Rule 99. Deprivation of Liberty
Rule 99. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty is prohibited.
Summary
State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts. It should be noted that common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, as well as both Additional Protocols I and II, require that all civilians and persons hors de combat be treated humanely (see Rule 87), whereas arbitrary deprivation of liberty is not compatible with this requirement.
The concept that detention must not be arbitrary is part of both international humanitarian law and human rights law. Although there are differences between these branches of international law, both international humanitarian law and human rights law aim to prevent arbitrary detention by specifying the grounds for detention based on needs, in particular security needs, and by providing for certain conditions and procedures to prevent disappearance and to supervise the continued need for detention.
International armed conflicts
Grounds for detention
Rules on the reasons for which persons may be deprived of their liberty by a party to an international armed conflict are to be found in all four Geneva Conventions:[1] 
• The First Geneva Convention regulates the detention or retention of medical and religious personnel.[2] 
• The Second Geneva Convention regulates the detention or retention of medical and religious personnel of hospital ships.[3] 
• The Third Geneva Convention is based on the long-standing custom that prisoners of war may be interned for the duration of active hostilities.[4]  There are additional conditions in the Third Geneva Convention with respect to disciplinary punishments, judicial investigations and repatriation of seriously wounded or sick prisoners of war.[5] 
• The Fourth Geneva Convention specifies that a civilian may only be interned or placed in assigned residence if “the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary” (Article 42) or, in occupied territory, for “imperative reasons of security” (Article 78).[6]  In the Delalić case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia interpreted Article 42 as permitting internment only if there are “serious and legitimate reasons” to think that the interned persons may seriously prejudice the security of the detaining power by means such as sabotage or espionage.[7] 
The grounds for initial or continued detention have been limited to valid needs, as evidenced by the list above. For example, the detention of “enemy aliens” has been restricted in the Fourth Geneva Convention to those “absolutely necessary” for security purposes, and the Third Geneva Convention requires the repatriation of seriously wounded and sick prisoners of war because they are no longer likely to take part in hostilities against the Detaining Power.
Procedural requirements
In addition to valid grounds, certain procedures must be followed in order for a deprivation of liberty to be lawful. Article 43 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that any person interned or placed in assigned residence is entitled to have such decision reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board and if the decision is maintained to have it reviewed periodically, and a least twice yearly.[8]  Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that decisions regarding assigned residence or internment in occupied territory must be made according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the occupying power in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. It also provides that such decision is subject to an appeal to be decided with the least possible delay. If the appeal is upheld it must be subject to periodical review, if possible every six months, by a competent body set up by the occupying power.[9]  These procedures are also set forth in a number of military manuals.[10]  In addition, the Third Geneva Convention requires the examination of sick or wounded prisoners of war by a Mixed Medical Commission in order to establish whether they should be repatriated or accommodated in neutral countries.[11] 
Apart from the specific provisions of Articles 43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Geneva Conventions provide for the appointment of Protecting Powers to try and prevent arbitrary detention and the ill-treatment that often accompanies such detention. The Protecting Powers must be impartial supervisors who scrutinize the implementation of the Conventions in order to safeguard the interests of the parties to the conflict.[12]  In particular, a Detaining Power must immediately inform the Protecting Powers, as well as the Information Bureau and Central Information Agency, of the capture of prisoners of war or the internment of civilians.[13] 
Furthermore, Additional Protocol I provides that “any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed conflict shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons why these measures have been taken”.[14]  This rule is set forth in a number of military manuals.[15] 
Detention that is not in conformity with the various rules provided by the Geneva Conventions is referred to as “unlawful confinement”. “Unlawful confinement” of civilians is a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention.[16]  “Unlawful confinement” of a person protected under the Geneva Conventions is a grave breach under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 for East Timor.[17]  The Elements of Crimes for the International Criminal Court states that unlawful confinement may be in relation to any person protected under one of the Geneva Conventions and not only in relation to civilians.[18] 
The military manuals of many States prohibit unlawful confinement.[19]  This prohibition is also contained in the legislation of numerous States.[20]  The terminology used in these manuals and legislation varies: unlawful/illegal confinement, unlawful/illegal detention, arbitrary detention, unnecessary detention, arrest or deprivation of liberty contrary to international law, unjustified restriction of liberty and indiscriminate mass arrests. The prohibition of unlawful detention was also upheld in several cases after the Second World War.[21] 
Non-international armed conflicts
Grounds for detention
The prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty in non-international armed conflicts is established by State practice in the form of military manuals, national legislation and official statements, as well as on the basis of international human rights law (see infra). While all States have legislation specifying the grounds on which a person may be detained, more than 70 of them were found to criminalize unlawful deprivation of liberty during armed conflict.[22]  Most of this legislation applies the prohibition of unlawful deprivation of liberty to both international and non-international armed conflicts.[23]  Several military manuals which are applicable in or have been applied in non-international armed conflicts also prohibit unlawful deprivation of liberty.[24]  As indicated above, the terminology used in these manuals and legislation varies from unlawful/illegal confinement and unlawful/illegal detention to arbitrary or unnecessary detention.
