规则62. 不当使用敌方的旗帜或军用标志、徽章或制服。.. Rule 62. Improper Use of the Flags or Military Emblems, Insignia or Uniforms of the Adversary

规则62. 禁止不当使用敌方的旗帜或军用标志、徽章或制服。
第2卷,第18章,F节。
国家实践将此规则确立为一项适用于国际性武装冲突的习惯国际法规范。可以认为,在非国际性武装冲突中,若冲突各方事实上的确穿着制服的话,此规则也应适用。
这是一项已在《利伯守则》、《布鲁塞尔宣言》和《牛津手册》中得到承认的存在已久的习惯国际法规则。[1]它也被载入了《海牙章程》。[2]《第一附加议定书》规定“在从事攻击时,或为了掩护、便利、保护或阻碍军事行动”禁止使用敌方旗帜、军用标志、徽章或制服。[3]根据《国际刑事法院规约》,在国际性武装冲突中“不当使用……敌方旗帜或军事标志或制服”致使人员死亡或重伤的,构成战争罪。[4]
许多军事手册中都载有这一规则。[5]《瑞典国际人道法手册》(Sweden’s IHL Manual)认为《第一附加议定书》第39条中禁止不当使用国家标志的规定是对习惯国际法的编纂。[6]根据很多国家的立法,违反该规则构成犯罪。[7]这一规则还为正式声明和其它实践所支持。[8]
有些实践将穿着敌方制服视为背信弃义的行为。[9]但依照背信弃义的定义这并不完全合适,因为即使身着此制服会诱取敌方信任,但在人道法下,敌方制服并不享有特别保护(关于背信弃义的定义,参见对规则65的评注)。其它一些实践将其视为对善意原则的违反。[10]
《布鲁塞尔宣言》、《牛津手册》和《海牙章程》禁止“不当”使用敌方旗帜、军徽和制服,却没有载明哪种行为属于不当,哪种不属于。[11]《国际刑事法院规约》之《犯罪要件》载明,“在从事攻击时,以国际法禁止的方式”使用敌方制服构成战争罪。[12]
许多军事手册禁止“不当”使用,但却未做进一步解释。[13]《英国军事手册》指出:
[《海牙章程》]不禁止以诈术为目的使用敌方国旗、军徽或制服,但却禁止对其的不当使用,从而留下了怎样使用为适当,怎样为不适当这一未决问题。然而,在战斗中,使用敌方国旗、军徽或制服是禁止的,即禁止身着敌方军服开火。但是否允许以接近敌方或撤退为目的而穿着敌方制服或展示敌方旗帜,还尚未达成一致意见。为了进行阴谋破坏的或与之相关的目的使用敌方制服则属于间谍行为。[14]
《比利时战争法手册》(Belgium’s Law of War Manual)规定了以下不当使用的例子:身着敌方制服开火或参与进攻,以及从缴获敌方的带有徽章的战斗用车辆上开火。该手册规定,“渗透敌方防线以制造恐慌,致使对方将己方士兵误认为是经过化装的敌人而向其开火,或在敌方防线后身着其制服进行军事行动以收集情报或进行阴谋破坏”不被认为是不当使用,[15]尽管这些行为可能导致其丧失获得战俘地位的权利(见规则106)。《瑞典国际人道法手册》解释道:
禁止不当使用被解释为意味着在战斗中或与作战相关的情况下不能使用敌方制服,这导致了实施中很大的不确定性。在1974-1977年的外交会议期间,某些大国希望保留身着敌方制服出现的可能性,但绝大多数小国宣称这一可能性应被排除或减少到最小。会议在这点上采纳了小国的意见。[《第一附加议定书》]第39(2)条的规则[即“在从事攻击时,或为了掩护、便利、保护或阻碍军事行动”而使用敌方制服是不当的]可被解释为,敌方制服只可用于个人保护(例如在极端的气候条件下),而绝不可用于任何类型的军事行动。战俘为了脱逃而使用敌方制服不被视为是对第39条的违反。[16]
