相关规则
Uganda
Practice Relating to Rule 100. Fair Trial Guarantees
Uganda’s Geneva Conventions Act (1964) punishes “any person, whatever his nationality, who, whether within or without Uganda commits or aids, abets or procures the commission by any other person of any grave breach of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions”. 
Uganda, Geneva Conventions Act, 1964, Section 1(1).
In the Kotido Field Court Martial case in 2008, Uganda’s Constitutional Court unanimously ruled that accused persons in Field Court Martials were entitled, as of right, to appeal through the Military Courts system up to the Supreme Court. In the lead judgment, Twinomujuni J stated:
On the afternoon of the 25th March 2002, at exactly 12.50 pm they [the two accused soldiers] were indicted before a Field Court Martial presided over by Col. Sula Semakula and eight other soldiers. They were tried, convicted and three hours after their indictment, they were sentenced to death and executed by a firing squad. The issue is whether this was the FAIR AND SPEEDY HEARING envisaged in article 28(1) of the Constitution. In order to understand the meaning of this mandatory requirement, we have to look at relevant provisions in the whole Constitution, but also the entire provisions of articles 22 [Protection of right to life], 28 [Right to a fair hearing] and 44(c) [Right to fair hearing] of the Constitution. Can what is required to be done under those articles be accomplished in a matter of just three hours? Surely when considering the requirement of a speedy trial, speed must be measured against the requirement that the trial must be fair in all other aspects spelt out by the Constitution.
Speed must be “reasonable” speed measured against the overall objective of achieving a fair trial. In my opinion, this trial was not conducted in accordance with article 28(1) of the Constitution. The process was a clear contravention of that article. 
Uganda, Constitutional Court, Kotido Field Court Martial case, Judgment, 5 February 2008, pp. 22–23.
[emphasis in original]
Twinomujuni J further stated:
I have discussed in this judgment at length whether the accused were accorded protections provided for under articles 28(1), 28(3) and 44 (c) of the Constitution. I came to the conclusion that the accused were denied those protections and that they were not accorded a fair hearing at all. It follows, therefore, that the answer as to whether they had a fair trial is in the negative. They did not receive a fair trial as required by articles 28, 22 and 44(c) of the Constitution. 
Uganda, Constitutional Court, Kotido Field Court Martial case, Judgment, 5 February 2008, p. 29.
In 2003, in its initial report to the Human Rights Committee, Uganda stated that there are “certain Rights that cannot be derogated from and these include … the right to fair hearing”. 
Uganda, Initial report to the Human Rights Committee, 14 February 2003, UN Doc. CCPR/C/UGA/2003/1, 25 February 2003, § 108; see also §§ 119, 137 and 385–407.
The report further stated:
473. It is important to note that … there are areas where derogation is not acceptable under whatever circumstances. They are under article 44.
474. Article 44 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995) states that:
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, there shall not be derogation from the enjoyment of the following rights and freedoms:
(a) freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) freedom from slavery or servitude;
(c) right to fair hearing;
(d) right to an order of habeas corpus. 
Uganda, Initial report to the Human Rights Committee, 14 February 2003, UN Doc. CCPR/C/UGA/2003/1, 25 February 2003, § 108; see also §§ 473–474.
In the Kotido Field Court Martial case in 2008, which related to a Field Court Martial held in 2002 that had, within the space of three hours, resulted in the indictment, conviction and then execution of two soldiers for the crime of murder, Uganda’s Constitutional Court unanimously ruled that accused persons in Field Court Martials were entitled, as of right, to appeal through the Military Courts system up to the Supreme Court. In the lead judgment, Twinomujuni J stated:
ADEQUATE TIME AND FACILITIES TO PREPARE A DEFENCE
We have no information as to when (if at all) the accused persons were told of the offence they were going to be indicted on. All we know is that the indictment was read to them in court at 12.50 pm on 25th March 2003. Three hours later, the trial was over and they were dead. It seems to me that they were not accorded any time at all to prepare for their defence. This is contrary even to the provisions of the UPDF [Uganda Peoples Defence Forces] Act and the regulations governing trial procedure in military courts. I have no doubt in my mind that the Field Court martial in the Kotido trial grossly contravened article 28(3)(c) of the Constitution [“be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defence”].
