Practice Relating to Rule 148. Reprisals in Non-International Armed Conflicts

Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
Article 4(4) of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property provides that the High Contracting Parties “shall refrain from any act directed by way of reprisals against cultural property”. 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954, Article 4(4).
Article 19(1) of the Convention provides:
In the event of an armed conflict not of an international character occurring within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the provisions of the present Convention which relate to respect for cultural property. 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954, Article 19(1).
Additional Protocol II (draft)
Article 8(4) of the draft Additional Protocol II submitted by the ICRC to the CDDH provided: “Measures of reprisals against [all persons whose liberty has been restricted by capture or arrest for reasons in relation to the armed conflict] are prohibited.” 
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. I, Part Three, Draft Additional Protocols, June 1973, p. 36.
Additional Protocol II (draft)
Article 19 of draft Additional Protocol II submitted by the ICRC to the CDDH provided: “Measures of reprisals against the wounded, the sick, and the shipwrecked as well as against medical personnel, medical units and means of medical transport are prohibited.” 
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. I, Part Three, Draft Additional Protocols, June 1973, p. 38.
Additional Protocol II (draft)
Article 26(4) of the draft Additional Protocol II submitted by the ICRC to the CDDH provided: “Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited.” 
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. I, Part Three, Draft Additional Protocols, June 1973, p. 40.
Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Paragraph 6 of the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requires that hostilities be conducted in accordance with Articles 48–58 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of International Humanitarian Law between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Geneva, 27 November 1991, § 6.
Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Paragraph 2.5 of the 1992 Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina requires that hostilities be conducted in accordance with Articles 48–58 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
Agreement between Representatives of Mr. Alija Izetbegović (President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and President of the Party of Democratic Action), Representatives of Mr. Radovan Karadžić (President of the Serbian Democratic Party), and Representative of Mr. Miljenko Brkić (President of the Croatian Democratic Community), Geneva, 22 May 1992, § 2.5.
Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (1992), in a part dealing with “victims of civil war”, states: “During all military operations, offensive or defensive, certain forms of conduct are prohibited and remain contrary to the law of war. Examples [are] … to carry out reprisals against populations.” 
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, p. 150, § 532(1).
India
India’s Manual of Military Law (1983) prohibits reprisals. The provision is in a section relative to the actions of a commander acting in aid of civil authorities for the handling of crowds and mobs. The manual adds that action is preventive and not punitive and that no soldier can punish a civilian, except under martial law. 
India, Manual of Military Law, Three Volumes, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1983, Vol. 1, Chapter VII, § 8.
Italy
Italy’s Combatant’s Manual (1998) instructs: “[D]o not engage in reprisals”. 
Italy, Manuale del Combattente, SME 1000/A/2, Stato Maggiore Esercito/Reparto Impiego delle Forze, Ufficio Dottrina, Addestramento e Regolamenti, 1998, § 250.
Denmark
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (1973), as amended in 1978, provides:
Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 1973, as amended in 1978, § 25(1).
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (2005) provides:
Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 2005, § 36(2).
No data.
Australia
At the CDDH, in its explanation of vote concerning draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, the Australian delegation stated that it had abstained from voting because it considered that the article “did no more than prohibit in internal conflicts acts that violate the provisions of the Protocol and that the article was not concerned with reprisals”, whereas “many delegations interpreted the article as a prohibition of reprisals, which they claimed found no place in the law applicable to internal armed conflicts”. Australia further stated that delegations of other States “also saw the article as an interference with the sovereignty of the State”. The Australian delegation expressed its disappointment that the provision had not been acceptable to a majority of States. 
Australia, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 119.
Belarus
At the CDDH, the representative of Belarus said that he fully supported the opinion of the German Democratic Republic and Poland in favour of draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II. 
Belarus, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 429, § 16.
Belgium
At the CDDH, the Belgian delegation stated that it “regretted that [draft] Articles 6 to 8 [of Additional Protocol II] did not include a strict prohibition of reprisals. The term was doubtless less important than the deed.” The Belgian delegation also stated:
The words ‘are, and shall remain prohibited at any time and at any place whatsoever’ which already appeared in Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 … should serve as a rule of conduct and an absolute prohibition of recourse to reprisals in the Articles of Part II. 
Belgium, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.40, 14 April 1975, p. 425, §§ 21–22.
The Belgian delegation announced that it would abstain from voting on draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II. However, as to the fundamental guarantees within draft Additional Protocol II, the Belgian delegation stated: “The question of reprisals could not arise, since under the terms of that article, persons who did not take a direct part or who had ceased to take part in hostilities, were in all circumstances to be treated humanely.” 
Belgium, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 109, § 11.
Cameroon
At the CDDH, in its explanation of vote on draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, the delegation of Cameroon stated that it had
voted for this provision in the belief that a blanket prohibition of reprisals would not be feasible. No State could reasonably be asked to stand by and allow grave and repeated breaches of the Conventions or the Protocols by its adversary. The prohibition of reprisals should … be limited to certain well-defined cases, restrictively enumerated. 
Cameroon, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 455.
