Related Rule
Germany
Practice Relating to Rule 145. Reprisals
Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (1991) states: “Reprisals are measures of retaliation, as such adverse to international public law, which a State may, as an exception, use against another State in order to induce the latter to stop the violation of international public law.” 
Germany, Taschenkarte, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, Bearbeitet nach ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, Zentrum Innere Führung, June 1991, p. 2.
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) states: “Reprisals are retaliatory measures normally contrary to international law taken by one party to the conflict in order to stop the adversary from violating international law.” 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 476.
The manual further states:
The use of reprisals can cause an adversary acting contrary to international law to stop his violations of the law. Reprisals are permissible only in exceptional cases and only for the purpose of enforcing compliance with international law. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 1206.
Germany’s IHL Manual (1996) provides: “Reprisals are compulsory measures which one State may exceptionally use against another State in order to cause the latter to stop violations of international public law.” 
Germany, ZDv 15/1, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, DSK VV230120023, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, June 1996, § 318.
Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (2006) states:
Reprisals are measures of retaliation, as such adverse to public international law, which a State may, as an exception, use against another State in order to induce the latter to stop violations of public international law. 
Germany, Druckschrift Einsatz Nr. 03, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, Erarbeitet nach ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, DSK SF009320187, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, R II 3, August 2006, p. 2.
The Report on the Practice of Germany states that the Rules of Engagement for the German Composite Force in Somalia provided that when it became necessary to open fire, “retaliation is forbidden”. 
Report on the Practice of Germany, 1997, Chapter 2.9, referring to Rules of Engagement for the German Composite Force in Somalia.
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) provides: “Reprisals … shall be the last resort, if all other means to stop the illegal behaviour have failed and the warning has not been heeded.” 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 478.
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) provides: “Reprisals shall not be excessive in relation to the offence committed by the adversary.” 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 478.
Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (1991) states: “Because of their political and military consequences reprisals on the part of the German Military Forces may only be ordered by the Federal Government.” 
Germany, Taschenkarte, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, Bearbeitet nach ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, Zentrum Innere Führung, June 1991, p. 2; see also ZDv 15/1, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, DSK VV230120023, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, June 1996, § 319.
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) provides that “because of their political and military significance, reprisals shall be ordered by the supreme political level, which would be in the Federal Republic of Germany the Federal Government. No soldier is entitled to order reprisals on his own accord.” 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 477.
The manual further states that reprisals “require a decision to be taken by the supreme political level”. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 1206.
Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (2006) states: “Because of their political and military consequences reprisals on the part of the German armed forces may only be ordered by the Federal Government.” 
Germany, Druckschrift Einsatz Nr. 03, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, Erarbeitet nach ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, DSK SF009320187, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, R II 3, August 2006, p. 2.
In 2010, in the Italian Partisans case, Germany’s Federal Court of Justice was called upon to decide a case concerning the killing of nine Italian civilians in Tuscany in June 1944 by German troops. The Court summarized the facts of the case as follows:
2.
… Two [German] soldiers, whom the accused had tasked with obtaining transport vehicles [as part of a mission to repair a bridge], were killed by partisans in an ambush. A third [German] soldier was injured. Since the partisans had absconded after the attack, the accused, motivated by rage and revenge, decided to take retaliatory measures against the male civilian population of the area. First, he reported the incident to the battalion commander and suggested to take action against the Italian civilians which he had already planned. Agreeing with the accused’s proposal, the battalion commander ordered the [retaliatory] measure and additionally provided logistic support by making available an antiaircraft gun and explosives. The next day, the accused ordered the arrest of all male civilians in the area. In the end, the detainees comprised a group of nine men, the oldest of whom was 67 years old and which included two adolescents who were 15 and 16 years of age. None of them had participated in the attack or was suspected of supporting the partisans. They were locked into a house.
3
Although some detainees were afraid of being shot, others assumed that they would stay alive but would be deported to a concentration camp in Germany in order to work there. Soon, however, the house was destroyed by explosion. Subsequently, and also pursuant to the accused’s order, machine guns were fired at the debris in order to kill any surviving victims. In the end, only the fifteen-year-old survived with severe injuries. …
4
On this basis, the accused was convicted on ten counts of murder and attempted murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Italian Partisans case, Decision, 25 October 2010, §§ 2–4.
The Court held: “The criminal chamber [of the lower court] rightly considered the killings of the Italian civilians ordered by the accused as murder.” 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Italian Partisans case, Decision, 25 October 2010, § 22.
The Court rejected the argument that the killings would have been justified as war reprisals under the law in force at the time. Regarding the limitation of reprisals by principles of humanity, the Court held:
40
(2) War reprisals were limited by the so-called barrier of humanity (Humanitätsschranke). Even if a humane way of killing is barely conceivable, in particular not today, the law at the time at least recognized the prohibition of reprisals against women and children …
41
The accused argues that the victims who were 15 and 16 years of age were not children. The Court does not share this view. The term child is not uniformly defined in law. … The equation of women with children at the time means in the view of this Court that war reprisals ought not to be taken against those who cannot at all become regular soldiers (women) or who cannot yet become regular soldiers (children). According to the law in force in Italy at the time regulating compulsory military service, the obligation to provide military service only began at the age of 17 …. Thus, the two adolescents affected by the retaliatory measure would not have been subject to compulsory military service. For this reason, the Court considers that they must be considered children for the present purposes.
42
(3) The way in which the killing was carried out is often considered a central aspect in determining the “humanity” of a killing in the context of a reprisal … The destruction of a building by explosion in which the victims, unaware of their fate, were detained, is considered a humiliating and degrading and therefore inhumane way of killing which is not justified under the laws of war. The same is true for the subsequent and additional killing by firing machine guns …
43
(4) The least controversial condition for the lawfulness of a war reprisal in this context was the so-called notification, i.e. the public declaration of the event … The purpose of the notification was, on the one hand, to repel future repetitions of attacks against the occupying power … and, on the other hand, to demonstrate “that the measures taken were in the interest of enforcing the law … and thus did not have to be concealed” … There was no such notification. …
44
c) … [T]he finding of the criminal chamber [of the lower court] that the objective requirements for a permissible war reprisal were not fulfilled is fully confirmed. 
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Italian Partisans case, Decision, 25 October 2010, §§ 40–44.