Germany
Practice Relating to the Prohibition of Certain Types of Landmines
Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (2006) states:
German servicemen or servicewomen are prohibited from using in particular the following means of combat in armed conflicts:
- anti-personnel mines;
 
Germany, Druckschrift Einsatz Nr. 03, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, Erarbeitet nach ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, DSK SF009320187, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, R II 3, August 2006, p. 5.
Germany’s Law on Anti-Personnel Mines (1998) provides:
(1) It is forbidden to—
1. use, develop, produce or trade in anti-personnel mines, to acquire them from or transfer them to another person, to import or export them, to transport them through or otherwise bring them into or out of federal territory, or otherwise to exercise actual control over them, in particular to convey, stockpile or retain them;
2. induce another person to commit an act specified in subparagraph 1; or
3. encourage an act specified in subparagraph 1.
(2) The definition of anti-personnel mines in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of December 3, 1997 shall apply.
(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to acts permitted under the provisions of the Convention referred to in paragraph (2). 
Germany, Law on Anti-Personnel Mines, 1998, Article 18a.
Germany’s Law on the Control of War Weapons (1990), as amended in 2009, states:
1) It is forbidden to
1. use, develop, produce or trade in anti-personnel mines … , to acquire them from or transfer them to another person, to import or export them, to transport them through or otherwise bring them into or out of federal territory, or otherwise to exercise actual control over them, particularly to transport, store or retain them,
2. induce another person to commit an act specified in item 1 above, or
3. encourage an act specified in item 1 above.
(2) For the definition of anti-personnel mines, Article 2 of the [1997] Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction of 3 December 1997 shall apply. …
(3) Paragraph (1) does not apply to acts which are permitted under the provisions of the … [Convention] listed in paragraph 2. 
Germany, Law on the Control of War Weapons, 1990, as amended in 2009, § 18a.
Germany adopted a unilateral export moratorium on anti-personnel landmines in 1994, and in January 1996 the government prolonged the moratorium indefinitely. In April 1996, the Federal Armed Forces renounced the use of anti-personnel landmines and in December 1997 the last stockpiles were eliminated. 
Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World, available at http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pqs_report=germany&pqs_section=; Auswärtiges Amt, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of Public Relations), Weltweite Ächtung von Antipersonenminen. Der Vertrag von Ottawa – Eine Herausforderung für die Zukunft (Worldwide Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines – the Treaty of Ottawa – A Challenge for the Future), June 1998, p. 55.
In a speech addressed to the UN General Assembly in 1995, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs stated:
Anti-personnel mines … are “weapons of mass destruction”. Day in, day out, they are taking a terrible toll on human life, and many of the victims are women and, above all, innocent children. If any kind of weapon must be outlawed, then this one should be. 
Germany, Statement by the German Minister of Foreign Affairs before the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/50/PV.8, 27 September 1995, p. 7.
Prior to the launch of the “Ottawa Process” which led to the adoption of a treaty banning anti-personnel landmines, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel, presented the government’s “Seven-Point Action Programme on Antipersonnel Mines” on 18 July 1996. He noted:
The Federal Government has taken action. In January 1996 it imposed a unilateral unlimited moratorium on all exports of anti-personnel mines. In April 1996 the Federal Armed Forces relinquished totally and unconditionally the use of anti-personnel mines. Existing stocks will be destroyed. The conference to review the UN Conventional Weapons Convention which ended on 3 May 1996 agreed on more extensive prohibitions and restrictions on landmines. This was not enough. I therefore propose a seven-point action program on antipersonnel mines. 
Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World, available at http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pqs_report=germany&pqs_section=; www.auswaertiges-amt.de, Seven-Point Action Programme on Anti-Personnel Mines, presented by Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Klaus Kinkel (English Version), Bonn, Germany, 18 July 1996, p. 1.