Canada
At the CDDH, Canada proposed an amendment to the draft Additional Protocol II which read, inter alia: “Measures of reprisal against [persons whose liberty has been restricted by capture or otherwise for reasons relative to the armed conflict] are prohibited.” 
Canada, Article 8 draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/I/37, 14 March 1974, pp. 23–24.
Canada
At the CDDH, the Canadian delegation submitted a proposal for a new Article 9(4) of the Additional Protocol II which read: “Acts of retaliation comparable to reprisals against [all persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take a part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted] are prohibited.” 
Canada, Article 9(4) of draft amendment concerning Additional Protocol II as a whole submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/212, 4 April 1975, p. 196.
The Canadian delegation further proposed a new Article 17 which read: “Acts of retaliation comparable to reprisals against the wounded and sick and the shipwrecked as well as against medical personnel, medical units and means of medical transports are prohibited.” 
Canada, Article 17 of draft amendment concerning Additional Protocol II as a whole submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/212, 4 April 1975, p. 199.
A proposal for a new Article 22(3) read: “Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of acts of retaliation comparable to reprisals are prohibited.” 
Canada, Article 22(3) of draft amendment concerning Additional Protocol II as a whole submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/212, 4 April 1975, p. 201.
Canada
At the CDDH, Canada made another draft proposal for an article to be inserted in the Additional Protocol II, which provided:
If a Party to the conflict persistently violates the provisions of the Protocol and refuses to comply with those provisions after being called upon to do so, then, except concerning the persons protected by articles … [footnote: these would be the articles that concern, in particular, the protection of persons within the power of one of the Parties to the conflict], the adverse Party may nevertheless resort to measures which are in breach of the Protocol, provided it had warned the offending party that such action will be resorted to if the offensive acts are not terminated within a specific time [footnote: As is clear from the language of the proposal, this is intended to be of general application affecting the entire Protocol]. 
Canada, New proposal concerning an Article to be introduced in Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/I/287/Rev. 1, 3 February–18 April 1975, p. 109.
Canada
At the CDDH, during discussions on draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, the representative of Canada stated:
As his delegation regarded the concept of reprisals as appertaining to international law, it considered that there was no place for that concept in Protocol II. There was a risk that the introduction of such a concept in Protocol II might increase the danger of reprisals followed by counter-reprisals and result in an escalation of hostilities. Its conclusion might also inhibit some States from becoming Parties to the Protocol. 
Canada, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 428, § 9.
Canada
In 1986, in an annex to a memorandum on Canada’s attitude to possible reservations with regard to the 1977 Additional Protocol I, the Canadian Ministry of Defence stated:
It should be noted that the … limitations on the use of reprisals apply only in the event of an international armed conflict. Common Article 3 of the [1949] Geneva Conventions, which is the only treaty law concerning internal armed conflict other than [the 1977 Additional Protocol II], does not make any explicit reference to reprisals …
[The 1977 Additional Protocol II], concerned with internal armed conflicts, does not contain the word “reprisal” or any similar expression. 
Canada, Ministry of Defence, Memorandum on Ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Reprisals Reservation, Operational Considerations, Doc. 3440-13-2 (D Law/I), 14 March 1986, Annex A, §§ 5 and 9.
Colombia
At the CDDH, Colombia, backed by a representative of Indonesia, supported the view that draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II should be deleted. 
Colombia (supported by Indonesia), Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 429, § 14.
Egypt
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II, Egypt stated:
The Arab Republic of Egypt, while declaring its commitment to respecting all the provisions of Additional Protocols I and II, wishes to emphasize, on the basis of reciprocity, that it upholds the right to react against any violation by any party of the obligations imposed by Additional Protocols I and II with all means admissible under international law in order to prevent any further violation. 
Egypt, Declaration made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II, 9 October 1992, § 3.
Finland
At the CDDH, Finland proposed an amendment concerning the provision of fundamental guarantees within the Additional Protocol II (Part II, Article 6) according to which “measures of reprisal” should have been prohibited. 
Finland, New proposal concerning Article 6 draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/I/93, 4 October 1974, p. 18.
With respect to this proposal, the delegation of Finland declared:
[A] reference to measures of reprisals should be included in [the 1977 Additional Protocol II], so that civilian populations would have at least minimum guarantees against inhumane treatment by the parties to non-international armed conflicts … The amendment by the Finnish delegation was aimed at adding a new subparagraph [in the draft provision of the 1977 Additional Protocol II dealing with fundamental guarantees] in order to place a general prohibition on reprisals, as had been done in Article 33 of [the 1949 Geneva Convention IV]. 
Finland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 324, § 7.
The representative of Finland explained further:
Contrary to what was often stated, reprisals were not limited to times of war or other types of armed conflict, but were also exercised in times of peace. Reprisals should never in any circumstances be used against the civilian populations. They could possibly be employed between States or Parties to a conflict. For example, they could be regarded as legitimate in the event of destruction of public property or a violation of international law by one or other Party to a conflict. But there was universal agreement that reprisals of an inhumane nature were inadmissible. That was why innocent civilians should be protected against such acts in times both of war and peace. 
Finland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 324, § 8.