一些军事手册重述了《第一附加议定书》中有关“不当使用”敌方制服的定义,即“在从事进攻时,或为了掩护、便利、保护或阻碍军事行动”。[17]批准《第一附加议定书》时,加拿大做出了保留,从而使自己所受的约束仅仅是在从事进攻时禁止使用敌方制服,而在为了掩护、便利、保护或阻碍军事行动时不受此约束。[18]其《武装冲突法手册》重述了这一点。[19]与此类似,有几国的手册也将这一禁止性规定限制适用于战斗行动。[20]还应指出的是,有几个军事手册完全禁止使用敌方制服。[21]
在1947年的斯科热尼案(Skorzeny case)中,美国驻德国占领区普通军事法庭(the US General Military Court of the US Zone of Germany)宣告因身着敌方制服参加战斗而被指控不当使用制服的被告无罪。法庭不认为德国军官在试图占领敌方军事目标时身着敌方制服是不当的,并且没有证据表明他们在此装束下使用了武器。[22]美国声明,“不支持[《第一附加议定书》]第39条中禁止在军事行动期间使用敌方标志和制服的规定”。[23]第二次世界大战以来的几次冲突(包括非国际性武装冲突)中,出现了身着敌方制服的实践。[24]因此,无法得出结论认为在战斗以外身着敌方制服将是不当的。
一些手册表明海军可以悬挂敌方船旗以欺骗敌人,但在实际武装行动之前必须展示其真实船旗。[25]然而,对于军用航空器不能使用敌方标志似乎已达成共识。虽然《厄瓜多尔海军手册》(Ecuador’s Naval Manual)和《美国海军手册》(the US Naval Handbook)将这一禁止性规定的适用限于战斗,但《德国军事手册》(Germany’s Military Manual)、《新西兰军事手册》(New Zealand’s Military Manual)和《美国空军手册》(the US Air Force Pamphlet)规定军用航空器不能带有敌方标志。[26]《加拿大武装冲突法手册》(Canada’s LOAC Manual)认为在空战中若“在军用航空器上使用虚假标识,例如敌方航空器……标识”实施敌对行动,属背信弃义行为。[27]之所以区别对待船舶和航空器,其理由是,在开战前,正在航行的船舶改变旗帜是实际可能的,但航空器在空中则无法改变标识。
红十字国际委员会向通过《附加议定书》的外交大会提交的《第二附加议定书草案》规定,“为了实施或重新开始敌对行动……在战斗中使用敌方的特殊军事标志”构成背信弃义。在外交大会第三委员会的协商过程中,这一条款被从草案中删除了。[28]在其它一些涉及非国际性武装冲突的法律文件中也包含了禁止在展开攻击时,或为了掩护、便利、保护或阻碍军事行动,利用对方旗帜或军用标志、徽章或制服的规定。[29]
一些可适用于或已适用于非国际性武装冲突的军事手册中含有禁止不当使用敌方制服和徽章的规定。[30]根据许多国家的立法,任何武装冲突中违反该规则的行为都构成犯罪。[31]该规则在非国际性武装冲突中的适用还得到了正式声明和其它国内实践的支持。[32]例如,在中国内战中,中国共产党指责国民党,称国民党士兵为使红军丧失信誉在一些行动中穿着红军制服。[33]
Rule 62. Improper use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of the adversary is prohibited.
Volume II, Chapter 18, Section F.
State practice establishes the customary nature of this rule in international armed conflicts. It can be argued that it should also apply in non-international armed conflicts when the parties to the conflict do in fact wear uniforms.
