相关规则
Philippines
Practice Relating to Rule 100. Fair Trial Guarantees
The Philippines’ Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), in the rule dealing with the rights of the accused at trial, states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(h) To have a speedy, impartial and public trial. 
Philippines, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2000, Rule 115, Section 1(h).
The Philippines’ Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law (2002) states:
Sec. 26. Duty of the Family Court to Protect the Rights of the Juvenile.– In all criminal proceedings in the Family Court, the judge shall ensure the protection of the following rights of the juvenile in conflict with the law:
h) To have speedy and impartial trial, with legal or other appropriate assistance and preferably in the presence of his parents or legal guardian, unless such presence is considered not to be in the best interests of the juvenile taking into account his age or other peculiar circumstances. 
Philippines, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 2002, Section 26(h).
The Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (2006) provides:
While not in combat:
8. Inform the troops that a child taken in custody by government forces in an area of armed conflict should be informed of his/her constitutional rights and shall be treated humanely. Some of [these] basic rights are “the right to remain silent”, “the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty”, “the right to be notified of the charge,” “right to counsel”, “right to presence of parents or guardian”, and the “right to confront and cross examine witnesses.” 
Philippines, Philippine Army Soldiers Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, A Practical Guide for Internal Security Operations, 2006, p. 55, § 8.
The Philippines’ Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), in the rule dealing with the rights of the accused at trial, states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
- To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. 
Philippines, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2000, Rule 115, Section 1(a).
The Philippines’ Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law (2002) states:
Sec. 26. Duty of the Family Court to Protect the Rights of the Juvenile. – In all criminal proceedings in the Family Court, the judge shall ensure the protection of the following rights of the juvenile in conflict with the law:
a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. 
Philippines, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 2002, Section 26(a).
In its judgment in the Valencia case in 1991, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated:
Procedural due process demands that [a] respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Valencia case, Judgment, 26 April 1991.
In its judgment in the Lucero case in 1991, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated:
Basic is the rule that an accused must be presumed innocent until his guilt is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It simply means that the evidence must engender moral certainty or constitute that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Lucero case, Judgment, 31 May 1991.
In its judgment in the Hernandez case in 1996, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated: “The rule prohibiting the stipulation of facts in criminal cases is grounded on the fundamental right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the corollary duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.” 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Hernandez case, Judgment, 30 July 1996.
In the Binamira case before the Supreme Court of the Philippines in 1997, in which the appellant appealed the decision of a lower court that had convicted him of the crime of robbery with homicide, the court reversed and set aside the lower court’s decision and ordered his immediate release from confinement. In doing so, the court noted:
[W]e must stress that mere suspicions and speculations can never be the bases of a conviction in a criminal case. Our Constitution and our laws dearly value individual life and liberty and require no less than moral certainty or proof beyond reasonable doubt to offset the presumption of innocence. Courts – both trial and appellate – are not called upon to speculate on who committed the crime. The task of courts, rather, is to determine whether the prosecution has submitted sufficient legally admissible evidence showing beyond reasonable doubt that a crime has been committed, and that the accused committed it. In this case, the prosecution has failed to present adequate proof demonstrating beyond reasonable doubt that Appellant Armando Binamira y Alayon was the culprit who robbed and killed Jessie Flores y Cledera. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Binamira case, Judgment, 14 August 1997.
In its judgment in the Cosep case in 1998, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated:
It is axiomatic that in every criminal prosecution, if the state fails to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, it fails utterly. Accordingly, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, it is our policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence of the accused must be favored and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Cosep case, Judgment, 21 May 1998.
The Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (2006) provides:
While not in combat:
8. Inform the troops that a child taken in custody by government forces in an area of armed conflict should be informed of his/her constitutional rights and shall be treated humanely. Some of [these] basic rights are “the right to remain silent”, “the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty”, “the right to be notified of the charge,” “right to counsel”, “right to presence of parents or guardian”, and the “right to confront and cross examine witnesses.” 
Philippines, Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, A Practical Guide for Internal Security Operations, 2006, p. 55, § 8.
The Philippines’ Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), in the rule dealing with the rights of the accused at trial, states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 
Philippines, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2000, Rule 115, Section 1(b).
The Philippines’ Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law (2002) states:
Sec. 26. Duty of the Family Court to Protect the Rights of the Juvenile. – In all criminal proceedings in the Family Court, the judge shall ensure the protection of the following rights of the juvenile in conflict with the law:
b) To be informed promptly and directly of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and if appropriate, through his parents or legal guardian. 