The representative of Finland also stated:
With regard to the word “reprisals”, he still considered that there was no reason why it should not be used also in connexion with non-international armed conflicts; but his delegation would be willing to accept another word, provided that the content [i.e. of the proposal prohibiting reprisals] was not changed. 
Finland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 339, § 79.
Finland
At the CDDH, in its explanation of vote concerning draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, the delegation of Finland stated:
As the article was put to the vote … the Finnish delegation had to cast a favourable vote in view of its consistent support throughout the Conference for the prohibition of reprisals or measures in kind in armed conflicts, whether international or non-international. 
Finland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 119.
France
At the CDDH, the delegation of France, in its explanation of vote concerning draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, stated that it had voted against the retention of the provision, without, however, expressing any views on the substance of the provision. 
France, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 120.
Germany, Federal Republic of
At the CDDH, the Federal Republic of Germany proposed an amendment to Article 8 of the draft Additional Protocol II which read, inter alia: “Amend Article 8 to read: … 2. … (b) measures of reprisals against [all persons whose liberty has been restricted by capture or arrest for reasons in relation to the armed conflict] are prohibited”. 
Germany, Federal Republic of, New proposal concerning Article 8 draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/I/236, 13 March 1975, p. 25.
Germany, Federal Republic of
At the CDDH, in discussing the Finnish proposal to introduce an explicit prohibition of reprisals in the 1977 Additional Protocol II, the Federal Republic of Germany stated:
Was it advisable to use the word “reprisal” in draft Protocol II? Perhaps it would be possible to find another term where non-international armed conflicts were concerned. There were no objections from the legal point of view to the use of the word “reprisal”, but from the political point of view it could be inferred that its use gave the Parties to a conflict a status under international law which they had no right to claim. He suggested that another formulation, for example “measures of retaliation comparable to reprisals”, might not meet with the same objections. 
Germany, Federal Republic of, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 325, § 11.
German Democratic Republic
At the CDDH, the German Democratic Republic delegation expressed its strong support for draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II. 
German Democratic Republic, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 428, § 10.
Greece
At the CDDH, in the run-up to the vote on draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, Greece supported the views expressed by the representative of Mexico, whose delegation objected to any provision that would authorize reprisals either directly or a contrario. 
Greece, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 429, § 20.
Holy See
At the CDDH, the Holy See expressed its favourable position concerning the inclusion of draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II. 
Holy See, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 428, § 12.
In its explanation of vote concerning the draft Article, the Holy See declared that it had voted for the retention of the article, “because it provided for the prohibition of reprisals”. 
Holy See, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 120.
India
At the CDDH, India said that it supported the view of a US representative according to which Article 10 bis should be deleted and also prepared to vote against the provision. Nevertheless, it expressed the opinion that while compromises were to be appreciated, they tended to jeopardize the national sovereignty of States. 
India, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 108, § 8.
Indonesia
At the CDDH, a representative of Indonesia supported the view of the delegation of Colombia that draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II should be deleted. 
Indonesia, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 429, § 14.
Iran
At the CDDH, Iran submitted a new proposal to be included in the draft Additional Protocol II, according to which “acts of vengeance likely to affect the humanitarian rights conferred upon persons protected by this Part are prohibited”. 
Iran, New proposal concerning an Article of draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/I/287/Rev. 1, 3 February–18 April 1975, p. 109.
Iran
At the CDDH, Iran stated that “it had reservations concerning the addition of the word ‘reprisals’, which was not appropriate in a protocol concerning non-international armed conflicts”. 
Iran, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 330, § 37.
Iran
At the CDDH, Iran stated that it “supported the Canadian representative’s view that the concept of reprisals should not be included in Protocol II”. 
Iran, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, § 15, p. 429.
Iraq
At the CDDH, Iraq, considering draft Article 19 of the Additional Protocol II, stated: “In any case, the question of reprisals had no place in Protocol II, for the Conference was not entitled to legislate for the treatment of citizens of sovereign States.” 
Iraq, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 326, § 16.
Italy
At the CDDH, Italy submitted the following proposal to be included in the draft Additional Protocol II to the effect that: “The provisions of the present Part must be observed at all times and in all circumstances, even if the other Party to the conflict is guilty of violating the provisions of the present Protocol.” 
Italy, New proposal concerning an Article of draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/I/287/Rev. 1, 3 February–18 April 1975, p. 110.
Italy
At the CDDH, when Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II was rejected, Italy, in its explanation of vote, stated:
The Italian delegation abstained in the vote leading to the deletion of Article 10 bis, which provided that certain articles of Protocol II “shall not, in any circumstances or for any reason whatsoever, be violated, even in response to a violation of the provisions of the Protocol”.
