Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries
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Commentary of 2020 
Article 82 : Applicable legislation
Text of the provision*
(1) A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power; the Detaining Power shall be justified in taking judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of any offences committed by a prisoner of war against such laws, regulations and orders. However, no proceedings or punishments contrary to the provisions of this Chapter shall be allowed.
(2) If any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Power shall declare acts committed by a prisoner of war to be punishable, whereas the same act would not be punishable if committed by a member of the forces of the Detaining Power, such acts shall entail disciplinary punishment only.
* Paragraph numbers have been added for ease of reference.
Reservations or declarations
None
Contents

A. Introduction
3556  Article 82 opens the chapter on penal and disciplinary sanctions (Articles 82–108), laying down the basic principle that prisoners of war are subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power. As a corollary, it recognizes the authority of the Detaining Power to take judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of any offence committed by a prisoner of war against such laws, regulations or orders.
3557  The inclusion of the ‘principle of assimilation’[1] in Article 82 reveals that the drafters of the Third Convention did not intend to establish ‘a code of penal laws or criminal proceedings’ applicable to prisoners of war,[2] preferring instead to set the outer limits of acceptable treatment of prisoners of war by establishing minimum standards that the Detaining Powers had to adhere to. For the specifics of penal and disciplinary procedure, reference was to be made to national regulations applicable to members of the Detaining Power’s armed forces through the principle of assimilation. In practice, this means that prisoners of war will benefit indirectly from the relevant domestic legal framework as informed by applicable international law.[3]
3558  The principle of assimilation therefore serves to identify the starting point when determining the standards of treatment that prisoners of war are to be accorded. It is not meant to be rigid in application but is subject to the minimum requirements of international humanitarian law. If a Detaining Power’s legislation falls short of these minimum requirements, the latter prevail. This approach to regulating the treatment of prisoners of war by reference to the rules of both national and international law is also reflected in the provisions of Section VI, Chapter III. Several of these provisions expressly make the principle of assimilation subject to compliance with humanitarian law standards that must be applied to all prisoners of war, irrespective of the national standards applicable to members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power.
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B. Historical background
3559  The Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 enunciated the principle that prisoners of war are subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the army of the Detaining Power, and moreover stipulated that ‘any act of insubordination’ justified the taking of ‘such measures of severity as may be considered necessary’.[4] On the premise that prisoners of war are military personnel,[5] the drafters of the Hague Regulations considered it logical that they should be subject to the same criminal and disciplinary regimes as those applicable to members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power.[6]
3560  The experience of the First World War showed that abuses could result from strict assimilation of prisoners of war with members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power.[7] Military codes are typically designed to enforce discipline, loyalty and unity among the armed forces and tend to impose severe punishments for conduct that undermines these values. Since prisoners of war owe no allegiance to the Detaining Power, it might not always be reasonable to hold them to the same standards of conduct as members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power.[8] The 10th International Conference of the Red Cross, which met in Geneva in 1921, thus recommended the inclusion of an international code of disciplinary and penal sanctions applicable to prisoners of war in the new prisoner of war convention.[9]
3561  However, the legal difficulties associated with establishing such a code were considered too great, and there was little chance that States would accept such a solution.[10] Instead, the drafters of the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War maintained the idea of assimilation expressed in the Hague Regulations. To address the concerns that strict assimilation had generated, Article 45 of the 1929 Convention made the principle of assimilation subject to compliance with the provisions of the chapter on penal sanctions. Thus, acts of insubordination rendered prisoners ‘liable to the measures prescribed by such laws, regulations and orders, except as otherwise provided in this Chapter’ (emphasis added).
