect, reference is made to the answers to questions 2 and 4. 
Germany, Lower House of Federal Parliament (Bundestag), Reply by the Federal Government to the Minor Interpellation by the Members Dr. Norman Paech, Monika Knoche, Wolfgang Gehrcke, further Members and the Parliamentary Group DIE LINKE, BT-Drs. 16/12087, 27 February 2009, p. 6.
The Federal Government further stated:
2. a) Is it correct that the Federal Government still considers the Gaza-Strip as territory occupied by Israel?
b) If so, does the Federal Government share the view that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians constitutes an international armed conflict?
c) If not, why not?
On 12 September 2005, Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip after 38 years. However, it continues to exercise control over the borders and airspace of the Gaza Strip. The Federal Government is thus of the view that the civilian population in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel is protected by international humanitarian law, in particular the [1949] Geneva Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. This remains the case as long as Israel is exercising effective control over the Gaza Strip as occupying power. Therefore, in the Federal Government’s view, the provisions of the Geneva Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War apply to the armed confrontations between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. 
Germany, Lower House of Federal Parliament (Bundestag), Reply by the Federal Government to the Minor Interpellation by the Members Dr. Norman Paech, Monika Knoche, Wolfgang Gehrcke, further Members and the Parliamentary Group DIE LINKE, BT-Drs. 16/12087, 27 February 2009, p. 3.
The Federal Government also stated:
4. How does the Federal Government justify its position that despite the allegations of independent international observers that Israel committed war crimes and human rights violations during the recent war in the Gaza Strip, the creation of an International Commission to investigate such allegations is to be blocked?
The Federal Government has always emphasized that fundamental rules of international humanitarian law must also be respected in Gaza … An investigation commission of the United Nations which examines attacks against UN installations and operations during the Gaza war began its work on 12 February 2009 and will report to the Secretary General of the United Nations after completing its investigations. The Federal Government agrees with its partners in the European Union that the result of these investigations should not be pre-empted. This common position is also reflected in the Council conclusions of 26 and 27 January 2009: “The Council reminds all parties to the conflict to fully respect human rights and comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and will follow closely investigations into alleged violations of international humanitarian law.” 
Germany, Lower House of Federal Parliament (Bundestag), Reply by the Federal Government to the Minor Interpellation by the Members Dr. Norman Paech, Monika Knoche, Wolfgang Gehrcke, further Members and the Parliamentary Group DIE LINKE, BT-Drs. 16/12087, 27 February 2009, p. 4.
Indonesia
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in 2004, Indonesia stated:
Israel is under legal obligations to restore land and private properties forcibly seized for the construction of the Wall, to pay full compensation, to annul all measures enacted regarding the Wall, [and] to cease restriction on freedom of movement in the Occupied Palestine Territory, including East Jerusalem. 
Indonesia, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 29 January 2004, p. 9.
Jordan
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in 2004, Jordan stated:
5.288 There is no doubt that in international law the breach of an international obligation carries with it the obligation to make adequate reparation.
5.289 Where the breaches of international law are not merely breaches occurring in what may be termed a “civil” context (such as the expropriation of property without compensation) but occur in a context which is delictual, involving, in particular, the use of force in breach of the United Nations Charter and rules of international law having the character of ius cogens, the nature of the reparation to be made will need to reflect the more serious basis of liability.
5.290 Moreover, where a breach of international law has been accompanied by a deliberate intention to cause harm to those affected, the normal rule that reparation is only due in respect of the normal and reasonably foreseeable consequences of an unlawful act is extended so as to cover also those deliberately intended consequences. …
5.296 Where the primary remedy for the unlawful act (restitution) is not available, the principle of effective reparation requires extensive compensation. Against the background of the requirement that reparation must be “full” and that the injury for which reparation is due “includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State (Article 31.2), Article 36 of the [International Law Commission’s] Articles on State Responsibility provides:
“1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution.
2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established.” 
Jordan, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 30 January 2004, §§ 5.288–5.290 and 5.296.
[emphasis in original]
Kuwait
According to the Report on the Practice of Kuwait, it is Kuwait’s opinio juris that States that cause damage to the environment are under a duty to remedy such damage. 
Report on the Practice of Kuwait, 1997, Chapter 4.4.
Malaysia
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in 2004, Malaysia stated:
Israel is obliged to make reparation to the Palestinian Authority, as well as to the individual victims concerned, for all the internationally wrongful acts committed by the construction and maintenance of the Wall. 
Malaysia, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 30 January 2004, p. 56.
In its oral pleadings, Malaysia stated:
On the one hand, Israel is under an obligation to put an end to the unlawful situation; on the other hand, it is required to make reparation for the damage caused by construction of the Wall. This leads to the application of the primary principle in the matter, namely that of restitutio in integrum, which involves the destruction of the Wall and the restoration of the status quo ante. 
Malaysia, Oral pleadings before the ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 February 2004, Verbatim Record CR 2004/2 (official translation), p. 56.
Peru
In 2004, in its fourth periodic report to the Committee against Torture, Peru stated:
120. The TRC [Truth and Reconciliation Commission] laid down the duty and right to compensate the victims of violence in the following terms:
According to international human rights law, the responsibility of the State arises when the latter fails to fulfil its primary obligation to respect and ensure respect for internally recognized human rights. This obligation includes … the duty to provide compensation for victims.
121. Insofar as, according to the TRC, the Peruvian State has the duty to offer due compensation to all victims of violence, including torture victims, the TRC recommended a Comprehensive Plan for Reparations, the general objective of which is: “to repair and compensate the violation of human rights as well as social, moral and material losses or damage suffered by victims as a result of internal armed conflict.” This plan makes provision for various types of reparations …
Comprehensive Plan for Reparations includes torture victims:
Generally speaking, the TRC considers that victims include … all persons or groups of persons who for the purposes of or on account of the internal armed conflict which the country underwent between May 1980 and November 2000 have been subjected to any acts or omissions that violate the rules of international human rights law, such as: enforced disappearance, abduction, extrajudicial execution, assassination, enforced displacement, arbitrary arrest and violation of due process, enforced recruitment, torture, rape, and wounds, injuries or death inflicted in the course of attacks that violate international humanitarian law.
123. In order to follow up the TRC’s recommendations and to coordinate the implementation of public policies specifically aimed at the fulfilment of peace, reconciliation and collective reparation goals, the High Level Multisectoral Committee was set up with responsibility for monitoring State actions and policies in the areas of peace, collective reparation and national reconciliation. Within one year of the issue of the TRC’s final report, the High Level Committee found that a number of steps had been taken to achieve collective reparations, including the following: approval of the Framework Programme of State Action in the Area of Peace, Reparation and National Reconciliation; the Supreme Decree extending the benefits of comprehensive health insurance to the victims of internal conflict suffering from mental health problems; and the Ministerial Decision setting up a list of victims’ organizations. 
Peru, Fourth periodic report to the Committee against Torture, 27 May 2005, UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.697, submitted 15 November 2004, §§ 120–121 and 123; see also § 177–179.
[Emphasis in original; footnotes in original omitted]
Saudi Arabia
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in 2004, Saudi Arabia stated regarding the obligation to make reparation arising from an internationally wrongful act:
The Separation Wall is an international wrongful act by the occupying Power and thus entails its international responsibility. There are legal consequences. The first obligation is to cease performance of the internationally wrongful act, not to repeat it, and to make full reparation. Reparation includes restitution, which in this case requires destruction of the Separation Wall, compensation and satisfaction. 
Saudi Arabia, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 30 January 2004, pp. 22–23.
Spain
In 2008, in its written replies to the Human Rights Committee concerning its fifth periodic report, Spain stated with regard to the reparation measures that have been granted to victims of torture: “[N]ote should be taken of the recent adoption of Act. No. 52/2007 of 26 December 2007, which recognizes and extends rights and introduces measures in favour of victims of persecution or violence during the civil war and the dictatorship”. 
Spain, Written replies by the Government of Spain to the Human Rights Committee concerning the list of issues raised in connection with the fifth periodic report of Spain, 14 October 2008, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ESP/Q/5/Add.1, Question 7(d), p. 20.
Switzerland
In 2005, in a report in response to a parliamentary postulate on private security and military companies, Switzerland’s Federal Council stated:
Nonfeasance in international law or activities running counter to international law which can be ascribed to states raises the question of their so-called state responsibility. Important rules regarding state responsibility are contained in the [2001] “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” of the “International Law Commission” of the United Nations (ILC), a document reflecting international customary law.
A state can be held responsible for acts carried out by its authorities who contravene international law. Conduct running counter to international law of an individual, a group of individuals, or a corporate body which are not state bodies can also be ascribed to a state if the named actors are empowered on the basis of the laws of this state to carry out sovereign activities, or if in their activities they in fact act under the instructions or under the direction or control of this state. In addition, the conduct of an individual or group of individuals, according to international law, is considered to be an act of the state if the individual or group of individuals, in the absence or default of the official authorities actually assume sovereign functions, and conditions are such that the exercise of such sovereign functions are required (Art. 5, 8 and 9 of the ILC Draft Articles).
The consequence of this state responsibility is the obligation to provide full reparation in the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction to the wronged state or if necessary to the international community (Part 2 of the ILC Draft Articles).
Thus the conduct of private security companies mandated by states can potentially be ascribed to a state under international law.
While the “Draft Articles” of the ILC describe state responsibility towards other states or the international community, individuals also have the possibility to bring before certain national and international forums a state which has violated certain rules of international law (international humanitarian law or human rights). However the investigation of the different national and regional possibilities to call a state to account on the basis of international law is beyond the scope of this report. 
Switzerland, Report by the Swiss Federal Council on Private Security and Military Companies, 2 December 2005, Section 5.5.1, p. 48.
[footnote in original omitted; emphasis in original]
Switzerland
In 2006, Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs issued a conceptual framework for dealing with the past, which states:
Although there is no standard model for dealing with the past, Switzerland has strongly contributed to the elaboration of a conceptual framework in this field. The so-called “Joinet principles” constitute the basis of this approach. They identify four key areas in the struggle against impunity:
- The right to know,
- The right to justice,
- The right to reparation,
- The guarantee of non-recurrence.
The right to reparation
The right to reparation, both at the individual level and in collective forms, entails individual measures for victims and their relatives or dependants such as:
- Restitution, i.e. seeking to restore the victim to his or her previous situation;
- Compensation for physical or mental injury, including lost opportunities, physical damage, defamation, and legal aid costs;
- Rehabilitation, i.e. medical care, including psychological and psychiatric treatment.
Collective measures of reparation involve symbolic acts such as annual tributes of homage to the victims or public recognition by the State of its responsibility, which help to discharge the duty of remembrance and help restore victims’ dignity. 
Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland’s conceptual framework for dealing with the past, 2006.
Switzerland
In 2010, in response to a question by a member of the National Council, Switzerland’s Federal Council wrote:
Independently of the right to justice, and in line with Switzerland's commitment to peace and reconciliation in Sri Lanka, the Federal Council encourages the Sri Lankan government to address the recent past of the country, in accordance with the three other “Joinet principles” adopted by the Commission on Human Rights of the UN: the right to know, the right to reparation and the guarantee of non-recurrence.  
Switzerland, National Council, Response by the Federal Council to Interpellation No. 10.3457, 8 September 2010, p. 2.
Switzerland
In 2011, Switzerland’s Federal Council issued a communiqué on the continuation of measures promoting peace and human security 2012–2016, which stated:
[Switzerland] will concretely support societies emerging from armed conflicts so that a holistic approach to dealing with the past and to fighting impunity is put in place, combining measures such as fact-finding and truth commission, special courts, reparation and rehabilitation programmes for victims and reform of security institutions to strengthen guarantees of non-repetition. … With regard to the fight against impunity, Switzerland will refer in its action to relevant international principles that provide a strategic framework of reference for taking measures focused on the rights of victims and the obligation of States in the area of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition of violations (“Joinet principles”). 
Switzerland, Federal Council, Communiqué on the continuation of measures promoting peace and human security 2012–2016, 29 June 2011, pp. 5909–5910.
Switzerland
In 2012, in a statement before the UN Security Council during a debate on women, peace and security, Switzerland’s chargé d’affaires a.i. stated:
We strongly encourage more systematic measures to enhance protection and prevent the recurrence of sexual violence through transitional justice approaches. These measures should combine the fight against impunity as well as the recognition of the rights of victims – for example through appropriate reparations[.] 
Switzerland, Statement by the chargé d’affaires a.i. of Switzerland before the UN Security Council during a debate on women, peace and security, 23 February 2012.
Switzerland
In 2013, Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs issued the document “Women, Peace and Security: National Action Plan to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)”, which states:
The concept of [d]ealing with the past stems from the Principles against Impunity developed by Louis Joinet and approved by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1997. These principles recognise the rights of victims and the duties of states in combating impunity in cases of grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The Principles against Impunity call for combined initiatives to ensure the realisation of these rights and obligations in the following areas: the right to know, the right to justice, the right to reparation and the guarantee of non-recurrence. 
Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Women, Peace and Security: National Action Plan to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), 2013, p. 5.
The Action Plan also states:
GOAL 3
Greater inclusion of a gender perspective during and after violent conflicts in emergency aid, reconstruction and in dealing with the past
SUBORDINATE GOAL 3
Switzerland implements UNSCR [UN Security Council resolution] 1325 during and after violent conflicts, as well as in fragile contexts through its bilateral measures for emergency aid, reconstruction and dealing with the past.
Measures
3 Activities, programmes and projects focused on dealing with the past (DwP) incorporate gender aspects in in all four areas: Right to Truth, Right to Justice, Right to Reparation, Guarantee of Non-Recurrence). 
Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Women, Peace and Security: National Action Plan to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), 2013, pp. 16–17.
[emphasis in original; footnote in original omitted]
Switzerland
In 2013, in a statement before the UN Security Council during a debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, Switzerland’s chargé d’affaires stated:
We remain most concerned by reports of serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in Syria. … In view of the extent of the violations and the number of victims in Syria, a holistic approach will be required in order to address the victims’ right to know, right to justice, right to reparation, and the guarantee of non-recurrence, within the framework of a political solution to the conflict. 
Switzerland, Statement by the chargé d’affaires of Switzerland before the UN Security Council during a debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 19 August 2013.
Uganda
In the Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation signed between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement in 2007, the contracting Parties,
[h]aving signed the Principal Agreement by which the parties committed themselves to implementing accountability and reconciliation with respect to the conflict;
[decided that t]he Government shall by law establish a body to be conferred with all the necessary powers and immunities [to inquire into the past and related matters], whose functions shall include:
(j) to make recommendations for the most appropriate modalities for implementing a regime of reparations, taking into account the principles set out in the Principal Agreement. 
Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation signed between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) on 29 June 2007, Juba, 19 February 2008, Preamble, Article 4(j).
The Annexure also includes a title “Reparations”, which provides:
16. The Government shall establish the necessary arrangements for making reparations to victims of the conflict in accordance with the terms of the Principal Agreement.
17. Prior to establishing arrangements for reparations, the Government shall review the financial and institutional requirements for reparations, in order to ensure the adoption of the most effective mechanisms for reparations.
18. In reviewing the question of reparations, consideration shall be given to clarifying and determining the procedures for reparations. 
Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation signed between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) on 29 June 2007, Juba, 19 February 2008, Articles 16–18.
United States of America
In 2001, a draft concurrent resolution was put before the US Congress for it to call upon the Government of Japan to “immediately pay reparations to the victims of [sexual enslavement of young women during colonial occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands during the Second World War, known to the world as ‘comfort women’]”. 
United States, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, 1st Session, Concurrent Resolution 195, HCON 195 IH, 24 July 2001.
United States of America
In 2005, the US Department of Justice submitted a Statement of Interest of the United States to the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York prior to that court’s consideration of Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation (The Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin, et al. v. Dow Chemical Company, et al). That statement reiterated the US position that no rule of international law barred the use of chemical herbicides in war generally nor barred the destruction of crops intended for use by enemy forces. With regard to reparations, it stated:
[I]n light of the traditional rule of international law that war reparations are the subject of government-to-government negotiations, and not individual claims, recognizing such federal common law claims would be truly extraordinary.
War reparations include “all the loss and damage to which … Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them.” Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 275 (D.NJ. 1999), quoting The Versatile Treaty, art. 231. See also Black’s Law Dictionary at 1325 (8th ed. 2004) (defining reparations as “[c]ompensation for an injury or wrong, esp. for wartime damages or breach of an international obligation”). Claims based upon the United States’ use of chemical herbicides as a tool of war readily fall within the scope of war reparations claims.
Yet such war reparations claims have traditionally been, and as a matter of customary international law are, the subject of government-to-government negotiations, as opposed to private lawsuits. “Under international law claims for compensation by individuals harmed by war-related activity belong exclusively to the state of which the individual is a citizen.” Burger-Fischer. 65 F. Supp. at 273. Thus, “[l]ike other claims for violation of an international obligation, a state’s claim for a violation that caused injury to rights or interests of private persons is a claim of the state and is under the state’s control… Any reparation is, in principle, for the violation of the obligation to the state, and any payment made is to the state.” Restatement (3d) Foreign Relations § 902, comment i (emphasis added); cf Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003) (“[historically, wartime claims against even nominally private entities have become issues in international diplomacy”).
This latter point undermines any assertion that private claims for war reparations are as widely accepted as the eighteenth century paradigms discussed in Sosa Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, US Supreme Court, 2004]. To the contrary, it establishes precisely the opposite – as a matter of international law war reparations claims such as plaintiffs’ belong to states and not to individuals. To jettison this legal principle in order to recognize individual causes of actions for plaintiffs’ claims would run counter to Sosa’s admonition that the practical consequences of recognizing new causes of action “must” inform the Court’s judgment in crafting federal common law. In sum, the determination of whether, when, and how to pay reparations for conduct of the United States’ Armed Forces should stay where it has been for the past two-hundred-plus years by virtue of both the Constitution and principles of customary international law – with the Political Branches of government. For this reason as well, the Court should not recognize any federal common law cause of action in this case. 
United States, Department of Justice, Statement of Interest of the United States submitted to the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York, In re: Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation (The Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin, et al. v. Dow Chemical Company, et al), 12 January 2005, pp. 42–43.
United States of America
In 2005, in its second periodic report to the Committee Against Torture, the United States stated that it “continues to hold the view that in addition to monetary compensation, States should take steps to make available other forms of remedial benefits to victims of torture, including medical and psychiatric treatment as well as social and legal services”. 
United States, Second periodic report to the Committee Against Torture, 13 January 2006, UN Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3/Rev.1, submitted 6 May 2005, p.27, § 83.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1993 on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the UN General Assembly recognized “the right of victims of ‘ethnic cleansing’ to receive just reparation for their losses” and urged all parties “to fulfil their agreements to this end”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 48/153, 20 December 1993, § 13, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1994 on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the UN General Assembly recognized “the right of victims of ethnic cleansing to receive just reparation for their losses” and urged all parties “to fulfil their agreements to this end”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 49/196, 23 December 1994, § 13, voting record: 150-0-14-21.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on Afghanistan, the UN General Assembly urged the Afghan authorities “to provide efficient and effective remedies to the victims of grave violations of human rights and of accepted humanitarian rules”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 51/108, 12 December 1996, § 11, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In 2001, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled “Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”, to which the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, and thus Article 31 entitled “Reparation”, was annexed. In the resolution, the General Assembly took note of the Draft Articles and commended them to the attention of governments “without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate action”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 56/83, 12 December 2001, § 3 and Annex, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the UN General Assembly stressed:
… that national legal systems should ensure that the victims of [torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment] obtain redress, are awarded fair and adequate compensation and receive appropriate social and medical rehabilitation, and encourages the development of rehabilitation centres for victims of torture. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 58/164, 22 December 2003, § 2, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 during an emergency special session on the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, the UN General Assembly:
Having received with respect the advisory opinion of the Court on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, rendered on 9 July 2004,
Noting in particular that the Court replied to the question put forth by the General Assembly in resolution ES-10/14 as follows:
“B. Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto, in accordance with paragraph 151 of this Opinion;
“C. Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem;
2. Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, comply with its legal obligations as mentioned in the advisory opinion. 
UN General Assembly, Res. ES-10/15, 20 July 2004, preamble and § 2, voting record: 150-6-10-25.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the UN General Assembly:
Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, comply with its legal obligations under international law, as mentioned in the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice and as demanded in resolution ES-10/15 and resolution ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, and that it cease the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, dismantle forthwith the structure situated therein, repeal or render ineffective all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto, and make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/124, 10 December 2004, § 8, voting record: 149-7-22-13.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the UN General Assembly:
Stresses that national legal systems must ensure that victims of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment obtain redress, are awarded fair and adequate compensation and receive appropriate social and medical rehabilitation, urges Governments to take effective measures to this end, and in this regard encourages the development of rehabilitation centres. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/182, 20 December 2004, § 9, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the UN General Assembly:
Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, comply with its legal obligations under international law, as mentioned in the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice and as demanded in resolution ES-10/15 and resolution ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, and that it immediately cease the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, dismantle forthwith the structure situated therein, repeal or render ineffective all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto, and make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/107, 8 December 2005, § 8, voting record: 148-7-17-19.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 entitled “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, the UN General Assembly:
Affirming the importance of addressing the question of remedies and reparation for victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law in a systematic and thorough way at the national and international levels,
Recognizing that in honouring the victims’ right to benefit from remedies and reparation, the international community keeps faith with the plight of victims, survivors and future human generations. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/147, 16 December 2005, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the UN General Assembly:
Stresses that national legal systems must ensure that victims of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment obtain redress, are awarded fair and adequate compensation and receive appropriate social and medical rehabilitation, urges States to take effective measures to this end, and in this regard encourages the development of rehabilitation centres. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/148, 16 December 2005, § 9, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on the situation in Afghanistan, the UN General Assembly:
Continues to emphasize the necessity of investigating allegations of current and past violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law, including violations committed against persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, as well as against women and girls, [and] of facilitating the provision of efficient and effective remedies to the victims. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/18, 28 November 2006, § 19, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on the commemoration of the two-hundredth anniversary of the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling that slavery and the slave trade were declared a crime against humanity by the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, held in Durban, South Africa, from 31 August to 8 September 2001,
Recalling paragraphs 98 to 106 of the Durban Declaration, and emphasizing, in particular, the importance of the “provision of effective remedies, recourse, redress, and compensatory and other measures at the national, regional and international levels”, aimed at countering the continued impact of slavery and the slave trade. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/19, 28 November 2006, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the UN General Assembly:
Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, comply with its legal obligations under international law, as mentioned in the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice and as demanded in resolutions ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 and ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, and that it immediately cease the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, dismantle forthwith the structure situated therein, repeal or render ineffective all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto, and make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall, which has gravely impacted the human rights and the socio-economic living conditions of the Palestinian people. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/119, 14 December 2006, § 12, voting record: 157-9-14-12.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution entitled “Establishment of the United Nations Register of Damage Caused by the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” adopted in 2006 during an emergency special session, the UN General Assembly:
Guided by the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the rules and principles of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law,
Recalling also its relevant resolutions, including the resolutions of its tenth emergency special session on illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Recalling further the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and recalling in particular the Court’s reply to the question put forth by the General Assembly in resolution ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, as set forth in the dispositif of the advisory opinion,
Recalling in this regard the Court’s conclusion that, inter alia, “Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem”,
Reaffirming its resolution ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 entitled “Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem”,
Recalling the request made in resolution ES-10/15 for the Secretary-General to establish a register of damage caused to all natural or legal persons concerned in connection with paragraphs 152 and 153 of the advisory opinion,
Noting in this connection the Court’s conclusion whereby, inter alia:
Israel is accordingly under an obligation to return the land, orchards, olive groves and other immovable property seized from any natural or legal person for purposes of construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In the event that such restitution should prove to be materially impossible, Israel has an obligation to compensate the persons in question for the damage suffered. The Court considers that Israel also has an obligation to compensate, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law, all natural or legal persons having suffered any form of material damage as a result of the wall’s construction,
Recognizing the necessity of accurately documenting the damage caused by the construction of the wall for the purpose of fulfilling the obligation to make the above-mentioned reparations, including restitution and compensation, in accordance with the rules and principles of international law, and noting that the act of registration of damage, as such, does not entail, at this stage, an evaluation or assessment of the loss or damage caused by the construction of the wall,
1. Reaffirms its resolution ES-10/15 entitled “Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem”, and reiterates the demands made therein, inter alia, the demand that Israel, the occupying Power, comply with its legal obligations as mentioned in the advisory opinion;
3. Establishes the United Nations Register of Damage Caused by the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory:
(a) To serve as a record, in documentary form, of the damage caused to all natural and legal persons concerned as a result of the construction of the wall by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem;
4. Decides to set up an office of the Register of Damage, which will be:
(a) Responsible for the establishment and comprehensive maintenance of the Register of Damage;
(b) Composed of a three-member Board and a small secretariat …
(c) A subsidiary organ of the General Assembly operating under the administrative authority of the Secretary-General;
6. Decides that the responsibilities assumed by the Board of the Office of the Register of Damage shall be as follows:
(a) The Board shall have overall responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of the Register of Damage;
(c) The Board shall determine the eligibility criteria, bearing in mind varying circumstances with regard to the title and residency status of the claimants, for the inclusion of damages and losses caused in the Register of Damage with an established causal link to the construction of the wall;
(d) The Board shall, guided by the relevant findings of the advisory opinion, general principles of international law and principles of due process of law, also determine the criteria of damage and the procedure for the collection and registration of damage claims;
8. Decides that the secretariat of the Office of the Register of Damage shall provide substantive, technical and administrative support for the establishment and maintenance of the Register of Damage by undertaking, inter alia, the following functions:
(a) Designing the format of the damage claims;
(b) Administering a public awareness programme to inform the Palestinian public about the possibility of and the requirements for filing a damage claim for registration, including an extensive community outreach programme to explain the purpose of the Register of Damage and provide guidance on how to fill out and submit the claim forms;
12. Instructs the Office of the Register of Damage, immediately upon its establishment, to seek the cooperation of the concerned Governments and authorities so as to facilitate its work in connection with the collection, submission and processing of damage claims in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem;
13. Calls upon the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority and relevant Palestinian institutions to cooperate with the Office of the Register of Damage. 
UN General Assembly, Res. ES-10/17, 15 December 2006, preamble and §§ 1, 3–4, 6, 8 and 12–13, voting record: 162-7-7-15
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the UN General Assembly:
Stresses that national legal systems must ensure that victims of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment obtain redress, are awarded fair and adequate compensation and receive appropriate social and medical rehabilitation, urges States to take effective measures to this end, and in this regard encourages the development of rehabilitation centres. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/153, 19 December 2006, § 10, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the situation in Afghanistan, the UN General Assembly:
Continues to emphasize the necessity of investigating allegations of current and past violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law, including violations committed against persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, as well as against women and girls, of facilitating the provision of efficient and effective remedies to the victims and of bringing the perpetrators to justice in accordance with international law. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/6, 11 November 2007, § 20, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the UN General Assembly:
Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, comply with its legal obligations under international law, as mentioned in the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice and as demanded in resolutions ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 and ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, and that it immediately cease the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, dismantle forthwith the structure situated therein, repeal or render ineffective all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto, and make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall, which has gravely impacted the human rights and the socio-economic living conditions of the Palestinian people. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/109, 17 December 2007, § 12, voting record: 156-7-11-18.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the UN General Assembly:
Stresses that national legal systems must ensure that victims of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment obtain redress, are awarded fair and adequate compensation and receive appropriate social and medical rehabilitation, urges States to take effective measures to this end, and in this regard encourages the development of rehabilitation centres. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/148, 18 December 2007, § 13, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the elimination of rape and other forms of sexual violence in all their manifestations, including in conflict, the UN General Assembly urged States:
To provide victims with access to appropriate health care, including sexual and reproductive health care, psychological care and trauma counselling, as well as to rehabilitation, social reintegration and, as appropriate, effective and sufficient compensation, in accordance with relevant international and national law. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/134, 18 December 2007, § 1(c), adopted without a vote.
UN Economic and Social Council
In a resolution adopted in 2005 entitled “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, ECOSOC:
Taking note of Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/35 of 19 April 2005, in which the Commission adopted the text of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,
1. Expresses its appreciation to the Commission for the adoption of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law;
2. Adopts the Basic Principles and Guidelines as contained in the annex to the present resolution;
3. Recommends to the General Assembly that it adopt the Basic Principles and Guidelines. 
ECOSOC, Res. 2005/30, 25 July 2005, preamble and §§ 1–3, voting record: 43-0-5.
[The UN General Assembly subsequently adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines in its resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005]
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1998, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged all parties to the conflict in Afghanistan to respect IHL and “to provide sufficient and effective remedies to the victims of grave violations and abuses of human rights and of accepted humanitarian rules”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1998/70, 21 April 1998, § 5(d), adopted without a vote; see also Res. 1996/75, 23 April 1996, § 10, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
4. … urges Governments to take effective measures to provide redress and to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including their gender-based manifestations;
10. Also stresses that national legal systems should ensure that the victims of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment obtain redress and are awarded fair and adequate compensation and receive appropriate socio-medical rehabilitation, and in this regard encourages the development of rehabilitation centres for victims of torture. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/32, 23 April 2003, §§ 4 and 10, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 entitled “The right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms”, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Reaffirming that, pursuant to internationally proclaimed human rights principles, victims of grave violations of human rights should receive, in appropriate cases, restitution, compensation and rehabilitation,
Reiterating the importance of addressing the question of restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in a systematic and thorough way at the national and international levels,
Recalling also the report of the independent expert, Mr. Cherif Bassiouni, appointed by the Commission (E/CN.4/2000/62), and, in particular, the draft of the “Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”, annexed to his report, and the note by the Secretariat (E/CN.4/2002/70),
1. Calls upon the international community to give due attention to the right to a remedy and, in particular, in appropriate cases, to receive restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, for victims of grave violations of international human rights law and humanitarian international law;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to circulate to all Member States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council the draft of the “Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”, annexed to the report of the independent expert, and to request those that have not yet done so to send their comments thereon to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights;
3. Takes note of the report of the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the consultative meeting, held on 30 September and 1 October 2002, with a view to finalizing the “Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law” (E/CN.4/2003/63);
4. Requests the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the consultative meeting, in consultation with the independent experts, Mr. Theo van Boven and Mr. Cherif Bassiouni, to prepare a revised version of the “Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”, taking into account the opinions and commentaries of States and of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and the results of the consultative meeting;
5. Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to hold, with the cooperation of interested Governments, a second consultative meeting for all interested Member States, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council, using available resources, with a view to finalizing the “Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law” and, if appropriate, to consider options for the adoption of these principles and guidelines; the second consultative meeting should have, as a basis for its work, the comments submitted, the report of the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the first consultative meeting and the revised version of the principles and guidelines to be prepared by the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the first consultative meeting in consultation with the independent experts, Mr. Theo van Boven and Mr. Cherif Bassiouni;
6. Encourages the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the first consultative meeting to conduct informal consultations with all interested parties, to further contribute to the process of the “Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”;
7. Requests the High Commissioner for Human Rights to transmit to the Commission at its sixtieth session the final outcome of the second consultative meeting for its consideration. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/34, 23 April 2003, preamble and §§ 1–7, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the elimination of violence against women, the UN Commission on Human Rights emphasized the duty of governments to “take appropriate and effective action concerning acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State, by private persons or by armed groups or warring factions, and to provide access to just and effective remedies”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/45, 23 April 2003, § 5, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 entitled “The right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms”, the UN Commission on Human Rights,
Reaffirming that, pursuant to internationally proclaimed human rights principles, victims of grave violations of human rights should receive, in appropriate cases, restitution, compensation and rehabilitation,
Reiterating the importance of addressing the question of restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in a systematic and thorough way at the national and international levels,
Recalling also the report of the independent expert appointed by the Commission, Mr. Cherif Bassiouni (E/CN.4/2000/62) and, in particular, the draft of the “Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”, annexed to his report, and the note by the Secretariat (E/CN.4/2002/70),
1. Calls upon the international community to give due attention to the right to a remedy and, in particular, in appropriate cases, to receive restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, for victims of grave violations of international human rights law and humanitarian international law;
2. Takes note of the report of the ChairpersonRapporteur of the second consultative meeting on basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law (E/CN.4/2004/57, annex), held in Geneva on 20, 21 and 23 October 2003;
3. Requests the ChairpersonRapporteur of the consultative meetings, in consultation with the independent experts, Mr. Theo van Boven and Mr. Cherif Bassiouni, to prepare a revised version of the “Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”, taking into account the opinions and commentaries of States and of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and the results of the previous consultative meetings (see E/CN.4/2003/63 and E/CN.4/2004/57);
4. Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to hold, with the cooperation of interested Governments, a third consultative meeting for all interested Member States, intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council, using available resources, with a view to finalizing the “Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”, and if appropriate, to consider all options for the adoption of these principles and guidelines; this meeting should have, as a basis for its work, inter alia, the comments received, the revised version of the principles and guidelines to be prepared by the ChairpersonRapporteur pursuant to paragraph 3 of the present resolution, and the reports of the ChairpersonRapporteur of the two previous consultative meetings;
5. Encourages the ChairpersonRapporteur of the consultative meetings to conduct informal consultations with all interested parties;
6. Requests the High Commissioner to transmit to the Commission at its sixty-first session the outcome of the consultative process, for its consideration;
7. Decides to continue its consideration of this question, as a matter of priority, at its sixty-first session under the subitem entitled “Independence of the judiciary, administration of justice, impunity” of the relevant agenda item. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/34, 19 April 2004, preamble and §§ 1–7, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Stresses that national legal systems should ensure that victims of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment obtain redress, are awarded fair and adequate compensation and receive appropriate sociomedical rehabilitation, and in this regard encourages the development of rehabilitation centres for victims of torture. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/41, 19 April 2004, § 5, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the elimination of violence against women, the UN Commission on Human Rights emphasized the duty of governments to “take appropriate and effective action concerning acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State, by private persons or nonState actors, and to provide access to just and effective remedies”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/46, 20 April 2004, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, comply with its legal obligations under international law, as mentioned in the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice and as demanded in resolution ES-10/15 and resolution ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, and that it cease the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, dismantle forthwith the structure situated therein, repeal or render ineffective all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto, and make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/7, 14 April 2005, § 8, voting record: 29-10-14.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Stresses that national legal systems should ensure that victims of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment obtain redress, are awarded fair and adequate compensation and receive appropriate socio-medical rehabilitation, and in this regard encourages the development of rehabilitation centres for victims of torture. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/39, 19 April 2005, § 6, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted the text of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for the Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. The text was subsequently forwarded in a draft resolution to the Economic and Social Council with the recommendation that it be submitted to the UN General Assembly for adoption. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/35, 19 April 2005, §§ 1–3, voting record: 40-0-13.
The UN General Assembly subsequently adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines in its resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Stresses that national legal systems should ensure that victims of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment obtain redress, are awarded fair and adequate compensation and receive appropriate socio-medical rehabilitation, and in this regard encourages the development of rehabilitation centres for victims of torture. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/39, 19 April 2005, § 6, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the elimination of violence against women, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Strongly condemns all acts of violence against women and girls, whether these acts are perpetrated by the State, by private persons or non-State actors, and calls for the elimination of all forms of genderbased violence in the family, within the general community and where perpetrated or condoned by the State, in accordance with the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, and stresses the need to treat all forms of violence against women and girls as a criminal offence, punishable by law, as well as the duty to provide access to just and effective remedies and specialized assistance to victims, including medical and psychological assistance, as well as effective counselling. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/41, 19 April 2005, § 3, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 entitled “Right to the truth”, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Acknowledging, in cases of gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law, the need to study the interrelationship between the right to the truth and the right to access to justice, the right to obtain effective remedy and reparation, and other relevant human rights. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/66, 20 April 2005, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1993 on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights recommended that “steps be taken to ensure full reparation for losses suffered as a consequence of aggression and religious and ethnic cleansing”. 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1993/17, 20 August 1993, § 8; see also Res. 1995/8, 18 August 1995, § 6.
League of Arab States
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in 2004, the League of Arab States stated:
Israel is under a duty to make full reparation for the injury caused by this unlawful act (art. 31 ILC Draft [Articles on State Responsibility]). This reparation includes, first, restitution. There is, thus, a duty “to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed” (article 35 ILC Draft). This means that the Wall has to be torn down by Israel. It also means that the land used for the purpose of building the Wall must be given back to the [Palestinian National Authority] or to the original owners. That restitution in kind takes precedence over any payment of compensation. 
League of Arab States, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 30 January 2004, p. 104.
No data.
Permanent Court of International Justice
In the Chorzów Factory case (Merits) in 1928, the PCIJ ruled:
It is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation … Reparation is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention, and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself. 
PCIJ, Chorzów Factory case (Merits), Judgment, 13 September 1928, p. 29.
International Court of Justice
In its Advisory Opinion in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in 2004, the ICJ stated the following on the customary status of the obligation to make reparation:
152. … Given that the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory has, inter alia, entailed the requisition and destruction of homes, businesses and agricultural holdings, the Court finds further that Israel has the obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal persons concerned. The Court would recall that the essential forms of reparation in customary law were laid down by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the following terms:
“The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act – a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals – is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it – such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law.” (Factory at Chorzów, Merits, Judgement No 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47.)
153. Israel is accordingly under an obligation to return land, orchards, olive groves and other immovable property seized from natural or legal person for purposes of the construction of the wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory. In the event that such restitution should prove to be materially impossible, Israel has an obligation to compensate the persons in question for the damage suffered. The Court considers that Israel also has an obligation to compensate, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law, all natural or legal persons having suffered any form of material damage as a result of the wall’s construction. 
ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, §§ 152–153.
International Court of Justice
In its judgment in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case (DRC v. Uganda) in 2005, the ICJ stated:
The Court observes that it is well established in general international law that a State which bears responsibility for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by that act (see Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 21; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 81, para. 152; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 59, para. 119). Upon examination of the case file, given the character of the internationally wrongful acts for which Uganda has been found responsible (illegal use of force, violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity, military intervention, occupation of Ituri, violations of international human rights law and of international humanitarian law, looting, plunder and exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources), the Court considers that those acts resulted in injury to the DRC and to persons on its territory. Having satisfied itself that this injury was caused to the DRC by Uganda, the Court finds that Uganda has an obligation to make reparation accordingly. 
ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case (DRC v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, § 259.
The Court subsequently found that Uganda was “under obligation to make reparation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the injury caused”. 
ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case (DRC v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, § 345 (5).
The Court also found that the Democratic Republic of the Congo was under obligation to make reparations to Uganda for injury caused to Ugandan nationals:
[T]he Democratic Republic of the Congo, by the conduct of its armed forces, which attacked the Ugandan Embassy in Kinshasa, maltreated Ugandan diplomats and other individuals on the Embassy premises, maltreated Ugandan diplomats at Ndjili International Airport, as well as by its failure to provide the Ugandan Embassy and Ugandan diplomats with effective protection and by its failure to prevent archives and Ugandan property from being seized from the premises of the Ugandan Embassy, violated obligations owed to the Republic of Uganda under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. 
ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case (DRC v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, § 345(12) and (13).
International Court of Justice
In its judgment on the merits in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) in 2007, the ICJ stated:
The principle governing the determination of reparation for an internationally wrongful act is as stated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Factory at Chorzów case: that “reparation must, so far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed” (P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 17, p. 47: see also Article 31 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility) … 
ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, Judgment, 26 February 2007, § 460.
International Court of Justice
In its judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) in 2012, the ICJ stated:
It is, therefore, unnecessary for the Court to consider a number of questions which were discussed at some length by the Parties. In particular, the Court need not rule on whether, as Italy contends, international law confers upon the individual victim of a violation of the law of armed conflict a directly enforceable right to claim compensation. Nor need it rule on whether, as Germany maintains, Article 77, paragraph 4, of the Treaty of Peace or the provisions of the 1961 Agreements amounted to a binding waiver of the claims which are the subject of the Italian proceedings. That is not to say, of course, that these are unimportant questions, only that they are not ones which fall for decision within the limits of the present case. The question whether Germany still has a responsibility towards Italy, or individual Italians, in respect of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by it during the Second World War does not affect Germany’s entitlement to immunity. Similarly, the Court’s ruling on the issue of immunity can have no effect on whatever responsibility Germany may have. 
ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, 3 February 2012, § 108.
Human Rights Committee
In its General Comment on the Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties under the 1966 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights in 2004, the Human Rights Committee held:
Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that States Parties make reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Without reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated, the obligation to provide an effective remedy, which is central to the efficacy of article 2, paragraph 3, is not discharged. In addition to the explicit reparation required by articles 9, paragraph 5, and 14, paragraph 6, the Committee considers that the Covenant generally entails appropriate compensation. The Committee notes that, where appropriate, reparation can involve restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations. 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 [Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant], 26 May 2004, § 16.
Human Rights Committee
In its concluding observations on the second periodic report of Paraguay in 2006, the Human Rights Committee noted with concern “the persistent excessive use of force, including beatings and killings, by security forces and prison staff” and recommended that Paraguay “ensure that allegations of excessive use of force are thoroughly investigated and the culprits prosecuted. Victims of such methods should receive fair and adequate compensation”. 
Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Paraguay, UN Doc. CCPR/C/PRY/CO/2, 24 April 2006, § 11.
(emphasis in original)
In addition, the Human Rights Committee stated that “victims of [torture] should receive fair and adequate compensation”, and recommended that Paraguay “abolish the recruitment of children for military service, investigate cases of ill-treatment and death of conscripts and compensate the victims”. 
Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Paraguay, UN Doc. CCPR/C/PRY/CO/2, 24 April 2006, §§ 12 and 14.
(emphasis in original)
Human Rights Committee
In its concluding observations on the second periodic report of the Central African Republic in 2006, the Human Rights Committee stated:
The Committee notes with concern that, to date, the authorities have not carried out any exhaustive and independent appraisal of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Central African Republic and that the victims have received no reparations (arts. 2, 6 and 7 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]).
The State party should in all circumstances ensure that victims of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are guaranteed effective remedy, which is implemented in practice, including the right to as full compensation and reparations as possible. The State party should act swiftly to implement the recommendations of the national dialogue on the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission. 
Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of the Central African Republic, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CAF/CO/2, 27 July 2006, § 8.
[emphasis in original]
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
In 2001, in the Case of the Riofrío massacre (Colombia), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated:
48. Before turning to the analysis of the alleged violations of the standards of the American Convention, it must be ascertained whether the acts of the individuals implicated in the incident in violating such fundamental rights as the rights to life and humane treatment are attributable to the State of Colombia and therefore call into question its responsibility in accordance with international law. In this regard, the Inter-American Court has noted that it is sufficient to show that the infringement of the rights recognized in the Convention has been supported or tolerated by the government.
49. First, it should be said that, as noted by the [Inter-American Commission on Human Rights] in its Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, the State has played a leading role in developing the paramilitary or self-defense groups, that it allowed them to act legitimately with the protection of the law during the 1970s and 1980s, and that it is generally responsible for their existence and for strengthening them.
50. These groups sponsored or accepted by branches of the armed forces were created mainly to combat armed groups of dissidents. As a result of their counterinsurgency purposes, the paramilitaries established links with the Colombian army that became stronger over a period of more than twenty years. Eventually, on May 25, 1989, the Supreme Court of Justice declared Decree 3398 unconstitutional, thereby removing all legal support for their ties to national defense. In the wake of this action, the State passed a number of laws to criminalize the activities of these groups and of those that supported them. Despite these measures, the State did little to dismantle the structure it had created and promoted, particularly in the case of groups that carried out counterinsurgency activities and, in fact, the ties remained in place at different levels, which in some instances requested or permitted paramilitary groups to carry out certain illegal acts on the understanding that they would not be investigated, prosecuted, or punished. The toleration of these groups by certain branches of the army has been denounced by agencies within the State itself.
51. As a result of this situation, the Commission has established, for the purposes of determining the international responsibility of the State in accordance with the American Convention, that in cases in which members of paramilitary groups and the army carry out joint operations with the knowledge of superior officers, the members of the paramilitary groups act as agents of the State.
52. In the present case, according to analysis of the facts mentioned above, there is evidence to show that agents of the State helped to coordinate the massacre, to carry it out, and, as discovered by domestic courts, to cover it up. Therefore, the only conclusion is that the State is liable for the violations of the American Convention resulting from the acts of commission or omission by its own agents and by private individuals involved in the execution of the victims. 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case of the Riofrío massacre (Colombia), Report, 6 April 2001, §§ 48–52.
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
In its Decision Number 7, Guidance Regarding Jus ad Bellum Liability, in 2007, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, in considering the breadth of State responsibility for violations of international law, stated:
21. … [T]here have been few modern instances in which a State has been determined to bear responsibility for damages resulting from a war as a matter of international law. Throughout history, indemnities frequently have been exacted from the losing parties in wars, but this has resulted from the exercise of power by the victor, not the application of the international law of State responsibility.
22. In the Commission’s view, the few twentieth century cases in which States have been held to be internationally responsible for extensive war damages do not provide clear guidance, and instead counsel caution. The war guilt and reparations provisions of the Treaty of Versailles reflected a collective judgment by the victorious parties to the First World War that Germany bore responsibility for the initiation and continuation of that war, and authorized a massive program of reparations. However, the history of those provisions makes clear that they were heavily shaped by motives of policy and revenge unrelated to the principles of law. The program of reparations under the Treaty of Versailles had a brief and unsatisfactory history.
23. The Commission likewise does not see the international community’s measures relating to compensation following the Second World War as providing compelling reference points in the present situation, involving a violation of law of a much different order. At the end of that war, there was a broad consensus on the part of the Allied Powers that Germany and Japan were responsible for initiating and waging aggressive war on a massive scale. Individual leaders of both States were held criminally responsible for their conduct, and some senior leaders were executed.
24. Nevertheless, the practice of States at that time does not support the expansive view of State responsibility [one of the parties] urges now. The States deemed by the international community to be directly responsible for the war ultimately bore financial consequences that were modest in relation to the resulting damages. For reasons largely related to the post-war division of Germany, there was no comprehensive multilateral peace treaty with Germany corresponding to the Treaty of Versailles, and there was no internationally agreed program of reparations or compensation. The Soviet Union for a time carried out its own program of enforced reparations from Germany, but this was “victor’s justice,” not a principled application of the international law of State responsibility enjoying international support and legitimacy. Germany subsequently carried out extensive programs of compensation and assistance to the State of Israel and to many groups of persons injured by its conduct, but these were largely shaped by considerations of morality and politics, not by the law of State responsibility.
25. The September 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan included substantial provisions relating to claims and property, but again does not provide compelling guidance. While the Treaty of Peace brought about or confirmed substantial transfers of assets, its provisions resulted from a negotiation aimed at reintegrating Japan into the global community, not an application of the law of State responsibility. Article 14 of the Treaty illustrates this negotiated aspect, as well as the parties’ decision not to repeat the experience of the Treaty of Versailles.
26. Given its purposes, the Treaty of Peace did not require the immediate commitment of fresh funds to provide compensation. Instead, Article 14(a)(2)(I) gave each of the Allied Powers and China the right to seize and keep or liquidate certain overseas property of Japan and Japanese nationals and entities. Under Article 14(a), Japan also agreed to “promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work …” Compensation under the Treaty was exclusive. In Article 14(b) “the Allied Powers waive[d] all reparations claims … arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war …”
27. Thus, the post-war practice of States regarding Nazi Germany and Japan, both generally regarded by the international community as having initiated and waged aggressive war on a massive scale, provide no clear reference here. There either were no reparations determined through application of international law (Germany), or reparations were determined through negotiations shaped by the defeated State’s ability to pay and other political and economic factors (Japan). 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Decision Number 7, Guidance Regarding Jus ad Bellum Liability, 27 July 2007, §§ 21–27.
[footnotes in original omitted]
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
In its Ethiopia’s Damages Claims final award in 2009, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission considered the principle of reparation for State violations of international law. First, the Commission considered whether moral damages were appropriate, stating:
61. … Large per capita awards of moral damages may be logical and appropriate in some contexts involving significant injuries to an individual or to identifiable members of small groups. The concept cannot reasonably be expanded to situations involving claimed moral injury to whole populations of large areas.
63. The Commission also does not accept the mechanical use of “severity factors” to swell the claim. This system has no precedent in international law. The factors themselves, and the manner of their application, are questionable. Two of the factors … involve matters bearing upon inter-State relations. These might be relevant to certain claims for damage purely to the State, but not to assessing moral injury to individuals …
64. … The moral damages awards of the courts and tribunals … cite[d] reflect a painstaking assessment of detailed records in individual cases. There can be no such assessment in a claim involving huge numbers of hypothetical victims.
65. In appropriate cases, the Commission has weighed some of the considerations identified … such as the gravity of a particular type of violation, and the extent and consequences of the resulting human injury, in determining the damages to be awarded. However, it has done so as an integral element of its damages awards, not by using a separate calculus of “moral damage”. 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Ethiopia’s Damages Claims, Final Award, 17 August 2009, §§ 61 and 63–65.
[footnote in original omitted]
The Commission also considered reparation in general, stating:
285. Legal Considerations. The International Court of Justice has employed broad language to describe the reparation that should follow from a breach of the jus ad bellum, but its judgments have not addressed concretely the types or extent of damage to be regarded as proximately caused by a delict. Most recently, the Court in Congo v. Uganda affirmed in broad terms “that a State which bears responsibility for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by that act,” but it left it to the parties to determine in the first instance what this meant through negotiations. This process has not yet borne fruit. In Cameroon v. Nigeria, the Court found that Nigerian armed forces and police were present in large areas found to belong to Cameroon, but it denied further relief, concluding that “by the very fact of the present judgment and of the evacuation of the Cameroonian territory occupied by Nigeria, the injury suffered by Cameroon by reason of the occupation of its territory will in all events have been sufficiently addressed.” Nicaragua v. United States affirmed the United States’ responsibility for unlawful uses of force, but the case was withdrawn by Nicaragua while the damages phase was underway.
286. Some other international courts, tribunals and commissions have wrestled with whether particular types of damage have the requisite causal connection to a delict. Their decisions offer some guidance, at two levels. First, some decisions suggest the outer boundaries of compensable damage. Since at least the Alabama arbitration, panels have rejected claims for damages to generalized economic interests of the victorious State or its nationals, or to its expenses in waging war. The Alabama Commissioners thus concluded that the claims of the United States for the transfer of American merchant vessels to British registry, increased insurance costs, and the prolongation of the war and associated costs “do not constitute, upon the principles of international law applicable to such cases, good foundation for an award of compensation.” The United States-German Mixed Claims Commission, cited with approval by both Parties, emphasized the need for a direct causal connection between a loss and the actions of the defendant State, and rejected claims for “all damage or loss in consequence of the war.” More recently, in creating the United Nations Compensation Commission [UNCC], the Security Council sought to limit the extent of compensable damage by confining jurisdiction to “direct” claims against Iraq.
288. On a second level, past decisions offer informative precedents for some specific types of damage now claimed. Thus, in the case of post-conflict injuries from mines of unknown origin, the Commission found persuasive Umpire Parker’s analysis in a claim before the U.S.-German Mixed Claims Commission. The UNCC also addressed some questions and types of injury akin to those here; the Commission found persuasive the UNCC’s practice of including damage resulting from actions by the forces of both parties to a conflict. However, for several types of injuries claimed … Whiteman’s observation remains apt: “While there has been more or less agreement that certain types of damage are unreasonable, there has been no such agreement as to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a wide variety of types of damage.”
289. Factual Considerations, Proximate Cause and Foreseeability. Past decisions and practice suggest elements of a legal framework for analyzing compensation claims for violation of the jus ad bellum, but they do not answer other basic questions. Like the U.S.-German Mixed Claims Commission before it, the Commission does not believe that a State’s international responsibility in a case such as this extends to all of the losses and disruptions accompanying an international conflict. A breach of the jus ad bellum by a State does not create liability for all that comes after. Instead, there must be a sufficient causal connection. The Commission concluded in Decision Number 7 that this was best expressed through the concept of proximate cause. The nature and extent of the causal connection between Eritrea’s conduct in May 1998 and ensuing events involves assessments of facts regarding the character and course of the armed conflict. This task has been complicated and uncertain. As time passed, the conflict was driven or shaped by both Parties’ actions, by the actions of outside parties, and by the element of chance that pervades battlefields. Not surprisingly, the record rarely illuminated either Party’s motivations and intentions.
290. In assessing causation, the Commission has tried, inter alia, to weigh whether particular consequences were, or should have been, foreseen … It agrees that the test of foreseeability should extend to a broader range of outcomes than might need to be considered in a less momentous situation. A substantial resort to force is a serious and hazardous matter. A party considering this course is bound to consider matters carefully, weighing the costs and possible bad outcomes, as well as the outcome it seeks. This is particularly so given the uncertainties of armed conflict. At the same time, if a party is deemed to foresee too wide a range of possible results of its action, reaching too far into the future, or too far from the battlefield, foreseeability loses meaning as a tool to assess proximate cause. If all results are foreseeable, the test is meaningless.
297. Assessments of proximate causation and foreseeability become more complex and less certain as to injuries occurring at greater remove in space and time from the initial fighting in Badme and on the Western Front. In making these assessments, the Commission has given significant weight to the seriousness of a decision by a State to resort to the large-scale use of force. Such a momentous decision places a heavy obligation on the acting State’s leaders to analyze and weigh carefully the potential consequences of their intended action. In this regard, a State choosing to resort to force in violation of the jus ad bellum bears responsibility for the foreseeable results both that it desires, and those it does not.
