Related Rule
Canada
Practice Relating to Rule 142. Instruction in International Humanitarian Law within Armed Forces
Canada’s Unit Guide (1990) states:
1. The aim of this manual is to acquaint all ranks with the principles of the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims signed on August 12, 1949.
2. Each of the 1949 Geneva Conventions contains a provision requiring participating nations to distribute the text of the Convention as widely as possible and, in particular, to include a study of these texts in programmes of military instruction. 
Canada, Unit Guide for the Geneva Conventions, Canadian Forces Publication C 318(4), 1990, § 101.
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) notes that it is designed “to be used as the main source for the preparation of lesson plans required for the training of all members of the CF [Canadian Forces] on the LOAC”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, Introduction, p. i, § 5.
The manual also states:
The most important factor in ensuring that the LOAC is applied by all parties to an armed conflict is knowledge of the law. Canada has the obligation, as a party to the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I), to instruct the CF on the LOAC, in time of peace as well as in time of armed conflict. Canada also has the obligation to include the study of LOAC in military instruction programmes. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 15-1, § 6.
Canada’s Code of Conduct (2001) states:
CF [Canadian Forces] members are not expected to know all the details of the various treaties and international customs that make up the Law of Armed Conflict. They are, however, expected to know at least the basic principles which, when followed, will ensure CF members carry out their duties in accordance with the spirit and principles of the Law of Armed Conflict. These principles of the Law of Armed Conflict are set out in the CF Code of Conduct. 
Canada, Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 4 June 2001, Introduction, § 8.
The Code of Conduct further states: “It is CF policy to respect and abide by the Law of Armed Conflict in all circumstances. To meet this commitment, every CF member must know and understand, as a minimum, the basic principles of the Law of Armed Conflict.” 
Canada, Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 4 June 2001, Rule 11, § 1.
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states:
1. The aim of the Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels [LOAC Manual] is to provide a working level publication on the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and a practical guide for the use of commanders, staff officers and LOAC instructors.
2. The Manual is designed to apply to the tactical/operational levels of doctrine related to the LOAC and to be used as the main source for the preparation of lesson plans required for the training of all members of the CF [Canadian Forces] on the LOAC. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, p. i.
In its chapter entitled “Preventative and enforcement measures and the role of protecting powers”, the manual further states:
The most important factor in ensuring that the LOAC is applied by all parties to an armed conflict is knowledge of the law. Canada has the obligation, as a party to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I), to instruct the CF on the LOAC, in time of peace as well as in time of armed conflict. Canada also has the obligation to include the study of LOAC in military instruction programmes and to encourage the study of the LOAC by the civilian population. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1503.
Canada’s Prisoner of War Handling and Detainees Manual (2004) states:
The GCs [1949 Geneva Conventions] and AP I [the 1977 Additional Protocol I] place a duty on their signatories in time of both peace and war to circulate the texts as widely as possible within their countries. They are especially required to ensure that the implications of the GCs and AP I are clearly understood by the members of their Armed Forces and by the civilian population. In order to assist this process, the GCs and AP I place an obligation on signatories to disseminate the text of the Conventions to appropriate military and civilian personnel. 
Canada, Prisoner of War Handling, Detainees, Interrogation and Tactical Questioning in International Operations, B-GJ-005-110/FP-020, National Defence Headquarters, 1 August 2004, § 104.1.
Canada’s Code of Conduct (2005) explains in its introduction:
4. Operational missions often require CF [Canadian Forces] members to make decisions under considerable stress and in times of confusion. Moreover, the course of action one elects to make during operations can have serious consequences. Decisions must often be made very quickly. Compliance with this simple Code of Conduct helps to ensure that split second decisions are consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict and Canadian law.
5. The purpose of the Code, therefore, is to provide simple and understandable instructions to ensure that CF members apply as a minimum, the spirit and principles of the Law of Armed Conflict in all CF operations other than Canadian domestic operations.
8. CF members are not expected to know all the details of the various treaties and international customs that make up the Law of Armed Conflict. They are, however, expected to know at least the basic principles which, when followed, will ensure CF members carry out their duties in accordance with the spirit and principles of the Law of Armed Conflict. These principles of the Law of Armed Conflict are set out in the CF Code of Conduct.