No official contrary practice was found with respect to either international or non-international armed conflicts Alleged cases of unlawful deprivation of liberty have been condemned. The UN Security Council, for example, has condemned “arbitrary detention” in the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Burundi.[25]  Similarly, the UN General Assembly has expressed its deep concern over serious violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights in the former Yugoslavia and Sudan, including “unlawful detention” and “arbitrary detention”.[26]  The UN Commission on Human Rights has also condemned “detentions” in the former Yugoslavia and “arbitrary detention” in Sudan in resolutions adopted without a vote.[27] 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the regional human rights treaties recognize the right to liberty and security of person and/or provide that no one may be deprived of his or her liberty except for reasons and under conditions previously provided by law.[28]  These principles are also provided for in other international instruments.[29] 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European and American Conventions on Human Rights provide that no one may be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.[30]  The European Convention on Human Rights spells out the grounds on which a person may be deprived of his or her liberty.[31]  In its General Comment on Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (concerning states of emergency), the UN Human Rights Committee stated that States parties may “in no circumstances” invoke a state of emergency “as justification for acting in violation of humanitarian law or peremptory norms of international law, for instance … through arbitrary deprivations of liberty”.[32]  The prohibition of arbitrary arrest or detention is also set forth in other international instruments.[33] 
The need for a valid reason for the deprivation of liberty concerns both the initial reason for such deprivation and the continuation of such deprivation. Detention which continues beyond that provided for by law is a violation of the principle of legality and amounts to arbitrary detention. This point was made by the UN Human Rights Committee and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in cases concerning persons who continued to be detained after their prison term was completed,[34]  or despite an acquittal,[35]  or despite an order for their release.[36] 
Procedural requirements
Since the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, there has been a significant development in international human rights law relating to the procedures required to prevent arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Human rights law establishes (i) an obligation to inform a person who is arrested of the reasons for arrest, (ii) an obligation to bring a person arrested on a criminal charge promptly before a judge, and (iii) an obligation to provide a person deprived of liberty with an opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of detention (so-called writ of habeas corpus). Although obligations (i) and (ii) are not listed as non-derogable in the relevant human rights treaties, human rights case-law has held that they may never be dispensed with altogether.[37] 
(i) Obligation to inform a person who is arrested of the reasons for arrest. The requirement that persons who are arrested be informed promptly of the reasons therefore is contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European and American Conventions on Human Rights.[38]  While the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not explicitly provide for this right, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has specified that it is part and parcel of the right to fair trial.[39]  This requirement is also provided for in the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by the UN General Assembly without a vote.[40]  In its General Comment on Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee held that “if so-called preventive detention is used, for reasons of public security, it must be controlled by these same provisions, i.e. … information of the reasons must be given”.[41]  This rule is part of the domestic law of most, if not all, States in the world.[42]  It was included in the agreements concluded between the parties to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.[43] 
(ii) Obligation to bring a person arrested on a criminal charge promptly before a judge. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European and American Conventions on Human Rights require the prompt appearance of a person who is arrested or detained before a judge or other officer authorized to exercise judicial power. [44]  While the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not explicitly provide for this right, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has specified that it is part and parcel of the right to fair trial.[45]  This requirement is also provided for in the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment and the UN Declaration on Enforced Disappearance, both adopted by the UN General Assembly without a vote.[46]  This rule is part of the domestic law of most, if not all, States in the world.[47]  In its General Comment on Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee stated that a prompt appearance means that “delays must not exceed a few days”.[48]  There is now also significant case-law by regional human rights courts on the application of this principle during states of emergency.[49] 