308. Given the limited guidance available from past decisions, the Commission weighed several factors in assessing the amount of compensation that should follow from a breach of the jus ad bellum. A threshold question was whether any award of damages should be designed to serve the exceptional purpose of helping to deter future violations of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the [1945] Charter of the United Nations, or should, instead, serve the more conventional purpose of providing appropriate compensation within the framework of the law of State responsibility. As to this, the Commission understands the latter to be its responsibility, and it doubts that possible awards of monetary compensation would be likely to deter a State contemplating action in breach of the jus ad bellum. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council has primary responsibility for addressing (and deterring) violations of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter, inter alia, by its authority to impose sanctions. Other deterrents are found in the rights of individual and collective self-defence and in the risk of criminal punishment of government officials responsible for deciding upon the unlawful resort to force. The prospect of potential monetary liabilities seems of little comparative weight.
312. In a similar vein, the Commission believes that the law of State responsibility must maintain a measure of proportion between the character of a delict and the compensation due. …
315. The caution in setting levels of compensation reflected in … past experiences highlights another important concern. The process of moving from war to a stable and mutually beneficial peace often is difficult and uncertain, as the Parties’ current relations show. Informed by the unhappy consequences of reparations under the Treaty of Versailles, most States have been concerned to ensure that programs for compensation or reparation do not themselves undermine efforts to accomplish a stable peace. The Commission would be greatly concerned if its efforts to carry out the mandate given it by the Parties led to a further deterioration of their relations, and impaired the prospects for a durable peace. 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Ethiopia’s Damages Claims, Final Award, 17 August 2009, §§ 285–286, 288–290, 297, 308, 312 and 315.
[footnotes in original omitted]
ICRC
In 1993, in a report submitted to the UN General Assembly on the protection of the environment in time of armed conflict, the ICRC stated:
Article 1, common to the four Geneva Conventions and to Protocol I, stipulates that the contracting States are under an obligation “to respect and ensure respect for” those instruments. Beyond that, and on a more general level, a State is responsible for every act or omission attributable to it and amounting to a breach of an international obligation incumbent on it, including in the field of the international protection of the environment. States affected by such a breach are entitled to insist on the implementation of such rules of State responsibility, including … reparation. 
ICRC, Report on the protection of the environment in time of armed conflict submitted to the UN General Assembly, reprinted in Report of the UN Secretary-General on the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict, UN Doc. A/48/269, 29 July 1993, § 47.
ICRC
In 1993, in its report on the protection of war victims, the ICRC, referring to Article 91 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, stated: “This article confirms a rule which is today accepted as being part of customary law and was already stated, in almost identical terms, in Article 3 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907.” Referring to Article 51 of the 1949 Geneva Convention I, Article 52 of the 1949 Geneva Convention II, Article 131 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV and Article 148 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, the ICRC further stated:
This provision … also implies that, irrespective of the outcome of an armed conflict, no decision or agreement can dispense a State from the responsibility to make reparation for damages caused to the victims of breaches of international humanitarian law.
The ICRC recommended that:
The International Conference for the Protection of War Victims should make it clear that it wishes procedures to be set up to provide reparation for damage inflicted on the victims of violations of international humanitarian law … so as to enable them to receive the benefits to which they are entitled. 
ICRC, Report on the Protection of War Victims, Geneva, June 1993, Section 4.3, IRRC, No. 292, 1993, pp. 391–445.
American Law Institute
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1986, provides:
Under international law, a state that has violated a legal obligation to another state is required to terminate the violation and, ordinarily, to make reparation, including in appropriate circumstances restitution or compensation for loss or injury. 
The American Law Institute, Restatement Third. Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, 1987, § 901.
The Restatement (Third) further provides:
A private person, whether natural or juridical, injured by a violation of an international obligation by a state, may bring a claim against that state or assert that violation as a defense
(a) in a competent international forum when the state has consented to the jurisdiction of that forum with respect to such private claims;
(b) in a court or other tribunal of that state pursuant to its law; or
(c) in a court or other tribunal of the injured person’s state of nationality or of a third state, pursuant to the law of such state, subject to limitations under international law. 
The American Law Institute, Restatement Third. Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, 1987, § 906.
Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery
The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery recommended that the United Nations and all the states and people thereof “take all steps necessary to ensure that the government of Japan provides full reparations to the victims and survivors and those entitled to recover on account of the violations committed against them”. 
Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, The Prosecutors and the Peoples of the Asia-Pacific Region v. Emperor Hirohito et al. and the Government of Japan, Final Judgment, 4 December 2001, Recommendations, § 149(i).
Hague Regulations (1899)
Article 41 of the 1899 Hague Regulations provides:
A violation of the terms of the armistice by private individuals acting on their own initiative, only confers the right of demanding the punishment of the offenders, and, if necessary, indemnity for the losses sustained. 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, Article 41.
Hague Regulations (1907)
Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) provides: “A belligerent Party which violates the provisions of the [1907 Hague Regulations] shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation.” 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 3.
Hague Regulations (1907)
Article 41 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provides:
A violation of the terms of the armistice by private persons acting on their own initiative only entitles the injured party to demand the punishment of the offenders or, if necessary, compensation for the losses sustained. 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 41.
European Convention on Human Rights
Article 5(5) of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights provides: “Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.” 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950, as amended by Protocol No. 11, Strasbourg, 11 May 1994, Article 5(5).
Peace Treaty for Japan
Article 14(a) of the 1951 Peace Treaty for Japan provides:
It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time meet its other obligations …
Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation. 
Treaty of Peace signed between the Allied Powers and Japan, San Francisco, 8 September 1951, Article 14(a).
Peace Treaty for Japan
Under Article 16 of the 1951 Peace Treaty for Japan, Japan undertook, inter alia, to compensate former prisoners of war, in the following terms:
As an expression of its desire to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied Powers who suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan, Japan will transfer its assets and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which were at war with any of the Allied Powers or, at its option, the equivalent of such assets, to the International Committee of the Red Cross which shall liquidate such assets and distribute the resultant fund to appropriate national agencies for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable.  
Treaty of Peace signed between the Allied Powers and Japan, San Francisco, 8 September 1951, Article 16.
Peace Treaty for Japan
The 1951 Yoshida-Stikker Protocol, concluded between the Netherlands and Japan with respect to Japan’s occupation of the Dutch East Indies and the 1951 Peace Treaty for Japan, states:
The Government of Japan does not consider that the Government of the Netherlands by signing the [1951 Peace Treaty for Japan] has itself expropriated the private claims of its nationals so that, as a consequence thereof, after the Treaty comes into force these claims would be non-existent. 
Treaty of Peace signed between the Allied Powers and Japan, San Francisco, 8 September 1951.
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation
Article 1(1) of Chapter Four (“Compensation for Victims of Nazi Persecution”) of the 1952 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation provides:
The Federal Republic [of Germany] acknowledges the obligation to assure … adequate compensation to persons persecuted for their political convictions, race, faith or ideology, who thereby have suffered damage to life, limb, health, liberty, property, their possessions or economic prospects (excluding identifiable property subject to restitution). Furthermore, persons persecuted by reason of nationality, in disregard of human rights, who are now political refugees and no longer enjoy the protection of their former home country shall receive adequate compensation where permanent injury has been inflicted on their health. 
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation (with Annex), Bonn, 26 May 1952, also known as the Transference Treaty, as amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Paris, 23 October 1954, Chapter Four, Article 1(1).
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation
Article 4(1) of Chapter Five (“External Restitution”) of the 1952 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation provides:
If property to be restituted has, after identification in Germany, either been utilised or consumed in Germany before return to the claimant or been destroyed, stolen or otherwise disposed before receipt by the claimant Government or by an appropriate agency of one of the Three Powers for despatch to the claimant, the Federal Republic [of Germany] shall compensate claimants who would otherwise be entitled to restitution … or who, at the entry into force of the present Convention, have had their claims for restitution approved by one of the Three Powers. 
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation (with Annex), Bonn, 26 May 1952, also known as the Transference Treaty, as amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Paris, 23 October 1954, Chapter Five, Article 4(1).
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation
Article 5 of Chapter Six (“Reparation”) of the 1952 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation provides:
The Federal Republic [of Germany] shall ensure that the former owners of property seized pursuant to measures referred to in Articles 2 and 3 of this Chapter [i.e. of the Three Powers with regard to German external assets or other property for the purpose of reparation] shall be compensated. 
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation (with Annex), Bonn, 26 May 1952, also known as the Transference Treaty, as amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Paris, 23 October 1954, Chapter 6, Article 5.
Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and Israel
The 1952 Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and Israel provides:
Whereas unspeakable criminal acts were perpetrated against the Jewish people during the National-Socialist regime of terror,
And whereas by a declaration in the Bundestag on 27th September, 1951, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany made known their determination, within the limits of their capacity, to make good the material damage caused by these acts,
And whereas the State of Israel has assumed the heavy burden of resettling so great a number of uprooted and destitute Jewish refugees from Germany and from territories formerly under German rule and has on this basis advanced a claim against the Federal Republic of Germany for global recompense for the cost of the integration of these refugees
Now therefore the State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany have agreed as follows: –
Article 1
(a) The Federal Republic of Germany shall, in view of the considerations hereinbefore recited, pay to the State of Israel the sum of 3,000 million Deutsche Mark.
(b) In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany shall, in compliance with the obligation undertaken in Article 1 of the [1952 Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany], pay to Israel for the benefit of the said [Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany] the sum of 450 million Deutsche Mark …
(c) The provisions hereinafter contained in the present Agreement shall apply to the total sum of 3,450 million Deutsche Mark so arising …
Article 2
The Federal Republic of Germany will make available the amount referred to in Article 1, paragraph (c) of the present Agreement for the purchase … of such commodities and services as shall serve the purpose of expanding opportunities for the settlement and rehabilitation of Jewish refugees in Israel. 
Agreement between the State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany (with Schedule, Annexes, Exchanges of Letters and Protocols), Luxembourg, 10 September 1952, Articles 1 and 2.
Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and Israel
By Letter No. 1a of the 1952 Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and Israel, which, according to Article 16(a)(ii) constitutes an integral part of the Agreement, the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs conveyed the following to the representatives of Germany:
1. Considering that the Federal Republic of Germany has in the Agreement signed today undertaken the obligation to pay recompense for the expenditure already incurred or to be incurred by the State of Israel in the resettlement of Jewish refugees, the claim of the State of Israel for such recompense shall, in so far as it has been put forward against the Federal Republic of Germany, be regarded by the Government of Israel as having been settled with the coming into force of the said Agreement. The State of Israel will advance no further claims against the Federal Republic of Germany arising out of or in connection with losses which have resulted from National-Socialist persecution.
2. The Government of Israel are here proceeding on the assumption that claims of Israel nationals under legislation in force in the Federal Republic of Germany on internal restitution, compensation, or other redress for National-Socialist wrongs, and the automatic accrual of rights to Israel nationals from any future legislation of this nature, will not be prejudiced by reason of the conclusion of the Agreement. 
Agreement between the State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany (with Schedule, Annexes, Exchanges of Letters and Protocols), Luxembourg, 10 September 1952, Letter No. 1a.
By Letter No. 1b of the 1952 Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and Israel, which constitutes an integral part of the Agreement, the German Chancellor took note of the content of paragraph 1 of Letter No. 1a and confirmed, with regard to paragraph 2 of this Letter, that the assumption of the Government of Israel was correct. 
Agreement between the State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany (with Schedule, Annexes, Exchanges of Letters and Protocols), Luxembourg, 10 September 1952, Letter No. 1b.
Austrian State Treaty
Article 26 of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, which in its preamble considers that “on 13 March 1938, Hitlerite Germany annexed Austria by force and incorporated its territory in the German Reich”, provides:
1. In so far as such action has not already been taken, Austria undertakes that, in all cases where property, legal rights or interests in Austria have since 13 March 1938, been subject of forced transfer or measures of sequestration, confiscation or control on account of the racial origin or religion of the owner, the said property shall be returned and the said legal rights and interests shall be restored together with their accessories. Where return or restoration is impossible, compensation shall be granted for losses incurred by reason of such measures to the same extent as is, or may be, given to Austrian nationals generally in respect of war damage.
2. Austria agrees to take under its control all property, legal rights and interests in Austria of persons, organizations or communities which, individually or as members of groups, were the object of racial, religious or other Nazi measures of persecution where, in the case of persons, such property, rights and interests remain heirless or unclaimed for six months after the coming into force of the present Treaty, or where in the case of organizations and communities such organizations or communities have ceased to exist. Austria shall transfer such property, rights and interests to appropriate agencies or organizations to be designated by the Four Heads of Mission in Vienna by agreement with the Austrian Government to be used for the relief and rehabilitation of victims of persecution by the Axis Powers, it being understood that these provisions do not require Austria to make payments in foreign exchange or other transfers to foreign countries which would constitute a burden on the Austrian economy. 
State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria (with Annexes and Maps), concluded between France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Austria, accession of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland and Yugoslavia, Vienna, 15 May 1955, Article 26.
Part IV (“Claims arising out of the War”, Articles 21–24) and Part V (“Property, Rights and Interests”, Articles 25–28) provide for detailed and comprehensive settlement of all property claims on a State-to-State level.  
State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria (with Annexes and Maps), concluded between France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Austria, accession of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland and Yugoslavia, Vienna, 15 May 1955, Part IV, Articles 21–24, and Part V, Articles 25–28.
Yoshida-Stikker Protocol
The 1956 Yoshida-Stikker Protocol between Japan and the Netherlands states:
Desiring to settle the problem concerning certain types of private claims of Netherlands nationals which the government of Japan might wish voluntarily to deal with, as referred to in the letters of 7th and 8th of September, 1951, exchanged between Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of The Netherlands, Dirk U. Stikker, and Prime Minister of Japan, Shigeru Yoshida, Have agreed as follows:
Article I. For the purpose of expressing sympathy and regret for the suffering inflicted during the Second World War by agencies of the Government of Japan upon Netherlands nationals, the Government of Japan shall voluntarily tender as a solatium the amount of Pounds Sterling equivalent to U.S. $ 10,000,000 to the Government of the Kingdom of The Netherlands on behalf of those Netherlands nationals.
Article III. The Government of the Kingdom of The Netherlands confirms that neither itself nor any Netherlands nationals will raise against the Government of Japan any claim concerning the sufferings inflicted during the Second World War by agencies of the Government of Japan upon Netherlands nationals. 
Protocol between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of Japan relating to settlement of the problem concerning certain types of private claims of Dutch nationals, following the Exchange of Letters between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Dirk U. Stikker, and the Prime Minister of Japan, Shigeru Yoshida, 7–8 September 1951, Tokyo, 13 March 1956, Articles I and III.
Agreement concerning Payments on behalf of Norwegian Nationals Victimized by National Socialist Persecution
Article 1(1) of the 1959 Agreement concerning Payments on behalf of Norwegian Nationals Victimized by National Socialist Persecution, concluded between Germany and Norway, provides:
The Federal Republic of Germany shall pay the Kingdom of Norway 60 million Deutsche Mark on behalf of Norwegian nationals who were victimized by National Socialist persecution because of their race, beliefs or opinions and whose freedom or health was in consequence impaired, and also on behalf of the survivors of persons who died as a result of such persecution. 
Agreement concerning Payments on behalf of Norwegian Nationals Victimized by National Socialist Persecution (with Exchange of Notes) between the Federal Republic of Germany and Norway, Oslo, 7 August 1959, Article 1(1).
American Convention on Human Rights
Article 63(1) of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights states:
If the [Inter-American Court of Human Rights] finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court … shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party. 
American Convention on Human Rights, adopted by the OAS Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San José, 22 November 1969, also known as Pact of San José, Article 63(1).
Additional Protocol I
Article 91 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides: “A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation.” 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 91. Article 91 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.46, 31 May 1977, p. 344.
Implementation Agreement to the German Unification Treaty
Article 2 of the 1990 Implementation Agreement to the German Unification Treaty provides:
The Federal Government is prepared, in continuation of the policy of the German Federal Republic, to enter into agreements with the Claims Conference [Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany] for additional Fund arrangements in order to provide hardship payments to persecutees who thus far received no or only minimal compensation according to the legislative provisions of the German Federal Republic. 
Vereinbarung zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zur Durchführung und Auslegung des am 31. August 1990 in Berlin unterzeichneten Vertrags zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik über die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands, Bonn, 18 September 1990, Article 2.
CIS Agreement on the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts
Article 3 of the 1993 CIS Agreement on the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts requires States to adopt national measures granting “social security and compensation for material losses to people afflicted by armed conflicts”. 
Agreement on Primary Measures for Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts, Commonwealth of Independent States, Moscow, 24 September 1993, Article 3.
US-Germany Agreement concerning Final Benefits to Certain US Nationals Who Were Victims of National Socialist Measures of Persecution
In 1995, Germany and the United States concluded the US-Germany Agreement concerning Final Benefits to Certain US Nationals Who Were Victims of National Socialist Measures of Persecution (also known as the Princz Agreement), which provides:
Article 1
This Agreement shall settle compensation claims by certain United States nationals who suffered loss of liberty or damage to body or health as a result of National Socialist measures of persecution conducted directly against them. This Agreement shall cover only the claims of persons who, at the time of their persecution, were already nationals of the United States of America and who have to date received no compensation from the Federal Republic of Germany. This Agreement shall, inter alia, not cover persons who were subjected to forced labor alone while not being detained in a concentration camp as victims of National Socialist measures of persecution.
Article 2
1. For the prompt settlement of known cases of compensation claims covered by Article 1, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany shall pay to the Government of the United States of America three million Deutsche Mark …
2. For any possible future cases not known at the present moment, both Governments intend to negotiate two years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an additional lump sum payment based on the same criteria as set forth in Article 1 and derived on the same basis as the amount under paragraph 1.
Article 3
The distribution of the amounts … to the individual beneficiaries shall be left to the discretion of the Government of the United States of America. 
Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the United States of America concerning Final Benefits to Certain United States Nationals Who Were Victims of National Socialist Measures of Persecution, Bonn, 19 September 1995, also known as the Princz Agreement, Articles 1–3.
Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords
Article 1(1) of the 1995 Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords provides:
All refugees and displaced persons … shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them. 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 7, Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, signed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, Dayton, 22 November 1995, Article 1(1).
Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords
By Article VII of the 1995 Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords, the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina was established. According to Article XI, the mandate of the Commission was to
receive and decide any claims for real property in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the property has not voluntarily been sold or otherwise transferred since April 1, 1992, and where the claimant does not now enjoy possession of that property. Claims may be for return of the property or for just compensation in lieu of return. 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 7, Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, signed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, Dayton, 22 November 1995, Articles VII and XI.
Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords
Article XII(2) and (6) of the 1995 Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords provides:
Any person requesting compensation in lieu of return who is found by the Commission to be the lawful owner of that property shall be awarded just compensation as determined by the Commission.
In cases in which the claimant is awarded compensation in lieu of return of the property, the Commission may award a monetary grant or a compensation bond for the future purchase of real property. The Parties welcome the willingness of the international community assisting in the construction and financing of housing in Bosnia and Herzegovina to accept compensation bonds awarded by the Commission as payment, and to award persons holding such compensation bonds priority in obtaining that housing.  
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 7, Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, signed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, Dayton, 22 November 1995, Article XII(2) and (6).
Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords
Article XI of the 1995 Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords, which establishes the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina, provides:
The Commission shall receive and decide any claims for real property in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the property has not voluntarily been sold or otherwise transferred since April 1, 1992, and where the claimant does not now enjoy possession of that property. Claims may be for return of the property or for just compensation in lieu of return. 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 7, Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, signed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, Dayton, 22 November 1995, Article XI.
US-China Memorandum of Understanding on the Settlement of Chinese Claims for Deaths, Injuries or Losses resulting from the Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade
The 1999 US-China Memorandum of Understanding on the Settlement of Chinese Claims for Deaths, Injuries or Losses resulting from the Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade provides:
1. The two sides have reached a consensus on the payment relating to deaths, injuries or losses suffered by the personnel of the Chinese side. The U.S. Government will pay to the Chinese Government the sum of U.S. $4,500,000 in a single payment as promptly as possible consistent with U.S. legal requirements, for direct distribution by the latter to the bereaved families and those suffering injuries or losses.
2. The Chinese Government, upon receipt of the amount mentioned above, will distribute, as soon as possible, all the funds among the bereaved families and those suffering injuries or losses, and provide the U.S. Government with relevant information and receipts confirming the distribution.
3. The agreed amount, when fully paid as agreed, will constitute a full and final settlement of any and all claims for deaths, injuries or losses suffered by the personnel of the Chinese side caused by the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Delegation of the United States of America and the Delegation of the People’s Republic of China [on the Settlement of the Chinese Claims for Deaths, Injuries or Losses suffered by the Chinese side as a result of the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 8 May 1999], Beijing, 30 July 1999, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/6151.htm (Chapter 8. International Claims and State Responsibility), Articles 1–3.
US-China Agreement on the Settlement of Chinese Claims for Property Loss and Damage resulting from the Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade
Article 1 of the 1999 US-China Agreement on the Settlement of Chinese Claims for Property Loss and Damage resulting from the Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade provides: “The sum of twenty eight million U.S. dollars shall constitute the final settlement amount.” 
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China [on the settlement of the Chinese claims for property loss and damage suffered by the Chinese side as a result of the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 8 May 1999], Beijing, 16 December 1999, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/6151.htm (Chapter 8. International Claims and State Responsibility), Article 1.
Article 2 of the Agreement provides:
The agreed amount, when fully paid as agreed, will constitute a full and final settlement of any and all claims for the property loss and damage suffered by the Chinese side as a result of the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China [on the settlement of the Chinese claims for property loss and damage suffered by the Chinese side as a result of the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 8 May 1999], Beijing, 16 December 1999, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/6151.htm (Chapter 8. International Claims and State Responsibility), Article 2.
US-China Memorandum of Understanding on the Settlement of US Claims for Property Loss and Damage Suffered after the Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade
Article 1 of the 1999 US-China Memorandum of Understanding on the Settlement of US Claims for Property Loss and Damage Suffered after the Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade provides:
The sum of 2.87 million US dollars shall constitute the final settlement amount. The Government of the People’s Republic of China shall pay the above-mentioned amount to the Government of the United States in a single payment to an account opened by the Embassy of the United States in Beijing no later than ten working days after the payment by the Government of the United States under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China … 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China [on the settlement of the US claims for property loss and damage suffered by the US side after the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 8 May 1999], Beijing, 16 December 1999, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/6151.htm (Chapter 8. International Claims and State Responsibility), Article 1.
Article 2 of the Memorandum of Understanding provides:
The agreed amount, when fully paid as agreed, will constitute a full and final settlement of any and all claims for the property loss and damage suffered by the U.S. side after the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China [on the settlement of the US claims for property loss and damage suffered by the US side after the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 8 May 1999], Beijing, 16 December 1999, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/6151.htm (Chapter 8. International Claims and State Responsibility), Article 2.
Agreement on the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future”
The 2000 Agreement on the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future”, concluded between Germany and the United States, aims to complement the creation of a foundation established under the German Law on the Creation of a Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” (as amended) of 2000. Article 1(1) provides:
The parties agree that the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future” covers, and that it would be in their interests for the Foundation to be the exclusive remedy and forum for the resolution of, all claims that have been or may be asserted against German companies arising from the National Socialist era and World War II. 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future”, Berlin, 17 July 2000, Article 1(1).
Agreement on the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future”
Article 2(1) of the 2000 Agreement on the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future” provides:
The United States shall, in all cases in which the United States is notified that a claim described in article 1 (1) has been asserted in a court in the United States, inform its courts through a Statement of Interest … that it would be in the foreign policy interests of the United States for the Foundation to be the exclusive remedy and forum for resolving such claims asserted against German companies … and that dismissal of such cases would be in its foreign policy interest. 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future”, Berlin, 17 July 2000, Article 2(1).
Agreement on the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future”
Article 3 of the 2000 Agreement on the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future” provides:
(2) This agreement shall not affect unilateral decisions or bilateral or multilateral agreements that dealt with the consequences of the National Socialist era and World War II.
(3) The United States will not raise any reparations claims against the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future”, Berlin, 17 July 2000, Article 3.
Austrian-US Executive Agreement concerning the Austrian Reconciliation Fund
In 2000, Austria and the United States concluded the Austrian-US Executive Agreement concerning the Austrian Reconciliation Fund, which is intended “to complement the creation of the [Austrian Reconciliation] Fund”. In the preamble, the two States recognize
that Austria has, by adopting legislation approved by the Allied Forces or building on international agreements to which the United States is a party, and in close cooperation with victims’ associations and interested governments, provided restitution and compensation to victims of National Socialist persecution, [and note] that, by means of the Austrian Fund for Reconciliation, Peace, and Cooperation (“Fund”), formed under Austrian federal law as an instrumentality of Austria and funded by contributions from Austria and Austrian companies, Austria and Austrian companies wish to respond to and acknowledge the moral responsibility for all claims involving or related to the use of slave or forced labor during the National Socialist era or World War II. 
Agreement between the Austrian Federal Government and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Austrian Fund “Reconciliation, Peace and Cooperation”, Vienna, 24 October 2000.
Austrian-Belarusian Agreement concerning the Austrian Reconciliation Fund
In 2000, Austria concluded bilateral agreements with six Central and Eastern European States, including the Austrian-Belarusian Agreement concerning the Austrian Reconciliation Fund, in order to fulfil the conditions necessary for the coming into force of the Austrian Reconciliation Fund Law. All of these agreements provided for cooperation between the respective States in the payment of compensation to former slave labourers and forced labourers by the Austrian Reconciliation Fund via national foundations which were to be established by the respective States. 
Abkommen zwischen der Österreichischen Bundesregierung und der Regierung der Republik Belarus über die Zusammenarbeit bei den freiwilligen Leistungen der Republik Österreich an ehemalige Sklaven- und Zwangsarbeiter des nationalsozialistischen Regimes, Vienna, 24 October 2000.
Austrian-Czech Agreement concerning the Austrian Reconciliation Fund
In 2000, Austria concluded bilateral agreements with six Central and Eastern European States, including the Austrian-Czech Agreement concerning the Austrian Reconciliation Fund, in order to fulfil the conditions necessary for the coming into force of the Austrian Reconciliation Fund Law. All of these agreements provided for cooperation between the respective States in the payment of compensation to former slave labourers and forced labourers by the Austrian Reconciliation Fund via national foundations which were to be established by the respective States. 
Abkommen zwischen der Österreichischen Bundesregierung und der Regierung der Tschechischen Republik über die Zusammenarbeit bei den freiwilligen Leistungen der Republik Österreich an ehemalige Sklaven- und Zwangsarbeiter des nationalsozialistischen Regimes, Vienna, 24 October 2000.
Austrian-Hungarian Agreement concerning the Austrian Reconciliation Fund
In 2000, Austria concluded bilateral agreements with six Central and Eastern European States, including the Austrian-Hungarian Agreement concerning the Austrian Reconciliation Fund, in order to fulfil the conditions necessary for the coming into force of the Austrian Reconciliation Fund Law. All of these agreements provided for cooperation between the respective States in the payment of compensation to former slave labourers and forced labourers by the Austrian Reconciliation Fund via national foundations which were to be established by the respective States. 
Abkommen zwischen der Österreichischen Bundesregierung und der Regierung der Republik Ungarn über die Zusammenarbeit bei den freiwilligen Leistungen der Republik Österreich an ehemalige Sklaven- und Zwangsarbeiter des nationalsozialistischen Regimes, Vienna, 24 October 2000.
Austrian-Polish Agreement concerning the Austrian Reconciliation Fund
In 2000, Austria concluded bilateral agreements with six Central and Eastern European States, including the Austrian-Polish Agreement concerning the Austrian Reconciliation Fund, in order to fulfil the conditions necessary for the coming into force of the Austrian Reconciliation Fund Law. All of these agreements provided for cooperation between the respective States in the payment of compensation to former slave labourers and forced labourers by the Austrian Reconciliation Fund via national foundations which were to be established by the respective States. 
Abkommen zwischen der Österreichischen Bundesregierung und der Regierung der Republik Polen über die Zusammenarbeit bei den freiwilligen Leistungen der Republik Österreich an ehemalige Sklaven- und Zwangsarbeiter des nationalsozialistischen Regimes, Vienna, 24 October 2000.
Austrian-Ukrainian Agreement concerning the Austrian Reconciliation Fund
In 2000, Austria concluded bilateral agreements with six Central and Eastern European States, including the Austrian-Ukrainian Agreement concerning the Austrian Reconciliation Fund, in order to fulfil the conditions necessary for the coming into force of the Austrian Reconciliation Fund Law. All of these agreements provided for cooperation between the respective States in the payment of compensation to former slave labourers and forced labourers by the Austrian Reconciliation Fund via national foundations which were to be established by the respective States. 
Abkommen zwischen der Österreichischen Bundesregierung und der Regierung der Ukraine über die Zusammenarbeit bei den freiwilligen Leistungen der Republik Österreich an ehemalige Sklaven- und Zwangsarbeiter des nationalsozialistischen Regimes, Vienna, 24 October 2000.
Austrian-Russian Agreement concerning the Austrian Reconciliation Fund
In 2000, Austria concluded bilateral agreements with six Central and Eastern European States, including the Austrian-Russian Agreement concerning the Austrian Reconciliation Fund, in order to fulfil the conditions necessary for the coming into force of the Austrian Reconciliation Fund Law. All of these agreements provided for cooperation between the respective States in the payment of compensation to former slave labourers and forced labourers by the Austrian Reconciliation Fund via national foundations which were to be established by the respective States. 
Abkommen zwischen der Österreichischen Bundesregierung und der Regierung der Russischen Föderation über die Zusammenarbeit bei den freiwilligen Leistungen der Republik Österreich an ehemalige Sklaven- und Zwangsarbeiter des nationalsozialistischen Regimes, Vienna, 27 November 2000.
Peace Agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia
Article 5 of the 2000 Peace Agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia provides:
1.Consistent with the 1998 OAU Framework Agreement on Eritrea and Ethiopia, in which the parties commit themselves to addressing the negative socio-economic impact of the crisis on the civilian population, including the impact on those persons who have been deported, a neutral Claims Commission shall be established. The mandate of the Commission is to decide through binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one Government against the other, and by nationals (including both natural and juridical persons) of one party against the Government of the other party or entities owned or controlled by the other party that are (a) related to the conflict that was the subject of the Framework Agreement, the Modalities for its Implementation and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, and (b) result from violations of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or other violations of international law. The Commission shall not hear claims arising from the cost of military operations, preparing for military operations, or the use of force, except to the extent that such claims involve violations of international humanitarian law. 
Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, Algiers, 12 December 2000, also known as the Algiers Agreement, Article 5.
Washington Agreement between France and the US Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered during World War II
In the preamble to the 2001 Washington Agreement between France and the US Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered during World War II, the parties recognize that “France, following the end of World War II, enacted legislation that provided restitution and compensation for victims of anti-Semitic persecution during World War II under the authority of the occupying German authorities or the Vichy Government”. They also welcomed the various efforts of the French Government to legislate with respect to compensation programmes for victims of the French occupation during the Second World War, as well as the establishment of a fund of US$ 22.5 million, contributed by the banks, and another commitment of the banks to contribute 100 million Euro to the Foundation for the Memory of the Shoah. 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of France Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered During World War II, Washington, 18 January 2001, preamble.
Washington Agreement between France and the US Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered during World War II
Article 1(1) of the 2001 Washington Agreement between France and the US Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered during World War II, the parties agreed that:
The Commission [for the Compensation of Victims of Spoliation Resulting from Anti-Semitic Legislation in Force During the Occupation], the [Fund of US$22.5 million, contributed by the banks], and the [Foundation for the Memory of the Shoah] cover, and that it would be in the interest of all concerned for these entities to be the exclusive remedies and fora for the resolution of, any and all claims that have been or may be asserted against the Banks.  
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of France Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered During World War II, Washington, 18 January 2001, Article 1(1).
By Article 1(4), France agreed “to ensure that the Banks will promptly pay, in full, all claims approved by the [Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Spoliation Resulting from Anti-Semitic Legislation in Force During the Occupation]”. 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of France Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered During World War II, Washington, 18 January 2001, Article 1(4).
In turn, by Article 2 of the Agreement, the United States, with respect to pending and future cases concerning claims against one of the banks involved, committed itself to inform its courts through a Statement of Interest that
it would be in the foreign policy interests of the United States for the [Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Spoliation Resulting from Anti-Semitic Legislation in Force During the Occupation], the [Foundation for the Memory of the Shoah], and the [Fund of US$22.5 million, contributed by the banks] to be the exclusive remedies and fora for resolving such claims asserted against the Banks and that dismissal of such cases would be in its foreign policy interest. 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of France Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered During World War II, Washington, 18 January 2001, Article 2.
Annex A to the Austrian-US Agreement concerning the Austrian General Settlement Fund
Paragraph 1 of the 2001 Annex A to the Austrian-US Agreement concerning the Austrian General Settlement Fund, reflecting “key elements of the General Settlement Fund (‘GSF’) … and the additional measures for victims of National Socialism that form the basis for the Exchange of Notes between the United States and Austria”, provides:
Immediate Compensation for Survivors: The Austrian Government will make a US $150 million contribution to the National Fund, which will be distributed in its entirety on an expedited basis to all Holocaust survivors originating from or living in Austria … This amount will cover 1) apartment and small business leases; 2) household property; 3) personal valuables and effects. This amount will not cover potential claims against Dorotheum … or in rem claims for works of art. This amount will be credited against the final cap for the GSF. 
Joint Settlement Statement on Holocaust Restitution, 17 January 2001, together with Diplomatic Note No. 14 from the United States of America to Austria, Vienna, 23 January 2001 and Annexes A, B and C to the Agreement, § 1.
Annex A to the Austrian-US Agreement concerning the Austrian General Settlement Fund
Paragraph 2 of the 2001 Annex A to the Austrian-US Agreement concerning the Austrian General Settlement Fund provides:
Establishment of a General Settlement Fund: The Austrian Federal Government will propose the necessary legislation to the National Council by April 30, 2001 to establish a GSF. Austria will undertake its best efforts to ensure that this legislation is passed by June 30, 2001. The legislation will enter into force once all contributions have been made available. The GSF will be a voluntary fund that will provide ex gratia payments to certain applicants. The GSF will include both a “claims-based” and an “equity-based” component. The GSF will be capped at US $210 million plus interest, at the Euribor rate, accruing to it beginning 30 days after all claims, pending as of June 30, 2001, against Austria and/or Austrian companies arising out of or related to the National Socialist era or World War II are dismissed with prejudice, and such interest shall continue to accrue on the funds available at any given time until the GSF has paid all approved claims. The US $210 million contribution by Austria and Austrian companies (including the Austrian insurance industry) + interest, under the terms described supra, will be in addition to the US $150 million referred to supra in para. 1. The distribution of payments by the GSF will be based on decisions of the independent Claims Committee. 
Joint Settlement Statement on Holocaust Restitution, 17 January 2001, together with Diplomatic Note No. 14 from the United States of America to Austria, Vienna, 23 January 2001 and Annexes A, B and C to the Agreement, § 2.
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Article 27(1) of the 2003 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides: “If the Court finds that there has been violation of a human or peoples’ right, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation.” 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, signed at Ouagadougou on 10 June 1998, Article 27(1).
Hague Rules of Air Warfare
Article 24(5) of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare requires a belligerent State “to pay compensation for injuries to person or to property caused by the violation by any of its officers or forces of the provisions of this article [on aerial bombardment]”. 
Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, Part II, drafted by a Commission of Jurists, The Hague, December 1922–February 1923, Article 24(5).
ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War
Article 29 of the 1938 ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War provides: “Any State committing a breach of this Convention is liable to pay compensation for all damage caused by such breach to a State injured thereby or any of its nationals.” 
Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War, adopted by the International Law Association, Fortieth Conference, Amsterdam, 29 August–2 September 1938, Article 29.
Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims
Protocol No. 1 of the 1952 Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims, concluded at a meeting between the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims at which “the extension of the legislation existing in the Federal Republic of Germany for the redress of National-Socialist wrongs” was discussed and at which the representatives of both parties “agreed on a number of principles for the improvement of the existing legislation as well as on other measures”, provides:
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany declare that they will take as soon as possible all steps within their constitutional competence to ensure the carrying out of the following programme:
I. Compensation
1. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is resolved to supplement and amend the existing compensation legislation by a Federal Supplementing and Coordinating Law (Bundesergänzungs- und rahmengesetz) so as to ensure that the legal position of the persecutees throughout the Federal territory be no less favourable than under the General Claims Law now in force in the US Zone.
3. Where residence and date-line requirements are applicable under compensation legislation, compensation payments for the deprivation of liberty shall be granted to persons who emigrated before the date-line and had their last German domicile or residence within the Federal territory.
4. Persecutees who were subject to compulsory labour and lived under conditions similar to incarceration shall be treated as if they had been deprived of liberty by reason of persecution.
5. A persecutee who, within the boundaries of the German Reich as of December 31, 1937, lived “underground” under conditions similar to incarceration or unworthy of human beings shall be treated as if he had been deprived of liberty by reason of persecution, in the meaning of that term under compensation legislation.
6. Where a persecutee died after March 8, 1945, his heirs (children, spouse or parents) shall be entitled to assert his claim for compensation for deprivation of liberty …
9. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will provide compensation to persons who suffered losses as officials or employees of Jewish communities or public institutions within the boundaries of the German Reich as of December 31, 1937.
12. Persons who were persecuted because of their political convictions, race, faith or ideology and who settled in the Federal Republic or emigrated abroad from expulsion areas … shall receive compensation for deprivation of liberty and damage to health and limb … Compensation in accordance with Paragraph 1 shall also be paid to persecutees who emigrated abroad or settled in the Federal Republic during or after the time the general expulsion took place.
14. Persons who were persecuted for their political convictions, race, faith or ideology during the National-Socialist regime of terror and who are at present stateless or political refugees and who were deprived of liberty by National-Socialist terror acts shall receive appropriate compensation for deprivation of liberty and damage to health and limb. 
Agreement consisting of Protocol No. 1 drawn up by the Representatives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany; and Protocol No. 2 drawn up by the Representatives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany, Protocol No. 1, §§ I(1), (3)–(6), (9), (12) and (14).
Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims
Protocol No. 2 of the 1952 Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims provides:
Whereas the National-Socialist regime of terror confiscated vast amounts of property and other assets from Jews in Germany and in territories formerly under German rule;
And whereas part of the material losses suffered by the persecutees of National-Socialism is being made good by means of internal German legislation in the fields of restitution and indemnification and whereas an extension of this internal German legislation, in particular in the field of indemnification, is intended;
And whereas considerable values, such as those spoliated in the occupied territories, cannot be returned, and that indemnification for many economic losses which have been suffered cannot be made because, as a result of the policy of extermination pursued by National-Socialism, claimants are no longer in existence;
And whereas [a] considerable number of Jewish persecutees of National-Socialism are needy as a result of their persecution …
And having regard to [the 1952 Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and Israel] …
[Germany and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims] therefore … concluded the following Agreement:
Article 1
In view of the considerations hereinbefore recited the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany hereby undertakes the obligation towards the [Conference on Jewish Material Claims] to enter, in the Agreement with the State of Israel, into a contractual undertaking to pay the sum of 450 million Deutsche Mark to the State of Israel for the benefit of the [Conference on Jewish Material Claims].
Article 2
The Federal Republic of Germany will discharge their obligation undertaken for the benefit of the [Conference on Jewish Material Claims], in the [1952 Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and Israel], by payments made to the State of Israel … The amounts so paid and transmitted by the State of Israel to the [Conference on Jewish Material Claims] will be used for the relief, rehabilitation and resettlement of Jewish victims of National-Socialist persecution … Such amounts will, in principle, be used for the benefit of victims who at the time of the conclusion of the present Agreement were living outside Israel. 
Agreement consisting of Protocol No. 1 drawn up by the Representatives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany; and Protocol No. 2 drawn up by the Representatives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany, Protocol No. 2, preamble and Articles 1 and 2.
UN Declaration on Enforced Disappearance
Article 19 of the 1992 UN Declaration on Enforced Disappearance provides:
The victims of acts of enforced disappearance and their family shall obtain redress and shall have the right to adequate compensation, including the means for as complete a rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of enforced disappearance, their dependants shall also be entitled to compensation. 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res. 47/133, 18 December 1992, Article 19.
Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala
Article VIII of the 1994 Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala provides:
The Parties recognize that it is a humanitarian duty to compensate and/or assist victims of human rights violations. Said compensation and/or assistance shall be effected by means of government measures and programmes of a civilian and socio-economic nature addressed, as a matter of priority, to those whose need is greatest, given their economic and social position. 
Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights between the Government of the Republic of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, Mexico City, 29 March 1994, annexed to Letter dated 8 April 1994 from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UN General Assembly and to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/928-S/1994/448, 19 April 1994, Annex I, Article VIII.
Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and IHL in the Philippines
Article 2(3) of Part III of the 1998 Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and IHL in the Philippines states that the right of the victims and their families to seek justice for violations of human rights includes “adequate compensation”. 
Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, The Hague, 16 March 1998, Part III, Article 2(3).
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2000)
Article 23 of the 2000 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law provides:
Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable damage resulting from violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, such as:
(a) Physical or mental harm, including pain, suffering and emotional distress;
(b) Lost opportunities, including education;
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning potential;
(d) Harm to reputation or dignity; and
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicines and medical services, and psychological and social services. 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, annexed to The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Final Report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, submitted in accordance with UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/33, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62,18 January 2000, Article 23.
UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/60
Sections 2(2), (5) and (6) of UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/60 provide:
2.2 Any person whose property right was lost between 23 March 1989 and 24 March 1999 as a result of discrimination has a right to restitution in accordance with the present regulation. Restitution may take the form of restoration of the property right (hereafter “restitution in kind”) or compensation.
2.5 Any refugee or displaced person with a right to property has a right to return to the property, or to dispose of it in accordance with the law, subject to the present regulation.
2.6 Any person with a property right on 24 March 1999, who has lost possession of that property and has not voluntarily disposed of the property right, is entitled to an order from the Commission for repossession of the property. The Commission shall not receive claims for compensation for damage to or destruction of property. 
UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/60 on Residential Property Claims and The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Housing and Property Directorate and the Housing and Property Claims Commission, 31 October 2000, Sections 2(2), (5) and (6).
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility
Article 34 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, dealing with “Forms of reparation”, provides: “Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.” 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001, Article 34.
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility
Article 36 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, dealing with compensation as a form of reparation, provides:
1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution.
2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established. 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001, Article 36.
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement between the political forces of Côte d’Ivoire
The 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement between the political forces of Côte d’Ivoire provides:
The government of national reconciliation shall commit itself to facilitating humanitarian operations in favour of all the victims of the conflict throughout the national territory.
On the basis of the report of the national human rights commission, it will take measures to indemnify and rehabilitate the victims. 
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement between the political forces of Côte d’Ivoire, Round table of the Ivorian political forces, meeting at Linas-Marcoussis from 15 to 23 January 2003 and bringing together the following parties: FPI (Front Populaire Ivoirien), MFA (Mouvement des Forces d’Avenir), MJP (Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix), MPCI (Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire), MPIGO (Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest), PDCI-RDA (Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain), PIT (Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs), RDR (Rassemblement des Républicains), UDCY (Union Démocratique et Citoyenne), UDPCI (Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire), Linas-Marcoussis, 24 January 2003, Annex, paragraph VI. 4.
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of IHL (2005)
Paragraph 20 of the 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law states:
Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case, resulting from gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law, such as:
(a) Physical or mental harm;
(b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social benefits;
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning potential;
(d) Moral damage;
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical services, and psychological and social services. 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, annexed to UN General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, § 20.
[emphasis in original]
Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1969), in a provision dealing with the violation of the terms of an armistice by an individual, refers to Article 41 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and provides:
The violation of the terms of the armistice by private persons acting on their own initiative only entitles [the injured party] to demand the punishment of the offenders or, if necessary, compensation for the damages sustained. 
Argentina, Leyes de Guerra, RC-46-1, Público, II Edición 1969, Ejército Argentino, Edición original aprobado por el Comandante en Jefe del Ejército, 9 May 1967, § 6.013.
Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1989), referring to Article 91 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, provides: “The party which violates the [1949 Geneva] Conventions or [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation.” 
Argentina, Leyes de Guerra, PC-08-01, Público, Edición 1989, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, aprobado por Resolución No. 489/89 del Ministerio de Defensa, 23 April 1990, § 8.10.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) states that the means of securing observance of the law of armed conflict “include protest and demand for compensation by a belligerent or neutral power”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 15-1, § 3.
The manual further provides: “A state which violates the LOAC shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation.” 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 15-2, § 9.
Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on the treatment of prisoners of war (PWs):
The responsibility for the treatment of PWs rests upon the Detaining Power. Failure to properly care for PWs may make that power liable to pay compensation, while the individuals responsible for such ill-treatment or for allowing it to occur, are liable to be tried as war criminals. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1014.
In its chapter entitled “Preventative and enforcement measures and the role of protecting powers”, the manual states:
1502. General
2. Once hostilities have commenced, the means of securing observance of LOAC are limited … [They] include protest and demand for compensation by a belligerent or neutral power …
1506. State responsibility
1. Parties to the conflict are responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces. [A] state which violates the LOAC shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, §§ 1502.2 and 1506.1.
Canada
Canada’s Code of Conduct After Capture Manual (2004) states: “responsibility for the treatment of PWs [prisoners of war] rests upon the detaining power. Failure to care for PWs properly may make that power pay compensation”. 
Canada, The Code of Conduct After Capture for the Canadian Forces, B-GJ-005-110/FP-010, National Defence Headquarters, 28 October 2004, § 301.
Colombia
Colombia’s Basic Military Manual (1995), after mentioning the possibility of taking political, economic and legal sanctions against a State whose agents or civil servants have committed violations of international law, provides: “For the States and their governments, the sanctions entail high costs which represent compensations”. After discussing the responsibility of individual members of the armed forces who have committed violations of international law, the manual states: “Furthermore, apart from the individual sanctions, the nation can be sentenced, by its highest tribunals, to compensate for the damages and prejudices caused to individuals by arbitrary and illegal conduct of its authorities.” 
Colombia, Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual Básico para las Personerías y las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 1995, p. 36.
Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book III, Volume 2 (Instruction of second-year trainee officers):
III.1. Collective responsibility
Collective responsibility of a belligerent party for a violation of the law of armed conflicts [LOAC] takes several forms.
- The third type of collective responsibility lies in the financial responsibility of States for damages caused by their illegal acts. In 1907, this form of responsibility of the State was formally included in Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. According to Article 3, a belligerent party which has committed a violation of the provisions of the Regulations “shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation”. The article specifies further that that party “shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces”.
In practice, it is rare that the financial responsibility of the State in case of breaches of the Law of Armed Conflicts has important effects. At the most, a peace treaty can impose on the vanquished party the obligation to pay a global sum to the victor, in reparation of financial losses the latter has suffered due to the war.
The main interest of the diverse modalities relating to the responsibility of the State probably lies in their dissuasive effect. The fact that every violation of the law of armed conflicts engages the responsibility of the State can prompt the authorities to respect the provisions of the LOAC.
III.4. Mechanisms to engage the responsibility of the State
… A party to a conflict which violates the provisions of the law of armed conflicts can, if necessary, be called upon to pay compensation.
Breaches of international humanitarian law by members of the armed forces engage the international responsibility of the State concerned. Consequently, a State will have to answer for the consequences of every act contrary to the law committed by every soldier vis-à-vis the State that suffered the breach. It must restore the situation and, if need be, is bound to indemnify the State which has suffered the breach. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 2: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 2ème année, Manuel de l’instructeur, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, pp. 37–38 and 41; see also Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 68.
Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989), under a provision entitled “Observance of the law of armed conflict”, states: “In the event of a clearly established violation of the law of armed conflict, the aggrieved nation may: … 2. Protest to the offending nation and demand that those responsible be punished and/or that compensation be paid.” 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 6.2.
Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992), referring to Article 91 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV), provides: “A party to a conflict which does not comply with the provisions of international humanitarian law shall be liable to pay compensation.” 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 1214.
Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands, under a provision stating the responsibility of States for violations of IHL committed by members of their armed forces, refers to Article 91 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and provides that “a party to a conflict may be obliged to pay compensation” for violations of IHL. 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, p. IX-3.
Netherlands
The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states: “If a prisoner of war is not properly treated, the captive may claim payment of compensation from the detaining power.” 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0710.
The manual further states:
A party to a conflict which breaches the provisions of the Geneva Conventions or AP I [1977 Additional Protocol I] is bound to pay compensation. It is liable for all actions carried out by persons belonging to its armed forces. In principle, this liability applies to those who perpetrated the damage and to any other parties to the conflict. When it violates the conditions of the humanitarian law of war, a party to a conflict may be required to pay compensation. Holding parties liable in this way contributes to compliance with the requirements of the humanitarian law of war. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 1120.
New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states: “The only remedy against a State for breaches of the law of armed conflict committed by its authority or by its personnel is by way of compensation.” 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 1605(1).
Nigeria
Nigeria’s Manual on the Laws of War provides: “If the State contravenes the rules of the laws of War, it has to pay compensation.” 
Nigeria, The Laws of War, by Lt. Col. L. Ode PSC, Nigerian Army, Lagos, undated, § 7.
Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states: “The belligerent State is bound to pay compensation for damage caused to persons or property [through violations of IHL].” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 172.g.
Peru
Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states: “The belligerent State is bound to pay compensation for damage caused to persons or property [through violations of IHL].” 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 163(g), p. 343.
Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea’s Military Law Manual (1996) provides that any party injured by a violation of IHL by the enemy can ask for remedies. 
Republic of Korea, Military Law Manual, 1996, pp. 89 and 90.
Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996), in a chapter dealing with the consequences of “incorrect behaviour” of members of the armed forces, notes:
In the event of non-compliance with the rules [of the LOAC], the State is liable insofar as it has the obligation to pay compensation in accordance with any resolutions condemning the acts in question or to adopt any other measures agreed on by the international community. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 7.6.a.
The manual also states: “The State and … international organizations may commit illicit acts. However, the responsibility which they incur is not of a criminal nature but compensatory, and is materialized in the obligation to pay an indemnification (art. 91 [of the 1977 Additional Protocol I]).” 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 11.8.a.
In a further provision entitled “Payment of compensation for war”, the manual states: “The belligerent party which violates the rules of the LOAC can be obliged to compensate where appropriate.” 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 11.10.f.
Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007), in a section dealing with the consequences of misconduct in combat by its armed forces, states:
In the event of failure to comply with the established rules [of the LOAC], the State is liable to pay any compensation awarded and adopt any measures agreed by the international community. States are therefore responsible for all criminal acts committed by their armed forces. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 7.6.a.
The manual also states
When a State that is party to a conflict violates the provisions of the Conventions, it is liable, if the case demands, to pay compensation. The State is responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces and is therefore liable to pay any compensation awarded for violations committed by such persons. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 11.5.a.
The manual further states:
The State and international organizations can commit unlawful acts. They are not, however, held criminally responsible, but are liable to pay compensation. Whether individuals accused of war crimes are successfully prosecuted or not (by international or national courts) does not affect the responsibility of the State, which is liable to pay compensation in the form of reparation. Any party to a conflict that violates treaty-law provisions relating to armed conflict is liable to pay compensation and is responsible for all acts committed by the persons forming part of their armed forces. The proper channels for enforcing this responsibility are diplomatic protests or international legal proceedings. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 11.7.c.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) provides: “The belligerent State that is the victim of violations of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions can take the following measures: … if need be it can demand compensation.” 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 195(a).
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK Military Manual (1958), in a chapter dealing with “Means of securing legitimate warfare”, quotes Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV). In addition to other means of securing legitimate warfare, the manual lists “compensation” and refers to Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV). 
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, §§ 618 and 620.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states:
Enforcement of the law of armed conflict can involve a wide variety of measures. “Enforcement” is taken here to mean action to ensure observance of the law and also action that may be taken following alleged or actual violations. Action aimed at effective enforcement of the law can include, but is not limited to:
j. Demands for compensation in respect of violations. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 16.1.
The manual further states:
It is a principle of international law that a state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is obliged to make full reparation for the injury caused by that act. This principle extends to the law of armed conflict in that a state is responsible for violations of the law committed by persons forming part of its armed forces and, if the case demands, is liable to pay compensation. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 16.15.
United States of America
The US Field Manual (1956), quoting Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV), states:
In the event of violation of the law of war, the injured party may legally resort to remedial action of the following types: … Protest or demand for compensation … Such communications may be sent through the protecting power, a humanitarian organization performing the duties of a protecting power, or a neutral state, or by parlementaire direct to the commander of the offending forces. 
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 495(b).
United States of America
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976), quoting Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) and Article 29 of the 1949 Geneva Convention I and Article 12 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III, states:
Under international law, states which violate their obligations are responsible, in appropriate cases, for payment of monetary damages to compensate states for injuries suffered. This principle applies to law of armed conflict violations. State responsibility to compensate victims of violations is an important feature in enforcement measures. Claims for compensation are frequently combined with protests about violations … Thus, the violater state’s obligation to compensate for violations of the Hague Regulations applies regardless of whether the acts constituting violations were authorized by competent authorities of the violator state … However, as a general rule, in the absence of some cause for the fault such as inadequate supervision or training, no obligation for compensation arises on the part of the state for other violations of the law of armed conflict committed by individual members outside of their general area of responsibility. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 10-3.
The Pamphlet further states: “Article 3 [of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV)] concerns a state’s obligation to pay compensation for acts committed by its Armed Forces which violate the Hague Regulations. The 1949 Geneva Conventions contain a variety of such obligations.” 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 15-2(b).