9. The CF Code of Conduct consists of eleven rules which capture the essence of the Law of Armed Conflict. This Code does not in any way replace or alter the existing treaties and conventions to which Canada is a party. Actually, it represents a summary of the Law of Armed Conflict. It is designed to assist you, your commanders and your fellow members of the armed forces to achieve legitimate military objectives while ensuring operations are carried out in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict. You must, therefore, know and faithfully comply with these eleven rules. 
Canada, Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 2005, Introduction, §§ 4–5 and 8–9.
Rule 11 of the Code of Conduct further states:
It is CF policy to respect and abide by the Law of Armed Conflict in all circumstances. To meet this commitment, every CF member must know and understand, as a minimum, the basic principles of the Law of Armed Conflict. 
Canada, Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 2005, Rule 11, § 1.
The 1997 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces (CF) to Somalia stated:
The training plan for Operation Cordon did not adequately provide for sufficient and appropriate training in relation to several non-combat skills that are essential for peacekeeping, including: … the Law of Armed Conflict, including arrest and detention procedures … The failure of the training plan to provide adequately for these non-combat skills arose primarily from the lack of any doctrine recognizing the need for such training, and the lack of supporting training materials and standards. 
Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Public Works and Government Services Canada – Publishing, Ottawa, 1997, pp. 586 and ES-27.
The report also stated:
The CF is obliged under international law to provide training in the LOAC … Documents that we have received indicate that in the mid-1980s, individual non-commissioned members within the CF were expected to have a “basic knowledge” of the Geneva Conventions, including treatment of prisoners of war and civilian detainees. Field officers attending the Command and Staff College would have received three hours of training in the LOAC in the mid-1980s, and some majors and most lieutenant-colonels would receive a full day session on the LOAC and ROE. According to the CF, there is considerable LOAC training taking place within the CF but it is not well co-ordinated.
• In 1992, there was insufficient training in the CF generally on the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). This in turn resulted from a lack of institutional commitment within the CF regarding a systematic and thorough dissemination of the LOAC to all its members …
•There was a serious lack of training on the LOAC during the pre-deployment training for Somalia, as evidenced by the soldier’s confusion in theatre over how to treat detainees once they were captured.
•The lack of attention to the LOAC and its dissemination demonstrates a profound failure of the CF leadership, both in adequate preparation of Canadian troops sent to Somalia, and in Canada’s obligation to respect the elementary principles of international law in the field of armed conflict.  
Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Public Works and Government Services Canada – Publishing, Ottawa, 1997, pp. 613–615.
However, the report further stated:
In making recommendations on training, we are mindful of the developments that have occurred in the Canadian Forces since the incidents in Somalia in March 1993 … We … certainly endorse the specific attention being given to the Law of Armed Conflict and rules of engagement, and the increased emphasis on humanitarian and legal aspects of operations. 
Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Public Works and Government Services Canada – Publishing, Ottawa, 1997, pp. 625–626.
The Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces (CF) to Somalia recommended with respect to the training of the armed forces for peacekeeping missions, inter alia, that:
21.8 The Chief of the Defence Staff oversee the development of specialist expertise within the Canadian Forces in training in the Law of Armed Conflict and the rules of engagement …
21.9 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that the time and resources necessary for training a unit to a state of operational readiness be assessed before committing that unit’s participation in a peace support operation.
21.14 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish mechanisms to ensure that all members of units preparing for deployment on peace support operations receive sufficient and appropriate training on the local culture, history, and politics of the theatre of operations, together with refresher training on negotiation and conflict resolution and the Law of Armed Conflict.
21.15 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine and policy that no unit be declared operationally ready unless all its members have received sufficient and appropriate training on mission-specific rules of engagement and steps have been taken to establish that the rules of engagement are fully understood.
21.16 The Chief of Defence Staff ensure that training standards and programs provide that training in the Law of Armed Conflict, rules of engagement, cross-cultural relations, and negotiation and conflict resolution be scenario-based and integrated into training exercises, in addition to classroom instruction or briefings, to permit the practice of skills and to provide a mechanism for confirming that instructions have been fully understood. 
Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Public Works and Government Services Canada – Publishing, Ottawa, 1997, pp. 628–631, Recommendations No. 21(8), 21(9), 21(14), 21(15) and 21(16).
