相关规则
Sri Lanka
Practice Relating to Rule 16. Target Verification
In 2011, in its Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis July 2006–May 2009, Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Defence stated:
X. General Operational Procedures and Preparations to Safeguard Civilian Lives
D. Sri Lanka Air Force
237. Having a battle ready inventory in its possession and with the battle infrastructure set up, a stringent and meticulous mission execution procedure was laid down by the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) in undertaking any type of offensive action.
239. Targets were re-evaluated using the sources held/maintained by other intelligence organisations prior to engagement. i.e., whenever a target was given by Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), it was crosschecked with State Intelligence Service (SIS), Directorate of Naval Intelligence (DNI) and other intelligence agencies. This multiple verification ensured that no doubt was present when targeting was done. Single source targeting was never done.
240. All the targets were re-evaluated using imagery by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) or other aerial reconnaissance platforms and other sources like aerial photography/satellite images. This positively confirmed the absence of civilians in those areas targeted by air.
242. In destroying those targets, SLAF ensured accuracy by observing high discipline and detailed procedures:
b. Once areas of engagement were decided, the strike pilots were extensively briefed prior to engagement. In some cases, separate UAV missions were conducted to familiarise the pilots with targets. Pilots were not sent if there was the slightest doubt about the identification of targets. 
Sri Lanka, Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis July 2006–May 2009, July 2011, §§ 237, 239–240 and 242(b).