This is a long-standing rule of customary international law already recognized in the Lieber Code, the Brussels Declaration and the Oxford Manual.[34] It was codified in the Hague Regulations.[35] Additional Protocol I prohibits the use of enemy flags, military emblems, insignia or uniforms “while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favour, protect or impede military operations”.[36] Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, “making improper use … of the flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy” constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts when it results in death or serious personal injury.[37]
This rule is set forth in numerous military manuals.[38] Sweden’s IHL Manual considers that the prohibition of improper use of emblems of nationality in Article 39 of Additional Protocol I is a codification of customary international law.[39] Violation of this rule is an offence under the legislation of many States.[40] The rule is also supported by official statements and other practice.[41]
Some practice was found that considers the wearing of enemy uniforms as perfidious.[42] This does not square entirely, however, with the definition of perfidy inasmuch as enemy uniforms are not entitled to specific protection under humanitarian law, even though the wearing of such uniforms may invite the confidence of the enemy (for a definition of perfidy, see the commentary to Rule 65). Other practice considers it a violation of the principle of good faith.[43]
The Brussels Declaration, the Oxford Manual and the Hague Regulations prohibit the “improper” use of enemy flags, military insignia and uniforms without specifying what is improper and what is not.[44] The Elements of Crimes of the Statute of the International Criminal Court specifies that it is a war crime to use enemy uniforms “in a manner prohibited under the international law of armed conflict while engaged in an attack”.[45]
Many military manuals prohibit “improper” use without further explanation.[46] The UK Military Manual specifies that:
The employment of the national flag, military insignia or uniform of the enemy for the purpose of ruse is not forbidden, but the [Hague Regulations] prohibit their improper use, leaving unsettled what use is proper and what use is not. However, their employment is forbidden during a combat, that is, the opening of fire whilst in the guise of the enemy. But there is no unanimity as to whether the uniform of the enemy may be worn and his flag displayed for the purpose of approach or withdrawal. Use of enemy uniform for the purpose of and in connection with sabotage is in the same category as spying.[47]
Belgium’s Law of War Manual provides the following examples of improper use: opening fire or participating in an attack while wearing an enemy uniform and opening fire from a captured enemy combat vehicle with its insignia. The manual states that “infiltrating enemy lines in order to create panic to the point that the adversary starts firing on its own soldiers believing that they are disguised enemies or operating behind enemy lines wearing enemy uniform in order to collect information or commit acts of sabotage” is not considered an improper use,[48] although these acts may lead to loss of the right to prisoner-of-war status (see Rule 106). Sweden’s IHL Manual explains that:
The prohibition of improper use has been interpreted to mean that enemy uniform may not be used in connection with or during combat, and this has led to great uncertainty in application. During the 1974–1977 diplomatic conference, certain of the great powers wished to retain the possibility of appearing in enemy uniforms, while most of the smaller States claimed that this possibility should be excluded or minimised. The Conference accepted the view of the smaller States here. The rule in Article 39(2) [of Additional Protocol I that the use of enemy uniforms is improper “when engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favour, protect or impede military operations”] can be interpreted to mean that enemy uniform may be used only as personal protection, for example under extreme weather conditions, and may never be used in connection with any type of military operation. Where prisoners of war make use of enemy uniforms in connection with escape attempts, this may not be seen as an infringement of Article 39. [49]
A number of military manuals restate the definition of “improper use” of enemy uniforms contained in Additional Protocol I, namely “while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favour, protect or impede military operations”.[50] Upon ratification of Additional Protocol I, Canada made a reservation to the effect that it would only be bound by the prohibition on using enemy uniforms while engaging in attacks but not in order to shield, favour, protect or impede military operations.[51] Its LOAC Manual restates this point.[52] Several manuals similarly limit the prohibition to combat operations.[53] It should also be pointed out that several manuals prohibit the use as such of enemy uniforms.[54]
In the Skorzeny case in 1947, the US General Military Court of the US Zone of Germany acquitted the accused of charges of improper use by entering into combat disguised in enemy uniforms. The Court did not consider it improper for German officers to wear enemy uniforms while trying to occupy enemy military objectives and there was no evidence that they had used their weapons while so disguised.[55] The United States has stated that it does “not support the prohibition in article 39 [of Additional Protocol I] of the use of enemy emblems and uniforms during military operations”.[56] There are several examples of conflicts since the Second World War in which the wearing of enemy uniforms was practised, including in non-international armed conflicts.[57] It cannot be concluded, therefore, that the wearing of enemy uniforms outside combat would be improper.