Philippines, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 2002, Section 26(b).
The Philippines’ Republic Act No. 9372 (2007) states:
Rights of a Person under Custodial Detention. – The moment a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism is apprehended or arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be informed, by the arresting police or law enforcement officers or by the police or law enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned is brought, of his or her right: … (b) [to be] informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the presence of his legal counsel. 
Philippines, Republic Act No. 9372, 2007, Section 21.
In its judgment in the Espinosa case in 2003, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated:
Arraignment is an indispensable requirement of due process. It consists of the judge’s or the clerk of court’s reading of the criminal complaint or information to the defendant. At this stage, the accused is granted, for the first time, the opportunity to be officially informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation. Thus, arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Espinosa case, Judgment, 15 August 2003.
The Joint Circular on Adherence to IHL and Human Rights (1991) of the Philippines provides: “Legal counsels of detainees or arrested persons must be granted free access to the detention center/jail where the detainees are held.” 
Philippines, Implementation Guidelines for Presidential Memorandum Order No. 393, dated 9 September 1991, Directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippines National Police to Reaffirm their Adherence to the Principles of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in the Conduct of Security/Police Operations, Joint Circular Number 2-91, Department of National Defense, Department of Interior and Local Government, 1991, § 2(b)(2).
The Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (2006) provides:
While not in combat:
8. Inform the troops that a child taken in custody by government forces in an area of armed conflict should be informed of his/her constitutional rights and shall be treated humanely. Some of [these] basic rights are “the right to remain silent”, “the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty”, “the right to be notified of the charge,” “right to counsel”, “right to presence of parents or guardian”, and the “right to confront and cross examine witnesses.” 
Philippines, Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, A Practical Guide for Internal Security Operations, 2006, p. 55, § 8.
[emphasis in original]
The Philippines’ Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), in the rule dealing with the rights of the accused at trial, states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel. 
Philippines, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2000, Rule 115, Section 1(c).
The Philippines’ Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law (2002) states:
Sec. 26. Duty of the Family Court to Protect the Rights of the Juvenile. – In all criminal proceedings in the Family Court, the judge shall ensure the protection of the following rights of the juvenile in conflict with the law:
d) To have legal and other appropriate assistance in the preparation and presentation of his defense;
h) To have speedy and impartial trial, with legal or other appropriate assistance and preferably in the presence of his parents or legal guardian, unless such presence is considered not to be in the best interests of the juvenile taking into account his age or other peculiar circumstances. 
Philippines, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 2002, Section 26 (d) and (h).
The Philippines’ Republic Act No. 9344 (2006), the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, provides: “Every child in conflict with the law shall have the following rights, including but not limited to: … (e) the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance”. 
Philippines, Republic Act No. 9344, 2006, Section 5(e).
The Philippines’ Republic Act No. 9372 (2007) states:
Rights of a Person under Custodial Detention. – The moment a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism is apprehended or arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be informed, by the arresting police or law enforcement officers or by the police or law enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned is brought, of his or her right: (a) to be informed of the nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel of his or her choice, the police or law enforcement officers concerned shall immediately contact the free legal assistance unit of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO). It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO thus contacted to immediately visit the person(s) detained and provide him or her with legal assistance. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of the counsel of choice; (b) informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the presence of his legal counsel; (c) allowed to communicate freely with his legal counsel and to confer with them at any time without restriction. 
Philippines, Republic Act No. 9372, 2007, Section 21.
In its judgment in the Cuizon case in 1996, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated:
It is clear that appellant Lee was effectively denied his right to counsel, for although he was provided with one, he could not understand and communicate with him concerning his defense such that, among other things, no memorandum was filed on his behalf; further, he was denied his right to have compulsory process to guarantee the availability of witnesses and the production of evidence on his behalf, including the services of a qualified and competent interpreter to enable him to present his testimony. In sum, he was denied due process. For this reason, we hold that the case as against Lee must be remanded to the court of origin for a re-trial. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Cuizon case, Judgment, 18 April 1996.
In the Binamira case before the Supreme Court of the Philippines in 1997, in which the appellant appealed the decision of a lower court that had convicted him of the crime of robbery with homicide, the court reversed and set aside the lower court’s decision and ordered his immediate release from confinement. In doing so, the court noted:
In the present case, Appellant Binamira was not adequately informed of his constitutional right to engage a counsel of his own choice, much less afforded an opportunity to exercise such right …
Moreover, the extrajudicial confession itself shows that, in the course of the custodial investigation, Appellant Binamira was not fully apprised of his constitutional rights. While he was perfunctorily informed of his right to be represented by counsel, it was not explained to him that he may choose that counsel. More important, he was not given the chance to actually retain such counsel of his choice. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Binamira case, Judgment, 14 August 1997.
