Related Rule
Israel
Practice Relating to Rule 104. Respect for Convictions and Religious Practices
Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states:
The population of occupied areas
International law governs the duty of the army and its authority over populations in occupied areas or in zones under military occupation during battle[.] The Fourth Geneva Convention includes a complete list of instructions that is binding upon the army in its dealings with the civilian population in an occupied area and regulate the army’s authority (for example … the duty to preserve the freedom of worship and more).
The State of Israel claimed in the past that the Convention, at least in part, does not constitute customary international law, however, for political reasons it applies the humanitarian provisions of the Convention de facto, with respect to everything concerning the Occupied Territories. 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 27.
The Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) is a second edition of the Manual on the Laws of War (1998).
In its judgment in the Beit Sourik Village Council case in 2004, Israel’s High Court of Justice stated:
35. The approach of this Court is well anchored in the humanitarian law of public international law. This is set forth in Regulation 46 of the Hague Regulations and Article 46 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Regulation 46 of the Hague Regulations provides:
Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated.
Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides:
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof … However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.
These rules are founded upon a recognition of the value of man and the sanctity of his life. See Physicians for Human Rights, at para. 11. Interpreting Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Pictet writes:
Article 27 … occupies a key position among the articles of the Convention. It is the basis of the Convention, proclaiming as it does the principles on which the whole “Geneva Law” is founded. It proclaims the principle of respect for the human person and the inviolable character of the basic rights of individual men and women … the right of respect for the person must be understood in its widest sense: it covers all the rights of the individual, that is, the rights and qualities which are inseparable from the human being by the very fact of his existence and his mental and physical powers, it includes, in particular, the right to physical, moral and intellectual integrity – one essential attribute of the human person. 
Israel, High Court of Justice, Beit Sourik Village Council case, Judgment, 30 June 2004, § 35.
In its judgment in the Municipality of Bethlehem case in 2005, Israel’s High Court of Justice stated:
12. The freedom of religion and worship is recognized in our law as one of the basic human rights. This freedom was already mentioned in article 83 of the Palestine Order in Council, 1922, and in the Declaration of Independence. Freedom of religion and worship has been recognized in the case law of this court for a long time (see, for example, HCJ 292/83 Temple Mount Faithful v. Jerusalem District Police Commissioner [9], at p. 454; [10] HCJ 650/88 Israel Movement for Progressive Judaism v. Minister of Religious Affairs [10], at p. 381; HCJ 257/89 Hoffman v. Western Wall Superintendent [11], at pp. 340–341; HCJ 1514/01 Gur Aryeh v. Second Television and Radio Authority [12], at p. 277). Freedom of worship was recognized as an expression of freedom of religion, and as a branch of freedom of expression (HCJ 7128/96 Temple Mount Faithful v. Government of Israel [13], at pp. 523–524; Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [3], at para. 19), and there are some who also regard it as an aspect of human dignity (President Barak in HCJ 3261/93 Manning v. Minister of Justice [14], at p. 286, and in CA 6024/97 Shavit v. Rishon LeZion Jewish Burial Society [16], at p. 649 {___}). Within the scope of freedom of religion and freedom of worship the court has also recognized the yearning of persons of religious belief to pray at sites that are holy to them (Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [3], at para. 16). To this we can also add the recognition of the freedom of access for members of the various religions to the places that are sacred to them as a right that is worthy of protection, which is also enshrined in Israeli law in the Protection of Holy Places Law, 5727-1967 (ss. 1 and 2(b) of the law).
The status of the freedom of worship was discussed not long ago by this court in Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [3], per Justice Procaccia:
“The freedom of religion is a constitutional basic right of the individual, with a preferred status even in relation to other constitutional human rights. The freedom of worship constitutes an expression of freedom of religion, and it is an offshoot of freedom of expression … The constitutional protection given to freedom of worship is therefore similar, in principle, to the protection given to freedom of speech, and the constitutional balancing formula that befits the one is also applicable to the other … We are concerned with a constitutional right of great strength whose weight is great when it is balanced against conflicting social values” (ibid. [3], at para. 19).