Several manuals indicate that naval forces may fly enemy colours to deceive the enemy but must display their true colours prior to an actual armed engagement.[58] However, there appears to be agreement that military aircraft may not use enemy markings. While Ecuador’s Naval Manual and the US Naval Handbook restrict this prohibition to combat, Germany’s Military Manual, New Zealand’s Military Manual and the US Air Force Pamphlet state that military aircraft may not bear enemy markings.[59] Canada’s LOAC Manual considers it an act of perfidy in air warfare if a hostile act is committed while “using false markings on military aircraft such as the markings of … enemy aircraft”.[60] The different treatment between ships and aircraft is explained by the fact that it is practically possible to change the flag under which a ship is sailing before engaging in combat, while an aircraft cannot change its marking whilst in the air.
The draft of Additional Protocol II submitted by the ICRC to the Diplomatic Conference leading to the adoption of the Additional Protocols provided that “when carried out in order to commit or resume hostilities … the use in combat of the enemy’s distinctive military emblems” constitutes perfidy. This provision was deleted from the draft during the negotiations in Committee III of the Diplomatic Conference.[61] The prohibition on making use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of an adverse party while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favour, protect or impede military operations is contained in other instruments pertaining also to non-international armed conflicts.[62]
The prohibition of improper use of enemy uniforms and insignia is contained in military manuals which are applicable in or have been applied in non-international armed conflicts.[63] Violation of this rule in any armed conflict is an offence under the legislation of numerous States.[64] The application of this rule in non-international armed conflicts is also supported by official statements and other national practice.[65] During the Chinese civil war, for example, the Chinese Communist Party denounced the use of Red Army uniforms by Nationalist soldiers alleging they were used while committing acts designed to discredit the Red Army.[66]
[1] Lieber Code,Articles 63 and 65(参见第2卷,第18章,第634段);Brussels Declaration,Article 13(f)(同上,第635段);Oxford Manual, Article 8(d)(同上,第636段)。
[2] 《海牙章程》第23(6)条(同上,第627段)。
[3] 《第一附加议定书》第39(2)条(经协商一致通过)(同上,第630段)。
[4] 《国际刑事法院规约》第8(2)(b)(vii)条(同上,第633段)。