[emphasis in original]
In its judgment in the Liwanag case in 2001, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated:
Accused-appellant’s citation of People v. Holgado and Powell v. Alabama, insofar as the right to be heard by counsel is concerned, is misleading. Both cases only defined the “right to be heard by counsel” as “the right to be assisted by counsel.” It cannot be inferred from these cases that “the right to be heard by counsel” presupposes “the right to an intelligent counsel.” The requirement is not for counsel to be “intelligent”, but to be effective.
Jurisprudence defined the meaning of “effective counsel” only in the light of Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution, which refers to the right of persons under custodial investigation. In People v. Lucero, the rationale for this constitutional right was elucidated by this Court, to wit:
The 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible. In providing for said right, this Court has held in the same case that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The requirements of effectiveness and vigilance of counsel during that stage before arraignment were for the purposes of guarding against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions which may taint them and render them inadmissible.
On the other hand, Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution requires that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. The reason for the latter provision was explained in People v. Holgado, thus:
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that “no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law”, and that all accused “shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.” In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
In essence, the right to be heard by counsel simply refers to the right to be assisted by counsel for the purpose of ensuring that an accused is not denied the collateral right to due process, a fundamental right which cannot be waived by an accused. The underlying basis for due process is the concept of fairness, without which there can be no justice. In other words, there can be no due process accorded an accused if he is not given the right to be heard through counsel or assisted by counsel. It follows that in order to be heard, and therefore be accorded due process, the assistance given by counsel must be “effective” as implied in the rationale of Article III, Section 14 (2). In this sense, this Court subscribes to American jurisprudence when it held that “[t]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.” 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Liwanag case, Judgment, 15 August 2001.
[emphasis in original]
In the Alejano case before the Supreme Court of the Philippines in 2005, in which the petitioners (six junior officer detainees charged with coup détat, together with two of their defence lawyers) sought to nullify a Court of Appeals decision to dismiss a petition for habeas corpus, the court dismissed the petition. In response to allegations by the detainees that access to their lawyers was being constrained at their place of detention, the court noted:
In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 [Republic Act No. 7438 – An Act Defining Certain Rights of the Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation] provides the standard to make regulations in detention centers allowable: “such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the detainees safety and prevent his escape.” In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees.
While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of detainees’ right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek permission from the ISAFP [Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines] officials to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours.
In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict non-contact visitation regulation like in Block v. Rutherford [468 U.S. 576 (1984)]. The limitation on the detainees’ physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Alejano case, Judgment, 25 August 2005.
[emphasis in original]
In its judgment in the Callangan case in 2006, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated:
In criminal cases, the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel is immutable. Otherwise, there will be a grave denial of due process. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned.
In People v. Ferrer, the essence of the right to counsel was enunciated:
The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Callangan case, Judgment, 27 June 2006.
[emphasis in original]
The Philippines’ Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), in the rule dealing with the rights of the accused at trial, states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(h) To have a speedy, impartial and public trial. 
Philippines, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2000, Rule 115, Section 1(h).
The Philippines’ Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law (2002) states:
Sec. 26. Duty of the Family Court to Protect the Rights of the Juvenile. – In all criminal proceedings in the Family Court, the judge shall ensure the protection of the following rights of the juvenile in conflict with the law:
h) To have speedy and impartial trial, with legal or other appropriate assistance and preferably in the presence of his parents or legal guardian, unless such presence is considered not to be in the best interests of the juvenile taking into account his age or other peculiar circumstances. 
Philippines, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 2002, Section 26(h).
In the Abadia case before the Supreme Court of the Philippines in 1994, an application by the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces to annul a decision by the Court of Appeal, requiring him to show lawful cause for the continued detention of Lt. Col Malajacan without trial, was denied. In doing so, the court noted:
In the context of the constitutional protection guaranteeing fair trial rights to accused individuals particularly the Right to a Speedy Trial, we cannot accept petitioners’ submission that the absence of any specific provision limiting the time within which records of general courts martial should be forwarded to the appropriate reviewing authority and for the reviewing authority to decide on the case would deny private respondent – or any military personnel facing charges before the General Courts Martial, for that matter – a judicial recourse to protect his constitutional right to a speedy trial. What petitioners suggest is untenable. In the case at bench, the records of the case may indefinitely remain with the General Court Martial, and our courts, because of a procedural gap in the rules, cannot be called upon to ascertain whether certain substantive rights have been or are being denied in the meantime. That is not the spirit ordained by inclusion of the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which mandates the “duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” Moreover, the absence of rules and regulations mandating a reasonable period within which the appropriate appellate military authority should act in a case subject to mandatory review is no excuse for denial of a substantive right. The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases “before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.” This protection extends to all citizens, including those in the military and covers the periods before, during and after the trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial.