(iii) Obligation to provide a person deprived of liberty with an opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of detention. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and European and American Conventions on Human Rights provide for the right to have the lawfulness of detention reviewed by a court and the release ordered in case it is not lawful (so-called writ of habeas corpus).[50]  This right is also provided for in the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by the UN General Assembly without a vote.[51]  This rule is part of the domestic law of most, if not all, States in the world.[52]  It was included in the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in the Philippines.[53] 
In its General Comment on Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (states of emergency), the UN Human Rights Committee stated that “in order to protect non-derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by a State party’s decision to derogate from the Covenant”.[54]  In its advisory opinions in the Habeas Corpus case and the Judicial Guarantees case in 1987, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights concluded that the writ of habeas corpus is among those judicial remedies that are “essential” for the protection of various rights whose derogation is prohibited under the American Convention on Human Rights and which is non-derogable in itself as a result.[55] 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has held that proceedings to decide on the lawfulness of detention must be brought before a court that is independent of the executive authority that ordered the detention, in particular in emergency-type situations where administrative detention is practiced.[56]  The European Court of Human Rights has similarly stressed the requirement that the review of the legality of detention be undertaken by a body which is independent of the executive.[57] 
There is, in addition, extensive practice to the effect that persons deprived of their liberty must have access to a lawyer.[58]  The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by the UN General Assembly without a vote, also specifies that “a detained person shall be entitled to have the assistance of a legal counsel”.[59]  In particular, the opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention requires the assistance of a lawyer, in order to be effective.
It should be noted, however, that all persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to a non-international armed conflict must be given the opportunity to challenge the legality of the detention unless the government of the State affected by the non-international armed conflict claimed for itself belligerent rights, in which case captured enemy “combatants” should benefit from the same treatment as granted to prisoners of war in international armed conflicts and detained civilians should benefit from the same treatment as granted to civilian persons protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention in international armed conflicts.

[1] Deprivation of liberty by neutral States is governed by Hague Conventions (V) and (XIII). Articles 11, 13 and 14 of Hague Convention (V) state the grounds for detention of belligerent persons by neutral States. Article 24 of Hague Convention (XIII) states the grounds for the detention of belligerent ships, their officers and crew by neutral States.
[2] First Geneva Convention, Articles 28, 30 and 32.
[3] Second Geneva Convention, Articles 36 and 37.
[4] Third Geneva Convention, Articles 21 and 118.
[5] Third Geneva Convention, Articles 90, 95, 103 and 109.
[6] Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 42 (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 32, § 2516) and Article 78 (ibid., § 2663).
[7] ICTY, Delalić case, Judgment (ibid., § 2643).
[8] Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 43, first paragraph (ibid., § 2746).
[9] Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 78 (ibid., §§ 2663 and 2747).
[10] See, e.g., the military manuals of Argentina (ibid., §§ 2755–2756), Canada (ibid., § 2757), Germany (ibid., § 2759), New Zealand (ibid., § 2760), United Kingdom (ibid., § 2761) and United States (ibid., §§ 2762–2763).
[11] Third Geneva Convention, Articles 110 and 112.
[12] First Geneva Convention, Articles 8 and 10; Second Geneva Convention, Articles 8 and 10; Third Geneva Convention, Articles 8 and 10; Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 9 and 11.
[13] Third Geneva Convention, Articles 69 and 122–123; Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 43, 105 and 136–137.
[14] Additional Protocol I, Article 75(3) (adopted by consensus) (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 32, § 2693).
[15] See, e.g., the military manuals of Canada (ibid., § 2697), New Zealand (ibid., § 2699), Sweden (ibid., § 2700) and Switzerland (ibid., § 2701).
[16] Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 147 (ibid., § 2517).
[17] ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(a)(vii) (ibid., § 2523); ICTY Statute, Article 2(g) (ibid., § 2529); UNTAET Regulation 2000/15, Section 6(1)(a)(vii) (ibid., § 2534).
[18] Elements of Crimes for the ICC, Definition of unlawful confinement as a war crime (ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(a)(vii)).
[19] See, e.g., the military manuals of Argentina (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 32, § 2535), Australia (ibid., § 2536), Canada (ibid., § 2537), Croatia (ibid., § 2539), France (ibid., §§ 2541–2542), Germany (ibid., § 2543), Hungary (ibid., § 2544), Netherlands (ibid., § 2545), New Zealand (ibid., § 2546), Nigeria (ibid., § 2548), South Africa (ibid., § 2549), Switzerland (ibid., § 2550), Uganda (ibid., § 2551), United Kingdom (ibid., § 2552) and United States (ibid., § 2553).