3562  The idea of establishing a special penal and disciplinary code for prisoners of war was again raised and rejected at the Conference of Government Experts in 1947.[11] At the Diplomatic Conference in 1949, States agreed to maintain the nuanced principle of assimilation set out in Article 45 of the 1929 Convention. By focusing on amplifying and clarifying the specifics of the provisions in the chapter on penal and disciplinary sanctions that place limits on the principle of assimilation, the drafters of the Third Convention enhanced the protection of prisoners of war in judicial and disciplinary matters.[12]
3563  Moreover, during the Second World War some Detaining Powers had imposed severe penalties for offences that could only be committed by prisoners of war.[13] In light of this experience, a new paragraph was added to Article 82, which provides that any offence that can only be committed by a prisoner of war may be addressed through disciplinary action only.[14]
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C. Paragraph 1: The principle of assimilation
1. First sentence: The applicable legislation and the authority to take judicial and disciplinary measures
a. The applicable legislation
3564  Article 82 recognizes that prisoners of war will be subject to a legal and disciplinary system during their captivity. It would be unreasonable to require a Detaining Power to apply the laws and regulations of the country of origin of the prisoners, since this would amount to an undue interference in its sovereignty and since its authorities cannot be expected to be familiar with foreign legislation, particularly considering that a single Detaining Power might hold prisoners of different nationalities. Applying the domestic laws and regulations of each prisoner could result in differential treatment according to nationality.[15] This goes against the fundamental principle that prisoners of war be treated equally,[16] which implies the need for a uniform disciplinary and penal system for all prisoners of war held by the same Detaining Power.[17] Given that the drafters did not opt to create a special penal and disciplinary code for prisoners of war,[18] the solution adopted in Article 82(1) was to maintain the approach of the 1929 Convention based on the principle of assimilation. The first sentence of paragraph 1 thus provides that prisoners of war will be subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power.[19] Prisoners of war must be made familiar with the regulations, orders, notices and publications relating to their conduct in a language they understand, as provided for in Article 41(2).
3565  The principle of assimilation seeks to avoid prisoners of war being placed in a less favourable position than members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power.[20] At a minimum, the Detaining Power is obliged to apply the same legal safeguards to prisoners of war as are afforded to members of its own forces. This principle permeates the Third Convention as a whole, and the present chapter in particular. It can, for example, be found in the provisions on disciplinary punishment;[21] confinement while awaiting hearing or trial;[22] courts and procedure;[23] the determination of penalties;[24] appeals;[25] and the execution of penalties.[26]
3566  Read alongside Article 82(1), the foregoing provisions make clear that prisoners of war are subject not only to the substantive provisions prescribing or proscribing certain conduct in the armed forces of the Detaining Power, but also to the procedural rules regulating their enforcement. For example, prisoners of war may only be tried by a court that is competent to try members of the detaining State’s armed forces and in accordance with the same procedures,[27] and the Detaining Power may only impose those penalties that are provided for in respect of the same offence when committed by members of its own forces.[28]
3567  The logic of assimilating prisoners of war with members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power is based on the assumption that prisoners of war are military personnel.[29] However, Article 82 makes no distinction between prisoners of war who are military personnel and other categories of persons entitled to prisoner-of-war status, as recognized by Article 4A(4)–(5).[30] The operation of the principle of assimilation with respect to these categories gives rise to certain challenges. For instance, were civilians who qualify as prisoners of war pursuant to Article 4 to be effectively ‘assimilated’ with combatants for the duration of their captivity, they too would become subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the detaining State.[31] However, there may exist constitutional or human rights limitations on the application of military law to civilian persons. Historically, applying the principle of assimilation to civilian persons with prisoner-of-war status was protective, as there were limited rules applicable to civilian persons generally. International law at present contains more specific rules on and guarantees for civilian persons, and it is appropriate to question whether there is a continued justification to apply the principle of assimilation to civilian prisoners of war. This matter is unresolved at present, as there is not sufficient State practice in this area.
3568  For prisoners of war to be subject to the same legislation as members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, States may need to enact implementing legislation or other governance measures. This could, for example, take the form of a provision stating that the laws, regulations and orders in force in the State’s own forces also apply to prisoners of war.[32] Alternatively, States could create an analogous code, applicable only to prisoners of war.[33] In the latter case, particular caution must be exercised to ensure that prisoners of war are not placed in a less favourable position than members of the State’s own forces, including as a result of a subsequent revision of the legislation applicable to members of the armed forces.[34] The development of such legislation should already be considered in peacetime.