A majority of delegations decided to delete Article 10 bis because of the widely felt need to simplify Protocol II as far as possible, in order to render it clear, to the point, well balanced and thus acceptable to a large number of countries …
… Protocol II contains many provisions mentioning obligations which must be respected “in all circumstances”, or rules which must be followed “as a minimum”. The language is very clear, highlighting the need for unconditional respect for those obligations and rules, even if the other Party to the conflict does not respect them. This is to be expected, since what is involved are elementary human rights, to which a basic morality (much older than the legal rule) ascribes absolute value …
Moreover, everything in Protocol II which represents a development of the common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, is subject to the conditions and rules set out in that article. And that article specifically mentions rules which must be applied “as a minimum” or “at any time and in any place whatsoever”; this clearly shows that these rules (and thence the rules derived from them in the present Protocol) must be understood as requiring unconditional respect. 
Italy, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, pp. 120–121.
Mexico
At the CDDH in 1976, in an explanation of vote concerning Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, Mexico stated that it “had opposed the adoption of article 10 bis, because it introduced the notion of reprisals in internal conflicts, which was unacceptable”. 
Mexico, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.64, 7 June 1976, p. 318, § 80.
Mexico
At the CDDH in 1977, Mexico reiterated “its formal objection to any provision that would authorize reprisals either directly or a contrario”. 
Mexico, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/I/349/Rev.1, published as CDDH/405/Rev.1, 17 March–10 June 1977, p. 231, § 43.
With regard to draft Article 10 bis of Additional Protocol II, Mexico re-emphasized that it “objected to any provision that would authorize reprisals either directly or indirectly”. 
Mexico, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 429, § 13.
In its explanation of vote on draft Article 74 of the Additional Protocol I and draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, Mexico stated that it had voted against draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II on the basis of its conviction that “experience shows that reprisals do not lead the enemy to respect humanitarian law, but result in an increase in violations and hostilities”. Mexico believed that the draft provision, as well as the French and Polish proposals, would have authorized reprisals (the Polish in an a contrario sensu) and that “the mandatory nature of humanitarian law does not depend on the observance of its rules by the adverse Party, but stems from the inherently wrongful nature of the act prohibited by international humanitarian law”, and therefore voted against these provisions. 
Mexico, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, pp. 449–450.
New Zealand
At the CDDH, a representative of New Zealand suggested that the Finnish amendment concerning reprisals in Part II of the draft Additional Protocol II should be accepted. 
New Zealand, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 331, § 44.
Nigeria
At the CDDH, the representative of Nigeria stated that “he was unhappy about the use of the word ‘reprisals’, but might endorse the Finnish amendment if another term were found, as for example ‘retaliation’ or ‘vengeance’”. 
Nigeria, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 327, § 21.
In its explanation of vote concerning draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, Nigeria stated:
This article is no less and no more than a disguised article on reprisals. Right from the beginning … the Nigerian delegation had repeatedly opposed the inclusion of an article on reprisals in this additional Protocol II. We are of the firm conviction that reprisals as a legal notion properly belongs to international legal relations as between sovereign States and should have no place in a Protocol dealing with internal armed conflicts. Also, the inclusion of an article on reprisals in this Protocol could lead Governments and States into embarrassing situations. This is because it is not inconceivable that in the course of an internal conflict, rebels may deliberately commit acts to which the normal reaction would be in the nature of reprisals but because of a prohibitory article such as this, Governments would feel bound to fold their arms while dissident groups go on a rampage killing and maiming innocent civilians and burning dwellings and food crops. No responsible Government can allow such a situation to develop, but if this article had been adopted this is the kind of scenario that would repeat itself time and again. 
Nigeria, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 122.
Norway
In introducing Resolution 2675 (XXV) (providing for the prohibition of reprisals against civilian populations or individual members thereof), which it co-sponsored, in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly in 1970, Norway explained that as used in the resolution, “the term ‘armed conflicts’ was meant to cover armed conflicts of all kinds, an important point, since the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations did not extend to all conflicts”. 
Norway, Statement before the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1785, 11 November 1970, p. 281.
Pakistan
At the CDDH, Pakistan made the following new proposal in order to prohibit reprisals:
Isolated cases of disrespect of the provisions of the present Protocol by one party shall not in any circumstances authorize the non-compliance by the other party with the provisions of [the relevant Part], even for the purpose of inducing the adverse party to comply with its obligations. 
Pakistan, New proposal concerning an Article of draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/I/287/Rev. 1, 3 February–18 April 1975, p. 109.
In a later statement, Pakistan stated: “After consultations between various delegations, groups and inter-regional groups, it had been proposed, as a compromise, that [draft] Article 10 bis should be deleted.” 
Pakistan, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 107, § 4.
Philippines
At the CDDH, the Philippines made the following new proposal for an Article in the draft Additional Protocol II concerning the prohibition of “reprisals” in the context of non-international armed conflicts which read: “Failure of one Party to the conflict to comply with the provisions of the present Protocol shall not authorize the other party to employ counter measures for the purpose of enforcing the provisions.” 
Philippines, New proposal concerning an Article of draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/I/287/Rev. 1, 3 February–18 April 1975, p. 109.
Poland
At the CDDH, the delegation of Poland, in its explanation of vote on articles of the draft Additional Protocols I and II relating to reprisals, stated that it had withdrawn an earlier proposed amendment which envisaged a general prohibition of reprisals, while stressing that if a group of persons should not be covered by specific provisions prohibiting reprisals, “there should be no attempt to prove by an a contrario argument that such a group is outside the prohibition of reprisals” and that this would be, in its understanding, “an argument in bad faith directed against the very spirit of the Geneva Law”. 