These rights are clearly available to all citizens even in the absence of statutory enactment. They cannot be denied to certain individuals because of gaps in the law for which they are not responsible. They cannot be taken away from certain individuals because of the nature of their vocation. Members of the military establishment do not waive individual rights on taking up military uniform. That they become subject to uniquely military rules and procedures does not imply that they agree to exclusively fall under the jurisdiction of only those rules and regulations, and opt to stand apart from those rules which govern all of the country’s citizens. As the respondent Court correctly held:
As admitted by counsel for respondents, there is no time frame within which to transmit the records of the case to the reviewing authority as well as time limitation within which the Chief of Staff must act on the recommendation of dismissal However, it must be stressed that the absence of a rule does not give to the Chief of Staff indefinite time within which to act at the expense of the constitutional right of a citizen to enjoy liberty and to be protected from illegal or arbitrary detention.
Respondent court, therefore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in ordering the petitioners to act with dispatch in dealing with the private respondent’s case. Over three years have elapsed since the respondent’s arrest. To this day, there is no indication – and it has not been alleged – that records of the case have been forwarded to the appropriate military appellate authority.
This case does not even involve complex issues of fact and law. The central issue which the appropriate military appellate authority will have to review is whether or not the General Court Martial was correct in dismissing the case on grounds of prescription under Article 38 of the Articles of War. We cannot see why the military appellate review authority should take an interminable length of time in coming up with a decision on the case. The unjustified delay in dealing with the respondent’s case is a deliberate injustice which should not be perpetrated on the private respondent a day longer. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Abadia case, Judgment, 23 September 1994.
The Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (2006) provides:
While not in combat:
8. Inform the troops that a child taken in custody by government forces in an area of armed conflict should be informed of his/her constitutional rights and shall be treated humanely. Some of [these] basic rights are “the right to remain silent”, “the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty”, “the right to be notified of the charge,” “right to counsel”, “right to presence of parents or guardian”, and the “right to confront and cross examine witnesses.” 
Philippines, Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, A Practical Guide for Internal Security Operations, 2006, p. 55, § 8.
[emphasis in original]
The Philippines’ Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), in the rule dealing with the rights of the accused at trial, states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf. 
Philippines, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2000, Rule 115, Section 1(d), (f) and (g).
The Philippines’ Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law (2002) states:
Sec. 26. Duty of the Family Court to Protect the Rights of the Juvenile. – In all criminal proceedings in the Family Court, the judge shall ensure the protection of the following rights of the juvenile in conflict with the law:
e) To testify as a witness in his own behalf and subject to cross-examination only on matters covered by direct examination, provided that the Rule on the Examination of a Child Witness shall be observed whenever convenient and practicable.
The juvenile shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself and his silence shall not in any manner prejudice him;
f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him;
g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf. 
Philippines, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 2002, Section 26(e)–(g).
In its judgment in the Valencia case in 1991, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated:
Procedural due process demands that [a] respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Valencia case, Judgment, 26 April 1991.
In its judgment in the Hernandez case in 1996, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated: “It is true that the rights of an accused during trial are given paramount importance in our laws on criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights of the accused is the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.” 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Hernandez case, Judgment, 30 July 1996.
In its judgment in the Genosa case in 2000, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated:
The prosecution has likewise the right to a fair trial, which includes the opportunity to cross-examine the defense witnesses and to refute the expert opinion given. Thus, consistent with the principle of due process, a partial reopening of the case is apropos, so as to allow the defense the opportunity to present expert evidence consistent with our foregoing disquisition, as well as the prosecution the opportunity to cross examine and refute the same. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Genosa case, Judgment, 29 September 2000.
