القاعدة ذات الصلة
Canada
Practice Relating to Rule 2. Violence Aimed at Spreading Terror among the Civilian Population
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) states: “Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population, are prohibited.” 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-4, § 32; see also p. 6-4, § 40.
The manual repeats this prohibition with respect to non-international armed conflicts in particular. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 17-5, § 37.
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on targeting: “Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population, are prohibited.” 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 423.
In its chapter on non-international armed conflicts, the manual contains the same prohibition. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1720.
In its chapter on land warfare, the manual further states:
Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population, are prohibited. The protection of civilians is a fundamental principle of the LOAC. A campaign of threats or violence designed to terrorize the civilian population is simply not acceptable under any circumstances, even where the civilian population exhibits a hostile attitude toward the presence of the CF [Canadian Forces]. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 617.
In 2013, in the Benneth case, the Appeal Division of Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board allowed an appeal against a decision considering a Nigerian national admissible to Canada. Regarding the definition of terrorism the Appeal Division stated:
70. As for … its understanding of the definition of terrorism the ID [Immigration Division] relied on both Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence and the Criminal Code definition. The ID evidenced that it considered the teaching of the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh v. Canada (MCI) [2002] S.C.J. No. 3 2002 SCCL wherein the court beginning at paragraph 96 held,
96 We are not persuaded, however, that the term “terrorism” is so unsettled that it cannot set the proper boundaries of legal adjudication. The recently negotiated International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, GA Res. 54/109, December 9, 1999, approaches the definitional problem in two ways. First, it employs a functional definition in Article 2(1)(a), defining “terrorism” as “[a]n act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex”. The annex lists nine treaties that are commonly viewed as relating to terrorist acts, such as the Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Can. T.S. 1972 No. 23, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 18 I.L.M. 1419, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 37 I.L.M. 249. Second, the Convention supplements this offence-based list with a stipulative definition of terrorism. Article 2(1)(b) defines “terrorism” as:
Any … act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
98 In our view, it may safely be concluded, following the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, that “terrorism” in s. 19 of the Act includes any “act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”. This definition catches the essence of what the world understands by “terrorism”. Particular cases on the fringes of terrorist activity will inevitably provoke disagreement. Parliament is not prevented from adopting more detailed or different definitions of terrorism. The issue here is whether the term as used in the Immigration Act is sufficiently certain to be workable, fair and constitutional. We believe that it is.
72. The ID summarized its understanding of what the Minister needed to prove in respect of terrorism as follows:
Again I agree with the Minister’s submission as to what needs to be proven. Serious criminal acts that cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian or any other person not taking part in the hostilities or a situation of arm[ed] conflict and acts committed with the purpose [of] intimidating a population or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing something.
88. The respondent argues that the absence of “armed conflict” ruled out a finding of terrorism. He does so based on his interpretation of Suresh, arguing that such a finding depends on the two requirements identified therein (see above) and that
the Minister failed to produce any credible and corroborated evidence that[,] in the context of the situation in Nigeria, involving members of MASSOB [Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra] and the Nigerian authorities, it could be described as an “armed conflict” as understood both in Canadian and international law.
Minister’s counsel did not directly address these submissions.
89. The respondent has set up a straw man argument when he asks whether there is any evidence that MASSOB has entered into armed conflict with the Nigerian Government. He has conflated the words used in Suresh and in the process excluded part of the definition making what is disjunctive, conjunctive. Minister’s counsel has not argued that MASSOB was in armed conflict with the Nigerian Government beyond arguing that there was evidence that MASSOB members had increasingly been taking up arms. The definition in Suresh does not require armed conflict to establish a terrorist act. Rather, it provides that in a situation of armed conflict a terrorist act can be committed against a person not taking an active part in it. Read correctly a terrorist act can be established in the absence of armed conflict, when the intended act of violence is directed at a civilian … when the purpose of the act of violence is intimidation of a population or to compel a government … to do or to abstain from something. 
Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Benneth case, Reasons and Decision, 7 January 2013, §§ 70, 72 and 88–89.
[footnotes in original omitted]