The essential elements of the action programme included:
1. A call for an international ban on anti-personnel landmines.
2. A summary of German efforts to help with mine clearance.
3. An outline of the contribution of the Federal Armed Forces towards training experts in mine detection and clearance.
4. A request that NATO and the Western European Union support efforts to clear mines.
5. A call for the speediest and widest possible application of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
6. Establishing that contributions of mine-afflicted countries to resolve their mine problems would be a criterion for support from German financial and technical cooperation programmes.
7. Urging the United Nations to make mine clearance part of UN peacekeeping missions. 
Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World, available at http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pqs_report=germany&pqs_section=; www.auswaertiges-amt.de, Seven-Point Action Programme on Anti-Personnel Mines, presented by Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Klaus Kinkel (English Version), Bonn, Germany, 18 July 1996, pp. 1–3.
Germany hosted a conference near Bonn on 24–25 April 1997, the focus of which was discussions on verification measures in the context of an international treaty banning anti-personnel landmines.
Germany ratified the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on 23 April 1997 and deposited its instruments of ratification on 2 May 1997. 
Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World, available at http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pqs_report=germany&pqs_section=; DIP – Das Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge (Information System on Parliamentary Proceedings), GESTA: XA012, Gesetz zum Protokoll II in der am 3. Mai 1996 geänderten Fassung und zum Protokoll IV vom 13. Oktober 1995 zum VN-Waffenübereinkommen (Law concerning Protocol II, revised version of 3 May 1996, and Protocol IV of 13 October 1995 to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons). http://dip.bundestag.de.
Germany was one of the first States to do so, but on the occasion, the Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, remarked that the Amended Protocol was unsatisfactory as it did not include a general ban on anti-personnel landmines worldwide. 
Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World, available at http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pqs_report=germany&pqs_section=; Press release, 2 May 1997, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de.
In its Annual Disarmament Report 2003, submitted to the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) in 2004, Germany’s Federal Government stated:
Since 2000, in the context of meetings on the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, to which – unlike to the Ottawa Convention [on Anti-Personnel Mines] – all States relevant for this issue are parties, the Federal Government has worked towards minimizing as far as possible the dangers of long-lived or non-detectable mines and has aimed for a prohibition of non-detectable anti-vehicle mines and of remotely delivered anti-vehicle mines whose functioning is not limited in time. It supports a corresponding proposal, co-supported by about 30 States, for a new Protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. So far this proposition has met with the resistance of individual States party, which could not see anti-vehicle mines as a primary problem of international humanitarian law.
For the meetings of the expert group in 2003, Germany had taken it on to analyse the reactions of States party to our initiative on sensitive fuse mechanisms for anti-vehicle mines. The findings were presented in a final report on 21 November 2003. Together with the survey, this report will contribute to the development of best practices; during the time before a potential regulation by international law, they take humanitarian demands into account.
The Federal Armed Forces neither possess land mines whose fuses cannot be recommended as methods of detonation, nor non-detectable anti-vehicle mines and remotely delivered anti-vehicles mines whose functioning is not limited in time.
Based on the decision of the German Bundestag of 13 June 2002, the Federal Government continues to work towards humanitarian demands being taken into account in the employment of anti-vehicle mines. A practical example of this is exactly our initiative on sensitive fuse mechanisms for anti-vehicle mines, mentioned in the paragraph above, which are meant to increase the awareness of non-acceptable technological solutions and finally to lead to generally accepted standards on this issue. Progress in this respect is to be expected most likely in the context of consultations and negotiations on the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Their subsequent transfer into the Ottawa Convention might be considered. 
Germany, Federal Government, Annual Disarmament Report 2003, 14 May 2004, p. 53.
In 2005, in a proposal for best practice regarding sensitive fuses and sensors for mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM) submitted to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons working group on MOTAPM, Germany stated:
Introduction
1. The use of MOTAPM can cause humanitarian suffering and can be a serious impediment to humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peacemaking, reconstruction, social and economic development. This appears to be concurrent with a general recognition that MOTAPM are a defensive weapon permissible according to international humanitarian law, as there is the need to warrant the operational capability of armed forces as well as their protection. Humanitarian aspects and military requirements need to be balanced.