In its judgment in the Monje case in 2002, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated:
It bears stressing that the cross-examination of a witness is an absolute right, not a mere privilege, of the party against whom he is called. With regard to the accused, it is a right guaranteed by the fundamental law as part of due process. Article III, Sec. 14, par. (2), of the 1987 Constitution specifically mandates that “the accused shall enjoy the right to meet the witnesses face to face,” and Rule 115, Sec. 1, par. (f), of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure enjoins that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Cross-examination serves as a safeguard to combat unreliable testimony, providing means for discrediting a witness’ testimony, and is in the nature of an attack on the truth and accuracy of his testimony. The purpose of cross-examination, however, is not limited to bringing out a falsehood, since it is also a leading and searching inquiry of the witness for further disclosure touching the particular matters detailed by him in his direct examination, and it serves to sift, modify, or explain what has been said, in order to develop new or old facts in a view favorable to the cross-examiner. The object of cross-examination therefore is to weaken or disprove the case of one’s adversary, and break down his testimony in chief, test the recollection, veracity, accuracy, honesty and bias or prejudice of the witness, his source of information, his motives, interest and memory, and exhibit the improbabilities of his testimony.
We discussed at length in Seneris the effects of the absence or the incomplete cross-examination of a witness on the admissibility in evidence of his testimony on direct examination. The basic rule is that the testimony of a witness given on direct examination should be stricken off the record where there was no adequate opportunity for cross-examination. Of course, there are notable modifications to the basic rule which make its application essentially on a case-to-case basis. Thus, where a party had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits his right to cross-examine and the testimony given by the witness on direct examination will be allowed to remain on record. But when the cross-examination is not or cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, or to the witness himself, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent and inadmissible in evidence. The direct testimony of a witness who dies before the conclusion of the cross-examination can be stricken only insofar as not covered by the cross-examination, and the absence of a witness is not enough to warrant striking of his testimony for failure to appear for further cross-examination where the witness has already been sufficiently cross-examined, which is not true in the present case, or that the matter on which further cross-examination is sought is not in controversy. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Monje case, Judgment, 27 September 2002.
[emphasis in original]
In its judgment in the Cuizon case in 1996, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated:
Unfortunately, appellant Paul Lee, who does not speak or understand a word of English or Pilipino and only knows Chinese-Cantonese, was not able to take the witness stand for lack of an interpreter who would translate his testimony to English.
It is clear that appellant Lee was effectively denied his right to counsel, for although he was provided with one, he could not understand and communicate with him concerning his defense such that, among other things, no memorandum was filed on his behalf; further, he was denied his right to have compulsory process to guarantee the availability of witnesses and the production of evidence on his behalf, including the services of a qualified and competent interpreter to enable him to present his testimony. In sum, he was denied due process. For this reason, we hold that the case as against Lee must be remanded to the court of origin for a re-trial. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Cuizon case, Judgment, 18 April 1996.
In its judgment in the Parazo case in 1999, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated:
Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a sign language expert. The fact that he was “helped and assisted by a person who has been known to him since 1983”, as noted by the trial court of origin and appearing on page 6 of the transcript of stenographic notes for February 8, 1995, is of no moment, absent any clear showing that appellant was aided by a competent sign language expert able to fully understand and interpret the actions and mutterings of appellant.
As held in People v. Crisologo:
The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who could also have communicated the accused’s own version of the circumstances which led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accused’s final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust circumstances.
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.
All the foregoing studiedly considered, the court is of the irresistible conclusion that movant richly deserves a re-arraignment and re-trial. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Parazo case, Judgment, 8 July 1999.
The Philippines’ Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), in the rule dealing with the rights of the accused at trial, states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel. 
Philippines, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2000, Rule 115, Section 1(c).
The Philippines’ Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law (2002) states:
Sec. 26. Duty of the Family Court to Protect the Rights of the Juvenile. – In all criminal proceedings in the Family Court, the judge shall ensure the protection of the following rights of the juvenile in conflict with the law:
c) To be present at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment. The juvenile may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence at the trial is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the juvenile without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When the juvenile under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present in all subsequent hearings until custody over him is regained. 
Philippines, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 2002, Section 26(c).
The Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (2006) provides:
While not in combat:
8. Inform the troops that a child taken in custody by government forces in an area of armed conflict should be informed of his/her constitutional rights and shall be treated humanely. Some of [these] basic rights are “the right to remain silent”, “the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty”, “the right to be notified of the charge,” “right to counsel”, “right to presence of parents or guardian”, and the “right to confront and cross examine witnesses.” 
Philippines, Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, A Practical Guide for Internal Security Operations, 2006, p. 55, § 8.
The Philippines’ Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), in the rule dealing with the rights of the accused at trial, states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself. 
