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Canada
Practice Relating to Rule 100. Fair Trial Guarantees
Section K. Public proceedings
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on rights and duties of occupying powers:
Representatives of the Protecting Power have the right to attend the trial of any protected person, unless the hearing has, as an exceptional measure, to be held in camera in the interests of the security of the occupant, who must then so notify the Protecting Power. A notification in respect of the date and place of the trial, however, must be sent to the Protecting Power. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1232.2.
Canada’s National Defence Act (1985) states:
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), courts martial shall be public and, to the extent that accommodation permits, the public shall be admitted to the proceedings.
Exception
(2) A court martial may order that the public be excluded during the whole or any part of its proceedings if the court martial considers that it is necessary
(a) in the interests of public safety, defence or public morals;
(b) for the maintenance of order or the proper administration of military justice; or
(c) to prevent injury to international relations.
Witnesses
(3) Witnesses are not to be admitted to the proceedings of a court martial except when under examination or by specific leave of the court martial. 
Canada, National Defence Act, 1985, Section 180(1)–(3)
Canada’s National Defence Act (1985), as amended in 2013, states:
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), courts martial, and proceedings before military judges … shall be public and, to the extent that accommodation permits, the public shall be admitted to the proceedings.
(2) A court martial or military judge, as the case may be, may order that the public be excluded during the whole or any part of the proceedings if the court martial or military judge considers that it is necessary
(a) in the interests of public safety or public morals;
(b) for the maintenance of order or the proper administration of military justice; or
(c) to prevent injury to international relations, national defence or national security.
(3) Witnesses are not to be admitted to the proceedings except when under examination or by specific leave of the court martial or military judge, as the case may be. 
Canada, National Defence Act, 1985, as amended in 2013, Section 180.
The Mahjoub case in 2004 concerned an Egyptian national found to be a refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention in Canada in 1996, and detained in Canada under a security certificate issued by Canadian authorities in 2000. In the context of proceedings before Canada’s Federal Court, related to the constitutionality of the detention, “Mr. Mahjoub sought an order that he be permitted to give a portion of his evidence in camera, in the absence of members of the public, including the media”. 
Canada, Federal Court, Mahjoub case, Reasons for Order and Order, 22 July 2004, § 3.
The Federal Court, in its 2004 decision on that motion, stated:
[17] It is a fundamental principle that the proceedings of Canadian courts are open and accessible to the public. This is a long recognized principle. The rationale for open proceeding was eloquently stated by Jeremy Bentham. His remarks have been quoted on more than one occasion by the Supreme Court of Canada:
“In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil in every shape have full swing. Only in proportion as publicity has place can any of the checks applicable to judicial injustice operate. Where there is no publicity there is no justice.” “Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial.” “The security of securities is publicity.”
See: Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General) (Re R. v. Carson), supra at paragraph 21; Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43 at paragraph 24.
[18] Counsel for the parties and the intervener all argue that the exercise of the Court’s discretion to trench on that fundamental principle of openness is properly anchored by the principles established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dagenais … Since the hearing of this application the correctness of this submission has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Vancouver Sun (Re)
[19] Thus, where a judge is asked to limit freedom of expression of the public or the press in a judicial proceeding, either by way of closed proceedings or a publication ban, the judge is to apply the Dagenais test in order to balance freedom of expression and other important rights and interests. This balancing is required because where, as in the case of an application to restrict access to judicial proceedings, the Charter rights of two entities come into conflict, Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that respects the importance of both sets of rights. See Dagenais, at page 877.
[20] The Dagenais test requires a judge to restrict access to proceedings only when:
(a) such a restriction is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the hearing, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
(b) the salutary effects of the restriction outweigh the deleterious effects of the free expression of those affected by the ban.
See: Dagenais at page 878. See also: R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 at paragraph 32 and Vancouver Sun (Re) at paragraph 29.
[21] To pose a serious risk to the proper administration of justice, the reality of the risk must be well-grounded in the evidence. It must also be a risk that “poses a serious threat to the proper administration of justice”. See: Mentuck at paragraph 34.
[22] The burden of displacing the general rule of openness lies on the party making the application.
[23] In Dagenais, at pages 890 to 891, the Supreme Court provided some general guidelines, which guidelines apply equally to applications for evidence to be adduced in camera. The guidelines included:
(c) […] A party who uses the power of the state against others must bear the burden of proving that the use of state power is justified in a free and democratic society. Therefore, the party seeking the ban bears the burden of proving that the proposed ban is necessary, in that it relates to an important objective that cannot be achieved by a reasonably available and effective alternative measure, that the proposed ban is as limited (in scope, time, content, etc.) as possible, and there is a proportionality between the salutary and deleterious effects of the ban […].
(d) The judge must consider all other options besides the ban and must find that there is no reasonable and effective alternative available.
(e) The judge must consider all possible ways to limit the ban and must limit the ban as much as possible; and
(f) The judge must weigh the importance of the objectives of the particular ban and its probable effects against the importance of the particular expression that will be limited to ensure that the positive and negative effects of the ban are proportionate. 