United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (1995), under a provision dealing with “Enforcement of the law of armed conflict”, states: “In the event of a clearly established violation of the law of armed conflict, the aggrieved nation may: … 2. Protest to the offending nation and demand that those responsible be punished and/or that compensation be paid.” 
United States, The Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 6.2.
(emphasis in original)
United States of America
The Annotated Supplement to the US Naval Handbook (1997), which contains a list of cases of demands for compensation involving US forces, states:
It is now generally established that the principle laid down in art. 3 [of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV)] is applicable to the violation of any rule regulating the conduct of hostilities and not merely to violations of the [1907] Hague Regulations. 
United States, Annotated Supplement to the Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, prepared by the Oceans Law and Policy Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, November 1997, § 6.2, footnote 21.
United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (2007), under a provision dealing with “Enforcement of the law of armed conflict”, states: “In the event of a clearly established violation of the law of armed conflict, the aggrieved nation may: … 2. Protest to the offending nation and demand that those responsible be punished and/or that compensation be paid.” 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 6.2.
(emphasis in original)
Argentina
Argentina’s Law on Compensation for Political Prisoners (1991) provides:
Article 1 – Persons who, during a state of siege, were put at the disposal of the national executive power, by decree thereof, or civilians who were detained on the basis of orders issued by a military court – whether or not they have undertaken legal proceedings for damage or prejudice suffered – come within the purview of this law, provided they have not already received compensation in accordance with a prior legal ruling concerning the events in question.
Article 2 – In order to come within the purview of this law, the above-mentioned persons must fulfil one of the following conditions:
(a) They must have been put at the disposal of the national executive power prior to 10 December 1983.
(b) In the case of civilians, they must have been deprived of their freedom on the basis of orders issued by a military court, regardless of whether or not they were convicted by that court. 
Argentina, Law on Compensation for Political Prisoners, 1991, Articles 1–2.
Argentina
Argentina’s Law on Compensation for Enforced Disappearances (1994) provides:
Article 1 – Persons who, at the time of the enactment of this law, are the victims of enforced disappearance, shall be entitled to receive, by proxy, special damages equal to the monthly salary of a level-A civil servant (coefficient 100), as provided by Decree No. 993/91. 
Argentina, Law on Compensation for Enforced Disappearances, 1994, Article 1.
Austria
In 1995, by its National Fund Law (1995), Austria established a national fund “for the provision of benefits to the victims of National Socialism”. 
Austria, National Fund Law, 1995, Article I, Section 1(1).
The Law provides:
The Fund shall render benefits to persons
(1) who were persecuted by the National Socialist regime for political reasons, for reasons of birth, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, because of physical or mental disability or on the basis of accusations of allegedly antisocial attitudes, or who in other ways fell victim to typically National Socialist injustice or left the country to escape such persecution,
(4) The Fund shall render one-time-only or recurrent financial benefits. 
Austria, National Fund Law, 1995, Article I, Sections 2(1) and 2(4).
In its 2001 amendment, the Law further provides:
(1) Without prejudice to [previous contributions], the Federal Government shall contribute to the Fund an amount the total of which shall correspond to the equivalent in Schillings as of 24 October 2000 of 150 million US Dollars and be allocated [to the Fund]. This amount shall be accounted for by the Fund in a special account for benefits paid under Paragraph 2.
(2) This amount shall be used for benefits to be paid to victims of National Socialism … as a final compensation for the following categories of losses of property:
a) apartment and small business leases;
b) household property;
c) personal valuables and effects.
The present Federal Law shall be without prejudice to the in rem return of works of art according to statutory provisions.
(3) Persons … who were persecuted by the National Socialist regime on political grounds, on grounds of origin, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, or of physical or mental handicap, or who left the country to escape such persecution, and who themselves, or whose parents, suffered a loss of property in one of the categories mentioned in Paragraph 2 as a result of, or in connection with, events in the territory of the present-day Republic of Austria between 13 March 1938 and 9 May 1945 shall be entitled to such benefits. There is no legal right to benefits by the Fund.
(6) The amount mentioned in Paragraph 1 shall be distributed in equal parts among those entitled to benefits. 
Austria, National Fund Law, 1995, as amended in 2001, Article I, Sections 2b(1)-2b(3) and 2b(6).
Austria
In 2000, Austria adopted the Reconciliation Fund Law (2000), as amended in 2001, establishing a national fund, the goal of which was
to make a contribution toward reconciliation, peace, and cooperation through a voluntary gesture of the Republic of Austria to natural persons who were coerced into slave labor or forced labor by the National Socialist regime on the territory of the present day Republic of Austria. 
Austria, Reconciliation Fund Law, 2000, as amended in 2001, Section 1(2).
The Law provides: “The Fund shall have moneys in the amount of 6 billion Austrian schillings to carry out its tasks.” 
Austria, Reconciliation Fund Law, 2000, as amended in 2001, Section 6(1).
The Law also provides that the amounts (one-time payments) are to be paid as follows:
1. 105,000 Austrian schillings to [slave labourers].
2. 35,000 Austrian schillings to [forced labourers] who had to perform forced labor in industry, business, construction, power companies and other commercial enterprises, public institutions, rail transportation or postal service.
3. 20,000 Austrian schillings to [forced labourers] who had to do forced labor exclusively in agriculture or forestry or in the form of personal services (housekeeping, hotel work, etc).
4.Children and minors [who were transported under the age of 12 with one or both parents into the territory of the present day Republic of Austria or who were born here during the mother’s period of forced labor] are to receive the amount to which the parent is entitled or would be entitled …
5. A supplementary payment of 5,000 Austrian schillings may be made to women who during their time as forced labourers gave birth to children in maternity facilities for eastern workers or who were forced to undergo abortions. 
Austria, Reconciliation Fund Law, 2000, as amended in 2001, Section 3(1).
Another provision states: “If the eligible person has died on or after February 15, 2000, then the heirs … shall succeed.” 
Austria, Reconciliation Fund Law, 2000, as amended in 2001, Section 4(2).
In addition, the Law provides:
Payment of an award is made under the condition that the recipient make a declaration that with the receipt of an award under this federal law he renounces irrevocably any claim for slave labor or forced labor against the Republic of Austria or against Austrian business. 
Austria, Reconciliation Fund Law, 2000, as amended in 2001, Section 5(1).
The Austrian Reconciliation Fund Law came into force on 27 November 2000 after the signing of bilateral agreements between Austria and six Central and Eastern European countries (Belarus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russian Federation, Ukraine), as well as the Executive Agreement with the United States, and the securing of the financial resources for the Reconciliation Fund, in fulfilment of the requirements of the law. 
Austria, Reconciliation Fund Law, 2000, as amended in 2001, Section 17.
Austria
In 2001, Austria adopted the General Settlement Fund Law by which it established the General Settlement Fund, the purpose of which was “to comprehensively resolve open questions of compensation of victims of National Socialism for losses and damages as a result of or in connection with events having occurred on the territory of the present-day Republic of Austria during the National Socialist era”. The Law provides:
The Fund’s purpose shall be to acknowledge, through voluntary payments, the moral responsibility for losses and damages inflicted upon Jewish citizens and other victims of National Socialism as a result of or in connection with the National Socialist Regime. The return of works of art shall be governed by the special legislation presently in force. 
Austria, General Settlement Fund Law, 2001, as amended, Article 1(1)(1) and (2).
The Law further provides:
To carry out its tasks, the Fund shall be endowed with an amount of 210 million US Dollars. This amount shall be made available, at the latest, 30 days after all claims in the United States pending as of June 30, 2001 against Austria or Austrian companies arising out or related to the National Socialist era or World War II have been dismissed. Excepted therefrom are claims covered by the Reconciliation Fund … claims for the return of works of art, as well as claims in rem restitution against provinces or municipalities. 
Austria, General Settlement Fund Law, 2001, as amended, Article 1(2)(1).
In addition, the Law provides:
(1) Persons (under the claims-based process also associations), who/which were persecuted by the National Socialist regime on political grounds or origin, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, or of physical or mental handicap or of accusations of so-called asociality, or who left the country to escape such persecution, and who suffered losses or damages as a result of or in connection with events having occurred on the territory of the present-day Republic of Austria during the National Socialist era shall be eligible to file an application.
(2) In addition … heirs of eligible claimants as defined in Paragraph 1 shall also be eligible to file an application. In case of a defunct association, an association which the Claims Committee regards as the legal successor shall be entitled to file an application as well. 
Austria, General Settlement Fund Law, 2001, as amended, Article 1(6).
The Law expressly states:
The payments shall be awarded as a final compensation for losses and damages as a result of or in connection with events having occurred on the territory of the present-day Republic of Austria during the National Socialist era. There shall be no legal right to these payments. 
Austria, General Settlement Fund Law, 2001, as amended, Article 1(7).
Canada
Canada’s Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000) provides:
There is hereby established a fund, to be known as the Crimes Against Humanity Fund, into which shall be paid
(a) all money obtained through enforcement in Canada of orders of the International Criminal Court for reparation or forfeiture or orders of that Court imposing a fine;
(b) all money obtained in accordance with section 31; and
(c) any money otherwise received as a donation to the Crimes Against Humanity Fund.
The Attorney General of Canada may make payments out of the Crimes Against Humanity Fund, with or without a deduction for costs, to the International Criminal Court, the Trust Fund established under article 79 of the Rome Statute, victims of offences under this Act or of offences within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and to the families of those victims, or otherwise as the Attorney General of Canada sees fit. 
Canada, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000, Article 30.
The Act goes on to say:
The Minister of Public Works and Government Services shall pay into the Crimes Against Humanity Fund
(a) the net proceeds received from the disposition of any property referred to in subsections 4(1) to (3) of the Seized Property Management Act that is forfeited to Her Majesty and disposed of by that Minister, if the property was derived as the result of the commission of an offence under this Act; and
(b) amounts paid or recovered as a fine imposed under subsection 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code in relation to proceedings for an offence under this Act. 
Canada, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000, Article 31.
Canada
Canada’s Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000) was amended by an Act assented to on 18 December 2001, to provide:
30. (1) There is hereby established a fund, to be known as the Crimes Against Humanity Fund, into which shall be paid
(a) all money obtained through enforcement in Canada of orders of the International Criminal Court for reparation or forfeiture or orders of that Court imposing a fine;
(b) all money obtained in accordance with section 31; and
(c) any money otherwise received as a donation to the Crimes Against Humanity Fund.
Payment out of Fund
(2) The Attorney General of Canada may make payments out of the Crimes Against Humanity Fund, with or without a deduction for costs, to the International Criminal Court, the Trust Fund established under article 79 of the Rome Statute, victims of offences under this Act or of offences within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and to the families of those victims, or otherwise as the Attorney General of Canada sees fit.
Credits to Fund
31. The Minister of Public Works and Government Services shall pay into the Crimes Against Humanity Fund
(a) the net amount received from the disposition of any property referred to in subsections 4(1) to (3) of the Seized Property Management Act that is
(i) proceeds of crime within the meaning of subsection 462.3(1) of the Criminal Code, obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of the commission of an offence under this Act, and
(ii) forfeited to Her Majesty and disposed of by that Minister; and
(b) any amount paid or recovered as a fine imposed under subsection 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code in substitution for the property referred to in paragraph (a). 
Canada, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000, as amended by An Act to amend the Criminal Code (organized crime and law enforcement) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, assented to on 18 December 2001, Sections 30–31.
Chile
Chile’s Law on the Establishment of a National Authority for Compensation and Reconciliation (1992), as amended in 2004, states that a “monthly compensatory pension is established for the benefit of the families of victims of violations of human rights and political violence”. 
Chile, Law on the Establishment of a National Authority for Compensation and Reconciliation, 1992, as amended in 2004, Article 17.
France
France’s Decree on Reparation for World War II Orphans (2004) provides:
Article 1 – Any person whose mother or father, of French or foreign nationality, was deported from the national territory during the Occupation on the grounds and under the conditions mentioned in articles L.272 and L.286 of the Code on Military Invalidity Pensions and War Victims, and died in deportation, is entitled to reparation, in accordance with the provisions of the present Decree, if the person was younger than 21 years at the time the deportation took place.
This regime equally benefits persons, younger than 21 years at the time of the events, whose father or mother, of French or foreign nationality, was executed during the Occupation under the circumstances defined in articles L.274 and L.290 of the same Code.
Excluded from the benefit of the regime provided by the present Decree are persons who receive a lifelong compensation for the same facts by the Federal Republic of Germany or the Republic of Austria.
Article 2 – The reparation takes the form, at the choice of the beneficiary, of a compensation sum of 27 440.82 € or of a lifelong monthly allowance of 457.35 €. 
France, Decree on Reparation for World War II Orphans, 2004, Articles 1–2.
Germany
Since the end of the Second World War, Germany has adopted several laws relative to the indemnification of victims of the war and the Holocaust, such as: the Law on the Equalization of Burdens as amended (1952); the Law for the Compensation of the Victims of National Socialist Persecution (1953), as amended in 1965; the Federal Restitution Law as amended (1957) which provides for compensation in case restitution was not possible; the Law on the Reparation of Losses as amended (1969); the Law on the Settlement of Open Property Matters as amended (1990); and the Law on Indemnification of Victims of Nazism as amended (1994). 
Germany, Law on the Equalization of Burdens, 1952, as amended; Law for the Compensation of the Victims of National Socialist Persecution, 1953, as amended in 1965; Federal Restitution Law, 1957, as amended; Law on the Reparation of Losses, 1969, as amended; Law on the Settlement of Open Property Matters, 1990, as amended; Law on Indemnification of Victims of Nazism, 1994, as amended.
Germany
In 2000, the German Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament), with the concurrence of the Bundesrat (Upper House of Parliament), adopted the Law on the Creation of a Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” (2000), as amended in 2001, thereby establishing a foundation responsible for making payments to entitled claimants and setting maximum amounts to be awarded to different categories of claimants. 
Germany, Law on the Creation of a Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future”, 2000, as amended in 2001.
The Law states: “The purpose of the Foundation is to make financial compensation available through partner organizations to former forced laborers and those affected by other injustices from the National Socialist period”. 
Germany, Law on the Creation of a Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future”, 2000, as amended in 2001, Section 2(1).
Eligible for compensation under this Law are the following persons:
1. persons who were held in a concentration camp … or in another place of confinement outside the territory of what is now the Republic of Austria or a ghetto under comparable conditions and were subjected to forced labor;
2. persons who were deported from their homelands into the territory of the German Reich within the borders of 1937 or to a German-occupied area, subjected to forced labor in a commercial enterprise or for public authorities there, and held under conditions other than those mentioned in Number 1, or were subjected to conditions resembling imprisonment or similar extremely harsh living conditions;
3. persons who suffered property loss as a consequence of racial persecution with essential, direct, and harm-causing collaboration of German businesses … The partner organizations may also award compensation from the funds provided to them … to those victims of National Socialist crimes who are not members of one of the groups mentioned in Sentence 1, Numbers 1 and 2, particularly forced laborers in agriculture … The funds provided for in Section 9, Paragraph 4, Sentence 2, Number 2 are intended to compensate property damage inflicted during the National Socialist regime with the essential, direct, and harm-causing participation of German enterprises, but not inflicted for reasons of National Socialist persecution. The funds referred to in Section 9, Paragraph 3, shall be awarded in cases of medical experiments or in the event of the death of or severe damage to the health of a child lodged in a home for children of forced laborers; in cases of other personal injuries they may be awarded.
(3) Eligibility cannot be based on prisoner-of-war status. 
Germany, Law on the Creation of a Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future”, 2000, as amended in 2001, Section 11.
Germany
Germany’s Federal Government Directive concerning the payment of amounts to victims of persecution in recognition of work in a ghetto which did not constitute forced labour and which has not been recognized to date under social insurance law (2007) states:
Persecuted persons within the meaning of § 1 of the Federal Law for the Compensation of the Victims of National Socialist Persecution [Bundesentschädigungsgesetz (BEG) – Federal Indemnification Act] who have been forced to live in a ghetto in an area under national socialist influence and who during this time have been employed without coercion in an employment-like relation, can receive a one-off payment according to this Directive if
1. that time has not already been recognized as a ghetto contribution period according to the Law for the Payment of Pensions for Periods of Work in a Ghetto of 20 June 2002 ([Gesetz zur Zahlbarmachung von Renten aus Beschäftigungen in einem Ghetto (ZRBG)]), and payments are not already being made for this time from a social security system,
2. for that work they have not received a payment from the funds of the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” or could have received such payment. 
Germany, Federal Government Directive concerning the payment of amounts to victims of persecution in recognition of work in a ghetto which did not constitute forced labour and which has not been recognized to date under social insurance law, 2007, Section 1, § 1(1) and (2).
Iraq
Iraq’s Law Compensating the Victims of Military Operations, Military Mistakes and Terrorist Actions (2009) states:
Article 1
This law aims to compensate any individual harmed [by] military operations, military mistakes, and terrorist attacks, and to define the extent of damage, [the] basis of such compensation, and the means to demand it.
Article 2 Related Provisions:
The compensation stipulated in this law includes the following damages:
1. [Martyrdom and loss resulting from operations covered by the Act;]
2. Total or partial disability[, on the basis of a report from a competent] medical committee[;]
3. [Injuries and other instances requiring temporary treatment, on the basis of a report from a competent] medical committee[;]
4. Damage to property[;]
5. Damage[] related to [employment or study].
Article 3
In pursuit of this law, the following entities shall be established:
First. A central commission designated as “The Central Commission for Compensating the Victims of Military Operations, Military Mistakes and Terrorist Actions”, based in Baghdad and affiliated to the Presidium of the [C]ouncil of [M]inisters.
Second. A branch commissions in Baghdad, and in the Kurdistan region, as well as in every region that would be established in the future, and in every province not affiliated to a region, designated as “The Branch Commission for Compensating the Victims of Military Operations, Military Mistakes and Terrorist Actions”. Such branch commission is entitled to initiate branches in its areas of operation, following the approval of the Central Commission.
Article 5
First. The Central Commission shall assume the following duties:
a. Ratifying recommendations issued by the branch commissions related to [compensation for] property and missing persons … , including amending or nullifying [them], after the passage of the contestation period stated in Article 7 of this law.
Article 9
First. Military, Ministry of Interior’s, and other security organizations’ personnel, both rank-and-file and temporarily contracted, are entitled [to the] following compensations:
a. Families of killed victims receive[] ID [Iraqi Dinars] 5,000,000 (Five million).
b. Victims of 75–100% disability receive[] ID 5,000,000 (Five million).
c. Victims of 50–75% disability receive[] ID 2,500,000 (Two and a half million).
d. Victims of less than 50% disability receive[] ID 2,000,000 (Two million).
Second. For other persons not covered with the classification stipulated in “First” above, the following compensations apply:
a. Families of killed victims receive[] ID 3,750,000 (Three million seven hundred and fifty thousand).
b. Victims of 75–100% disability receive[] ID 3,750,000 (Three million seven hundred and fifty thousand).
c. Victims of 50–75% disability receive[] not less than ID 2,000,000 (Two million) but not exceeding ID 3,000,000 (Three million).
d. Victims of less than 50% disability receive[] ID 1,750,000 (One million seven hundred and fifty thousand).
Article 13
Victims’ families and victims of total and partial disabilities are awarded a residential piece of land, provide[d] that they do not own another property. Line Ministries are obligated to take the necessary actions.
Article 14
First. Students who [suffered damages to] their studies [as a] consequence of incidents related to this law shall be allowed to return to their studies according to regulations set by competent departments.
Second. Civil servants [who] lost their jobs [as a] consequence of incidents related to this law shall be allowed to return to their jobs or jobs similar to their original jobs and shall be entitled [to receive] the salarie[s] and allowances due during the period of their absence.
Article 17
Individuals who received judicial verdicts for terror crimes in accordance with Terrorism Law [No.] 13/2005 are excluded from the provisions of this law until proven innocent.
Article 19: Related Provisions
This law is considered as valid starting from March 20, 2003.
Article 20
Armed and security forces and other security organizations’ personnel are covered by this law until the issuance of a law specifically covering these categories. 
Iraq, Law Compensating the Victims of Military Operations, Military Errors and Terrorist Actions, 2009, Articles 1–3, 5(1)(a), 9, 13–14, 17 and 19–20.
Peru
Peru’s Regulations to the Law Creating the Comprehensive Reparations Plan (2006) states:
The aim of this programme is to grant economic reparation to the victims referred to in Articles 38 and 39 of the present Regulations. The granting of such reparations shall only be applicable once the process of identifying the victims is completed and only if the general procedure for the registration, identification and certification referred to in Article 73 of these Regulations was followed. 
Peru, Regulations to the Law Creating the Comprehensive Reparations Plan, 2006, Article 37.
Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Constitution (1993) provides: “The rights of persons who have sustained harm from crimes and abuses of power shall be protected by the law. The state shall guarantee the victims access to justice and compensation for damage.” It also provides: “Everyone shall have the right to compensation by the state for the damage caused by unlawful actions (or inaction) of state organs, or their officials.” 
Russian Federation, Constitution, 1993, Articles 52 and 53.
Other Russian legislation of relevance to the question of compensation for victims of violations of IHL are: the Law on Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Persecution (1991), as amended; the Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Nations (1991); the Decree on the Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Nations in Relation to the Cossacks (1992); the Resolution on Compensation for Persons Having Suffered Nazi Persecution (1994); the Resolution on Return of Property and Compensation for Victims of Political Persecution (1994); and the Resolution on Compensation for Destruction of Property for Citizens Having Suffered from the Settling of the Crisis in Chechnya and Having Left Chechnya Irrevocably (1997). 
Russian Federation, Law on Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Persecution as amended, 1991; Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Nations, 1991; Decree on the Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Nations in Relation to the Cossacks, 1992; Resolution on Compensation for Persons Having Suffered Nazi Persecution, 1994; Resolution on Return of Property and Compensation for Victims of Political Persecution, 1994; Resolution on Compensation for Destruction of Property for Citizens Having Suffered from the Settling of the Crisis in Chechnya and Having Left Chechnya Irrevocably, 1997.
Spain
Spain’s Military Criminal Code (1985) provides: “The State is the civil authority with subsidiary liability for any offences that are committed by members of the armed forces in the line of duty and that are considered as such by the court.” 
Spain, Military Criminal Code, 1985, Article 48.
Spain
Spain’s Penal Code (1995) provides:
The State, the autonomous community, the province, the island, the municipality or another public authority, depending on the case, has subsidiary liability for damage caused by a person who has committed a fraudulent or culpable act, provided that the person in question is a representative, agent or employee of said authority, or an official acting in the line of duty, that the damage caused was a direct consequence of running the public services entrusted to that person, and that there can be no duplication of the compensation awarded. The aforesaid is without prejudice to the liability associated with the normal or faulty functioning of such services, in keeping with the rules of administrative procedure. 
Spain, Penal Code, 1995, Article 121.
The Code also provides: “If the civil liability of a representative, agent or employee of a public authority, or of an official, is being examined in legal proceedings, a claim must be lodged simultaneously against the administration or public authority presumed to have subsidiary liability.” 
Spain, Penal Code, 1995, Article 121.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Law on (State) Responsibility (1958), as amended, provides: “The Confederation shall be liable for any damage unlawfully caused to a third party by an official in the exercise of his or her official duties, regardless of the fault committed by the official.” 
Switzerland, Law on (State) Responsibility, 1958, as amended, Article 3(1).
The Law further provides:
If the official has committed a fault resulting in death or bodily harm, the competent authority may, taking into consideration the special circumstances of the case, award the victim or the relatives of the victim adequate moral damages.
Whoever suffers unlawful moral injury has the right, if the official has committed a fault, to be paid damages therefor, provided that this is justified by the gravity of the injury and that compensation has not otherwise been given by the official concerned. 
Switzerland, Law on (State) Responsibility, 1958, as amended, Article 6.
United States of America
In 1988, the US passed the Law on Restitution for WWII Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts (1988) (as amended) containing a Statement of Congress to the effect that:
(a) With regard to individuals of Japanese ancestry
The Congress recognizes that, as described by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, a grave injustice was done to both citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during World War II … The excluded individuals of Japanese ancestry suffered enormous damages, both material and intangible, and there were incalculable losses in education and job training, all of which resulted in significant human suffering for which appropriate compensation has not been made …
(b) With respect to the Aleuts
The Congress recognizes that, as described by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, the Aleut civilian residents of the Pribilof Islands and the Aleutian Islands west of Unimak Island were relocated during World War II to temporary camps in isolated regions of southeast Alaska where they remained, under United States control and in the care of the United States, until long after any potential danger to their home villages had passed. The United States failed to provide reasonable care for the Aleuts, and this resulted in widespread illness, disease, and death among the residents of the camps; and the United States further failed to protect Aleut personal and community property while such property was in its possession or under its control. The United States has not compensated the Aleuts adequately for the conversion or destruction of personal property, and the conversion or destruction of community property caused by the United States military occupation of Aleut villages during World War II. There is no remedy for injustices suffered by the Aleuts during World War II except an Act of Congress providing appropriate compensation for those losses which are attributable to the conduct of United States forces and other officials and employees of the United States. 
United States, Law on Restitution for WWII Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts (as amended), 1988, Statement of the Congress, Section 1989a.
Title I (“United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry and Resident Japanese Aliens”, also known as “Civil Liberties Act”) of the Law establishes the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund and, under a provision entitled “Restitution”, provides:
The Attorney General shall, subject to the availability of funds appropriated to the Fund for such purpose, pay out of the Fund to each eligible individual the sum of $20,000, unless such individual refuses … to accept the payment. 
United States, Law on Restitution for WWII Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts (as amended), 1988, Title I, §§ 1989b-3(a) and 1989b-4(a)(1).
Title II (“Aleutian and Pribilof Islands Restitution”) establishes the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands Restitution Fund and, under a provision entitled “Compensation for community losses”, provides: “Subject to the availability of funds appropriated to the Fund, the Secretary shall make payments from the Fund, in accordance with this section, as restitution for certain Aleut losses sustained in World War II.” 
United States, Law on Restitution for WWII Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts (as amended), 1988, Title II, §§ 1989c-2(a) and 1989c-4(a).
Under a provision entitled “Individual compensation of eligible Aleuts”, Title II further provides:
The Secretary shall, in accordance with this section, make per capita payments out of the Fund to eligible Aleuts. The Secretary shall pay, subject to the availability of funds appropriated to the Fund for such payments, to each eligible Aleut the sum of $12,000. 
United States, Law on Restitution for WWII Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts (as amended), 1988, Title II, § 1989c-5(a).
With respect to Attu Island, Title II also provides:
The public lands on Attu Island, Alaska, within the National Wildlife Refuge System have been designated as wilderness … In order to make restitution for the loss of traditional Aleut lands and village properties on Attu Island, while preserving the present designation of Attu Island lands as part of the National Wilderness Preservation System, compensation to the Aleut people, in lieu of the conveyance of Attu Island, shall be provided. 
United States, Law on Restitution for WWII Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts (as amended), 1988, Title II, § 1989c-6(a).
United States of America
A provision of the California Code of Civil Procedure (1873), as amended, dealing with compensation for slave and forced labour states:
Any Second World War slave labor victim, or heir of a Second World War slave labor victim, Second World War forced labor victim, or heir of a Second World War forced labor victim, may bring an action to recover compensation for labor performed as a Second World War slave labor victim or Second World War forced labor victim from any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor was performed, either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate. 
United States, California Code of Civil Procedure, 1873, as amended, Section 354.6(b).
Uruguay
Uruguay’s Law on Cooperation with the ICC (2006) states:
14.1. The State shall be responsible for the reparation of victims of the crimes set out in Titles I to III of Part II of the present law [which include war crimes] committed in the territory of the Republic or abroad by agents of the State or by persons who were not agents of the State but who acted under the authorization, support or acquiescence of State agents.
14.2. The reparation of the victim must be comprehensive and include indemnity … and must be extended to the victim’s relatives or to the group or community to which the victim belongs. “Relatives” are understood as the group of persons united by the bond of marriage or parenthood as well as by the act of cohabiting or maintaining a common form of life. 
Uruguay, Law on Cooperation with the ICC, 2006, Article 14.
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe’s War Victims Compensation Act (1980), as amended to 2001, states:
PART I
PRELIMINARY
2. Interpretation
(1) In this Act–
“the war” means the armed conflict which occurred in Zimbabwe and in neighbouring countries between the 1st January, 1962, and the 29th February, 1980, in connection with the bringing about of, or resistance to, political and social change in Zimbabwe.
PART III
APPLICATION OF ACT AND CLAIMS FOR AND ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION
4. Application of Act
This Act shall apply in respect of
(a) any injury to a person the date of which was before the 1st March, 1980;
(b) the death of a person caused by an injury referred to in paragraph (a); where
(i) such injury was caused directly or indirectly by the war; and
(ii) such person was, at the time he sustained such injury, a citizen of Zimbabwe:
Provided that if the Minister [of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare] by written notice to the Commissioner [of War Victims Compensation, instituted with the Act] so directs, this Act shall apply to such a person even if he was not a citizen of Zimbabwe at the time he sustained the injury.
5. Claims for compensation
(1) A claim for compensation may be made by or on behalf of any person who
(a) has sustained an injury referred to in section four; or
(b) was a dependant of a person whose death was caused by an injury referred to in section four.
6. Consideration of claims and entitlements to benefits
(1) The Commissioner shall consider all claims for compensation made to him in terms of section five and, if he finds that the claimant –
(a) is suffering from disablement which was caused by an injury referred to in section four; or
(b) was a dependant of a person whose death was caused by an injury referred to in section four;
then, subject to this Act, the claimant shall be entitled to compensation. 
Zimbabwe, War Victims Compensation Act, 1980, as amended to 2001, Sections 2(1), 4, 5(1) and 6(1).
The Act also states:
PART IV
COMPENSATION FOR DISABLEMENT
8. Disablement pension
(1) … [A] disabled person whose degree of disability is one hundred per centum shall be entitled to a disablement pension …
(2) … [A] disabled person whose degree of disability is less than one hundred per centum shall be entitled to a disablement pension which bears the same proportion to the pension which would have been payable … had his degree of disablement been one hundred per centum as his actual degree of disablement bears to one hundred per centum.
(3) If a disabled person is suffering from an injury which consists of an aggravation to a material extent of pre-existing ill-health, physical or mental incapacity or personal injury, the pension payable to him shall be assessed in respect of such aggravation only.
12. Refund of medical expenses
(1) Subject to this section, a disabled person shall be entitled to be paid a refund of any expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred by him as a result of his injury in respect of –
(a) dental, medical, surgical or hospital treatment; or
(b) skilled nursing services; or
(c) the supply of medicines or surgical dressings; or
(d) the supply, maintenance, repair or renewal of artificial limbs or apparatus.
13. Vocational training
(1) In this section –
“vocational training” includes any form of education or training which, in the opinion of the Commissioner [of War Victims Compensation, instituted with the Act], will permit a disabled person to support himself and his dependants or will increase his capacity to do so.
(3) If the Commissioner considers that a disabled person should, in consequence of his disablement, receive vocational training in a hospital or elsewhere, he may order the disabled person to undergo such training and may award him, in addition to any other benefits to which he is entitled under this Act, a temporary allowance in respect of the period during which he undergoes such training …
(5) The Commissioner may grant to a disabled person a refund of the whole or any part of the charges, fees or expenses incurred by him in respect of the vocational training, subject to such conditions as the Commissioner may determine.
(6) … [T]he Commissioner may grant to the disabled person such sum as the Commissioner considers to be reasonable for the purchase of tools or other equipment required by him in the vocation for which he has been trained.
(7) If a disabled person refuses to undergo any vocational training ordered under this section, the Commissioner may reduce or withdraw any disablement pension payable to him under this Act.
14. Benefits for financial loss
Where a disabled person sustains a financial loss as a result of undergoing a medical examination or treatment in a hospital or otherwise on account of his disability, the Commissioner may, if the disabled person –
(a) is in receipt of a disablement pension, increase his pension;
(b) is not in receipt of a disablement pension, award him such pension as the Commissioner considers equitable[.]
15. Constant attendance allowance
Where –
(a) the injury of a disabled person is of a serious nature; and
(b) the Commissioner is satisfied that the disability of the person referred to in paragraph (a) necessitates the constant and continuous attendance of a nurse or other attendant;
the Commissioner may award to that disabled person, in addition to any other benefits payable in terms of this Part, an allowance not exceeding the reasonable expenditure actually incurred in respect of such attendance.
16. Clothing allowance
If –
(a) a disabled person is in receipt of a disablement pension in respect of a disability which requires him regularly to wear an artificial limb or to use crutches or any other appliance; and
(b) in the opinion of the Commissioner, excessive wear and tear of the clothing of the disabled person referred to in paragraph (a) is thereby caused;
the Commissioner may award to that disabled person for the wear and tear of his clothing such allowance as the Commissioner considers reasonable in the circumstances.
17. Children’s allowance
(1) Subject to this section, where a disabled person is compelled to change his normal occupation or to follow a lower standard of occupation and, in the opinion of the Commissioner, his change of occupation or lower standard of occupation was a result of his disablement, he shall be paid in respect of his children an allowance …
18. Travelling and subsistence allowances
(1) Subject to this section, where a disabled person is required to make a journey … for treatment or attention necessitated by his injury, he shall be paid an allowance at a rate determined by the Commissioner.
(2) The Commissioner may grant to a disabled person who is receiving treatment as an in-patient at an institution or hospital an allowance at such rate as the Commissioner considers equitable in the circumstances. 
Zimbabwe, War Victims Compensation Act, 1980, as amended to 2001, Sections 8(1)–(3), 12(1), 13(1), (3) and (5)–(7), 14, 15, 16, 17(1) and 18.
The Act further states:
PART V
COMPENSATION FOR DEATH
19. Widow’s pension
(1) Subject to this section, if a deceased person leaves a widow, his widow shall be entitled to a pension calculated at the rate of sixty per centum of the earnings of the deceased person immediately prior to his death:
Provided that –
(ii) the maximum rate of pension shall be six thousand six hundred and fifty-one dollars per annum.
(2) A pension payable in terms of subsection (1) –
(b) shall cease with effect from the date on which the widow remarries.
(3) Where the pension payable to a widow in terms of subsection (1) has ceased in terms of paragraph (b) of subsection (2) and –
(a) the husband of the widow by that subsequent marriage dies; or
(b) the subsequent marriage is dissolved;
the Commissioner [of War Victims Compensation, instituted with the Act] may restore the pension … in whole or in part …
20. Polygamous wives
(1) Where any compensation is payable in terms of this Act to the widow of a deceased person and that person at the time of his death had more than one wife, the compensation payable shall be paid to the widow designated by the Commissioner for the purposes of this Act or shall be apportioned between the widows in such proportions as the Commissioner considers equitable in the circumstances, as the Commissioner directs.
(2) Where a pension had been apportioned … between two or more widows and the pension payable to one of the widows ceases because of her death or remarriage or otherwise, the pension or pensions payable to the other widow or widows shall not be increased.
21. Children’s pensions
(1) If a deceased person leaves a widow and child, there shall be paid in respect of each child, subject to a maximum of five children, a pension at the appropriate rate specified in Part I of the Second Schedule [which lays out the maximum pension for different age-categories of children in presence of a widow]:
(2) If a deceased person leaves a child and no widow, there shall be paid in respect of each such child, subject to a maximum of five children, a pension at the appropriate rate specified in Part II of the Second Schedule [which lays out the maximum pension for different age-categories of children without a widow].
(3) If a child in respect of whom a pension is payable in terms of subsection (1) or (2) –
(a) dies, or otherwise ceases to be a child as defined in subsection (1) [a child is an unmarried legal or legalized son or daughter under 19 years of age] of section two, the pension payable under subsection (1) or (2) … shall cease or, if there is another child or children, be adjusted accordingly;
(b) attains the age of six or twelve years, the pension payable under subsection (1) or (2) … shall be adjusted accordingly.
(7) If a deceased person leaves more than five children, the pensions payable in terms of this section in respect of the children shall be calculated in relation to the five eldest who are children as defined in subsection (1) of section two.
22. Pensions for other dependants
(1) Subject to subsection (2), if a deceased person leaves a dependant who is not his widow or child and who –
(a) is wholly or partly incapable of supporting himself; and
(b) is in need of support;
the Commissioner may award to that dependant a pension or other benefit calculated in terms of subsection (2) for such period and subject to such terms and conditions as the Commissioner considers equitable in the circumstances. 
Zimbabwe, War Victims Compensation Act, 1980, as amended to 2001, Sections 19(1)(ii), (2)(b) and (3), 20(1)–(2), 21(1)–(3) and (7) and 22(1).
The Act also states:
PART VI
SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN
24. Special provisions relating to females
(1) If a disabled person is a female and has –
(a) a husband who is incapable of supporting himself due to physical or mental incapacity occasioned without his default; or
(b) one or more children who are incapable of supporting themselves and have no father who is both able and willing to support them; or
(c) a dependant who—
(i) is not her husband or child; and
(ii) is wholly or partly incapable of supporting himself; and
(iii) is in need of support;
the Commissioner [of War Victims Compensation, instituted with the Act] may award in respect of such husband, children or dependant, as the case may be, the compensation that would have been payable in terms of this Act had the disabled person been a male and had a wife or children or a dependant, as the case may be, in those circumstances.
(2) If a disabled person is a female who is—
(a) married, her earnings shall, for the purpose of calculating the amount of any compensation payable to her in terms of this Act, be deemed to be the amount of the pension which would have been payable in terms of section nineteen had she been a widow;
(b) unmarried, her earnings shall, for the purpose of calculating the amount of any compensation payable to her in terms of this Act, be deemed to be such amount as the Commissioner may determine.
(3) If a deceased person was a female and leaves –
(a) a widower who is incapable of supporting himself due to physical or mental incapacity occasioned without his default; or
(b) one or more children who are incapable of supporting themselves and have no father who is both willing and able to support them; or
(c) a dependant who—
(i) is not her husband or child; and
(ii) is wholly or partly incapable of supporting himself; and
(iii) is in need of support;
the Commissioner may award to such widower or in respect of such children or dependant, as the case may be, the compensation that would have been payable in terms of this Act had the deceased person been a male and left a widow or children or a dependant, as the case may be, in those circumstances.
(4) If a deceased person was a female, her earnings shall –
be deemed to have been such amount as the Commissioner may determine.
25. Special provisions relating to minors
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act –
(a) there shall be paid in respect of the disablement of a minor such compensation as the Commissioner may consider appropriate …
(b) no pension shall be payable to any person in respect of the death of a minor.
26. Educational allowances
(1) If any pension or allowance payable in terms of this Act in respect of the child of a disabled person or deceased person has ceased because the child has reached the age of nineteen or twenty-one years, as the case may be, and that child continues to receive full-time education at an educational institution, the Commissioner may … award an allowance –
(a) if that child attends at a university, at a rate not exceeding eight hundred and fifty-six dollars per annum;
(b) if that child attends at an educational institution other than a university, at a rate not exceeding eight hundred and fifty-six dollars per annum or, if the Commissioner considers that there are special circumstances warranting a greater allowance, not exceeding five hundred and ninety-five dollars per annum.
(3) An allowance in terms of subsection (1) shall not be payable in respect of any period after the child attains the age of –
(a) in the case of a child attending at a university, twenty-four years;
(b) in the case of a child attending at an educational institution other than a university, twenty-one years:
Provided that, if the Commissioner considers that there are special circumstances … the Commissioner may authorize the payment of the allowance or part thereof for such period as the Commissioner thinks fit. 
Zimbabwe, War Victims Compensation Act, 1980, as amended to 2001, Sections 24, 25(2), and 26(1) and (3).
Canada
In the Bouzari case before Canada’s Court of Appeal for Ontario in 2004, the appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran [2002] OJ No. 1624), which had barred him from suing the Islamic Republic of Iran, under Canada’s State Immunity Act 1985 (SIA). Bouzari had attempted to claim damages for torture, an action which had arisen out of events that had occurred in the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1993 and 1994. In summarizing the lower court’s decision, the Court of Appeal noted:
[19] The motion judge dismissed the action in reasons for judgment that are both thorough and erudite. She first addressed the question of the court’s jurisdiction over a claim that is brought against a foreign defendant for a tort committed abroad. While she found no real and substantial connection with Ontario, as would normally be required to establish jurisdiction, she declined to decide the case on that basis because of the possibility that these rules might be modified where the claim is for torture by a foreign state inflicted in that state.
[20] She then turned to the issue of the state immunity of Iran. She found that none of the three exceptions provided in the SIA applies to displace the immunity accorded by s. 3 of that legislation. She also concluded that there is no public international law, sourced either in treaties or in customary international law, that alters that conclusion. Finally, she found that s. 3 of the SIA does not violate s. 7 of the Charter [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
[21] As a result, she concluded that the court has no jurisdiction over Iran in the circumstances of this case because of state immunity. She therefore dismissed the action. Mr. Bouzari now appeals. 
Canada, Court of Appeal for Ontario, Bouzari case, Judgment, 30 June 2004, §§ 19–21.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s dismissal, holding that the SIA precludes claims against foreign States for acts not enumerated in the statute, including torture:
[57] In my view [Goudge, JA], the wording of the SIA must be taken as a complete answer to this argument. Section 3(1) could not be clearer. To reiterate, it says:
3. (1) Except as provided by this Act, a foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction of any court in Canada [emphasis added by Court of Appeal].
[58] The plain and ordinary meaning of these words is that they codify the law of sovereign immunity. 
Canada, Court of Appeal for Ontario, Bouzari case, Judgment, 30 June 2004, §§ 57–58.
The Court of Appeal also affirmed the lower court’s finding that Canada’s treaty obligations do not encompass the civil remedy sought by Bouzari:
[72] … [I]t is Article 14 [of the 1984 Convention Against Torture] which is the focus of the appellant’s argument. It reads as follows:
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to compensation.
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other person to compensation which may exist under national law.
[81] In my view, the motion judge correctly concluded on the basis of these various considerations that Canada’s treaty obligation pursuant to Article 14 does not extend to providing the right to a civil remedy against a foreign state for torture committed abroad. The appellant’s various attacks on her careful analysis all must be dismissed. Canada’s treaty obligation under Article 14 simply does not extend to the appellant’s case. 
Canada, Court of Appeal for Ontario, Bouzari case, Judgment, 30 June 2004, §§ 72 and 81.
The Court of Appeal also affirmed the lower court’s finding that, although the prohibition against torture constitutes a rule of jus cogens, that norm does not encompass the civil remedy sought by Bouzari:
[87] The motion judge found that prohibition of torture is a rule of jus cogens. For the purpose of this appeal, no one, including the Attorney General of Canada, questions this conclusion. Rather the question is the scope of that norm. In particular, does it extend to a requirement to provide the right to a civil remedy for torture committed abroad by a foreign state?
[94] … [A]s a matter of practice, states do not accord a civil remedy for torture committed abroad by foreign states. The peremptory norm of prohibition against torture does not encompass the civil remedy contended for by the appellant. 
Canada, Court of Appeal for Ontario, Bouzari case, Judgment, 30 June 2004, §§ 87 and 94.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
In March 2006, in the Bongi Massaba case, a case against a captain of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Military Garrison Court of Ituri at Bunia held:
Whereas, in the present case, the three conditions of civil liability are fulfilled, inasmuch as the defendant has committed a fault by causing, by bullet, the death of the following persons …
Whereas, therefore, the civil liability of the defendant, as perpetrator of the act, is fully engaged.
Whereas, furthermore, the conditions of article 260, paragraph 3 [of the Congolese Civil Code], according to which masters and principals are liable for the damage caused by their servants and agents in the functions for which they were employed, must equally be examined;
Whereas, in fact, four conditions are required for the application of that article, namely: the existence of a link between the principal and the agent; proof that the damage was caused by the fault; occurrence of the damage in the exercise of the functions for which the agent was last employed; the damage was caused to a third person.
Whereas, in the present case, the four conditions mentioned above are fulfilled, inasmuch as:
- there is an agent, namely the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba, who worked under the authority and the orders of the principal who happens to be the Congolese State (Democratic Republic of the Congo), through the army, the FARDC;
- the death of the five persons cited above was caused by the defendant, captain Blaise Bongi Massaba, agent of the Congolese State, who, with the help of a war weapon, shot on the five victims;
- these victims, cited above, were third persons in the sense of the law …
[-] the defendant, captain Blaise Bongi Massaba, agent of the army, the FARDC, committed the act which caused injury to the victims while being in service;
Whereas, in view of the above, the civil liability of the principal, namely the Congolese State (the Democratic Republic of the Congo), through its army (the FARDC), remains fully engaged;
Therefore
The Military Garrison Tribunal of Ituri, finding on the civil action,
After proceedings in which both sides were heard, and by the majority of the votes of its members, by secret vote,
Consequently orders Mr Blaise Bongi Massaba jointly with the Democratic Republic of the Congo to pay each of the four families of the victims the equivalent in Congolese Francs of the sum of 75,000 US Dollars (seventy-five-thousand US Dollars) as damages and interest, covering all injuries, or the equivalent in Congolese Francs of the total sum of 300,000 US Dollars (three-hundred-thousand US Dollars). 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Garrison Court of Ituri, Bongi Massaba case, Judgment, 24 March 2006.
In November 2006, on the defendant’s appeal, the Military Court of the Eastern Province held:
Whereas the charges of the war crimes of pillage and violence to life and person are sufficiently established as required by the law;
Whereas these breaches caused damages and harm for which the civilian parties demand reparation and indemnification on the basis of articles 258 and 260 of the third book of the Congolese civil code;
Whereas the civil liability of the authors of breaches that have caused harm to the parties is based on article 258 of the third book of the Congolese civil code, according to which: “any act whatsoever which causes damage to another, obligates the person by whose fault that damage has occurred to repair it”.
What about the civil responsibility of the State?
Whereas that responsibility follows from the presumption of the fault the administration or the State can commit in the choice and supervision of its agents;
Whereas the beneficiary of the act accomplished by its agents on its account, it is only logical and follows from the elementary principle of fairness that the State is called on to repair the wrong resulting from the service from which it profits as master; …
Whereas the State, just like the principal, must answer for the damage caused by its agents in the exercise of their functions, not because it has committed a fault, created a risk or broken the equality of burdens between citizens, but because it is obligated to guarantee the safety of individuals against damaging acts by those who exercise an activity in its name and on its account;
Whereas, in fact, when an organ of the State acts, it is the State itself that acts, and, consequently, when an agent commits a fault in the exercise of his functions, that fault engages the whole State …;
Whereas the abuse of the function is no obstacle to the responsibility of the master;
Whereas the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba, in his capacity as soldier of the FARDC, is an agent of the Congolese State, thus that soldier engages the responsibility of the State, since it is admitted that the abuse of functions is not an obstacle to the responsibility of the principal, namely the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
Whereas the Military Court of the Eastern Province therefore judges that the responsibility of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is engaged as regards the assassination of the five pupils from Tchekele by the soldiers of the third company under the command of the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba;
Whereas the same applies to the other acts of attacks on property in which not only the soldiers are implicated but in which also and in particular the Congolese State has failed its mission to keep individuals safe;
Whereas that responsibility for acts of third persons finds its basis in article 260 of the third book of the Congolese civil code which provides:
- one is responsible not only for the damage one causes by one’s own act, but also for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom one is responsible or things which one has under one’s care;
Whereas the Democratic Republic of the Congo in its capacity as principal described above has the civil liability for the reparation or indemnification of damages and harm caused to third persons by the act of its agents, who are the soldiers of the FARDC, of the third company of the first battalion in the sixth brigade.
Therefore
The Military Court of the Eastern Province, finding on the civil action, after proceedings in which both sides were heard, and by the majority of the votes of its members.
1. Declares admissible and founded on the merits the action for reparation and indemnification for harms introduced by Madame …
The courts orders the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba, jointly with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to pay as compensation for damage suffered:
To Madame …
- mother of … and aunt of…
- the equivalent in Congolese Francs of 100,000 US Dollars as damages and interest,
- the equivalent in Congolese Francs of 15,000 US Dollars as the counter value of her destroyed house …,
- the restitution of the objects described above or their counter value …
2. As regards the civil party …, father of … and …,
The Military Court of the Eastern Province orders the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba, jointly with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to pay…
- the equivalent in Congolese Francs of 100,000 US Dollars as damages and interest.
3. As regards the civil party …, father of …,
The Military Court of the Eastern Province orders the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba, jointly with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to pay…
- the equivalent in Congolese Francs of 50,000 US Dollars as damages and interest. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Court of the Eastern Province, Bongi Massaba case, Judgment on Appeals, 4 November 2006.
France
In 2010, in the Kaplan case, the Paris Administrative Court was called upon to rule on a matter of compensation related to art works despoiled in occupied France during World War II:
[T]he Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Despoliation received an application for compensation regarding … pieces of art that were deposited in the safe of a bank in Bordeaux in 1941. According to the inventory of the deposit, there were 151 pieces, including 78 paintings, and all of them were seized by the occupying forces on 15 March 1943, while three of them were returned after the conflict. [The applicants] allege that the commission should have assessed the amount of the damage caused by the despoliation … with regards to [the value of the property at the] date when the damage was assessed rather than its value as recognized in 1962 by the German government … [The applicants allege also that] the prime minister, by adopting [the assessment of the damage as] recommended by the commission, violated the principle of integral reparation.
… [T]he damage to the property shall be assessed when its causes have ceased and its extension is known, and it is thus possible to proceed with the reparation. In the present case, from the 151 paintings and pieces of art stolen […], only three were returned after the war. The reparation of the damage provoked by the disappearance of this cultural property, which is by its very nature irreplaceable, can only consist of compensation corresponding to the estimated value of the property at the day of its disappearance, or from the moment when such estimation became possible, actualized to cover the monetary erosion … Consequently, the prime minister adequately applied [Decree No. 99-778 of 10 September 1999] by basing the calculation of the compensation due by the State … on the value determined jointly by the German authorities and the interested persons in 1962. This decree does not aim at ensuring the integral reparation of the damage, but rather at allowing the State to restore the balance destroyed by the damage in a fashion that appears to be the most exact possible and taking into account in particular the difficulties related to the long time elapsed since the facts, the diversity of the stolen property and the determination of its value. 
France, Paris Administrative Court, Kaplan case, Judgment, 25 June 2010, pp. 1–2.
The Court also explained:
[A]ccording to article 1 of the Decree [No. 99-778 of 10 September 1999]: “… a commission is established before the prime minister with the mandate of reviewing individual claims submitted by victims or their legal heirs or assignees in order to receive reparation for damages following the despoliation of their property resulting from anti-Semitic legislation adopted during the Occupation by either the occupying power or the Vichy government”. 
France, Paris Administrative Court, Kaplan case, Judgment, 25 June 2010, p. 2.
Germany
In 1952, the German Administrative Court of Appeal of Münster heard a claim for compensation for injuries suffered by a German national as a result of a road accident with a vehicle belonging to the occupying powers. The Court held that the liability of occupying powers for injuries caused by their personnel was strict and that:
The plaintiff’s claim for damages derives not only from public municipal law but also from international law. By virtue of Article 3 of the [1907 Hague Convention (IV)] a State is liable for all acts committed by persons belonging to its armed forces. According to the wide wording of Article 3, which has been chosen in the interests of the protection of the civilian population, fault on the part of the person who has caused the damage is not a prerequisite of liability. It is therefore an undisputed principle of the doctrine of international law that Article 3 provides for the absolute liability of the Occupant in respect of acts committed by members of its armed forces. Within the framework of this absolute liability for which international law provides, a State is under a duty – according to the views of writers on international law which have, however, not yet been universally accepted – to pay compensation for “incorporeal” damage. 
Germany, Administrative Court of Appeal of Münster, Personal Injuries case, Judgment, 9 April 1952.
Germany
In the Reparation Payments case in 1963 relating to claims for compensation for slave labour during the Second World War, Germany’s Federal Supreme Court stated that the claims were in the nature of reparations claims and that “with regard to the inextricable connection with the question of reparations under international public law … it is not possible to deny the right to compensation based on civil law from the outset”. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), Reparation Payments case, Judgment, 26 February 1963.
However, the Court held that no decision could be reached on the merits of the claim until there was a final reparations agreement between the plaintiff’s government and Germany, as it found that the London Agreement on German External Debts of 27 February 1953 had postponed the question of indemnification of individuals to when the issue of reparations more generally had been settled. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), Reparation Payments case, Judgment, 26 February 1963.
Germany
In the Forced Labour case in 1996, Germany’s Constitutional Court held obiter that there did not exist a rule of general international law preventing the payment of compensation to individuals for violations of international law. The Court added that it was therefore not prohibited for a State that has violated international law to allow individuals to bring claims for compensation for events during the Second World War through its national courts. 
Germany, Second Chamber of the Constitutional Court, Forced Labour case, Judgment, 13 May 1996.
Germany
In the Distomo case in 2003 dealing with killings committed by German soldiers in Greece during the Second World War, Germany’s Federal Supreme Court stated that, due to a concept of war as a “relationship from State to State” as it existed during the Second World War, a State which was responsible for crimes committed at that time was only liable to pay compensation vis-à-vis another State but not vis-à-vis the individual victims. According to the Court, international law conferred the right upon States to exercise diplomatic protection of their nationals, and the right to claim compensation was the right of the State. With reference to Articles 2 and 3 of the Hague Convention (IV) and declaring the 1907 Hague Regulations as being directly applicable, it stated that this was true “at least for the period in question”, i.e. for the time of the Second World War. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), Distomo case, Judgment, 26 June 2003.
In the Distomo case in 2006, the Federal Constitutional Court held:
The constitutional complaint is not accepted for decision.
