Related Rule
South Africa
Practice Relating to Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack
South Africa’s LOAC Manual (1996) lists the principle of proportionality among the general principles of the law of armed conflict. It states: “The loss of life and damage to property caused by military action must not be disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained.” 
South Africa, Presentation on the South African Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Appendix A, Chapter 4: International Humanitarian Law (The Law of Armed Conflict), National Defence Force, 1996, § 8(c). This manual is also included in Chapter 4 of the Draft Civic Education Manual of 1997.
The manual further states: “The law of war does not prohibit effective military action. Its purpose is to prevent unnecessary suffering and damage which would afford no military advantage or which is disproportionate to the military advantage obtained.” 
South Africa, Presentation on the South African Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Appendix A, Chapter 4: International Humanitarian Law (The Law of Armed Conflict), National Defence Force, 1996, § 16. This manual is also included in Chapter 4 of the Draft Civic Education Manual of 1997.
South Africa’s Revised Civic Education Manual (2004) states:
35. The following three principles govern the LOAC:
c. Proportionality. The loss of life and damage to property caused by military action must not be disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained. 
South Africa, Revised Civic Education Manual, South African National Defence Force, 2004, Chapter 4, § 35(c).
South Africa’s LOAC Teaching Manual (2008) states:
Proportionality
- The principle of proportionality is found in the [1907] Regulations to Hague Convention IV article 23 and [1977] Additional Protocol I article 57 (precautions in an attack) and is linked to Additional Protocol I article 51 (Protection of the civilian population).
- The LOAC [law of armed conflict] accepts the reality that the civilian population will be affected by the ravages of armed conflict. However, such suffering may only be incidental. In terms of the principle of proportionality, it must be ensured that the incidental loss of civilian life or damage to civilian property is not excessive when compared to (i.e. is proportional to) the concrete and direct advantage anticipated.
- A commander is not allowed to cause harm to civilian life or property, which is disproportionate to the military need.
- The test here is whether the incidental or collateral damage caused by the force is not excessive in comparison with the military utility of the force. In other words, the standard of measurement is the contribution to the military purpose of an attack or operations considered as a whole, as compared with the other consequences of the action, such as the effect on civilians or civilian objects.
- It involves weighing the interest arising from the success of the operation on the one hand, against the possible harmful effect upon protected persons and objects on the other. That is, there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate destructive effect and the undesirable collateral effects.
- The rule of proportionality cannot be used to justify unlimited destruction or attacks focused on civilian persons or objects.
Planning. Already at the planning stage of military operations or actions that could endanger civilian persons and objects, [it is] important to consider and provide for the principles of military necessity, no undue suffering and proportionality. 
South Africa, Advanced Law of Armed Conflict Teaching Manual, School of Military Justice, 1 April 2008, as amended to 25 October 2013, Learning Unit 1, p. 45.
The manual also states:
Additional Protocol I article 51.5 specifically states that, amongst others, the following types of attacks are indiscriminate:
An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
South Africa, Advanced Law of Armed Conflict Teaching Manual, School of Military Justice, 1 April 2008, as amended to 25 October 2013, Learning Unit 2, p. 119.
The manual further states:
Targeting Considerations
General
The principles of military necessity, distinction, proportionality and (the prevention of) unnecessary suffering form the basis for all targeting considerations undertaken in the absence of specific guidelines set forth under international and domestic law.
How to Determine Proper Targets
Once the target is confirmed as a military objective, it must be asked whether the destruction of the objective might result in incidental death of or injury to non-combatants, or collateral damage to protected property that is excessive to the direct and concrete military advantage to be gained. 
South Africa, Advanced Law of Armed Conflict Teaching Manual, School of Military Justice, 1 April 2008, as amended to 25 October 2013, Learning Unit 3, p. 181.
The manual also states:
Blockade
- The declaration or establishment of a blockade is prohibited if it has the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it other objects essential for its survival or the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the blockade. 
South Africa, Advanced Law of Armed Conflict Teaching Manual, School of Military Justice, 1 April 2008, as amended to 25 October 2013, Learning Unit 4, p. 206.
The manual further states:
Additional Protocol I article 85 provides further examples of grave breaches, in that it stipulates that the following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches when committed willfully, and causing death or serious injury to body or health:
- Launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects. 