3569  Prisoners of war are only subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power on the basis of Article 82(1) as long as they remain prisoners of that Power. In the case of a transfer to another belligerent or neutral Power in accordance with Article 12(2), the prisoners in question cease to be subject to the legislation of the transferring State and immediately upon transfer become subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the receiving State.[35]
3570  Being subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power does not entail that prisoners of war owe that Power any duty of allegiance.[36] Captivity does not sever the bond of allegiance between prisoners of war and the State on which they depend as members of its armed forces.[37] Nor does Article 82(1) suspend application of the domestic law of the country of origin of the prisoners of war who may, upon repatriation, be prosecuted for offences committed against that law while in captivity.[38]
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b. The authority to take judicial and disciplinary measures
3571  The second part of the first sentence complements the first by recognizing the authority of the Detaining Power to enforce its laws, regulations and orders against prisoners of war by judicial or disciplinary means. This authority is also reflected in Article 12(1), which sets out the responsibility of the Detaining Power for the treatment of prisoners of war for as long as they remain in its custody. To fulfil that responsibility, the Detaining Power must have the legal power to maintain law and order among the prisoners.[39]
3572  The Detaining Power is authorized to take judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of any violation of the applicable laws, regulations or orders that amounts to a punishable offence under those instruments. Under the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, ‘any act of insubordination’ justified the taking of measures by the Detaining Power. The 1947 Conference of Government Experts considered that the term ‘insubordination’ could give the wrong impression that prisoners of war owe a duty of allegiance to the Detaining Power.[40] The word was therefore replaced in Article 82(1) with the term ‘offences’ committed by a prisoner against the legislation of the detaining State.
3573  The Convention does not define the terms ‘measures’, ‘disciplinary’ or ‘judicial’. With respect to the meaning of the term ‘measures’, the second sentence of Article 82(1) is a qualification of the first sentence and prohibits ‘proceedings or punishments’ that are contrary to the present chapter. It can thus be inferred that ‘measures’, as the term is used in Article 82, encompasses both the proceedings and any sanctions imposed if an alleged offence is proven. As concerns the distinction between ‘disciplinary’ and ‘judicial’ measures, it is commonly understood that disciplinary measures cover minor offences that can be imposed by a camp commander without a trial, whereas judicial measures are taken in response to more serious, criminal offences after trial proceedings.[41] However, the terminology used within national military systems does not always correspond to that used in the Convention.[42]
3574  With respect to the scope of the Detaining Power’s authority to take judicial or disciplinary measures under Article 82, reference should also be made to Article 85. In addition to having authority to take judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of offences committed during captivity, it is clear from Article 85 that a Detaining Power may prosecute prisoners of war for offences committed prior to capture.
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2. Second sentence: The principle of assimilation subject to the provisions of the present Chapter
3575  As mentioned above, the experience of the two world wars demonstrated that a strict application of the principle of assimilation can have severe consequences for prisoners of war.[43] The judicial and disciplinary systems of Detaining Powers can vary considerably, and treating prisoners of war on a par with members of a detaining State’s own forces does not necessarily guarantee their humane treatment. Moreover, military laws typically aim at ensuring the loyalty, strength and unity of the armed forces.[44] By contrast, the prisoner-of-war regime recognizes the temporary exercise of jurisdiction by a Detaining Power over prisoners of war to maintain law and order among the prisoners until they are released and repatriated.[45] It might therefore not always be reasonable to hold prisoners of war to the same standards of conduct as members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. An attempt to escape, for instance, cannot be considered to amount to desertion, in the same way that unrest in a prisoner-of-war camp cannot be likened to mutiny.[46]
3576  The second sentence of paragraph 1 circumscribes the authority of the Detaining Power to enforce its legislation against prisoners of war by stipulating that ‘no proceedings or punishments contrary to the provisions of this Chapter shall be allowed’. Thus, in addition to the general obligation to treat prisoners of war humanely at all times,[47] Detaining Powers must comply with the minimum standards of treatment set out in the chapter on penal and disciplinary sanctions. These standards are independent of those applicable to members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power and include:[48]