Grounds:
1
The constitutional complaint concerns the question of the liability of the Federal Republic of Germany to pay damages and compensate for “reprisals” taken by members of the German armed forces during the occupation of Greece in World War II.
I.
2
1. The complainants are Greek nationals. On 10 June 1944, their parents were shot in the course of a “reprisal action” against the inhabitants of the Greek locality Distomo by members of an SS unit incorporated in the German occupation forces, after an armed confrontation with partisans had previously taken place. The soldiers in total killed between 200 and 300 of the approximately 1,800 inhabitants – not involved in the partisan fightings – of the village. Among the victims were mainly elderly persons, women, children and infants. The village was burnt down. The complainants, minors at the time, survived only due to the fortunate circumstance that a German soldier had signalled them to hide …
3
2. In September 1995, the complainants brought an action before the Regional Court. They sought the declaration that the Federal Republic of Germany was under the obligation to compensate them for the material damage they had suffered as a result of the operation of the SS unit in Distomo on 10 June 1944. The Regional Court, like the Higher Regional Court seized as court of appeal, dismissed the action. The complainants’ appeal on points of law [Revision] before the Federal Court of Justice, allowed by the Higher Regional Court, was also unsuccessful. By contrast, in parallel proceedings in Greece, in which, amongst others, the complainants participated, the competent Regional Court Levadeia had decided in October 1997 that the compensation claims based on the same facts were well founded.
II.
4
The complainants allege a violation of their Basic Rights based on Article 1, paragraph 1, Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 3, paragraph 1, Article 14, paragraph 1, sentence 1, and paragraph 3, Article 19, paragraph 4, Article 101, paragraph 1, sentence 2, as well as Article 103, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law.
III.
12
The constitutional complaint is not accepted for decision because the requirements for accepting a complaint under Section 93 a, paragraph 2 of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court are not fulfilled. To the extent that the constitutional complaint is admissible, it is unfounded. Ultimately, there are no objections under constitutional law against the contested decisions.
13
1. The constitutional complaint – filed within the time limit – is only partially admissible.
14
a) Insofar as the complainants allege a violation of their Basic Right under Article 103, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, the constitutional complaint does not meet the substantiation requirements following from Sections 92, 23, paragraph 1, sentence 2 of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz – BVerfGG]. The complainants’ submission that the rejection of a compensation claim based on Article 3 of Hague Convention IV had violated their right to a hearing in accordance with law is not sufficiently substantiated. As the complainants themselves concede, the competent courts below closely examined the question whether in the case of a violation of norms of the Hague Regulations an individual claim directly follows from Article 3 of Hague Convention IV. The complainants thereby allege that the courts did not follow their differing legal view, something which is, however, not part of the protective scope of Article 103, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law …
15
The same applies to the violation of Article 19, paragraph 4, sentence 1 of the Basic Law alleged by the complainants …
16
b) The violation of their general rights of personality as well as their right to physical integrity, alleged by the complainants, is not sufficiently substantiated either. According to the complainants’ submission it does not appear to be possible that the not-granting of compensation claims violated them in these rights. Neither from the general rights of personality nor from the right to physical integrity can be inferred a right to judicial decisions which comply with the legal view of the complainants …
17
2. The constitutional complaint has no prospect of success on the merits. The challenged decisions do not violate the claimants’ Basic Rights.
18
a) There are no objections under constitutional law to the Federal Court of Justice’s refusal to be bound by the judgement of the Greek Regional Court Livadeia of 30 October 1997. According to applicable international law, a State can demand exemption from another State’s jurisdiction if and to the extent that the assessment of its sovereign acts – so called acta iure imperii – is concerned … Since the SS unit involved in the events in Distomo was incorporated into the armed forces of the German Reich, the assaults are to be classified as sovereign acts, irrespective of the question of their unlawfulness under international law. The Federal Court of Justice therefore correctly held that it was not bound by the judgement of the Greek Regional Court.
19
b) Insofar as the complainants allege a violation of Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, it is true that claims for damages and compensation against the Federal Republic of Germany – their existence assumed – would indeed come under the protective scope of the guarantee of property … The claimants, however, neither have claims for damages or compensation based on international law, nor based on liability for breach of official duty or the doctrine of fair compensation for a special sacrifice to the community [Aufopferungsanspruch.
20
aa) Article 3 of Hague Convention IV does not give rise to a direct individual compensation claim for violations of the international law of war (comp. Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, “Italian military internees”). Admittedly, the origin of the norm shows that it is intended to protect the individual and is therefore of a nature indirectly protecting human rights (comp. Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, “Italian military internees”). However, it does not follow from this that the provision could be the basis of a direct, originally international law compensation claim of the concerned individual vis-à-vis the State.
21
A first argument against this is already the wording, according to which a belligerent party in the event of a violation of the Hague Regulations shall, “if the case demands”, be liable to pay compensation. Since Article 3 of Hague Convention IV, in view of the restricting addition, insofar is not “self executing”, an understanding of the norm as a basis of individual claims is already prevented by its lack of direct applicability. Secondly, according to the traditional conception of international law, the individual was not classified as a legal subject … Regardless of developments on the level of human rights protection, which have led to the recognition of the individual as a partial subject of international law as well as to the establishment of treaty-based individual complaints procedures, it is still only the home State which is entitled to secondary law compensation claims based on international wrongful acts of a State against foreign nationals.
22
In the present case, potential legal developments or changed legal views on the level of constitutional or international law in any case cannot be taken into consideration as regards the assessment of events in the year 1944. The differing legal view of the complainants is due to an incorrect understanding of Article 135 a, paragraph 1, no. 1 of the Basic Law. Admittedly, according to this provision the decision whether payments by the State for obligations of the German Reich are to be granted is to be made by the Federal legislator. It does not follow from this, however, that the question of the existence of an obligation of the Reich, which is quasi precursory, is to be assessed on the basis of the legal situation prevalent at the time the claim is made. Concerning this, as a principle, it is the legal provisions in force at the time of the events giving rise to liability which are to be applied.
23
bb) The complainants also have no claim according to Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 131 of the Weimar Constitution [State liability for breach of official duty]. A liability of the Federal Republic of Germany is ultimately prevented by the lack of a guarantee of reciprocity within the meaning of Section 7 of the Law on the Liability of the Reich for its Officials (old version) Gesetz über die Haftung des Reichs für seine Beamten – RBHG a.F.].
24
With regard to the provision giving rise to liability, the Federal Court of Justice essentially considered that a claim based on Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 131 of the Weimar Constitution had been eclipsed by the specific inter-State liability regime under international law, applicable at the time of the events. It need not be decided whether such an eclipse does justice to the necessity to ensure compliance with the rules of the international humanitarian law of war also in domestic legal orders in the form of parallel possibilities for sanctions (comp. Higher Regional Court of Cologne, Judgement of 28 July 2005, 7 U 8/04, “Bridge of Varvarin”; Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, “Italian military internees”). This is so because, ultimately, in the present case the exclusion of liability under Section 7 of the Law on the Liability of the Reich for its Officials (old version) applies, as correctly found by the Federal Court of Justice … According to the version of this provision applicable until 30 June 1992, a provision which was compatible both with the Basic Law and the general rules of international law within the meaning of Article 25 of the Basic Law …, nationals of a foreign State had a claim based on breach of official duty against the Federal Republic only if reciprocity was guaranteed by the legislation of a foreign State or by international treaty. Such a guarantee on the part of Greece vis-à-vis Germany was given only after the end of World War II (comp. publication of 31 May 1957, Federal Law Gazette 1957, Part I, p. 607).
25
The application of Section 7 of the Law on the Liability of the Reich for its Officials (old version) does not conflict with Article 25 of the Basic Law. There is no general rule of international law which generally demands equal treatment of foreign nationals and own nationals. Admittedly, it will generally run counter to the principles of international humanitarian law recognized as customary law if all compensation is denied to a wrongfully injured individual … In the present case, however, this situation does not arise, because Section 7 of the Law on the Liability of the Reich for its Officials (old version) did not exclude liability of breach for official duty in general, but only the transfer of liability to the State according to Article 34 of the Basic Law or Article 131 of the Weimar Constitution …
26
Recourse to Section 7 of the Law on the Liability of the Reich for its Officials (old version) further is not excluded on the ground that it is applied to a situation dealing with war crimes committed by an SS unit. The provision was not intended to protect the German Reich against claims arising from a specific national socialist wrong. Whether in situations at the bottom of which lie arbitrarily race-ideological considerations a different standard has to apply need not be decided here. The events in Distomo are to be classified as a situation formally subject to the international law of war, not characterized by a specific national socialist wrong and therefore not to be allocated to the separately regulated area of compensation for national socialist wrongs. Admittedly, reprisals against the civilian population uninvolved in the fighting often were, in view of their nature and scope, contrary to international law also on the basis of the legal views applicable at the time. As such, however, during World War II they were regarded as permitted also by the Allies … The unlawful excess of reprisals therefore cannot simply be classified as a specifically national socialist wrong, unless specific race-ideological circumstances were the decisive factor. In the present case, however, there were no such special circumstances which prove a sufficiently close connection between the violations of international law suffered by the complainants and NS [national socialist] ideology.
28
cc) There are no decisive objections against the rejection of compensation claims based on unlawful interference similar to expropriation [enteignungsgleicher Eingriff or to the doctrine of fair compensation for a special sacrifice to the community Aufopferungsanspruch. The history of both these concepts shows that the idea of a special sacrifice which finds its expression in Sections 74, 75 of the Introduction to the General State Laws for the Prussian States Einleitung zum Allgemeinen Landrecht für die preußischen Staaten – EinALR] was developed for situations of everyday administrative acts. According to the relevant German legal order, the basis for claims cannot be applied with regard to war damages … Damages following from the belligerent occupation of another State are no expression of “genuine” administrative law acts, but the consequence of a situation which is to be assessed under international law. In this respect, Article 14 of the Basic Law does not demand that compensation claims are made available for every conceivable form of State action which can lead to a wrong.
29
c) The challenged decisions do not violate Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law. In particular, they do not violate the general principle of equality inasmuch as it prohibits arbitrariness. A judicial decision is arbitrary if it is not legally justifiable from any conceivable point of view, and one is therefore forced to conclude that it is based on irrelevant considerations … In the present case, the courts dealt in detail with the legal questions raised and ultimately correctly denied claims of the complainants. Nothing indicates a violation of the standards of arbitrariness.
30
In this connection it also is to be borne in mind that with regard to Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, the legislator also is not precluded from distinguishing between, on the one hand, a general fate during law, albeit hard and involving violations of international law, and, on the other hand, victims of particularly ideologically motivated measures of persecution by the wrongful national socialist regime (comp. Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, “Italian military internees”). It therefore does not contravene the principle of equality if persecuted persons within the meaning of Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Federal Law for the Compensation of the Victims of National Socialist Persecution [Bundesentschädigungsgesetz – BEG] as well as persons subjected to forced labour eligible for payments according to Section 11, paragraph 1 of the Law on the Creation of a Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” [Gesetz zur Errichtung einer Stiftung Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft – EVZStiftG] are entitled to compensation, while the complainants are not included in the group of entitled persons. Furthermore, by making reparations in general and by paying compensation on the basis of bilateral agreements in particular, the Federal Republic of Germany has faced up to its responsibility under international law. Although reparation of human suffering by financial means can as a principle only ever be inadequate, an attempt has thereby – and by means of international and European cooperation – been made to create a situation more in keeping with international law (comp. Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 26 October 2004, 2 BvR 955/00, 1038/01, “East German expropriation case”). This connection finds its expression also in the conclusion of the Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany (Two-plus-Four-Treaty) [Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in bezug auf Deutschland (Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrag), which Germany concluded with the understanding that there had been final settlement of the question of reparations. 
Germany, Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), Distomo case, Decision, 15 February 2006, §§ 1–4, 12–26 and 28–30.
Germany
In the Bridge of Varvarin case, several nationals of the former Yugoslavia filed compensation claims against the Federal Republic of Germany in consequence of a NATO air strike against a bridge in the Serbian town of Varvarin in 1999. In 2003, Germany’s Regional Court of Bonn held:
1. The application is dismissed.
Facts
9
Between 24 March and 10 June 1999, air operations were conducted in Yugoslavia, with the participation of German armed forces.
10
German planes participated in the air operation “Allied Force” with so-called RECCE and ECR tornado planes, which provided air reconnaissance and escort.
11
On Sunday, 30 May 1999, in the town of [Varvarin], there was a market held on the main street leading from the bridge to the town …, as on every Sunday between 8 a.m. and about 4 p.m. … Around noon, there were approximately 3,000 to 3,500 persons in the area of the church and the market.
12
At that time, NATO fighter planes attacked the town of [Varvarin], flying at low altitude. Overall, four rockets were launched. The applicants all were harmed by that attack or are the legal successors of persons lethally injured.
13
The fighter planes did not belong to the respondent; it is contested between the parties whether German planes supported this mission.
16
The applicants are of the opinion that the respondent is liable for the consequences of the attack by NATO armed forces against the town of [Varvarin].
99
The respondent moves
100
that the application be dismissed.
Grounds
109
II.
The application … is unfounded.
110
The applicants have no compensation claim for material or immaterial damages against the respondent.
111
The claims raised have a legal basis neither in international law nor in German law on State liability.
112
Therefore, first, a further clarification of the facts was not necessary. Second, it did not need to be decided whether and to what extent the applicants’ submission justifies the assumption of a violation by the respondent against the principles of international humanitarian law or a violation of duties giving rise to a reparation obligation.
113
1. The applicants have no compensation claim for material or immaterial damages against the respondent based on a wrongful act under international law.
114
Such a claim neither arises directly from international law nor in conjunction with Article 25 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.
115
a) There are no norms of international law which would, as a consequence of the NATO attack of 30 May 1999, give the applicants as individuals a compensation claim for material or immaterial damages, enforceable against the respondent. This alone already prevents the success of the application.
116
The traditional conception of international law as inter-State law does not conceive the individual as a subject of international law, but only grants him indirect international protection: in the case of international wrongful acts in the form of actions against foreign nationals it is not the individual concerned himself but his home State which has a claim. By means of diplomatic protection the State asserts its own right to respect for international law in the person of its national. The individual is connected to international law only via the “medium” of the State, without himself being a subject of it …
117
This mediatization of the individual via the State in principle still applies. The individual therefore in principle can demand neither the determination of a wrong nor compensation for the wrong.
118
However, with the codification of the international protection of human rights the mediatization of the human being via the State has undergone changes: insofar as States create international norms to that effect, they can grant or allocate specific rights or obligations to the individual, and thereby give him a status as partial subject of international law – in relation to the specific content regulated and the States participating in the particular case. If States in the protective treaty law systems created by them offer, in addition, also an international law procedure to the individual in which he can enforce the rights attributed to him directly vis-à-vis a State, then a real international law entitlement of the individual exists … If this is not the case, the treaty law regulation is a mere benefit to the individual, which can arise as a reflex from the rights and obligations of the State and does not give the individual rights enforceable against another State …
119
An important penetration of the mediatization of the individual via the State is the [1950 European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It expressly grants various rights to the individual, in particular the right to life (Article 2 of the European Convention), provides an enforceable right to compensation of the individual in view of specific violations (Article 5, paragraph 5 of the European Convention), and with Article 34 of the European Convention further gives the individual the possibility to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. In the present case, the applicants cannot invoke this Convention vis-à-vis the respondent, since they were not within the jurisdiction of the respondent (see in this respect also the decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 12 December 2001 …). This is also the view of the applicants.
120
There is no international law regulation comparable to the human rights conventions which would give the individual a compensation claim for material or immaterial damages, enforceable against another State, for the consequences of an armed conflict like the one in question here. There is no protective treaty system which would give the applicants corresponding individual rights and would offer a procedure for their enforcement.
121
The provisions of the [Hague] Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907 … “do not apply except between contracting Powers” (Article 2 of the Hague Convention). Article 3 of the Hague Convention provides a liability to pay compensation only of the “belligerent party” (vis-à-vis the other belligerent party) (comp. also Federal Court of Justice, Judgement of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98, “Distomo case”).
122
In the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War of 12 August 1949 (Geneva Convention IV), raised by the applicants, likewise only the “High Contracting Parties”, in Article 1, undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the Convention. The same applies to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, which supplements the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims, Article 1, paragraph 3[.] Also here only the High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect, Article 1, paragraph 1; individual civilian persons “enjoy protection” (Article 51), but are not given rights of their own. Also the provision on liability laid down in Article 91 does not apply in favour of the individual. Apart from that, neither the Geneva Conventions nor their Additional Protocols offer a procedure which would make it possible for the individual to enforce potential individual claims.
124
b) Also in conjunction with Article 25 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany the applications do not have a claim under international law of their own.
125
It is true, according to that constitutional law provision, that the general rules of international law are an “integral part of federal law” and “directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory”. However, international law relevant here – as outlined above under a) – does not give claims to the individual person and therefore offers no basis for individual claims.
126
2. The applicants also have no claims against the respondent on the basis of German law on State liability.
127
It is true, the basic international law principle of diplomatic protection does indeed not preclude a State’s domestic law from granting a claim to an injured individual outside international law obligations, in addition to the international law claims of the individual’s home State (Federal Constitutional Court l.c., Federal Court of Justice, Judgement of 26 June 2003).
128
However, also according to the current legal situation, German law does not grant such a claim. Also insofar as a basis for a claim already does not exist here.
129
The applicants cannot base compensation claims on the Basic Rights alone, inter alia because these guarantees do not provide a compensation claim as a legal consequence. It is true, in particular Section 823 of the Civil Code, raised by the applicants, and also the potential legal bases under German law on liability of the State are indeed provisions giving rise to claims. However, Section 823 of the Civil Code is already not applicable if, like in the present case, only a specific act of an official could be considered as a reason for liability … German law on the liability of the State does not apply in cases of armed conflicts. It is eclipsed by the provisions of the international law of war. Armed conflicts are still … to be seen as a state of exception under international law, which to a large extent suspends the legal order applicable in peace time. Responsibility for beginning the conflict and the consequences of the use of force are generally to be regulated on the level of international law. The potential liability of a State under international law for damages caused comprises also the liability for the acts of all persons belonging to that State.
130
The regulation of the consequences of armed conflicts on the national level rather would require – like under international law – the codification of specific compensatory norms …
132
Therefore, neither German law on breach of official duty (Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 34 of the Basic Law) nor the legal doctrine of fair compensation for a special sacrifice to the community Rechtsinstitut des allgemeinen Aufopferungsanspruchs give rise to individual claims against the respondent by individual persons injured in the course of armed conflicts abroad. 
Germany, Regional Court of Bonn, Bridge of Varvarin case, Judgment, 10 December 2003, §§ 9–13, 16, 99–100, 109–122, 124–130 and 132.
In 2005, on the applicants’ appeal, the Higher Regional Court of Cologne held:
The appeal filed by the applicants against the judgement of the Regional Court of Bonn of 10 December 2003 … is dismissed.
75
2. Claims based on international law
76
Insofar as the applicants … base their claims directly on international (humanitarian) law, in particular on Article 3 of the Hague Convention … and Article 91 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions – AP I –, always in conjunction with the provisions of international humanitarian law serving the protection of civilians, and partly also in conjunction with Article 25 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, reference can be made to the explanations, correct in this respect, in the appealed judgement. It is (still, at least) the predominant view in international law, and has been recently stated by the Federal Constitutional Court with regard to the currently predominant view in the Federal Republic (most recently in the decision of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, “Italian military internees”; in this sense, for the time of World War II, also the Federal Court of Justice in its judgement of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98, “Distomo case”), that the traditional conception of international law as inter-State law conceives the individual not as a subject of international law, but only grants him indirect international protection. In the case of international wrongful acts through actions against foreign nationals it is not the individual concerned himself, but only his home State which has a claim. By means of diplomatic protection the State asserts its own right to respect for international law in the person of its national. In its most recent decision on this question (of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, “Italian military internees”), the Federal Constitutional Court expressly stated that Article 3 of the Hague Convention generally does not establish an individual compensation claim, but only codifies the general basic rule of international law regarding a liability to pay compensation between the States party; this claim for compensation, however, exists only in the international law relation between the States concerned. This basic rule also applies to the comparable provision of Article 91 AP I.
77
In addition, in a decision of 13 May 1996 BVerfGE 94, 315], the Federal Constitutional Court explained that international law, in the more recent development of an extended protection of human rights, indeed may grant own rights to the individual, and that protective systems had been developed under treaty law by which the individual can also himself assert his claim. Such a protective system under treaty law, however, does not exist as regards Article 3 of the Hague Convention and Article 91 AP I, raised here as basis of claims. Insofar as direct claims of the individual have been established in the course of the more recent development, for example within the framework of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, it is, in correct recognition of the legal situation, undisputed between the parties that the European Convention does not apply with regard to the NATO air strike in question here, as held by the European Court of Human Rights is in the “Bankovic” decision. There are therefore no direct claims based on international (humanitarian) law.
78
3. Claims based on national law
79
a) Claims based on Basic Rights
80
… [A]ccording to the general view, the Basic Rights themselves are no basis for claims – also not in the case of violations of the Basic Rights. Rather, they are first of all defensive rights against the State, which, however, independent of that, can in manifold ways have effect also within concrete bases for claims through the valuations expressed in them. Such a concrete norm, establishing a claim, is however necessary to give rise to a claim; directly on the basis of Basic Rights alone this is not the case …
81
b) Claims based on Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 34 of the Basic Law
82
Ultimately, there are also no claims based on breach of official duty.
83
aa) Applicability of civil law on liability of the State
84
In this respect, first of all, it is to be noted that individual civil law compensation claims of injured persons based on domestic law in parallel to a potential international law claim of their home State are not excluded. Contrary to the principle of exclusivity of international law in the sense of absorption of individual claims in the inter-State reparation claims, contended by a part of the literature …, the case law now to be seen as firm (Federal Constitutional Court, 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, “Italian military internees”; Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfgE 94, 315, [13 May 1996]; Federal Court of Justice, judgement of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98, “Distomo case”) has expressly underlined that there is no general rule of international law according to which claims based on domestic law, stemming from war events, cannot be enforced individually, but only on the inter-State level. In its decision BVerfgE 94, 315, the Federal Constitutional Court stressed that the parallelism of claims between international law and domestic law is given a fortiori, if a domestic claim is deduced not from a specific law on war consequences but on a general public law restitution claim, because such a restitution claim has no specific connection whatsoever with the regulation of war consequences.
85
In its most recent decision [of 28 June 2004], the Federal Constitutional Court additionally explained that this lack of preclusion does not allow the inference of a rule or assumption according to which a State violating international law must grant claims to injured persons on the basis of its domestic law. It is rather the concrete content of the domestic legal order, in the present case Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 34 of the Basic Law, on the basis of which the requirements of a claim must be assessed.
86
In this respect it is further to be noted that this general state liability claim is not excluded just because in the present case the decisive events took place not in the Federal Republic of Germany, but abroad. [This] Senate … and also the Federal Court of Justice (judgement of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98, “Distomo case”) have left no doubt in comparable cases that German law is to be applied also as regards breaches of official duty committed abroad, namely the relevant Section 839 of the Civil Code, in the cases quoted in conjunction with the then relevant Article 131 of the Weimar Constitution, today in conjunction with Article 34 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.
87
The decisive question is whether Section 839 of the Civil Code does not apply to the events in question here because they took place in the context of an armed conflict. With regard to the time up until the end of World War II, the Federal Court of Justice has stated in its “Distomo” decision ([26 June 2003]) that, according to the predominant view at that time, war was seen as a state of exception under international law, in its essence geared to the use of force, and to a large extent suspending the legal order applicable in peace time. Responsibility for beginning a war and for the consequences of the collective use of force inevitably connected with it, as well as liability for individual war crimes by persons belonging to the armed powers, was regulated on the level of the belligerent States. Based on this view of war as, first of all, a collective act of force, seen as a “relation from State to State”, at that time the idea was alien that due to wrongful acts of its armed forces abroad a belligerent State could become directly liable to pay compensation (also) vis-à-vis the victims.
88
The Federal Court of Justice expressly left open whether this view is still correct in the framework of today’s law on liability for breach of official duty. In view of the Senate this view is – at least in this absolute form – obsolete in view of today’s acts of war or armed conflicts and can no longer be justified in view of the development of international and domestic law in the meantime. To the details:
89
It is certainly still correct also today both as regards international public law and as regards international and domestic private/civil law that wars or armed conflicts are to be seen as states of exception, to which special provisions apply. The place of the provisions applicable in times of peace is taken by the “ius in bello” in its manifold manifestations, partly regulated by international law, partly by domestic law, which to a large extent suspends the legal order normally applicable.
90
It need not be decided how far this suspensive effect reaches in general and which areas are concerned; of interest here is alone the question of liability of the State, as laid down in Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 34 of the Basic Law. The idea codified in them, of liability of the State for a “wrong” done by public act to an individual owner of rights – not to other States – cannot be seen as completely suspended, for this would be contrary in a blatant manner to our modern understanding of State acts. Also in times of war or when participating in armed conflicts the State is bound by the law, especially international law, in particular as it has entered that obligation in a special manner by treaty law relations or by recognizing that law. To respect the “ius in bello” is an obligation of the State, for it exactly has the purpose to become effective instead of the national and international legal orders normally applicable, and demands application exactly to that purpose.
91
Insofar as these regulations demand application in times of war, they also require sanctions in order to become effective, for otherwise they would risk being void. Insofar as they are international law regulations, there have been and there are claims and procedures to that purpose, which, however, according to the traditional view only, were of an inter-State character and in which the individual human being participated only via the means of diplomatic protection. This view, however, due to the development over time, is today no longer tenable.
92
An essential difference first of all in the domestic law is the fact that, since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany, all acts of the State are to be seen in the light of the Basic Law. The order of values incorporated in the Basic Law, which with regard to the individual has found its expression in particular within the Basic Rights, has given first priority to the dignity and protection of the human being, gives to the individual as such a position different from that in the time before the validity of the Basic Law. Individual claims – defensive claims and claims for benefits – of the individual vis-à-vis the State find their expression in countless parts of our whole current legal order and are shaped by the system of values of the Basic Law. It is therefore out of the question to assume a complete suspension of Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 34 of the Basic Law in times of war or as regards military actions, since this is the general claim for damages against the State and the central regulation of liability of the State towards the individual injured by a public act. A suspension of the regulations would mean – except for specific regulations by law, which however exactly do not exist for cases such as the one in question here – to negate any claim of the individual human being for any wrongful public act, no matter how grave, to refuse any individual granting of rights, and to refer him to the (insecure) means of diplomatic protection. This is not consistent with the idea of the human being and the claim to grant rights according to the Basic Law.
93
The question therefore can only be how far the protection of Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 34 of the Basic Law reaches during war or in the context of an armed conflict, and not whether it is to be granted in principle …
94
This view is supported in particular also by the principle recognized by the Federal Constitutional Court, described above, of the parallelism of, on the one hand, the international law claims held alone by the home State and, on the other hand, the possibility to grant domestic individual claims; the Federal Constitutional Court recognizes that principle not only in relation to specific regulations, but considers it also in the form of a general restitution claim. If one supports such a parallelism of claims, but excludes as generally suspended the applicability of the general law on State liability when at the same time a specific regulation is lacking, one does not do justice to the concrete content of the domestic legal order, regarded as decisive by the Federal Constitutional Court, and the recognized parallelism of claims remains empty. In the light of the value judgement of the Basic Law, such an exclusion, for which in any case there are no indications in the wording of Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 34 of the Basic Law and which cannot be deduced from systematic or historic considerations either, therefore does not seem possible (any more).
95
This is true in particular in view of the multitude of international law regulations having come into existence since World War II, which give the protection of the human being an importance as high as that given by the Basic Law.
96
It is to be noted that since the end of World War II a change in the international humanitarian law (of war) is to be registered, to the effect that, more and more, the rights and the protection of the individual come to the fore. Numerous conventions have been concluded which expressly have the protection of the individual, in particular also of the civilian person, as their object, to which the Federal Republic of Germany has acceded, and which are applicable law. Apart from newer developments now also in the area of criminal law with the creation of the International Crimes Code and the establishing of an International Criminal Court, mention must be made in particular of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949, its Additional Protocol of 1977 and the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, the last expressly and decisively taking into account the protection of the individual by also providing individual procedures for the individual rights laid down in it. Such expressly granted individual rights and individual procedures may not follow from the further international humanitarian law. But there can be no serious doubt that its provisions, which e.g. in Article 48 et seq. AP I repeatedly refer to “individual civilians”, do not only abstractly serve the protection of the civilian population as a whole, but also concretely serve the protection of the individual. The ongoing tendency to underline and to strengthen the protection of the individual in the area of his fundamental human rights cannot be mistaken. In its most recent decision (28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, “Italian military internees), the Federal Constitutional Court described this protection of the individual in relation to the Hague Regulations (stemming already from 1907) as the concerned persons’ “primary right to respect for the prohibitions of international humanitarian law”, which – this is how the decision is to be understood –, unlike the secondary right to compensation resulting from it, does not exist in the international law relation between the States concerned, but which the individual has vis-à-vis the acting State.
97
The Federal Republic, by international treaty, has assumed the obligation to respect and observe these rights, they bind the State as directly applicable law under Article 25 of the Basic Law. If this is so, the secondary rights to compensation resulting from them and laid down in Article 3 of the Hague Convention and Article 91 of AP I may exist only between States, but within the framework of parallelism of claims, the applicability of Section 839 in conjunction with Article 34 of the Basic Law cannot be negated. If the primary right to respect for international humanitarian law is accepted, it contradicts the order of values more recently arisen on the domestic and international level – which makes the protection of human beings and respecting that protection a central duty not only in the interest of society but also for the benefit of the individual human being – not to give a corresponding, own compensation claim to a person concerned in case of a violation, if the applicable requirements of the claim are fulfilled. To generally negate such an individual claim due to suspension of the applicable liability norm, and to refer the individual to the means of diplomatic protection, would often make the right of the individual to respect for international humanitarian law go void, since the violation would remain without sanction. Especially the vanquished State will often not have a real possibility, and will often also not be willing, to effectively raise violations of international humanitarian law against its nationals by means of diplomatic protection vis-à-vis the victorious State.
98
The Senate therefore, also in the case of armed conflicts, regards the general legal provisions on State liability as generally applicable, at least insofar as the State thereby violates, in a manner inconsistent with international law, the primary right of the individual to respect of international humanitarian law.
99
bb) The requirements of Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 34 of the Basic Law are not fulfilled
100
The question how far the protection of the State liability claim under Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 34 of the Basic Law goes need not be answered in general. It is self-evident that it cannot cover such areas of the legal order which are suspended in consequence of the armed conflict. It is also self-evident that it must at least in principle cover those areas which are instead regulated by “ius in bello”, for these regulations then are the standard against which acts of a State are measured. How far the scope of protection of Section 839 Civil Code in conjunction with Article 34 of the Basic Law goes need not be decided in the present case. Indeed, at least such international law rules applicable in the framework of “ius in bello” would seem to come under a claim for breach of official duty which give concrete rights to the individual and are meant to grant him a right to their respect and observance vis-à-vis acts of a State, e.g. in the case of acts violating international law, having the character of war crimes, which in the sense of the law on State liability would appear to be an abuse of office. But such acts or other acts attributable to the respondent under liability law cannot be found here.
101
It is undisputed that it was not the respondent who attacked the bridge. An attribution under liability law is not possible just because the respondent participated in the NATO air operations as such. Such a generalized liability as joint and several debtors for the case that it cannot be established which NATO participant has caused a damage may not be alien to NATO law – compare Article VIII, paragraph 5, letter e, lit. iii of the NATO status of forces agreement, not applicable here. In the context of an assessment under German law on liability for breach of official duty, however, liability can only be assumed if a concrete attribution of damages is possible.
102
In the present case, own damaging actions lacking, such an attribution would only be possible if the respondent were at least responsible according to Section 830 of the Civil Code, be it as a co-perpetrator or as an aider/assistant; for this it would, however, be additionally required that the acts of the respondent which give rise to the capacity as co-perpetrator or aider/assistant would be reproachable as a breach of official duty.
103
Liability of the respondent could be considered in view of the applicants’ allegation that the respondent had insofar participated in the air strike against the bridge as she gave reconnaissance and escort/air space protection support …
104
Further clarification of the facts is not required, since, even if during their (potential) flight over Kosovo the measures related to air space protection also concerned the planes which destroyed the bridge, a reproachable breach of an official duty cannot be found. This would have been supporting aid/assistance which would only be reproachable as culpable aid/assistance to a reproachable act – the destruction of the bridge –, for which positive knowledge of the reproachability of the supported act, or at least negligent lack of knowledge, would be necessary. Nothing has been submitted or is otherwise apparent regarding such knowledge or negligent lack of knowledge of the reproachability of the supported act.
105
The reproachability of the destruction of the bridge with the consequent victims could result from the concrete circumstances of the attack being in violation of international law or even having the character of war crimes. Whether this was the case here, as submitted by the applicants in particular with regard to Article 48 et seq. AP I – which for hostilities contain provisions on the protection of the civilian population or also individual civilian persons – need, however, not be decided. Nothing indicates that the respondent or the authorities or persons acting for her before or at the time of the attack knew about its circumstances or did not know them due to negligence; it has not even been submitted or is otherwise apparent that the respondent knew at all that the bridge of Varvarin was to be attacked that day.
106
According to the principle of “need to know” described in detail by the respondent, which applied within NATO for all actions during the air operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, each member State had only that knowledge of the individual operations which it needed to fulfil its functions … Attribution of the consequences of the attack under liability law therefore is prevented since the respondent had no knowledge of the potential reproachability of the concrete realization of the attack, or did not negligently lack knowledge of it.
107
Liability of the respondent could finally be considered insofar as the bridge of Varvarin as such was at all included in the target lists for the air operations. The applicants allege that in the context of the NATO bodies, the respondent participating, every single target had been determined, with each participating NATO partner having had the right to veto the determination of a particular target; in case of a veto, such a target would not have been included in the planning.
108
Even if, in favour of the applicants, one acts on the assumption of this description and presumes such a veto right of the respondent at the time, liability of the respondent is nevertheless prevented.
111
… it is to be noted that with regard to decisions of the kind in question here the respondent has a wide margin of evaluation and discretion, which, in principle is not justiciable, except when the decision is obviously arbitrary or obviously in violation of international law and cannot be understood under any reasonable point of view. There is no question of that here.
112
In the case of armed conflicts or wars, bridges like the one in Varvarin leading across the river Morava are from an abstract point of view first of all always potential military objectives, be it on the basis of strategic or tactical considerations. Already because of that the omission of a veto by the respondent against the inclusion in target lists cannot be seen as obviously arbitrary and untenable under any point of view …
113
The inclusion in target lists or the omission of a veto also was not obviously in violation of international law. It need not be decided … whether the actual realization of the destruction was consistent with international law; the mere inclusion in a target list certainly did not contravene international law (of war) in the obvious way required, since at least generally the bridge was to be seen as also a military objective. The concrete circumstances of a potential attack against the bridge apparently were not discussed during the selection of targets; at least the applicants did not allege that and it would also contradict the principle of “need to know”. When agreeing to the selection of targets, the respondent generally was allowed to trust, facts indicating something else lacking, that a potential attack by NATO, bound by “ius in bello”, or by the equally bound member States, would be realized in line with international law.
114
That Varvarin or its bridge was not, contrary to the view of the applicants, a “non-defended locality” within the meaning of Article 59 AP I follows simply from paragraph 2 et seq. of that provision. It is therefore not relevant whether Article 59 AP I protects individual rights. 
Germany, Higher Regional Court of Cologne, Bridge of Varvarin case, Judgment, 28 July 2005, §§ 75–108 and 111–114.
In 2006, on the applicants’ appeal on points of law (Revision), Germany’s Federal Court of Justice held:
The revision filed by the applicants against the judgement of the Seventh Civil Law Senate of the Higher Regional Court of Cologne of 28 July 2005 is dismissed.
Grounds
4
The revision is unfounded. The Higher Regional Court rightly denied the claims.
I.
5
The Higher Regional Court (as did already the Regional Court) correctly noted that an – assumed – international wrongful act to the detriment of the applicants or their relatives in connection with the attack against the Varvarin bridge would not lead to a direct compensation claim for material or immaterial damages of the applicants against the respondent under international law.
6
1. a) The traditional conception of international law as an inter-State law did not conceive the individual as a subject of international law, but only granted him indirect international protection. In the case of international wrongful acts by actions against foreign nationals it was not the individual concerned himself who had a claim, but his home State. By means of diplomatic protection the State asserted its own right to respect for international law in the person of its national (Federal Court of Justice, judgement of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98, “Distomo case”) The individual was “mediatized” via the State; i.e. all international law relations were exclusively a matter of the States, which insofar conveyed the interests also of individuals. The individual could therefore demand neither the determination of a wrong nor compensation for it …
7
However, in connection with the development and codification of the international protection of human rights after World War II, the mediatization of the individual via the State in international law has undergone corrections. This development demands the recognition of the individual at least as a partial subject of international law (Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 15 February 2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, “Distomo case”, …). Since then, an ever tighter net of human rights guarantees has developed, together with the more and more universally accepted concept of human dignity and its protection as preceding the State … Human rights are therefore to be seen as genuinely benefiting the individual. Also, specific norms of the law of conflict related to the person confirm that international law can directly give rights and obligations also to individual persons … This corresponds with the circumstance that the individual person can also increasingly be called upon individually – for example by international criminal law – and has to take responsibility for his actions under international law.
8
b) But this does not mean that every human rights rule protected by treaty actually also gives individual rights. Some conventions merely lay down protective obligations of the State in the area of human rights, without at the same time granting individual rights … In particular, the rule still applies according to which – independent of a primary right of the persons concerned to respect for international law – only the home State is entitled to secondary compensation claims based on international wrongful acts of a State against foreign nationals (comp. for Article 3 of the Hague Convention, Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 26 October 2004, BVerfgE 112, 1, 32 et seq.; Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, “Italian military detainees”; Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 15 February 2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, “Distomo”). With respect to every international treaty benefiting individuals, it is therefore necessary to assess by means of interpretation whether and to what extent that treaty is meant to give rise to individual rights, i.e. whether it is the case of an independent benefit (a subjective right) – as the case may be also a right to compensation – or whether it is only a factual benefit, a legal reflex …
9
2. According to these principles, the applicants can base claims for compensation on the international law level neither on Article 3 of the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907 (Hague Convention), nor on Article 91 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, of 8 June 1977 (…, in the following: AP I). Further bases of claims – on the international law level – are not apparent.
10
a) Article 3 of the Hague Convention, which originally – due to the then predominant legal view on the mediatization of the individual – without a doubt was only of an inter-State character (comp. Federal Court of Justice, judgement of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98, “Distomo case”), does not give rise to a direct individual compensation claim for violations of the international law of war, even if taking into account the change of view of international law regarding the rights of the individual in the meantime (Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 26 October 2004, BVerfgE 112, 1, 32 et seq.; Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 15 February 2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, “Distomo case”). Indeed, the drafting history of the norm shows that it is intended to protect the individual and is therefore of a nature indirectly protecting human rights. However, it does not follow from this that the provision is the basis of a direct, originally international law compensation claim of the concerned individual vis-à-vis the State. According to the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, it is still only the home State which is entitled to secondary compensation claims due to international wrongful acts of a State against foreign nationals, irrespective of the development on the level of human rights protection, which has led to the recognition of the individual as a partial subject of international law as well as to the establishing of individual complaint procedures under treaty law (Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, “Italian military detainees”; Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 15 February 2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, “Distomo case”).
11
b) Also in relation to Article 91 of AP I, the legal situation ultimately cannot be judged differently. It may well be that the provisions of the law of war in the Additional Protocols of 1977 for the protection of the civilian population potentially of relevance here – in particular Article 51 of AP I – give rise to subjective rights of the concerned individual (civilian) persons in the sense of a (primary) right to respect for the prohibitions of international humanitarian law (comp. for Article 3 Hague Convention, Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, “Italian military detainees”; …). In any case, an individual (secondary) reparation claim in the event of the violation of these prohibitions does not follow from it, according to the wording of Article 91 of AP I, its origin and its treatment in international law practice so far.
12
aa) (1) According to Article 91, sentence 1 of AP I “[a] Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation.” “It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces” (sentence 2). This is almost exactly the wording of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. It is therefore the general view that Article 91 of AP I (merely) confirms the legal situation to be applied already according to Article 3 of the Hague Convention and extends it to the four Geneva (Red Cross) Conventions and the Additional Protocol, that therefore Article 91 of AP I has the same meaning as Article 3 of the Hague Convention … The travaux préparatoires of the conferences drafting the Additional Protocols also contain nothing which would indicate that the contracting parties intended to a give a meaning to Article 91 of AP I going beyond that of Article 3 of the Hague Convention … If, at the time, the contracting parties had wanted to establish individual compensation claims for the area concerned, it would have been possible to take guidance from, for example, Article 5, paragraph 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention), in force at the time of the negotiations on the Additional Protocols, which provides an express compensation claim of persons injured in their human rights; nothing indicates that something similar was intended with regard to the responsibility of States for violations of international humanitarian law during armed conflicts.
13
(2) That with regard to the Geneva Additional Protocols, according to the principles of State responsibility, only inter-State and no direct individual reparation claims were considered is generally affirmed, inter alia, by the circumstance that also the UN International Law Commission’s 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts in Article 42 et seq. only provide for the entitlement of the injured State to invoke the responsibility of another State, and does not provide for individual claims of injured individual persons. These provisions may contain binding international law only insofar as they codify customary international law … Nevertheless, they are an indication that a conviction to the contrary has not yet formed. Claims related to torts under international law rather are still to be seen as giving rise to compensation between States … In particular also because of the speciality of international humanitarian law in relation to general human rights …, a different interpretation of Article 91 of AP I cannot be deduced just from the circumstance that there are provisions which in certain cases give persons whose human rights have been injured an individual right of complaint against the violating State (see for example Article 34 European Convention).
14
bb) Also, the Commentary on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (de Preux, in: Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmerman, Commentary on the Additional Protocols [1987], MN. 3657) comes with regard to Article 91 of AP I to the conclusion that, apart from special exceptional cases, [“]persons with a foreign nationality who have been wronged by the unlawful conduct of a Party to the conflict should address themselves to their own government, which will submit their complaints to the Party or Parties which committed the violation[“]. Insofar as de Preux … at the same time points to a “tendency” since 1945 to [“]recognize the exercise of rights by individuals[“], this contains – like similar references and requests in international law literature … – for the area of international humanitarian law of war not more than the expression of a future ideal, so far in any case not yet implemented in the practice of international law. In this area, the general principle of tort law that the violation of a primary duty of behaviour generally gives rise to a secondary right of the owner of the violated right …, is factually recognized only in a limited way.
16
c) An active legitimation of the applicants to an international law compensation claim against the respondent due to a violation of international humanitarian law of war, lacking according to all the above, here also cannot be deduced (indirectly) from Article 25, sentence 2, second clause of the Basic Law, according to which the general rules of international law directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory. According to that, an individual’s primary claim under international law (see b) above) may for inhabitants of the federal territory, as the case may be, become the basis also of a compensation claim against the Federal Republic as violating State… In the present case such a basis for a claim in any case does not apply for the applicants, because Article 25, sentence 2, second clause of the Basic Law does not relate to foreigners abroad …
18
4. Since already due to the lack of an active legitimation of the applicants there is no international law obligation of the respondent vis-à-vis the applicants for potential unlawful acts in connection with the attack against the Varvarin bridge, it also need not be asked … whether, and if so under which conditions, a (co-)responsibility of the respondent for an internationally wrongful act, independent of unlawful acts or omissions of its own public agents, is to be considered simply on the basis of the respondent’s participation in the NATO mission in the Kosovo conflict …
II.
19
The Higher Regional Court also rightly denied a compensation claim of the applicants based on domestic (German) law, which would not already be precluded from the point of view of exclusivity of international law (… Federal Court of Justice, judgement of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98, “Distomo case”).
20
Only Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 34 of the Basic Law can be considered as the basis of such a claim. In this respect, this Senate held that, according to the understanding of the law on breach of official duty until the end of World War II, military actions of war abroad were excluded from claims based on breach of official duty under Section 839 Civil Code in conjunction with Article 131 of the Weimar Constitution (Federal Court of Justice, judgement of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98, “Distomo case”). This Senate leaves undecided whether – as answered in the negative by the Higher Regional Court – this view is to be upheld also for the time after the coming into force of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.
A compensation claim of the applicants against the respondent on this basis is in any case prevented by the circumstance that in connection with the attack against the Varvarin bridge during the Kosovo conflict no breaches of official duty by German soldiers or authorities in the sense of concrete (culpable) violations of the rules of international humanitarian law (of war) for the protection of the civilian population are present.
22
2. [The explanations of the Higher Regional Court] – assuming that liability of the respondent under German law on liability for breach of official duty were possible at all – hold out against legal review.
23
a) aa) As regards the – not existing – direct support by the respondent’s armed forces for the attack on the Varvarin bridge, the [applicants] without success criticize the explanations of the Higher Regional Court of Cologne as contradictory: It is absolutely possible … that the way the respondent’s forces shielded the air space was indeed a support to the attack on the Varvarin bridge as such, that, however, the German soldiers or authorities did not know details of the air strike as such. Contrary to the view of the application for revision, the circumstance that according to the principle “need to know”… they had no information, cannot be held against them.
24
bb) Also the further criticism of the application for revision that it had been overlooked that under liability law, in cases where a damage is due to several causes generated by different persons, it is irrelevant for joint and several liability whether specific causes are more significant than others does not lead to a different assessment. Since, according to the facts to be applied for the revision, the members of the German armed forces at the respective day of deployment had no information on the details of the objectives of the planes whose air space they protected, and especially no information on the nature of the attack against the Varvarin bridge, they did not have the intent required for attributing the attack to them as co-perpetrator or aider/assistant (Section 830 of the Civil Code). Such intent would have required … that the German authorities knew – or at least approvingly accepted – that an attack against the civilian population or at least an “indiscriminate attack” (comp. Article 51, paragraph 5, letter b of AP I) would take place. No facts to this effect have been established; also the applicants have submitted nothing to this effect for evidence.
25
b) The application for revision without success criticizes the assessment of the Higher Regional Court that the respondent’s participation – alleged by the applicants and contested by the respondent – in the inclusion of the Varvarin bridge in a NATO air operations target list also cannot be qualified as breaching official duty, since such a decision was within the limits of a wide, insofar not justiciable, margin of appreciation of the military commanding authorities, and was in particular not obviously in violation of international law and not completely untenable.
26
aa) … The application for revision cannot be followed insofar as it opines that such a margin of appreciation cannot exist in relation to the “rules of ius in bello strictly to be respected”. This is not a question on the abstract content of the rules, but on the assessment of the geographical and military situation in concrete application of these rules. The assessment of the Higher Regional Court of Cologne that the limits of the margin of appreciation are transgressed only in cases of complete untenability and obvious violation of international law, is not to be objected to.
27
bb) There are no objections to the way the Higher Regional Court of Cologne as trier of fact has found that this threshold has not been crossed in connection with the respondent’s approval – alleged by the applicants – of the inclusion of the Varvarin bridge in the target list for the NATO operation. This finding seems reasonable already because military objectives (comp. Article 52, paragraph 2, sentence 2 of AP I) traditionally include, inter alia, infrastructure like streets, railroads, bridges and telecommunication installations. From the respondent’s perspective, “in the circumstances ruling at the time” (Article 52, paragraph 2, sentence 2, fin) – the moment of inclusion in the target list –, this could be a sufficient standard of evaluation, even if finally the decision on a military attack could have been taken only under the condition that the destruction of the bridge – at that moment in time – offered a definite military advantage. Without legal mistake, the Higher Regional Court has explained that the respondent, when agreeing to the selection of targets, was allowed to trust that a potential attack would be realized in a way respecting international law.
29
3. Not correct is finally the view of the application for revision that – because the air operation was decided and executed by the NATO member States – compensation claims based on combat operations violating protective rights of the civilian population were to be asserted against any NATO member State, if the injured persons could not find out who was the concrete violator.
30
a) It need not be decided whether and to what extent such considerations would be relevant in the examination of international law compensation claims (between States; see above I.4.). For the compensation claims based on domestic law on liability for breach of official duty (Article 34 Basic Law in conjunction with Section 839 of the Civil Code) which alone – if at all – are under consideration here, an extension of liability under this aspect does not come into question. Already in view of the personal construction of liability for breach of official duty … the State generally is liable only to the extent the acting official himself would be liable (under Section 839 of the Civil Code) if the acceptance of liability by the State (via Article 34 of the Basic Law) did not exist. Liability for breach of official duty can therefore only be caused by culpable wrongdoing of a German official. Official acts of armed forces of other States generally cannot be attributed to the Federal Republic of Germany under the law on breach of official duty. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Bridge of Varvarin case, Judgment, 2 November 2006, §§ 4–14, 16, 18–20, 22–27 and 29–30.
Germany
In 2004, in the Italian Military Internees case concerning a constitutional complaint dealing with the exclusion of certain Italian nationals from the scope of application of the German Law on the Creation of a Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” of 2 August 2000, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court held:
The constitutional complaint is not accepted for decision.
Grounds:
1
The constitutional complaint concerns the constitutionality of the exclusion of so-called Italian military internees from the scope of application of the Law on the Creation of a Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” … – Foundation Law – and the question whether the Law has violated the property right positions of the complainants Nos. 2 to 943 in an unconstitutional way.
I.
2
1. Complainant No. 2 is an Italian national. In September 1943, he was arrested as an officer of the Italian army by units of the German Wehrmacht. During World War II, Italy was initially an ally of the German Reich. After Mussolini’s fall in September 1943, the new Italian government concluded an armistice with the Allies and declared war on Germany in October 1943. The German Wehrmacht offered Italian soldiers, allies of Germany until the change of fronts, the choice of either continuing the war on the side of Germany or of becoming prisoners of war. Those who, like complainant No. 2, chose detention as prisoners of war, were utilized as labourers for the German war economy.
3
In the summer of 1944, for reasons of foreign policy, the Italian soldiers interned by the German Reich, and in January 1945 also the officers, were released from detention as prisoners of war and were transferred into a “civilian work relationship”. However, the poor working conditions and the camp accommodation largely continued. The Italian military internees, including complainant No. 2, for the most part did not agree to the formal change of status.
4
2. Complainant No. 3 is also an Italian national. In August 1944, he was arrested by soldiers of the German Wehrmacht in the course of reprisals against the Italian civil population, was utilized for forced labour and was ill-treated during it. He is conducting civil proceedings in Italy against the Federal Republic of Germany with the aim of obtaining compensation for tangible and intangible damages for the period of internment and forced labour. The court of first instance denied its competence on account of Germany’s immunity as a State before the Italian courts. The appeal is still pending.
5
3. Complainants Nos. 4 to 943 are, like complainant No. 2, Italian military internees; further information on their individual fates is not submitted.
6
4. Complainant No. 1 is a non-commercial association, representing the interests of the Italian military internees. Complainants Nos. 2 to 943 are members of that association.
7
5. a) In the years 1999 and 2000, negotiations took place between the German Federal Government and the governments of other States which had participated in World War II, concerning compensation for persons utilized for forced labour in German companies and in the public sector. Subsequently, on 2 August 2000, the German legislator adopted the Foundation Law, whereby a foundation with legal capacity was created under public law, named “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future”. The aim of the foundation is to provide, through partner organizations, financial means to grant benefits to former forced labourers and persons affected by other forms of wrong during the time of national socialism (Section 2 of the Foundation Law). The distribution of funds to the persons entitled is done exclusively by the partner organizations; the foundation itself is neither entitled nor obliged to do so (Section 10 of the Foundation Law). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Geneva, a legal entity under international law enjoying immunity, is the partner organization responsible for Italy.
8
b) The group of forced labourers entitled to compensation and other affected persons is further specified in Section 11 paragraph 1 of the Foundation Law. Accordingly, entitled to benefits is a person who
9
1. was detained in a concentration camp within the meaning of Section 42 paragraph 2 of the Federal Compensation Law [Federal Law for the Compensation of the Victims of National Socialist Persecution; Bundesentschädigungsgesetz – BEG] or in another place of detention […] under comparable conditions, and was forced to work,
10
2. was deported from his home country into the territory of the German Reich within the borders of 1937 or into a territory occupied by the German Reich, was forced to work in an industrial enterprise or in the public sector, and was detained under conditions other than those stated in number 1, or was subject to conditions similar to detention or to comparable, particularly poor living conditions.
11
According to Section 11, paragraph 3 of the Foundation Law, detention as a prisoner of war does not establish entitlement to benefits; the explanatory memorandum to the Foundation Law … states in this regard:
12
Prisoners of war utilized for labour generally cannot obtain any benefit therefor, since, according to the rules of international law, prisoners of war can be utilized for labour by the detaining power. Persons released from detention as prisoners of war and transferred to civilian worker status can belong to the group of entitled persons under paragraph 1 if, for the rest, they fulfil the requirements.
13
According to Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Foundation Law, other places of detention within the meaning of Section 11, paragraph 1, no. 1 are characterized by “inhumane conditions of detention, inadequate supplies and absence of medical care”. Depending on the degree to which a person was affected, payments of up to DM 15,000 are made (Section 9 of the Foundation Law).
14
Finally, Section 16 of the Foundation Law provides for an exclusion of claims:
15
(1) Benefits from public funds including social security and from German companies for a national socialist wrong suffered within the meaning of Section 11 can be claimed only under this Law. […]
16
(2) Every entitled person will declare in the course of the application procedure that on receiving a benefit under this Law he […] renounces making any further claims against the public authorities related to forced labour […].