South Africa, Advanced Law of Armed Conflict Teaching Manual, School of Military Justice, 1 April 2008, as amended to 25 October 2013, Learning Unit 5, p. 237.
South Africa’s ICC Act (2002) reproduces the war crimes listed in the 1998 ICC Statute, including in international armed conflicts:
intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects … which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. 
South Africa, ICC Act, 2002, Schedule 1, Part 3, § (b)(iv).
South Africa’s Prohibition or Restriction of Certain Conventional Weapons Act (2008) states:
6. (1) No person may use or direct any mine, booby-trap or other device–
(e) in an indiscriminate manner–
(iii) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
South Africa, Prohibition or Restriction of Certain Conventional Weapons Act, 2008, Section 6(e)(iii).
South Africa’s Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act (2012) states:
5. Breach of Conventions or penalties
(1) Any person who, whether within or outside the Republic, commits a grave breach of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions, is guilty of an offence.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), “a grave breach” means–
(e) a grave breach referred to in Article … 85 of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I. 
South Africa, Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act, 2012, Section 5(1)–(2)(e).
In 1987, in the Petane case, the Cape Provincial Division of South Africa’s Supreme Court dismissed the accused’s claim that the 1977 Additional Protocol I reflected customary international law. The Court stated:
The accused has been indicted before this Court on three counts of terrorism, that is to say, contraventions of s 54(1) of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. He has also been indicted on three counts of attempted murder.
The accused’s position is stated to be that this Court has no jurisdiction to try him.
… The point in its early formulation was this. By the terms of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I to the [1949] Geneva Conventions the accused was entitled to be treated as a prisoner-of-war. A prisoner-of-war is entitled to have notice of an impending prosecution for an alleged offence given to the so-called “protecting power” appointed to watch over prisoners-of-war. Since, if such a notice were necessary, the trial could not proceed without it, Mr Donen suggested that the necessity or otherwise for giving such a notice should be determined before evidence was led. …
On 12 August 1949 there were concluded at Geneva in Switzerland four treaties known as the Geneva Conventions. …
South Africa was among the nations which concluded the treaties. … Except for the common art 3, which binds parties to observe a limited number of fundamental humanitarian principles in armed conflicts not of an international character, they apply to wars between States.
After the Second World War many conflicts arose which could not be characterised as international. It was therefore considered desirable by some States to extend and augment the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, so as to afford protection to victims of and combatants in conflicts which fell outside the ambit of these Conventions. The result of these endeavours was Protocol I and Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, both of which came into force on 7 December 1978.
Protocol II relates to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. Since the State of affairs which exists in South Africa has by Protocol I been characterised as an international armed conflict, Protocol II does not concern me at all.
The extension of the scope of art 2 of the Geneva Conventions was, at the time of its adoption, controversial. …
The article has remained controversial. More debate has raged about its field of operation than about any other articles in Protocol I. …
South Africa is one of the countries which has not acceded to Protocol I. Nevertheless, I am asked to decide, as I indicated earlier, as a preliminary point, whether Protocol I has become part of customary international law. If so, it is argued that it would have been incorporated into South African law. If it has been so incorporated it would have to be proved by one or other of the parties that the turmoil which existed at the time when the accused is alleged to have committed his offences was such that it could properly be described as an “armed conflict” conducted by “peoples” against a “ra[c]ist regime” in the exercise of their “right of self-determination”. Once all this has been shown it would have to be demonstrated to the Court that the accused conducted himself in such a manner as to become entitled to the benefits conferred by Protocol I on combatants, for example that, broadly speaking, he had, while he was launching an attack, distinguished himself from civilians and had not attacked civilian targets. …
… I am prepared to accept that where a rule of customary international law is recognised as such by international law it will be so recognised by our law.
To my way of thinking, the trouble with the first Protocol giving rise to State practice is that its terms have not been capable of being observed by all that many States. At the end of 1977 when the treaty first lay open for ratification there were few States which were involved in colonial domination or the occupation of other States and there were only two, South Africa and Israel, which were considered to fall within the third category of ra[c]ist regimes. Accordingly, the situation sought to be regulated by the first Protocol was one faced by few countries; too few countries in my view, to permit any general usage in dealing with armed conflicts of the kind envisaged by the Protocol to develop.