[5] 例如,参见以下国家的军事手册:阿根廷(同上,第641-642段)、澳大利亚(同上,第643-644段)、比利时(同上,第645-646段)、布基纳法索(同上,第647段)、喀麦隆(同上,第648-649段)、加拿大(同上,第650段)、刚果(同上,第651段)、克罗地亚(同上,第652段)、厄瓜多尔(同上,第653段)、法国(同上,第654和657段)、德国(同上,第658段)、匈牙利(同上,第659段)、以色列(同上,第661-662段)、意大利(同上,第664段)、韩国(同上,第665段)、黎巴嫩(同上,第666段)、马里(同上,第668段)、摩洛哥(同上,第669段)、新西兰(同上,第672段)、尼日利亚(同上,第673-674段)、俄罗斯(同上,第676段)、塞内加尔(同上,第677段)、南非(同上,第678段)、西班牙(同上,第679段)、瑞典(同上,第680段)、瑞士(同上,第681段)、英国(同上,第682-683段)、美国(同上,第684-686段)和南斯拉夫(同上,第687段)。
[6] 瑞典,IHL Manual(同上,第680段)。
[7] 例如,参见以下国家的立法:阿尔及利亚(同上,第688段)、亚美尼亚(同上,第690段)、澳大利亚(同上,第691段)、 白俄罗斯(同上,第692段)、加拿大(同上,第694段)、哥伦比亚(同上,第695段)、刚果(同上,第696段)、埃及(同上,第697段)、格鲁吉亚(同上,第698段)、德国(同上,第699段)、希腊(同上,第700段)、爱尔兰(同上,第701段)、意大利(同上,第702-703段)、马里(同上,第704段)、荷兰(同上,第705段)、新西兰(同上,第706段)、尼加拉瓜(同上,第707段)、挪威(同上,第708段)、波兰(同上,第710段)、西班牙(同上,第711-712段)、叙利亚(同上,第714段)、英国(同上,第716段)、美国(同上,第717段)和南斯拉夫(同上,第718段);还可参见阿根廷(同上,第689段)、布隆迪(同上,第693段)与特立尼达和多巴哥共和国(同上,第715段)的立法草案。
[8] 例如,参见,据报告的德国(同上,第721段)、伊拉克(同上,第723段)和韩国(同上,第725段)的实践。
[9] 例如,参见以下国家的军事手册:法国(同上,第655-656段)、匈牙利(同上,第659段)、以色列(同上,第662段)、罗马尼亚(同上,第675段)和瑞士(同上,第681段)。
[10] 例如,参见,阿根廷,Law of War Manual(同上,第641段)。
[11] Brussels Declaration, Article 13(f)(同上,第635段);Oxford Manual, Article 8(d)(同上,第636段);《海牙章程》第23(6)条(同上,第628段)。
[12] 国际刑事法院《犯罪要件》战争罪——不当使用敌方制服(《国际刑事法院规约》第8条第2款第2项第7目)。
[13] 例如,参见以下国家的军事手册:布基纳法索(参见第2卷,第18章,第647段)、喀麦隆(同上,第648段)、刚果(同上,第651段)、法国(同上,第654段)、德国(同上,第658段)、以色列(同上,第661段)、韩国(同上,第665段)、黎巴嫩(同上,第666段)、马里(同上,第668段)、摩洛哥(同上,第669段)、尼日利亚(同上,第674段)、俄罗斯(同上,第676段)和塞内加尔(同上,第677段)。
[14] 英国,Military Manual(同上,第682段)。
[15] 比利时,Law of War Manual(同上,第645段)。
[16] 瑞典,IHL Manual(同上,第680段)。
[17] 例如,参见以下国家的军事手册:澳大利亚(同上,第643-644段)、比利时(同上,第646段)、新西兰(同上,第672段)、南非(同上,第678段)和西班牙(同上,第679段)。
[18] 加拿大,Reservations and statements of understanding made upon ratification of Additional Protocol I(同上,第631段)。
[19] 加拿大,LOAC Manual(同上,第650段)。
[20] 例如,参见以下国家的军事手册:阿根廷(同上,第641-642段)、厄瓜多尔(同上,第653段)、法国(“在战斗中为了掩护、便利或阻碍军事行动”)(同上,第657段)、尼日利亚(同上,第673段)、英国(同上,第683段)、美国(同上,第685-686段)和南斯拉夫(同上,第687段)。
[21] 参见以下国家的军事手册:法国(同上,第655-656段)、印度尼西亚(同上,第660段)、意大利(同上,第663段)、马达加斯加(同上,第667段)、荷兰(同上,第670-671段)和罗马尼亚(同上,第675段)。
[22] 美国,General Military Court of the US Zone of Germany,Skorzeny case(同上,第719段)。
[23] 美国,Remarks of the Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State(同上,第729段)。
[24] 参见W. Hays Parks,“Air War and the Law of War”(同上,第740段)。
[25] 例如,参见以下国家的军事手册:澳大利亚(同上,第643-644段)、比利时(同上,第645段)、加拿大(同上,第650段)、厄瓜多尔(同上,第653段)、法国(同上,第657段)、德国(同上,第658段)、新西兰(同上,第672段)和美国(同上,第686段)。
[26] 厄瓜多尔,Naval Manual(同上,第653段);德国,Military Manual(同上,第658段);新西兰,Military Manual(同上,第672段);美国,Air Force Pamphlet(同上,第685段)和Naval Handbook(同上,第686段)。
[27] 加拿大,LOAC Manual(同上,第650段)。
[28] Draft Additional Protocol II, Article 21(1)(同上,第632段)。
[29] See,e.g. ,Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the SFRY, para. 6(同上,第637段);Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, para. 2.5(同上,第638段)。
[30] 例如,参见以下国家的军事手册:澳大利亚(同上,第643段)、克罗地亚(同上,第652段)、厄瓜多尔(同上,第653段)、德国(同上,第658段)、意大利(同上,第664段)、黎巴嫩(同上,第666段)、尼日利亚(同上,第674段)、南非(同上,第678段)和南斯拉夫(同上,第687段)。