THE RIGHT TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Article 28(3) (e) of the Constitution categorically states that where an accused person is facing trial on a charge which carries a sentence of death or life imprisonment, he is entitled to legal representation at the expense of the State. This requirement is mandatory. A look at the proceedings of the Court Martial will reveal that the accused was not even informed that he had a right to legal representation. When the prosecution witnesses completed giving evidence, the accused would be given opportunity to cross-examine but in most cases, they had nothing to ask and yet the case had complex issues. 
Uganda, Constitutional Court, Kotido Field Court Martial case, Judgment, 5 February 2008, pp. 24–25.
Twinomujuni J further stated:
It is not imaginable, that the accused persons who were not given even a few minutes to reflect on the indictment or the evidence against them, would be able to ask of the state witnesses any intelligent question in cross examination. No wonder then that they totally failed to cross-examine the witnesses.
This gross contravention of article 28(3) (e) of the Constitution cannot be cured by the fact that there was a military legal officer present throughout the trial. … I would hold that the Kotido trial was conducted in total contravention of the provisions of article 28(3) (e) of the Constitution of Uganda. 
Uganda, Constitutional Court, Kotido Field Court Martial case, Judgment, 5 February 2008, pp. 27–28.
Uganda’s Defence Forces Act (2005) provides:
214. Witnesses and advocates at military courts
(1) The commanding officer or officer commanding of the accused person and a military court shall take all necessary action to procure the attendance of the witnesses whom the prosecutor or the accused person or both request to be called and whose attendance can, having regard to the exigencies of the service, reasonably be procured.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall require the procurement of the attendance of any witnesses, the request for whose attendance is deemed by the commanding officer, officer commanding or the military court, to be frivolous or vexatious.
(3) Where a request by the accused person for the attendance of a witness is deemed to be frivolous or vexatious, the attendance of that witness, if his or her attendance, having regard to the exigencies of the service, can reasonably be procured, shall be procured if the accused person pays in advance the fees and expenses of the witness at the rates prescribed in regulations.
(4) If at the trial the evidence of the witness proves to be relevant and material, the military court shall order the accused person to be reimbursed in the amount of the fees and expenses of the witness paid under subsection (3).
(5) Nothing in this section limits the right of the accused person to procure and produce at the trial at his or her expense such witnesses as he or she may desire. 
Uganda, Defence Forces Act, 2005, § 214.
Uganda’s Defence Forces Act (2005) provides:
212. Trials Public
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), military courts shall be public and, to the extent that accommodation permits, the public shall be admitted to the trial.
(2) Where a military court considers that it is expedient in the interest of public safety, defence or public morals that the public should be excluded during the whole or any part of a trial, the court may make an order to that effect, and any such order shall be recorded in the record of the proceedings of the military court.
(3) A witness shall not be admitted to a trial until he or she is called upon to give evidence or by specific leave of the military court and the court may at any time require the witness to withdraw after having given his or her evidence. 
Uganda, Defence Forces Act, 2005, § 212.
Uganda’s Defence Forces Act (2005) provides:
227. Jurisdiction of appellate courts
(1) A party to the proceedings of a Unit Disciplinary Committee or court martial other than a Field Court Martial who is not satisfied with its decision shall have the right to appeal to an appellate court on any or all of the following matters –
(a) the legality or propriety of any or all of the findings;
(b) the legality of the whole or part of the sentence;
(c) the severity or lenience of the sentence.
228. Advice on the rights of appeal
(1) The Unit Disciplinary Committee or court martial shall, at the conclusion of the trial, inform the parties to its proceedings as to their rights of appeal. 
Uganda, Defence Forces Act, 2005, §§ 227–228.
In the Kotido Field Court Martial case in 2008, which related to a Field Court Martial held in 2002 that had, within the space of three hours, resulted in the indictment, conviction and then execution of two soldiers for the crime of murder, Uganda’s Constitutional Court unanimously ruled that accused persons in Field Court Martials were entitled, as of right, to appeal through the Military Courts system up to the Supreme Court. In the lead judgment, Twinomujuni J stated:
At the trial of this appeal, both counsel for the petitioners and the respondent appeared to accept the argument that the UPDF [Uganda People’s Defence Forces] Act does not provide for a right to appeal against the decision of a Field Court Martial.