2. Fuses and sensors are a crucial factor, alongside others, to ensure the proper functioning of MOTAPM. “Sensitive fuses” are those fuses which, although designed to be activated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle, are highly likely to be activated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person. For the purpose of this proposal, “sensitive fuses” do not include anti-handling devices.
Method of best practice
3. Best practice for fuse and sensor mechanisms employed in MOTAPM aims to reduce probable risks to human beings. The purpose of best practice is thus to determine suitable technical parameters for fuse mechanisms, which will increase the discriminatory capacity of MOTAPM and will prevent them from being actuated accidentally by the presence, proximity or contact of a person. This approach to best practice for sensitive fuses is neither attempting to, nor capable of, dealing with the issue of distinguishing civilian from military vehicles.
Types of fuses and sensors
4. Based on information and data provided by States Parties, the following broadly available fuses and sensors are considered as relevant: acoustic sensors; break wires; fiber-optic wires; infra-red-sensors; magnetic sensors; pressure sensors; roller arms; scratch wire sensors; seismic/vibration sensors; tilt rods; trip wires.
Grading sensitivity
5. Category One: Fusing systems that cannot be designed not to be excessively sensitive, i.e. break wires, tilt rods, and trip wires.(i)
(i) Break wires, tilt rods, and trip wires do not appear to be a recommended method of activation, as it does not seem possible to design them in such a way that an individual cannot, within reason, initiate the mine.
6. Category Two: Fusing systems that can be designed not to be excessively sensitive, but are best used in conjunction with other sensors, i.e. acoustic sensors,(i) infrared-sensors,(ii) and seismic/vibration sensors.(iii)
(i) Acoustically activated fuses use electronic sensors to react to acoustic pressure and recognize the acoustic signature. Use in conjunction with other sensors is preferable.
(ii) Infrared activated fuses should be designed so as not to be activated in the presence of a person. The sensor should be able to match detected heat signatures to the intended target preferably in conjunction with other sensors.
(iii) Seismic/Vibration sensors cannot currently locate their targets precisely; their use in conjunction with other sensors appears therefore to be indispensable. The sensor should be capable to match a seismic signature to the intended target.
7. Category Three: Fusing systems that can be designed not to be excessively sensitive and can be designed to operate satisfactorily on their own, i.e. fiber-optic wires,(i) magnetic sensors,(ii) pressure sensors,(iii) roller arms,(iv) and scratch wire sensors.(v)
(i) The pressure required to break the fiber-optic signal should be appropriate for the intended target.
(ii) To enhance military utility, magnetically activated mines should be capable of matching a magnetic signature to the intended target.
(iii) Pressure sensors should, where possible, be subject to a minimum pressure force appropriate for the intended target, e.g. 1500–1800 Newton. Pressure should preferably be exerted over a significant area (equal to that of a vehicle) rather than a single point.
(iv) The number of turns required to initiate the roller arm fuse should be matched to the intended target.
(v) The scratch wire sensor should be designed for specific targets by optimizing the scratch time, frequency and amplitude required to initiate the sensor by the intended target.
Qualifying sensitivity
8. Notwithstanding the recommendations pursuant to the preceding paragraphs 5 to 7, the observations in the subsequent paragraphs 9 to 11 merit due attention.
9. Future MOTAPM could incorporate multi-sensor fuses technology in order to reduce the possibility of inadvertent or accidental activation. If a single fuse or sensor fulfills safety requirements as recommended, the incorporation of multi-sensor fuses should be discretionary.
10. The influence of environmental factors – particularly (i) of weather and climate as well as (ii) of storage, handling and other external conditions – should be taken into account when selecting the types of fuses and determining the sensitivity of fuses.