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) provides: “Commanders have a responsibility to ensure that forces under their command are aware of their responsibilities related to the LOAC and that they behave in a manner consistent with the LOAC.” 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 15-1, § 7.
The manual further notes: “In order to prevent and suppress breaches, commanders are responsible for ensuring that members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations under the LOAC.” 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 16-7, § 50.
Canada’s Code of Conduct (2001) states: “A military unit that obeys the Law of Armed Conflict is one that demonstrates discipline and leadership. This requires training. The responsibility for this training rests with leaders at all levels.” 
Canada, Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 4 June 2001, Introduction, § 15.
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter entitled “Preventative and enforcement measures and the role of protecting powers”:
Commanders have a responsibility to ensure that forces under their command are aware of their responsibilities related to the LOAC and that they behave in a manner consistent with the LOAC. Commanders may be held personally and criminally liable in respect of illegal acts committed by those under their command, especially if they knew or should have known that such acts were being committed or were likely to be committed. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1504.
In its chapter on “War crimes, individual criminal liability and command responsibility”, the manual states: “In order to prevent and suppress breaches, commanders are responsible for ensuring that members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations under the LOAC.” 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1621.2.
Canada’s Code of Conduct (2005) states:
15. A military unit that obeys the Law of Armed Conflict is one that demonstrates discipline and leadership. This requires training. The responsibility for this training rests with leaders at all levels.
The responsibility for training all members of the CF [Canadian Forces] on the Code of Conduct rests with leaders at all levels. Although the office of the Judge Advocate General is the office of primary interest (OPI) as the subject matter expert for the development of the Code of Conduct, the actual training of members of the CF must be organized and conducted through the chain of command. 
Canada, Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 2005, Introduction, § 15 and Lesson Plan, Introduction.
The 1997 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia stated:
Training is one of the fundamental elements of preparing troops for operations … It is therefore to be expected that commanders at all levels of the chain of command, even the highest, pay particular attention to the training of a contingent, both to supervise and assess the preparations and, through their presence, to demonstrate their personal interest in and commitment to the operation that their troops are about to undertake.
In its findings with respect to this statement, the Commission noted:
Leaders at all levels of the chain of command, with the notable exception of the Brigade Commander during the initial stages of training, failed to provide adequate supervision of the training preparations undertaken by the CAR for Operation Cordon. 
Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Public Works and Government Services Canada – Publishing, Ottawa, 1997, pp. 592–593; see also p. ES-28.
Regarding the Rules of Engagement (ROE) established with respect to the Somalia mission, the Commission further noted:
The … briefing provided by LCol Watkin on December 10th [1992] included information on the ROE … The officers were then supposed to pass the information on to their subordinates. However, there were no efforts made to ensure that this information was properly understood before being passed down the chain of command to the troops, nor even that it was in fact passed down … While the need to systematically reinforce the ROE training once in theatre was recognized by senior commanders who testified before us, this did not translate into effective ROE training throughout the deployment period. Maj Pommet showed great concern for the understanding of the ROE by his commando and took steps to train his soldiers, but he did so on his own initiative. On several occasions he verified his troops’ knowledge of the ROE by presenting them with scenarios and asking them to respond. Although there may have been some discussion and briefings on the ROE, there was no organized and structured scenario-based training done in theatre. In our view, and notwithstanding the obvious need for it, the leaders failed to ensure that all of the soldiers had a comprehensive understanding of the use of force in Somalia through accessible and systematic training. 
Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Public Works and Government Services Canada – Publishing, Ottawa, 1997, pp. 616–617.
The Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, in its recommendations with respect to training of the armed forces, stated:
We recommend that: … Canadian Forces doctrine recognize the personal supervision of training by commanders, including the most senior, as an irreducible responsibility and an essential expression of good leadership. Canadian Forces should also recognize that training provides the best opportunity, short of operations, for commanders to assess the attitude of troops and gauge the readiness of a unit and affords a unique occasion for commanders to impress upon their troops, through their presence, the standards expected of them, as well as their own commitment to the mission on which the troops are about to be sent. 
Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Public Works and Government Services Canada – Publishing, Ottawa, 1997, p. 631, Recommendation No. 21(18).