Poland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 452.
Sweden
At the CDDH, in her comments on the Finnish proposal to prohibit all measures of reprisal in draft Article 6 of the Additional Protocol II, the Swedish representative recalled approvingly a statement by the UK representative expressing the view that the phrase “at any time and in any place whatsoever” excluded the possibility of reprisals against the categories of persons in question. Questioning why this should not be stated explicitly, she supported the Finnish proposal. 
Sweden, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 331, § 45.
Syrian Arab Republic
At the CDDH, the delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic, in its explanation of vote on draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, expressed regret that Poland had withdrawn an amendment prohibiting reprisals. It stated: “The reasons of expediency should not be interpreted, by an a contrario reasoning, as opening up the possibility of such measures.” It further stated: “Humanitarian law is dependent on jus cogens and it is therefore unthinkable that an inhuman act should provoke a similar act involving innocent persons.” 
Syrian Arab Republic, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 453.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
At the CDDH, a representative of the United Kingdom stated that the provision of draft Article 6(2) “‘at any time and in any place whatsoever’ was so comprehensive that it would probably not leave room for the operation of reprisals in any form”. Draft Article 6(2) contained a detailed list of specially prohibited acts directed against persons in the power of the parties to the conflict. 
United Kingdom, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 330, § 40.
United States of America
At the CDDH, a representative of the United States stated that “he hoped that … Article 10 bis would be rejected, since the whole concept of reprisals had no place in Protocol II”. 
United States, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 108, § 7.
United States of America
In 1987, the Deputy Legal Adviser of the US Department of State stated:
The basic core of Protocol II is, of course, reflected in common article 3 of the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions and therefore is, and should be, a part of generally accepted customary law. This specifically includes its prohibitions on violence toward persons taking no active part in hostilities, hostagetaking, degrading treatment, and punishment without due process. 
United States, Remarks of Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, US Department of State, The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, American Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 2, 1987, pp. 430–431.
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
At the CDDH, the delegation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in its explanation of vote on draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, stated: “It goes without saying … that reprisals are already forbidden against protected persons and objects, that is to say, against persons and objects in the power of the adversary.” Moreover, it expressed its view that “this rule of customary law … was codified in 1949 in the Geneva Conventions”. Nevertheless, it stated that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia still felt that “reprisals on the field of battle against an unscrupulous adversary who uses illicit methods and means of combat remain permissible under customary law, as a last resort against lawless conduct”. Nonetheless, the representative stated: “It seems both unjust and pointless to make non-combatants, women and children, pay for breaches for which they are in no way responsible.” 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, pp. 456 and 457.
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
Notwithstanding the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, according to which these States agreed to abide by the prohibition of reprisals contained in Articles 51 and 52 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, in 1991, the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) issued a general warning to the attention of the Croatian authorities, stating: “A number of impudent crimes has been committed against the members of the Y.P.A. … Family members of the Y.P.A. are being maltreated, persecuted and destroyed in many different ways. This cannot be tolerated any longer.” The YPA therefore warned that:
1. For every attacked and seized object of the [YPA] – an object of vital importance for the Republic of Croatia will be destroyed immediately.
2. For every attacked and occupied garrison – an object of vital importance to the town in which the garrison is located will be destroyed. This is, at the same time, a warning to civilian persons to abandon such settlement in time. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Warning to the attention of the President of Croatia, the Government of Croatia and the General Staff of the Croatian Army, 1 October 1991.
According to the Report on the Practice of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
This warning calls for detailed analysis, but arguably it can be classified as a threat of the use of belligerent reprisals. In any event, a question may be raised whether the approach of the YPA Supreme Command reflected the position that belligerent reprisals may be freely carried out in internal conflicts as well, without the IHL restrictions that apply to international conflicts. The text of the Supreme Command warning leads to this conclusion. 
Report on the Practice of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1997, Chapter 2.9.
UN General Assembly
UN General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII) adopted in 1968 affirmed Resolution XXVIII of the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross and the basic humanitarian principle applicable in all armed conflicts laid down therein that “it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2444 (XXIII), 19 December 1968, § 1(b), voting record: 111-0-0-15.
This phrase was interpreted by some government experts at the CE (1971) as including a prohibition of reprisals against the civilian population. 
ICRC, Protection of the Civilian Population against the Dangers of Hostilities, Documents submitted to the First Session of the Conference of Government Experts, 24 May–12 June 1971, Vol. III, Geneva, January 1971, p. 38.
UN General Assembly
In 1970, the UN General Assembly, “bearing in mind the need for measures to ensure the better protection of human rights in armed conflicts of all types”, adopted Resolution 2675 (XXV) on basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts in which it is stated: “Civilian populations, or individual members thereof, should not be the object of reprisals, forcible transfers or other assaults on their integrity.” 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2675 (XXV), 9 December 1970, preamble and § 7, voting record: 109-0-8-10.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution on Afghanistan adopted in 1993, the UN General Assembly urged all the Afghan parties “to protect all civilians from acts of reprisal”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 48/152, 20 December 1993, § 8), adopted without a vote.