11. Considerations and proposals of technical measures should take into account operational, procurement as well as life cycle factors; they should address clearly identified humanitarian issues as opposed to unquantifiable theoretical risks. 
Germany, Sensitive fuses and sensors for mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM) – Proposal for best practice, CCW/GGE/X/WG.2/WP.2, 6 January 2005, pp. 1–3.
In its Annual Disarmament Report 2004, submitted to the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) in 2005, Germany’s Federal Government stated:
A further mandate, confirmed [by the meeting of States party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] on 19 November 2004, concerns the continuation of consultations on anti-vehicle mines – in view of the opposition of individual States party a mandate to negotiate could not be reached, contrary to the request by the Federal Government. Since 2000, in the context of meetings on the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, to which – unlike to the Ottawa Convention [on Anti-Personnel Mines] – all States relevant for this issue are parties, the Federal Government has worked towards minimizing as far as possible the dangers of long-lived or non-detectable mines and has aimed for a prohibition of non-detectable anti-vehicle mines and of remotely delivered anti-vehicle mines whose functioning is not limited in time. It supports a corresponding proposal, co-supported by about 30 States, for a new Protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. To this purpose, it has financed the study “Humanitarian Impact from Mines other than Anti-Personnel Mines”…, presented on 8 November 2004 by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, which convincingly shows the long-lasting manner in which anti-vehicle mines whose functioning time is not limited in time are a threat to the civilian population in its living environments after the end of armed conflicts.
The efforts of the Federal Government toward the further development of humanitarian armament control are supported in particular by the circumstance that with regard to the German armed forces it has already been decided to have, from 2010, for employment purposes only such anti-vehicle mines whose functioning is limited in time. 
Germany, Federal Government, Annual Disarmament Report 2004, 17 June 2005, pp. 55–56.
[emphasis in original]
In its Annual Disarmament Report 2005, submitted to the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) in 2006, Germany’s Federal Government stated:
A further mandate, confirmed [by the meeting of States party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] in November 2005, concerns the continuation of consultations on anti-vehicle mines – in view of the opposition of individual States party a mandate to negotiate could not be reached, contrary to the request by the Federal Government. Since 2000, in the context of meetings on the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, to which – unlike to the Ottawa Convention [on Anti-Personnel Mines] – all States relevant for this issue are parties, the Federal Government has worked towards minimizing as far as possible the dangers of long-lived or non-detectable mines and has therefore aimed for a prohibition of non-detectable anti-vehicle mines and of remotely delivered anti-vehicle mines whose functioning is not limited in time. It supports a corresponding proposal, co-supported by currently 31 States, for a new Protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. To this purpose, it has financed the study “Humanitarian Impact from Mines other than Anti-Personnel Mines”…, presented on 8 November 2004 by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, which convincingly shows the long-lasting manner in which anti-vehicle mines whose functioning is not limited in time are a threat to the civilian population in its living environments after the end of armed conflicts. In 2005, in order to reduce the dangers of anti-vehicle mines, Germany proposed in the group of government experts to prohibit the employment of such fuses that have an increased risk potential. A further German initiative concerns the reduction of the dangers of anti-handling devices in anti-vehicle mines. The Federal Armed Forces already fulfill the standards aimed for.
The efforts of the Federal Government towards the further development of humanitarian armament control are supported in particular by the circumstance that with regard to the German armed forces it has already been decided to have, from 2010, for employment purposes only such anti-vehicle mines whose functioning is limited in time. 
Germany, Federal Government, Annual Disarmament Report 2005, 12 May 2006, p. 50.
In 2006, in a white paper on “German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr”, Germany’s Federal Ministry of Defence stated:
Germany actively supports the worldwide application of the Ottawa Convention on the global ban of anti-personnel mines and its consistent implementation. In the course of the negotiations on the UN Weapons Convention, Germany as a party to this Convention is striving for further development of humanitarian arms control, particularly with regard to anti-vehicle mines and cluster munitions. 