Moreover:
“The freedom of religion and worship … is regarded as a constitutional right of supreme status that should be realized in so far as possible in view of the conditions prevailing in the territories, while protecting the safety and lives of the worshippers” (ibid. [3], at para. 15).
14. The freedom of worship is not an absolute right. It is a relative right that may, in certain circumstances, yield to other public interests or basic rights … Indeed, in certain situations, the military commander may restrict or even prevent the realization of freedom of worship at a certain place in order to protect public order and public safety and in order to protect the lives and safety of the worshippers themselves (see Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [3], at para. 19; see also HCJ 2725/93 Salomon v. Jerusalem District Commissioner of Police [14]; HCJ 4044/93 Salomon v. Jerusalem District Commissioner of Police [15]). But before he restricts the worshippers’ freedom of worship, the military commander should examine whether he is able to adopt reasonable measures that will allow the realization of the freedom of worship while ensuring the safety of the worshippers. 
Israel, High Court of Justice, Municipality of Bethlehem case, Judgment, 3 February 2005, §§ 12 and 14.
In its judgment in the Committee for the Development of Hebron case in 2006, Israel’s High Court of Justice stated:
Every person is given the right to freedom of religion, faith, and worship. This is a fundamental constitutional right, and it is given, of course, also to residents of the region. The right of a person to exercise the fundamentals tenets of his faith, this being the freedom of worship, was recognized as far back as article 83 of the Palestinian Order in Council, 1922. Upon its establishment, in 5708 [1948], the State of Israel proclaimed, among its founding goals, the principles of freedom of religion and worship, in its declaration of independence, “… it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions …” This commitment found additional expression with enactment of the Preservation of Holy Places Law, 5727 – 1967. This court, too, has recognized freedom of worship as a fundamental right (HCJ 292/83, The Temple Mount Faithful v. Police Commander of the Jerusalem Region, P. D. 38 (2), 449, 454 (1984); HCJ 257/89, Hofmann v. Supervisor of the Western Wall, P. D. 48 (2) 265, 340-341 (1994)). The protection given the freedom of worship does not result only from recognition of the right of every person to carry out his religious commandments, to pray in his holy places, and carry out the rituals of members of his faith, but also from the perspective of this freedom as a branch of the freedom of expression (Hass, 462), and also from its being a branch of the broad category of human dignity (HCJ 3261/93, Manning v. Minister of Justice, P. D. 47 (3) 282, 286 (1993)). Indeed, the freedom of worship as an expression of freedom of religion is a basic right given to the person to express his religious feelings and to fulfill his beliefs, and as such is necessary to form the person’s individual identity. In this content, it is appropriate to bring the comments of Justice Procaccia in Hass:
The freedom of worship as an expression of freedom of religion is one of the basic human rights. It is the freedom of the individual to believe and to act in accordance with his belief, by observing its precepts and customs … This freedom is related to a person’s realization of his own identity. This freedom recognizes the desire of a believer to pray at a holy site. This recognition is a part of the broad constitutional protection given to the right of access of members of the various religions to the places that are holy to them, and the prohibition against injuring their sensibilities with regard to those places … The freedom of religion is regarded as a branch of freedom of expression in the sphere of religious belief.
We also accept that the freedom of worship includes as well the right of access to holy sites, inasmuch as the latter is necessary to realize the former (Hass, 461). In this context, Justice Procaccia added, in Hass:
The freedom of religion and worship is granted as a constitutional right to the population living in the territories, both Jews and Arabs. It is regarded as a constitutional right of supreme status that should be realized in so far as possible in view of the conditions prevailing in the territories, while protecting the safety and lives of the worshipers.
However, notwithstanding the view of freedom of worship as a recognized right on its own, it, like most other rights, is not absolute, but is relative, and may be balanced against other interests and freedoms (HCJ 292/83, supra, 455). 
Israel, High Court of Justice, Committee for the Development of Hebron case, Judgment, 27 June 2006, § 8.