17
6. In August 2001, the Foundation Board adopted a “Guideline on the entitlement to benefits and on the exclusion from benefits of former prisoners of war under the Foundation Law”, coordinated with the Federal Ministry of Finance. It states with regard to Section 11, paragraph 3 of the Foundation Law that
18
A prisoner of war utilized for civilian forced labour is not entitled to benefits if throughout the period of labour he retained the status of prisoner of war. Under the international law of war, the utilization of the labour of prisoners of war is permissible. If therefore the prisoner of war is only de facto used as a civilian worker, but has not been transferred to civilian status by a formal act, there is no entitlement to benefits. […] The Federal Government has commissioned an expert opinion examining whether Italian military internees, utilized for forced labour, were transferred into civilian status in the legal sense. The expert opinion answered this in the negative. The Federal Government has adopted the view of the expert opinion. For the Federal Government, according to the criteria of the Foundation Law, Italian military internees are therefore not entitled to benefits. However, prisoner of war status cannot be held against prisoners of war who were transported to a concentration camp, since in that case specific discrimination and ill-treatment motivated by NS [national socialist] ideology was decisive, and detention in a concentration camp cannot be regarded as a general fate during war.
The expert opinion mentioned is decisively based on the consideration that the status as prisoner of war, giving special protection under international law, cannot be withdrawn unilaterally by the obligated State.
22
7. Neither complainant No. 2 nor complainant No. 3 have applied to the IOM for benefits under the Foundation Law. Complainant No. 3 was, according to his own statements, not in a recognized place of detention within the meaning of Sections 11, paragraph 1, no. 1, 12, paragraph 1 of the Foundation Law …
II.
23
With the constitutional complaint … directly against Section 10, paragraph 1, Section 11, paragraph 3 and Section 16, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Foundation Law, violations of Article 14 paragraphs 1 and 3, sentence 4 [protection of property], Article 19, paragraph 1, sentence 2, and paragraph 4, Article 104, paragraph 1, and Article 3, paragraph 1 [non-discrimination] of the German Basic Law are alleged.
24
1. Complainants Nos. 2 and 3 allege to have a claim for compensation against the Federal Republic of Germany because of forced labour and treatment suffered during it. This claim allegedly stems from, on the one hand, Section 839 of the German Civil Code in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 of the [Geneva] Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 27 July 1929 …, and, on the other hand, directly from Article 3 of the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907 …
25
It is alleged that Section 16, paragraph 1 of the Foundation Law removes that claim in defiance of Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 3, sentence 4 of the Basic Law [protection of property] …
28
4. Finally, Section 11, paragraph 3 of the Foundation Law allegedly violates Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law [non-discrimination] by generally excluding prisoners of war from the group of persons entitled to benefits: the complainants had also suffered wrongs due to forced labour under unworthy conditions.
III.
29
The constitutional complaint is not accepted for decision because the requirements for accepting a complaint of Section 93 a, paragraph 2 of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court are not fulfilled. To the extent that the constitutional complaint is admissible, it is unfounded. Under constitutional law, there are no objections against the norms challenged.
30
1. a) The constitutional complaint of complainants Nos. 4 to 943 is inadmissible due to missed time limits …
31
b) The constitutional complaint of complainant No. 1 is inadmissible because it does not allege a violation of own constitutional rights …
32
c) The constitutional complaint of complainants Nos. 2 and 3 is partially admissible …
37
2. The constitutional complaint is unfounded.
38
a) Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention, as a principle, does not establish an individual compensation claim, but only codifies the general basic rule of international law (comp. Article 1 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts) regarding the liability to pay compensation between States party. This secondary claim for compensation, however, exists only in the international law relation between the States concerned. Insofar, it differs from the concerned individuals’ primary right to respect for the prohibitions of international humanitarian law, which exists in the international law relation between an occupying State and the population living in the territory occupied.
39
b) The basic principle of diplomatic protection does not categorically preclude a violating State’s domestic law from granting an individual claim to an individual injured, in addition to the international law claims of the individual’s home State … That this is not precluded, however, does not allow the inference of a rule or assumption according to which a State violating international law must grant claims to injured persons on the basis of its domestic law. It is rather the concrete content of the domestic legal order which is decisive. If, according to that, no compensation claim exists (comp. Federal Court of Justice, Judgement of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98, “Distomo case”), a violation of the property protection of Article 14 of the Basic Law does not come into question.
40
c) The provision in Section 11, paragraph 3 of the Foundation Law, according to which detention as prisoner of war in and of itself does not entitle to benefits, does not raise substantial concerns with a view to Article 3 of the Basic Law [non-discrimination].
41
Articles 4 et seq. of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention establish a special protection for prisoners of war. According to Article 6 of the Hague Regulations, they can, within exactly defined limits, also be utilized for forced labour. Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention sets up a special international law regime of liability for violations of the international humanitarian law of war. This system of rules of international law is a factor of such kind and weight … that it can justify the exclusion [of prisoners of war] under Section 11, paragraph 3 of the Foundation Law.
With regard to Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, the legislator is also not prevented from distinguishing between a general fate during law, albeit hard and involving violations of international law, and victims of particularly ideologically motivated measures of persecution by the wrongful national socialist regime; in view of certainly substantial but nevertheless limited funds of the Foundation, the legislator is also not prevented from including only the latter in the group of persons entitled to benefits under the Foundation Law. 
Germany, Federal Constitutional Court, Italian Military Internees case, Decision, 28 June 2004, §§ 1–18, 22–25, 28–32 and 37–41.
Germany
In 2004, in the East German Expropriation case, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court held:
100
(a) The expropriations on the territory of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany in the years 1945 to 1949, irrespective of whether they were occasioned directly by the Soviet occupying power or whether the German authorities installed by this occupying power had their own scope for decision in this respect, cannot be attributed to the sphere of responsibility of the state power of the Federal Republic of Germany, bound by the Basic Law (see BVerfGE 84, 90 (122–123)). …
101
Instead, the Soviet occupying power, which carried out the expropriations on the basis of sovereign acts or was responsible for them by reason of the factual circumstances of control, claimed special authorisation, in order to restructure the property system in its occupation zone as planned.
102
There is more than one reason to suggest that the competence to structure the occupation regime is restricted by the minimum requirements of humanity laid down in the Hague Land Warfare Convention (on the application of the Land Warfare Convention as customary public international law as early as in the course of the Second World War, see International Military Court (Internationaler Militärgerichtshof), Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher, 14. November 1945 bis 1. October 1946, judgment, pp. 260 ff., 267 ff.; Greenwood, in: Fleck (ed.), Handbuch des humanitären Völkerrechts, 1994, no. 120). Under Articles 42 et seq. of the Land Warfare Convention, armed occupation creates a legal relationship between the occupying and the occupied state. The occupier has particular rights and duties in the occupied territory. It is true that the victorious powers, in the legal foundation documents for the exercise of government power with regard to Germany, agreed that it should be possible for the victorious power in question to intervene significantly in the political and economic life of Germany. They regarded it as their duty “to fundamentally restructure the political system, the basis of the constitution, indeed, the education system and the whole economic and social structure of Germany” (see Part III.a § 3, 7, 9 and 11 et seq. of the Potsdam Agreement …)
103
However, the humanitarian core of the Land Warfare Convention, which consists of the principles of humanity in the meaning of the Martens clause of the Preamble to the Hague Land Warfare Convention … was binding even at the time of the occupation. The Martens clause was confirmed as follows in Article 1.2 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions:
104
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.
105
It cannot be excluded that – as the complainants believe – acts of the Soviet occupying power were inconsistent with elementary principles of law, because, without differentiation as to individual responsibility, they were directed against a group of persons called the “class enemy” and aimed at its economical or even physical destruction.
106
However, it is not necessary to decide here the precise position of the boundaries of competence to structure the occupation regime and whether in this specific case they were exceeded.
107
b) On German unification, the Federal Republic of Germany attained the sovereign competence to decide on the continuation of the measures on the basis of sovereign acts by occupying powers (aa). Public international law did not impose on the Federal Republic of Germany a duty to make restitution (bb). The Federal Republic of Germany was subject only to a duty of cooperation with regard to the consequences, in order to achieve a situation closer to public international law (cc).
110
bb) The Federal Republic of Germany is subject to no duty derived from public international law to make restitution to the persons affected by the expropriations. In connection with the Two-Plus-Four Talks, it impliedly and admissibly waived the right to any claims it had to damages under public international law (1). There are no rules of mandatory public international law preventing this (2).
111
(1) Between the German Reich and the Soviet Union, the states that were succeeded by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Russian Federation, there was a state of war under international law … The Hague Land Warfare Convention may give rise to claims on an international level, that is, between the occupying power and the returning sovereign. A party to a conflict that does not observe the provisions of Hague law is, by Article 3 of the Land Warfare Convention (see Article 91 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, of 1977) obliged to pay damages. This provision corresponds to the principle under customary international law that the violation of its duties under public international law makes a state responsible (see also Article 1 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility). This right to damages under secondary law, however, exists only in the public-international-law relationship between the states involved and is subject to their disposition. In this respect, the claim to damages differs from the claim under primary law of the persons involved that the prohibitions of humanitarian public international law are observed; this claim exists in the public-international-law relationship between the state occupying a territory and the population living in this territory.
112
In the Two-Plus-Four Talks, the Federal Republic of Germany impliedly waived any claims under the Hague Land Warfare Convention. By the wording of the Land Warfare Convention and the practice of the states, the Federal Republic of Germany was not obliged to assert such claims towards the former occupying power.
113
It is not in contradiction to this that each of the four Geneva Conventions of the year 1949 contains a provision depriving the states that are parties the right to release themselves or another from the responsibility for “serious violations” of public international law (Article 51 of the First Geneva Convention, Article 52 of the Second Geneva Convention, Article 131 of the Third Geneva Convention and Article 148 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). When these provisions were created, the creators believed that they had found in them an efficient means of enforcing the Hague law. In the practice of the law of war, however, this principle has not yet succeeded in establishing itself. Instead, as a rule the victor demands the payment of compensation from the conquered (reparations), although there was no unambiguous agreement to base this on violations of the law of war, and above all without the victor paying damages for the violations of law committed by itself. It cannot be concluded from the provisions of the Geneva Convention that the states are forbidden to waive claims under the Hague Land Warfare Convention in connection with entering into a peace treaty.
114
Any claims of the individuals protected by the Land Warfare Convention are burdened in advance by this authorisation of the occupying power and the sovereign to legislate and to waive, and they are also restricted by it. 
Germany, Federal Constitutional Court, East German Expropriation case, Order, 26 October 2004, §§ 100–107 and 110–114.
Germany
In 2006, in the Serbian Prisoners of War case, Germany’s Administrative Court of Berlin held:
1
The applicants, based on own or transferred rights, assert a claim for remuneration or compensation against the respondent due to forced labour done in the German Reich during detention as prisoners of war.
2
The applicants are supported in these proceedings by an association of former Serbian prisoners of war …
3
… [T]he applicants submit that they or their fathers, as prisoners of war during World War II, had been utilized for excessive forced labour. The applicants submit in this respect that they or their legal predecessors had been captured in April 1941 by a German-Italian army and had then been utilized for forced labour in a prisoner of war camp of the Wehrmacht, concretely identified in each case, until the day of their liberation.
4
The applicants base their claim for remuneration, amounting to DM 100 per month, on Article 34, paragraph 4 of the Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 27 July 1929 [1929 Geneva POW Convention] … and on Article 6, paragraph 5 of the Annex to the Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land – Hague Regulations – of 18 October 1907 … The respondent is said to be liable for the payment obligations not fulfilled by the German Reich. The applicants further are of the opinion that they also have compensation claims based on breach of official duty, due to the culpable omission by the German Reich to pay the remuneration, as well as a public law restitution claim, due to unjust enrichment of the German Reich. These claims had neither been excluded by international agreements, nor were they time-barred.
Grounds
10
The actions in any event are unfounded because the law does not give the applicants the asserted claim for payment against the respondent due to forced labour done during detention as prisoners of war in the German Reich before 8 May 1945.
11
1. From the provisions of international humanitarian law applicable until 8 May 1945 an individually enforceable claim for remuneration of prisoners of war for labour done during their detention cannot be deduced. After its own examination, the Chamber agrees with the legal opinion applied by the Administrative Court of Cologne in its judgment of 11 November 2002 … and the Higher Administrative Court for the Land North-Rhine Westphalia in its decision of 13 December 2004 …, in parallel proceedings of further Serbian former prisoners of war. These courts refer to the judgement of the Higher Administrative Court for the Land North-Rhine Westphalia of 19 November 1997 …, which in the case of a Polish former prisoner of war addressed the legal questions relevant here in a fundamental manner. Accordingly, no claim for remuneration for forced labour can be based on the provisions of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention applicable at the time of detention as prisoner of war, since in particular from Article 34, paragraphs 2 and 4 of that Convention no individual claims of nationals of States party to that Convention directly against a detaining power can be deduced. The Higher Administrative Court for the Land North-Rhine Westphalia assumed in its judgement that the applicant in that case was forced to do physical labour and, contrary to Article 34, paragraph 2 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention, was not remunerated for it. The Higher Administrative Court then further noted:
12
“The provisions mentioned, however, are not directly applicable (“self-executing”) in the sense that the individual can assert subjective rights vis-à-vis a State party to the Convention.
14
According to more recent international law doctrine the individual is, indeed, no longer a mere object of international law, connected to international law only through the medium of the State, but can himself directly have rights and obligations under international law.
16
This applies in particular also to the legal position of the individual in international armed conflict, which is regulated by the international law of war.
18
The Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1929, as international humanitarian treaty law, belongs to this “ius in bello”.
20
However, the provisions of Article 27, paragraph 3 and Article 34, paragraph 2 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention only benefit the individual prisoner of war; they do not give him subjective rights vis-à-vis the detaining State, which he could enforce in that State’s domestic courts. As provisions of international treaty law, they can have become legally binding within the State only if, according to their wording, purpose and content, they are capable of causing legal effects like a domestic statutory provision.
22
These requirements are not fulfilled here.
23
A claim of prisoners of war to remuneration for forced labour cannot be deduced from the provision of Article 34 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention. Indeed, prisoners employed for work other than that mentioned in paragraph 1 of the provision (administration, internal arrangement and maintenance of camps) are, according to the wording of Article 34, paragraph 2 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention “entitled to a rate of pay”. This, however, does not entitle the individual prisoner to file a claim in the courts of the detaining power for payment of remuneration denied to him. Article 34 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention is not sufficiently precise to serve as the basis of a claim for remuneration in an individual case. The provision itself contains no basis whatsoever for the calculation of pay, in particular also no differentiation depending on the kind of forced labour done. A treaty law provision lacking, the States party to the 1929 Geneva POW Convention rather left the fixing of the remuneration to be paid to the belligerent States, which are to conclude agreements regarding this matter (comp. Article 34, paragraph 2 of the Article 34, paragraph 2 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention). If no such agreements have been concluded …, Article 34, paragraph 4 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention, indeed, contains further provisions on the remuneration of the work of prisoners. These provisions, however, according to their content, objectively are not capable of serving as the basis of a claim for remuneration, either …
24
… Article 27, paragraph 3 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention, if violated, is also not sufficiently precise to be capable of serving – potentially in conjunction with other, domestic provisions – as the basis of an individual person’s compensation claim …
25
Independent of Article 27, paragraph 3 and Article 34, paragraph 2 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention being objectively incapable of serving as a legal basis of the claim for remuneration raised, their direct application as domestic law is also prevented by the fact that provisions on their enforcement in court are lacking. An assumed individual right remains empty, as long as the individual does not have the possibility to assert his rights – if necessary in domestic courts.
27
The 1929 Geneva Convention, however, does not provide for the legal protection of the individual by independent courts. Under the chapter heading “Complaints of prisoners of war respecting the conditions of captivity”, Article 42, paragraph 1 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention gives prisoners of war only the right to bring petitions to the notice of the military authorities of the detaining State. Further, according to Article 42, paragraph 2 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention, prisoners of war have the right to communicate with the representatives of the protecting powers in cases of complaints regarding their treatment. Before the military authorities and the protecting powers, prisoners of war are represented by the representatives appointed by them, comp. Article 43 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention. Furthermore, Articles 86, 87 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention provide the possibility of control by the protecting powers of the execution of the Convention. Apart from that, the 1929 Geneva Convention contains no further rights of the individual. Overall, it can be concluded that it is up to the contracting parties – and not to the individual prisoner of war – to raise among each other violations of the international law provisions and, if necessary, to punish them.
29
The objective of the 1929 Geneva Convention is, inter alia, in the extreme event of a war, to mitigate the inevitable rigours thereof and to alleviate the condition of prisoners of war (see preamble). The provisions on the work of prisoners of war in Part III of the 1929 Geneva Convention are therefore first of all expressions of humanity. The contracting parties are obligated to respect them in all circumstances (comp. Article 82 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention), so that the individual prisoner of war benefits from them by way of reflex, without being able to enforce adherence to the provisions in court.”
30
The applicants have submitted no decisive considerations in support of their claim which would require a different legal assessment. Their attempts to deduce an individual claim of the persons concerned from the development of the law do not succeed since a responsibility of the Federal Republic of Germany for obligations of the German Reich first of all requires that such an obligation existed. In this respect, the Federal Constitutional Court has clarified in its decision of 15 February 2006 [2 BvR 1476/03, “Distomo case”] that an obligation of the German Reich can have come into existence only on the basis of the legal provisions in force at the time of the events giving rise to liability. It is therefore irrelevant for the decision whether the view of the applicants regarding the development of the law since 8 May 1945 is to be followed.
31
In the decision mentioned, the Federal Constitutional Court declined to accept for decision the constitutional complaint against the judgement of the Federal Court of Justice of 26 June 2003. In its reasons for the non-acceptance for decision, the Federal Constitutional Court explained that there was no liability of the Federal Republic of Germany for war crimes by members of the German armed forces during the occupation of Greece during World War II, and, in this context, also addressed the question whether, in the case of a violation of the Hague Regulations, Article 3 of Hague Convention IV can give rise to individual claims. The Federal Constitutional Court answered this question in the negative and in particular also based itself on the view, also taken by the Higher Administrative Court for the Land North-Rhine Westphalia, that “understanding the norm as the basis of individual claims [was prevented] already by its lack of direct applicability”. Therefore, it was “still only the home State [which was] entitled to secondary claims for compensation based on international wrongful acts of a State against foreign nationals”.
32
2. The domestic law applicable in the territory of the Reich until 8 May 1945 has also not given rise to a claim for compensation against the German Reich for forced labour.
33
It need not be decided whether the requirements of liability for breach of official duty according to Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 131 of the Weimar Constitution were fulfilled. In any case, the compensation claim of a foreign prisoner of war was excluded according to Section 7 of the “Law on the Liability of the Reich for its Officials” (old version), because, according to that, claims of foreigners required a guarantee of reciprocity by international treaty or by a foreign State’s legislation, which had to be published in the Reich law gazette by the Reich chancellor. As already submitted by the applicants, such a publication was made only in relation to the Netherlands and Gdansk. According to the Federal Constitutional Court (l.c.), this provision is compatible with the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany; there is no general rule of international law which generally demands equal treatment of foreigners and nationals.
34
Finally, the applicants have no claim for remuneration of the work done on the basis of a public law restitution claim, analogous to Sections 812 et seq. of the Civil Code. A claim based on unjust enrichment in any case requires, not regarding the further requirements of the restitution claim, that the shift of assets happened without legal ground. Also in this respect reference can be made to the judgement of the Higher Administrative Court for the Land North-Rhine Westphalia, already quoted several times. Accordingly, such a claim is prevented already by the circumstance that the prisoners of war were utilized for forced labour not without legal ground. Rather, this treatment was permissible under the international law rules of the Hague Regulations and the 1929 Geneva POW Convention. If the prisoners of war were utilized for forced labour beyond the provisions of the Hague Regulations and the 1929 Geneva POW Convention, the detaining State – as described above – must answer for that only under international law rules, without a direct claim of the injured person against the detaining State coming into existence. 
Germany, Administrative Court of Berlin, Serbian Prisoners of War case, Judgment, 11 April 2006, §§ 1–4, 10–12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22–25, 27 and 29–34.
In 2007, the Higher Administrative Court of Berlin-Brandenburg rejected a motion of the applicants for admission of appeals proceedings against the judgment of the Administrative Court of Berlin.
6
2. The motion for admission of appeals proceedings is … unfounded.
13
The applicants’ submissions do not give cause to the Senate to assume that the claim based on international law requires further clarification, by way of derogation from the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court.
14
Already in its decision of 13 May 1996 the Federal Constitutional Court clarified that the traditional conception of international law as inter-State law conceived the individual not as a subject of international law, but only granted him indirect international protection. By means of diplomatic protection the State asserted its own right to respect for international law in the person of its national. This principle of exclusive entitlement of the State had applied already in the years 1943–1945 to the violations of human rights. Generally, the individual was not able to demand determination of a wrong or compensation for a wrong. Also, neither under international law nor generally under domestic law of a specific State, did the individual at the time have a subjective, enforceable right to the exercise of diplomatic protection by his home State. Only in the course of the more recent development of extended protection of human rights has international law given the individual a right of his own, has given other subjects of international law the right to intervene in cases of grave violations on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions, and has developed protective treaty law systems in which the individual himself can assert his rights.
15
Further, in its decision of 28 June 2004 [2 BvR 1379/01, “Italian military internees”], in a dispute regarding compensation for forced labour by Italian prisoners of war, the Federal Constitutional Court stated that Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention generally did not give rise to an individual compensation claim, but only codified the general basic rule of international law regarding liability obligations between States party; in this context the Federal Constitutional Court also considered Articles 4 et seq, 6 of the Hague Regulations. The secondary claim for compensation, however, existed only in the international law relation between the States concerned. Insofar, the compensation claim differed from the concerned individuals’ primary right to respect for the prohibitions of international humanitarian law, which existed in the international law relation between an occupying State and the population living in the territory occupied.
16
The Federal Constitutional Court repeated this understanding of international law in its decision of 15 February 2006 [2 BvR 1476/03, “Distomo case”] and further explained with regard to Article 3 of the Hague Convention that the provision did not give rise to a direct individual compensation claim for violations of the international law of war. Indeed, the origin of the norm showed that it was intended to protect the individual; it did, however, not follow from this that the provision could be the basis of a direct, originally international law compensation claim of the concerned individual vis-à-vis the State. Independent of the provision not being “self-executing”, the provision could not be understood as a basis of individual claims because according to the traditional conception of international law the individual was not qualified as a legal subject. Potential developments of the law or changed legal views on the level of constitutional or international law could anyway not be taken into consideration in the assessment of events in 1944. In this respect, the legal provisions in force at the time of the events giving rise to liability generally were relevant.
20
The applicants’ submission that during World War II some States paid compensation for forced labour by German prisoners of war does not show that this could have been enforced domestically in courts.
21
The further submission that the Federal Constitutional Court had exactly decided that the entitlement to claims of State parties did not exclude a corresponding entitlement of the individual and that international law claims did not exclude domestic claims, also does not help the applicants’ motion. The first point does not prove the granting of the entitlement of individual claims, the second point was taken into account by the Administrative Court insofar as it examined bases of claims based on domestic law – even those to be asserted in civil law courts.
22
d) Also with regard to domestic legal bases, the Senate sees no need for further clarification due to factual or legal difficulties.
23
… The Administrative Court dismissed a claim for breach of official duty [based on Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 131 of the Weimar Constitution] due to the consideration that such a compensation claim of a foreign prisoner of war was excluded according to Section 7 of the “Law on the Liability of the Reich for its Officials” of 22 May 1910 because, according to that, claims of foreigners required a guarantee of reciprocity by international treaty or by a foreign State’s legislation, which had to be published in the Reich law gazette by the Reich chancellor. In the case of Serbia, such a publication had not been made. According to the Federal Constitutional Court (in its decision of 15 February 2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, “Distomo case”), in confirmation of the decision of the Federal Court of Justice (judgement of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98, “Distomo case”), this legal understanding of the effect of the exclusion of liability under Section 7 of the “Law on the Liability of the Reich for its Officials” was not contrary to the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. According to the version of this provision applicable until 30 June 1992, a provision which had been compatible both with the Basic Law and the general rules of international law within the meaning of Article 25 of the Basic Law, nationals of a foreign State had had a claim based on breach of official duty against the Federal Republic only if reciprocity was guaranteed by the legislation of a foreign State or by international treaty. The Senate sees no need for further clarification regarding this point.
25
e) The Administrative Court further denied a claim for remuneration for forced labour on the basis of a public law restitution claim, analogous to Section 812 et seq. of the Civil Code. Such a claim based on unjust enrichment in any case required, not regarding the further requirements of the restitution claim, that the shift of assets happened without legal ground. This was not to be assumed here; the prisoners of war were utilized for forced labour not without legal ground, rather, there had been a legal ground in the international law provisions of the Hague Regulations and the 1929 Geneva POW Convention. If the prisoners of war were utilized for forced labour beyond the provisions of the Hague Regulations and the 1929 Geneva POW Convention, the detaining State alone had to answer for that under international law rules, without a direct claim of the injured person against the detaining State having come into existence.
26
In this respect the applicants submit in their motion that they did not deny that they had been obligated to do forced labour … [A]t the most, compensation was demanded for unlawful utilization for forced labour, forced labour going beyond the usual working time. They were rather of the opinion that with the forced labour they had acquired an entitlement to pay … The withholding of the pay infringed Article 14 [protection of property] of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany …
27
This argumentation, already because of its decisive point of departure – protection of property under Article 14 of the Basic Law –, does not lead to legal questions necessary to clarify in appeal proceedings. Relevant for the assessment of legal claims against the German Reich for which the Federal Republic of Germany, as the case may be, might be liable is the legal situation at the time when the forced labour in question here was done. Such debts, even if they had to be paid by the Federal Republic of Germany, are always only obligations of the Reich … This means in particular that, with regard to the possible bases of claims against the Reich, legal provisions, developments or changed legal views for example in the light of the Basic Law applicable today or of changes of international law must not be taken into consideration (comp. Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 15 February 2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, “Distomo case”, Federal Court of Justice, judgement of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98, “Distomo case”). Questions regarding a claim for unjust enrichment … on the basis of the protection of property under Article 14 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany therefore do not arise … Restitution or compensation claims would only come under the protection of Article 14 of the Basic Law if their existence were established … The scope of protection of Article 14 of the Basic Law … cannot give rise to a claim for unjust enrichment, such a claim rather is premised (comp. Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 15 February 2006).
28
f) The applicants also are not successful in claiming fundamental meaning of the subject matter as a ground for admission of appeals proceedings, Section 124, paragraph 2, no. 3 of the Administrative Courts Procedure Code …
30
Insofar as the legal bases of the claim under international law are concerned, the Senate is of the view that the quoted case law of the Federal Constitutional Court domestically sufficiently clarifies also the considerations decisive here regarding the non-granting of an individual claim against the Federal Republic of Germany on the basis of the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 27 July 1929. Admission to further domestic proceedings in second instance is therefore not necessary.
31
In view of the case law of the Federal Court of Justice described above, confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court, this also applies to the question of the limitation by Section 7 of the “Law on the Liability of the Reich for its Officials” of claims for breach of official duty under Section 839 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 131 of the Weimar Constitution. 
Germany, Higher Administrative Court of Berlin-Brandenburg, Serbian Prisoners of War case, Decision, 6 September 2007, §§ 6, 13–16, 20–23, 25–28 and 30–31.
Greece
A decision of the Court of First Instance of Leivadia in Greece in 1997 related to a claim for compensation against Germany brought by the prefecture of Voiotia and a number of individual claimants. The claims were based on acts – wilful murder and destruction of private property – committed by German occupation forces in June 1944. The Court rejected the German Government’s assertion of sovereign immunity on the ground that if a State acted in violation of a rule of jus cogens, it lost its right to invoke sovereign immunity. As the Court had previously concluded that the rules of IHL relating to belligerent occupation protecting, inter alia, the right to life, family honour, property and religious convictions were part of jus cogens, it found that Germany could not claim sovereign immunity. Having rejected Germany’s claim of immunity, the Court then determined that the suit was lawful under Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) and Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. It also considered that, in the absence of a rule of international law prohibiting this, the claims could be made by the plaintiffs in their individual capacity and not necessarily by their State of nationality. It also held that the words “if the case demands” in Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) specifically underlined that material damage must have been caused as a result of the violations of the conventions. The Court then reviewed the claims, rejecting those which lacked sufficient evidence of the property destroyed or of its value, and made awards of compensation in other cases. 
Greece, Court of First Instance of Leivadia, Prefecture of Voiotia case, Judgment, 30 October 1997.
In May 2000, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decisions, basing its conclusion that Germany was not entitled to sovereign immunity both on a finding that there existed a customary “tort law” exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and that as the acts in question violated peremptory norms of international law, they did not attract immunity. 
Greece, Supreme Court, Prefecture of Voiotia case, Judgment, 4 May 2000.
However, with regard to the same case, the Greek Government refused to give its consent necessary for the execution of the judgment against Germany for reasons of State immunity. 
Greece, Statement before the European Court of Human Rights, Kalogeropoulou and Others case, Decision on admissibility, 12 December 2002, A; see also Athens News Agency, Justice minister will not sign order to confiscate German properties in Athens, 15 September 2001.
Greece
In its judgment in Case No 93/1998 in 1998, Greece’s Court of First Instance of Larissa stated:
The plaintiffs claim a compensation of 340.000.000 drachmas, due to the murder of their relatives who were executed by the German occupation troops in a village of the Larissa prefecture on 2.4.1944, as reprisals for the activity of the Greek resistance movement …
According to the Convention of Vienna on Diplomatic and Consular Relations (1961 and 1963 respectively) the waiver of the privilege of immunity shall be explicit (art. 32§2 and 45§2 respectively) … Therefore it is accepted that a state can claim immunity even for acts that were committed in violation of international jus cogens rules … [A] tacit waiver cannot be accepted. 
Greece, Court of First Instance of Larissa, Case No 93/1998, Judgment of 1998.
Guatemala
In 2003, in its fourth periodic report to the Committee against Torture, Guatemala stated:
Various government bodies and non-governmental organizations have agreed that the establishment of the National Reconciliation Programme represents progress. Its purpose is to identify, provide reparation and compensation for, to return property to, to assist and to rehabilitate the victims of armed conflict. Following the political agreement which formed the basis of the National Reconciliation Programme, Government Agreement No. 258-2003 established the National Reconciliation Commission, which comprises five government representatives and five representatives of civil society. The government representatives are members of COPREDEH [The Presidential Commission for Coordinating Executive Policy in Human Rights]; a representative of the Ministry of Public Finance; the head of the Peace Secretariat; a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food and a personal representative of the President of the Republic who serves as chairman. The non-governmental representatives are two representatives of organizations for the victims of human rights violations that occurred during the armed conflict; a representative of Maya organizations; a representative of women’s organizations and a representative of human rights organizations. The specific purpose of this Commission is to provide compensation to victims of the human rights violations that took place during the internal armed conflict which ended on 29 December 1996. 
Guatemala, Fourth periodic report to the Committee against Torture, 27 May 2005, UN Doc. CAT/C/74/Add.1, submitted 8 December 2003, § 126.
Guatemala
In 2006, during the consideration of the fourth periodic report of Guatemala before the Committee against Torture, a representative of Guatemala stated that “compensation had not been awarded by domestic courts, but, in specific cases relating to the period of internal armed conflict, compensation had been awarded by virtue of international courts judgments.” 
Guatemala, Statement before the Committee against Torture during the consideration of the fourth periodic report of Guatemala, 12 May 2006, UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.701, § 56.
Israel
In its judgment in the Beit Sourik Village Council case in 2004, Israel’s High Court of Justice stated:
32. Petitioners’ second argument is that the construction of the Fence in the area is based, in large part, on the seizure of land privately owned by local inhabitants, that this seizure is illegal, and that therefore the military commander’s authority has no[t] to construct the obstacle … our opinion is that the military commander is authorized – by the international law applicable to an area under belligerent occupation – to take possession of land, if this is necessary for the needs of the army. See articles 23(g) and 52 of the Hague Convention; article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. He must, of course, provide compensation for his use of the land.
83. During the hearings, we asked respondent whether it would be possible to compensate petitioners by offering them other lands in exchange for the lands that were taken to build the Fence and the lands that they will be separated from. We did not receive a satisfactory answer. This petition concerns farmers that make their living from the land. Taking petitioners’ lands obligates the respondent, under the circumstances, to attempt to find other lands in exchange for the lands taken from the petitioners. Monetary compensation may only be offered if there are no substitute lands. 
Israel, High Court of Justice, Beit Sourik Village Council case, Judgment, 30 June 2004, §§ 32 and 83.
Israel
In its decision in the State of Israel v. Mustafa Dirani case in 2005, the District Court of Tel Aviv stated:
43. Plaintiff’s counsel argues in his brief that international conventions to which Israel is party require that monetary compensation be paid for violation of fundamental rights, in general, and torture during interrogation, in particular. For example, article 3 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, attached to the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907, states: “A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.” Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations prohibits parties to the Convention “to declare abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of nationals of the hostile party.”
A similar provision appears in article 91 of the First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, of 1977, which relates to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (which was ratified by Israel in 1951), while article 3(1) and articles 27 and 31 of the said Convention prohibit acts of violence and torture against enemy personnel. Article 75(2) of the First Protocol prohibits torture and outrages upon personal dignity (regarding the illegality of torture used during interrogation, see HCJ 5100/04, The Public Committee Against Torture v. Government of Israel, P. D. 53 (4) 817).
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of 1948, which prohibits, in article 5, torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, states: “Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitute or by law” (see Y. Dinstein, Non-State International Law (1979) 196–197). The Universal Declaration, supra, is recognized in Israel as part of binding customary law (see HCJ 103/67, The American-European Beth-El Mission v. Minister of Welfare, P. D. 21 (2) 325, 333).
The prohibition on torture appears also in article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, of 1966, which was ratified by Israel (31 Treaty Instruments 1040, p. 169), and is also recognized in Israel as part of international customary law (see HCJ 103/67, The American-European Beth-El Mission, supra, 325). Article 3 of the Covenant states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities… and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy.
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
The UN Human Rights Committee stated, in section 16 of its report of 29 April 2004 regarding the obligation of states to provide a remedy where rights protected in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are violated, that the states must grant suitable compensation and also must prosecute the persons responsible for violation of the rights. However, section 10 of the Committee’s report indicates that the aforesaid right of states who are party to the Covenant is limited to persons found in the jurisdiction of the state, or in areas under the state’s effective control, which is not the situation in our case. Section 10 states:
States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. This means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party even if not situated within the territory of the State Party. As indicated in General comment 15 adopted at the twenty-seventh session (1986), the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but must also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who may find themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party. This principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power of effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation.
44. As stated by Dinstein in his treatise Laws of War (at p. 267): “The principle of compensation may be viewed as relating to breach of any of the laws of war.” However, Prof. Dinstein also states in this context (at p. 268): “In practice, it is necessary, however, to take into account that so long as war is being conducted, there is no practical opportunity to investigate international monetary claims between the hostile sides.” In other words, the conventions state the right of a person injured by enemy forces to sue for compensation for violation of his rights protected in a convention, but this does not mean that he may do so prior to the end of the state of war.
Furthermore, not all the provisions of international law specified above necessarily reflect international customary law. With respect to those that reflect international customary law, they cannot prevail over Israel[i] domestic law. Israel is obliged, in accord with the conventions to which it is party, to enable a person whose protected rights are violated to sue for compensation for their violation. However, this right is not available to a resident of an enemy state if, under Israeli domestic law, he is denied that right. In addition, as stated above, international law itself recognizes the right of a state to prohibit transmission of property or money to a resident of an enemy state, as the Trading with the Enemy Ordinance, of 1939, provides. Therefore, even if the plaintiff is entitled to continue to conduct his claim for compensation, he will not be entitled to receive the compensation award as long as the state of war with Lebanon continues; rather, receipt of the award is subject to the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Ordinance.
The question of filing of a civil suit by an “enemy” is a special question, which the general provisions of international conventions are not necessarily intended to regulate. Anglo-American law denies a resident of an enemy state the right to file a civil suit while a state of war exists, and it does not appear that the conventions that regulate in a general manner the protection of human rights intended to nullify this domestic law. As explained above, there is support for the opinion that this rule of Anglo-American law does not contradict international law (see sections 28 and 31 above). It may be that international customary law, and not only treaty-based law, requires all states to enable a person whose fundamental rights have been violated to sue and receive a remedy for that violation. But the question if this rule applies also to an “enemy” or a member of a terrorist organization operating against the state in which his rights were violated has not been resolved in international treaty-based or customary law. This is the question that is to be decided in this application, and its resolution is determined by Israeli law.
56. Taking into account all of the above, it appears to me that, in the present case, the proper balance between violation of fundamental rights protected in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the goal of preventing assistance to the enemy will be achieved by means of the arrangement established in the Trading with the Enemy Ordinance. This ordinance prevents – on the one hand – transmission of money awarded to a resident of an enemy state during the time of a state of war and – on the other hand – creates a mechanism for protecting the assets of a resident of an enemy state until the end of the state of war. This mechanism will achieve in the present case the proper objective of preventing assistance to the enemy, and it does not necessarily violate the residents of the enemy state’s right of access to courts of law, which is a fundamental right of the first degree, there being no provision of Israeli law, by statute or in the common law, that denies this right. It should be mentioned that Canadian courts have also taken the middle road in problematic cases, enabling the resident of an enemy state to continue the civil action he filed, but ordering that the money that might be awarded him are not to be handed over until the war ends (see section 33 above). 
Israel, District Court of Tel Aviv, State of Israel v. Mustafa Dirani case, Decision, 9 December 2005, §§ 43–44 and 56.
Israel
In its judgment in the Adalah v. Government of Israel case in 2006, Israel’s High Court of Justice stated:
Section 5C of Amendment No. 7 negates the tort liability of the State for every tort claim that was filed relating to an incident that took place in a “zone of conflict.” The State’s response indicates that, following enactment of Amendment No. 7, extensive areas in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip were declared zones of conflict, and for prolonged periods of time. The region was divided into a number of large areas. Sometimes, one area encompasses whole cities or a number of villages and communities. According to the criteria established in this matter, a terrorist act occurring in one place inside a certain area is sufficient to declare the whole area a zone of conflict, and this for a number of days. In these circumstances, the infringement of human rights resulting from negating State liability under section 5C is great. We must remember that the territory of Judea and Samaria, and until August 2005 also the territory of the Gaza Strip, have been under belligerent occupation for close to forty years. In this framework, Israeli security forces remain in the region permanently and in large numbers. Residents of the region come in close, regular, daily contact with them in their coming and going, on their way to work and school, at inspection points at checkpoints inside the region and at crossing to and from Israel. Security forces maintain a permanent and continuing presence in the region. They are spread out and act in the region both in combat missions and in policing actions; both in areas in which there is hostile terrorist activity, and in quiet areas; both in times of conflict and in times of relative calm. In these circumstances, sweeping immunity of this kind given to the state under section 5C of Amendment No. 7 is the equivalent of a grant of exemption to the State from tort liability in broad areas of action that are not war actions also under the broad definition of that expression. It would leave many injured persons, who are not involved in any hostile activity whatsoever, and who are not injured incidental to actions of security forces intended to cope with hostile activity, without relief for injury to their life, body, and property. This sweeping infringement of rights is not necessary to achieve the purposes underlying section 5C of Amendment No. 7. Negation of State liability given in section 5C does not “adapt the tort law to the war situation.” It removes from the application of the tort law many actions that are not war actions. It is not consistent with the obligation of Israel, as the holder of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip in belligerent occupation. This occupation imposes on the State special obligations under international humanitarian law, which are not consistent with sweeping release from all tort liability. We do not take any position – because the matter did not arise before us – with respect to changes that may result from the Oslo agreements (see Gaza Coast Regional Council, pp. 523–524; HCJ 7015/02, Ajuri v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, P. D. 56 (6) 352, 364). Of course, we do not make any determination regarding the legal status of the Gaza Strip following the disengagement. Even if Israel’s belligerent occupation ended as the State argues, there is no justification in sweeping release from tort liability. 
Israel, High Court of Justice, Adalah v. Government of Israel case, Judgment, 12 December 2006, § 36.
Israel
In its judgment in the A. v. State of Israel case (No 3), in 2009, which addressed the question of whether targeted killings constitute “wartime action” that is exempt from tort liability under Israeli law, the Haifa District Court stated:
When a certain action comes within the definition of “wartime action,” the state is granted an exemption from tort liability for any damages resulting from the incident, inasmuch as the Civil Wrongs Law [Liability of the State Law, 5712 (1952)] exempts the state, in section 5, from liability for damages caused as a result of an act performed through a “wartime action” of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. An understanding of the foundation of the exemption indicates that the ordinary tort laws, which deal with the apportionment of risks for actions that harm the daily lives of a person in his state, are not the appropriate laws for arranging the special and atypical risks resulting from a situation of wartime actions (see C.A. 5964/92, Bani Odeh v. State of Israel [2002], P. D. 56 (4) 1). 
Israel, Haifa District Court, A. v. State of Israel case (No 3), Judgment, 18 March 2009, p. 8.
Italy
In its decision in the Markovic case in 2002, Italy’s Supreme Court of Cassation stated:
The provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1977 (Articles 35(2), 48, 49, 51, 52 and 57) and of the European Convention on Human Rights (Articles 2 and 15(2)), which govern the conduct of hostilities, are certainly concerned with the protection of civilians in the case of an attack, but as provisions of international law they govern relations between States. The same treaties lay down the procedures for ascertaining violations, providing for sanctions in the event of responsibility (Article 91 of the Protocol; Article 41 of the Convention), and designate which international courts have competence to enforce it.
On the other hand, the laws which have incorporated the above in the Italian legal order contain no express provisions that permit injured persons to seek reparation for the damage done to them by the violation of international rules from the State. 
Italy, Supreme Court of Cassation, Markovic case, Decision, 8 February 2002, § 3.
Japan
In the Shimoda case in 1963, the first case in which compensation was sought in Japan for violations of the laws of war, the plaintiffs, residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, brought proceedings against the Japanese Government on the ground that, by signing the 1951 Peace Treaty with the Allies, it had waived their right to seek compensation from the United States for its use of atomic bombs in violation of the laws of war. The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the government’s waiver of their claims obliged the government to pay them compensation itself. The Tokyo District Court ruled that, even though the aerial bombardment was an illegal act of war, individuals could be considered the subjects of rights under international law only in so far as they had been recognized as such in specific instances, such as, for example, in cases of mixed arbitral tribunals. In light of this determination, the Court concluded: “There is in general no way open to an individual who suffers injuries from an act of hostilities contrary to international law to claim damages on the level of international law, except for the cases mentioned above.” The Court went on to consider the question of whether the plaintiffs could seek redress before the municipal courts of either of the belligerent parties and concluded that considerations of sovereign immunity precluded proceedings against the United States either before Japanese or US courts. 
Japan, Tokyo District Court, Shimoda case, Judgment, 7 December 1963.
Japan
In the Siberian Detainees case in 1989, Japan’s Tokyo District Court dismissed claims of former soldiers and civilian employees who had been detained and put into involuntary labour in Siberia for a long time after the end of the Second World War. The claimants were seeking compensation for their labour from Japan as “power on which prisoners of war depend” on the basis of the Geneva Conventions and customary international law, but the Court dismissed the case for a lack of standing. 
Japan, Tokyo District Court, Siberian Detainees case, Judgment in Trial of First Instance, 4 April 1989.
The judgment was upheld on appeal. 
Japan, Tokyo High Court, Siberian Detainees case, Judgment in Trial of Second Instance, 5 March 1993; Supreme Court, Siberian Detainees case, Judgment in Trial of Third Instance, 13 March 1997.
Japan
In the Apology for the Kamishisuka Slaughter of Koreans case before Japan’s Tokyo District Court in 1996, three Korean plaintiffs claimed compensation for the arrest and execution of their father and brother by the Japanese military police on charges of spying in August 1945. They argued that, as the employer of the military police, Japan was under a duty to provide compensation. The claim was based on the Japanese Civil Code and international law. The Court found that:
Regarding the existence of international customary law as alleged by the plaintiffs, neither the general practice nor the conviction (opinio juris) that the state has a duty to pay damages to each individual when that state infringes its obligations under international human rights law or international humanitarian law can be said to exist. As international customary law as alleged by the plaintiffs cannot be determined, therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim based on international law is also without grounds. 
Japan, Tokyo District Court, Apology for the Kamishisuka Slaughter of Koreans case, Judgment in Trial of First Instance, 27 July 1995.
The judgment was upheld on appeal in 1996, when the Tokyo High Court approved the statement of the lower court but limited its finding of the absence of a rule of customary law entitling individuals to compensation in the law as it was at the time of the incident. The Court emphasized:
When the incident occurred, there was no evidence of any general practice, nor the existence of opinio juris that when a State acts in violation of the obligation of international human rights law or international humanitarian law, that State has the responsibility of compensating for damages any individual who was a victim.
Therefore, the international customary law against which the appellants claim did not exist at the time of the incident, and there are no grounds for the allegation of the appellants based upon international law. 
Japan, Tokyo High Court, Apology for the Kamishisuka Slaughter of Koreans case, Judgment on Appeal, 7 August 1996.
Japan
In 1998, Japan’s Tokyo District Court considered three further cases in which groups of individuals sought compensation from the Government of Japan for violations of IHL: the Ex-Allied Nationals Claims case, the Dutch Nationals Claims case and the Filipino Comfort Women Claims case. The first two cases dealt with claims of former POWs and civilian internees, the third with claims of Filipino women who were allegedly assaulted, confined and raped as “comfort women” during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during the Second World War. The cases were based principally on Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) and customary international law. The Court dismissed all three cases for lack of standing by the individuals. The Court reviewed the precise wording of Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) and concluded that it did not specify the methods for enforcing liability for violations nor provided that individuals had a right to claim compensation against a State in national courts. Having reached this conclusion on the basis of the language of Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV), the Court pointed out that international law only exceptionally recognized the right of individuals to enforce their rights under international law directly and that usually this had to be done by their State of nationality by means of diplomatic protection. The Court confirmed this conclusion by a review of the drafting history of Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) and of its application by other States, and concluded that Article 3 could not be interpreted so as to provide a right to individuals who had suffered damages because of violations of the laws of war to bring direct claims for compensation against the violating State in domestic courts. 
Japan, Tokyo District Court, Ex-Allied Nationals Claims case, Judgment, 26 November 1998; Dutch Nationals Claims case, Judgment, 30 November 1998; Filipino “Comfort Women” Claims case, Judgment, 9 October 1998.
In the Filipino “Comfort Women” case, the Court stated:
To summarize, according to the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms in their context, Article 3 of the Hague Convention cannot be understood as a clause that entitles individual victims to bring a claim for compensation directly against a wrongdoing State. Accordingly, it is impossible to recognize that the article is a codification of a rule of customary international law.
Having considered the reconfirmation of the principle of Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) since the Second World War, the Court further stated:
Consequently, throughout its close examination of texts and the drafting process of Article 3 of the Hague Convention, the Court has been unable to recognize the alleged rule of customary international law that provides individual residents in an occupied territory the right to claim compensation directly against the occupying State for damages resulting from a violation of the Hague Regulations committed by members of the occupying forces.
In addition, throughout its careful survey of all records of the case, the Court was unable to find any rule of customary international law apart from Article 3 of the Hague Convention that provides the principle mentioned above. 
Japan, Tokyo District Court, Filipino “Comfort Women” Claims case, Judgment, 9 October 1998.
Japan
In the Zhang Baoheng and Others case in 2002, Japan’s Fukuoka District Court awarded US$ 1.29 million to 15 Chinese men who had been forced to work in Japan during the Second World War and who had filed a lawsuit against the Japanese Government and a mining company for compensation and a public apology. The Court ruled that the company should be held liable, but not the Japanese Government, finding that the company and the government “jointly committed an illegal act” but that the Constitution barred the Court from ordering the government to pay compensation. 
Japan, Fukuoka District Court, Zhang Baoheng and Others case, Judgment, 26 April 2002.
Japan
In the Ko Otsu Hei Incidents case in 1998, Japan’s Yamaguchi Lower Court ordered the Japanese Government to pay 300,000 yen each to three “comfort women” from the Republic of Korea for their enforced prostitution during the Second World War. It considered that the acts in question constituted severe violations of human rights and human dignity on the basis of the sex and race of the plaintiffs. As the Japanese Government had been aware of the violations but had not adopted legislation to compensate the plaintiffs, it was at fault and in violation of the Constitution. The Court rejected the claim for an official apology from the Japanese Government before the Japanese Parliament and the UN General Assembly on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to make such orders. Regarding the claims of Korean women who had worked as slave labourers in Japanese factories during the war, the Court found that, unlike the situation of the “comfort women”, the suffering of the forced labourers was not so great when compared to the hardships suffered by members of the civilian population generally during the war as to have required the Japanese Government to adopt legislation to compensate them. The Court added that the labourers’ claim was within the scope of war reparation, responsibility for which was vested in the executive and the legislature and not the courts. 
Japan, Yamaguchi Lower Court, Ko Otsu Hei Incidents case, Judgment, 27 April 1998.
However, in March 2001, the Hiroshima High Court reversed the 1998 judgment and dismissed the claims for the reasons that the Japanese Constitution did not oblige the State to apologize or to legislate laws concerning the compensation as such. Referring to the State’s obligation to compensate for its omission, which had been admitted at the trial of first instance, the Court stated that a decision on the modalities of post-war compensation was a policy decision within the discretionary power of the legislature. However, it stated: “Considering the serious damage the applicants have suffered, we understand their dissatisfaction caused by the State’s omission of legislation.” 
Japan, Hiroshima High Court, Ko Otsu Hei Incidents case, Judgment, 29 March 2001.
Nepal
In its order in the Forced Disappearances case in 2007, the Supreme Court of Nepal stated:
Article 24(2) of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, 2006 imposes an obligation on each State Party to ensure in its legal system measures for reparation, including prompt, fair, and adequate compensation to victims of enforced disappearance. A similar provision is found in Article 19 of the Declaration to Provide Protection to All Disappeared Persons, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution No. 47/133 in 18 December 1992. The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance, in interpreting the Article, has recommended that when providing monetary compensation to victims of enforced disappearance, [factors such as] physical or mental loss, lost opportunities, loss of property, loss of income, effects on prestige or dignity, and expenditure incurred in hiring experts or legal services should be taken into consideration.
Article 7 of resolution No. 71 (A), passed by the 60th Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, provides that persons who are victims of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law should have equal and effective access to justice for the losses they suffered by receiving prompt, effective and adequate reparation; the Working Group has proposed that victims should have access to any available information. As Nepal is a member of the United Nations, there is no reason for her to remain indifferent towards such commitments.
The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, while interpreting Articles 2 and 9 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Nepal is a party, has articulated that the State should, in addition to providing other remedies, provide compensation in situations of violations of the rights of persons and should adopt interim measures as immediate steps. It has been accepted that an enforced disappearance during a conflict not only affects the disappeared person, but also the families of the disappeared person. Therefore, the Committee argued that the State should provide relief and compensation to the disappeared person and his kin.
Thus, on the basis of the constitutional provisions of Nepal, decisions of foreign courts and regional human rights courts, international instruments concerning human rights to which Nepal is a party, and documents and proposals issued by the United Nations and the international community, it is hereby established that the State has the obligation to provide immediate relief and adequate compensation to the victims of serious violations of civil and human rights. On the grounds deliberated above, it is found that the persons stated in the petitions were disappeared during the time of the conflict and it has been established that the State has a special obligation to such persons. It is now appropriate to provide interim, immediate relief to the victims, in light of the physical and mental torture, as well as economic loss, that the families of the victims have suffered during their search and attempts to obtain justice.
Even as it is not possible to provide specific legal remedies like punishment or compensation in the situation when the true status of a detainee is not known, it is hereby ordered to provide interim relief, even in symbolic form, in light of the situation at the time of deciding this case, with the limited purpose of helping the victims’ families bear the pains suffered by them while seeking justice, on the condition that it will not affect the amount and nature of the remedy to be provided as per the law to be enacted pursuant to section (B) and any subsequent investigations.
The incidents of violations of the right to freedom and security of life are not matters to be merely compensated in monetary and economic terms. However, this court has, in light of the obligation of the State to provide assistance, however small, to victims, the fact that rights would be meaningless in the absence of effective remedies, and the need to respect the rights of victims’ families to seek remedies, orders the provision of immediate relief of an interim nature.
Therefore, this order is hereby issued to the Government of Nepal, as well as the Cabinet Secretariat pursuant to Article 100 and 107 (2) of the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007, to provide immediate relief of two hundred thousand rupees to the nearest claimant of Chakra Bahadur Shahi, whose death has been verified by the investigation of the DIT, constituted by the order of this court, and two hundred thousand rupees to the families of those who are declared dead; one hundred fifty thousand rupees each to Rajendra Prashad Dhakal, Bipin Bhandari and Dil Bahadur Rai, in whose cases the investigation of the DIT constituted by this court verified their arrest by the security forces, but whose status subsequently changed to disappeared; and one hundred thousand rupees each to remaining persons stated in the petitions whose status has not been clarified. 
Nepal, Supreme Court, Forced Disappearances case, Order, 1 June 2007.
Peru
In 2007, in the Chuschi case, the National Criminal Chamber of Peru’s Supreme Court of Justice stated regarding the crime of enforced disappearance:
In this case the state, its institutions, mechanisms and agents should have guaranteed the protection against criminal acts as opposed to … state agents systematically violating its citizens’ rights.