It reiterated this appeal in another resolution in 1994. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 49/207, 23 December 1994, § 9, adopted without a vote.
UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the rights of the child, the UN General Assembly:
Recalls, in accordance with international humanitarian law, that indiscriminate attacks against civilians, including children, are prohibited and that they shall not be the object of attack, including by way of reprisal or excessive use of force, condemns these practices, and demands that all parties immediately put an end to them. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/141, 18 December 2007, § 40, voting record: 183-1-0-8.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1993 on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged all the Afghan parties “to respect accepted humanitarian rules, as set out in the [1949] Geneva Conventions … and the Additional Protocols thereto …, [and] to protect all civilians from acts of reprisal and violence”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1993/66, 10 March 1993, § 6, adopted without a vote.
The same appeal was reiterated in 1994. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1994/84, 9 March 1994, § 8, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on assistance to Somalia in the field of human rights, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Deploring continued attacks, acts of reprisal, abductions and other acts of violence committed against United Nations personnel, personnel of other humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations and representatives of the international media in Somalia, sometimes resulting in serious injury or death. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1995/56, 3 March 1995, preamble, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, the UN Commission on Human Rights noted “with deep concern that the civilian population is still the target of … acts of reprisal”. It urged “all Afghan parties fully to respect accepted humanitarian rules, as set out in the [1949] Geneva Conventions … and the Additional Protocols thereto … to halt the use of weapons against the civilian population and to protect all civilians”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1995/74, 8 March 1995, preamble and § 6, adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Commission on Human Rights:
Noting that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a party to several international and regional human rights instruments and to several instruments pertaining to international humanitarian law,
3. Condemns:
(c) The reprisals against the civilian population in the territories controlled by RCD-Goma and MLC, especially the operation “Effacer le tableau” (“Clean the blackboard”) at the end of 2002, in addition to the exactions committed by the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), and stresses that the foreign forces which support RCD-Goma, MLC and UPC should also be held responsible for the massacres and atrocities that have occurred. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/15, 17 April 2003, preamble and § 3(c), adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on technical cooperation and advisory services in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned:
The persistent violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly the armed violence and reprisals against the civilian population in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, northern Katanga and other areas in the eastern part of the country. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/84, 21 April 2004, § 3(a), adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on technical cooperation and advisory services in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned:
The violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, particularly in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, northern Katanga and other areas in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including armed violence and reprisals against the civilian population …  
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/85, 21 April 2005, § 4(a), adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1993, in a report on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights noted with respect to Chad:
190. … Numerous killings were said to have taken place during counter-insurgency operations and reprisal attacks against persons perceived by government security forces as members or supporters of rebel groups because of their ethnic origin or place of residence.
193. The Special Rapporteur received alarming reports about massive killings of civilians by security forces in the regions of Moyen-Chari and Logone Oriental during the first half of 1993. A number of these killings were said to have been committed in retaliation for earlier attacks on security forces by armed opposition groups. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7, 7 December 1993, §§ 190 and 192.
In a subsequent report in 1994, the Special Rapporteur noted:
The Special Rapporteur continued to receive alarming reports of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions of civilians by members of the Chadian army. According to the information received, the authorities did not take any steps to prevent such acts. On 26 August 1994, the Special Rapporteur sent an urgent appeal to the Government after receiving reports of the extrajudicial execution of more than 25 villagers in the Kaga district between 12 and 14 August 1994. The victims were said to have included at least two minors, Justin Helkom (15) and Raymond Ekoudjewa (16). According to the reports received, the killings were reprisal actions by the army after the death of five soldiers during armed confrontations between the security forces and the rebel Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale (Armed Forces for the Federal Republic, FARF). 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/61, 14 December 1994, § 88.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1994, in a report on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission stated with respect to Turkey:
The reports and allegations received by the Special Rapporteur indicate that violations of the right to life continued to occur during 1994 in the context of the armed conflict between government security forces and guerrillas of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers’ Party, PKK) in the south-eastern parts of Turkey …
The Special Rapporteur sent four urgent appeals to the Government. Fears had been expressed for the lives of [individuals], who were said to have been detained during a raid by the security forces at their village, allegedly in reprisal for the refusal of the villagers to participate in the village guard system for fear of reprisal attacks from the PKK. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/61, 14 December 1994, §§ 308–309.