Canada, Federal Court, Mahjoub case, Reasons for Order and Order, 22 July 2004, §§ 17–23.
[emphasis in original]
In 2004, in Vancouver Sun (Re), the Supreme Court of Canada noted:
24. The open court principle has long been recognized as a cornerstone of the common law: Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), supra, at para. 21. The right of public access to the courts is “one of principle … turning, not on convenience, but on necessity”: Scott v. Scott, [1913] A.C. 417 (H.L.), per Viscount Haldane L.C., at p. 438. “Justice is not a cloistered virtue”: Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago, [1936] A.C. 322 (P.C.), per Lord Atkin, at p. 335. “Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion, and the surest of all guards against improbity”: J. H. Burton, ed., Benthamiana: Or, Select Extracts from the Works of Jeremy Bentham (1843), p. 115.
25. Public access to the courts guarantees the integrity of judicial processes by demonstrating “that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner, according to the rule of law”: Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), supra, at para. 22. Openness is necessary to maintain the independence and impartiality of courts. It is integral to public confidence in the justice system and the public’s understanding of the administration of justice. Moreover, openness is a principal component of the legitimacy of the judicial process and why the parties and the public at large abide by the decisions of courts.
27. Furthermore, the principle of openness of judicial proceedings extends to the pretrial stage of judicial proceedings because the policy considerations upon which openness is predicated are the same as in the trial stage: MacIntyre, supra, at p. 183. Dickson J. found “it difficult to accept the view that a judicial act performed during a trial is open to public scrutiny but a judicial act performed at the pretrial stage remains shrouded in secrecy”: MacIntyre, at p. 186. 
Canada, Supreme Court, Vancouver Sun (Re), Judgment, 23 June 2004, §§ 24–25 and 27.
[emphasis in original]
In 2007, in Named person v. Vancouver Sun, the Supreme Court of Canada noted:
31. The “open court principle” is a “hallmark of a democratic society”, as this Court said in Vancouver Sun (Re), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332, 2004 SCC 43, at para. 23. This principle, as the Court noted in that case, “has long been recognized as a cornerstone of the common law” (para. 24), and has been recognized as part of the law since as far back as Scott v. Scott, [1913] A.C. 417 (H.L.), and Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago, [1936] A.C. 322 (P.C.), where Lord Atkin wrote, at p. 335: “Justice is not a cloistered virtue”. “Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion, and the surest of all guards against improbity” (J. H. Burton, ed., Benthamiana: or, Select Extracts from the Works of Jeremy Bentham (1843), at p. 115).
32. Open courts have several distinct benefits. Public access to the courts allows anyone who cares to know the opportunity to see “that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner, according to the rule of law”: Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (“CBC”), at para. 22. An open court is more likely to be an independent and impartial court. Justice seen to be done is in that way justice more likely to be done. The openness of our courts is a “principal component” of their legitimacy: Vancouver Sun, at para. 25.  
Canada, Supreme Court, Named person v. Vancouver Sun, Judgment, 11 October 2007, §§ 31–32.
[emphasis in original]
In 2004, in its fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Canada stated:
90. On 23 June 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the context of a constitutional challenge to the investigative hearing provisions of the Anti-terrorism Act (see above under article 9), found that Parliament chose to have investigative hearings of a judicial nature, the open court principle is a fundamental characteristic of judicial proceedings that should not be presumptively displaced in favour of an in camera process and that judicial officers should therefore reject the notion of presumptively secret hearings. The presumption of openness should only be displaced upon proper consideration of the competing interests at every stage of the process. The existence of the hearing and as much of its subject-matter as possible should be made public unless, under a balancing exercise of minimal impairment/proportionality, secrecy becomes necessary. Applying the test in a contextual manner, judges would be entitled to proceed on the basis of evidence that satisfies him or her that publicity would unduly impair the proper administration of justice.
91. The Anti-terrorism Act amended the Canada Evidence Act (CEA) by setting out pre-trial, trial and appellate procedures to apply where there is a possibility that information injurious to international relations, national defence or national security could be disclosed. Once notice has been given to the Attorney General for Canada by any participant to a proceeding who expects to cause the disclosure of sensitive information, disclosure is prohibited unless authorized by the Attorney General of Canada or the Federal Court. The Federal Court must balance the public interest in disclosure against that in non-disclosure and, in order to serve as far as possible both of these public interests, may provide for the use in proceedings of summaries and agreed statements of fact. To ensure that these procedures are consistent with fair trial rights, the CEA provides that the person presiding at a criminal proceeding may make any order they consider appropriate, other than calling for disclosure of the information. Orders can include staying proceedings (if the judge takes the view that the accused would not otherwise get a fair trial), dismissing specified counts of the indictment or information or proceeding only in respect of a lesser or included offence. 
Canada, Fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CAN/2004/5, 18 November 2004, §§ 90–91.