Thus … , compensation shall be paid jointly between those responsible for the crime and third parties found civilly liable, thus requiring the state to compensate the victims or their families. 
Peru, Supreme Court of Justice, National Criminal Chamber, Chuschi case, Case No. 105-04, Judgment of 5 February 2007, p. 145.
Republic of Korea
In its decision in the Legislative Omissions case in 2003, the Republic of Korea’s Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint seeking a declaration that the National Assembly had breached its constitutional obligations by failing, despite repeated requests, to order a fact-finding mission and payment of compensation to the victims of the massacre of civilians at Moongyung-Kun and Hahmpyung-Kun during the Korean War, allegedly by members of the Korean Army. 
Republic of Korea, Constitutional Court, Legislative Omissions case, Decision, 15 May 2003, in Constitutional Court Decisions, Vol. I (1998–2004), p. 921.
The Court ruled that the State had a constitutional obligation to protect the basic rights of its citizens, but went on to state:
However, as long as there are the investigatory system set forth in the Criminal Procedure Act and the state compensation system under the State Compensation Act, an additional state obligation to enact a law for factfinding and compensation concerning the incident at issue in this case is not generated by constitutional interpretation, as argued by the complainants. It would be desirable for the legislators to enact a separate special law for factfinding and compensation under the legislative formative discretion considering the significance and specificity of damage caused by the civilian massacre and various objective circumstances that prohibited the victims in this case from timely requesting factfinding or compensation. However, such obligation to enact is not and cannot be derived through constitutional interpretation.
A constitutional complaint on the ground that legislative omissions of failing to enact a special law for factfinding and compensation with respect to the civilian massacre at issue in this case is unconstitutional is unjusticiable, apart from an affirmative constitutional complaint with respect to the incomplete statutory provision itself on the ground that an effective investigation may not be conducted and the right to seek compensation may not be properly exercised in such a special case as the civilian massacre by the state authority at issue in this case due to an excessively short or incomplete statute of limitations under the Criminal Procedure Act or request period under the State Compensation Act. 
Republic of Korea, Constitutional Court, Legislative Omissions case, Decision, 15 May 2003, in Constitutional Court Decisions, Vol. I (1998–2004), pp. 921–923.
One of the nine justices gave a dissenting opinion and argued:
In a situation of nonexistence of law where a special infringement upon the basic right caused by the state organization in the period of peril such as a war cannot be appropriately redressed by way of the normal system of law, an obligation arises for the National Assembly to enact a special law to guarantee the basic rights of the citizens. Such constitutional interpretation conforms to the spirit of the Constitution for the guarantee of the basic right.
In this case, the fact that many unarmed and innocent civilians were killed by those presumed to be members of the Korean Army in Moongyung and Hahmpyung during the period of the Korean War is acknowledged and confirmed. Although it was clearly an infringement by the state organization of the basic rights of private individuals, the state has attempted to cover up the case instead of trying to find the fact of the case or compensate for the harm caused. The victims even have acknowledgedly been deprived for a long period of time of an opportunity to raise their argument before the state. In such a circumstance, it is difficult to expect the victims to timely file a lawsuit against the state for restitution or compensation.
Especially in this case, the state under the obligation to protect its citizens is suspected to have killed, in an organized fashion, innocent civilians by way of military power during the war. If proven to be true, such conduct would be a genocide-like act and, as such, would duly be treated similarly to a genocide or treated as a crime against humanity.
Then, a normal system of law such as the statute of limitations under the State Compensation Act is not applicable in this case. In such a situation of nonexistence of law, a special obligation to enact law to redress (especially an obligation to effectively guarantee the right to request state compensation) arises for the National Assembly through constitutional interpretation based on the obligation to guarantee basic rights under the second provision of Article 10 of the Constitution. 
Republic of Korea, Constitutional Court, Legislative Omissions case, Decision, 15 May 2003, in Constitutional Court Decisions, Vol. I (1998–2004), pp. 923–924.
Russian Federation
In the Khamzaev case in 2001, a Russian District Court rejected the claim of a private person against the Russian Government for material and moral compensation for the damages sustained in the aerial bombardment of Urus-Martan in October 1999 by Russian aviation. During the trial, the government denied that bombings had taken place in the relevant part of the town. However, the representative of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation declared:
We think that the damage was caused by the Federal armed forces. The house was destroyed. But, if the generals assert that they had not given the order to attack residential areas of Urus-Martan, then the pilot(s) exceeded the limits of the order. Hence, there are no grounds for compensation for damages from the State treasury. 
Russian Federation, Basmanny District Court, Khamzaev case, Judgment, 11 May 2001.
Considering that those who are seeking compensation have declared that their property was pillaged or that their property was destroyed during the hostilities and that members of their families were victims of the hostilities, and, therefore, they must be compensated for all of this by Alexis Dusingize along with the Rwandan State as he was an authority responsible for assisting the mayor of the Commune of Kanzenze.
[The Court c]onfirms that Alexis Dusingize, along with the public authorities, must pay the compensation that has been claimed;
[The Court o]rders that he must pay damages valued at 15,000 RWF [Rwandan Franc] and, failing which, expropriation should forcibly take place through the action of the State[.] 
Rwanda, Court of First Instance of Nyamata, Dusingize case, Judgment, 12 March 1997, p. 2.
The Court of Appeal of Ruhengeri:
Having regard to Articles 93 [on court hearings being public, with the exception of those held in closed session when public disclosure poses a threat to public order or decency] and 94 [on all judgments being reasoned and pronounced in open court] of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 10/06/1991;
Having regard to the protocol to the Arusha Peace Agreement on power-sharing of 30/10/1992, particularly Articl[e] 26 [on the recognition of specific ordinary and military jurisdictions of the judiciary while specifying the law may establish any other specialized courts]… ;
Having regard to Articles 109 [stating that the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear appeals against judgment handed down by the Court of First Instance], 135 [on the definition and objective of a civil action] and 136 [on when a civil action may be pursued at the same times as or separately from any criminal proceedings] of Decree No. 09/80 of 7 July 1980 determining the Organization and Jurisdiction of Courts;
Having regard to Articles 90 [on the format that any judgment must take and the information it should contain] and 99 [on the right to lodge an appeal and who has the right to do so] of the Law of 23/02/1963 determining the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended and supplemented by Decree No. 07/82 of 07/01/1982;
Having regard to Articles 21 and 22 of Book I of the Rwandan Penal Code, and Article 312 of Book II of the Rwandan Penal Code;
Having regard to Articles 2(b) [which states that persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, prefectoral, communal, sector or cell level, or in a political party, the army, religious organizations or in a militia and who perpetrated or fostered such crimes fall within Category One of offenders for the purpose of the Organic Law], 3 [on the definition of an accomplice and criminal responsibility of superiors for acts referred to in this organic law committed by a subordinate if the superior knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish or prevent such acts], and 14(a) [which states that persons whose acts place them in Category One are liable to the death penalty] and 24 [on when decisions of the Specialized Chambers may be subject to opposition and appeal] of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30/08/1996 on the organization of prosecutions for offences constituting the crime of genocide [or crimes against humanity committed since 1 October 1990];
Having regard to International Conventions of 09/12/1948 on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and of 26/11/1968 on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity;
Having regard to Decree No. 08/75 of 12/02/1975 on Rwanda ratifying these Conventions;
Ruling on the documents submitted by the parties:
Switzerland
In its judgment in the Spring case in 2000 dealing with the claim of a Jewish Auschwitz survivor against the Swiss Confederation for 100,000 Swiss francs in compensation for having been handed over in November 1943 by Swiss border guards to German troops, Switzerland’s Federal Court referred to a possible right to compensation on the ground of Switzerland’s Law on (State) Responsibility as amended. It stated, however, that, as a condition for the applicability of this law, the right to compensation would not have to be barred by statutes of limitation or by laches. The Federal Court, stating that the claimant based his right to compensation, inter alia, on the alleged illegal handing over to the German authorities which he had qualified as complicity in genocide, referred to Article 75(1) bis of the Swiss Penal Code and Article 56 bis of the Swiss Military Criminal Code. It stated that even under these provisions, which excluded the applicability of statutes of limitation to, inter alia, genocide and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or other international agreements on the protection of victims of war if the offence was particularly serious given the circumstances, the alleged criminal acts were barred. The Federal Court also referred to the principle according to which statutes of limitation under penal law could also be applicable to the right under civil law. It further stated that the claim was also barred by statutes of limitation under (the applicable national) public law. Therefore, in the merits, the Federal Court dismissed the claim. Nevertheless, it awarded the claimant 100,000 Swiss francs in compensation for the procedural costs. 
Switzerland, Federal Court, Spring case, Judgment, 21 January 2000.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2004, in the Bici case, the England and Wales High Court of Justice stated:
Introduction.
1. At about midnight on July 2nd 1999, three British soldiers involved in a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Kosovo shot and killed two men, Fahri Bici and Avni Dundi, and injured another two. The men, all Kosovar Albanians, were travelling together in a car in the city of Pristina. The shooting took place near a building known as Building 42. The first claimant in this action, Mohamet Bici, was injured by a bullet which struck him in the face. It entered his mouth and exited the lower left side of his jaw. Apart from the not inconsiderable pain, it has also caused longer term problems with eating and speaking. The second claimant, his cousin Skender Bici, did not suffer any direct physical injury but alleges that he has suffered psychiatric illness as a consequence of being in the car, both as a result of being put in personal fear, and from witnessing the incident. Both claimants sue for damages both in negligence and trespass. The soldiers say that they were acting in self-defence being in fear of their own lives.
The rules of engagement.
6. Each of the British soldiers stationed in Kosovo was issued with a document setting out individual guidance on the use of force. It permits the minimum force necessary to be used in self-defence. It provides that if the situation permits a challenge should be issued, such as “NATO! STOP OR I WILL FIRE”, and that if there is a failure to stop a warning shot may be fired. Paragraph 11 provides, so far as is material:
“You may use necessary minimum force, including opening fire, against any individual whom you believe is about to commit or is committing an act which endangers life, and there is no other way to prevent such an act. For example, you may open fire against an individual who:
a. Fires or aims a weapon at you or any person in your presence.
Paragraph 13 states that “if you have to open fire, you must fire only aimed shots, and fire no more rounds than are necessary, and stop firing as soon as the situation permits.”
The background to the incident.
14. The background to the events in question is uncontroversial. On 2nd July 1999, crowds gathered in the centre of Pristina to celebrate the city’s liberation …
The incident.
24. The claimants were two of a group of men who were travelling in a white Opel estate. They say they were simply participating in the celebrations … The car was driven by Nasser Bici. In the front passenger seat was Driton Bici; Avni Dudi, was a rear seat passenger as initially at least was second claimant Skender Bici. There were two persons who were on the roof of the car; one was Mohamet Bici who was at the front and behind him was Fahri Bici. As virtually all the evidence indicates, Fahri Bici had an AK47, (a Kalashnikov) which is an automatic rifle …
26. At some time … Fahri Bici fired his AK47 into the air …
27. The bare bones of the matter can be described as follows. As the car was being driven away from building 42, three soldiers emerged from the undergrowth outside building 42 and fired shots towards the vehicle. The effect was devastating. Fahri Bici was killed by a single bullet. It entered his back 8 centimetres to the right of the mid line and exited from his chest. Avni Dundi, was also killed. Isak Berisha, who had so recently joined the car, and Mohamet Bici, the first claimant, were wounded. The uncontroverted evidence was that the car began to accelerate away from the soldiers as the firing was taking place, before it came to a halt at a distance of some metres from its position when the first gun was fired.
Were the soldiers acting in self-defence?
42. One of the defences advanced by the soldiers in this case is that they were acting in self-defence. As far as the criminal law is concerned, it is a defence if they had an honest belief that they were going to be attacked and reacted with proportionate force: see R v Palmer (1971) 55 Cr App R 223 (P.C.). In civil law, however, the belief must be both honest and reasonable. The defence is available both to meet a claim in negligence and in trespass (whether assault or battery), but the manner in which it does so is slightly different in each case. In negligence, the claim asserts that the defendant owed a duty of care and breached that duty by unreasonable conduct causing foreseeable loss to the claimant. Accordingly, if the defendant’s conduct is reasonable, there is no breach. In trespass, any unlawful interference with the bodily integrity of the claimant will not be unlawful if it is justified, and it will be justified if the defendant can establish that the claimant’s conduct was such that the defendant reasonably apprehended that he would be imminently attacked and used reasonable force to protect himself. In this case the claimants properly concede that if the soldiers did reasonably believe that Fahri Bici was about to shoot at them, then they were entitled to shoot first; such a response would be reasonable and proportionate.
44. In determining this question of whether the soldiers had a reasonable apprehension that they might be shot, I bear in mind two matters. First, as Mr Rose [appearing as counsel for the claimants] accepts, in circumstances where the failure to establish self-defence suggests that the soldiers may well have committed serious criminal offences, the evidence of wrongdoing must be strong. The well-known observations of Lord Nicholls in re H (Minors) [1996] A.C. 563 at 586 are pertinent:
“When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability. Fraud is less likely than negligence. Deliberate physical injury is less likely than accidental physical injury … Built into the preponderance of the probability standard is a generous degree of flexibility in respect of the seriousness of the allegation.”
45. That principle is applicable here, albeit that it has to be applied where the burden is on the defence. It is not readily to be assumed that these soldiers would without reasonable cause have fired their guns at Fahri Bici.
46. Second, I also bear in mind certain observations of Lord Diplock in Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s’ Reference no 1 of 1975 [1997] A.C.105 at 138, when he observed that often a soldier has to act intuitively, and that in assessing his conduct and judging the action of the reasonable soldier, it is important to recognise that his action “is not undertaken in the calm analytical atmosphere of the court room after counsel with the benefit of hindsight have expounded at length the reasons for and against the kind and degree of force that was used by the accused, but in the brief second or two which the accused had to decide whether to shoot or not and under all the stresses to which he was exposed.”. These observations were made in the context of a criminal case, but in my view they apply no less forcefully when considering liability in civil law.
47. Even bearing these matters very fully in mind, I have reached the clear conclusion on the evidence before me that the soldiers were not being threatened with being shot by Fahri Bici when they fired their guns, and there were no reasonable grounds for them to believe that they were …
48. It is not necessary for me to assess whether in the heat of the moment the soldiers could conceivably for some reason have been acting under the honest but mistaken impression that Fahri Bici was threatening to shoot them. It is enough for the purposes of civil liability that I reach the clear conclusion that any such belief was not reasonable. Indeed, the alternative view is unsupported by any reliable evidence.
Were the soldiers reckless?
49. Mr Rose asked the court to go further. He submitted that not only were the soldiers not acting in self-defence, but that the evidence supported the inference that they were deliberately firing to disable the car, and were thereby acting in a wholly reckless manner. They must have been aware that there were persons in the car, and they were acting with no thought for their safety. He suggests that they may have been irritated by the fact that Fahri Bici refused, as they saw it, to hand over his weapon, and that they lost control in the face of this provocative act …
58. Bearing in mind the gravity of these allegations, and the matters I have referred to above, I have concluded, not without hesitation, that the claimants have not shown that the soldiers were reckless in the manner alleged. I have regard to the fact that it would be surprising if they lost their discipline in such a fundamental way, and there is no obvious reason why they should have done so.
The legal issues.
59. The claimants allege both negligence and trespass. The arguments based on trespass are raised in unusual circumstances since the claimants accept that the soldiers did not intend to interfere with their personal security. In response to these claims, the defendants raise two broad defences, in addition to the issue of self-defence, which I have already analysed. The first is what is termed “combat immunity”. The defendants submit not only that this defence is applicable, but also that it is a complete answer to any tortuous claim which is advanced, however formulated. The second defence relates solely to the claim in negligence. It is that in the circumstances the soldiers did not owe the claimants a duty of care at all, and accordingly cannot be liable in negligence …
The defences.
83. As I have indicated, apart from self-defence these are combat immunity and the lack of any duty of care.
Combat immunity.
84. The defence of combat immunity is not strictly a defence at all, in the sense of rendering lawful what is alleged to be unlawful. Rather, where the doctrine applies its effect is to remove the jurisdiction of the court to decide certain kinds of dispute; they are non-justiciable. Where the doctrine applies the court is being deprived of its historic and jealously guarded role of determining a dispute where a citizen claims that his rights have been unlawfully infringed by an act of the executive.
85. Before considering the scope of this doctrine, it helpful to bear in mind certain fundamental principles of constitutional law. The starting point is the famous case of Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 ST.TR.1030. The King’s messengers were sued in trespass for breaking into the plaintiff’s house and seizing his papers. They pleaded that they were acting under a warrant of the Secretary of State, but the defence failed. Lord Camden C. J. observed:
“ …with respect to the argument of State necessity, or a distinction that has been aimed at between state offences and others, the common law does not understand that kind of reasoning, nor do our books take notice of any such distinctions.”
86. This is a ringing endorsement of the rule of law and of the system of democratic government. The executive cannot simply assert interests of state or the public interest and rely upon that as a justification for the commission of wrongs.
87. However, whilst that is the general position, there are certain circumstances where the courts will decline to determine the claims brought before them.
88. One such situation may arise where the interests of foreign nationals are concerned. In a claim for compensation against the state, the state can in an appropriate case rely on the doctrine of Act of State. The concept is a highly ambiguous one and the term is used in a number of quite discrete ways. However, in the context where claims are brought by foreign nationals alleging infringement of their legal rights, the effect of a successful claim of Act of State is to remove the jurisdiction of the court to hear the dispute. The way in which the government exercises its prerogatives in relation to foreign affairs and in its relations with foreign states does not give rise to rights which are cognisable by the domestic courts. As Lord Wilberforce commented in Nissan v The Attorney General [1970] AC 179 at 231(f):
“As regard such acts it is certainly the law that the injured person if an alien cannot sue in an British Court and can only have resort to diplomatic protest. How far this rule goes and how far it prevents resort to the courts by British subjects is not a matter on which clear authority exists.”
89. In this case the defendants have expressly disavowed any reliance upon this doctrine. It has not been contended that the acts of the soldiers were either authorised or ratified by the Crown.
90. The concept of combat immunity, which is relied upon, serves a quite different purpose. Unlike Act of State, it can be relied upon even against citizens of the United Kingdom and even where torts are committed in the United Kingdom. It is closely and imprecisely related to (and in some cases perhaps identical with) a separate concept of necessity. This is exceptionally a defence to the Government and indeed individuals, who take action in the course of actual or imminent armed conflict and cause damage to property or injury (including possibly death) to fellow soldiers or civilians. Unlike Act of State, the doctrine has nothing to do with a concern about undermining the acts of the executive in relation to foreign affairs. It is essentially an exception to the Entick v Carrington principle and as such should be narrowly construed. The courts recognise that very exceptionally the basic liberties of the citizen may have to give way to vital interests of state. When arms clash or attack is imminent, the citizen may be an unfortunate victim of the conflict, whether as a result of enemy action or sometimes friendly fire or precautionary actions. In relying upon the doctrine in this case, the defendants have to demonstrate that the defence would be available in similar circumstances if the events had taken place on British soil in relation to a British citizen. Save where Act of State is applicable, no special principles apply because the injured claimant is a citizen of a foreign state.
91. There are a few cases which testify to this principle of combat immunity. It seems that the concept was first described in those terms in Shaw Savill and Albion Company Ltd v The Commonwealth [1940] HCA40; (1940) 66 CLR 344, a decision of the High Court of Australia. The plaintiffs brought a claim in damages for negligence. They owned a ship “The Coptic” which was in a collision with His Majesties Australian Ship “Adelaide”. The plaintiff alleged that the collision resulted from the negligence of the defendant’s officers … The defence was that, at the relevant time; the Adelaide was part of the naval forces of Australia and was engaged in active naval operations against the enemy.
92. The High Court of Australia accepted that in principle such a defence was open to the state. Dixon J, in the course of his judgment, said this:
“It could hardly be maintained that during an actual engagement with the enemy or a pursuit of any of his ships the navigating officer of a King’s ship of war was under a common-law duty of care to avoid harm to such non-combatant ships as might appear in the theatre of operations. It cannot be enough to say that the conflict or pursuit is a circumstance affecting the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct as a discharge of the duty of care, though the duty itself persists. To adopt such a view would mean that whether the combat be by sea, land or air our men go into action accompanied by the law of civil negligence, warning them to be mindful of the person and property of civilians. It would mean that the Courts could be called upon to day whether the soldier on the field of battle or the sailor fighting on his ship might reasonably have been more careful to avoid causing civil loss or damage. No one can imagine a court undertaking the trial of such an issue, either during or after a war. To concede that any civil liability can rest upon a member of the armed forces for supposedly negligent acts or omissions in the course of an actual engagement with the enemy is opposed alike to reason and to policy. But the principle cannot be limited to the presence of the enemy or to occasions when contact with the enemy has been established. Warfare perhaps never did admit of such a distinction, but now it would be quite absurd. The development of the speed of ships and the range of guns were enough to show it to be an impracticable refinement, but it has been put out of question by the bomber, the submarine and the floating mine. The principle must extend to all active operations against the enemy. It must cover attack and resistance, advance and retreat, pursuit and avoidance, reconnaissance and engagement. But the real distinction does exist between active operations against the enemy and other activities of the combatant services in time of war.”
93. But he made it plain that the basis of the immunity is wider than simply relieving soldiers from any duty of care that might otherwise exist. The judge said this:
“There is no authority dealing with civil liability for negligence on the part of the King’s forces when in action, but the law has always recognised the rights of property and of person must give way to the necessities of the defence of the realm …
The uniform tendency of the law has been to concede to the armed forces complete legal freedom of action in the field, that is to say in the course of active operations against the enemy, so that the application of private law by the ordinary courts may end where the active use of arms begins. Consistently with this tendency the civil law of negligence cannot attach to active naval operations against the enemy.”
94. A similar principle but relating to damage to property and not in terms described as combat immunity was adopted by the House of Lords in Burma Oil Company Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75. In that case the General Officer Commanding in Burma during the war of 1939 to 1945 ordered certain oil installations of the appellant companies near Rangoon to be destroyed. The reason was that the Japanese Army was advancing and the Government wished to deny resources to the enemy. The destruction was carried out on the day before the Japanese occupied Rangoon. The question was, whether compensation was payable for this destruction. Their Lordships, by majority of three to two (Lords Reid, Pearce and Upjohn, Viscount Radcliffe and Lord Hodson dissenting), held that the Government were exercising a prerogative power which required them to pay compensation. However, their Lordships distinguished this situation from one where property was damaged or destroyed during the course of battle. Lord Reid after quoting many cases and the views of learned jurists, concluded as follows (p. 110):
“In my judgment, those authorities and others quoted in their opinions afford ample justification for the decision of the First Division with regard to the general rule, and no contrary Scots authority has been cited. This case therefore turns, in my view, on the extent of the exception of what has been called battle damage.
Such damage must include both accidental and deliberate damage done in the course of fighting operations. It cannot matter whether the damage was unintentional or done by our artillery or aircraft to dislodge the enemy or by the enemy to dislodge our troops. And the same must apply to destruction of a building or a bridge before the enemy actually capture it. Moreover, it would be absurd if the right to compensation for such a building or bridge depended on how near the enemy were when it was destroyed. But I would think that Vattel is right in contrasting acts done deliberately (librement et par precaution) with damage caused by inevitable necessity (par une necessite inevitable). His examples show that he means something dictated by the disposition of the opposing forces. It may become necessary during the war to have new airfields or training grounds and the necessity may be inevitable, but that kind of thing would not come within the exception as stated by any of the commentators, inevitably necessary because there is really no choice: for example, there may be only one factory in the country or one site available for a particular purpose.”
100. In my judgment, these authorities suggest that the exclusion of liability for the intentional infliction of damage to property or person will, as one might expect, be narrower than the exclusion of liability for negligence. As Burma Oil makes plain, there can be no deliberate interference with property rights without payment of damages or compensation save where it is the result of inevitable necessity or what Lord Reid termed “something dictated by the disposition of the opposing forces.” That of course was in the context of interfering with property rights but the right to interfere with personal integrity can hardly be any less rigorous. Indeed, one might expect that the courts would require a high degree of necessity even in war time for the Government to be able to claim combat immunity in relation to the deliberate infliction of harm on one of its citizens.
101. I confess that I have considerable difficulty in seeing how the doctrine has any application at all in this case. It is relied upon when a person is injured or their property is damaged or destroyed in circumstances where they are the “innocent” victims of action which is taken out of pressing necessity in the wider public interest arising out of combat. It is not the conduct of the victim which justifies immunity from suit but rather a very pressing public interest. It is curious to pray the concept in aid where the claimants themselves have been acting unlawfully. The justification for the defendant in those circumstances, if there be any justification, is that steps are required to restrain or prevent the wrongful conduct. That is precisely the situation here. The justification advanced for firing at Fahri Bici was the soldiers’ self-protection, namely that they were about to be shot by him, or at least that this was their reasonable belief. It has never been suggested by the soldiers or anyone else that they fired at him because of wider concerns which necessitated such draconian measures in the public interest, nor even that any such interest arose out in the course of combat, however widely that concept is construed. For example, it has not been suggested that there was a real fear that the men in the car were part of a wider group intent on attacking building 42 or anything of that nature. Whatever initial concerns there may have been on that score, they no longer figured in the minds of the soldiers when the car was being driven away at increasing speed from that building. If self-defence fails, as I have held that it does, then I do not see how combat immunity is engaged.
102. Moreover, we are in my judgment very far from the kind of situation where the courts would permit the executive by reason of state necessity to act free from any legal fetters for negligent or intentional acts. Even focussing on the soldier’s activities on the night in question, it is plain that they were carrying out essentially a policing and peacekeeping function. I accept that this labelling of their role does not of itself determine matters since even when carrying out those activities they could still be engaged in an attack or threat of attack, as Mr Justice Owen recognised in Bell. But any such threat must in my view be imminent and serious. Indeed, even where they are under some sort of attack, such as where there is a civilian riot that, would not mean that the doctrine of combat immunity would necessarily apply. There are numerous cases of riot where the authorities have been held liable in tort, the Livingstone case itself being but one example. In my view it requires a significant degree of necessity before the doctrine can trump the fundamental protection afforded by Entick v Carrington, and I do not consider that the situation comes near to being such a case. It was at most an incident of disorder in the streets. The soldiers did not claim that they were in a combat situation, and in my judgment they plainly were not.
Was there a duty of care?
103. I turn to consider whether the circumstances were such as to negate the duty of care …
104. … Troops frequently have to carry out difficult and sensitive peace keeping functions, such as in Northern Ireland, whilst still being subject to common law duties of care. The difficulties of their task are reflected in the standard of the duty rather than by denying its applicability. In Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s Reference no 1 [1977] A.C.105, 137 a British soldier had shot and killed an unarmed man who had run away when challenged, in the honest and reasonable, although mistaken, belief that he was a terrorist. The soldier was searching for terrorists at the time. The judge held that he had no intention to kill or seriously injure and that the killing was justifiable homicide. The reference from the Attorney General raised two questions, first whether the Crown had established in the circumstances that the act of the constituted unreasonable force; and second, if so, whether this constituted the crime of murder. The House of Lords held that these were matters of fact rather than law. In the course of giving his judgment, Lord Diplock said this (p.137):
“There is little authority in English law concerning the rights and duties of a member of the armed forces of the Crown when acting in aid of the civil power, and what little authority there is relates almost entirely to the duties of soldiers when troops are called upon to assist in controlling a riotous assembly. Where used for such temporary purposes, it may not be inaccurate to describe the legal rights and duties of a soldier as being no more than those of an ordinary citizen in uniform.”
The basic position therefore is that soldiers owe the same duties as ordinary citizens, and the latter clearly owe a duty of care in the circumstances.
105. I am confirmed in my view that the duty of care is in principle applicable to peace keeping and policing functions of this kind by the fact that soldiers peace keeping in Northern Ireland have from time to time faced negligence claims arising from incidents when they have been required to take aggressive action to preserve the peace in the face of a disorderly and hostile crowd. Again Livingstone is but one example, although the action in negligence failed in that case. A fortiori in my view these soldiers were subject to a duty when, as I have found, there was no relevant aggressive action directed against the authorities at all.
106. It follows that in my view the defences on which the defendant seeks to rely are not available to them.
Contributory Fault.
107. Finally I turn to consider the issue of contributory fault. Mr Miller contends that the claimants are contributorily negligent. He submits that by agreeing to travel in a vehicle with someone who, to their knowledge, was firing a gun in a potentially provocative manner, they were acting recklessly and contributing to their own injury. Moreover, he submits, and I accept, that they must have known that there was an embargo on the use of guns.
108. It is well established that in assessing whether or not to apportion liability under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 it is necessary to have regard both to causation and to blameworthiness.
109. In my judgment it cannot sensibly be said that the claimants by their conduct shared in the responsibility for their injuries. Any imprudence on their part was dwarfed by the acts of the soldiers. The latter deliberately and without justification caused these injuries, and in my view it would not be just or equitable to reduce the damages on grounds of contributory fault.
Conclusion.
112. In my judgment the claimants succeed in establishing that the defendant is liable to them in negligence and also, in the case of Mohamet Bici, in trespass to the person. The amount of damages will have to be assessed at a separate hearing.
113. It would, however, be wrong to leave this judgment without putting this incident in context. The British Army can justifiably be proud of the operation it carried out in Kosovo. It helped to bring peace to a scarred and deeply divided community, and will have saved countless lives. It displayed professionalism and discipline of the highest quality. The soldiers on the ground had to carry out difficult and highly responsible tasks which required a combination of courage and sensitivity. In general, they discharged their duties with considerable credit. But soldiers are human; from time to time mistakes are inevitable, and even the most rigorous discipline will crack. In this case the fall from the Army’s usual high standards led to tragic consequences for the victims and their families. The Queen’s uniform is not a licence to commit wrongdoing, and it has never been suggested that it should be. The Army should be held accountable for such shortcomings, even where the victims are from the very community which has benefited so much from the Army’s assistance. A proper system of justice requires no less. 
United Kingdom, England and Wales High Court of Justice (Queen’s Bench Division), Bici case, Judgment, 7 April 2004, §§ 1, 6, 14, 24, 26–27, 42, 44–49, 58–59, 83–94, 100–109 and 112–113.
United States of America
In the Goldstar case in 1992, a US Court of Appeals rejected a claim brought against the US Government by Panamanian nationals whose business establishments had been looted during the US intervention in Panama. The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that Article 3 of 1907 Hague Convention (IV) provided them with a remedy which could be enforced before the US courts and that the United States had waived its sovereign immunity under this self-executing provision. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the Hague Convention was not self-executing and stating:
International treaties are not presumed to be self-executing … Courts will only find a treaty to be self-executing if the document, as a whole, evidences an intent to provide a private right of action … The Hague Convention does not explicitly provide for a privately enforceable cause of action. Moreover, we find that a reasonable reading as a whole does not lead to the conclusion that the signatories intended to provide such a right. 
United States, Court of Appeals (Fourth Circuit), Goldstar case, Judgment, 16 June 1992.
United States of America
In the Princz case in 1992 in which the plaintiff had brought an action for damages against Germany based on his internment by the Nazi regime during the Second World War, a US District Court affirmed its subject matter jurisdiction and rejected the claim of sovereign immunity by Germany. It held that Germany was stopped from relying on State immunity and that:
Under the circumstances of this case, a nation that does not respect the civil and human rights of an American citizen is barred from invoking United States law [i.e. immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976] to block the citizen in his effort to vindicate his rights. In such a case, Plaintiff has a right to have his claim heard by a U.S. court. 
United States, District Court for the District of Columbia, Princz case, Judgment, 23 December 1992.
However, in 1994, the decision of the District Court was overruled by the Court of Appeals which held: “None of the exceptions to sovereign immunity provided in the [Foreign States Immunity Act of 1976] applies to the facts alleged by [the plaintiff].” It therefore dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction. 
United States, Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Princz case, Judgment, 1 July 1994. This conclusion was based on the retrospective application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The Court also concluded that if the Act were considered not to apply retrospectively it would lack jurisdiction in any event because the type of claim in question was not within the post-Act jurisdiction of District Courts.
In his dissenting opinion, one of the judges stated that he believed that “Germany’s treatment of [the plaintiff] violated jus cogens norms of the law of nations, and that by engaging in such conduct, Germany implicitly waived its immunity from suit”. 
United States, Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Princz case, Dissenting opinion of Judge Wald, 1 July 1994.
United States of America
In the Mochizuki case in 1998, a class action brought by Latin American nationals of Japanese ancestry who had been arrested in various Latin American countries during the Second World War and who had been brought to the United States and interned, and who were not entitled to benefit from the terms of the 1988 Law on Restitution for WWII Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts (as amended) because they were not US nationals, the US Court of Federal Claims preliminarily approved the settlement agreement entered into by the parties shortly before, which grants each member of the group of plaintiffs US$ 5,000 in compensation to be paid by the United States. 
United States, Court of Federal Claims, Mochizuki case, Settlement Agreement, 10 June 1998; Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement, 11 June 1998, § 3.
In its final order of 1999, the same Court stated: “The Settlement Agreement executed by the parties on June 10, 1998, is adjudged to be fair, reasonable, and adequate, and its terms are hereby approved.” 
United States, Court of Federal Claims, Mochizuki case, Opinion and Order, 25 January 1999, § 2.
United States of America
In July 1999, Barclays Bank, having been sued before a US District Court along with various other banks with branches, operations or predecessors in France during the Second World War by families of Jewish customers in France who had lost their assets during the German occupation, agreed to the so-called Barclays French Bank Settlement which provided for the establishment of a US$ 3,612,500 fund to compensate the victims. 
United States, District Court of the Eastern District of New York, Barclays French Bank Settlement case, Settlement Agreement, 8 July 1999.
The US District Court approved the Settlement Agreement. 
United States, District Court of the Eastern District of New York, Barclays French Bank Settlement case, Preliminary Order, 10 April 2000, and Supplemental Order, 4 June 2001; Notice of pendency of class action, proposed settlement of class action and settlement hearing, 4 June 2001.
United States of America
In 2000, J.P. Morgan agreed to settle compensation claims by the so-called J.P. Morgan Settlement Agreement which provided for the establishment of a settlement fund of US$ 2,750,000 to compensate Jewish victims of the Holocaust who had seen their bank accounts seized during the Second World War in France. 
United States, District Court of the Eastern District of New York, J. P. Morgan French Bank Settlement case, Settlement Agreement, 29 September 2000.
The Settlement Agreement was approved by the US District Court. 
United States, District Court of the Eastern District of New York, J. P. Morgan French Bank Settlement case, Preliminary Order, 10 April 2000 and Supplemental Order, 4 June 2001; Notice of pendency of class action, proposed settlement of class action and settlement hearing, 4 June 2001.
United States of America
In the Holocaust Victims Assets case in 2000, a US District Court approved a class-action Settlement Agreement between Holocaust victims and Swiss banks agreed in August 1998, finding it fair, reasonable and adequate. The Agreement set up a US $1.25 billion fund to be created in four annual instalments over three years. In addition, it released, with few exceptions, “the Swiss Confederation, the Swiss National Bank, all other Swiss banks, and other members of Swiss industry”. 
United States, District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Holocaust Victims Assets case, Memorandum and Order, 26 July 2000.
In its final order and judgment of 2000, the District Court approved the Settlement Agreement. 
United States, District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Holocaust Victims Assets case, Final Order and Judgment approving the Settlement Agreement, 9 August 2000.
United States of America
In the Comfort Women case in 2001 dealing with the claim of 15 Asian women seeking compensation from Japan for having been used, during the Second World War, by Japanese military as so-called “comfort women”, a US District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, additionally, nonjusticiability on the ground of the political question doctrine. It stated, however, that “for [these] reasons, this court is unable to provide plaintiffs the redress they seek and surely deserve”.  
United States, District Court for the District of Columbia, Comfort Women case, Memorandum Opinion and Judgment, 4 October 2001.
United States of America
In May 2004, the US Secretary of Defense appeared before The House Armed Services Committee, following the public revelations of detainee abuse by US service personnel at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. In his testimony, the Secretary of Defense stated that “I am seeking a way to provide appropriate compensation to those detainees who suffered such grievous and brutal abuse and cruelty at the hands of a few members of the U.S. military.” 
United States, Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, Transcript of Testimony given before The House Armed Services Committee, 7 May 2004.
United States of America
In the Hwang Geum Joo (Comfort Women) case in 2005, 15 women from China, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines sued Japan under the Alien Tort Statute “seeking money damages for [allegedly] having been subjected to sexual slavery and torture before and during World War II”, in violation of “both positive and customary international law”. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court (which had found that, as the alleged activities did not fall within the commercial activity exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Japan had sovereign immunity), on the ground that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question, namely, whether the governments of the appellants’ countries foreclosed the appellants’ claims in the peace treaties they had signed with Japan:
Even if we assume, however, as the appellants contend, that the 1951 Treaty [1951 Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Allied Powers, 3 U.S.T. 3169] does not of its own force deprive the courts of the United States of jurisdiction over their claims, it is pellucidly clear the Allied Powers intended that all war-related claims against Japan be resolved through government-to-government negotiations rather than through private tort suits. Indeed, Article 26 of the Treaty obligated Japan to enter “bilateral” peace treaties with non-Allied states “on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present treaty,” which indicates the Allied Powers expected Japan to resolve other states’ claims, like their own, through government-to-government agreement.
The governments of the appellants’ countries apparently had the authority – at least the appellants do not contest the point to bargain away their private claims in negotiating a peace with Japan and, as we noted previously, it appears “in fact [they] did.” 332 F.3d at 685.
The question whether the war-related claims of foreign nationals were extinguished when the governments of their countries entered into peace treaties with Japan is one that concerns the United States only with respect to her foreign relations, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches, with “the President [having] the ‘lead role.’” Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 423 n.12. And with respect to that question, the history of management by the political branches, Baker, 369 U.S. at 211, is clear and consistent: Since the conclusion of World War II, it has been the foreign policy of the United States “to effect as complete and lasting a peace with Japan as possible by closing the door on the litigation of war-related claims, and instead effecting the resolution of those claims through political means.”
Here, however, the United States is not a party to the treaties the meaning of which is in dispute, and the Executive does not urge us to adopt a particular interpretation of those treaties. Rather, the Executive has persuasively demonstrated that adjudication by a domestic court not only “would undo” a settled foreign policy of state-to-state negotiation with Japan, but also could disrupt Japan’s “delicate” relations with China and Korea, thereby creating “serious implications for stability in the region.”
Is it the province of a court in the United States to decide whether Korea’s or Japan’s reading of the treaty between them is correct, when the Executive has determined that choosing between the interests of two foreign states in order to adjudicate a private claim against one of them would adversely affect the foreign relations of the United States? Decidedly not. The Executive’s judgment that adjudication by a domestic court would be inimical to the foreign policy interests of the United States is compelling and renders this case nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine. 
United States, Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Hwang Geum Joo (Comfort Women) case, Judgment, 28 June 2005.
United States of America
In 2007, in the In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation cases, in which nine plaintiff detainees sought monetary damages and declaratory relief against the defendants, who they claimed were liable for torture and abuse inflicted on them while detained by the United States military during hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court stated:
The Court cautions against the myopic approach advocated by the plaintiffs and amici, which essentially frames the issue as whether torture is universally prohibited and thereby warrants a judicially-created remedy under the circumstances. There is no getting around the fact that authorizing monetary damages remedies against military officials engaged in an active war would invite enemies to use our own federal courts to obstruct the Armed Forces’ ability to act decisively and without hesitation in defense of our liberty and national interests, a prospect the Supreme Court found intolerable in Eisentrager:
Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. They would diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States.
Although the Supreme Court’s concern was voiced in the context of granting writs of habeas corpus to enemy aliens, the same reasoning is equally applicable here. The discovery process alone risks aiding our enemies by affording them a mechanism to obtain what information they could about military affairs and disrupt command missions by wresting officials from the battlefield to answer compelled deposition and other discovery inquiries about the military’s interrogation and detention policies, practices, and procedures. Military discipline and morale surely would be eroded by the spectacle of high-ranking military officials being ha[u]led into our own courts to defend against our enemies’ legal challenges, which might leave subordinate personnel questioning the authority by which they are being commanded and further encumber the military’s ability to act decisively. Commanders likely would hesitate to act for fear of being held personally liable for any injuries resulting from their conduct. These are only some of the many reasons why “[e]xecutive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been deemed, throughout our history, essential to war-time security.”
It is established beyond peradventure that military affairs, foreign relations, and national security are constitutionally committed to the political branches of our government and “the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302, 38 S. Ct. 309, 62 L. Ed. 726 (1918); Schneider v. Kissinger, 366 U.S. App. D.C. 408, 412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Absent precedent, there could still be no doubt that decision-making in the fields of foreign policy and national security is textually committed to the political branches of government.”). Although it may be the case that standards appropriate for judicial application are available to resolve whether certain acts constitute torture, in the unique factual circumstances presented here that legal determination invariably would place the Court in the position of inquiring into the propriety of specific interrogation techniques and detention practices employed by the military while prosecuting wars. Some methods undoubtedly might be deemed improper and unlawful, but others might not – and still others might occupy a place on the periphery between the two. Military, executive, and congressional officials might arrive at a different conclusion from the judiciary about where on the spectrum a particular interrogation technique falls and whether it was, or is, properly used to obtain information about our enemies while conducting a war. It is at this point of divergence that the judiciary most risks intruding into military and foreign affairs. The hazard of such multifarious pronouncements – combined with the constitutional commitment of military and foreign affairs to the political branches and the Court’s previously expressed concerns about hindering our military’s ability to act unhesitatingly and decisively – warrant leaving to Congress the determination whether a damages remedy should be available under the circumstances presented here.
In addition to invoking the Alien Tort Statue as authority for a cause of action for money damages to remedy alleged violations of Geneva Convention IV, the plaintiffs also assert that the treaty itself provides a private right to sue … The plaintiffs point to Articles 3, 27, 31, 32, 118 and 119 of Geneva Convention IV as self-executing provisions …
The Court is not convinced that Geneva Convention IV is self-executing and establishes individual rights that may be judicially enforced via private lawsuits in federal courts. “Absent authorizing legislation, an individual has access to courts for enforcement of a treaty’s provisions only when the treaty is self-executing, that is, when it expressly or impliedly provides a private right of action.” Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 233 U.S. App. D.C. 384, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
[I]t is the law of this circuit that a treaty is not self-executing when the rights of individuals are intended to be vindicated through diplomatic recourse. Holmes v. Laird, 148 U.S. App. D.C. 187, 459 F.2d 1211, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Article 149 provides that any alleged violation of the treaty shall be subject to an “enquiry” at the request of a party to the conflict, which enquiry shall be undertaken according to procedures negotiated by the parties or determined by an agreed-upon umpire. Id. at art. 149. If a violation of the treaty is established, “the Parties to the conflict shall put an end to it and shall repress it with the least possible delay.” Id. When considered as a whole, it is apparent from these provisions – which make clear that enforcement of Geneva Convention IV is to be left to the legislation and laws of the parties or to diplomatic enquiry – that the treaty is not intended to be self-executing, in which case the plaintiffs are not entitled to pursue private lawsuits against the defendants for alleged violations.
[T]he recently-enacted Military Commissions Act of 2006, 109 P.L. 366, 120 Stat. 2600, confirms the Court’s view that Geneva Convention IV is not self-executing. Section 5 of the Act states that “[n]o person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its States or territories.” However, given that the other stated grounds support the Court’s conclusion that Geneva Convention IV is not self-executing, it is not necessary to address at this time whether the Military Commissions Act of 2006 has retroactive application to the plaintiffs’ lawsuit.
Because Geneva Convention IV manifests an intent to be enforced through legislation or diplomacy, it is not a self-executing treaty that provides a private right for the plaintiffs to sue the defendants for money damages. The plaintiffs’ cause of action for violations of Geneva Convention IV therefore fails to state a claim for relief and will be dismissed. 
United States, District Court for the District of Columbia, In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation cases, Judgment, 27 March 2007.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
In 1993, in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Bosnia and Herzegovina initiated proceedings, claiming
that reparations must be paid by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the Applicant for all the death, destruction, physical and mental injury, property damage and environmental harm that have been inflicted upon It and its People by the Respondent and its agents and surrogates in violation of all the sources of international law specified above and in particular for grossly violating the Genocide Convention, the United Nations Charter, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocol I of 1977, the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and numerous other international treaties and agreements, principles of customary international law, the laws of war, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and jus cogens that will be specified in further submissions by Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Applications instituting proceedings submitted to the ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 20 March 1993, § 134.
Bosnia and Herzegovina therefore requested the Court to adjudge and declare
that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ha[d] an obligation to pay Bosnia and Herzegovina, in its own right and as parens patriae for its citizens, reparations for damages to persons and property as well as to the Bosnian economy and environment caused by the foregoing violations of international law in a sum to be determined by the Court. Bosnia and Herzegovina reserve[d] the right to introduce to the Court a precise evaluation of the damages caused by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Applications instituting proceedings submitted to the ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 20 March 1993, § 135 (r).
Similarly, in its memorial submitted to the ICJ in 1994, Bosnia and Herzegovina asked:
6. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) must wipe out the consequences of its international wrongful acts and must restore the situation existing before the violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide were committed;
7. That, as a result of the international responsibility incurred for the above violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is required to pay, and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is entitled to receive, in its own right and as parens patriae for its citizens, full compensation for the damages and losses caused, in the amount to be determined by the Court in a subsequent phase of the proceedings in this case. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Memorial of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 15 April 1994, p. 294, §§ 6–7.
In its oral pleadings before the ICJ in 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina stated:
8. It is doubtless unnecessary, Madam President, to dwell on the general principles applicable – especially since, let me repeat, the Respondent did not challenge them when they were set out in some detail in the written pleadings of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides, they are well known and uncontroversial. It is therefore sufficient to recall that:
the basic principle, enunciated by the PCIJ in the Factory at Chorzów case, “is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act has not been committed”;
this basic principle is incorporated in Article 31 of the 2001 Articles of the International Law Commission;
1. pursuant to the provisions of Article 34 of those same Articles, “[f]ull reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction …”;
2. inasmuch as making restitution means “to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed” - this being a quotation from the ILC [International Law Commission] - it constitutes a prime means of reparation, since it is, by definition, the one best suited to effectively ensuring full redress for the injury sustained;
3. however, to the extent that restitutio in integrum proves materially impossible or “out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation”, reparation may take the form of compensation involving “payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear”;
4. and lastly, “[t]he State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation”.
2. Compensation
13. As I said earlier, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not asking the Court to set the amount of compensation. Indeed, neither this august body, Members of the Court, nor we ourselves have the necessary information for that purpose, not even for the purpose of putting forward some idea of the amount. Bosnia and Herzegovina is convinced that this task lends itself more readily to diplomatic negotiation in good faith, rather than judicial debate, if only because this is undoubtedly a matter for experts rather than jurists – provided, however (though these are important conditions), as I also said before, that the negotiation is not too protracted and that it can be based on a judgment which clearly establishes the applicable legal principles.
14. It seems to us that these should consist, on the one hand, of an enumeration of compensable injuries and, on the other, of an indication of the principles applicable to the calculation of compensation. Bosnia and Herzegovina, for its part, considers that, for both purposes, the rules contained in the relevant provisions of the ILC [A]rticles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, although they have not been incorporated in any formal convention, reflect the generally applicable rules on the subject and certainly constitute a necessary starting point.
16. There is no need to linger over the principles applicable to compensation in the present case … Those principles are known and should not really present any particular problems in this case. It is true that a serious violation of a norm of jus cogens is involved but, after lengthy deliberations, the ILC [International Law Commission] chose not to hold that this could result in an entitlement to punitive damages and no such provision is made in Articles 40 and 41, which deal with violations of this kind. Bosnia and Herzegovina therefore respectfully requests you, Members of the Court, to indicate the classic basic principles applicable for the guidance of the Parties in the implementation of your Judgment. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Oral pleadings before the ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 7 March 2006, Verbatim Record CR 2006/11, pp. 29–33, §§ 8, 13–14 and 16.
Concluding its oral pleadings, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in its final submissions, requested the ICJ to adjudge and declare:
6. That the violations of international law set out in submissions 1 to 5 constitute wrongful acts attributable to Serbia and Montenegro which entail its international responsibility, and, accordingly,
(b) that Serbia and Montenegro must redress the consequences of its international wrongful acts and, as a result of the international responsibility incurred for the above violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, must pay, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is entitled to receive, in its own right and as parens patriae for its citizens, full compensation for the damages and losses caused. That, in particular, the compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage which corresponds to:
(i) damage caused to natural persons by the acts enumerated in Article III of the Convention, including non-material damage suffered by the victims or the surviving heirs or successors and their dependants;
(ii) material damage caused to properties of natural or legal persons, public or private, by the acts enumerated in Article III of the Convention;
(iii) material damage suffered by Bosnia and Herzegovina in respect of expenditures reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate damage flowing from the acts enumerated in Article III of the Convention;
(c) that the nature, form and amount of the compensation shall be determined by the Court, failing agreement thereon between the Parties one year after the Judgment of the Court, and that the Court shall reserve the subsequent procedure for that purpose;
(d) that Serbia and Montenegro shall provide specific guarantees and assurances that it will not repeat the wrongful acts complained of, the form of which guarantees and assurances is to be determined by the Court. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Oral pleadings before the ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 24 April 2006, Verbatim Record CR 2006/37, pp. 60–61, § 6.
Canada
In 1988, the Canadian Government concluded an agreement with the National Association of Japanese Canadians, the so-called Japanese-Canadian Redress Agreement, under which the government officially acknowledged that the forced removal and internment of Canadian nationals of Japanese descent during the Second World War was unjust and violated human rights. The Agreement also provided:
As symbolic redress for those injustices, the Government offers:
a) [CAN]$21,000 individual redress, subject to application by eligible persons of Japanese ancestry who, during this period, were subjected to internment, relocation, deportation, loss of property or otherwise deprived of the full enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms based solely on the fact that they were of Japanese ancestry; each payment would be made in a tax-free lump sum, as expeditiously as possible;
b) [CAN]$12 million to the Japanese-Canadian community, through the National Association of Japanese Canadians, to undertake educational, social and cultural activities or programmes that contribute to the well-being of the community or that promote human rights;
c) [CAN]$12 million, on behalf of Japanese Canadians and in commemoration of those who suffered these injustices, and matched by a further $12 million from the Government of Canada, for the creation of a Canadian Race Relations Foundation that will foster racial harmony and cross-cultural understanding and help to eliminate racism.
f) to provide, through contractual arrangements, up to [CAN]$3 million to the National Association of Japanese Canadians for their assistance, including community liaison, in administration of redress over the period of implementation. 
Canada, Prime Minister, Agreement between the Government of Canada and the National Association of Japanese Canadians (Japanese-Canadian Redress Agreement), 22 September 1988.
Canada
In 1991, during a debate in the UN General Assembly on the environmental impact of the Gulf War, Canada deduced the illegality of Iraq’s conduct of war from the fact that “a mechanism had been put in place [by the relevant UN Security Council resolutions] to obtain compensation for the damage done and the clean-up involved”. 
Canada, Statement before the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.6/ 46/SR.18, 22 October 1991, § 11.
Chad
In 2009, during the consideration of Chad’s initial report to the Committee against Torture, a statement by the delegation of Chad was summarized by the Committee in its records as follows:
16. The government had instructed a commission comprising representatives of civil society, judges and international observes to investigate the unrest of February 2008; the commission had recommended that victims of acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment during those events should be compensated.
56. With regard to the events of 2 February 2008, for 48 hours N’Djamena had been entirely occupied by rebels who, as they withdrew, had attacked the population. 
Chad, Statement by the delegation of Chad before the Committee against Torture during the consideration of the initial report of Chad, 30 April 2009, published in the summary record of the 873rd meeting, 25 September 2009, UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.873, §§ 16 and 56.
Chile
In 1991, in its official report on violation of human rights during the military regime, Chile’s National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation recommended that reparations be paid by the State in respect of disappearances, and concluded that Chile should grant the families of disappeared persons a pension for life as material recompense. 
Chile, National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, Official Report on Violations of Human Rights During the Military Regime, International Commission of Jurists Review, No. 46/1991, p. 6.
Chile
In 1994, in its second periodic report to the Committee against Torture, Chile stated:
In response to the recommendations made by the National Commission for the Truth and Reconciliation in regard to compensation for victims of human rights violations during the military regime, and as a contribution of the State to this endeavour and a specific form of reparation designed to confer legal recognition on a problem experienced in Chile by a significant segment of the population, the Programme of Compensation and Full Health Care for Victims of Human Rights Violations (PRAIS) was introduced in 1991. At present, seven PRAIS teams are functioning as part of state health services in different areas of the country, financed by contributions from those services and international cooperation. Apart from torture victims, beneficiaries of PRAIS include family members of missing detainees, persons executed for political reasons and exiles. 
Chile, Second periodic report to the Committee against Torture, 1 March 1994, UN Doc. CAT/C/20/Add.3, submitted 16 February 1994, § 39.
Chile
In its views and comments on the 1997 Draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Victims of [Gross] Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law – as they were then called – Chile stated:
It seems appropriate to include in the set of basic principles and guidelines a specific provision establishing the State’s immediate, direct liability for compensation, without prejudice to its right to attempt to recover from the offenders the amount paid. 
Chile, Views and Comments on the note and revised Draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of [Gross] Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, 7 October 1997, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/34, 22 December 1997, § 21.