Germany, Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, 25 October 2006, p. 46.
In 2006, in a report on the cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Nations in the Years 2004 and 2005, submitted to the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament), Germany’s Federal Government stated:
11. Ottawa Convention on the global ban on anti-personnel mines
The Ottawa Convention of 18 September 1997 with currently 151 States party (as of: September 2006) is the central treaty instrument for the worldwide ban on anti-personnel mines. As a State party to the Convention, Germany in the United Nations also in the years 2004 and 2005 underlined as a co-sponsor of resolutions A/RES/59/84 and A/RES/60/80 the determination to eliminate anti-personnel mines. In the resolutions, all States are called upon to accede to the Ottawa Convention [on Anti-Personnel Mines] or to ratify it without delay. The primary aim of Germany and its partners in the EU is the worldwide application of the Convention and its consistent implementation. As an element of its dedication to the worldwide ban on anti-personnel mines the Federal Government gives assistance to mine and ordnance clearance, in particular where they are a pressing humanitarian problem (see: Humanitarian Demining).
12. UN Weapons Convention
The UN Weapons Convention of 10 October 1980 aims to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, in declared wars or other international armed conflicts … Germany is a State party to the Convention and all its Protocols. On 3 March 2005, Germany, as the fifth State party, deposited the instrument on the ratification of Protocol V with the UN Secretary-General as depositary of the UN Weapons Convention … Resolutions A/RES/59/107 and A/RES/60/93 on the UN Weapons Convention, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2004 and 2005 and co-sponsored by Germany, inter alia called for a speedy ratification of the new Protocol. On 26 July 2005, following ratification, the amendment to Article 1 of the UN Weapons Convention (applicability of the Convention and its Protocols also to non-international armed conflicts) has come into force for Germany. A mandate of an expert group on anti-vehicle mines in the framework of the UN Weapons Convention, established on the initiative of Germany and friendly States, has been confirmed for 2006 at the meeting of States party in November 2005. The purpose of this is to reduce as much as possible the dangers caused by long-lived or non-detectable anti-vehicle mines. The Federal Government supports the proposal, co-supported by 31 States, for a new Protocol which, inter alia, provides prohibitions on non-detectable anti-vehicle mines as well as remotely delivered anti-vehicle mines whose functioning is not limited in time. 
Germany, Federal Government, Report on the Cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Nations in the Years 2004 and 2005, 7 December 2006, p. 18.
In its Annual Disarmament Report 2006, submitted to the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) in 2007, Germany’s Federal Government stated:
The 3rd Review Conference [on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] in 2006 decided, inter alia, to continue the discussions on a new Protocol concerning anti-vehicle mines (MOTAPM) at the next meeting of States party [to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] in 2007, to which – unlike to the Ottawa Convention [on Anti-Personnel Mines] – all States relevant for this issue are parties. This concerns the minimization as far as possible of the dangers to the civilian population of long-lived or non-detectable as well as remotely delivered anti-vehicle mines. The efforts of the Federal Government toward the further development of humanitarian armament control are supported in particular by the circumstance that with regard to the German armed forces it has already been decided to have, from 2010, for employment purposes only such anti-vehicle mines whose functioning is limited in time. 
Germany, Federal Government, Annual Disarmament Report 2006, 27 April 2007, p. 29.
In 2010, in its Annual Disarmament Report 2009 submitted to the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament), Germany’s Federal Government stated:
Having entered into force in 1999, the [1997] Ottawa Convention is the central treaty instrument for the worldwide ban on anti-personnel mines and thus a milestone of international humanitarian law. …
The 2nd Review Conference of the Ottawa Convention took place between 30 November and 4 December 2009 in Cartagena, Colombia, under Norwegian presidency. This was an occasion to draw positive conclusions regarding the previous five years. The international market for landmines has completely dried up, and there have been great successes in mine clearance.