[20] See, e.g., the legislation (ibid., §§ 2554–2625).
[21] See, e.g., Netherlands, Temporary Court-Martial at Makassar, Motomura case and Notomi Sueo case (ibid., § 2626); Netherlands, Special Court (War Criminals) at The Hague and Special Court of Cassation, Rauter case (ibid., § 2626); Netherlands Special Court in Amsterdam and Special Court of Cassation, Zühlke case (ibid., § 2626); United Kingdom, Military Court at Lüneberg, Auschwitz and Belsen case (ibid., § 2626); United States, Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Pohl case (ibid., § 2626).
[22] See, e.g., the legislation (ibid., §§ 2554–2625).
[23] See, e.g., the legislation of Armenia (ibid., § 2555), Australia (ibid., § 2556), Azerbaijan (ibid., § 2559), Belgium (ibid., § 2562), Bosnia and Herzegovina (ibid., § 2563), Cambodia (ibid., § 2567), Democratic Republic of the Congo (ibid., § 2572), Croatia (ibid., § 2576), Ethiopia (ibid., § 2579), Georgia (ibid., § 2580), Moldova (ibid., § 2593), Nicaragua (ibid., § 2598), Niger (ibid., § 2600), Paraguay (ibid., § 2605), Poland (ibid., § 2606), Portugal (ibid., § 2607), Slovenia (ibid., § 2611), Spain (ibid., § 2613), Sweden (ibid., § 2615), Tajikistan (ibid., § 2616) and Yugoslavia (ibid., § 2624); see also the legislation of Bulgaria (ibid., § 2565) and Romania (ibid., § 2608), the application of which is not excluded in time of non-international armed conflict, and the draft legislation of Argentina (ibid., § 2554), Burundi (ibid., § 2566), El Salvador (ibid., § 2578), Jordan (ibid., § 2584) and Nicaragua (ibid., § 2599).
[24] See, e.g., the military manuals of Australia (ibid., § 2536), Croatia (ibid., § 2539), Germany (ibid., § 2543) and South Africa (ibid., § 2549).
[25] UN Security Council, Res. 1019 and 1034 (ibid., § 2629) and Res. 1072 (ibid., § 2630).
[26] UN General Assembly, Res. 50/193 (ibid., § 2633) and Res. 55/116 (ibid., § 2634). Resolution 50/193 was adopted by 114 votes in favour, one against and 20 abstentions. However, the explanation of the Russian Federation, which voted against the resolution, shows that it did not object to the principle of condemning unlawful detention but thought that the resolution was too one-sided; see the statement by the Russian Federation in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.3/50/SR.58, 14 December 1995, § 17. Resolution 55/116 was adopted by 85 votes in favour, 32 against and 49 abstentions. In explanations given by Canada, Bangladesh, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Thailand and the United States, there is no indication that there was a disagreement on the principle which is under discussion here; see the explanations of vote of these States given in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, 10 October 2000, UN Doc. A/C.3/55/SR.55, 29 November 2000, § 138 (Canada), § 139 (United States), § 146 (Bangladesh), § 147 (Thailand) and § 148 (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya).
[27] UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1996/71 (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 32, § 2635) and Res. 1996/73 (ibid., § 2636).
[28] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9(1) (ibid., §§ 2519 and 2665); Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 37(b) (ibid., §§ 2522 and 2668) (no general reference to liberty and security of person; limited to requirement of arrest, detention or imprisonment in conformity with law); European Convention on Human Rights, Article 5(1) (ibid., §§ 2518 and 2664); American Convention on Human Rights, Article 7 (ibid., §§ 2520 and 2666); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 6 (ibid., §§ 2521 and 2667).
[29] See, e.g., Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 3 (ibid., § 2526); American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, Articles I and XXV (ibid., §§ 2527 and 2672); Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 2 (ibid., § 2673); Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Article 20 (ibid., § 2528); EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 6 (ibid., § 2533).
[30] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9(1) (ibid., § 2519); Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 37(b) (ibid., § 2522); American Convention on Human Rights, Article 7(3) (ibid., § 2520); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 6 (ibid., § 2521).