[31] 例如,参见以下国家的立法:亚美尼亚(同上,第690段)、 白俄罗斯(同上,第692段)、哥伦比亚(同上,第695段)、德国(同上,第699段)、尼加拉瓜(同上,第707段)、波兰(同上,第710段)、西班牙(同上,第713段)和南斯拉夫(同上,第718段);还可参见意大利的立法(同上,第702-703段)(未排除此立法适用于非国际性武装冲突),以及阿根廷的立法草案(同上,第689段)。
[32] 例如,参见,土耳其的声明(同上,第727段)和据报告的中国(同上,第720段)和卢旺达(同上,第726段)的实践。
[33] 关于中国实践的报告(同上,第720段)。
[34] Lieber Code, Articles 63 and 65 (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 18, § 634); Brussels Declaration, Article 13(f) (ibid., § 635); Oxford Manual, Article 8(d) (ibid., § 636).
[35] Hague Regulations, Article 23(f) (ibid., § 627).
[36] Additional Protocol I, Article 39(2) (adopted by consensus) (ibid., § 630).
[37] ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(vii) (ibid., § 633).
[38] See, e.g., military manuals of Argentina (ibid., §§ 641–642), Australia (ibid., §§ 643–644), Belgium (ibid., §§ 645–646), Burkina Faso (ibid., § 647), Cameroon (ibid., §§ 648–649), Canada (ibid., § 650), Congo (ibid., § 651), Croatia (ibid., § 652), Ecuador (ibid., § 653), France (ibid., §§ 654 and 657), Germany (ibid., § 658), Hungary (ibid., § 659), Israel (ibid., §§ 661–662), Italy (ibid., § 664), Republic of Korea (ibid., § 665), Lebanon (ibid., § 666), Mali (ibid., § 668), Morocco (ibid., § 669), New Zealand (ibid., § 672), Nigeria (ibid., §§ 673–674), Russian Federation (ibid., § 676), Senegal (ibid., § 677), South Africa (ibid., § 678), Spain (ibid., § 679), Sweden (ibid., § 680), Switzerland (ibid., § 681), United Kingdom (ibid., §§ 682–683), United States (ibid., §§ 684–686) and Yugoslavia (ibid., § 687).
[39] Sweden, IHL Manual (ibid., § 680).
[40] See, e.g., the legislation of Algeria (ibid., § 688), Armenia (ibid., § 690), Australia (ibid., § 691), Belarus (ibid., § 692), Canada (ibid., § 694), Colombia (ibid., § 695), Congo (ibid., § 696), Egypt (ibid., § 697), Georgia (ibid., § 698), Germany (ibid., § 699), Greece (ibid., § 700), Ireland (ibid., § 701), Italy (ibid., §§ 702–703), Mali (ibid., § 704), Netherlands (ibid., § 705), New Zealand (ibid., § 706), Nicaragua (ibid., § 707), Norway (ibid., § 708), Poland (ibid., § 710), Spain (ibid., §§ 711–712), Syrian Arab Republic (ibid., § 714), United Kingdom (ibid., § 716), United States (ibid., § 717) and Yugoslavia (ibid., § 718); see also the draft legislation of Argentina (ibid., § 689), Burundi (ibid., § 693) and Trinidad and Tobago (ibid., § 715).
[41] See, e.g., the reported practice of Germany (ibid., § 721), Iraq (ibid., § 723) and Republic of Korea (ibid., § 725).
[42] See, e.g., the military manuals of France (ibid., §§ 655–656), Hungary (ibid., § 659), Israel (ibid., § 662), Romania (ibid., § 675) and Switzerland (ibid., § 681).
[43] See, e.g., Argentina, Law of War Manual (ibid., § 641).