– the obligation on the Detaining Power to adopt, wherever possible, disciplinary rather than judicial measures;[49]
– the prohibition on trying a prisoner of war in a court that does not offer the fundamental guarantees of independence and impartiality;[50]
– the prohibition on punishing a prisoner more than once for the same act or on the same charge;[51]
– the prohibition of collective punishments, corporal punishments, imprisonment in premises without daylight, and any form of torture or cruelty;[52]
– restrictions in relation to the nature and duration of disciplinary punishments;[53]
– the prohibition of imposing judicial sanctions for escape attempts, offences committed in relation thereto and not involving violence to life or limb, and the aiding and abetting of an escape or attempted escape;[54]
– the obligation to provide an accused prisoner with the rights and means of defence;[55]
– the prohibition on using moral or physical coercion to induce a confession;[56]
– restrictions in relation to the imposition of the death penalty;[57]
– the stipulation that the conditions under which prisoners of war serve sentences in all cases conform to, among other things, the requirements of health and humanity;[58]
– the general provisions requiring humane treatment in all circumstances.[59]
3577  Pursuant to Article 82(1), the national legislation applicable to members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power constitutes one, but not necessarily the governing, benchmark for determining the judicial and disciplinary treatment owed to prisoners of war. For example, if the domestic law of the Detaining Power permits a more severe disciplinary punishment than is permitted under the present chapter, the provisions of the present chapter must prevail. If, however, the maximum punishment permitted under the domestic law of the detaining State is less severe than that permitted under the Convention, it is the limitation contained in the domestic law of the Detaining Power that must be applied.[60] This follows from the fact that the absolute provisions of the present chapter only come into play if the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power fall below the minimum standards set by these provisions, not if they go beyond them and provide for greater protection. The sentence therefore indicates an upward exemption to the principle of assimilation in that it guarantees certain rights to convicted prisoners of war at all times, whether or not these are granted to members of the Detaining Power’s armed forces under domestic law.
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D. Paragraph 2: Special legislation
3578  Article 82(2) provides that, although prisoners of war are subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power, the reverse is not necessarily true: members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power are not subject to every rule, regulation or order applicable to prisoners of war. While a Detaining Power may enact special provisions for prisoners of war to ensure order in prisoner-of-war camps or other places where they may be held, it may only exercise disciplinary powers to enforce them.
3579  This paragraph was new in 1949 and was deemed a necessary safeguard in view of the experience of the Second World War, when certain Detaining Powers enacted special legislation for prisoners of war and imposed heavy penalties in case of transgressions.[61] The provision was also informed by the observation that offences justifying heavy penalties, such as murder or rape, are generally already included in the domestic laws of the Detaining Power.[62] Any offence that can only be committed by a prisoner of war is therefore unlikely to warrant the imposition of penal sanctions.
3580  The 1947 Conference of Government Experts considered that special legislation or orders solely for prisoners of war should be permitted ‘only to meet exceptional and unforeseen situations, arising from [their] internment’.[63] Establishing rules to maintain order and discipline in a prisoner-of-war camp can be said to form part of the Detaining Power’s responsibility for the treatment of prisoners of war in accordance with Article 12(1). However, the present paragraph restricts the authority of the Detaining Power to enforce such special laws, regulations or orders, by providing that their violation must entail disciplinary punishment only.
3581  Article 82(2) therefore goes further than the general leniency clause set out in Article 83, as it excludes the option of imposing penal sanctions for offences that can only be committed by prisoners of war.[64] The only other instance where judicial measures are expressly excluded under the Convention is in its provisions pertaining to escape in Articles 92(1) and 93(2)–(3). These provisions preclude the Detaining Power from classifying attempted escape, certain offences committed in relation to an escape, and the aiding and abetting of an escape or attempted escape as a separate type of offence attracting penal sanction.[65] Since rules relating to escape are likely to be special rules applicable only to prisoners of war, these provisions can be seen as specific applications of the general rule set out in Article 82(2).
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Select bibliography
Esgain, Albert J. and Solf, Waldemar A., ‘The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War: Its Principles, Innovations, and Deficiencies’, North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1963, pp. 537–596.