On the one hand, the participation of the USA, China, Russia and India (as observers) and, on the other hand, the general observation that these States, who are not contracting States, have largely complied with the Convention in the last five years must be considered a success of the Review Conference. The Convention thereby makes an impact beyond the circle of contracting States. While the number of States parties has been stagnating since 2007 at 156, Poland’s and Finland’s announcement to ratify the Convention by the end of 2012 opens the prospect of all member States of the European Union being contracting States at the next Review Conference in 2014. 
Germany, Federal Government, Annual Disarmament Report 2009, 13 January 2010, pp. 22–23.
[footnote in original omitted]
The Federal Government also stated regarding the Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons held in Geneva in 2009:
[T]he Federal Government, supported by Ireland, Australia and Latvia, has spoken out in favour of the resumption of negotiations on anti-vehicle mines. However, it was not possible to reach consensus on this matter because many States give higher priority to the conclusion of a protocol on cluster munitions. The topic of anti-vehicle mines will again be on the agenda of the Conference of States parties in 2010. 
Germany, Federal Government, Annual Disarmament Report 2009, 13 January 2010, p. 24.
In 2010, in its report on German humanitarian aid abroad between 2006 and 2009 which was submitted to the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament), Germany’s Federal Government stated:
What has been achieved within a few years by the Ottawa Convention is considerable:
- 156 States have acceded (since 2005 there have been 13 new signatory States).
- The number of victims has remained almost constant in the reporting period (2006 = 5.751; 2008 = 5.197).
- The trade in anti-personnel mines has practically ceased.
- The use of anti-personnel mines by national States is stigmatized.
- Only two countries (Russia, Myanmar) have reportedly still used anti-personnel mines in 2008. Moreover, non-State armed groups have used anti-personnel mines in seven other countries.
- Important countries which have not acceded to the Convention (Russia, China, USA) have adopted a moratorium on exports.
- Approximately 44 million anti-personnel mines from stock piles have so far been destroyed.
- Approximately 2.2 million anti-personnel mines have so far been removed (in addition, approximately 250.000 anti-vehicle mines … have been removed. 
Germany, Report by the Federal Government on German Humanitarian Aid Abroad 2006 to 2009, 5 August 2010, pp. 13–14
In 2010, in reply to a Minor Interpellation in the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) entitled “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”, Germany’s Federal Government wrote:
12. What is the current state of the Federal Government’s measures, announced in the Annual Disarmament Report 2009 (p. 8), to work towards a protocol on the prohibition of anti-vehicle mines?
With the support of Australia, Ireland and Lithuania, at last year’s Meeting of the States Parties to the [1980] Convention on Conventional Weapons the Federal Government advocated the resumption of negotiations on a protocol concerning the prohibition of anti-vehicle mines which are non-detectable or which do not offer the possibility to limit the period in which they are active, the possibility of self-neutralization or of self-destruction. The Federal Government will do this again at this year’s Meeting of the States Parties. 
Germany, Lower House of Federal Parliament (Bundestag), Reply by the Federal Government to the Minor Interpellation by Members Agnes Malczack, Dr. Gerhard Schick, Marieluise Beck (Bremen), further Members and the Parliamentary Group BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, BT-Drs. 17/3185, 5 October 2010, p. 6.
The Federal Government further wrote:
13. How does the Federal Government ensure that there are no civilian victims when using anti-vehicle mines which only remain active in the ground for a certain period of time?
Which rules of engagement exist on this matter?
The Bundeswehr only has anti-tank mines in its stockpile which only remain active in the ground for a certain period of time. … The Bundeswehr is not using anti-tank mines in any of its current operations. 
Germany, Lower House of Federal Parliament (Bundestag), Reply by the Federal Government to the Minor Interpellation by Members Agnes Malczack, Dr. Gerhard Schick, Marieluise Beck (Bremen), further Members and the Parliamentary Group BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, BT-Drs. 17/3185, 5 October 2010, p. 6.