Mr Donen contended that the provisions of multilateral treaties can become customary international law under certain circumstances. I accept that this is so. There seems in principle to be no reason why treaty rules cannot acquire wider application than among the parties to the treaty.
Brownlie Principles of International Law 3rd ed at 13 agrees that non-parties to a treaty may by their conduct accept the provisions of a multilateral convention as representing general international law. …
I incline to the view that non-ratification of a treaty is strong evidence of non-acceptance.
It is interesting to note that the first Protocol makes extensive provision for the protection of civilians in armed conflict. …
In this sense, Protocol I may be described as an enlightened humanitarian document. If the strife in South Africa should deteriorate into an armed conflict we may all one day find it a cause for regret that the ideologically provocative tone of s 1(4) has made it impossible for the Government to accept its terms.
To my mind it can hardly be said that Protocol I has been greeted with acclaim by the States of the world. Their lack of enthusiasm must be due to the bizarre mixture of political and humanitarian objects sought to be realised by the Protocol. …
According to the International Review of the Red Cross (January/February 1987) No 256, as at December 1986, 66 States were parties to Protocol I and 60 to Protocol II, which, it will be remembered, deals with internal non-international armed conflicts. With the exception of France, which acceded only to Protocol II, not one of the world’s major powers has acceded to or ratified either of the Protocols. This position should be compared to the 165 States which are parties to the Geneva Conventions.
This approach of the world community to Protocol I is, on principle, far too half-hearted to justify an inference that its principles have been so widely accepted as to qualify them as rules of customary international law. The reasons for this are, I imagine, not far to seek. For those States which are contending with “peoples[’]” struggles for self-determination, adoption of the Protocol may prove awkward. For liberation movements who rely on strategies of urban terror for achieving their aims the terms of the Protocol, with its emphasis on the protection of civilians, may prove disastrously restrictive. I therefore do not find it altogether surprising that Mr Donen was unable to refer me to any statement in the published literature that Protocol I has attained the status o[f] customary international [law].
I have not been persuaded by the arguments which I have heard on behalf of the accused that the assessment of Professor Dugard, writing in the Annual Survey of South African Law (1983) at 66, that “it is argued with growing conviction that under contemporary international law members of SWAPO [South-West Africa People’s Organisation] and the ANC [African National Congress] are members of liberation movements entitled to prisoner-of-war status, in terms of a new customary rule spawned by the 1977 Protocols”, is correct. On what I have heard in argument I disagree with his assessment that there is growing support for the view that the Protocols reflect a new rule of customary international law. No writer has been cited who supports this proposition. Here and there someone says that it may one day come about. I am not sure that the provisions relating to the field of application of Protocol I are capable of ever becoming a rule of customary international law, but I need not decide that point today.
For the reasons which I have given I have concluded that the provisions of Protocol I have not been accepted in customary international law. They accordingly form no part of South African law.
This conclusion has made it unnecessary for me to give a decision on the question of whether rules of customary international law which conflict with the statutory or common law of this country will be enforced by its courts.
In the result, the preliminary point is dismissed. The trial must proceed. 
South Africa, Supreme Court, Petane case, Judgment, 3 November 1987, pp. 2–8.
In 2010, in the Boeremag case, South Africa’s North Gauteng High Court stated:
In Petane, … Conradie J found that the provisions of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol I are not part of customary international law, and therefore are also not part of South African law.
Referring to the fact that in December 1986 only 66 of the 165 States party to the Geneva Conventions had ratified Protocol I, the Court [in Petane] stated:
This approach of the world community to Protocol I is, on principle, far too half-hearted to justify an inference that its principles have been so widely accepted as to qualify them as rules of customary international law. The reasons for this are, I imagine, not far to seek. For those States which are contending with “peoples[’]” struggles for self-determination, adoption of the Protocol may prove awkward. For liberation movements who rely on strategies of urban terror for achieving their aims the terms of the Protocol, with its emphasis on the protection of civilians, may prove disastrously restrictive. I therefore do not find it altogether surprising that Mr Donen was unable to refer me to any statement in the published literature that Protocol I has attained the status of customary international law.
Important changes with respect to certain aspects applicable at the time of Petane have taken place. The ANC [African National Congress] has become South Africa’s ruling party and in 1995 ratified Protocol I. The total number of States that have ratified it, is now … 162.