[44] Brussels Declaration, Article 13(f) (ibid., § 635); Oxford Manual, Article 8(d) (ibid., § 636); Hague Regulations, Article 23(f) (ibid., § 628).
[45] Elements of Crimes for the ICC, Improper use of uniforms of the enemy as a war crime (ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(vii)).
[46] See, e.g., the military manuals of Burkina Faso (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 18, § 647), Cameroon (ibid., § 648), Congo (ibid., § 651), France (ibid., § 654), Germany (ibid., § 658), Israel (ibid., § 661), Republic of Korea (ibid., § 665), Lebanon (ibid., § 666), Mali (ibid., § 668), Morocco (ibid., § 669), Nigeria (ibid., § 674), Russian Federation (ibid., § 676) and Senegal (ibid., § 677).
[47] United Kingdom, Military Manual (ibid., § 682).
[48] Belgium, Law of War Manual (ibid., § 645).
[49] Sweden, IHL Manual (ibid., § 680).
[50] See, e.g., the military manuals of Australia (ibid., §§ 643–644), Belgium (ibid., § 646), New Zealand (ibid., § 672), South Africa (ibid., § 678) and Spain (ibid., § 679).
[51] Canada, Reservations and statements of understanding made upon ratification of Additional Protocol I (ibid., § 631).
[52] Canada, LOAC Manual (ibid., § 650).
[53] See, e.g., the military manuals of Argentina (ibid., §§ 641–642), Ecuador (ibid., § 653), France (“in combat with a view to dissimulate, favour or impede military operations”) (ibid., § 657), Nigeria (ibid., § 673), United Kingdom (ibid., § 683), United States (ibid., §§ 685–686) and Yugoslavia (ibid., § 687).
[54] See the military manuals of France (ibid., §§ 655–656), Indonesia (ibid., § 660), Italy (ibid., § 663), Madagascar (ibid., § 667), Netherlands (ibid., §§ 670–671) and Romania (ibid., § 675).
[55] United States, General Military Court of the US Zone of Germany, Skorzeny case (ibid., § 719).
[56] United States, Remarks of the Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State (ibid., § 729).
[57] See W. Hays Parks, “Air War and the Law of War” (ibid., § 740).
[58] See, e.g., the military manuals of Australia (ibid., §§ 643–644), Belgium (ibid., § 645), Canada (ibid., § 650), Ecuador (ibid., § 653), France (ibid., § 657), Germany (ibid., § 658), New Zealand (ibid., § 672) and United States (ibid., § 686).
[59] Ecuador, Naval Manual (ibid., § 653); Germany, Military Manual (ibid., § 658); New Zealand, Military Manual (ibid., § 672); United States, Air Force Pamphlet (ibid., § 685) and Naval Handbook (ibid., § 686).
[60] Canada, LOAC Manual (ibid., § 650).
[61] Draft Additional Protocol II, Article 21(1) (ibid., § 632).
[62] See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, § 6 (ibid., § 637); Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, § 2.5 (ibid., § 638).
[63] See, e.g., military manuals of Australia (ibid., § 643), Croatia (ibid., § 652), Ecuador (ibid., § 653), Germany (ibid., § 658), Italy (ibid., § 664), Lebanon (ibid., § 666), Nigeria (ibid., § 674), South Africa (ibid., § 678) and Yugoslavia (ibid., § 687).
[64] See, e.g., the legislation of Armenia (ibid., § 690), Belarus (ibid., § 692), Colombia (ibid., § 695), Germany (ibid., § 699), Nicaragua (ibid., § 707), Poland (ibid., § 710), Spain (ibid., § 713) and Yugoslavia (ibid., § 718); see also the legislation of Italy (ibid., §§ 702–703), the application of which is not excluded in time of non-international armed conflict, and the draft legislation of Argentina (ibid., § 689).
[65] See, e.g., the statement of Turkey (ibid., § 727) and the reported practice of China (ibid., § 720) and Rwanda (ibid., § 726).
[66] Report on the Practice of China (ibid., § 720).