China
In 1955, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs stated:
During the war in which Japanese militarists invaded China, millions of Chinese people were killed, Chinese public and private property worth billions of dollars was damaged, thousands of Chinese people were forcibly moved to Japan and were enslaved and killed. The Japanese Government should understand that the Chinese people have the right to ask the Japanese Government to compensate for all the damages suffered by the Chinese people. 
China, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Statement on the issue of so-called withdrawal of Japanese Nationals in China put forward by the Japanese Government, 16 August 1955, Documents on Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, World Knowledge Press, Beijing, Vol. 3, pp. 338–339.
Côte d’Ivoire
In 2009, in its report to the UN Human Rights Council, Côte d’Ivoire stated: “[T]he political and military crises faced by Côte d’Ivoire since 1999, exacerbated by the war which broke out in September 2002, have had many grave consequences in the political, economic and social spheres.” 
Côte d’Ivoire, Report to the UN Human Rights Council, 3 September 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/6/CIV/1, § 136.
Côte d’Ivoire also stated: “A draft law to compensate war victims has … been prepared and is being transmitted to Parliament.” 
Côte d’Ivoire, Report to the UN Human Rights Council, 3 September 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/6/CIV/1, § 134.
Djibouti
In 2010, in its initial report to the Committee against Torture, Djibouti stated:
46. Following independence in 1977, Djibouti experienced a difficult period of internal tension, which led to a visible, steady rise in violations of human rights and individual freedoms. This state of affairs reached its height during the civil war between government forces and the armed opposition of the Front pour la restauration de l’unité et de la démocratie [Front for the restoration of unity and democracy] (FRUD).
47. With the signing of [the] peace agreement between the warring parties in 1994 and again in 2001, the human rights situation improved dramatically. …
49. … The special commission was … entrusted with compiling a list of victims of torture and other acts of war and setting compensation …
55. The 199[5] law declaring an amnesty for acts other than droit commun offences was promulgated at the end of the civil war, following the signing of the peace agreement between the Government and the FRUD armed opposition. The law permitted the release of many detainees from both sides who had been victims of torture or ill[-]treatment. Regulations were issued that established the law’s implementing procedures and listed its beneficiaries. … Financial compensation or compensation in kind was awarded to those who applied for it through the courts free of charge to those who were entitled to it. 
Djibouti, Initial report to the Committee against Torture, 18 January 2011, UN Doc. CAT/C/DJI/1, submitted 21 July 2010, §§ 46–47, 49 and 55.
Djibouti also stated:
191. From studying … reports [prepared by international human rights organizations] and observing victims, it can be seen that, to this day, many victims are still suffering the consequences of the torture inflicted on them during the periods of heightened political tension and civil war between 1977 and 1993, in other words, before the signing of the 1994 peace agreement and Djibouti’s ratification of the [1984] Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment[.]
192. Some victims still suffer from physical disability, deafness, impaired vision, impotence as a result of trauma to the genitals, psychological and sleep disorders, traces of injuries on the body, ulcers, nervous [system] problems, memory loss, permanent back and shoulder pain, etc.
193. No trace of or statement about any compensation … of the injury sustained by victims has been found for any of the alleged consequences of torture reported by victims. Despite the range of complaints lodged by victims from that period, calling for … the compensation of victims for physical, material and moral injury … to this day no solution or even the beginning of a response has been proposed.
194. Despite these demands, to our knowledge no programme of compensation … has thus far been put in place formally for victims of torture in Djibouti. 
Djibouti, Initial report to the Committee against Torture, 18 January 2011, UN Doc. CAT/C/DJI/1, submitted 21 July 2010, §§ 191–194.
El Salvador
In 1979, a special committee set up by the Government of El Salvador to investigate the whereabouts of missing persons recommended that action be taken to compensate the families of missing political prisoners whose deaths could be either confirmed or presumed. The Ministry of the Presidency consequently announced that the families would be compensated. 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 1979–1980, Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.50 Doc. 13 rev.1, 2 October 1980, p. 138.
France
In 1999, the French Government created by a decree a “Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Spoliation Resulting from Anti-Semitic Legislation in Force During the Occupation” (also known as “Commission Drai”). 
France, First Minister and other ministries, Decree No. 99-778 Creating a Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Spoliation Resulting from the Anti-Semitic Legislation in force during the Occupation, 10 September 1999, Journal Officiel de la République française, No. 211, 11 September 1999, p. 13633.
Furthermore, in 2000, the French Government established a special compensation programme for orphans whose parents were victims of anti-Semitic persecution. 
France, First Minister and other ministries, Decree No. 2000-657 Establishing a Special Compensation Program for Orphans whose Parents were Victims of Anti-Semitic Persecution, 13 July 2000, Journal Officiel de la République française, No. 162, 14 July 2000, p. 10838.
France
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in 2004, France stated:
40. … [O]ne of the most serious breaches of the rules of international humanitarian law resulting from the construction of the wall along the chosen route no doubt concerns, prima facie, the property destruction caused by it, which is referred to in the Secretary-General’s Report.
41. On this subject international law calls for account to be taken of two considerations. First, it requires compensation which effectively makes good the entire injury suffered by the owners of the property in question. Second, it allows for account to be taken of “necessities of war”. 
France, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 30 January 2004, §§ 40–41.
Germany
In 1951, the German Chancellor made a declaration before the German Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament), which was then endorsed by this body. The declaration stated:
However, unspeakable crimes have been committed in the name of the German people, crimes that impose a duty to make moral and material amends, both as regards the individual damage that Jews have suffered and as regards Jewish property for which individual claimants no longer exist … The Federal Government is prepared to work with representatives of Jews and the State of Israel, which has received so many homeless Jewish refugees, to find a solution to the problem of making amends in a material sense. 
Germany, Lower House of Parliament, Declaration by the Federal Chancellor entitled ”Germany is obliged to make moral and material amends”, BT-Drucksache 6697, 27 September 1951.
Germany
In a diplomatic note relative to the 1995 US-Germany Agreement concerning Final Benefits to Certain US Nationals Who Were Victims of National Socialist Measures of Persecution, the Government of Germany stated: “Any payment by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany under this Agreement will be only for the benefit of United States nationals who were victims of national socialist measures of persecution by reason of their race, their faith or their ideology.” In its response, the US Government acknowledged receipt of the diplomatic note. 
Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the United States of America concerning Final Benefits to Certain United States Nationals Who Were Victims of National Socialist Measures of Persecution, Bonn, 19 September 1995, also known as the Princz Agreement.
Germany
In 1995, the German Government, in reply to a question from members of the Lower House of Parliament with regard to payments in reparation for Greek victims of the German National Socialist regime, stated:
With regard to a concluding settlement of the claims of Greece resulting from National Socialist measures of persecution against Greek nationals who have suffered damages to their freedom and health, the Federal Republic of Germany has paid, on the basis of the treaty of 18 March 1960 “concerning obligations in favour of Greek nationals who were concerned by national socialist measures of persecution”, DM 115 million. 
Germany, Lower House of Parliament, Reply by the Government to a question on payments in compensation for victims of the National Socialist regime from Greece, BT-Drucksache 13/2878, 7 November 1995, p. 2.
Germany
In 1995, the German Government, in reply to a question from members of the Lower House of Parliament regarding the amount of payments made by the Federal Republic of Germany in compensation to former East and West European inmates of concentration camps, stated: “Including … payments in the field of reparations through the social insurance, the total amount of payments up to now are significantly more than DM100 billion.” 
Germany, Lower House of Parliament, Response by the federal government to a question from members of parliament on payments made by the Federal Republic of Germany in compensation to the US citizen and survivor of the concentration camp Mr Hugo Princz, BT-Drucksache 13/3190, 4 December 1995, p. 3.
Germany
In 2006, in reply to a minor interpellation in the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) entitled “Criminal prosecution of persons responsible for war crimes in Italy and compensation for Italian military internees”, Germany’s Federal Government wrote:
1. Does the Federal Government share the view of the authors of the Minor Interpellation that the Hague [Convention], while not making individual compensations for violations of the Convention compulsory, nevertheless allows them, and if not, why not?
International humanitarian law only envisages inter-State claims in compensation of war damages, not however individual compensation claims. Also Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention IV accordingly only codifies a liability to pay compensation between contracting States …
2. According to the view of the Federal Government, did the German Reich actually grant the status of prisoners of war including the rights related to that status to the Italian military internees, and what is the basis of the Federal Government’s view?
3. According to the view of the Federal Government, as regards the question whether the Italian detainees are to be regarded as prisoners of war, is it necessary to take into consideration not only their formal legal situation but also their actual material situation, and what is the basis of the Federal Government’s position?
4. Does the Federal Government share the view of the authors of the Minor Interpellation that the Italian military internees were de facto not treated as prisoners of war, and if not, why not?
5. Does the Federal Government share the view that the treatment of the Italian military internees was a grave wrong, and if yes, why has it so far refused to compensate them?
The Federal Government concurs with the expert opinion by Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Christian Tomuschat, according to which the so-called Italian military internees, from the time of their capture until the end of the war, had the legal status of prisoners of war according to the provisions of the 1899/1907 Hague Regulations and the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 27 July 1929. The expert opinion finds that a transferral into civilian status, effective under international law, had not taken place.
The Federal Government expressly regrets that many of the military internees had to live and work under conditions which were harsh and inconsistent with human dignity and that protective provisions of the international law of war were not respected. This, however, does not change the legal classification of the military internees as prisoners of war. The Law on the Creation of a Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” has settled in a final manner the question of compensation for forced labour; according to Section 11, paragraph 3 of the Law prisoners of war are not eligible for payments.
7. Is the information received by the authors of the minor appellation … correct that of the 110.000 applications submitted by Italian forced labourers to the International Organization for Migration 100.000 have been rejected?
Italian military internees and other prisoners of war have a legal entitlement to payments only if they were deported to a concentration camp. In these exceptional cases a special persecution, marked by national socialist ideology, was present; prisoner-of-war status recedes into the background …
8. How many actions for compensation by former Italian military internees are currently filed
a) with German courts,
The Federal Government has no reliable total numbers on actions by former Italian military internees pending in German courts, since these actions are not separately registered …
b) with foreign courts (please list by country),
In Italy, currently pending are 40 individual actions and 6 class-actions (overall 113 applicants) for compensation for material/immaterial damages, filed by survivors of German war crimes or other national socialist crimes committed during World War II, or by their relatives or surviving dependants. There is no information on actions of Italian victims in other foreign courts.
c) with international courts?
The Federal Government is aware that an association of former military internees has lodged an individual application against the Federal Republic of Germany with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. So far, however, the Court has not communicated this application to the Federal Republic of Germany. The Federal Government is not aware of further proceedings in international courts.
9. From the point of view of the Federal Government, how have these court proceedings developed and what position does the Federal Government take in these proceedings?
The Federal Government is of the view that these proceedings contravene the principle of State immunity. Since the Federal Government has so far not been involved in proceedings in international courts – see reply to question 8c – it cannot make a statement on that.
10. From the point of view of the Federal Government, what is the development of a case in the Supreme Court of Cassation in Rome, which, inter alia, dealt with the question of State immunity?
a) What is the Federal Government’s assessment of that decision?
b) From the point of view of the Federal Government, what are the consequences of that decision?
The Federal Government is of the view that the judgement of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation in the Ferrini case contravenes the principle of State immunity.
14. Is it correct that contributions to social security were paid for the Italian military internees forced to do forced labour, that, however, until today those have not been paid out to the entitled persons, and if yes, what consequences does the Federal Government draw from this?
For prisoners of war of all nationalities who during World War II, at the instigation of the former German Wehrmacht, worked for German employers, no contributions to German pension insurance institutions were paid. Neither for the prisoner of war nor for the German employer was there an obligation to pay contributions to pension funds, since the work was not done in the context of an employment or work relationship and the prisoner of war did not receive a salary for his work from the employer. Who is to be regarded as prisoner of war in this context does not follow from German laws but from the international law provisions of the 1929 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, which allows military authorities to employ prisoners of war as workmen.  
Germany, Bundestag, Reply by the Federal Government to the Minor Interpellation by the Members Ulla Jelpke, Sevim Dagdelen, Jan Korte, further Members and the Parliamentary Group DIE LINKE – BT-Drs. 16/2187, Criminal prosecution of persons responsible for war crimes in Italy and compensation for Italian military internees, BT-Drs. 16/2422, 21 August 2006, pp. 1–6.
Germany
In 2010, in reply to a Minor Interpellation in the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) entitled “Victims of the war in Afghanistan”, Germany’s Federal Government wrote:
11. Since 2002, in how many cases have victims, their relatives or others been refused compensation payments and based on what assessment of the circumstances (please identify the legal bases and specific cases)?
Payments were not made in three cases.
In one case compensation for the repair costs of a damaged vehicle was rejected because the Afghan claimant had himself caused the accident by a reckless overtaking manoeuvre. Concerning another vehicle accident, compensation was also rejected because there was no evidence that the German ISAF-vehicle was involved. In a third case compensation for injuries to civilians was rejected because the German soldiers involved had used lawful enforcement measures and the Afghan citizens had not reacted to the clear warning signals.
12. Based on what grounds in international law or constitutional law does the Federal Government determine compensation payments and their amount?
The payments are made for humanitarian reasons.
a) Which legal criteria are used to determine whether compensation is paid?
See response to question 12.
13. Are there cases in which there is a legal obligation to pay compensation?
The payments are made for humanitarian reasons.
a) If so, which are they (please include the legal bases and specific cases)?
b) If not, please provide the reasons why nonetheless compensation has been paid/is being paid?
See response to question 13. 
Germany, Lower House of Federal Parliament (Bundestag), Reply by the Federal Government to the Minor Interpellation by Members Jan van Aken, Paul Schäfer (Cologne), Christine Buchholz, further Members and the Parliamentary Group DIE LINKE, BT-Drs. 17/1813, 20 May 2010, p. 6.
Germany
In 2010, in reply to a Minor Interpellation in the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) entitled “Agreements with the Italian government to avoid the payment of compensation to victims of the National Socialists and state of the dispute on compensation matters”, Germany’s Federal Government wrote:
g) Did the Federal Government enter into contact with the claimants to settle their compensation claims out of court or does it plan to do so, for example in case of a guilty verdict?
The Federal Government did not enter into contact with the claimants and does not plan to do so. International humanitarian law provides for inter-State compensation for damage caused, but not an individual right to compensation.
For the purposes of reparation, the Allies had agreed after the Second World War to confiscate or seize German assets abroad and German copyrights as well as to carry out dismantling and deliveries from the on-going production etc. in the respective occupation zones. Other former war opponents were also involved through the international reparation commission in Paris. However, in its peace treaty of 1947 Italy had renounced its claims against Germany resulting from the Second World War. In addition, in the early 1960s the Federal Republic of Germany concluded so-called comprehensive compensation agreements with twelve Western States to compensate for specific wrongs by the National Socialists and made payments. 
Germany, Lower House of Federal Parliament (Bundestag), Reply by the Federal Government to the Minor Interpellation by Members Ulla Jepke, Jan Korte, Christine Buchholz, further Members and the Parliamentary Group DIE LINKE, BT-Drs. 17/2340, 29 June 2010, p. 5.
Iraq
In 1996, in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, Iraq reported that “a number of United States warplanes dropped 10 heat flares in the Saddam Dam area of Ninawa Governorate in northern Iraq” and affirmed “the legally established right of the Republic of Iraq to seek compensation for the damage caused by these unwarranted actions by the United States, in accordance with the principle of international responsibility”. 
Iraq, Letter dated 14 August 1996 to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/1996/657, 14 August 1996.
Iraq
In 2012, in its initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child under the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, Iraq stated:
[T]he Compensation for Persons Affected by Military Operations and Errors and Terrorist Operations Act No. 20 of 2009 was enacted. The Act aims to compensate any natural person harmed as a result of hostilities, military operations and errors. The Act provides for compensation in the following cases:
1. Martyrdom and loss resulting from operations covered by the Act;
2. Total or partial disability, on the basis of a report from a competent medical committee;
3. Injuries and other instances requiring temporary treatment, on the basis of a report from a competent medical committee;
4. Damage to property;
5. Damage related to employment or study.
Pursuant to the Act, victims or members of their family shall be granted fair compensation or a retirement pension, in accordance with the situation of the victim. 
Iraq, Initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child under the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 18 October 2013, UN Doc. CAT/C/OPAC/IRQ/1, submitted 9 May 2012, § 52.
Israel
In 1998, during a debate in the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly in which several States had referred to a resolution of the General Assembly and stated that Israel was obliged to pay the costs resulting from its attack on the UNIFIL compound at Qana, Israel replied: “Defensive military operations against terrorists who had shamelessly used a UNIFIL outpost as cover for their provocative attacks had been, and continued to be, justified and necessary.” 
Israel, Statement before the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.5/52/SR.62, 18 May 1998, § 67.
Kuwait
In a memorandum issued in 1994 on “practical means to fully support international humanitarian law and apply its rules”, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Justice stated that a belligerent was “responsible for the acts committed by its armed forces’ personnel, and [obliged] to make up for these damages, and pay compensation for wrongful acts”. 
Kuwait, Ministry of Justice, Memorandum concerning the discussion of practical means to fully support international humanitarian law and apply its rules, 5 June 1994.
Kuwait
According to the Report on the Practice of Kuwait, Kuwait has demanded compensation for the damage to its environment during the Gulf War. The report further states that it is Kuwait’s opinio juris that States which cause damage to the environment are under a duty to remedy such damage. 
Report on the Practice of Kuwait, 1997, Chapter 4.4.
Lebanon
In 1998, during a debate in the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly, Lebanon, speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States, stated:
[The Group of Arab States] wished to convey their regret and displeasure at the fact that Israel had failed to meet its obligation, under paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 51/233, to pay the sum of US$ 1,773,618 to cover the costs resulting from its attack on the UNIFIL compound at Qana in 1996. The international community, as represented in the General Assembly, should compel Israel to pay the costs in question. 
Lebanon, Statement on behalf of the Group of Arab States before the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.5/52/SR.62, 18 May 1998, § 63. This statement was endorsed by Saudi Arabia (§ 64), Indonesia (§ 66) and Egypt (§ 72).
Mexico
At the CDDH, Mexico, with respect to Article 91 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, stated:
The article did not rule out the possibility of a State incurring liability, and consequently being required to pay compensation, if it had not taken steps to prevent its nationals from committing the offences covered by the [1949] Geneva Conventions, [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I and its domestic legislation. 
Mexico, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.46, 31 May 1977, p. 344, § 23.
Nepal
In 2004, in a declaration of commitment on the implementation of human rights and international humanitarian law, the Prime Minister of Nepal stated:
The accused held in detention shall not be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Any person so treated shall be provided with the compensation stipulated by the law and any person responsible for such treatment shall be prosecuted and punished according to the law. 
Nepal, Declaration of commitment on the implementation of human rights and international humanitarian law, 26 March 2004, § 8.
Netherlands
When in 1996 the question of whether victims of violations of IHL could seek compensation from Japan was raised in the Dutch Parliament, the Government of the Netherlands stated that it could not claim financial compensation from Japan for damage incurred during the occupation of the former Dutch East Indies because of the 1951 Peace Treaty for Japan and the 1956 Yoshida-Stikker Protocol. The government added that its position would be the same even in the event of an individual invoking the international law rules regulating compensation for damage caused by war. 
Netherlands, Lower House of Parliament, Reply by the Minister of Public Health to a question in Parliament, 1996–1997 Session, Appendix, Doc. 1031, pp. 2107–2108.
Norway
In 1998, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice drafted a White Paper for Parliament with the conclusion that in addition to an official apology to Norwegian Jewry, the government should pay out 450 million Norwegian Kroner in settlement of anti-Jewish measures such as confiscation of Jewish property taken by the Nazi occupation authorities and the Quisling regime during the Second World War. This amount reflected the share of the total loss that was confiscated by the Norwegian treasury during the Second World War. On 11 March 1999, the White Paper was unanimously adopted by all political parties in Parliament. The compensation was divided into two main categories: individual compensation, the fixed sum of 200,000 Norwegian Kroner (US$ 28,000) to be given to those persons in Norway who suffered from anti-Jewish measures during the war; and collective compensation of 250 million Norwegian Kroner (US$ 35 million) to be divided among Jewish communities in Norway. Under the White Paper, contributions were also to be made to establish a research centre for Holocaust studies and minority research in Norway. 
Norway, Ministry of Justice and the Police, White Paper No. 82 to the Storting, “Historical and moral settlement for the treatment in Norway of the economic liquidation of the Jewish minority during World War II”, 26 June 1998, approved by The King in Council on 26 June 1998, Stortingsproposisjon No. 82 (1997–1998).
Peru
In 2006, during the consideration of the fourth periodic report of Peru before the Committee against Torture, a representative of Peru stated: “With regard to the programme of reparations recommended by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, measures … [are] in preparation for the payment of the equivalent of some US$ 8 million under the Comprehensive Plan for Reparations.” 
Peru, Statement before the Committee against Torture during the consideration of the fourth periodic report of Peru, 9 May 2006, UN Doc. CAT/C/SR. 697 § 36.
Poland
In 1970, during a debate in the Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly on measures carried out by Israel in the occupied territories, Poland stated:
The destruction of houses and the confiscation of property, which were designed to demoralize the inhabitants of certain areas and to force them to abandon their homes, were in violation of the basic principles of international law and contrary to the provisions of article 46 of the [1907 Hague Regulations] and article 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention. Since such acts were illegal, the Government of Israel was liable for full compensation for destroyed property. 
Poland, Statement before the Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/SPC/SR.748, 10 December 1970, § 9.
Republic of Korea
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, the Republic of Korea declared:
In relation to Article 91 of Protocol I, a party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions or of this Protocol shall take the responsibility for paying compensation to the party damaged from the acts of violation, whether the damaged party is a legal party to the conflict or not. 
Republic of Korea, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 15 January 1982, § 3.
Republic of Korea
In 1998, the Government of the Republic of Korea established a trust fund to provide compensation to 155 women used as sex slaves by the former Japanese Imperial Army. The Government of the Republic of Korea indicated that it planned to collect the value of the fund (5 million yen) as compensation from the Japanese Government. 
“Seoul to compensate ‘comfort women’, get refund from Tokyo”, BBC News, 11 March 1998.
Russian Federation
The Report on the Practice of the Russian Federation notes that a number of victims of the conflict in Chechnya have filed claims and “are entitled to get a reimbursement for their homes demolished by federal troops, i.e., for the lost property”. 
Report on the Practice of the Russian Federation, 1997, Chapter 6.2.
Rwanda
In 1996, during the preparatory work in the Rwandan Parliament on a law for the punishment of acts of genocide and crimes against humanity in 1996, the issue of the responsibility of the State and the duty to compensate victims was raised. The government spokesman declared that the Rwandan State recognized its responsibility and that a compensation scheme had been adopted. 
Rwanda, Travaux préparatoires of the Parliamentary Committees on the organic law of 30 August 1996, Report of the meeting of 9 July 1996 (original in Kinyarwanda), p. 54, Report on the Practice of Rwanda, 1997, Chapter 6.2.
Spain
In 2008, in its written replies to the Human Rights Committee concerning its fifth periodic report, Spain stated with regard to the reparation measures that have been granted to victims of torture:
[N]ote should be taken of the recent adoption of Act. No. 52/2007 of 26 December 2007, which recognizes and extends rights and introduces measures in favour of victims of persecution or violence during the civil war and the dictatorship … [including] compensation for victims of the Franco period (including victims of torture). 
Spain, Written replies by the Government of Spain to the Human Rights Committee concerning the list of issues raised in connection with the fifth periodic report of Spain, 14 October 2008, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ESP/Q/5/Add.1, Question 7(d), p. 20.
Sri Lanka
In its final report in 1997, the Commission of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Persons in the Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa Provinces, established by the Sri Lankan Government, recommended that:
(i) Expeditious payment of fair and adequate compensation be made to dependants of disappeared persons within a time-frame in all the districts. Such payment should cover dependants of employees of the public sector, corporations and other state-owned institutions. The idea of introducing a new tax similar to the Defence Levy may be considered in order to generate funds for this purpose.
(ii) A scheme to provide monetary assistance to affected families who had suffered loss and damage to property be initiated. A forum be created to receive complaints of successors of disappeared persons.
(iii) Legislative provision be made exempting whatever amount paid as compensation for being made the subject matter of a civil claim and seizure. 
Sri Lanka, Commission of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Persons in the Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa Provinces, Final report, Sessional Paper No. V – 1997, September 1997, Chapter 14, Section I(1).
Sri Lanka
In its final report in 1997, the Commission of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Persons in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, established by the Sri Lankan Government, noted:
The Commission has worked out a Compensation Scheme in accordance with the circular issued by the Ministry of Public Administration No. 21/88 of 13th July, 1988 and this is only a token of the concern of the Government for deprivation suffered by the affected families. Money in any quantity will not compensate the absence of the bread-winner, the love of the father, the duty of the son for the family. But money helps in some way to cushion the blow. 
Sri Lanka, Commission of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Persons in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, Final report, Sessional Paper No. VII – 1997, September 1997, Chapter 10, Section G.
Switzerland
In 2005, in a report in response to a parliamentary postulate on private security and military companies, Switzerland’s Federal Council stated:
Nonfeasance in international law or activities running counter to international law which can be ascribed to states raises the question of their so-called state responsibility. Important rules regarding state responsibility are contained in the [2001] “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” of the “International Law Commission” of the United Nations (ILC), a document reflecting international customary law.
A state can be held responsible for acts carried out by its authorities who contravene international law. Conduct running counter to international law of an individual, a group of individuals, or a corporate body which are not state bodies can also be ascribed to a state if the named actors are empowered on the basis of the laws of this state to carry out sovereign activities, or if in their activities they in fact act under the instructions or under the direction or control of this state. In addition, the conduct of an individual or group of individuals, according to international law, is considered to be an act of the state if the individual or group of individuals, in the absence or default of the official authorities actually assume sovereign functions, and conditions are such that the exercise of such sovereign functions are required (Art. 5, 8 and 9 of the ILC Draft Articles).
The consequence of this state responsibility is the obligation to provide full reparation in the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction to the wronged state or if necessary to the international community (Part 2 of the ILC Draft Articles). 
Switzerland, Report by the Swiss Federal Council on Private Security and Military Companies, 2 December 2005, Section 5.5.1, p. 48.
[footnote in original omitted; emphasis in original]
Syrian Arab Republic
In 1998, during a debate in the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Syrian Arab Republic stated:
Israel’s financial obligations under General Assembly resolution 51/233 represented only a minute part of the consequences of the Israeli attack on the UNIFIL compound at Qana, and were nothing compared with the lives of the victims, namely the United Nations soldiers and the Lebanese civilians seeking protection at the compound. In accordance with the principles of international law, Israel … must be forced to comply with resolution 51/233 so as to avoid establishing a precedent.  
Syrian Arab Republic, Statement before the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.5/ 52/SR.62, 18 May 1998, § 65.
Syrian Arab Republic
The Report on the Practice of the Syrian Arab Republic asserts that the Syrian Arab Republic considers Article 91 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to be part of customary international law. 
Report on the Practice of the Syrian Arab Republic, 1997, Chapter 6.2.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1991, during a debate in the House of Commons on the subject of compensation for Allied prisoners of war in the hands of Japan during the Second World War, the UK Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, referring to Articles 14 and 16 of the 1951 Peace Treaty for Japan, stated:
The [1951 Peace Treaty for Japan] contained a specific provision for compensation for prisoners of war. We had insisted on that provision, which had not been included in the original treaty, because we thought it important that the treaty should recognise the cruel and barbaric treatment to which allied service men in the far east had been subjected … No one could dispute that the issue of compensation was crucial … From the disposal of Japanese property within its jurisdiction, the United Kingdom received just over £3 million. The United Kingdom’s share of the £4.5 million that the Japanese Government placed at the disposal of the International Red Cross in accordance with article 16 of the treaty was just over £1.6 million.
It was agreed in a minute between the Japanese and the allied powers that the payment of the £4.5 million would be recognised as a full discharge by the Japanese Government of their obligations under article 16 of the peace treaty … I sympathise with my right hon. friend’s contention that the settlement was unsatisfactory but … the provisions of the treaty remove any possibility of the British Government claiming further compensation or reparations from the Japanese Government. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Statement by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 6 June 1991, Hansard, Vol. 192, cols. 479–482.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2003, in a written reply to a question in the House of Commons asking “what compensation will be paid to the estates of Iraqi civilians who died as a result of British military action in Iraq”, the UK Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, stated:
There are no plans to pay compensation to Iraqi civilians killed during combat operations in Iraq.
The handling of claims made by Iraqis for losses which do not arise in connection with combat operations are governed by section 6 of the Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17. This provides that any such claims shall be submitted to and dealt with by the parent state of the person whose activities are alleged to have caused the loss. The claims will then be dealt with in a manner consistent with the national laws of that parent state.
Where a claim against British troops arises from activity which would not give rise to a legal liability to pay compensation under English law, there may nevertheless be an ex gratia payment made to the injured person or to the family of the deceased where this would be in accordance with local custom or directed to meet a particular urgent humanitarian need. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, Hansard, 17 November 2003, Vol. 413, Written Answers, col. 499W.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2003, in a written reply to a question in the House of Lords, the UK Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated:
The Government deplore the war crimes committed during the Balkans conflict in the early 1990s, including the rape of women and girls in Bosnia.
We are sympathetic to any proposal to improve the situation of the victims of these crimes, but it is not clear that awarding civilian war victim status would be the most effective means of ensuring support for these women. What is required is recognition of their suffering as victims of rape, conviction of the perpetrators and provision of appropriate support for these women and their children.
Through the work of the Department for International Development, and support for UNICEF and local NGOs, the Government support projects to raise awareness of rape as a war crime. We strongly support the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, which is tasked with bringing to trial those suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Balkans conflict, including rape. It has convicted a number of individuals of this crime. With our partners in the EU, we apply concerted pressure to all governments in the region for greater co-operation with ICTY, particularly in the handover and prosecution of indictees.
The best way to secure financial support for these women and their children is through successful convictions in the Bosnian courts, which can award compensation to the victims of rape. Together with our EU partners, we are working hard to strengthen the capacity of the Bosnian judicial system, so that it can prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes more effectively and efficiently, and provide sustainable support to the victims. 
United Kingdom, House of Lords, Written answer by the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hansard, 10 December 2003, Vol. 655, Written Answers, col. WA64.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2003, during a debate in the House of Lords, the UK Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence stated:
My Lords, every effort is made to minimise the impact of military operations on the Iraqi civilian population, and we deeply regret all civilian casualties. Since 1st May 2003, we have investigated every civilian fatality allegedly caused by UK military personnel, sometimes resulting in a formal investigation by the Special Investigation Branch.
We treat claims for compensation in respect of civilians who have allegedly been killed or injured by UK forces since 1st May on their merits, in accordance with English law. We have no liability to pay compensation in respect of Iraqis killed or injured during combat operations. 
United Kingdom, House of Lords, Statement by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence, Hansard, 17 December 2003, Vol. 655, Debates, col. 1143.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2004, in a written answer to a question concerning, inter alia, economic assistance to Iraqi families for loss or long-term disablement of a main income earner, the UK Secretary of State for Defence stated:
Iraqi civilians alleging negligence against the Ministry of Defence may submit a compensation claim to the Department’s Area Claims Officer based at Basra. When such claims are submitted, they are considered on the basis of whether or not the Ministry of Defence has a legal liability to pay compensation. Where there is a legal liability to pay compensation, we do so. Any amount payable is determined case by case, taking into account the specific circumstances of the injured party. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Minister of State for Defence, Hansard, 17 November 2004, Vol. 426, Written Answers, col. 1537W.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2006, in a written answer to a question in the House of Commons concerning “what provisions are in place for compensation for Afghan civilians (a) killed, (b) wounded and (c) otherwise harmed during International Security Assistance Force operations”, the UK Minister of State for Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, stated:
When compensation claims are received they are considered on the basis of whether or not the UK Ministry of Defence has a legal liability to pay compensation. Where there is a proven legal liability, compensation is paid.
From the outset of operations in Afghanistan we have recognised our duty to provide compensation to Afghan civilians where this is required by the law. The procedures for handling compensation claims are straightforward and have been tested in other operational theatres. An area claims officer based in Helmand Province handles routine claims, but to ensure a consistent approach those cases involving death or serious injury of Afghan civilians are handled by claims staff in UK. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Minister of State for Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, Hansard, 30 October 2006, Vol. 451, Written Answers, col. 100W.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 2007, in the information provided to the Human Rights Committee on the implementation of the Committee’s concluding observations concerning the UK’s sixth periodic report, the United Kingdom stated:
26. The Armed Forces are fully aware of their obligations under international law. …
27. Reparation will be paid to victims or their families where there is a legal liability to do so resulting from the unlawful activities of any member of the UK armed forces. Claims for death and personal injury can be brought under UK common law and compensation may be payable for human right breaches under the Human Rights Act where that applies. Compensation may also be payable under UK criminal injuries compensation provisions where applicable. 
United Kingdom, Information on the implementation of the concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, 3 November 2009, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6/Add.1, submitted 11 August 2009, §§ 26–27.
United States of America
In 1991, during a debate in the UN General Assembly on the environmental impact of the Gulf War, the United States maintained that:
Under Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Iraq was financially liable for the environmental damage it had caused. Thus, existing international law not only prohibited the type of acts committed by Iraq, but also provided important remedies to address and deter such acts, in particular with respect to … official financial liability. 
United States, Statement before the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.6/ 46/SR.18, 22 October 1991, § 39.
United States of America
In 1996, the United States, with regard to funding provided by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) for the construction of a new hospital and satisfactory compensation in favour of petitioners before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights who had allegedly suffered a US military aircraft attack on an asylum in Grenada, formally noted
its long-standing position that its actions were entirely in conformance with the law of armed conflict, and that therefore the US had no legal liability for any damages claimed. For these reasons, the US categorically rejects as inaccurate and misleading the petitioners’ statement as an alleged settlement of this case and compensation paid in this matter. 
United States, Note for the record of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concerning Case 9213 (US), referred to in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 3/96, Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91 Doc. 7, 1 March 1996, p. 201.
United States of America
In a concurrent resolution adopted in 2000 concerning the war crimes committed by the Japanese military during the Second World War, the US Congress expressed its sense that:
the Government of Japan should –
(2) immediately pay reparations to the victims of those crimes, including United States military and civilian prisoners of war, survivors of the “Rape of Nanjing” from December, 1937, until February, 1938, and the women who were forced into sexual slavery and known by the Japanese military as “comfort women”. 
United States, House of Representatives (Senate concurring), Concurrent Resolution, H.CON. RES. 357, 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 19 June 2000.
United States of America
In 2005, in its second periodic report to the Committee Against Torture, the United States stated:
120. The United States is committed to adequately compensating the victims of abuse and mistreatment by U.S. military personnel in Iraq. The U.S. Army is responsible for handling all claims in Iraq. Several claims statutes allow the United States to compensate victims of misconduct by U.S. military personnel. The primary mechanism for paying claims for allegations of abuse and mistreatment by U.S. personnel in Iraq is through the Foreign Claims Act (FCA), 10 U.S.C. § 2734. Under the FCA, Foreign Claims Commissions are tasked with investigating, adjudicating, and settling meritorious claims arising out of an individual’s detention. …
121. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has directed the Secretary of the Army to review all claims for compensation based on allegations of abuse in Iraq and to act on them in his discretion. In instances where meritorious claims are not payable under the FCA or the MCA [Military Claims Act], the Secretary of the Army is responsible for identifying alternative authorities to provide compensation and either to take such action or forward the claim to the Deputy Secretary of Defense with a recommendation for action. 
United States, Second periodic report to the Committee Against Torture, 13 January 2006, UN Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3/Rev.1, submitted 6 May 2005, Annex 1, p.81, §§ 120–121.
United States of America
In May 2006, in his opening remarks to the Committee against Torture prior to its consideration of the United States’ second periodic report, the head of the US delegation stated:
Our focus on eradicating torture and punishing its perpetrators would be incomplete without a parallel effort to help its victims recover from abuses. The United States has comprehensive legislation that enables citizens and non-citizens of the United States who are victims of torture to bring claims for damages against foreign government officials in U.S. federal courts. 
United States, Department of State Legal Adviser, John B. Bellinger, US Meeting with the UN Committee Against Torture, Geneva, Switzerland, 5 May 2006.
Zimbabwe
In 1995, in its initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Zimbabwe stated:
243. The War Victims Compensation Act of Zimbabwe provides financial assistance to children of war victims. Those who are not covered by this Act are assisted through the Public Assistance Programme.
245. … The War Victim Act does not cover victims of civil wars. 
Zimbabwe, Initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 12 September 1995, UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.35, submitted 23 May 1995, §§ 243 and 245.
Zimbabwe
According to media reports, in October 1999, the President of Zimbabwe apologised for the atrocities committed by the Five Brigade army unit which killed an estimated 25,000 people in an opposition stronghold during the civil war in the early 1980s and announced that the government was ready to compensate the families of the victims. 
“Zimbabwe – Mugabe offers compensation for 25,000 civil war killings”, The Independent, 19 October 1999.
Zimbabwe
In 2014, in an oral answer to a question without notice in the Senate, Zimbabwe’s Minister of Defence stated:
[I]t is true as we all know that during the liberation war, the Rhodesians planted a lot of landmines along our borders with Zambia, Mozambique and South Africa …
There are people who have lost limbs; they have been amputated by these landmines and have undergone medical treatment. Some of them have got prostheses, that is artificial limbs and that process is going on.
With regards to compensation in monetary terms, that is for the time being not under way but we think everything that is possible should be done to rehabilitate all those that have been injured or maimed by these landmines. In terms of monetary compensation Madam President, for now we are not yet in a position to do so. It will have to be a policy decision as to how much compensation is paid. If one has a lost a limb or the lower leg, how much do we compensate? If one has lost a forearm, how much do you pay? If one has lost two fingers, what do you do? Those are intricate issues that we will obviously look into but for the time being, the resources available are mainly earmarked for clearing the landmines around the country. 
Zimbabwe, Parliament of Zimbabwe, Oral answers by the Government to questions without notice in the Senate, Hansard, 28 August 2014, pp. 30–31.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1976 on South Africa’s military activities against Angola, the UN Security Council called upon the Government of South Africa “to meet the just claims of the People’s Republic of Angola for a full compensation for the damage and destruction inflicted on its State”. 
UN Security Council, Res. 387, 31 March 1976, § 4, voting record: 10-0-5; see also Res. 475, 27 June 1980, § 6, voting record: 12-0-5; Res. 546, 6 January 1984, § 7, voting record: 13-0-2 and Res. 567, 20 June 1985, § 4, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1979 following an incursion into Zambia of troops from southern Rhodesia, the UN Security Council called for “the payment of full and adequate compensation to the Republic of Zambia by the responsible authorities for the damage to life and property resulting from the acts of aggression”. 
UN Security Council, Res. 455, 23 November 1979, § 5, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1980, the UN Security Council:
Recalling once again the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and in particular article 27, which reads,
“Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons… They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof … “,
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,
1. Condemns the assassination attempts on the lives of the Mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh and calls for the immediate apprehension and prosecution of the perpetrators of these crimes;2. Expresses deep concern that Israel, as the occupying Power, has failed to provide adequate protection to the civilian population in the occupied territories in conformity with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
3. Calls upon the Government of Israel to provide the victims with adequate compensation for the damages suffered as a result of these crimes. 
UN Security Council, Res. 471, 5 June 1980, preamble and §§ 1–3, voting record: 14-0-1.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1982 on South Africa’s military actions against Lesotho, the UN Security Council demanded “the payment by South Africa of full and adequate compensation to the Kingdom of Lesotho for the damage to life and property resulting from [its] aggressive act”. 
UN Security Council, Res. 527, 15 December 1982, § 2, voting record: 15-0-0; see also Res. 572, 30 September 1985, § 4, voting record: 15-0-0 and Res. 580, 30 December 1985, § 2, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1985 on South Africa’s military activities against Angola, the UN Security Council stated that Angola should be entirely and adequately compensated for the loss of human life and the material damages resulting from the acts of aggression of South Africa. It decided to appoint a Commission of Investigation comprised of three members of the Security Council to evaluate the damage resulting from the invasion of Angola by South African forces. 
UN Security Council, Res. 571, 20 September 1985, §§ 6 and 7, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN Security Council
In Resolution 687 adopted in 1991 in the context of the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the UN Security Council decided
to create a fund to pay compensation for claims [resulting from Iraq’s liability “under international law for any direct loss, damage – including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources – or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait”] and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund. 
UN Security Council, Res. 687, 3 April 1991, §§ 16 and 18, voting record: 12-1-2.
UN Security Council
By Resolution 692 adopted in 1991, the UN Security Council, “acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”, decided “to establish the Fund and Commission referred to in paragraph 18 of resolution 687 (1991) in accordance with Part I of the Secretary-General’s report”, i.e. the United Nations Compensation Fund and the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC). 
UN Security Council, Res. 692, 20 May 1991, preamble and § 3, voting record: 14-0-1.
Although the UNCC deals principally with losses arising from Iraq’s unlawful use of force, it is also responsible for awarding compensation for violations of IHL suffered by individuals. 
See, e.g., UNCC, Governing Council, Decision 3: Personal injury and mental pain and anguish, 18 October 1991, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1991/3, 23 October 1991; Decision 11: Eligibility for compensation of members of the Allied Coalition Armed Forces, 26 June 1992, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1992/11, 26 June 1992.
UN Security Council
In Resolution 827 of May 1993 establishing the ICTY, the UN Security Council decided that “the work of the International Tribunal shall be carried out without prejudice to the right of the victims to seek, through appropriate means, compensation for damages incurred as a result of violations of international humanitarian law”. 
UN Security Council, Res. 827, 25 May 1993, § 7, voting record: 15-0-0.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1996, the UN General Assembly condemned “the Israeli military attacks against the civilian population in Lebanon, especially against the United Nations base at Qana, which violate the rules of international humanitarian law pertaining to the protection of civilians” and stated that “Lebanon is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered and that Israel is responsible for such compensation”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 50/22 C, 25 April 1996, §§ 3 and 7, voting record: 64-2-65-54.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1997 concerning, inter alia, the attack by Israel against the UNIFIL compound in Qana, the UN General Assembly decided that “the total amount mentioned … above, namely 1,773,618 dollars [i.e. the amount to cover the costs resulting from the incident at the headquarters of the Force at Qana on 18 April 1996], shall be borne by Israel”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 51/233, 13 June 1997, §§ 7 and 8, voting record: 127-2-1-55.
UN General Assembly
In 2001, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled “Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”, to which the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, and thus Article 36 entitled “Compensation”, were annexed. In the resolution, the General Assembly took note of the Draft Articles and commended them to the attention of governments “without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate action”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 56/83, 12 December 2001, § 3 and Annex, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on UNRWA operations, the UN General Assembly urged the Government of Israel to “speedily compensate the Agency for damage to its property and facilities resulting from actions by the Israeli side”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/102, 8 December 2005, § 10, voting record: 159-6-3-23.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on UNRWA operations, the UN General Assembly:
Urges the Government of Israel to speedily compensate the Agency for damage to its property and facilities resulting from actions by the Israeli side and to expeditiously reimburse the Agency for port and related charges, including storage, demurrage and transit charges, incurred by the Agency and other financial losses sustained by the Agency as a result of delays and restrictions on movement and access imposed by Israel. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/114, 14 December 2006, § 12, voting record: 169-6-8-9.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the UN General Assembly:
Welcoming the universal ratification of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, which alongside human rights law provide an important framework of accountability in relation to extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions during armed conflict,
3. Reiterates the obligation of all States to conduct exhaustive and impartial investigations into all suspected cases of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, to identify and bring to justice those responsible, while ensuring the right of every person to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, to grant adequate compensation within a reasonable time to the victims or their families, and to adopt all necessary measures, including legal and judicial measures, to put an end to impunity and to prevent the further occurrence of such executions, as recommended in the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/173, 19 December 2006, preamble and § 3, voting record: 137-0-43-12.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on an oil slick on Lebanese shores, the UN General Assembly:
1. Expresses its deep concern over the adverse implications of the destruction by the Israeli Air Force of the oil storage tanks in the direct vicinity of the Lebanese El-Jiyeh electric power plant for the achievement of sustainable development in Lebanon;
2. Considers that the oil slick has heavily polluted the shores of Lebanon and consequently has serious implications for human health, biodiversity, fisheries and tourism, all four of which in turn have serious implications for livelihoods and the economy of Lebanon;
3. Calls upon the Government of Israel to assume responsibility for prompt and adequate compensation to the Government of Lebanon for the costs of repairing the environmental damage caused by the destruction, including the restoration of the marine environment. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/194, 20 December 2006, §§ 1–3, voting record: 170-6-0-16.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on UNRWA operations, the UN General Assembly:
Urges the Government of Israel to speedily compensate the Agency for damage to its property and facilities resulting from actions by the Israeli side and to expeditiously reimburse the Agency for all transit charges incurred and other financial losses sustained by the Agency as a result of delays and restrictions on movement and access imposed by Israel. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/104, 17 December 2007, preamble and § 12, voting record: 170-6-3-13.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on an oil slick on Lebanese shores, the UN General Assembly:
2. Reiterates the expression of its deep concern about the adverse implications of the destruction by the Israeli Air Force of the oil storage tanks in the direct vicinity of the Lebanese el Jiyeh electric power plant for the achievement of sustainable development in Lebanon;
3. Considers that the oil slick has heavily polluted the shores of Lebanon and partially polluted Syrian shores and consequently has had serious implications for livelihoods and the economy of Lebanon, owing to the adverse implications for natural resources, biodiversity, fisheries and tourism, and for human health, in the country;
4. Requests the Government of Israel to assume responsibility for prompt and adequate compensation to the Government of Lebanon and other countries directly affected by the oil slick for the costs of repairing the environmental damage caused by the destruction, including the restoration of the marine environment. 
UN General Assembly, Res. Res. 62/188, 19 December 2007, §§ 2–4, voting record: 169-8-3-12.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on the Sudan, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Calls once more upon the Government of the Sudan to ensure a full and thorough investigation by the independent judicial inquiry commission of the killings of Sudanese employees of foreign relief organizations, to bring to justice those responsible for the killings and to provide just compensation to the families of the victims. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1995/77, 8 March 1995, § 17, voting record: 33-7-10.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the UN Commission Human Rights:
Reiterates the obligation of all States to conduct exhaustive and impartial investigations into all suspected cases of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, to identify and bring to justice those responsible, while ensuring the right of every person to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, to grant adequate compensation within a reasonable time to the victims or their families and to adopt all necessary measures, including legal and judicial measures, in order to bring an end to impunity and to prevent the recurrence of such executions, as stated in the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/53, 24 April 2003, § 4, voting record: 37-0-16.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Reiterates the obligation of all States to conduct exhaustive and impartial investigations into all suspected cases of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, to identify and bring to justice those responsible, while ensuring the right of every person to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, to grant adequate compensation within a reasonable time to the victims or their families and to adopt all necessary measures, including legal and judicial measures, in order to bring an end to impunity and to prevent the recurrence of such executions, as stated in the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions.  
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/37, 19 April 2004, § 5, voting record: 39-0-12.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Reiterates the obligation of all States to conduct exhaustive and impartial investigations into all suspected cases of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, to identify and bring to justice those responsible, while ensuring the right of every person to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, to grant adequate compensation within a reasonable time to the victims or their families and to adopt all necessary measures, including legal and judicial measures, in order to bring an end to impunity and to prevent the recurrence of such executions, as stated in the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/34, 19 April 2005, § 4, voting record: 36-0-17.
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1993 on the situation in Peru, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, after condemning the violations of human rights by the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA), and regretting the violations of human rights “by some members of the forces of law and order”, urged the Peruvian authorities “to compensate the victims of such [human rights] violations”. 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1993/23, 23 August 1993, §§ 2, 3 and 8.
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1995, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights called “for the individuals implicated in the war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Rwanda who have already been identified to be punished in order to guarantee the victims or their heirs fair compensation in accordance with the principles of international law”. 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1995/5, 18 August 1995, § 9.
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1998 on systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices during armed conflict, including internal armed conflict, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights reiterated that “States must respect their international obligations to … compensate victims of human rights and humanitarian law violations”. 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1998/18, 21 August 1998, § 9.
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1999 on systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights:
4. Aware that the provision of the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land which states that States “shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of [their] armed forces” and “shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation” for violations of the rules is part of customary international law;
9. Reiterates that States must respect their international obligations to … compensate all victims of human rights and humanitarian law violations;
12. Calls upon States to provide effective … compensation for unremedied violations in order to end the cycle of impunity with regard to sexual violence committed during armed conflicts. 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1999/16, 26 August 1999, §§ 4, 9 and 12.
UN Secretary-General
In 1998, in his report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, the UN Secretary-General stated:
Adherence to international humanitarian and human rights norms by all parties to a conflict must be insisted upon, and I intend to make this a priority in the work of the United Nations. In order to make warring parties more accountable for their actions, I recommend that combatants be held financially liable to their victims under international law where civilians are made the deliberate target of aggression. I further recommend that international legal machinery be developed to facilitate efforts to find, attach and seize the assets of transgressing parties and their leaders. 
UN Secretary-General, Report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, UN Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318, 13 April 1998, § 50; see also Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/1999/957, 8 September 1999, § 38.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1996, in a report on a mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan on the issue of military sexual slavery in wartime, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences recommended that:
137. The Government of Japan should:
(b) Pay compensation to individual victims of Japanese military sexual slavery according to principles outlined by the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. A special administrative tribunal for this purpose should be set up with a limited time-frame since many of the victims are of a very advanced age.
139. The Governments of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea may consider requesting the International Court of Justice to help resolve the legal issues concerning Japanese responsibility and payment of compensation for the “comfort women”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Report on the mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan on the issue of military sexual slavery in wartime, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.1, 4 January 1996, §§ 137(b) and 139.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1998, in a report on systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices during armed conflict, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights recommended that:
108. … Peace treaties must not seek to extinguish the rights of victims of human rights violations with respect to claims of compensation and other forms of legal redress unless appropriate administrative schemes for compensation and prosecution are incorporated into the substantive peace agreement …
109. … By incorporating an understanding of gender into the legal framework for responding to systematic rape and sexual slavery, the full range of the obligations and legal accountability of all parties to a conflict may be carefully articulated and concrete steps may be outlined to ensure adequate prevention, investigation and criminal and civil redress, including compensation of victims.
112. When the necessary elements exist to establish that sexual violence constitutes an international crime such as slavery, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture or war crimes, it must be charged, prosecuted and redressed as such. Concrete steps must be taken immediately, including in those countries currently experiencing internal armed conflict or violence, to ensure that … (c) victims of such abuses receive full redress under both criminal and civil laws, including compensation where appropriate. 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Wartime, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, 22 June 1998, §§ 108–109 and 112.
United Nations Environment Programme
The conclusions of UNEP’s Working Group of Experts on Liability and Compensation for Environmental Damage Arising from Military Activities presented in a report in 1996 stressed, inter alia, that:
(19) thresholds of damage established under instruments relating to the laws of war should not be a defence against claims arising in relation to the illegal use of force …
(21) where compensation is due for damage caused by a wrongful act, the basis for that compensation under international law is reflected in the approach of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzów Factory (Indemnity) case …
(22) that approach relates to the standard of compensation but does not provide guidance as to how to value the damage which has occurred …
(26) the environmental as well as the economic costs of clean-up measures should be considered, in accordance with the basic requirement of mitigation or avoidance of damage …
(27) the basic aim of restoration should be to reinstate the ecologically significant functions of injured resources and the associated public uses and amenities supported by such functions. 
UNEP, Conclusions by the Working Group of Experts on Liability and Compensation for Environmental Damage Arising from Military Activities, UN Doc. UNEP/Env.Law/3/Inf.1, 15 October 1996, Liability and Compensation for Environmental Damage, Nairobi, 1998, § 87(19), (21), (22), (26) and (27).
UN Commission on the Truth for El Salvador
In its report in 1993, the UN Commission on the Truth for El Salvador stated with respect to an incident which had occurred at El Junquillo that:
On 12 March 1981, soldiers and members of the Cacaopera military defence unit attacked the population, consisting solely of women, young children and old people. They killed the inhabitants and raped a number of women and little girls under the age of 12. They set fire to houses, cornfields and barns.
The Commission finds that: … the Government and the judiciary of El Salvador failed to conduct investigations into the incident. The State thus failed in its duty under international human rights law to … compensate the victims or their families. 
UN Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, Report, UN Doc. S/25500, 1 April 1993, p. 67.
International Law Commission
In its commentary on Article 36 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the International Law Commission stated:
Restitution, despite its primacy as a legal principle, is frequently unavailable or inadequate … The role of compensation is to fill gaps so as to ensure full reparation for damage suffered. … As compared with satisfaction, the function of compensation is to address the actual losses incurred as a result of the internationally wrongful act … Monetary compensation is intended to offset, as far as may be, the damage suffered by the injured State as a result of the breach … Within the field of diplomatic protection, a good deal of guidance is available as to appropriate compensation standards and methods of valuation, especially as concerns personal injury and takings of, or damage to, tangible property. It is well-established that a State may seek compensation in respect of personal injuries suffered by its officials or nationals, over and above any direct injury it may itself have suffered in relation to the same event. Compensable personal injury encompasses not only associated material losses, such as loss of earnings and earning capacity, medical expenses and the like, but also non-material damage suffered by the individual (sometimes, though not universally, referred to as moral damage in national legal systems). Non-material damage is generally understood to encompass loss of loved ones, pain and suffering as well as the affront to sensibilities associated with an intrusion on the person, home or private life. No less than material injury sustained by the injured State, non-material damage is financially assessable and may be the subject of a claim of compensation, as stressed in the “ Lusitania” case. 