Hingorani, Rup C., Prisoners of War, 2nd edition, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, 1982.
Krähenmann, Sandra, ‘Protection of Prisoners in Armed Conflict’, in Dieter Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 359–411.
Levie, Howard S., Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict, International Law Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Vol. 59, 1978.
Maia, Catherine, Kolb, Robert and Scalia, Damien, La Protection des Prisonniers de Guerre en Droit International Humanitaire, Bruylant, Brussels, 2015, pp. 371–417.
Rosas, Allan, The Legal Status of Prisoners of War: A Study in International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, Turku/Åbo, 1976, reprinted 2005.
Rowe, Peter, ‘The trial of prisoners of war by military courts in modern armed conflicts’, in Caroline Harvey, James Summers and Nigel D. White (eds), Contemporary Challenges to the Laws of War: Essays in Honour of Professor Peter Rowe, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 313–336.
– ‘Penal or Disciplinary Proceedings Brought against a Prisoner of War’, in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta and Marco Sassòli (eds), The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 1025–1038.

1 - For a general discussion of the principle of assimilation, see Introduction, section A.3.c.
2 - Preliminary Documents submitted by the ICRC to the Conference of Government Experts of 1947, p. 161.
3 - See Introduction, para. 34.
4 - Hague Regulations (1899), Article 8; Hague Regulations (1907), Article 8.
5 - See Rosas, p. 454.
6 - Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention, ICRC, 1960, p. 406.
7 - Ibid.
8 - Ibid. p. 407. See also paras 3570, 3572 and 3575 of this commentary, as well as the commentaries on Article 83, para. 3589, and on Article 87, para. 3675.
9 - See ‘Projet de Code des prisonniers de guerre, déportés, évacués et réfugiés’, Revue internationale de la Croix-Rouge, Vol. 5, No. 56, August 1923, pp. 771–814, at 776.
10 - Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention, ICRC, 1960, pp. 407–408.
11 - Report of the Conference of Government Experts of 1947, p. 203.
12 - Ibid. and Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. II-A, p. 570.
13 - Report of the Conference of Government Experts of 1947, p. 204.
14 - Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. II-A, pp. 303–304, 499 and 570.
15 - Ibid. p. 407.
16 - See Article 16.
17 - See Rowe, 2015, p. 1026.
18 - See paras 3560–3562 of this commentary.
19 - In certain cases, such as during multinational operations where several States may exercise joint command over a patrol or a prisoner-of-war camp, it may not be immediately apparent which State is the actual Detaining Power, and thus which laws are applicable. Determining the identity of the Detaining Power in such situations is discussed in the commentary on Article 12, section C.2.b.
20 - See Rosas, p. 454.
21 - Article 89.
22 - Articles 95(1) and 103(1).
23 - Articles 84 and 102.
24 - Articles 87(1) and 88(2) and (3).
25 - Article 106.
26 - Articles 88(1), 88(2), 88(3) and 108(1).
27 - Article 102.
28 - Articles 87(1), 88(2) and 88(3).
29 - See para. 3559 of this commentary.
30 - See the commentary on Article 4, section H.1.
31 - See Rowe, 2015, pp. 1026 and 1028–1029 (for the issue of trial by military courts).
32 - See e.g. Belarus, Instruction on the Application of International Humanitarian Law, 2009, para. 52; Denmark, Military Manual, 2016, p. 652; Ireland, Prisoners of War and Enemy Aliens Act, 1956, as amended, section 4; Netherlands, Military Manual, 2005, para. 0744; United Kingdom, Joint Doctrine Captured Persons, 2015, p. 10-24, para. 1040(a); and United States, Army Regulation on Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1997, para. 3-7(a), and Uniform Code of Military Justice, 1950, as amended, Article 2(a)(9).
33 - See e.g. United Kingdom, Prisoners of War Discipline Regulations, 1958; and Joint Doctrine Captured Persons, 2015, pp. 10-11–10-12, para. 1019. See also Rowe, 2015, p. 1027.
34 - See Rowe, 2014, pp. 326–327.