This last aspect forms the basis on which the First Respondent [the State] and the applicants agree that Protocol I forms part of customary international law as well as of South African law. As requested, this position is accepted for the purposes of the decision, without deciding on the matter.
Despite these changes, it remains debatable whether the provisions of Protocol I have become a part of South African law in this way.
The consensus of both parties to the conflict is required. See Petane … and Article 96 of Protocol I. …
Parliament’s failure to incorporate Protocol I into legislation in accordance with Article 231(4) of the Constitution in fact points to the contrary, and is indicative that the requirements of usus and/or opinio juris have not been met. See Petane. 
South Africa, North Gauteng High Court, Boeremag case, Judgment, 26 August 2010, pp. 21–22.
[footnotes in original omitted]
The Court also held:
If the [1977 Additional Protocol I] applies in South Africa as customary international law, the two requirements that form the basis of customary law must be met. It is arguable that the requirement of usus has been met by the vast number of States that have acceded or ratified it. By ratifying Protocol I the Republic of South Africa has indicated its intention to apply the Protocol, thereby fulfilling the requirement of opinio juris. 
South Africa, North Gauteng High Court, Boeremag case, Judgment, 26 August 2010, p. 66.
In 2010, in a statement before the UN Security Council during an open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation stated:
The deliberate targeting of civilians and the indiscriminate and excessive use of force, including suicide attacks, have become widespread in certain places, creating an atmosphere of fear aimed at further destabilizing and displacing civilian populations. In other conflict situations, militarily superior parties, including multinational forces, often respond with methods and means of warfare that violate the principles of distinction and proportionality. In such cases it is again civilians who bear the brunt.
We therefore unequivocally condemn both deliberate attacks on civilians and the loss of life as a result of the indiscriminate or disproportionate use of force, which is a gross violation of international humanitarian law. As a signatory of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its two Additional Protocols of 1977, South Africa wishes to underline the importance of adhering to the principles contained therein and calls for the full implementation of the commitments made by States parties to those basic tenets of international law. 
South Africa, Statement by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation before the UN Security Council during an open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 7 July 2010.
In 2011, in an opening statement at the Eleventh Annual Regional Seminar on the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in Pretoria, South Africa’s Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation stated:
One of the most important purposes of International Humanitarian Law is to protect civilians during armed conflicts, to minimise casualties. In this regard, South Africa is on record for unequivocally condemning both deliberate attacks on civilians and the loss of life as a result of the indiscriminate or disproportionate use of force, which is a gross violation of international humanitarian law. 
South Africa, Opening Statement by the Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation at the Eleventh Annual Regional Seminar on the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in Pretoria, 23 August 2011.
South Africa’s LOAC Teaching Manual (2008) states:
Proportionality
- The test here is whether the incidental or collateral damage caused by the force is not excessive in comparison with the military utility of the force. In other words, the standard of measurement is the contribution to the military purpose of an attack or operations considered as a whole, as compared with the other consequences of the action, such as the effect on civilians or civilian objects. 
South Africa, Advanced Law of Armed Conflict Teaching Manual, School of Military Justice, 1 April 2008, as amended to 25 October 2013, Learning Unit 1, p. 45.
South Africa’s LOAC Teaching Manual (2008) states:
Targeting Considerations
How to Determine Proper Targets
Once the target is confirmed as a military objective, it must be asked whether the destruction of the objective might result in incidental death of or injury to non-combatants, or collateral damage to protected property that is excessive to the direct and concrete military advantage to be gained.
All the facts, as well as surrounding circumstances, must be considered thoroughly. The standard by which military commanders must take these targeting decisions is based on their assessment of the information reasonably available to them at the time, rather than what is determined in hindsight.
The following pieces of intelligence are needed by commanders to ensure respect for the LOAC [law of armed conflict]:
- Concentrations of civilians.
- Civilian surroundings of military objectives.
- Nature of built up areas.
- Existence and nature of important and protected civilian objects.
- Nature of the natural environment. 
South Africa, Advanced Law of Armed Conflict Teaching Manual, School of Military Justice, 1 April 2008, as amended to 25 October 2013, Learning Unit 3, pp. 181–182.
[emphasis in original]