[31] European Convention on Human Rights, Article 5(1); see also UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 8 (Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) (ibid., § 2644) (the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty applies to all such deprivations, “whether in criminal cases or in other cases such as, e.g., mental illness, vagrancy, drug addiction, educational purposes, immigration control, etc.”).
[32] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29 (Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) (ibid., § 2645).
[33] See, e.g., Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 9 (ibid., § 2526).
[34] UN Human Rights Committee, García Lanza de Netto v. Uruguay (ibid., § 2646); African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Pagnoulle v. Cameroon (ibid., § 2649).
[35] African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria (148/96) (ibid., § 2651).
[36] UN Human Rights Committee, Torres Ramírez v. Uruguay (ibid., § 2647).
[37] With respect to the obligation to inform a person who is arrested of the reasons for arrest, see e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights (ibid., § 3019), Doctrine concerning judicial guarantees and the right to personal liberty and security, reprinted in Ten years of activities (1971–1981), Washington, D.C., 1982, p. 337. With respect to the obligation to bring a person arrested on a criminal charge promptly before a judge, see, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 8 (ibid., § 2735); European Court of Human Rights, Aksoy v. Turkey (ibid., 2742) and Brogan and Others case (ibid., § 2740); Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Castillo Petruzzi and Others case, (ibid., § 2743).
[38] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9(2) (ibid., § 2691); European Convention on Human Rights, Article 5(2) (ibid., § 2690); American Convention on Human Rights, Article 7(4) (ibid., § 2692).
[39] African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (ibid., § 2712).
[40] Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 10 (ibid., § 2694).
[41] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 8 (Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) (ibid., § 2710).
[42] See, e.g., the legislation of India (ibid., § 2702), Spain (ibid., § 2705) and Zimbabwe (ibid., § 2706).
[43] Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of International Humanitarian Law between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, § 4 (ibid., § 2695); Agreement on the Application of International Humanitarian Law between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, § 2.3 (ibid., § 2696).
[44] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9(3) (ibid., § 2720); European Convention on Human Rights, Article 5(3) (ibid., § 2719); American Convention on Human Rights, Article 7(5) (ibid., § 2721).
[45] African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (ibid., § 2737).
[46] Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principles 11 and 37 (ibid., §§ 2724–2725); UN Declaration on Enforced Disappearance, Article 10 (ibid., § 2726).
[47] See, e.g., the legislation of India (ibid., § 2729), Myanmar (ibid., § 2730) and Uganda (ibid., § 2731).
[48] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 8 (Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) (ibid., § 2735).
[49] See European Court of Human Rights, Brannigan and McBride v. UK (delay of up to seven days not found to be excessive because the detainees were allowed to consult a lawyer, contact a family member or friend and to be examined by a doctor within 48 hours) (ibid., § 2741) and Aksoy v. Turkey (delay of 14 days incommunicado detention found to be excessive) (ibid., § 2742); Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Castillo Petruzzi and Others case (delay of 36 days found to be excessive) (ibid., § 2743).
[50] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9(4) (ibid., § 2749); European Convention on Human Rights, Article 5(4) (ibid., § 2748); American Convention on Human Rights, Article 7(6) (ibid., § 2750).
[51] American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, Article XXV (ibid., § 2752); Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 32 (ibid., § 2753).
[52] See, e.g., the legislation of the Russian Federation (ibid., § 2764).
[53] Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and IHL in the Philippines, Part II, Article 5 (ibid., § 2754).
[54] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29 (Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) (ibid., § 2776).
[55] Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Habeas Corpus case (ibid., § 2781) and Judicial Guarantees case (ibid., § 2782); see also Neira Alegría and Others case (ibid., § 2783).
[56] African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication Nos. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91 and 89/93, Amnesty International and Others v. Sudan, Decision, 26th Session, Kigali, 1–15 November 1999, § 60; Communication Nos. 143/95 and 159/96, Constitutional Rights Project and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, 26th Session, Kigali, 1–15 November 1999, §§ 31 and 34.
[57] European Court of Human Rights, Lawless case, Judgment (Merits), 1 July 1961, § 14; Ireland v. UK, Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction), 18 January 1978, §§ 199–200.
[58] See, e.g., UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the report of Senegal (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 32, § 3276); UN Committee against Torture, Report of the Committee against Torture on the Situation in Turkey, UN Doc. A/48/44/Add.1, 15 November 1993, § 48; European Court of Human Rights, Aksoy v. Turkey, Judgment, 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, § 83.
[59] Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 17 (ibid., § 3230).