35 - On the requirements for a transfer to a co-belligerent (or neutral) State to be lawful, see the commentary on Article 12, section D. See also Levie, pp. 318–319, and Krähenmann, p. 402.
36 - See e.g. Report of the Conference of Government Experts of 1947, pp. 203–204; Rosas, p. 454; Hingorani, p. 91; Rowe, 2015, p. 1028; and United Kingdom, Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, 2004, p. 187, para. 8.116.1. See also Articles 83, 87(2) and 100(3).
37 - Report of the Conference of Government Experts of 1947, pp. 203–204. See also Rosas, p. 430, and similarly United States, Law of War Manual, 2016, p. 617, para. 9.26.1.
38 - The 1947 Conference of Government Experts was ‘anxious to specify … that as a member of the armed forces of his own country, a [prisoner of war] remains subject to its military law. He may therefore be answerable for his actions before the courts of his country, after repatriation, in which case he cannot … plead in defence that, in accordance with Art. 45 [present Article 82], national legislation is not applicable’; Report of the Conference of Government Experts of 1947, p. 205. This point is also underscored in the military manuals of some States. For example, United States, Law of War Manual, 2016, p. 600, para. 9.22.2, provides that ‘while they are POWs, they may not conduct disciplinary proceedings against one another; however, they are liable to punishment for violations committed during captivity, once they have been released and repatriated’; see also ibid. p. 617, 9.26.1. See also United Kingdom, Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, 2004, pp. 169–170, para. 8.69, and pp. 186–187, para. 8.115.
39 - See Levie, p. 318, and Rosas, p. 433. The doctrine of one State specifically observes that ensuring discipline within a holding facility is necessary not only to guard against escapes, ‘but also to enable the establishment of a detention environment as required by the Geneva Conventions and other laws’, United Kingdom, Joint Doctrine Captured Persons, 2015, p. 10-11, para. 1017.
40 - See Report of the Conference of Government Experts of 1947, pp. 204–205.
41 - See Levie, p. 317, fn. 11, and p. 324.
42 - For example, the United States, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 1950, as amended, Articles 15–21, differentiates between ‘non-judicial punishment’ and courts-martial. The military manuals of certain other States refer to ‘disciplinary’ and ‘criminal’ punishment or procedures; see e.g. Israel, Manual on the Rules of Warfare, 2006, p. 34, and Netherlands, Military Manual, 2005, para. 0744. Still other States distinguish between ‘summary’ and ‘court-martial’ proceedings; see e.g. Canada, Prisoner of War Handling Manual, 2004, p. 3F-1, para. 3F01(6), and New Zealand, Military Manual, 2019, Vol. 4, para. 12. See also the commentary on Article 84, para. 3603.
43 - Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention, ICRC, 1960, pp. 406–407.
44 - See ibid. p. 497, and Esgain/Solf, p. 572.
45 - See Rosas, p. 430.
46 - See also the commentary on Article 87, para. 3675.
47 - Article 13(1).
48 - The list presented is illustrative and non-exhaustive. Furthermore, certain standards listed are proper to disciplinary proceedings, others to judicial proceedings, while a number apply to both.
49 - Article 83.
50 - Article 84(2).
51 - Article 86.
52 - Article 87(3).
53 - Articles 89 and 90.
54 - Articles 92(1) and 93(2)–(3).
55 - Articles 96(4), 99(3) and 105.
56 - Article 99(2).
57 - Articles 100 and 101.
58 - Article 108(1).
59 - Article 13.
60 - See Levie, p. 329–330.
61 - Report of the Conference of Government Experts of 1947, p. 204, and Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention, ICRC, 1960, pp. 409–410.
62 - Report of the Conference of Government Experts of 1947, p. 204, and Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention, ICRC, 1960, p. 410.
63 - Report of the Conference of Government Experts of 1947, p. 202.
64 - Article 83 provides that, ‘[i]n deciding whether proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by a prisoner of war shall be judicial or disciplinary, the Detaining Power shall ensure that the competent authorities exercise the greatest leniency and adopt, wherever possible, disciplinary rather than judicial measures’.
65 - See Articles 92 and 93.