I am unable to tell precisely how they came to that conclusion. 
Uganda, Constitutional Court, Kotido Field Court Martial case, Judgment, 5 February 2008, p. 34.
Twinomujuni J also stated:
Article 22(1) of the Constitution provides:
Protection of Right to Life
(1) No person shall be deprived of life intentionally except in execution of a sentence passed in a fair trial by a court of competent jurisdiction in respect of a criminal offence under the laws of Uganda and the conviction and sentence have been confirmed by the highest appellate court. 
Uganda, Constitutional Court, Kotido Field Court Martial case, Judgment, 5 February 2008, p. 28.
Twinomujuni J further stated:
I stated earlier in this judgment that article 45 supra of our Constitution clearly states that Chapter IV of the Constitution is not exhaustive of fundamental human rights and freedoms available to the people of Uganda. An automatic right of appeal where one’s fundamental rights and freedoms have been violated is one good example. In the instant case the accused persons in the Kotido trial were entitled to a right to life guaranteed under article 22(1) of the Constitution. The right of appeal was therefore automatic. A denial of that right was clearly unconstitutional. 
Uganda, Constitutional Court, Kotido Field Court Martial case, Judgment, 5 February 2008, p. 36.
Twinomujuni J further stated: “I am unable to accept the argument that [the] UPDF Act does not grant a right of appeal from the decision of a Field Court Martial or any other Military Court.” 
Uganda, Constitutional Court, Kotido Field Court Martial case, Judgment, 5 February 2008, p. 37.
Twinomujuni J further stated:
… This does not in any way exempt the court from the mandatory application of article 22(1) of the Constitution, nor does it affect the automatic right of appeal, which I have discussed above. It does not affect the operation of the right of appeal guaranteed by section 81 of the UPDF Act. In the result, I would hold that the accused persons in the Kotido trial were entitled, as of right, to appeal through the Military Courts system up to the Supreme Court. … Unfortunately, the execution of the soldiers in the Kotido trial put an end to this procedure. That was in contravention of article 22(1) of the Constitution of Uganda. 
Uganda, Constitutional Court, Kotido Field Court Martial case, Judgment, 5 February 2008, pp. 42–43.
Uganda’s Defence Forces Act (2005) provides:
216. Autrefois acquit and autrefois convict
(1) A person, in respect to whom a charge of having committed a service offence has been dismissed, or who has been found guilty or not guilty by a military court or civil court on a charge of having committed any such offence, shall not be tried again by any court in respect of that offence or any other offence of which he or she might have been found guilty on that charge. 
Uganda, Defence Forces Act, 2005, § 216.
In 2003, in its initial report to the Human Rights Committee, Uganda stated:
410. The principle of non-retroactive jurisdiction is contained in Uganda’s domestic legislation. Under Article 28 (7) of the Constitution “No person shall be charged with or convicted of a criminal offence which is founded on an act or omission that did not at the time it took place constitute a criminal offence”. The constitution also in a related manner prohibits “double jeopardy”, Article 28 (9) states that “A person who shows that he or she has been tried by a competent court for criminal offence and convicted or acquitted of that offence, shall not again be tried for the offence or for any criminal offence of which he or she could have been convicted at the trial for that offence, except upon the order of superior court in the course of appeal or review proceedings relating to the conviction or acquittal”.
411. Furthermore, article 28(10) prohibits trying a person for a criminal offence in which he has previously been pardoned. It states “No person shall be tried for a criminal offence if the person shows that he or she has been pardoned in respect of that offence”. There has not been a case since 1986 where the principle of non-retroactive jurisdiction has been violated. Even if it was, it would have been challenged under the law and under the independent judiciary in the country. 
Uganda, Initial report to the Human Rights Committee, 14 February 2003, UN Doc. CCPR/C/UGA/2003/1, 25 February 2003, §§ 410–411.