The report also noted that, following the urgent appeals, “the Government [of Turkey] replied to the [Special Rapporteur], informing him that shots had been fired from within the village of Payamli against gendarmes performing a field operation in the vicinity of the village”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/61, 14 December 1994, § 311.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1994, in a report on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights stated with respect to Mali:
The Special Rapporteur transmitted to the Government allegations he had received according to which … civilians and members of the Tuareg ethnic group … were killed in April 1994 by members of the Malian armed forces, reportedly in reprisal for the killing on the previous day of two soldiers by former Tuareg fighters who had joined the army …
On 4 August 1994, the Government informed the Special Rapporteur that [s]ome of the former MFUA combatants, who had been integrated into the army in 1991, reportedly deserted and committed acts of violence against their former colleagues and civilians. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/61, 14 December 1994, §§ 213–214.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1994, in a report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights noted: “The new Government [of Rwanda] pledges not only to refrain from taking measures or acts of reprisal but also to punish any persons engaging in such acts.” 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/12, 12 August 1994, § 30.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1995, in a report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights deplored the fact that
in Rwanda, genocide and reprisals are dialectically linked: genocide seems inevitably to lead to reprisals … All the acts committed [violations of property rights, of the right to personal safety and of the right to life] taken together would appear to constitute reprisals by the victims of genocide. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/71, 17 January 1995, §§ 29–34.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteurs)
In 1995, in a joint report on the situation in Colombia, the Special Rapporteurs of the UN Commission on Human Rights on Torture and on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions reported:
One of the most salient recent cases of human rights violations by members of the security forces was the killing of 10 civilians, mostly fishermen, from the village of Puerto Lleras by soldiers from the Artillery Group No. 19 Revéiz Pizarro of the Colombian Army on 3 January 1994. The massacre was said to have been carried out in reprisal for a guerrilla attack against a military base earlier on the same day, in which three soldiers had died. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Torture and Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Joint report on the visit by the Special Rapporteurs to Colombia from 17 to 26 October 1994, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/111, 16 January 1995, § 59.
UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 1997, in a report on the situation of human rights in Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo), the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights reported that, in Lutabura, “FAZ [Forces Armées Zaïroises], with the help of civilians, killed some 100 Banyamulengue as a reprisal for [a] massacre … in Epombo”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Zaire, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/6, 28 January 1997, § 191.
UN Verification Mission in Guatemala
In 1995, in a report concerning the conflict in Guatemala, MINUGUA recommended to the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) that “it should also prevent any retaliatory attacks against civilian persons or property”. 
MINUGUA, Director, First report, UN Doc. A/49/856, 1 March 1995, Annex, § 194.
In a subsequent report, MINUGUA urged the URNG “to refrain from attacks on civilian property, such as its destruction of installations on rural estates in retaliation against agricultural producers who refuse to pay the so-called ‘war tax’, and any other kind of reprisal”. 
MINUGUA, Director, Second report, UN Doc. A/49/929, 29 June 1995, Annex, § 198.
In two further reports, MINUGUA reiterated its denunciations of actions against civilian property or reprisals as violations of the commitment to end the suffering of the civilian population. These statements were made in the context of the collection of so-called “war taxes”. 
MINUGUA, Director, Third report, UN Doc. A/50/482, 12 October 1995, Annex, §§ 145 and 206; Fourth report, UN Doc. A/50/878, 24 February 1996, Annex, §§ 156 and 170(b).
No data.
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
At the CDDH, the ICRC suggested an amendment which contained two proposals on draft Article 6(3) (entitled “Fundamental guarantees”). Proposal I stated: “Measures comparable with reprisals and violating the provisions of this Protocol against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are prohibited.” Proposal II stated: “Countermeasures violating the provisions of this Protocol and taken against the persons referred to in paragraph 1, even when intended to make the adverse Party respect his own obligations, are prohibited.” 
ICRC, Suggested amendment to Article 6 draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/I/302, 23 April 1976, p. 19.
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
At the CDDH, the ICRC submitted a suggested amendment to Additional Protocol II containing a draft Article 10 bis provisionally entitled “Prohibition of reprisals”, which read:
Failure by a Party to the conflict to observe the provisions of this Protocol shall not entitle the adverse Party to take countermeasures infringing the provisions of this Protocol against persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take a part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, and against medical units and transports, even if the aim of such countermeasures is to make the adverse Party respect his own obligations. 
CDDH, Suggested amendment to Article 10 bis draft Additional Protocol II submitted by the ICRC, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/I/302, 23 April 1976, p. 37.
This draft provision was rejected in the plenary session by 41 votes in favour, 20 against and 22 abstentions. 
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 109.
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
At the CDDH, the report of the sub-group on reprisals of Working Group B of Committee I on the draft Additional Protocol II contained the following suggested provision: “The provisions of Parts II and III and of articles … shall not, in any circumstances or for any reason whatsoever, be violated, even in response to a violation of the provisions of the Protocol.” 
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/405/Rev. 1, Annex II (circulated as Working Group document CDDH/I/GT/95), 17 March–10 June 1977, p. 234.
Committee I of the CDDH subsequently adopted a draft Article 10 bis in Part II of the Additional Protocol II entitled “Humane treatment of persons in the power of the Parties to the conflict”. The provision read: “The provisions of Parts II and III and of Articles 26, 26 bis and 28 shall not, in any circumstances or for any reason whatsoever, be violated, even in response to a violation of the provisions of the Protocol.” 
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/405/Rev. 1, Annex IV, 17 March–10 June 1977, p. 283.