International Law Commission, Commentary on Article 36 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Report of the International Law Commission, 53rd Session, UN Doc. A/56/10, New York, 2001, pp. 244–252.
European Parliament
In a resolution adopted in 1983 on missing persons in Argentina, the European Parliament insisted that
the good future relations of the Community with Argentina require that effective steps be taken by the Argentinean authorities to establish the fate of citizens of Member States who have disappeared and to provide financial compensation for them or their dependants. 
European Parliament, Resolution on the situation in Argentina, 13 October 1983, § 3.
International Conference of the Red Cross (1981
The 24th International Conference of the Red Cross in 1981 adopted a resolution on assistance to victims of torture in which it welcomed the efforts within the UN to “establish a Voluntary Fund for victims of torture … to extend humanitarian, legal and financial aid to individuals whose fundamental rights have been severely violated as a result of torture and to relatives of such victims” and urged governments to “consider responding favourably to requests for contributions to such a fund”. 
24th International Conference of the Red Cross, Manila, 7–14 November 1981, Res. XV, §§ 1 and 2.
International Conference of the Red Cross (1986)
The 25th International Conference of the Red Cross in 1986 adopted a resolution on assistance to victims of torture in which it urged “National Societies to take the initiative to give, either independently or in co-operation with their governments, humanitarian, legal, medical, psychological and social assistance to victims of torture in exile and, whenever possible, in their own countries”. 
25th International Conference of the Red Cross, Geneva, 23–31 October 1986, Res. XI.
International Conference of the Red Cross (1986)
The 25th International Conference of the Red Cross in 1986 adopted a resolution on assistance to victims of torture in which it appealed to “governments in a position to do so to respond favourably to requests for further contributions to the United Nations’ Voluntary Fund for victims of torture”. 
25th International Conference of the Red Cross, Geneva, 23–31 October 1986, Res. XII, § 1.
Inter-Parliamentary Conference (1993)
In a resolution adopted in 1993, the 90th Inter-Parliamentary Conference called on “all States to review procedures on compensation for damages caused to victims of violations of international humanitarian law and the payment of indemnities so as to allow the victims to derive real benefit from the assistance to which they are entitled”. 
90th Inter-Parliamentary Conference, Canberra, 13–18 September 1993, Resolution on Respect for International Humanitarian Law and Support for Humanitarian Action in Armed Conflicts, § 2(n).
International Conference for the Protection of War Victims
The Final Declaration adopted by the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims in 1993 reaffirmed that “States which violate international humanitarian law shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation.” 
International Conference for the Protection of War Victims, Geneva, 30 August–1 September 1993, Final Declaration, § II(7), ILM, Vol. 33, 1994, pp. 300–301.
Hague Appeal for Peace Conference
The Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice for the Twenty-first Century, adopted by the Hague Appeal for Peace Conference in May 1999, addressed the issue of reparation to victims of armed conflict and concluded that:
The Hague Appeal will demand that victims of armed conflict and human rights violations be made whole through the establishment of national, regional and international victim compensation funds and other reparation measures, which address the need of victims in a timely way. 
Hague Appeal for Peace Conference, The Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice for the Twenty-first Century, 12–15 May 1999, UN Doc. A/54/98, Point 17, p. 10.
African Parliamentary Conference on International Humanitarian Law for the Protection of Civilians during Armed Conflict
In the Final Declaration of the African Parliamentary Conference on International Humanitarian Law for the Protection of Civilians during Armed Conflict in 2002, the participants committed themselves to see that “any party to an armed conflict which violates International Humanitarian Law shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation”. 
African Parliamentary Conference on International Humanitarian Law for the Protection of Civilians during Armed Conflict, Niger, 18–20 February 2002, Final Declaration, § 11.
International Court of Justice
In its judgment on the merits in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) in 2007, the ICJ, dealing with the question of reparation for the failure to comply with the obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention to prevent and punish genocide, stated:
460. The principle governing the determination of reparation for an internationally wrongful act is as stated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Factory at Chorzów case: that “reparation must, so far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed” (P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 17, p. 47: see also Article 31 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility). In the circumstances of this case, as the Applicant recognizes, it is inappropriate to ask the Court to find that the Respondent is under an obligation of restitutio in integrum. Insofar as restitution is not possible, as the Court stated in the case of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), “[i]t is a well-established rule of international law that an injured State is entitled to obtain compensation from the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act for the damage caused by it” (I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 81, para. 152.; cf. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 198, paras. 152–153; see also Article 36 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility). It is therefore appropriate to consider what were the consequences of the failure of the Respondent to comply with its obligations under the Genocide Convention to prevent and punish the crime of genocide, committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and what damage can be said to have been caused thereby.
461. The Court has found that the authorities of the Respondent could not have been unaware of the grave risk of genocide once the VRS [Army of Republika Srpska] forces had decided to take possession of the Srebrenica enclave, and that in view of its influence over the events, the Respondent must be held to have had the means of action by which it could seek to prevent genocide, and to have manifestly refrained from employing them (paragraph 438). To that extent therefore it failed to comply with its obligation of prevention under the Convention. The obligation to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide is imposed by the Genocide Convention on any State party which, in a given situation, has it in its power to contribute to restraining in any degree the commission of genocide. To make this finding, the Court did not have to decide whether the acts of genocide committed at Srebrenica would have occurred anyway even if the Respondent had done as it should have and employed the means available to it. This is because, as explained above, the obligation to prevent genocide places a State under a duty to act which is not dependent on the certainty that the action to be taken will succeed in preventing the commission of acts of genocide, or even on the likelihood of that outcome. It therefore does not follow from the Court’s reasoning above in finding a violation by the Respondent of its obligation of prevention that the atrocious suffering caused by the genocide committed at Srebrenica would not have occurred had the violation not taken place.
462. The Court cannot however leave it at that. Since it now has to rule on the claim for reparation, it must ascertain whether, and to what extent, the injury asserted by the Applicant is the consequence of wrongful conduct by the Respondent with the consequence that the Respondent should be required to make reparation for it, in accordance with the principle of customary international law stated above. In this context, the question just mentioned, whether the genocide at Srebrenica would have taken place even if the Respondent had attempted to prevent it by employing all means in its possession, becomes directly relevant, for the definition of the extent of the obligation of reparation borne by the Respondent as a result of its wrongful conduct. The question is whether there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the wrongful act, the Respondent’s breach of the obligation to prevent genocide, and the injury suffered by the Applicant, consisting of all damage of any type, material or moral, caused by the acts of genocide. Such a nexus could be considered established only if the Court were able to conclude from the case as a whole and with a sufficient degree of certainty that the genocide at Srebrenica would in fact have been averted if the Respondent had acted in compliance with its legal obligations. However, the Court clearly cannot do so. As noted above, the Respondent did have significant means of influencing the Bosnian Serb military and political authorities which it could, and therefore should, have employed in an attempt to prevent the atrocities, but it has not been shown that, in the specific context of these events, those means would have sufficed to achieve the result which the Respondent should have sought. Since the Court cannot therefore regard as proven a causal nexus between the Respondent’s violation of its obligation of prevention and the damage resulting from the genocide at Srebrenica, financial compensation is not the appropriate form of reparation for the breach of the obligation to prevent genocide. 
ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, Judgment, 26 February 2007, §§ 460–462.
UN Compensation Commission Governing Council
Decision 1 of the UNCC Governing Council in August 1991 stressed Iraq’s responsibility for five particular causes of loss:
(a) military operations or threat of military action by either side during the period 2 August 1990 to 2 March 1991, (b) departure from or inability to leave Iraq or Kuwait (or a decision not to return) during that period, (c) actions by officials, employees or agents of the Government of Iraq or its controlled entities during that period in connection with the invasion or occupation, (d) the breakdown of civil order in Kuwait or Iraq during that period, and (e) hostage-taking or other illegal detention. 
UNCC, Governing Council, Decision 1: Criteria for expedited processing of urgent claims, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1991/1, 2 August 1991, § 18.
In a number of other decisions, the UNCC Governing Council admitted the following types of claims for compensation: (a) serious personal injury and mental pain and anguish; (b) business claims; (c) embargo losses; (d) contract losses; (e) losses involving tangible property; (f) losses relating to income-producing properties; and (g) claims by members of coalition forces. 
UNCC, Governing Council, Decision 3: Personal injury and mental pain and anguish, 18 October 1991, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1991/3, 23 October 1991; Decision 4: Business losses of individuals eligible for consideration under the expedited procedures, 18 October 1991, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1991/4, 23 October 1991; Decision 7: Criteria for additional categories of claims, 18 November 1991 as revised on 16 March 1992, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev.1, 17 March 1992; Decision 9: Propositions and conclusions on compensation for business losses: types of damages and their valuation, 6 March 1992, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1992/9, 6 March 1992; Decision 11: Eligibility for compensation of members of the Allied Coalition Armed Forces, 26 June 1992, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1992/11, 26 June 1992; Decision 15: Compensation for business losses resulting from Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait where the trade embargo and related measures were also a cause, 18 December 1992, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1992/15_*, 4 January 1993; J. R. Crook, “The United Nations Compensation Commission – A New Structure to Enforce State Responsibility”, AJIL, Vol. 87, 1993, pp. 153–156.
UN Compensation Commission Governing Council
In Decision 7 of November 1991 and revised in March 1992, the UNCC Governing Council held that payments were in principle available
with respect to any direct loss, damage, or injury to Governments or international organizations as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. This will include any loss suffered as a result of: (a) military operations or threat of military action by either side during the period 2 August 1990 to 2 March 1991; … (c) actions by officials, employees or agents of the Government of Iraq or its controlled entities during that period in connection with the invasion or occupation. 
UNCC, Governing Council, Decision 7: Criteria for additional categories of claims, 18 November 1991, as revised on 16 March 1992, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev.1, 17 March 1992, § 34.
With regard to environmental claims, the UNCC Governing Council decided that:
These payments are available with respect to direct environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait: This will include losses or expenses resulting from: (a) abatement and prevention of environmental damage, including expenses directly relating to fighting oil fires and stemming the flow of oil in coastal and international waters; (b) reasonable measures already taken to clean and restore the environment or future measures which can be documented as reasonably necessary to clean and restore the environment; (c) reasonable monitoring and assessment of the environmental damage for the purposes of evaluating and abating the harm and restoring the environment; (d) reasonable monitoring of public health and performing medical screenings for the purposes of investigation and combating increased health risks as a result of environmental damage; and (e) depletion of or damage to natural resources. 
UNCC, Governing Council, Decision 7: Criteria for additional categories of claims, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev.1, 18 November 1991, as revised on 16 March 1992, 17 March 1992, § 35.
UN Compensation Commission Governing Council
In Decision 11 of June 1992, the UNCC Governing Council provided:
Members of the Allied Coalition Armed Forces are not eligible for compensation for loss or injury arising as a consequence of their involvement in Coalition military operations against Iraq, except if the following three conditions are met:
a. The compensation is awarded in accordance with the general criteria already adopted; and
b. They were prisoners of war as a consequence of their involvement in Coalition military operations against Iraq in response to its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait; and
c. The loss or injury resulted from mistreatment in violation of international humanitarian law (including the Geneva Conventions of 1949). 
UNCC, Governing Council, Decision 11: Eligibility for compensation of members of the Allied Coalition Armed Forces, 26 June 1992, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1992/11, 26 June 1992. (At its twentieth Session, in October 1998, the Governing Council extended the application of its Decision 11 to members of forces that were not part of the Allied Coalition Forces, UN Doc. S/AC.26/SR.81, 12 October 1998.)
UN Compensation Commission
In 1994, the Panel of Commissioners appointed by the UNCC recommended in relation to claims from individuals who suffered serious personal injury or whose spouse, child or parent died as a direct result of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait that:
c) Claims submitted for detained persons
… Compensation, if any, would be awarded for claims for serious personal injury submitted by the detainee personally after his/her release, or for claims for death submitted by the family after it has been determined by the detainee’s Government that the detainee is deceased.
d) Missing persons
… compensation be awarded where from the documentation submitted it could be presumed that the “missing” person is deceased.
In instances where it could not conclude that the “missing” person is deceased, the Panel holds that compensation cannot be recommended at this stage and that a new claim can be submitted if the family ever receives confirmation of the death. 
UNCC, Governing Council, Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners concerning individual claims for serious personal injury or death (category “B” claims), 14 April 1994, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1994/1, 26 May 1994, § II(A)(2)(c) and (d).
UN Compensation Commission
The 1994 report and recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners concerning Part One of the Second Instalment of Claims for Serious Personal Injury or Death (Category “B” Claims) of the UNCC state:
Among the claims for “serious personal injury” or “death” were those involving members of the Allied Coalition Armed Forces which in principle are not recommended for compensation by the Panel pursuant to Decision 11 of the Governing Council. However, the Panel had before it claims by members of the Allied Coalition Armed Forces that fall within the exceptional conditions stated in the same decision. These members of the Allied Forces were taken prisoners of war during coalition military operations against Iraq and their claims contain extensive medical documentation explaining the torture and injuries that were inflicted upon them by Iraqi authorities during their captivity. Many of the personal statements attached to the claim forms explain that beatings were administered to members of the Allied Forces so as to coerce them into releasing information. The Panel accordingly recommends that these claims be awarded compensation. 
UNCC, Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners concerning Part One of the Second Instalment of Claims for Serious Personal Injury of Death (Category “B” Claims), UN Doc. S/AC.26/1994/4, 15 December 1994, § 14.
UN Compensation Commission
On 30 July 1993, Kuwait Oil Company filed with the UNCC the “Well Blowout Control Claim” (also known as “WBC Claim”)
in the amount of US$951,630,871 for costs it allegedly incurred in (a) the planning for the work anticipated on the return of the oil fields of Kuwait … (b) the work performed to extinguish the well-head fires that were burning upon the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; (c) the initial sealing of the wells to stop the flow of oil and gas; and (d) the making safe of the wellheads so that work on the reinstatement of production could be started. 
UNCC, Governing Council, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1996/5/Annex, Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners appointed to review the Well Blowout Control Claim (the “WBC Claim”), 18 December 1996, § 1.
UN Compensation Commission Governing Council
On 22 March 1995, the UNCC Governing Council appointed a Panel of Commissioners. 
UNCC, Governing Council, Report and recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners appointed to review the Well Blowout Control Claim (the “WBC Claim”), UN Doc. S/AC.26/1996/5/Annex, 18 December 1996, § 9.
During the proceedings, regarding the categorization of the claim (category “E” or category “F” claim), the Panel referred to Decision 7 of the Governing Council. It also noted that, in its view, “the categorization of a claim as an ‘E’ or ‘F’ claim does not necessarily entail substantive consequences in terms of the law applicable to such claim” and that UN Security Council Resolution 687 provided “for the compensability of, inter alia, ‘environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources’, without making any qualifications as to the legal subject or entity eligible to make such claims”.  
UNCC, Governing Council, Report and recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners appointed to review the Well Blowout Control Claim (the “WBC Claim”), UN Doc. S/AC.26/1996/5/Annex, 18 December 1996, §§ 49 and 51.
On the question of a direct link between actions taken by Iraq and damage incurred by Kuwait, the Panel of Commissioners found that “although part of the damage for which compensation is being sought in the WBC Claim may be a result of the Allied bombing, the bulk of the oil-well fires was directly caused by the explosives placed on the wellheads and detonated by Iraqi armed forces”. Referring to Decision 7 of the Governing Council, it added that “Iraq is liable for any direct loss, damage or injury whether caused by its own or by the coalition armed forces. Iraq’s contention that the Allied air raids broke the chain of causation therefore cannot be upheld.” 
UNCC, Governing Council, Report and recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners appointed to review the Well Blowout Control Claim (the “WBC Claim”), UN Doc. S/AC.26/1996/5/Annex, 18 December 1996, §§ 85 and 86.
The Panel included in its recommendations that:
(a) the Claimant KUWAIT OIL COMPANY (the “Claimant”) is to be paid the amount of US$ 610,048,547 as compensation for the costs incurred in the execution of the Well Blowout Control Exercise as a direct result of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait; … (c) the claim for the costs incurred in connection with the work performed by the Claimant’s own firefighting team … is rejected; (d) the claim for the indirect costs incurred in fighting oil-well fires … is rejected. 
UNCC, Governing Council, Report and recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners appointed to review the Well Blowout Control Claim (the “WBC Claim”), UN Doc. S/AC.26/1996/5/Annex, 18 December 1996, § 233.
UN Compensation Commission Governing Council
In December 1996, the UNCC Governing Council approved the recommendations of the Panel of Commissioners in the “WBC Claim” and decided “to approve the amount of the recommended award of US$610,048,547 … to Kuwait Oil Company on behalf of Kuwait’s public oil sector as a whole”. 
UNCC, Governing Council, Decision 40: Well Blowout Control Claim, 17 December 1996, UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.40, 18 December 1996, §§ 1 and 2.
European Court of Human Rights
In its judgment in Akdivar and Others v. Turkey in 1998, the European Court of Human Rights stated:
45. The applicants further submitted that the Court should confirm … that the government should (1) bear the costs of necessary repairs in [their village] to enable the applicants to continue their way of life there; and (2) remove any obstacle preventing the applicants from returning to their village.
In their view, such confirmation was necessary to prevent future and continuing violations of the Convention, in particular the de facto expropriation of their property.
46. The government maintained that the restoration of rights is not feasible due to the emergency conditions prevailing in the region. However, resettlement will take place when the local inhabitants feel themselves to be safe from terrorist atrocities.
47. The Court recalls that a judgement in which it finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to such breach and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach (restitutio in integrum). However, if restitutio in integrum is in practice impossible, the respondent States are free to choose the means whereby they will comply with a judgement in which the Court has found a breach, and the Court will not make consequential orders or declaratory statements in this regard.
The Court awarded damages for pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses but dismissed the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction. 
European Court of Human Rights, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, Judgment, 1 April 1998, §§ 45–47.
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
In 2003, in two partial awards dealing with claims brought by Eritrea and Ethiopia on behalf of their nationals respectively, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission awarded compensation related to the treatment of former prisoners of war by the two governments. 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Prisoners of War, Eritreas Claim, Partial Award, 1 July 2003; Prisoners of War, Ethiopias Claim, Partial Award, 1 July 2003.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
In 1983, in a report on the situation of human rights of a segment of the Nicaraguan population of Miskito origin, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights recommended that a conference should be held by representatives of the Government of Nicaragua and persons representing the people of the Miskitos. For the agenda of the conference, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights suggested, inter alia, the “establishment of procedures and mechanisms to compensate the Miskito for the loss of their homes, crops, livestock or other belongings when they were evacuated from their villages”. 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights of a segment of the Nicaraguan population of Miskito origin, Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62 Doc. 10 rev. 3, 29 November 1983, Part Three, § B(3)(i).
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
In 1983, a petition filed before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleged that an asylum in Grenada had been bombed by US military aircraft. Before a settlement could be reached with the United States on the matter, the Commission declared the petition admissible, inter alia, given the “unwillingness of the US Government to compensate these victims subsequent to the expiration of the ad hoc compensation program”. 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 9213 (US), Report on the admissibility of the petition, 22 September 1987.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
In a case concerning Colombia in 1992, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concluded that the Colombian Government had failed to comply with its obligation under the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights (right to life, right to humane treatment, right to personal liberty and judicial protection) and concluded that “Colombia must pay the victim’s next-of-kin compensatory damages”. 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 10.581 (Colombia), Report, 25 September 1992, Conclusions, § 2.
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
In its Decision Number 7, Guidance Regarding Jus ad Bellum Liability, in 2007, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission considered the principles governing compensation as a form of reparation for State violations of international law, deciding the standard of legal causation which would apply to claims for compensation. The Commission stated:
7. The Commission regards the standard of legal causation to be relevant to the matters at issue. Compensation can only be awarded in respect of damages having a sufficient causal connection with conduct violating international law. … [N]umerous terms have been used to describe this connection, including such terms as reasonable, direct, proximate, foreseeable or certain (or conversely, unreasonable, remote, attenuated, or speculative). … [T]hese varying terminologies often provide limited assistance in analyzing specific situations. Both Parties also referred to a point noted by the International Law Commission in its Commentary to its State Responsibility Articles – that “the requirement of a causal link is not necessarily the same in relation to every breach of an international obligation.” The degree of connection may vary depending upon the nature of the claim and other circumstances. In this regard, some writers see causation being more readily found in cases involving particularly serious violations of law.
8. [One of the parties] acknowledged the potential limitations of any verbal formulation. However, at the hearing, it maintained that the varying formulae were best distilled in Whiteman’s treatise on Damages in International Law – “that damages allowed on account of the commission or omission of an act giving rise to responsibility generally are those which it is reasonable to allow.” While acknowledging its debt to Whiteman’s treatise, the Commission is not persuaded that her formulation is the best way forward. The notions of “reasonableness” or “reasonable connection” rest upon a subjective concept – “reasonableness” – likely to be heavily shaped by the decisionmaker’s culture and life experience. This concept has a significant role in some national legal systems, but not in others. Given this, it cannot be seen as a general principle of law. Moreover, given the varying approaches to causation adopted by differing international tribunals, the concept has not attained the status of a customary rule of international law.
9. For its part, [the other party] argued that the connection was better described in the more familiar lexicon of “proximate cause,” although it acknowledged that this term was not a perfect expression of the required relationship. Again, this formulation is not a general principle of law or a rule of customary international law… [B]oth Parties viewed the link between delict and compensable injury as an area in which judgment was required, and where the Commission necessarily exercised a measure of discretion.
10. Yet another approach is the concept of “direct” or “indirect” damages. In the historic Alabama arbitration, the arbitrators’ decision to exclude “indirect” claims (for losses resulting from the transfer of U.S. ships to the British flag, increased insurance rates, and the prolongation of the war) was crucial in avoiding possible frustration of the process. The Treaty of Versailles also required Germany to provide compensation for damage “directly in consequence of hostilities or of any operations of war.” However, many tribunals and commentators have criticized this approach, finding that it lacks analytical power. The umpire in the War-Risk Insurance Premium Claims case described the distinction as “frequently illusory and fanciful,” and urged that it “should have no place in international law.”
11. Notwithstanding these concerns, when the Security Council established the mandate of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) in Resolution 687, it specified that the UNCC’s jurisdiction was limited to “direct” injury. Much of the subsequent work of the UNCC’s Governing Council and of its Panels of Commissioners has involved line-drawing to determine what injury is deemed “direct” for purposes of Resolution 687. The UNCC’s work is of interest, but its relevance to the present question is uncertain. In addition to the criticisms noted above, the fundamental “line-drawing” decisions regarding the extent of direct injury for the UNCC’s purposes have been made by the UNCC Governing Council in light of reports of the UNCC’s Panels of Commissioners. The Governing Council is a political organ that has operated in an unusual political and factual setting. It does not follow judicial processes or necessarily apply international law in its decisions. Thus, while the UNCC offers significant precedents in many areas, its decisions regarding the scope of “direct” injury must be assessed with care and in light of their context.
12. Another substantial line of cases finds the proper test of the connection between delict and compensable damage to be whether the damage was foreseeable (or sometimes, “reasonably foreseeable”) to the perpetrator of the delict. These have included awards of the Samoan Claims Commission, the U.S.-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission, the Portugo-German Arbitral Tribunal case, and the Lighthouses arbitration between France and Greece.
13. Given this ambiguous terrain, the Commission concludes that the necessary connection is best characterized through the commonly used nomenclature of “proximate cause.” In assessing whether this test is met, and whether the chain of causation is sufficiently close in a particular situation, the Commission will give weight to whether particular damage reasonably should have been foreseeable to an actor committing the international delict in question. The element of forseeability, although not without its own difficulties, provides some discipline and predictability in assessing proximity. Accordingly, it will be given considerable weight in assessing whether particular damages are compensable.
14. The Commission notes that, in many situations, the choice of verbal formula to describe the necessary degree of connection will result in no difference in outcomes. In this regard, both Parties agreed that a significant range of possible damages related to war lie beyond the pale of State responsibility. Both cited with approval the decisions of the American-German Mixed Claims Commission established in 1922, which excluded significant types of claims, such as increased living costs and transportation costs, as being too remote from particular conduct by Germany. In this regard, the American-German Commission mirrored other war claims tribunals that excluded broad categories of claims, such as those for generalized economic damages, increased insurance rates, and similar matters. 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Decision Number 7, Guidance Regarding Jus ad Bellum Liability, 27 July 2007, §§ 7–14.
[footnotes in original omitted]
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
In its Eritrea’s Damages Claims final award in 2009, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, in considering the principle of compensation for State violations of international law, stated:
24. The Parties’ overall economic positions are relevant to determining compensation … In considering both Parties’ claims for violation of the jus in bello, the Commission has been mindful of the principle, set out by the Permanent Court of International Justice in Chorzów Factory, that the purpose of compensation payable by a responsible State is “to seek to wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.” This notion underlies Article 31 of the ILC’s [International Law Commission’s] Articles on State Responsibility, that “[t]he responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”
26. Chorzów Factory teaches that compensation has a limited function. Its role is to restore an injured party, in so far as possible, to the position it would have occupied but for the injury. This function is remedial, not punitive. Accordingly, in situations involving diplomatic protection, compensation must be assessed in light of the actual social and economic circumstances of the injured individuals in respect of whom the State is claiming. The difficult economic conditions found in the affected areas of Eritrea and Ethiopia must be taken into account in assessing compensation there. Compensation determined in accordance with international law cannot remedy the world’s economic disparities. 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Eritrea’s Damages Claims, Final Award, 17 August 2009, §§ 24 and 26.
[footnotes in original omitted]
The Commission also considered whether compensation extended to “consequential damages”, stating:
[I]nternational law does not recognize a separate category of compensable “consequential damages” involving different standards of legal causation or other distinctive legal elements. The concept of consequential damages has a significant role in some national legal systems, but does not exist in others, and so cannot be viewed as a general principle of law. Similarly, the concept has not been recognized in international proceedings as a separate form of compensable injury as Eritrea advocates. The Commission thus does not assign particular legal significance to Eritrea’s characterization of certain types of damages as “consequential.” It instead examines this claim in accordance with the principles generally applicable in determining damages in international claims. The Commission notes in this regard that this claim seeks large sums in addition to those … for the costs of repairing or replacing damaged or destroyed buildings or other infrastructure for which the Commission has found liability. 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Eritrea’s Damages Claims, Final Award, 17 August 2009, § 203.
[emphasis in original]
ICRC
The ICRC Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention states with respect to Article 148 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV:
As regards material compensation for breaches of the Convention, it is inconceivable, at least as the law stands today, that claimants should be able to bring a direct action for damages against the State in whose service the person committing the breach was working. Only a State can make such claims on another State, and they form part, in general, of what is called “war reparations”. It would seem unjust for individuals to be punished while the State in whose name or on whose instructions they acted was released from all liability. 
Jean S. Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention, ICRC, Geneva, 1958, p. 603.
ICRC
The ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols states:
Article 91 literally reproduces Article 3 of the Hague Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907, and does not abrogate it in any way, which means that it continues to be customary law for all nations.
In fact [the principle contained in Article 51 of the 1949 Geneva Convention I, Article 52 of the 1949 Geneva Convention II, Article 131 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III and Article 148 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV] is the same principle as that contained in the present Article 91 and in Article 3 of Hague Convention IV of 1907. The purpose of this provision is specifically to prevent the vanquished from being compelled in an armistice agreement or peace treaty to renounce all compensation due for breaches committed by persons in the service of the victor. 
Yves Sandoz et al. (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, §§ 3645 and 3649.
ICRC
In 1993, in a report submitted to the UN General Assembly on the protection of the environment in time of armed conflict, the ICRC stated that during expert meetings on the issue, a list of the most important matters to be discussed had been drawn up. 
ICRC, Report on the protection of the environment in time of armed conflict submitted to the UN General Assembly, reprinted in UN Doc. A/48/269, Report of the UN Secretary-General on the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict, 29 July 1993, §§ 65–72.
Under one of these specific issues (“When should damage to the environment be qualified as a ‘grave breach’? State Responsibility and compensation”), it was stated:
86. Any violation of either treaty-based or customary rules attributable to a State would create an obligation on the part of the offending State towards the State or States whose environment suffered damage.
87. According to article 3 of the Hague Convention IV of 1907 and to article 91 of Protocol I of 1977, a State violating an international obligation must be liable to pay compensation. 
ICRC, Report on the protection of the environment in time of armed conflict submitted to the UN General Assembly, reprinted in UN Doc. A/48/269, Report of the UN Secretary-General on the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict, 29 July 1993, §§ 86 and 87.
ICRC
In 1993, in a report on the protection of war victims, the ICRC, referring to Article 91 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, stated: “This article confirms a rule which is today accepted as being part of customary law and was already stated, in almost identical terms, in Article 3 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907.” Referring to Article 51 of the 1949 Geneva Convention I, Article 52 of the 1949 Geneva Convention II, Article 131 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV and Article 148 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, the ICRC moreover stated:
This provision … also implies that, irrespective of the outcome of an armed conflict, no decision or agreement can dispense a State from the responsibility to make reparation for damages caused to the victims of breaches of international humanitarian law or to pay compensation for those damages.
The ICRC recommended that:
The International Conference for the Protection of War Victims should make it clear that it wishes procedures to be set up to provide reparation for damage inflicted on the victims of violations of international humanitarian law and award compensation to them, so as to enable them to receive the benefits to which they are entitled. 
ICRC, Report on the Protection of War Victims, Geneva, June 1993, Section 4.3, IRRC, No. 292, 1993, pp. 391–445.
Spanish Junta de Defensa Nacional
In 1936, during the Spanish Civil War, in a note to the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Negotiations, the President of the Spanish Junta de Defensa Nacional, while denouncing and condemning certain acts of assassination, mistreatment and damage allegedly committed against his side and non-belligerent third parties by members of the adverse party (the “Red Forces Armed by the Government of Madrid”), expressed his intention to pay compensation to the victims of the alleged offences and to repair the damage caused. 
Spain, Note from the President of the Spanish Junta de Defensa Nacional to the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Negotiations, concerning a supposed incursion into Portuguese territory of “Red forces armed by the Government of Madrid” resulting in the death of a commander of the “National” army, mistreatment of Spanish and Portuguese subjects, and damage to Portuguese property, Burgos, 17 September 1936, reprinted in Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Dez anos de política externa (1936–1947), A Nação portuguesa e a segunda Guerra Mundial, 1964, pp. 285–287.
Institute of International Law
In a resolution on the application of the rules of IHL in hostilities in which UN forces are engaged, adopted at its Zagreb Session in 1971, the Institute of International Law stated:
Without prejudice to the individual or collective responsibility which derives from the very fact that the party opposing the United Nations Forces has committed aggression, that party shall make reparation for injuries caused in violation of the humanitarian rules of armed conflict. The United Nations is entitled to demand compliance with these rules for the benefit of its Forces and to claim damages for injuries suffered by its Forces in violation of these rules. 
Institute of International Law, Zagreb Session, Resolution on Conditions of Application of Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in which United Nations Forces May be Engaged, 3 September 1971, § 7.
American Law Institute
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1986, provides:
Under international law, a state that has violated a legal obligation to another state is required to terminate the violation and, ordinarily, to make reparation, including in appropriate circumstances restitution or compensation for loss or injury. 
The American Law Institute, Restatement Third. Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, 1987, § 901.
The Restatement (Third) further provides:
A private person, whether natural or juridical, injured by a violation of an international obligation by a state, may bring a claim against that state or assert that violation as a defense
(a) in a competent international forum when the state has consented to the jurisdiction of that forum with respect to such private claims;
(b) in a court or other tribunal of that state pursuant to its law; or
(c) in a court or other tribunal of the injured person’s state of nationality or of a third state, pursuant to the law of such state, subject to limitations under international law. 
The American Law Institute, Restatement Third. Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, 1987, § 906.
Afghan News
In a joint statement in 1987, several factions involved in the conflict in Afghanistan declared that the USSR could not securely leave Afghanistan without paying war compensation. 
Afghan News, 15 August 1987, Vol. III, Nos. 15 and 16, pp. 8 and 9.
Supreme Council of Abkhazia
In 1992, in the context of the conflict in Georgia, Abkhazia denounced acts of pillage committed by Georgian troops and considered the leadership of the Republic of Georgia responsible for them. It further considered that Georgia was obliged to compensate the damage caused to the Republic of Abkhazia and to each victim in particular. 
Supreme Council of Abkhazia, Statement of the Press-Service of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia, No. 10-86, August 1992.
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)
The SPLM Human Rights Charter provides: “The victims of human rights abuses shall receive compensation. In the case of victims who have been killed, the compensation should go to their kin in accordance with the customary law of the victim.” 
SPLM, Human Rights Charter, May 1996, Article 10.
Kalshoven
In an expert opinion on Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) prepared in the context of cases seeking compensation for individual victims before Japanese courts, Kalshoven asserted that the adoption of Article 91 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I which, in his words, “contains a slightly modernised version of Article 3 [1907 Hague Convention IV]” at the CDDH without much discussion and without any dissent “reflected and indeed reaffirmed the general acceptance of the contents of the Article as established customary law”. 
Frits Kalshoven, Expert opinion, Article 3 of the Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907, reprinted in Hisakazu Fujita, Isomi Suzuki and Kantaro Nagano (eds.), War and the Rights of Individuals. Renaissance of Individual Compensation, Nippon Hyoron-sha Co., Tokyo, 1999, p. 37.
In the same opinion, Kalshoven added:
Although the first sentence of Article 3 does not state in so many words that individual persons, including persons resident in occupied territory, have a right to claim the compensation due under the Article, the drafting history of the Article leaves no room for doubt that this was precisely its purpose. 
Frits Kalshoven, Expert opinion, Article 3 of the Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907, reprinted in Hisakazu Fujita, Isomi Suzuki and Kantaro Nagano (eds.), War and the Rights of Individuals. Renaissance of Individual Compensation, Nippon Hyoron-sha Co., Tokyo, 1999, p. 38.
Greenwood
An expert opinion prepared by Christopher Greenwood took into account military manuals (from the United Kingdom and Germany), which stated that the laws of war were binding not only upon governments but also upon every individual, and the position of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), which insisted on punishing individuals responsible for violations of the laws of war, to state:
The international law of war thus clearly imposes duties upon individuals and subjects those who violate their obligations to criminal penalties. There is, therefore, no reason why the rights created by the international law of war should be confined to states. To confine them in that way would create a wholly illogical asymmetry in the law for which there would be no justification. 
Christopher Greenwood, Expert opinion, Rights to Compensation of Former Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees under Article 3 of Hague Convention No. IV 1907, reprinted in Hisakazu Fujita, Isomi Suzuki and Kantaro Nagano (eds.), War and the Rights of Individuals. Renaissance of Individual Compensation, Nippon Hyoron-sha Co., Tokyo, 1999, pp. 66–67, §§ 21, 22 and 23.
[emphasis in original]
Referring to the debates on what became Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV), which led to the conclusion that the “liability on the part of the State is additional to the criminal liability of the individual wrongdoer” and to Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) creating a Compensation Commission to hear claims for compensation in Kuwait after the Gulf War, Greenwood added:
It is my opinion, therefore, that Article 3 of the Hague Convention, the Hague Regulations and customary international law of war confer rights upon individuals, including rights to compensation, in the event of a violation, which the individual can assert against the State of the wrongdoer. The right exists under international law. While it is obviously a matter of Japanese law … whether the Japanese courts have jurisdiction to give effect to that right, for them to do so would clearly be in accordance with international law and would enable the Japanese State to comply with its obligations under international law. 
Christopher Greenwood, Expert opinion, Rights to Compensation of Former Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees under Article 3 of Hague Convention No. IV 1907, reprinted in Hisakazu Fujita, Isomi Suzuki and Kantaro Nagano (eds.), War and the Rights of Individuals. Renaissance of Individual Compensation, Nippon Hyoron-sha Co., Tokyo, 1999, pp. 67 and 69, §§ 24 and 30.
International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims
In the late 1990s, five European Insurance companies (Generali, Allianz, Axa, Winterthur Leben and Zurich) sued by Holocaust survivors in the United States formed and funded, in co-operation with the United States National Association of Insurance Commissioners, representatives of Jewish organizations and the State of Israel, the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC) in order to settle the claims of Holocaust survivors and/or their heirs for non-payment of pre-Second-World War policies. 
See, e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, “The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective”, Paper presented at the Association of Genocide Scholars, 4th Biennial Conference, Minneapolis, June 2001.
In this context, the Italian insurer Assicurazioni Generali, for example, agreed to pay US$100 million. 
“Payment for Past: Survivors May Finally Collect Claims”, The Christian Science Monitor, 21 August 1998.
Association française des banques (AFB)
In 1999, the French Banking Association (Association française des banques, AFB), long accused of benefiting from unclaimed accounts confiscated or frozen by French banks during the Second World War, announced compensation measures for survivors of the Holocaust and their heirs. Some 76,000 French Jews were sent to Nazi death camps in the Second World War, and the banks are accused of making no effort to return the funds from their accounts since then. 
“News in Brief”, The Christian Science Monitor, 25 March 1999.
Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery
The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery stated in its first findings:
In examining the government of Japan’s obligation to provide reparations, we refer to the longstanding principle of international law that the state must provide a remedy for its international wrongs. The state’s responsibility is to provide compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. Reparation includes any or all forms that are applicable to the situation and cover all injuries suffered by the victim …
Under international law, compensation must come from the government and must be adequate to the material harm, lost opportunities and emotional suffering of the victims, their families and close associates. 
Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, The Prosecutors and the Peoples of the Asia-Pacific Region v. Emperor Hirohito et al. and the Government of Japan, Summary of Findings, 12 December 2000, §§ 32 and 35.
The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal therefore recommended that:
The government of Japan … enact legislation and take all necessary and appropriate measures to compensate the victims and survivors and those entitled to recover as a result of the violations declared herein through the government and in amounts adequate to redress the harm and deter its future occurrence. 
Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, The Prosecutors and the Peoples of the Asia-Pacific Region v. Emperor Hirohito et al. and the Government of Japan, Summary of Findings, 12 December 2000, Preliminary Recommendations.
Note: For practice concerning the investigation of enforced disappearances, see Rule 98.
Paris Agreement on Reparation from Germany
The 1946 Paris Agreement on Reparation from Germany was concluded
in order to obtain an equitable distribution among [the signatory governments] of the total assets which … are or may be declared to be available as reparation from Germany … in order to establish an Inter-Allied Reparation Agency, and to settle an equitable procedure for the restitution of monetary gold. 
Agreement on Reparation from Germany, on the Establishment of an Inter-Allied Reparation Agency and on the Restitution of Monetary Gold, concluded between Albania, the United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece, India, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Union of South Africa and Yugoslavia, Paris, 14 January 1946.
Paris Agreement on Reparation from Germany
The single Article of Part III of the 1946 Paris Agreement on Reparation from Germany, entitled “Restitution of monetary gold”, provides:
A. All the monetary gold found in Germany by the Allied Forces … shall be pooled for distribution as restitution among the countries participating in the pool in proportion to their respective losses of gold through looting or by wrongful removal to Germany.
B. Without prejudice to claims by way of reparation for unrestored gold, the portion of monetary gold thus accruing to each country participating in the pool shall be accepted by that country in full satisfaction of all claims against Germany for restitution of monetary gold.
C. A proportional share of the gold shall be allocated to each country concerned which adheres to this arrangement for the restitution of monetary gold and which can establish that a definite amount of monetary gold belonging to it was looted by Germany or, at any time after 12 March 1938, was wrongfully removed into German territory. 
Agreement on Reparation from Germany, on the Establishment of an Inter-Allied Reparation Agency and on the Restitution of Monetary Gold, concluded between Albania, the United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece, India, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Union of South Africa and Yugoslavia, Paris, 14 January 1946, Part III.
European Convention on Human Rights
Article 41 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights provides:
If the [European Court of Human Rights] finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the [European Court of Human Rights] shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950, as amended by Protocol No. 11, Strasbourg, 11 May 1994, Article 41.
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation
Article 2 of Chapter Three (“Internal Restitution”) of the 1952 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation provides:
The Federal Republic [of Germany] hereby acknowledges the need for, and assumes the obligation to implement fully and by every means in its power, the legislation … and the programmes for restitution and re-allocation thereunder provided. The Federal Republic shall entrust a Federal Agency with ensuring the fulfilment of the obligation undertaken under this Article, paying due regard to the provisions of the [German] Basic Law. 
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation (with Annex), Bonn, 26 May 1952, also known as the Transference Treaty, as amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Paris, 23 October 1954, Chapter Three, Article 2.
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation
Article 4 of Chapter Three (“Internal Restitution”) of the 1952 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation provides:
1. The Federal Republic [of Germany] hereby undertakes
(a) … to ensure the payment to restitutees of all judgments or awards which have been or hereafter shall be given or made against the former German Reich …
(b) to assume forthwith, by appropriate arrangements with the City of Berlin, liability for the payment … of all judgments and awards against the former German Reich under the internal restitution legislation in the Western Sector of Berlin.
3. The obligation of the Federal Republic to the Three Powers with respect to money judgments and awards under paragraph 1 of this Article shall be satisfied when such judgments and awards shall have been paid or shall, if the Federal Republic so requests, be considered to have been satisfied when the Federal Republic shall have paid a total of DM 1,500,000,000 thereon. 
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation (with Annex), Bonn, 26 May 1952, also known as the Transference Treaty, as amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Paris, 23 October 1954, Chapter Three, Article 4.
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation
By Article 6 of Chapter Three (“Internal Restitution”) of the 1952 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation, a “Supreme Restitution Court” was established. 
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation (with Annex), Bonn, 26 May 1952, also known as the Transference Treaty, as amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Paris, 23 October 1954, Chapter Three, Article 6.
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation
Article 1, first paragraph, of Chapter Five (“External Restitution”) of the 1952 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation provides:
Upon the entry into force of the present Convention, the Federal Republic [of Germany] shall establish, staff and equip an administrative agency which shall … search for, recover, and restitute jewellery, silverware and antique furniture … and cultural property, if such articles or cultural property were, during the occupation of any territory, removed therefrom by the forces or authorities of Germany or its Allies or their individual members (whether or not pursuant to orders) after acquisition by duress (with or without violence), by larceny, by requisitioning or by other forms of dispossession by force. 
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation (with Annex), Bonn, 26 May 1952, also known as the Transference Treaty, as amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Paris, 23 October 1954, Chapter Three, Article 1, para. 1.
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation
Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of Chapter Five (“External Restitution”) of the 1952 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation provides:
Notwithstanding provisions of German law to the contrary, any person who, or whose predecessor in title, during the occupation of a territory, has been dispossessed of his property by larceny or by duress (with or without violence) by the forces or authorities of Germany or its Allies, or their individual members (whether or not pursuant to orders), shall have a claim against the present possessor of such property for its restitution. 
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation (with Annex), Bonn, 26 May 1952, also known as the Transference Treaty, as amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Paris, 23 October 1954, Chapter Five, Article 3, para. 1.
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation
Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of Chapter Six (“Reparation”) of the 1952 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation provides:
The Federal Republic [of Germany] shall in the future raise no objections against the measures which have been, or will be, carried out with regard to German external assets or other property, seized for the purpose of … restitution. 
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation (with Annex), Bonn, 26 May 1952, also known as the Transference Treaty, as amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Paris, 23 October 1954, Chapter Six, Article 3, para. 1.
Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property
Paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of the 1954 Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property provide:
1. Each High Contracting Party undertakes to prevent the exportation, from a territory occupied by it during an armed conflict, of cultural property as defined in Article 1 of the [1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property].
3. Each High Contracting Party undertakes to return, at the close of hostilities, to the competent authorities of the territory previously occupied, cultural property which is in its territory, if such property has been exported in contravention of the principle laid down in the first paragraph. Such property shall never be retained as war reparations.
4. The High Contracting Party whose obligation it was to prevent the exportation of cultural property from the territory occupied by it, shall pay an indemnity to the holders in good faith of any cultural property which has to be returned in accordance with the preceding paragraph. 
Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954, §§ 1, 3 and 4.
Austrian State Treaty
Article 26 of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, which in its preamble considers that “on 13 March 1938, Hitlerite Germany annexed Austria by force and incorporated its territory in the German Reich”, states:
1. In so far as such action has not already been taken, Austria undertakes that, in all cases where property, legal rights or interests in Austria have since 13 March 1938, been subject of forced transfer or measures of sequestration, confiscation or control on account of the racial origin or religion of the owner, the said property shall be returned and the said legal rights and interests shall be restored together with their accessories …
2. Austria agrees to take under its control all property, legal rights and interests in Austria of persons, organizations or communities which, individually or as members of groups, were the object of racial, religious or other Nazi measures of persecution where, in the case of persons, such property, rights and interests remain heirless or unclaimed for six months after the coming into force of the present Treaty, or where in the case of organizations and communities such organizations or communities have ceased to exist. Austria shall transfer such property, rights and interests to appropriate agencies or organizations to be designated by the Four Heads of Mission in Vienna by agreement with the Austrian Government to be used for the relief and rehabilitation of victims of persecution by the Axis Powers. 
State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria (with Annexes and Maps), concluded between France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Austria, accession of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland and Yugoslavia, Vienna, 15 May 1955, Article 26.
Part IV (“Claims arising out of the War”, Articles 21–24) and Part V (“Property, Rights and Interests”, Articles 25–28) provide for more detailed and comprehensive settlement of all property claims on a State-to-State level. 
State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria (with Annexes and Maps), concluded between France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Austria, accession of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland and Yugoslavia, Vienna, 15 May 1955, Part IV, Articles 21–24, and Part V, Articles 25–28.
American Convention on Human Rights
Article 63(1) of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights provides:
If the [Inter-American Court of Human Rights] finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall … also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party. 
American Convention on Human Rights, adopted by the OAS Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San José, 22 November 1969, also known as Pact of San José, Article 63(1).
Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords
Article 1(1) of the 1995 Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords provides: “All refugees and displaced persons … shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them.” 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 7, Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, signed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, Dayton, 22 November 1995, Article 1(1).
Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords
By Article VII of the 1995 Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords, the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina was established. According to Article XI, the mandate of the Commission was to
receive and decide any claims for real property in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the property has not voluntarily been sold or otherwise transferred since April 1, 1992, and where the claimant does not now enjoy possession of that property. Claims may be for return of the property or for just compensation in lieu of return. 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 7, Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, signed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, Dayton, 22 November 1995, Articles VII and IX.
ICC Statute
Article 75(1) of the 1998 ICC Statute provides: “The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution … and rehabilitation.” 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 75(1).
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Article 27(1) of the 2003 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides: “If the Court finds that there has been violation of a human or peoples’ right, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation.” 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, signed at Ouagadougou on 10 June 1998, Article 27(1).
Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims
Protocol No. 1 of the 1952 Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims, concluded at a meeting between the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims at which “the extension of the legislation existing in the Federal Republic of Germany for the redress of National-Socialist wrongs” was discussed and at which the representatives of both parties “agreed on a number of principles for the improvement of the existing legislation as well as on other measures”, states:
II. Restitution
1. The legislation now in force in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning restitution of identifiable property to victims of National-Socialist persecution shall remain in force without any restrictions …
2. The Federal Government will see to it that the Federal Republic of Germany accepts liability also for confiscation of household effects in transit which were seized by the German Reich in European ports outside of the Federal Republic, in so far as the household effects belonged to persecutees who emigrated from the territory of the Federal Republic.
3. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will see to it that payments shall be ensured to restitutees – private persons and successor organizations appointed pursuant to law – of all judgments or awards which have been or hereafter shall be given or made against the former German Reich under restitution legislation. The same shall apply to amicable settlements …
In accordance with Article 4, paragraph 3 of Chapter Three of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation, the obligation of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be considered to have been satisfied when the judgments and awards shall have been paid or when the Federal Republic of Germany shall have paid a total of DM 1,500 million. Payments on the basis of amicable settlements shall be included in this sum. 
Agreement consisting of Protocol No. 1 drawn up by the Representatives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany; and Protocol No. 2 drawn up by the Representatives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany, Protocol No. 1, § II(1)–(3).
Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and IHL in the Philippines
Article 2(3) of Part III of the 1998 Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and IHL in the Philippines states that the right of the victims and their families to seek justice for violations of human rights includes “adequate compensation or indemnification, restitution and rehabilitation”. 
Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, The Hague, 16 March 1998, Part III, Article 2(3).
UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/23
In 1999, Section 2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/23 established the Housing and Property Claims Commission in Kosovo. 
UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/23 on the Establishment of the Housing and Property Claims Directorate and the Housing and Property Claims Commission, 15 November 1999, Section 2.
UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/60
According to Section 2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/60, the Housing and Property Claims Commission in Kosovo is given the power to decide on claims for restitution, repossession and return to the property brought by certain categories of persons, among which persons who lost their property right as a result of discrimination and refugees or displaced persons. 
UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/60 on Residential Property Claims and The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Housing and Property Directorate and the Housing and Property Claims Commission, 31 October 2000, Section 2.
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2000)
Article 21 of the 2000 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law provides:
In accordance with their domestic law and international obligations, and taking account of individual circumstances, States should provide victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law the following forms of reparation: restitution, … rehabilitation, and satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, annexed to The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Final Report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, submitted in accordance with UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/33, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62,18 January 2000, Article 21.
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2000)
Article 22 of the 2000 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law provides:
Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the victim to the original situation before the violations of international human rights or humanitarian law occurred. Restitution includes: restoration of liberty, legal rights, social status, family life and citizenship; return to one’s place of residence; and restoration of employment and return of property. 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, annexed to The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Final Report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, submitted in accordance with UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/33, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62,18 January 2000, Article 22.
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2000)
Article 25 of the 2000 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law provides:
Satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition should include, where applicable, any or all of the following:
(a) Cessation of continuing violations;
(b) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth to the extent that such disclosure does not cause further unnecessary harm or threaten the safety of the victim, witnesses, or others;
(c) The search for the bodies of those killed or disappeared and assistance in the identification and reburial of the bodies in accordance with the cultural practices of the families and communities;
(d) An official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, reputation and legal and social rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the victim;
(e) Apology, including public acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility;
(f) Judicial or administrative sanctions against persons responsible for the violations;
(g) Commemorations and tributes to the victims;
(h) Inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that occurred in international human rights and humanitarian law training and in educational material at all levels;
(i) Preventing the recurrence of violations. 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, annexed to The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Final Report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, submitted in accordance with UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/33, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62,18 January 2000, Article 25.
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility
Article 34 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, dealing with “Forms of reparation”, provides: “Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.”  
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001, Article 34.
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility
Article 35 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, entitled “Restitution”, provides:
A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided and to the extent that restitution:
a) Is not materially impossible;
b) Does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation. 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001, Article 35.
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility
Article 37 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, entitled “Satisfaction”, provides:
1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation.
2. Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality.
3. Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion to the injury and may not take a form humiliating to the responsible State. 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001, Article 37.
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement between the political forces of Côte d’Ivoire
The 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement between the political forces of Côte d’Ivoire provides:
The government of national reconciliation shall commit itself to facilitating humanitarian operations in favour of all the victims of the conflict throughout the national territory.
On the basis of the report of the national human rights commission, it will take measures to indemnify and rehabilitate the victims. 
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement between the political forces of Côte d’Ivoire, Round table of the Ivorian political forces, meeting at Linas-Marcoussis from 15 to 23 January 2003 and bringing together the following parties: FPI (Front Populaire Ivoirien), MFA (Mouvement des Forces d’Avenir), MJP (Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix), MPCI (Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire), MPIGO (Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest), PDCI-RDA (Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain), PIT (Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs), RDR (Rassemblement des Républicains), UDCY (Union Démocratique et Citoyenne), UDPCI (Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire), Linas-Marcoussis, 24 January 2003, Annex, paragraph VI. 4.
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of IHL (2005)
Paragraphs 18 to 23 of the 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law state:
18. In accordance with domestic law and international law, and taking account of individual circumstances, victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law should, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case, be provided with full and effective reparation, as laid out in principles 19 to 23, which include the following forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.
19. Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the victim to the original situation before the gross violations of international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law occurred. Restitution includes, as appropriate: restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights, identity, family life and citizenship, return to one’s place of residence, restoration of employment and return of property.
[20. Compensation…] [see under Section B above]
21. Rehabilitation should include medical and psychological care as well as legal and social services.
22. Satisfaction should include, where applicable, any or all of the following:
(a) Effective measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations;
(b) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth to the extent that such disclosure does not cause further harm or threaten the safety and interests of the victim, the victim’s relatives, witnesses, or persons who have intervened to assist the victim or prevent the occurrence of further violations;
(c) The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, for the identities of the children abducted, and for the bodies of those killed, and assistance in the recovery, identification and reburial of the bodies in accordance with the expressed or presumed wish of the victims, or the cultural practices of the families and communities;
(d) An official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the victim;
(e) Public apology, including acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility;
(f) Judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the violations;
(g) Commemorations and tributes to the victims;
(h) Inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that occurred in international human rights law and international humanitarian law training and in educational material at all levels.
23. Guarantees of non-repetition should include, where applicable, any or all of the following measures, which will also contribute to prevention:
(a) Ensuring effective civilian control of military and security forces;
(b) Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by international standards of due process, fairness and impartiality;
(c) Strengthening the independence of the judiciary;
(d) Protecting persons in the legal, medical and health-care professions, the media and other related professions, and human rights defenders;
(e) Providing, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and international humanitarian law education to all sectors of society and training