Philippines, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2000, Rule 115, Section 1(d) and (e).
The Philippines’ Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law (2002) states:
Sec. 26. Duty of the Family Court to Protect the Rights of the Juvenile. – In all criminal proceedings in the Family Court, the judge shall ensure the protection of the following rights of the juvenile in conflict with the law:
e) To testify as a witness in his own behalf and subject to cross-examination only on matters covered by direct examination, provided that the Rule on the Examination of a Child Witness shall be observed whenever convenient and practicable.
The juvenile shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself and his silence shall not in any manner prejudice him. 
Philippines, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 2002, Section 26 (e).
The Philippines’ Republic Act No. 9372 (2007) states:
No Torture or Coercion in Investigation and Interrogation. No threat, intimidation, or coercion, and no act which will inflict any form of physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, on the detained person, which shall vitiate his freewill, shall be employed in his investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; otherwise, the evidence obtained from said detained person resulting from such threat, intimidation, or coercion, or from such inflicted physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, shall be, in its entirety, absolutely not admissible and usable as evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing. 
Philippines, Republic Act No. 9372, 2007, Section 24.
In the Binimira case before the Supreme Court of the Philippines in 1997, in which the appellant appealed the decision of a lower court that had convicted him of the crime of robbery with homicide, the court reversed and set aside the lower court’s decision and ordered his immediate release from confinement. In doing so, the court noted:
In the present case, Appellant Binamira was not adequately informed of his constitutional right to engage a counsel of his own choice, much less afforded an opportunity to exercise such right …
… [T]the extrajudicial confession itself shows that, in the course of the custodial investigation, Appellant Binamira was not fully apprised of his constitutional rights.
… [T]he Court will not take up appellant’s allegations that he was tortured and maltreated by the investigating police and the security guards, because such consideration is no longer necessary in view of our holding on the violation of his right to counsel of choice. Where a confession is extracted contrary to the accused’s Miranda rights, it is ipso facto inadmissible in evidence. Hence, there is no more need for the appellant to prove duress or intimidation to attain the same objective of outlawing the confession. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Binimira case, Judgment, 14 August 1997.
In its judgment in the Liwanag case in 2001, the Supreme Court of the Philippines stated:
… Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution … refers to the right of persons under custodial investigation. In People v. Lucero, the rationale for this constitutional right was elucidated by this Court, to wit:
The 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible. In providing for said right, this Court has held in the same case that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The requirements of effectiveness and vigilance of counsel during that stage before arraignment were for the purposes of guarding against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions which may taint them and render them inadmissible. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Liwanag case, Judgment, 15 August 2001.
[emphasis in original]
The Philippines’ Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), in the rule dealing with the rights of the accused at trial, states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(h) To have a speedy, impartial and public trial. 
Philippines, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2000, Rule 115, Section 1(h).
The Philippines’ Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), in the rule dealing with the rights of the accused at trial, states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. 
Philippines, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2000, Rule 115, Section 1(i).
The Philippines’ Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law (2002) states:
Sec. 26. Duty of the Family Court to Protect the Rights of the Juvenile. – In all criminal proceedings in the Family Court, the judge shall ensure the protection of the following rights of the juvenile in conflict with the law:
i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. 
Philippines, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 2002, Section 26(i).
In its judgment in the Tujan case in 1998, the Philippine Supreme Court stated:
Article III of the Constitution provides:
“Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.”
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the first criminal action: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Tujan case, Judgment, 1 April 1998.
[emphasis in original]
In its judgment in the Lumilan case in 2000, the Philippine Supreme Court stated:
Under Sec. 7 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, double jeopardy lies when after the accused has pleaded to the first offense charged in a valid complaint or information and he is subsequently convicted or acquitted or the case against him is dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, he is prosecuted for a second offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or any other offense, which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Lumilan case, Judgment, 25 January 2000.
In its judgment in the Espinosa case in 2003, the Philippine Supreme Court stated:
A waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy must be clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent. Corollary to this rule, the alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must be unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. Otherwise, the plea should be deemed to be simple and unconditional.
The right against double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 21 of Article III of the Constitution, which reads:
“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.”
This constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by Section 17 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated:
“x x x (1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
“And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.”
It has been the unwavering position of this Court that substantial rights cannot be trifled with or cast aside on the basis of mere suppositions and conjectures. The relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid out convincingly. Such waiver must be clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent. 
Philippines, Supreme Court, Espinosa case, Judgment, 15 August 2003.