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
In a decision in the Tadić case (Interlocutory Appeal) in 1995, the ICTY stated:
The emergence of international rules governing internal strife has occurred at two different levels: at the level of customary law and at that of treaty law. Two bodies of rules have thus crystallised, which are by no means conflicting or inconsistent, but instead mutually support and supplement each other. Indeed, the interplay between these two sets of rules is such that some treaty rules have gradually become part of customary law. This holds true for common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions … but also applies to Article 19 of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, and … to the core of Additional Protocol II of 1977. 
ICTY, Tadić case, Interlocutory Appeal, 2 October 1995, § 98.
According to the ICTY, UN General Assembly Resolutions 2444 (XXIII) of 1968 and 2675 (XXV) of 1970 “were declaratory of the principles of customary international law regarding the protection of civilian populations and property in armed conflicts of any kind”. 
ICTY, Tadić case, Interlocutory Appeal, 2 October 1995, § 112.
As to the customary character of the provisions of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, the ICTY stated:
Many provisions of this Protocol can now be regarded as declaratory of existing rules or as having crystallised emerging rules of customary law or else as having been strongly instrumental in their evolution as general principles. 
ICTY, Tadić case, Interlocutory Appeal, 2 October 1995, § 117.
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
In the review of the indictment in the Martić case in 1996 in which the accused was held accountable for having knowingly and wilfully ordered the shelling of Zagreb in May 1995, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated:
16. … Although [the 1977 Additional Protocol II] does not specifically refer to reprisals against civilians, a prohibition against such reprisals must be inferred from its Article 4. Reprisals against civilians are contrary to the absolute and non-derogable prohibitions enumerated in this provision. Prohibited behaviour must remain so “at any time and in any place whatsoever”. The prohibition of reprisals against civilians in non-international armed conflicts is strengthened by the inclusion of the prohibition of “collective punishments” in [Article 4(2)(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II].
17. Therefore, the rule which states that reprisals against the civilian population as such, or individual civilians, are prohibited in all circumstances, even when confronted by wrongful behaviour of the other party, is an integral part of customary international law and must be respected in all armed conflicts. 
ICTY, Martić case, Review of the Indictment, 8 March 1996, §§ 16–17.
National Society (Mexico)
In a declaration issued in 1994 in the context of the conflict between the Mexican Government and the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), the Mexican Red Cross reminded the parties of their obligation to protect the life, dignity and human rights of combatants and civilians under their authority from all acts of violence or reprisals, on the basis of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
Mexican Red Cross, Declaración en torno a los acontecimientos que se han presentado en el estado de Chiapas a partir del 1o. de enero de 1994, 3 January 1994.
Committee on Justice and Human Rights of the Senate of the Philippines
In 1990, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights of the Senate of the Philippines reported that members of the media viewed some military counterinsurgency operations as having been carried out as wanton reprisals, with little or no regard to the social and human costs. These views were expressed in the context of the internal situation. 
Philippines, Senate, Report of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 1990, Report on the Practice of the Philippines, 1997, Chapter 2.9.
Human Rights Advocates of Negroes
According to the Report on the Practice of the Philippines, Human Rights Advocates of Negroes, a Philippine NGO, reported in 1990 that reprisals were frequent in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. An operation carried out in response to an attack on a military detachment had caused destruction of property and the evacuation and deaths of civilians. 
Report on the Practice of the Philippines, 1997, Chapter 2.9, referring to Report of the Human Rights Advocates of Negroes, 1990.
Kalshoven
Kalshoven stated:
The question of whether retaliatory actions in the context of armed conflict constitute belligerent reprisals will … depend on the status of the parties to such actions, that is on whether these can be regarded as a State or similar autonomous entity. This is already apparent in the event of civil war, where the concept of belligerent reprisals can only find application to the extent that the insurgents have succeeded in establishing themselves as an essentially autonomous party, for instance by bringing part of the territory under their effective control. 
Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals, A.W. Sijthof, Leyden, 1971, p. 36.
With regard to the taking of white hostages by an armed opposition group that occurred in the armed conflict in the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Stanleyville) in 1964, Kalshoven stated:
[The] episode involving measures on the part of a belligerent … could at first sight be taken for belligerent reprisals … The scope of the rebellion and the nature of the actions on both sides were such that the situation could without any doubt be classified as an internal armed conflict … [The central Government] resorted to the employment of white mercenaries and of bombing aircraft manned by foreign pilots … On the other hand, the insurgents (who likewise received outside support) took to holding as hostages the white residents whom they found in the areas under their control … The rebels announced that they would hold all the whites as hostages so long as [the adversary] would not desist from the use of mercenaries. 
Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals, A.W. Sijthof, Leyden, 1971, pp. 305–306.
However, Kalshoven, further developing the facts, concluded:
The taking of hostages, far from serving to enforce the law of war, in reality was designed to exert influence on the progress of the military operations … Thus, the policy of keeping hostages as applied by the insurgents in Stanleyville lacked the characteristic feature of a belligerent reprisal: it was not so much a means to enforce the law of war as to guarantee the insurgents a degree of safety and to further their policy objectives. 
Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals, A.W. Sijthof, Leyden, 1971, p. 311.
Therefore, Kalshoven considered that the actions taken were a violation of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals, A.W. Sijthof, Leyden, 1971, p. 315.